



DOCUMENTS ON  
BRITISH  
FOREIGN POLICY  
1919—1939

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*FIRST SERIES*

*Volume II*

1919

LONDON

HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1948

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LONDON

PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

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1948

Price £1. 12s. 6d. net

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE  
BY THE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
COMMISSION ON POLISH AFFAIRS	Oct. 27	App. F. Note submitting a draft letter to the German Delegation relative to proposed municipal elections in Upper Silesia.	115
9 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 79	Oct. 30	1. Arrangements for the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	116
		2. The sinking of the German fleet at Scapa Flow.	119
		3. Question of the dispatch of naval vessels to Flensburg.	122
		4. Questions of the Dobrudja and of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier.	122
		5. Modification of the draft instructions to the Interallied Commission for the Baltic Provinces.	123
DRAFTING COMMITTEE		App. A. Draft note to the German Government relative to the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	124
BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND JAPANESE NAVAL ADVISERS	Oct. 29	App. B. Conclusions relative to reparation for the sinking of the German warships at Scapa Flow.	126
U.S. NAVAL ADVISER	Oct. 30	App. C. Minority report on the above question.	127
ALLIED NAVAL REPRESENTATIVES		App. D. Report on the question of the dispatch of naval vessels to Flensburg.	128
10 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10 a.m. H.D. 80	Nov. 1	1. Powers of General Milne in Asia Minor.	129
		2. Adoption of a draft note to the German Government relative to putting the Treaty of Versailles into force.	130
		3. Approval of the draft protocol confirming the obligations imposed upon the German Government by the Armistice.	131
		4. Question of the sale of German aeronautical material.	137
		5. Consideration of the reply to the Bulgarian counter-propositions: questions of the Dobrudja and of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier.	138
BRITISH DELEGATION	Oct. 28	App. A. Note relative to the powers of General Milne in Asia Minor.	142
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Nov. 1	App. B. Revised note to the German Government on the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	143
DRAFTING COMMITTEE		App. C. Draft protocol confirming the obligations imposed upon the German Government by the Armistice.	144
FRENCH DELEGATION		App. D. Draft note to the German Government relative to the sale of aeronautical material.	147

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
CENTRAL TERRITORIAL COMMITTEE		App. E. Report on the Bulgarian demands concerning the Serbo-Bulgarian fron- tier.	148
11 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3-30 p.m. H.D. 81	Nov. 1	[1. Formulation of a paragraph in the protocol relative to unexecuted clauses of the Armistice.] 150 2. Approval of the reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals to the peace condi- tions. 151 3. Request from the Latvian Government for assistance. 154 4. Reparation for the sinking of the German fleet at Scapa Flow. 154 5. Question of the draft reply to the German note of October 12 relative to the sale of aeronautical material. 156	
CENTRAL TERRITORIAL COMMITTEE	Nov. 3	App. A. Draft reply to the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation on the conditions of peace. 156	
CENTRAL TERRITORIAL COMMITTEE		App. B. Draft reply to the Bulgarian request for modification of the fron- tiers assigned to Bulgaria. 169	
MARSHAL FOCH Paris No. 5226	Oct. 31	App. C. Memorandum concerning a re- quest from the Latvian Government for assistance. 170	
ALLIED NAVAL ADVISERS	Nov. 1	App. D. Report of a meeting concerning the compensation to be demanded of the German Government for the sinking at Scapa Flow. 172	
12 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10 a.m. H.D. 82	Nov. 3	1. Decision not to send troops to Memel before the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles. 173 2. Suppression of the Interallied Trans- port Commission. 174 3. Consideration of Roumanian and Hungarian questions. 174 4. Approval of the draft Greek Minori- ties Treaty. 178 5. Question of the signing of the treaty of peace with Bulgaria. 179 6. Consideration of a draft reply to a note from the Netherlands Govern- ment regarding German ships sold to Dutch navigation companies. 179 [7. Consideration of a proposal of the Allied Railway Commission in Poland to open for commercial traffic three railways crossing the German-Polish frontier north of Warsaw.] 180 8. Consideration of a request from the European Danube Commission for the establishment of the new regime of the Danube. 180 [9. Consideration of a request from the European Danube Commission for the attribution to it of two tugs.] 181	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
12 <i>Continued</i>	Nov. 3	10. Consideration of a German note regarding the shipment of potatoes purchased by Germany in Denmark.	181
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL Versailles S.W.C. 477	Oct. 30	App. A. Report on the suggested occupation of Memel.	181
MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL Versailles S.W.C. 476	Oct. 30	App. B. Suppression of the Interallied Transport Committee.	182
FRENCH DELEGATION		App. C. Note concerning the ministerial situation in Hungary.	183
M. PICHON Paris		App. D. Telegram to Bucharest requesting the Allied Ministers there to obtain a reply from the Roumanian Government to an Allied note concerning questions outstanding.	184
M. NEPVEU Paris	Oct. 28	App. G. Note to M. Pichon regarding German ships acquired by Dutch navigation companies during the war.	185
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Oct. 31	App. H. Note concerning the reply to M. Nepveu's note above.	186
EUROPEAN DANUBE COMMISSION		App. J. Request for representation at the conference to establish the new regime of the Danube.	186
GERMAN DELEGATION	Oct. 27	App. L. Note concerning the shipment of potatoes from Denmark to Germany.	186
13 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 83	Nov. 4	[1. Curtailment of service on German railways.]	187
		2. Question of troops of occupation in Hungary; attitude of Admiral Horthy.	187
		3. Arrangements preparatory to putting into force the Treaty of Versailles.	192
		[4. Transport in the Baltic of wood destined for Belgium.]	194
		5. Railway system of the Baltic Provinces.	194
		6. Approval of a note to the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires relative to the German ships sold to Dutch navigation companies during the war.	195
		7. Representation of the European Danube Commission at the conference to establish the new regime of the Danube.	195
		8. Question of a protocol to be signed by Bulgaria.	195
		9. Notification of the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by Japan.	196

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
SIR G. CLERK Budapest No. 3	Nov. 1	App. B. Telegram to Sir E. Crowe regarding the situation in Hungary.	197
	Nov. 4	App. E. Proposed letter to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Netherlands relative to German ships sold to Dutch navigation companies during the war.	198
14 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 84	Nov. 5	1. Approval of a telegram to Sir G. Clerk concerning questions connected with the evacuation of Roumanian troops from Hungary.	199
		2. Arrangements for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.	200
		3. Refusal of the request of the Provisional Government of Memel for authorization to send representatives to Paris.	201
		4. Drafting of instructions to the Allied Commission to examine into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	201
		[5. Questions still to be taken up by the Supreme Council.]	203
		6. Question of certain German tankers.	203
	Nov. 5	App. A. Draft telegram from the Supreme Council to Sir G. Clerk concerning questions connected with the evacuation of Roumanian troops from Hungary.	203
SUPREME COUNCIL	Nov. 5	App. B. Approved text of the above telegram to Sir G. Clerk.	204
BRITISH DELEGATION	Nov. 4	App. C. Note concerning a request from the Provisional Government of Memel for permission to send representatives to Paris.	205
15 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 85	Nov. 6	1. Situation in Hungary.	206
		2. Publication of the Allied note and annexed protocol recently addressed to the German Government.	209
		3. Salaries of the personnel of Control Commissions in Germany.	209
		4. Question of publication of the correspondence with the Austrian Delegation.	209
		5. Questions relative to the demobilization of General Haller's Army.	210
		6. Interpretation of the financial measures of coercion taken against Germany on account of the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	210
		[7. Question of the liquidation of the property of inhabitants of Schleswig.]	211
		8. Military missions at Riga.	211
		9. Arrival of Italian representatives on the Plebiscite and Delimitation Commissions.	211
		[10. Roumanian and Yugoslav representation on the commission at Vienna for the distribution of rolling-stock.]	212
		11. Luxemburg affairs.	212

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
SIR G. CLERK Budapest No. 3	Nov. 4	App. A. Telegram to Supreme Council concerning the evacuation of Roumanian troops from Hungary and the attitude of M. Friedrich.	213
SIR G. CLERK Budapest No. 4	Nov. 5	App. B. Telegram to Supreme Council concerning the situation in Hungary and opposing the suggested employment of Czechoslovak and Yugoslav forces.	213
INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION Budapest No. 775	Nov. 5	App. C. Telegram to Supreme Council protesting against the suggested occupation of Hungary by Czechoslovak and Yugoslav forces.	214
INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION Budapest	Nov. 3	App. D. Telegram to Supreme Council concerning Czechoslovak conditions for the evacuation of Salgó Tarján.	214
	Nov. 6	App. E. Telegram from the Supreme Council to Sir G. Clerk concerning questions relating to the Roumanian evacuation of Hungary.	215
MARSHAL FOCH Paris No. 5249	Nov. 3	App. H. Letter to M. Clemenceau concerning salaries of personnel of the Control Commissions for Germany.	216
SIR E. CROWE Paris	Nov. 3	App. I. Note to M. Dutasta concerning the publication of correspondence exchanged with the Austrian Delegation.	216
16 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 86	Nov. 7	1. Constitution of a Commission to compare the lists of Germans charged with war-crimes.	217
		2. Ruling on certain aerial clauses in the Treaty of Versailles.	218
		3. British declaration on the question of Eastern Galicia.	218
		4. Consideration of a German note on the organization of the plebiscite in Eupen and Malmédy.	219
		[5. Removal by German authorities of material belonging to the German Government at Danzig.]	220
		6. Reply of President Wilson to communications regarding the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.	220
		7. Arrangements for discussions by experts concerning the execution of the Treaty of Versailles.	221
		8. Notification that M. Venizelos would request to be heard during the discussion of the report of the Commission of Enquiry for Smyrna.	222
		9. Question of the temporary regime of Western Thrace.	222
BARON VON LERSNER Versailles No. 28	Oct. 3	App. B. Note to M. Clemenceau relative to the plebiscite at Eupen and Malmédy.	222

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
	BELGIAN DELEGATION	Oct. 14	App. C. Note to M. Dutasta relative to Eupen and Malmédy.	226
17	MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 87	Nov. 8	1. Salaries of the personnel of Control Commissions in Germany.	229
			2. Consideration of the report of the Commission of Enquiry for Smyrna: hearing of M. Venizelos.	229
	ALLIED COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY FOR SMYRNA Constantinople	Oct. 14	App. A. Report, with related documents, on incidents in connexion with the Greek occupation of Smyrna.	237
18	MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 88	Nov. 10	1. Italian suggestion relative to the prolongation or postponement of the work of the Supreme Council.	259
			2. German municipal elections in Upper Silesia.	261
			[3. Granting of a Swiss request relative to the insertion in treaties still to be signed of clauses relative to Swiss neutrality.]	262
			4. Situation in Smyrna; discussion of the Report of the Allied Commission of Enquiry.	262
			5. Refusal to sanction the export to Russia of German munitions and war material.	268
			6. Procedure for the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.	269
			7. Adoption of a reply to the German note relative to the plebiscites at Eupen and Malmédy.	270
	BARON VON LERSNER Paris No. 48	Nov. 7	App. A. Note to M. Clemenceau relative to municipal elections in Upper Silesia.	271
	BRITISH DELEGATION	Nov. 7	App. C. Note to the Supreme Council regarding the export of German arms to Russia; activities in Berlin of the Anti-Bolshevik League.	272
	DRAFTING COMMITTEE		App. D. Note relative to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, enclosing a draft note for dispatch by President Wilson.	273
	COMMISSION ON BELGIAN AFFAIRS		App. E. Proposed reply to a German letter on the question of Eupen and Malmédy.	274
19	MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 89	Nov. 11	1. Question of replying to M. Venizelos with regard to incidents at Smyrna.	275
			2. Transport for the German and Austrian Delegations to the Labour Conference at Washington.	275
			3. Observations of the Yugoslav Delegation regarding the Minorities Treaty.	276
			[4. Question of the allotment of merchant tonnage to Italy and Yugoslavia.]	278

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
19 <i>Continued</i>	Nov. 11	5. Removal of German material from Danzig.	278
		6. Constitution of the commission charged with preparing the organization of mixed tribunals set up under article 229 of the peace treaty with Germany.	279
		7. Status of Eastern Galicia.	279
		8. Questions still to be decided by the Supreme Council.	281
		[9. Allowances to members of Boundary Commissions.]	282
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Nov. 7	App. D. Note concerning naval material at Danzig.	282
COMMISSION ON POLISH AFFAIRS	Nov. 10	App. F. Note on the question of Eastern Galicia.	283
FRENCH DELEGATION		App. H. List of questions for regulation by the Supreme Council.	285
20 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 90	Nov. 12	1. Adoption of a note to M. Venizelos relative to incidents at Smyrna.	287
		2. Consideration of a reply from the Roumanian Government to the Allied note regarding questions outstanding.	289
		3. Situation in Hungary.	293
		[4. Expenses of transport of Allied troops of occupation and of maintenance of them and of Plebiscite Commissions.]	293
		5. Arrangements for the signature of the Bulgarian treaty.	294
		6. Evacuation of Czechoslovak troops from Salgó Tarján.	294
		7. Interruption of railway traffic in Germany.	294
		8. Distribution of Austrian commercial tonnage between the Italian and Yugoslav Governments.	294
		App. A. Note from the Supreme Council to M. Venizelos relative to the report of the Smyrna Commission of Enquiry.	295
ALLIED HIGH COMMISSIONERS Constantinople	Nov. 3	App. B. Telegram complaining of the activities of the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna.	296
M. VENIZELOS Paris	Nov. 4	App. C. Note to M. Clemenceau concerning press censorship at Smyrna.	296
GEN. VAITOIANU Bucharest	Nov. 2	App. D. Verbal note to the Supreme Council regarding Hungarian affairs.	298
SIR G. CLERK Budapest No. 6	Nov. 9	App. E. Telegram to the Supreme Council reporting on the situation in Hungary.	300
INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION Budapest No. 831	Nov. 10	App. F. Telegram to the Supreme Council giving particulars of a plan submitted by the Roumanian Command for the evacuation of Hungary as far as the river Theiss.	301

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
21 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 91	Nov. 13	1. Approval of a telegram to Sir G. Clerk with regard to Hungarian affairs.	302
		2. Question of instructions to the Aeronautical Commission of Control for Germany.	302
		3. Municipal elections in Upper Silesia.	303
		[4. Allowances to generals on military missions of control who are not chairmen of commissions or sub-commissions.]	304
		5. Reply to the Roumanian Government with regard to Hungarian affairs.	304
		6. Question of the recognition of the Grand-Ducal Government of Luxemburg.	306
		7. Question of certain German tankers.	307
	Nov. 12	App. A. Telegram from the Supreme Council to Sir G. Clerk with regard to Hungarian affairs.	308
	Nov. 3	App. B. Note to the General Secretariat concerning a reply to the German note of Oct. 12 relative to aeronautical material.	309
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Nov. 11	App. C. Note concerning German aeronautical material.	309
		App. D. Proposed letter to the German Delegation relative to municipal elections in Upper Silesia.	310
	Nov. 13	App. F. Draft note to the Roumanian Government requesting unconditional compliance with Allied demands for a Roumanian evacuation of Hungary, Roumanian signature of the Treaty of St. Germain, and the Minorities Treaty, &c.	311
22 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 92	Nov. 14	1. Report by M. Clemenceau on a conversation with General Coanda and M. Antonescu concerning the draft note to the Roumanian Government.	313
		2. The question of the use of certain German tankers.	314
		3. Adoption of a joint report from the Polish and Czechoslovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in Teschen.	320
		4. Situation in Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan: statement by Colonel Haskell.	321
		5. British proposition regarding measures to be taken to remedy the dearth of rolling-stock in Austria.	322
		6. Adoption of a proposal of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal.	323

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
COMMITTEE ON ORGANIZATION OF THE REPARATION COMMITTEE		App. C. Draft decision relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal.	324
23 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 93	Nov. 15	1. Status of Eastern Galicia. 325 2. Adoption of a note to Roumanian Government. 325 3. The question of the extension to Georgia and Azerbaijan of Colonel Haskell's mission to Armenia. 328 4. The question of the agenda of the conference. 329 5. The question of provisioning Vienna. 329 6. Consideration of a telegram from Sir G. Clerk on the Hungarian situation; attitude of Admiral Troubridge. 330 7. Use of certain German tankers. 330 8. The question of the distribution of enemy warships. 330 9. The question of the distribution of Austro-Hungarian tonnage. 330	
SIR G. CLERK Budapest No. 7	Nov. 13	App. B. Telegram to the Supreme Council reporting on political negotiations in Hungary.	331
24 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 94	Nov. 17	1. Question of the disposition of enemy warships. 332 2. Management of certain German tankers. 333 3. The situation in Hungary. 338 4. The nature of the occupation of Smyrna by Greek forces. 338 5. Detention in the United States of ex-German passenger vessels allocated to Great Britain for management. 338 6. Adoption of a report of the Special Committee on the resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany. 339 7. Adoption of instructions to General Masterman regarding the disposal by Germany of aeronautical material. 341 [8. Question of the signature by Yugoslavia and Roumania of the financial arrangements of St. Germain.] 341 [9. Return of Austrian prisoners from Serbia.] 341	
FRENCH DELEGATION	Nov. 15	App. A. Note relative to the distribution of enemy warships.	341
CAPT. FULLER Paris	Nov. 16	App. B. Historical summary concerning the disposal and distribution of enemy surface warships.	343
BRITISH DELEGATION	Nov. 14	App. C. Proposal regarding the distribution of enemy surface warships.	344
	Nov. 15	App. D. Two telegrams to the British Delegation reporting on steps being taken for the delivery of tank steamers.	345

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
BRITISH DELEGATION	Nov. 14	App. F. Memorandum concerning the detention in the United States of ex-German passenger vessels allocated to Great Britain for management.	346
DRAFTING COMMITTEE		App. H. Draft instructions to General Masterman concerning the disposal of German aeronautical material.	347
25 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 95	Nov. 18	[1. The question of Yugoslav demands relative to the distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage.] 348 2. The question of the signature of the Austrian treaty by the Yugoslav Delegation. 348 3. Approval of the date for the signature of the Bulgarian treaty. 348 4. Consideration of two letters from M. Venizelos relative to the situation in Smyrna. 349 5. The situation in Hungary. 349 6. The question of the distribution of enemy warships. 350 7. Correction of a previous minute relative to the use of certain German tankers. 350 8. The question of German ships transferred during the war to Dutch navigation companies. 351	
M. VENIZELOS Paris	Nov. 15	App. B. Letter to M. Clemenceau relative to the situation in Smyrna.	352
SIR G. CLERK Budapest No. 8	Nov. 16	App. D. Telegram to the Supreme Council reporting upon the situation in Budapest.	353
26 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11 a.m. H.D. 96	Nov. 19	[1. The question of a treaty between Greece and Bulgaria with regard to reciprocal emigration.] 354 [2. The question of the signature of the Minorities Treaty with Roumania.] 354 3. Rejection of an Estonian request for the establishment of a neutral zone between the Baltic States and Russia. 354 4. Request from the Polish Delegation that the arrangement regarding Galicia be communicated to it. 355 [5. Organization of plebiscite zones in Germany.] 355 6. The question of the cost of transportation of troops and supplies in plebiscite areas. 356	
ESTHONIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Reval		App. C. Telegram to the Supreme Council requesting the establishment of a neutral zone between the Baltic States and Russia.	357
27 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10 a.m. H.D. 97	Nov. 20	1. Preparation of a final draft of the Hungarian Treaty. 357 [2. Terms for the distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage.] 358	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
<b>27 Continued</b>	Nov. 20	[3. Question of the provisional distribution of rolling-stock between states forming part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.]	359
		4. Examination of a report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the terms of a proposed \$100,000,000 loan for the provisioning of Austria.	359
		5. Proposed date of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles.	362
		6. Status of Eastern Galicia; hearing of M.M. Patek and Grabski.	363
		7. Adjournment of consideration of a request of the Polish Delegation that negotiations with regard to relations between Poland and Danzig be transferred from Warsaw to Paris.	369
SIR G. CLERK Budapest No. 9	Nov. 17	App. A. Telegram to the Supreme Council reporting on a meeting of the Hungarian Government and Opposition.	369
ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE OF THE REPARATION COMMISSION	Nov. 14	App. E. Report on the terms of a proposed loan of \$100,000,000 for the provisioning of Austria.	369
COMMISSION ON POLISH AFFAIRS	Nov. 20	App. F. Report enclosing amendments to the draft statute for Eastern Galicia.	372
<b>28 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 98</b>	Nov. 21	1. Status of Eastern Galicia.	377
		[2. Greek administration in Smyrna.]	378
		3. Report by M. Berthelot of his and M. Dutasta's interview with the German delegates on the subject of questions connected with the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	379
		4. Labour Conference in Washington.	382
		[5. Confiscation of Greek Orthodox property in Hungary.]	382
		[6. Liquidation of property of Schleswigers residing abroad.]	382
		7. Rejection of a request from the Dutch Government to import war material from Germany.	382
		[8. Approval of the draft treaty regarding Spitzbergen.]	382
AMERICAN COMMISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE	Nov. 21	App. A. Summary of the American position regarding Eastern Galicia.	383
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Nov. 19	App. E. Note relative to the request of the Netherlands to receive war material from Germany.	384
<b>29 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 99</b>	Nov. 24	1. Negotiations with the German Delegation.	385
		[2. Financial arrangements in the plebiscite territories and Danzig and Memel.]	387
		[3. Allowances to personnel of Allied Commissions.]	387

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
<b>29</b> <i>Continued</i>	Nov. 24	4. Fulfilment of Sir G. Clerk's mission.	387
		5. Negotiations between the Polish Government and (a) the city of Danzig, (b) the German Government.	388
		6. Adoption of a note to the German Government concerning the sale of German aeronautical material.	389
		[7. Appointment of a sub-committee of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission charged with the improvement of circulation of rolling-stock in the ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire.]	390
		8. German soldiers demobilized in the Schleswig plebiscite area.	390
BARON VON LERSNER Paris	Nov. 21	App. A. Note to M. Dutasta informing him of the departure of Herr von Simson for Berlin and protesting against the association of the repatriation of prisoners of war with the coming into force of the peace treaty.	390
BARON VON LERSNER Paris No. 447	Nov. 23	App. B. Note to M. Dutasta requesting postponement of a meeting with Allied representatives until the return to Paris of Herr von Simson.	391
M. CLEMENCEAU Paris	Nov. 22	App. C. Note to Baron von Lersner concerning delay in signing the protocol of ratification of the peace treaty.	391
M. CLEMENCEAU Paris	Nov. 24	App. D. Postscript to the above note to Baron von Lersner.	392
MM. PATEK AND GRABSKI Paris	Nov. 17	App. H. Note to M. Clemenceau requesting that negotiations between the Polish Government and the City of Danzig should take place in Paris.	392
MM. PATEK AND GRABSKI Paris	Nov. 19	App. I. Note to M. Clemenceau regarding negotiations concerning questions relating to the execution of the peace treaty.	393
	Nov. 24	App. J. Draft note to the President of the Interallied Aeronautic Control Commission for Germany for transmission to the German Government upon the going into force of the peace treaty.	393
BRITISH DELEGATION	Nov. 22	App. L. Note relative to the demobilization of German forces at Flensburg.	394
<b>30</b> MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 100	Nov. 25	1. German evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	395
		[2. Allowances to personnel of Allied Commissions.]	396
		3. Question of the answer of the Roumanian Government to the Allied note.	396
		4. Consideration of a note from the Yugoslav Delegation regarding the treaty for the protection of minorities.	398

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
30 <i>Continued</i>	Nov. 25	5. Agreement upon a reply to the Bulgarian Delegation regarding reciprocal immigration between Greece and Bulgaria.	398
		6. Adoption of a note to the German Government relative to demobilized German soldiers in the Schleswig plebiscite area.	399
		7. Seat of the negotiations between Poland and the city of Danzig.	400
		8. Disposal of Russian war material left in Roumania after the demobilization of the Russian Army.	402
GENERAL NIESSEL Tilsit		App. A. Telegram to Marshal Foch concerning the German evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	403
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Nov. 25	App. B. Telegram to General Niessel giving him authority to take necessary action to ensure the German evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.	403
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Nov. 24	App. F. Note to the German Government regarding demobilized Germans at Flensburg.	403
GENERAL TCHER- BATCHEFF Paris No. 11571	Nov. 15	App. G. Note to M. Clemenceau regarding Russian war-material in Roumania.	404
31 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 101	Nov. 28	1. Distribution of enemy warships.	406
		2. Negotiations between Poland and the city of Danzig.	409
		[3. Exequaturs of foreign consuls at Danzig prior to the establishment of the free city.]	411
		[4. Communication of article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles to Spain and Sweden.]	411
		5. Request of the Austrian Delegation for the insertion of an article in the Hungarian treaty to guarantee food supplies from Hungary to Austria.	411
		6. Roumanian questions; time-limit for the Roumanian reply to the Allied note; protection of Jews in Roumania.	412
32 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 102	Nov. 29	1. Question of the distribution of enemy surface warships.	415
		2. Question of the distribution of enemy submarines.	420
		3. Modification of the Roumanian Minorities Treaty.	422
		4. Consideration of a letter from the King of Roumania to M. Poincaré with regard to relations between Roumania and the Principal Allied Powers.	424
		5. Question of the determination of the provisional eastern frontiers of Poland.	424

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
<b>32</b> <i>Continued</i>	Nov. 29	6. Maintenance of Russian prisoners of war and refugees in Germany.	426
	Nov. 28	App. A. Summary of the situation with regard to surrendered enemy submarines.	428
FRENCH DELEGATION		App. B. Proposals concerning enemy submarines.	429
		App. C. Statement of the number of submarines in the Allied navies.	429
KING OF ROUMANIA Bucharest	Nov. 24	App. D. Letter to President Poincaré with regard to relations between Roumania and the Principal Allied Powers.	429
		App. E. Additional draft protocol to the treaty of June 28, 1919, between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland.	430
SPECIAL COMMISSION ON RUSSIAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN GERMANY Paris		App. F. Note to the Supreme Council relative to expenses for the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war and refugees in Germany.	431
<b>33</b> MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 103	Dec. 1	1. Report by Sir G. Clerk on Hungarian affairs.	435
		2. Military situation in Germany.	438
		3. Relations between the Esthonian Government and General Yudenitch.	438
		4. Adoption of a form of organization for the Interallied Commissions of Control in Bulgaria.	439
		5. Question of a reply to a German note on the Scapa Flow incident.	440
		6. Adoption of a reply to a German note concerning prisoners of war.	440
		7. Stocks of Russian cartridges in Germany.	441
		8. Question of the determination of the provisional eastern frontiers of Poland.	442
		9. Possible signature by Montenegro of a separate peace with Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria.	442
		10. Preparation of the Hungarian treaty.	443
SIR G. CLERK	Nov. 29	App. A. Report on his mission to Budapest.	444
MR. POLK Paris	Dec. 1	App. B. Telegram to General Bandholtz inviting the Hungarian Government to send delegates to Neuilly to receive the conditions of peace.	451
MARSHAL FOCH Paris No. 5505	Nov. 27	App. C. Letter to M. Clemenceau regarding the military situation in Germany.	452
MARSHAL FOCH Paris		App. D. Note requesting the German Government to restrict the organization of military forces.	453

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
MARSHAL FOCH Paris No. 5514	Nov. 28	App. E. Letter to M. Clemenceau regarding relations between the Estonian Government and General Yudenitch.	454
BARON VON LERSNER Paris No. 53	Nov. 27	App. G. Note to M. Clemenceau transmitting a memorandum concerning the scuttling of the German warships at Scapa Flow.	455
BARON VON LERSNER Paris No. 54	Nov. 27	App. H. Note to M. Clemenceau relative to the repatriation of German prisoners of war.	458
	Dec. 1	App. I. Note from the Supreme Council to Baron von Lersner regarding the repatriation of German prisoners of war.	461
GENERAL TCHER- BATCHEFF Paris No. 3-1103	Nov. 17	App. J. Letter to Marshal Foch concerning Russian cartridges in Germany.	463
M. PLAMENATZ Neuilly-sur-Seine No. 1086	Nov. 16	App. L. Note to M. Clemenceau concerning the possible signature by Montenegro of a separate peace with Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria.	464
34 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 104	Dec. 2	1. Report by M. Dutasta of an interview with Baron von Lersner. 466 2. Exploitation of the Pecs mines. 467 3. Question of a reply to the German note on the Scapa Flow incident. 467 4. Insertion in the Hungarian peace treaty of an article concerning Fiume. 467 [5. Appointment of a Committee to distribute the rolling-stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.] 469 [6. Claims of inheriting states for rolling-stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.] 469 7. Approval of the declaration relating to the provisional eastern frontiers of Poland. 470 8. Western Galicia. 470 9. Distribution of enemy submarines. 471	
	Dec. 1	App. A. Note of an interview between M. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner with regard to the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles. 473	
	Dec. 2	App. C. Draft reply to the German note of November 27 regarding the Scapa Flow affair. 474 App. D. Draft article on Fiume to be inserted in the Hungarian peace treaty. 475	
35 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 105	Dec. 3	[1. Personnel for the German mine-sweeping service.] 476 2. German activities in Schleswig. 476 3. Plans of the Turkish Government for the reconstruction of Constantinople. 477	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
35 <i>Continued</i>	Dec. 3	[4. Question of the creation of a provisional commission to organize the circulation of rolling-stock in the successor states of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.]	477
		5. Financial arrangements with Yugoslavia.	478
		6. Delay of the Roumanian reply to the recent Allied note.	479
		[7. Exequatur of foreign consuls at Danzig prior to the establishment of the free city.]	482
BRITISH DELEGATION	Dec. 1	App. B. Memorandum for the Supreme Council concerning German activities in Schleswig.	482
FRENCH DELEGATION	Dec. 2	App. C. Summary of a telegram from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest regarding the Roumanian reply to the recent Allied note.	483
36 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 107	Dec. 5.	[1. Financial arrangements with Yugoslavia.]	485
		2. Question of the reply to the German note relative to the sinking at Scapa Flow.	486
		3. Adoption of a draft treaty delimiting the frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia.	488
		[4. Expenses of the International Teschen Commission.]	488
		5. Roumanian affairs.	489
		6. Adoption of the draft financial, economic, and reparation clauses of the treaty of peace with Hungary.	489
		7. Approval of a request of Chancellor Renner that he should consult with the Supreme Council on the economic situation of Austria.	490
		8. Former Austro-Hungarian warships at Spalato.	490
		App. B. Draft treaty delimiting the frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia.	490
37 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 108	Dec. 6	1. Consideration of resolutions passed at the session of the Supreme Economic Council in Rome with regard to (a) Austria; (b) danger of non-ratification of the Treaty of Versailles; (c) Armenia; (d) Russia; (e) German tankers.	492
		2. Questions of the customs control on the Franco-German and Germano-Belgian frontiers and of the payment of German customs duties on a gold basis.	493
		3. Recent political developments in Roumania.	495

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL Rome		App. A. Resolutions concerning Austria, danger of non-ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, Armenia, Russia, and German tankers.	499
ORGANIZATION COM- MITTEE OF THE RE- PARATION COMMISSION C.R. No. 442	Nov. 27	App. B. Note to M. Clemenceau with related documents relative to (a) customs control on the Franco-Ger- man and Belgo-German frontiers, (b) payment of German customs duties on a gold basis.	500
38 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 109	Dec. 7	[1. Cost of administration of Western Thrace.] 506 2. Question of a Belgo-German conven- tion relative to the reimbursement of German marks held by Belgium. 506 3. Rights of Poland to reparation. 506 4. Questions remaining for settlement by the Supreme Council. 507 5. Roumanian affairs. 510 6. Sanction of purchase of Russian car- tridges in Germany for account of General Tcherbatcheff. 510 7. Refusal of a purchase of Russian car- tridges in Germany for account of Finland. 511	
POLISH DELEGATION	Dec. 5	App. C. Note concerning the rights of Poland to reparation.	512
SECRETARIAT-GENERAL OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE		App. D. List of outstanding questions to be settled by the Supreme Council.	513
39 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 110	Dec. 9	1. Distribution of enemy warships. 514 2. Drafting of the treaty between the Principal Allied Powers and Rou- mania for the protection of minorities; protection of Jews in Roumania. 516 3. Question of the reorganization of the Supreme War Council at Versailles. 519 [4. Execution of article 259 of the Treaty of Versailles.] 519 5. Determination of frontiers between Hungary and Croatia. 519 6. Employment of contingents from Togo and the Cameroons for the defence of metropolitan and colonial territories. 520 7. Questions relative to the peace treaty with Hungary. 522 8. Collection by Germany of customs duties in gold marks. 523 9. Cost of the Allied armies of occupa- tion. 524 10. Organization of the Commission for the distribution of rolling-stock and material belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. 524 11. Composition of the Hungarian peace delegation. 525 12. Farewell to Mr. Polk on his departure from Paris. 525	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
BRITISH DELEGATION	Dec. 8	App. A. Modified proposal regarding the distribution of enemy surface warships.	526
	Dec. 9	App. B. Draft orders for the Interallied Naval Commission for superintending the disposal of enemy warships.	527
COMMISSION ON ROUMANIAN AND YUGOSLAV AFFAIRS	Dec. 9	App. D. Report concerning the frontiers between Hungary and Croatia.	529
M. HUSZAR Budapest No. 225	Dec. 4	App. F. Telegram to M. Clemenceau requesting that the Roumanian authorities should release certain Hungarian officials in connexion with the dispatch of the Hungarian peace delegation to Paris.	531
40 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 111	Dec. 16	1. Coming into force of the treaty with Germany; delay in arrival of British contingents for the plebiscite areas. 532	
		2. Restricted powers of the new American Representative on the Supreme Council. 532	
		3. Consideration of the German reply to the Allied note of December 8 with regard to questions connected with the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles. 532	
		4. Question of the Vorarlberg. 534	
		5. Provisioning of Austria. 535	
		6. Hearing of Chancellor Renner on the economic situation of Austria. 536	
BARON VON LERSNER Paris No. 58	Dec. 14	App. A. Note to M. Clemenceau relative to questions connected with the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles and the sinking at Scapa Flow.	539
SECRETARIAT-GENERAL OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE	Dec. 15	App. C. Note reporting declarations made by Baron von Lersner when communicating the above note to M. Dutasta.	541
FRENCH DELEGATION	Dec. 12	App. D. Note on the question of the Vorarlberg.	542
FRENCH DELEGATION		App. E. Note concerning the dangers of the disintegration of Austria.	543
CHANCELLOR RENNER Paris		App. F. Declaration to the Supreme Council regarding the critical food situation in Austria.	545
41 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 112	Dec. 17	1. Economic and financial assistance to the Austrian Republic. 548	
		2. Collection by Germany of customs duties in gold marks. 550	
		3. Report by M. Loucheur of a conference between the Allied and German delegates on the subject of reparations claimed by the Supreme Council for the Scapa Flow sinking. 551	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
41 <i>Continued</i>	Dec. 17	4. Right of priority claimed by Yugoslavia for reparations.	558
		[5. Protection of Allied nationals, bearers of banknotes issued by the Soviet Government of Hungary.]	559
42 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 113	Dec. 18	1. Situation in the Baltic Provinces; proposal by Marshal Foch that General Niessel should be charged with a mission to Esthonia.	559
		2. Notification to Roumania and Poland of the frontier between Roumania and Eastern Galicia in Bukovina.	561
		3. Line of demarcation between the Government of General Denikin and the states of the Caucasus.	563
		[4. Repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war.]	564
		5. Distribution of enemy submarines: withdrawal of a reservation by M. Matsui.	564
		6. Conditions under which the German warships should be delivered to the Allies.	564
		7. Report by M. Loucheur of a conference between the Allied and German delegates concerning the reparation demanded for the Scapa Flow affair.	565
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Dec. 14	App. A. Note to the Supreme Council on the German evacuation of the Baltic Provinces and the proposed mission of General Niessel to Esthonia.	568
COLONEL HASKELL Caucasus		App. C. Telegram reporting the conclusion of an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.	569
FRENCH DELEGATION	Dec. 13	App. E. Memorandum on the conditions under which the German warships should be delivered to the Allies.	570
43 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 3 p.m. H.D. 114	Dec. 20	1. Compensation claimed by the Supreme Council from the German Government for the Scapa Flow affair.	571
		2. Question of the signature of the protocol between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany; attitude of the United States.	572
		3. Conditions under which the German warships should be surrendered.	574
		4. Question of the Polish list of Germans accused of violating the laws of war.	576
		[5. Rights of Allied nationals, holders of banknotes issued by the Soviet Government of Hungary.]	577
		[6. Insertion in the Hungarian peace treaty of clauses relative to certain railways of common interest to Hungary and (a) Yugoslavia, (b) Roumania.]	577

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
43 <i>Continued</i>	Dec. 20	7. Diplomatic representation of Germany at Vienna.	577
		8. Transportation of Allied troops for the plebiscite zones of Germany.	577
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Dec. 19	App. A. Note on the conditions for the surrender of German warships.	578
ORGANIZATION COMMISSION OF MIXED TRIBUNALS	Dec. 17	App. B. Note regarding the list of Germans accused of crimes contrary to the laws of war submitted by the Polish Delegation; reply of the Drafting Committee (Dec. 18) on this subject.	579
FRENCH DELEGATION		App. F. Note regarding the diplomatic representation of Germany at Vienna.	580
44 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 115	Dec. 22	1. Status of Eastern Galicia; suspension of the 25-years mandate to Poland.	582
		2. Question of mandates for former German colonies.	582
		3. Negotiations relative to the Scapa Flow incident; attitude of the British Government.	583
		4. Demand of the Yugoslav Delegation for priority of treatment in the matter of reparations.	587
		5. Adoption of two letters to the German Delegation on the subject of the collection by Germany of customs duties in gold marks.	588
		6. Resumption of commercial relations with Roumania.	589
		[7. Inventory of the rolling-stock on the Roumanian railways.]	589
45 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 116	Dec. 24	1. Question of the enemy vessels to be allocated to Poland.	591
		2. Procedure with regard to the conditions of the surrender of German warships.	591
		3. Negotiations with the German Delegation relative to the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles and reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow.	591
		4. Question of the convocation of the first Council of the League of Nations.	593
		5. Discussion of draft conventions relative to certain mandates; Japanese reservation with regard to 'C' mandates.	593
	Dec. 23	App. A. Notes of two conversations between M. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner on December 23.	601
		App. B. Part of a convention relating to the mandate for the portion of German East Africa assigned to Great Britain.	602
JAPANESE DELEGATION		App. I. Note formulating reservations concerning the draft of Mandate 'C'.	602

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
46 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 117	Dec. 27	1. Negotiations with the German Delegation relative to reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow. 2. Transport of Allied troops for the plebiscite territories. 3. Question of the enemy ships to be allocated to Poland. 4. Conditions of delivery of German warships. 5. Procedure for the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations.	604 607 609 610 612
SWISS LEGATION Paris	Dec. 18	App. D. Aide-mémoire concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations.	613
DRAFTING COMMITTEE		App. E. Note concerning the adherence of Switzerland to the League of Nations.	615
47 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 118	Dec. 29	1. Report by M. Dutasta of a conversation with Baron von Lersner on the subject of the draft protocol. 2. Situation in Klagenfurt. 3. Adjustment of the time period provided for in Annex 4 of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles. 4. Procedure for the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. 5. Conditions of the surrender of the German warships. 6. The proposed mission of General Niessel to Reval; congratulation of General Niessel upon the successful conclusion of his mission to secure the German evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. 7. The rank of German diplomatic agents in neutral countries; irregular position of the German Minister at Caracas.	616 618 619 620 621 624 626
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Dec. 31	App. A. Note relative to the conditions covering the delivery of German warships.	627
FRENCH DELEGATION	Dec. 29	App. B. Note as to the material to be taken from German warships.	628
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Dec. 25	App. C. Note to M. Clemenceau relative to arrangements in connexion with General Niessel's proposed mission to Reval.	628
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Dec. 24	App. D. Note relative to German diplomatic representation in neutral countries.	629
48 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 119	Dec. 30	1. Report of a conversation on December 29 between M. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner with regard to the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles and reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow.	630

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
48 <i>Continued</i>	Dec. 30	2. Jurisdiction of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission over American-occupied territory.	632
		3. Negotiations with German experts relative to the transport of Allied troops in the plebiscite areas.	632
		4. Date of the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	634
		5. Procedure for the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.	635
		6. Voting rights in Schleswig.	636
		7. Instructions to the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control for Germany.	636
		8. Modifications in the economic clauses of the peace treaty with Hungary requested by the Yugoslav Delegation.	636
		9. Determining the future agenda.	637
		App. A. Draft letter to Baron von Lersner containing assurances with regard to reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow.	638
BRITISH DELEGATION		App. C. Note to the Supreme Council concerning the jurisdiction of the Rhineland High Commission over American-occupied territory.	639
BARON VON LERSNER Paris No. 23	Oct. 16	App. D. Note to M. Clemenceau regarding the voting rights of inhabitants of Schleswig in occupied territory.	640
M. PACHITCH Paris	Dec. 12	App. G. Note to M. Clemenceau concerning Hungarian properties in transferred territories as affecting Yugoslav interests.	640
M. SERRUYS Paris No. 334	Dec. 27	App. H. Note to M. Dutasta regarding Hungarian properties in territories transferred to Yugoslavia.	642
49 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 120	Dec. 31	1. Negotiations with Baron von Lersner relative to the signing of the protocol and reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow.	643
		2. Report by General Le Rond of negotiations with German experts relative to the transfer of powers in plebiscite areas.	645
		3. Protection of nationals of plebiscite areas.	648
		4. Conditions of the advance of funds for the expenses of Allied troops in the plebiscite areas.	648
		5. Adoption of a reply to the Swiss note of December 18 concerning Switzerland's accession to the League of Nations.	649
		6. Arrangements for winding up the Interallied Commission of Russian prisoners of war in Germany.	650

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
49 <i>Continued</i>	Dec. 31	7. Violent treatment by German troops of members of General Niessel's mission.	653
		8. German military measures in Upper Silesia.	653
		9. Position of the Comitats of Western Hungary; dispatch of an Allied mission.	653
		10. Question of the amendments to the economic clauses of the peace treaty with Hungary proposed by the Czechoslovak Delegation.	653
		11. The question of the Åland Islands.	654
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Dec. 29	App. D. Draft reply to the Swiss note of December 18 relative to the adherence of Switzerland to the League of Nations.	654
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Dec. 1	App. E. Two draft resolutions respecting the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war in Germany.	656
GENERAL NIESSSEL Tilsit No. 292 s/p	Dec. 11	App. G. Note concerning violent treatment by German troops of members of the Interallied Commission in the Baltic States: transmits statement of attacks.	657
GENERAL NIESSSEL Tilsit No. 203 s/e	Dec. 13	App. H. Note to M. Clemenceau transmitting a copy of a letter from a delegation of Lithuanians concerning the retention of German troops in Memel and advancing Lithuanian territorial claims against East Prussia.	663
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Dec. 30	App. I. Draft telegram to General Nudant demanding the punishment of Germans guilty of attacks against members of General Niessel's mission.	664
MARSHAL FOCH Paris	Dec. 30	App. J. Note to M. Clemenceau concerning German military concentrations in Upper Silesia; transmits a draft note on the matter to the German Government.	665
FRENCH DELEGATION	Dec. 30	App. K. Note on the situation in the Comitats of Western Hungary.	667
M. SERRUYS Paris	Dec. 26	App. L. Note to M. Dutasta regarding amendments proposed by the Czechoslovakian Delegation to the economic clauses of the peace treaty with Hungary.	667
50 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 121	Jan. 3	1. Negotiations with the German Delegation concerning the protocol and reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow.	669
		2. Negotiations with the German Delegation concerning the putting into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	670
		3. Powers of the Prisoners of War Commission.	675

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
50 <i>Continued</i>	Jan. 3	4. Arrangements for the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.	675
		5. Evacuation of civilian population from districts abandoned by General Denikin's army.	677
		6. Authorization of the occupation of the Buk district by Greek troops.	677
		[7. Procedure for giving interpretations of clauses of the peace treaties.]	678
		8. Situation of General Yudenitch's army; General Niessel's proposed mission to Esthonia considered unnecessary by the British Government.	678
BARON VON LERSNER Paris No. A 1782	Jan. 1	App. A. Note to M. Dutasta regarding the delivery of floating docks by Germany in reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow.	679
	Jan. 2	App. B. Three notes in connexion with negotiations with the German Delegation relative to the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	679
AMERICAN EMBASSY Paris	Jan. 2	App. D. Memorandum concerning the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.	681
GENERAL FRANCHET D'ESPEREY Constantinople	Dec. 29	App. E. Telegram regarding the evacuation of civilian population from districts abandoned by General Denikin's army.	682
51 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 122	Jan. 5	1. State of negotiations with the German Delegation concerning the protocol and the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	683
		2. Conditions for a loan to the Austrian Government; question of American participation.	686
		3. Assistance demanded by General Denikin.	688
		4. Relations between the Esthonian Government and the army of General Yudenitch.	689
		5. Authorization demanded by the Polish Government to buy arms and munitions in Germany.	691
		6. Question of the prohibition of enemy trade in Turkey.	692
		7. Adoption of a reply to the German note of November 17 concerning the manufacture of aeronautical material and the organization of aerial navigation.	693
		8. Non-signature by Poland of the declarations of December 8 modifying the financial arrangements of St. Germain-en-Laye.	694
		9. Preparation of the peace treaty with Hungary.	695

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
<b>51</b> <i>Continued</i>	Jan. 5	10. Use of the term 'Allied and Associated Powers'.	695
		App. A. Draft note from the Supreme Council to the German Delegation regarding the signature of the protocol and reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow.	696
BARON VON LERSNER Paris No. 74	Jan. 2	App. B. Note to M. Clemenceau relative to the allocation of Allied contingents to the plebiscite zones, Danzig and Memel.	698
ORGANIZATION COM- MITTEE OF THE RE- PARATION COMMISSION	Dec. 29	App. C. Note in regard to granting credits to Austria.	699
FRENCH DELEGATION	Dec. 31	App. D. Note concerning assistance requested by General Denikin.	699
FRENCH DELEGATION	Jan. 4	App. E. Note concerning the enrolment of Bulgarians in General Denikin's army.	700
BRITISH DELEGATION	Jan. 4	App. F. Note relative to General Niesse's projected mission to Reval.	701
FRENCH DELEGATION	Jan. 3	App. G. Note regarding the Polish Government's request to buy arms and munitions in Germany.	701
FRENCH DELEGATION	Dec. 30	App. H. Note on the prohibition of enemy trade in Turkey, enclosing a telegram of December 23 from the Allied High Commissioners.	702
		App. I. Note for transmission to the German Government concerning the manufacture of aeronautical material and the organization of aerial navigation.	704
POLISH DELEGATION	Dec. 19	App. K. Note to M. Dutasta protesting against modifications of the financial arrangement of St. Germain-en-Laye.	705
<b>52</b> MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 10.30 a.m. H.D. 123	Jan. 6	1. State of the negotiations with the German Delegation relative to the signature of the protocol and the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles.	706
		2. Receipt of the reply of the Roumanian Government to the Supreme Council's note of November 15.	708
		3. Representations to the Hungarian Government in favour of the communists condemned to death.	708
		4. Preparation of the peace treaty with Hungary.	708
M. CLEMENCEAU Paris	Jan. 6	App. A. Note to Baron von Lersner rejecting a German proposal to establish a frontier zone between Germany and Poland.	711

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
COMMISSIONS ON BALTIC AND ON POLISH AFFAIRS		App. C. Joint report concerning the transfer of sovereignty at Danzig and Memel.	711
COMMISSIONS ON BALTIC AND ON POLISH AFFAIRS		App. D. Bases for an arrangement with Germany concerning the transfer of sovereignty at Memel and Danzig and their provisional administration.	712
FRENCH DELEGATION	Jan. 4	App. E. Proposal to request the clemency of the Hungarian Government for certain communists.	713
53 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11.30 a.m. H.D. 124	Jan. 9	1. State of negotiations with the German Delegation relative to the protocol and reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow. 2. Arrangements for the ceremony of the signature of the protocol and of the <i>procès-verbal</i> of the deposit of ratifi- cations of the Treaty of Versailles. 3. Adoption of a note to the German Delegation regarding the provisional replacement of United States repre- sentatives, particularly in connexion with Memel and Danzig. 4. Concentration of German troops in West Prussia. 5. Transport of Allied contingents in the plebiscite areas. 6. Arrangements relative to the occupa- tion of Schleswig. 7. Arrangements for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. 8. Expenses of the Rhineland Inter- allied High Commission to be a priority charge on Germany.	714 715 715 717 717 718 718 719
GERMAN DELEGATION	Jan. 3	App. C. Memorandum regarding the temporary replacement of American representatives on commissions con- stituted under the Treaty of Ver- sailles.	719
GERMAN DELEGATION	Jan. 8	App. D. General observations regarding the negotiations as to the territories of Memel and Danzig; question of American representation.	720
	Jan. 9	App. E. Note from the Supreme Council to Baron von Lersner regarding the provisional replacement of the United States representatives, particularly in regard to Memel and Danzig.	721
MARSHAL FOCH Paris No. 28	Jan. 6	App. F. Note to M. Clemenceau con- cerning German military concentra- tions in West Prussia; transmits a note on this subject from the Polish Military Mission in France.	722

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
54 MEETING OF SUPREME COUNCIL: 11.30 a.m. H.D. 125	Jan. 10	1. Use of native troops of Togoland and the Cameroons for the defence of the metropolitan and of the colonial territory. 2. Constitution of an interallied military organization to function after the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles. 3. Situation in the Caucasus; question of Allied aid to the Caucasian States against Soviet forces. 4. Organization of the work of the Conference; termination of the Council of Heads of Delegations.	724 724 725 725

## CHAPTER II

### Meetings in London and Paris of Allied Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs December 11, 1919-January 21, 1920

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
55 ANGLO-FRENCH MEETING: 3 p.m. London I.C.P. I	Dec. 11	1. Abandonment of the mandate system for Turkey in Asia other than the Arab portions. 2. Constantinople and the Straits. 3. Positions of Italy and Greece in Asia Minor. 4. Question of Cilicia and Armenia; suggestion by M. Clemenceau for the financial control of Turkey. 5. The Dodecanese; Mr. Lloyd George in favour of their attribution to Greece; Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot to examine jointly the British and French schemes for a settlement in Turkey. 6. The question of oil; to be discussed by Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot. 7. The attitude of the British and French Governments towards the United States of America. 8. The question of Palestine and Syria; Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot to confer with regard to the headwaters of the Jordan. 9. The question of the Caucasus. 10. General agreement of Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau with regard to Russia. 11. Representation by M. Clemenceau as to the desirability of a more favourable British attitude towards Poland. 12. Alleged British influence in Hungary. 13. Questions relating to Morocco and Egypt; to be discussed by Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot.	727 728 733 734 735 735 735 735 735 735 736 737 737

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
55 <i>Continued</i>	Dec. 11	14. Form of the guarantee of the neutrality of Belgium.	738
		15. Position of Marshal Foch and the proposed constitution of an Allied Military Organization at Versailles.	738
56 MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, U.S.A., AND ITALY: 11.30 a.m. London I.C.P. 2	Dec. 12	1. The question of the Adriatic; communication of the Allied note of December 9 to Signor Scialoja.	739
		2. Allied policy towards Russia.	744
57 ANGLO-FRENCH MEETING: 3.30 p.m. London I.C.P. 3	Dec. 12	1. Reparations: the proportion for distribution.	748
		2. The presidency of the Reparation Commission.	749
		3. British stores in France.	750
		4. Loans to France.	751
		5. British supply of coal to France; the question of price.	751
58 ANGLO-FRENCH MEETING: 11 a.m. London I.C.P. 4	Dec. 13	1. Attitude of the United States of America to the peace treaty.	754
		2. Information with regard to the German reply to the Allied note of December 8 relative to the protocol and reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow.	754
		3. Signature of treaty by Roumania.	754
		4. Future of the Peace Conference; position of Marshal Foch.	754
		5. Enemy breaches of the laws of war; preparation of lists of offenders.	756
		6. Question of the extradition and trial of the former German Emperor.	758
		7. British supply of coal to France.	760
		8. Japanese representation at the meetings in London.	761
		9. Question of reparation; French claim to priority.	761
		10. Allied policy towards Russia.	764
		11. Question of petrol; British and French experts to confer.	765
M. CLEMENCEAU Paris	Dec. 9	App. 1. Draft Anglo-French declaration concerning the reservations of the American Senate to the Treaty of Versailles.	766
U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS Washington		App. 2. Reservations to the Treaty of Versailles.	770
59 ANGLO-FRENCH MEETING: 3.30 p.m. London I.C.P. 5	Dec. 13	1. Agreement upon Allied policy in Russia.	773
		2. Agreement upon the future of the Peace Conference.	773
		3. Breaches of the laws of war; appointment of an Allied committee to revise the lists of the accused.	774

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
59 <i>Continued</i>	Dec. 13	4. Agreement to proceed with the demand for the surrender of the former German Emperor.	774
		5. Allied policy as regards Siberia; the question of Japanese intervention.	774
60 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 4.30 p.m. London I.C.P. 6	Dec. 13	1. Agreement upon Allied policy in Russia and upon the method of its announcement.	775
		2. Agreement upon the future of the Peace Conference.	778
		3. Enemy breaches of the laws of war.	778
61 ANGLO-FRENCH MEETING: 5.30 p.m. London I.C.P. 7	Dec. 13	1. Approval of an Anglo-French Economic Agreement relative to the functioning of the Reparation Commission, the allocation of reparations paid by Germany, and the issue of a French loan in London.	779
		2. Agreement upon the need for the consent of the British Dominions before the British Government finally approved the proposed distribution of reparation as between France and the British Empire.	780
		3. Agreement to complete the Allied negotiations before making a statement upon the above subject.	780
	Dec. 13	App. A. Anglo-French Economic Agreement relative to the functioning of the Reparation Commission, the allocation of reparations paid by Germany, and the issue of a French loan in London.	780
62 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT THE ALLIED MEETINGS IN LONDON I.C.P. 8	Dec. 11-13	A. Allied policy in Russia.	782
		B. Future of the Peace Conference.	782
		C. Enemy breaches of the laws of war.	783
		D. Demand for the surrender of the former German Emperor.	783
		E. Economic questions; communiqué to be issued regarding the working of the Reparation Commission, the issue of a French loan in London, and the export of British coal.	783
		Question of the attitude of the United States to the peace treaty.	784
		Preparation of the peace with Turkey; Lord Curzon to consult with M. Berthelot.	784
		Arrangement for a meeting between French and British petrol experts.	784
63 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 12.15 p.m. Paris I.C.P. 9	Jan. 9	The question of the Adriatic; communication to Signor Nitti of proposals by Mr. Lloyd George.	785

	NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
64	MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES: 11.50 a.m. Paris I.C.P. 10	Jan. 10	The question of the Adriatic; discussion of the reply presented by Signor Nitti.	786
	SIGNOR NITTI Paris	Jan. 10	App. Memorandum regarding the ques- tion of the Adriatic.	789
65	MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS: NOON Paris C.M. 1	Jan. 10	1. Rejection of Czechoslovak and Yugo- slav requests for modifications to the military clauses of the Hungarian peace treaty. 793 2. Exploitation of the mines of Pecs. 793 3. Financial questions in connexion with the draft Hungarian peace treaty. 794 4. Date of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. 795 5. Situation in the Caucasus; Allied recognition <i>de facto</i> of the Govern- ments of Georgia and Azerbaijan. 796 6. Question of the surrender of the former German Emperor. 797	
	MILITARY REPRESENTA- TIVES OF THE SUPREME WAR COUNCIL Paris	Jan. 7	App. A. Report on the modifications to the military clauses of the Hungarian peace treaty requested by the Czecho- slovak and Yugoslav Delegations.	798
	COMMISSION ON ROU- MANIAN AND YUGO- SLAV AFFAIRS	Jan. 9	App. B. Report concerning the exploita- tion of the Pecs mines.	801
66	MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES: 4.30 p.m. Paris I.C.P. 11	Jan. 10	The question of the Adriatic; hearing of M. Trumbić.	803
67	MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES: 11 a.m. Paris I.C.P. 12	Jan. 12	The question of the Adriatic; continued hearing of M. Trumbić.	815
68	MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES: 3 p.m. Paris I.C.P. 13	Jan. 12	The question of the Adriatic; statement by Signor Nitti.	823
69	MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS: 11 a.m. Paris C.M. 2	Jan. 13	1. The legal relation of Croatia-Slovenia to Hungary. 833 2. Draft treaty of peace with Hungary; question of the regulation of entails by Yugoslavia. 833 3. Draft treaty of peace with Hungary; modification of article 207. 836	

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
69 <i>Continued</i>	Jan. 13	4. Question of the prohibition of enemy trade in Turkey.	837
		5. Cost of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission.	839
		6. Distribution of enemy surface warships, submarines, and port material.	839
		7. Question of the publication of the records of the Peace Conference.	841
		8. American representation on the Interallied Naval Commission of Control for Germany.	844
		9. Organization of the Conference; proposal by Lord Curzon to terminate the Council of Foreign Ministers.	846
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Jan. 12	App. A. Note on the legal relation of Croatia-Slovenia to Hungary and relevant financial considerations.	847
FINANCIAL COMMISSION	Dec. 29	App. B. Note concerning the legal relation of Croatia-Slovenia to Hungary.	848
FINANCIAL COMMISSION	Jan. 12	App. C. Note relative to the regulation of entails in territories transferred from Hungary to Yugoslavia.	849
		App. G. Note requesting that the Government of United States be asked whether it accepts the proposed distribution of enemy surface warships, submarines, and port material.	849
SECRETARIAT-GENERAL		App. H. Note relative to a general compilation of the acts of the Conference, together with a note of September 23 from the Drafting Committee.	850
BRITISH DELEGATION	Jan. 12	App. I. Memorandum regarding the question of American representation on the Naval Interallied Commission of Control for Germany.	855
70 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES: 3 p.m. Paris I.C.P. 14	Jan. 13	The Adriatic question; discussion with the Yugoslav Delegation.	856
	Jan. 13	App. A. Memorandum regarding the Adriatic question communicated to the Yugoslav Delegation.	865
71 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES: 11 a.m. Paris I.C.P. 15	Jan. 14.	1. The Adriatic question; alteration to the memorandum communicated to the Yugoslav Delegation.	866
		2. Arrangement to receive representatives of the Hungarian Peace Delegation.	866
		3. Commercial policy in Russia; hearing of representatives of the co-operative movement in Russia.	867
		4. Tabling of draft notes to the Netherlands Government relative to the surrender of the former German Emperor.	875

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
72 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES: 4 p.m. Paris I.C.P. 16	Jan. 14	1. Conditions for the communication of the Hungarian peace terms. 2. The Adriatic question; discussion of the reply of the Yugoslav Delegation.	876 876
YUGOSLAV DELEGATION	Jan. 14	App. 3. Reply to the memorandum of January 13 regarding the question of the Adriatic.	883
73 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVES: 3 p.m. Paris I.C.P. 17	Jan. 15	1. Adoption of a note to the Netherlands Government relative to the surrender of the former German Emperor. 2. Formula to be adopted for the beginning of the above note to the Netherlands Government. 3. Enemy breaches of the laws of war; reduction of the lists of accused. 4. Agreement to hear Count Apponyi on behalf of the Hungarian Peace Delegation. 5. Question of Belgian participation in the Military Council at Versailles. 6. Continuance of the Allied Military Organization at Versailles.	884 885 886 887 888 889
FRENCH DELEGATION	Jan. 12	App. 1. Draft note to the Netherlands Government requesting the surrender of the former German Emperor.	889
DRAFTING COMMITTEE	Jan. 10	App. 2. Draft note to the Netherlands Government on the same subject.	890
MR. LANSING Paris	June 26	App. 3. Draft note to the Netherlands Government on the same subject.	891
COUNT APPONYI Neuilly	Jan. 14	App. 4. Note to M. Clemenceau with regard to arrangements for receiving the conditions of peace with Hungary.	892
COUNT APPONYI Neuilly	Jan. 14	App. 5. Note to M. Clemenceau requesting that he might be heard by the Allied representatives.	892
74 MEETING OF AMERICAN, BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN REPRESENTA- TIVES: 10.30 a.m. Paris I.C.P. 18	Jan. 16	1. Enemy breaches of the laws of war. 2. Allied agreement to enter into trading relations with the co-operative movement in Russia. 3. The situation in the Caucasus.	894 894 896
COMMITTEE ON THE REOPENING OF CERTAIN TRADING RELATIONS WITH THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE	Jan. 15	App. 1. Report on measures to be taken.	898
M. BERTHELOT Paris	Jan. 16	App. 2. Draft press communiqué regarding the reopening of certain trading relations with the Russian people.	899

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
75 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 2.30 p.m. Paris I.C.P. 19	Jan. 16	Hearing of Count Apponyi regarding the conditions of peace with Hungary.	900
76 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 4 p.m. Paris I.C.P. 20	Jan. 16	1. Commercial policy towards Russia: approval of a communiqué to the press. 2. Arrangements for the communication to the Netherlands Government of the note requesting the surrender of the former German Emperor.	911
	Jan. 16	App. A. Communiqué to the press concerning the reopening of certain trading relations with the Russian people.	912
	Jan. 15	App. B. Note to the Netherlands Government demanding the delivery of the former German Emperor for trial.	912
77 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 10.30 a.m. Paris I.C.P. 21	Jan. 19	1. Commercial policy with Russia; economic questions relative thereto referred to the Supreme Economic Council. 2. Situation in the Caucasus; hearing of Caucasian representatives; question of Allied aid; recognition <i>de facto</i> of the Government of Armenia.	914 915
ALLIED MILITARY COMMITTEE Paris	Jan. 12	App. Report on the situation created in Caucasus by the defeat of General Denikin's armies and on measures to be taken to enable the Caucasian republics to resist the Soviet forces, together with a note on this subject from the British Delegation.	925
78 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 10.30 a.m. Paris I.C.P. 22	Jan. 20	1. Adoption of the list of persons accused of war crimes. 2. Adoption of a telegram to Washington concerning Russian affairs. [3. Judicial administration of Thrace.] 4. Question of the admission of Switzerland to the League of Nations; hearing of M. Ador. 5. The affairs of Roumania and Hungary; discussion with M. Vaida-Voevod. 6. Question of Bessarabia; discussion with M. Vaida-Voevod. 7. Question of the defence of Poland against Soviet forces. 8. Allied contingents for the occupation of plebiscite zones. 9. Question of the Adriatic; statement by Signor Nitti. App. A. Draft telegram to the French Ambassador in Washington for submission to the American Government	927 928 928 929 932 936 938 938 942 944

NO. AND NAME	DATE	MAIN SUBJECT	PAGE
78 <i>Continued</i>	Jan. 20	regarding the proposed reopening of trading relations with co-operative societies in Russia.	
79 MEETING OF ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES: 6.30 p.m. Paris I.C.P. 23	Jan. 20	1. Allied contingents in plebiscite areas. 946 2. Functioning of Delimitation Committees. 949 3. The question of the Adriatic; farewell tributes to M. Clemenceau; discussion with the Yugoslav representatives. 950	
COMMITTEE ON ALLIED CONTINGENTS FOR PLEBISCITE ZONES	Jan. 20	App. A. Report on the furnishing of Allied contingents for plebiscite zones. 956	
BARON VON LERSNER Paris	Jan. 19	App. B. Note to M. Clemenceau disclaiming responsibility for the effects of the postponement of the transport of Allied troops to the plebiscite zones. 956	
M. CLEMENCEAU Paris	Jan. 20	App. C. Letter to Baron von Lersner regarding the transport of Allied troops for plebiscite zones. 957	
80 MEETING OF BRITISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVES: 11 a.m. Paris C.M. 3	Jan. 21	1. Adoption of a reply to Mr. Lansing's memorandum of January 20 relative to the question of the Adriatic. 958 2. Question of the entry of Switzerland into the League of Nations. 961 3. Arrangements for the termination of the main session of the Peace Conference and for the functioning of the Conference of Ambassadors. 963 4. The Turkish question; decision to invite the co-operation of the United States. 965 5. Frontiers of Italy and Yugoslavia. 967	
BRITISH DELEGATION		App. A. Draft reply to Mr. Lansing's memorandum of January 20 relative to the question of the Adriatic. 968	
M. BERTHELOT Paris		App. B. Draft reply to the same memorandum. 970	

## CHAPTER I

# Concluding Proceedings of the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (Heads of Delegations)

October 16, 1919—January 10, 1920

### No. 1

H. D. 71.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, October 16, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. de St. Quentin.

*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned.

U.S.A.: Mr. C. Russell, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Sir George Clerk, Mr. Leeper, Mr. Forbes-Adam, Capt. G. Lothian Small.

*Italy*: M. Vannutelli-Rey.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

I. MR. POLK said that a telegram had just been received from the Inter-allied Military Mission at Budapest dated the 14th October.

*Telegram from the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest* He desired that the telegram (see Appendix A) should be placed before the Council and be considered before the question of Sir George Clerk's mission was discussed.

M. MANTOUX then read the text of the telegram.

MR. POLK said that he wished to call attention to the fact that the telegram expressed the opinion of the four Generals at Budapest. He thought that the question of the reply should be considered at once. The telegram was addressed, not to the American delegation, but to the Supreme Council. If the telegram required an answer, as he thought it did, the question was to decide as to the nature of the answer.

M. PICHON agreed that the telegram could not be left unanswered. It was important that the demand of the Interallied Military Mission should be fulfilled. He considered that the Generals should be given entire satisfaction.

MR. POLK said that at the same time that the telegram had been received his attention had been called to a press despatch from Budapest, which stated that it was rumoured in both Austria and Hungary that the members of the Interallied Military Mission were on the point of resigning, because they felt that they had not received adequate support from the Supreme Council.

M. PICHON said he did not see how this demand could be made. In any event, it was important to beware of rumours. In point of fact, the Supreme Council had replied to the previous telegrams of the Interallied Military Mission and had taken the views of the Mission into full consideration. Up to the present time the Interallied Military Mission had never transmitted to the Council a telegram so precise in its statements and so far-reaching in its consequences. He considered it essential to accede to the wishes of the Interallied Military Mission, namely, that the Roumanian Government should be asked to evacuate Hungary forthwith. He wished to point out, however, the grave situation which would be almost certain to result in Hungary following the retirement of the Roumanian army of occupation. The question of arming a police force of sufficient size to enforce order was not mentioned in the telegram, and the Military Mission had made no suggestions in regard to this matter. He asked whether the Military Mission had made any proposals relative to the organizing of a police force before the evacuation should take place.

MR. POLK pointed out that the Military Mission had already asked for 10,000 rifles for the purpose of organizing a police force.

M. PICHON said that he had not been present at the last meeting of the Council where the subject had been discussed. He understood, however, that Sir George Clerk had already proposed the immediate evacuation of Hungary by the Roumanian forces.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that Sir George Clerk had proposed the evacuation of Hungary by the Roumanians, but that he had also insisted upon the necessity of the establishment of a Government which could maintain order and be recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers. (See H. D. 67.)<sup>1</sup>

MR. POLK said that he did not understand that the report advocated that the Roumanians should remain in Hungary until a stable Government was established.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Allied and Associated Governments had already addressed the Roumanian Government on the subject of the evacuation of Hungary.

MR. POLK said that he thought that the Council had already insisted that the Roumanian military authorities form the police of Hungary and then withdraw. It was most important that the Roumanians should not await the establishment of a suitable Government.

M. PICHON asked who should give orders to the police.

MR. POLK said that the Interallied Military Mission had already reported that the Government of M. Friedrich were prepared to organize a police force.

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. I, No. 71, minute 7.

M. PICHON pointed out that the Council had already considered the draft of a telegram to M. Friedrich telling him that he should withdraw and permit someone else to form a government.

MR. POLK said that he thought it was important not to mix the two questions. So far as he was concerned, he was not in a position to accept a form of action which would enable the Roumanian forces to remain until a satisfactory Government had been established.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Allied and Associated Governments had already told the Roumanian Government that they must withdraw their military forces from Hungary.

(He then read an extract from the Note to the Roumanian Government (see Appendix B to H. D. 68;<sup>2</sup> in which a definite demand upon the Roumanians to withdraw their military forces from Hungary was made.)

He said that he considered that it was most important to inform the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest that this demand had been made of the Roumanian Government.

M. PICHON said that it was of equal importance to see that the Roumanian Government carried out the measures in question.

MR. POLK said that he hoped that the matter could be cleared up. He wished to ask whether the rifles were to be delivered to the Hungarian police at the present time, and whether the Roumanian forces were to withdraw at the present time, whatever the Government in Hungary might be.

M. PICHON replied in the affirmative.

M. SCIALOJA asked whether the Interallied Military Mission had been informed of the telegram sent to Bucharest.

M. PICHON replied that they had not been informed, but that they ought to be informed immediately.

MR. POLK said that he understood that a decision had been taken at the meeting of the Council on the 11th October<sup>2</sup> to inform the Interallied Military Mission of the Note to the Roumanian Government.

M. PICHON said that the resolution had not been drafted in this sense, but that the decision should be communicated to the Interallied Military Mission, as it would be the best reply to their telegram.

MR. POLK said that he wished to express the hope that the Supreme Council would not forget that possibly six weeks ago, certainly four, the Roumanian military authorities had been told to deliver the necessary rifles to the police. The Council were aware that the Roumanians had never done this. M. Misu had informed him that the Hungarians had plenty of rifles from Field-Marshal Mackensen's supply. In point of fact this was not the case. The Roumanians were unwilling to carry out the wishes of the Supreme Council.

M. PICHON said that Marshal Foch had been informed on the 10th October by Colonel Dimitrescu that the Roumanian High Command had some time before placed at the disposal of Colonel Yates for the Hungarian gendarmerie 10,000 rifles and 40 machine guns. 1,000 rifles had already been

<sup>2</sup> Vol. I, No. 72.

delivered and the rest was guarded by Roumanian troops until such time as they should be delivered. Colonel Dimitrescu added that Colonel Yates, the United States Military Attaché at Bucharest, had been charged by the Interallied Military Mission with the creation of a Hungarian gendarmerie. The Roumanian troops had begun their withdrawal from Hungary.

MR. POLK said that in his opinion it was delightfully typical of the Roumanians that of 10,000 rifles, 9,000 had not been delivered.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that on the 20th September M. Diamandi and General Mardarescu had promised to turn over the rifles and machine guns for the use of the Hungarian gendarmerie. As far as he was aware they had not delivered a single rifle or machine gun.

MR. POLK said that they had delivered 1,000 rifles which might be useful for parade purposes, but which could not shoot.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that substantially there was no additional information in the telegram now before the Supreme Council. The point was that the Supreme Council had not communicated to the Generals the Note to the Roumanian Government; that the Generals therefore were unaware when they sent this telegram of the steps that the Supreme Council had already taken. He had no desire to doubt the evidence of the Interallied Mission, but the evidence was largely collected from Hungarian sources. For this reason he did not consider that their report was altogether satisfactory since the Roumanians might have some explanation to make. In their telegram the Interallied Military Mission had mentioned the names of several towns as lying in territory which was to be ceded to Roumania under the terms of the Treaty of Peace. As a matter of fact some of the towns in question would remain in Hungarian territory. He did not think that the report should be accepted as gospel.

SIR GEORGE CLERK said that he wished to add that on the night before he had left for Bucharest M. Misu had come to see him. He had pointed out to M. Misu how impossible the conduct of the Roumanian authorities had been, as for example, in the case of the Museum at Budapest. M. Misu then turned to M. Vaida and asked him for the official explanation. M. Vaida had then produced a telegram from his Government stating that the Roumanian Government had only wished to recover archives belonging to them which had been carried off from [?to] Budapest. He did not vouch for the truth of this explanation, which had not been investigated: it simply went to show that such incidents might have satisfactory explanations.

MR. POLK said that the explanation which the Roumanians had made to the Interallied Military Mission was that the material in question was Transylvanian property, and they wished to take it as they expected to acquire Transylvania. He wished to emphasize the point, however, that as the four Powers had sent four representatives to Budapest, there was no reason why the Roumanians should not make their explanations to them. He felt that the Council should either accept the statements of the Generals or else recall them. Personally he had great faith in General Bandholtz. The fact that the Roumanian Officials made their explanations outside of

Budapest was decidedly unjust to the Interallied Military Mission and placed them in an impossible position.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he agreed. He said further that the Council should insist that the explanation of the Roumanian authorities should be made to the Interallied Military Mission. The point which he had wished to raise was this: a note had been despatched to the Roumanian Government and the Council had not yet heard their side. He wished to emphasize the necessity of waiting until a reply from the Roumanian Government had been received, as he did not believe that conditions were any worse than the Council already knew them to be.

M. PICHON said that the Council agreed as to the necessity of informing the Interallied Military Mission of the note to the Roumanian Government.

(It was decided:

to communicate to the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest the text of the note from the Principal Allied and Associated Governments to the Roumanian Government approved by the Supreme Council on the 11th October (H. D. 68).<sup>2</sup>)

2. M. PICHON said that Mr. Polk had not considered it advisable to transmit a telegram to M. Friedrich but to send a representative of the Council to Budapest. The instructions to be given to Sir George Clerk were contained in the draft telegram to M. Friedrich which had been previously discussed by the Council (see Appendix C, H. D. 68).<sup>2</sup>

*Mission of Sir  
George Clerk to  
Budapest*

MR. POLK said that he wished to suggest two changes in the text. In the first paragraph it was stated that the Allies had waited in the hope that the Government of M. Friedrich, recognizing its inability to meet the conditions required by the principal Allied and Associated Powers, would either include representatives of all parties in Hungary or withdraw from office. He thought that instead of speaking of 'all parties' it would be better to substitute the words, 'the several parties'. In the second paragraph he wished to suggest that the words 'in the view of the Allied and Associated Powers' be omitted.

M. PICHON said that it had been agreed to inform the Interallied Military Mission in regard to Sir George Clerk's departure for Budapest. He thought that Sir George Clerk should be charged to inform the Generals as to the discussion which had taken place in the Council on that day and to inform them that the Council were resolved to do all that was necessary to make the Roumanian Government follow the line of action which had been decided upon.

(At this point Sir George Clerk left the meeting.)

MR. POLK said that he wished to raise a question which he had hesitated to mention in Sir George Clerk's presence. He understood that as Sir George Clerk was proceeding to Budapest as a representative of the principal Allied and Associated Powers the necessary expenses in connection with his mission, amounting to whatever sum Sir George Clerk in his discretion might consider necessary and proper, would be paid by the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. PICHON said that he thought that the British Government should pay the necessary expenses and that the amount in question should then be divided between the Powers interested.

MR. POLK said that Sir George Clerk was going to Budapest as the representative of the Supreme Council and it would be unfortunate if the impression should obtain in Roumania or Hungary that the Council were dissatisfied with the Interallied Military Mission. He thought that a formal statement should be made to the four Generals which should contain the reasons why Sir George Clerk was going to Budapest.

M. PICHON said that the Council had already decided to notify the four Generals at Budapest of Sir George Clerk's mission (see H. D. 69,<sup>3</sup> minute 3).

MR. POLK pointed out that Sir George Clerk's mission would be known to the press.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Sir George Clerk was being sent to Budapest because it had been thought inadvisable by sending a telegram to give the appearance of mixing in the internal affairs of Hungary.

M. PICHON said that he did not approve of giving any statement to the press. In any mention of Sir George Clerk's mission, he would only be referred to as being charged with a special mission to Budapest on behalf of the Supreme Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked that Sir George Clerk's date of departure might be fixed for the following Saturday.<sup>4</sup>

(It was decided:

- (1) that Sir George Clerk should proceed to Budapest as the special representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. (See H. D. 69,<sup>3</sup> minute 3);
- (2) that Sir George Clerk should be directed to communicate with the several Hungarian political parties and that in his mission he should be guided by the spirit of the views of the Allied and Associated Powers as expressed in the draft telegram to M. Friedrich (see Appendix C to H. D. 68),<sup>2</sup> with the following alterations in the text: for the words 'all parties' (line 12)<sup>5</sup> the words 'the several parties' should be substituted, and in lines 17 and 18<sup>6</sup> 'in the view of the Allied and Associated Powers' should be omitted;
- (3) that Sir George Clerk should inform the four Generals at Budapest of the discussion which had taken place in the Supreme Council on that day and that the Council were resolved to do all that was necessary to make the Roumanian Government follow the line of action required of them;
- (4) that such funds as Sir George Clerk might, in his discretion, consider necessary and proper for the expenses of the mission should be paid by the British Government and subsequently shared by the Principal Allied and Associated Governments;
- (5) that the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest should be notified by telegraph of Sir George Clerk's mission;

<sup>3</sup> Vol. I, No. 73.

<sup>5</sup> Line 9 of the printed text.

<sup>4</sup> October 18, 1919.

<sup>6</sup> Lines 13 and 14 of the printed text.

(6) that the only statement which should be made with regard to Sir George Clerk's mission was that he had been despatched to fulfil a special mission at Budapest on behalf of the Supreme Council.)

3. (The Council had before it a Note of the 10th October from M. Politis<sup>7</sup> to M. Clemenceau, [see Appendix B].<sup>8</sup>)

*Protest of the Greek Delegation against the failure of the Inter-Allied Mission of Inquiry at Smyrna to communicate information to the Greek representative* M. DE SAINT QUENTIN read and commented upon the note in question.

M. PICHON said that he thought it was a difficult matter for the Council to give instructions from Paris. If witnesses had given testimony under a promise of secrecy, he did not see how the Council could absolve the Commission from the promises which they might have made.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Council had made an engagement to M. Venizelos.<sup>9</sup>

M. SCIALOJA said that when the Council had given the undertaking to M. Venizelos they were not aware that the Commission had promised certain witnesses that their testimony would be held as secret.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had just received a telegram from the British High Commissioner at Constantinople on the subject. The telegram confirmed the fact that the Commission had decided to take certain evidence *in camera* for the purpose of obtaining reliable information and avoiding reprisals. A definite promise had been made to certain witnesses. On the other hand, the Council had given an undertaking to the Greek Government.

M. PICHON said that the Council were not to blame for what had occurred.

<sup>7</sup> Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs and Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed. In this note M. Politis referred to the decision of the Supreme Council of September 30, 1919 (see Vol. I, No. 68, minute 6), as communicated to M. Venizelos, and reported that the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna had nevertheless 'limited itself to sending to Colonel Mazarakis a statement of the facts established by it without communicating to him the depositions of the witnesses regarding which it informed him by a letter dated October 7th that those depositions "had been made under the promise of absolute secrecy and that it would be impossible for it to communicate them without breaking its promise".'

'Colonel Mazarakis replied, in conformity with the instructions of the Greek Government, that it was indispensable for him to see the whole dossier as the Supreme Council had decided.

'I am informed that the promise referred to by the Commission was not taken with all the witnesses: to the Greek witnesses the Commission only recommended discretion without promising anything to them. However it may be, after having deprived the Representatives of the Greek Government of the right of legitimate defence prescribed by justice, the Commission of Inquiry, in spite of the instructions of the Supreme Council, has gone as far as to surround its procedure with an absolute secrecy, even as regards Colonel Mazarakis.

'In the name of the Greek Government, I feel obliged to protest against that unjust and arbitrary decision and I appeal to the equity of the Supreme Council, so that, in conformity with its decision of December [sic] 30th, the Commission of Inquiry be formally invited to communicate to Colonel Mazarakis the depositions of the witnesses, even if strictly confidential.'

<sup>9</sup> See Vol. I, No. 68, minute 6.

He thought the only possible compromise was to inform the Greek Delegation that the testimony taken after the instructions of the Supreme Council had been received, would be placed at the disposal of the Greek Government. The Supreme Council were not in a position to give an undertaking as to previous promises made by the Commission of Inquiry.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed that this compromise would seem the best means of solving the difficulty.

MR. POLK asked as to the nature of the promise made by the Supreme Council.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that the undertaking in question was contained in a resolution of the Supreme Council. (See H. D. 64, Minute 6.<sup>9</sup>)

(It was decided:

that, owing to pledges of secrecy given by the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna to certain witnesses, the Commission be not obliged to communicate to the representative of the Greek Government, in its entirety, the evidence given by these witnesses before the receipt of the terms of the resolution of the 30th September (see H. D. 64).<sup>9</sup>)

4. (The Council had before it a Note from the British Delegation of the 15th October (see Appendix C).<sup>10</sup>)

*Repatiation of Austrian and Hungarian Prisoners in Great Britain and Japan* SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was not one of great importance. The Austrian Delegation had asked that the Austrian prisoners of war held in Great Britain should be repatriated. There were only 36 officers and 135 others in Great Britain and the British Government saw no reason for refusing the request of the Austrian Delegation. It would probably be possible to repatriate the prisoners in question with German prisoners. There was also a small number of Hungarian prisoners in Great Britain and the British Military Authorities were anxious that these should be repatriated at the present time.

M. MATSUI asked whether the Council had any objections to the Japanese Government repatriating the small number of Austrian and Hungarian prisoners in their hands.

(It was decided:

that there was no objection to the immediate repatriation of the Austrian and Hungarian prisoners of war in Great Britain and Japan.)

5. SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Council had just addressed a stiff note to the Roumanian Government which asked them, in effect, whether or not they were prepared to accept the guidance of the Supreme Council. He desired to call attention to the fact that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had not signed the Treaty of Peace with Austria or the Minorities Treaty. At the

*Relations with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government*

<sup>10</sup> Not printed. This brief note outlined the position as explained by Sir E. Crowe except that the figures for Austrian prisoners of war in England were given as 36 officers and 125 other ranks.

present time there was a ministerial crisis at Belgrade.<sup>11</sup> He had hoped that the moderate element would come into power, but at the moment it looked as if the intransigent element were about to come into power. If the matter were brought to a head at the present time the effect would be to strengthen the hands of the elements in Yugo-Slavia who were most anxious to cooperate with the Allied and Associated Powers. He suggested that at an early date a communication be addressed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government inquiring whether or not they were prepared to sign the Treaties.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with the opinion of Sir Eyre Crowe and thought that action should be taken at once.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had prepared a rough draft of a note to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. He did not mean that the draft should be accepted as final but he simply wished to refer it to his colleagues for their consideration as a possible basis of discussion.

6.

*Russian Prisoners  
of War in Ger-  
many*

[Not printed]<sup>12</sup>

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,  
October 16, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 1<sup>13</sup>

*U.S. Naval Communication Service, Paris, France.*

From 22 VN Z 1139 Budapest October 13-14 1919

To Supreme Council Peace Conference. Paris.

Cold weather setting in, day's delay now more serious than would have been week's delay two months ago. Inter-Allied military mission therefore desires present Supreme Council following statement facts concerning conduct Roumanians with request for prompt action. They have so thoroughly cleaned out

<sup>11</sup> On September 13, 1919, M. Davidović, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, had tendered his resignation on the ground that the Treaty of St. Germain was in certain respects unsatisfactory to Yugoslavia. Successive attempts to form alternative governments failed, and M. Davidović consented to maintain the conduct of affairs for the time being: cf. No. 4, minute 8.

<sup>12</sup> With reference to minute 4 of No. 72 in Vol. I the Supreme Council took note of Mr. Polk's remarks 'to the effect that the American representative on the Commissions dealing with questions relating to Russian prisoners of war, and American representatives on all Commissions, could not bind their Government to financial obligations unless the subjects in question had been brought before the Supreme Council and received Mr. Polk's approval'.

<sup>13</sup> The text of the telegram in this appendix is printed with verbal variation by General H. H. Bandholtz: *An Undiplomatic Diary* (New York, 1933), pp. 151-4. This published text is generally less condensed than the telegraphic text here printed, and has been used in establishing the sense of passages which are corrupt or uncertain in their telegraphic form.

country of rolling-stock that there are not enough for transportation local food and fuel requirements. Their Administration reduced food reserve Budapest to one third what it was September. According report from Hungarian Food Minister they have by unnecessary and cruel restriction prevented food from going out Budapest to neighbouring suburbs, population [of] which estimated six hundred thousand. Reported during evacuation trans Dunabia [?Trans-Danubia] they released Bolsheviks who been detained and in city Budapest have repeatedly by force without written order taken Bolsheviks prisoners out of jail. At S[z]olnok, where committee this mission obtaining information about Roumanian exportations, have arrested several Hungarian railway men who were aiding our efforts. Have prevented University students from reporting for continuation their courses. September 26th their commander in chief sent letter to mission stating that to cover needs feeding Hungary, zone between Danube and Thies Rivers been placed at disposition Hungarian Government, no requisitions would take place that zone except those necessary for actual feeding troops, especially for city Budapest above zone be extended to East Thies to boundary line fixed by Commander, despite which October 5th Roumanian Colonel Rujinschi seized thirty aeroplane motors Budapest which cannot [be] classified as food. October 10th in Budapest from firm Schmitt and Tarsai they seized removed machinery which put two thousand labourers out work. Large number of similar cases with proof on hand. In reply to letter from mission that desired that objects National Museum be not disturbed until acted upon by committee they sent reply that intended take those and that signers [of] letters, Mardaescu and Diamandi, assumed responsibility for action, this being in effect insult to nations represented on interallied military mission. That they did not take objects due fact doors sealed signed by President [of] Day at time and they afraid go to extreme breaking seal. Between five and six o'clock this morning they attempted arrest Prime Minister Friederic and did arrest two Government officials result which President of Day in person delivered General Mardaescu memorandum from mission copy which telegraphed Supreme Council this date. They kept their commander in chief General Mardaescu and High Commissioner Diamandi absent in Bucharest week during which no representative present with whom business could be transferred [transacted]. Although they in August acknowledged Interallied Military Mission as representing their superiors the Supreme Council, they have with negligible exceptions carried out none of instructions this mission and have always insisted acting as though Roumania equal or superior to nations represented on mission. They sent misleading reports Paris placing themselves attitude saviours of Hungary and have censored press in Hungary to extent that Hungarians could not refute false statement. On 19th September General Mardaescu wrote mission he [had] taken all necessary measures make treatment of prisoners satisfactory, stating especially from sanitary viewpoint according report his surgeon general conditions very good. October 11th Mission receives communication from International Red Cross representatives [representative] stating this [his] investigations at Arad resulted discover conditions so opposed to conventions covering treatment prisoners war that he felt this mission should take action. This [His] conclusions which [are as] follows concur with all reports concerning same except Roumanian reports: 'I find that these prisoners were not captured on field battle but many days after cessation hostilities; that lodgings of prisoners are unsanitary; that army which captured them take no care of them whatever, furnishes them neither food, clothing, medicine, covering or anything; that from date their captivity prisoners

had no funds and that majority cannot purchase anything for even insufficient nourishment. That prisoners treated contrary Article Nine *General* [Geneva] Convention 1906; that all these men are exposed to serious diseases if not properly aided; that orders given Red Cross at Arad to take care prisoners needs entirely illegal and cannot be based upon any law or international convention.' Dr. Munro British Food Commission and Swiss Captain Burnier International Red Cross just returned from visiting following towns: Hatzam [Hatvan], Gyongyon [Gyöngyös], Miskolcz, Sátoralja Ujhely, Nyregyháza, Dedreczem [Debreczen], Szolnok, Magycarad [Nagy-Varad], Dekes gyula [Békés, Gyula], Arad, Temesvar and Szeged all in permanent portion Hungary but now occupied by Roumanians and have submitted statement from which following is extract: 'In all towns occupied by Roumanians we found oppression so great as to make life unbearable. Murder is common. Youths and women flogged, imprisoned without trial, arrested without reason, theft of personal property under name of requisition. Condition of affairs prevails difficult for Western European realize who not seen and heard evidence. People forced take oath allegiance to Roumanian King; if refuse they persecuted. Experienced Hungarian doctors of hospitals been replaced by inexperienced Roumanian doctors. Roumanian military authorities demand petition for every passport, request for coal or food. Petitions must be written Roumanian language. Roumanian lawyer just been [must be] employed and charges enormous fees. Stationmaster Weber of Brad and Stationmaster [of] Ketegyháza been fearfully flogged. Last Good Friday Roumanians advanced suddenly to Boros-Sebes and two hundred fifty Hungarian soldiers taken prisoners. These killed in most barbarous manner; stripped naked and stabbed with bayonets in way to prolong life long as possible. Roumanians established custom house every village. Delivery permits only be obtained by payment ridiculously large sum. Commerce is impossible. People will soon starve. Deliberately for no military or political reasons apparent hospitals not allowed transport for coal and wood which already (Wire went out of commission here) paid for. Very life of hospitals hangs on coal. Hospitals have closed [will have to close] down entirely unless relieved immediately. Results be disastrous. Will be outbreaks all sorts contagious epidemic disease such [as] typhus, typhoid, etc.' An American officer and an Italian doctor if Roumanians permit will accompany International Red Cross representative on thorough investigation prisoners war camps. In general Roumanian conduct been such that this Mission been almost wholly unable carry out its instructions and there apparently no prospect immediate improvement. It is unanimous opinion of Mission that unless Roumanians immediately evacuate Hungary and make at least partial restitution in particular of rolling stock, machinery and much other property seized here there will result in short time extreme suffering from lack food and fuel and recrudescence of Bolshevism. This Mission therefore of unanimous opinion that either Roumanians should be forced evacuate Hungary at once and make restitution outlined or this Mission should be relieved. End Message.

INTERALLIED MILITARY MISSION.

7:53 p.m. October 14, 1919.

## No. 2

H. D. 72.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, October 18, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. Tittoni; SECRETARIES, M. Paterno, M. Barone Russo.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Mr. E. L. Dresel, Dr. J. B. Scott, Capt. B. Winthrop.  
*British Empire*: Gen. Sackville-West, Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. Shearman, Mr. G. Tufton.  
*France*: Marshal Foch, M. Tardieu, Gen. Weygand, M. Laroche, M. Fromageot, M. Aubert, M. Escoffier.  
*Italy*: Gen. Cavallero, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Pilotti.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. (The Council had before it a report presented by the Special Commission charged with determining the Composition of Interallied Forces of Occupation (see Appendix A).)  
*Composition of the Interallied Forces of Occupation provided for by the Treaty with Germany* GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the report. He called the attention of the Council to the reservations formulated by the Italian Military Representative and by the British Delegation. The Italian Military Representative felt that he ought to affirm again that his Government had only authorized the participation of three battalions destined for Upper Silesia. In the table prepared by the Commission the provision had been made for the employment of seven Italian battalions. He felt that he should add that in former Conferences the Italian Military Delegate had always expressed the same opinion on this point.

M. TITTONI pointed out that in fact he had always stated that his Government could only send three battalions.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that this decision meant imposing a heavy burden on the French. He took the liberty of insisting that M. Tittoni should reconsider the matter. It seemed to him that Italy, not being threatened on any frontier, could do at least something more. If she should persist in her refusal she would put the French in a most unfair situation.

M. TITTONI reserved the right to reconsider the question.

GENERAL WEYGAND added that the British Delegation had made two reservations: it had first been decided that Memel should be occupied by a

British battalion and an American battalion; according to the revised table which the Council had before it the American battalion was to be sent to Upper Silesia to reinforce the United States forces there and was replaced at Memel by a French battalion. The British Delegate accepted this change on condition that the command should be held by a British officer.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this request was based on the same reasons which the British had always advanced. It was purely a question of organization and administration.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that France had no objection to the command at Memel being held by a British Officer.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the British Delegation also asked that all British troops forming part of the forces of occupation at Dantzic, Marienwerder, Allenstein and Memel should be treated as a single unit from an administrative point of view, although they were placed under different commands.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he could not see anything unreasonable in this request.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that no formal reservation had been made with respect to the American troops: but according to his conversations with General Bliss it seemed to him that one point still remained to be settled, namely, would the American Government authorize to the use [*sic*] of its troops before the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate?

MR. POLK observed that a cable had been sent on this subject and a reply was expected. All he could say for the moment was that the troops were on the way and were first to be sent to Coblenz. He wished to draw the Council's attention to another point. The Commission expressed the desire that in each zone of occupation the Presidency of the Interallied Commission and the command of the troops of occupation should be invested in individuals of the same nationality. Would it not be preferable with respect to the Interallied Commission that the Presidency would not be permanent but should rather be held in rotation by each nation represented?

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that this was scarcely practicable.

GENERAL WEYGAND observed that some Commissions, such as the one in Upper Silesia, would have a rather long life—perhaps from eight to twenty months—while others would only exist for from three to six months. Under these conditions he did not think a system of alternation was feasible.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as far as he was concerned he attached so much importance to good feeling between Allies that he was quite willing to accede to Mr. Polk's suggestion.

MR. POLK said that he in no way insisted upon this, he was merely making a suggestion.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that each Interallied Commission might be left free to elect its own President.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that this question was distinct from that of the command of the military forces, which would be determined before the departure of the troops in conformity with the Commission's recommenda-

tions. He wished finally to call the Council's attention to a desire expressed by the Commission: it wished the departure of the Interallied Commissions and of the forces of occupation to be determined in such a way, and the date of the coming into force of the Treaty to be settled in such a fashion, that the Commissions and forces of occupation would arrive at their appointed destinations at the moment of the coming into force of the Treaty. The Commission also wished the German Government to be advised beforehand of the date determined for the entry into force of the Treaty and its coincidence with the arrival of the Commissions and troops of occupation so that the German Government might take the necessary measures.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that the Allied General Staffs should therefore agree on the date when the troops could arrive at their appointed destinations: that would be date upon which, as far as military questions were concerned, the Treaty could come into force. He would inform the Council of this date.

It was decided:

- (1) to accept the recommendations of the special Commission relative to the composition of Interallied forces of occupation (see Appendix A), with the reservation that the definite approval of the Italian Government should be obtained;
- (2) that the command of the various forces of occupation should be exercised according to the recommendations of the Commission, and that, at Memel, a British officer should be in command;
- (3) that although the British troops forming part of the forces of occupation at Dantzig, Marienwerder, Allenstein and Memel would be placed under different commands, they should, from an administrative point of view, be treated as a single unit;
- (4) that the departure of the Commissions and of the forces of occupation should be regulated in such a way, and that the date of the entrance into force of the Treaty should be fixed in such a manner, that both the Commissions and the forces of occupation should arrive at their appointed destinations at the moment of the entrance into force of the treaty of Peace;
- (5) that Marshal Foch, after agreeing with the Allied General Staffs, should inform the Supreme Council of the date from which they consider it possible for the Treaty to enter into force;
- (6) that the German Government should be notified in advance of the date fixed for the entry into force of the Treaty and of its coincidence with the arrival of the Commissions and the forces of occupation, so that it might take all necessary measures within the proper time, and, especially to fix the date of evacuation of the districts in question by its own forces;
- (7) that the Interallied Commissions sent into the zones of occupation should choose their own presidents, without it being necessary for them to be of the same nationality as the Commanding Officers in the corresponding zones of occupation.

2. (The examination of this draft note was adjourned to the following session).

*Draft note to  
the Serb-Croat-  
Slovene Govern-  
ment*

3. M. BERTHELOT said that a telegram had just been received from the Interallied Mission at Budapest 'see Appendix B',<sup>1</sup> stating that the Mission had learned by a private telegram of the sending of Sir George Clerk to Budapest. The Mission asked that it receive official confirmation thereof and that Sir George Clerk's Mission might be defined. He submitted a draft telegram 'see Appendix C' which would officially notify the Generals of Sir George Clerk's arrival and would define the Mission with which he was entrusted.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that in order to make the matter even more definite there should be added at the end of the first paragraph a sentence specifying that Sir George Clerk represented the Supreme Council in all political questions.

M. TITTONI said that he had no objection to this draft on the condition that it was well understood that the Generals were in no way superseded; it should be clear that Sir George Clerk had a special mission and the Generals should retain jurisdiction over all military questions.

M. BERTHELOT proposed that the following sentence should be added at the end of the first paragraph, 'He will represent the Supreme Council in all political questions, the Generals retaining jurisdiction over military questions.'<sup>2</sup>

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the draft telegram (see Appendix C) to be sent to the Allied Generals at Budapest;
- (2) to add to the end of the first paragraph of this draft telegram the following sentence;

'He will represent the Supreme Council in all political questions, the Military Mission retaining jurisdiction over military questions.'<sup>2</sup>

4.  
*Italian proposal  
to insert certain  
Articles in the  
Treaty of Peace  
with Hungary*

[Not printed]<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The contents of this brief telegram, dated October 17, 1919, were as stated by M. Berthelot. In particular, it requested the Supreme Council 'to clearly specify just what shall be the respective attributions of the Commission on one hand, and of Sir George Clerk on the other'.

<sup>2</sup> This sentence, with drafting amendment, was incorporated in the text of appendix C (q.v.) annexed in the original.

<sup>3</sup> With reference to its decision of October 11, 1919 (see Vol. I, No. 72, minute 7), the

5. (The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee dated October 17th, 1919 (see Appendix E).)

*Putting into Force of the Treaty with Germany* M. FROMAGEOT read and commented on the note of the Drafting Committee. With respect to the eventual convocation of the Council of the League of Nations the following questions were raised:

MR. POLK asked if all the Powers which, when they should have ratified the Treaty of Peace would be represented in the Council of the League of Nations, would have to be represented at the first meeting of the Council. President Wilson had made it known that he was prepared to call a meeting of the Council for the three Powers which had ratified the Treaty, and he wished to know if the other powers had now to designate their representatives.

M. FROMAGEOT explained that they did not have to, but that they could do so. This obligation would only arise for those Powers after they had ratified the Treaty. Nothing in the Treaty made the coming into force or the ratification thereof a condition precedent to these designations.

MR. POLK wished to know if this applied, for instance, to Spain.

M. FROMAGEOT answered that Spain could designate its representative: that it was known, moreover, that she was ready to do so.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to know if the Treaty specified any quorum necessary to validate the meetings of the League of Nations. Would the absence of one of the members invalidate the Council's decisions?

MR. POLK said that he did not think so.

M. TARDIEU said that there was no such provision in the Treaty.

MR. POLK asked if the Drafting Committee could prepare for Monday's<sup>4</sup> meeting a draft form of convocation to be sent out by President Wilson to call the meeting of the Council.

M. FROMAGEOT resumed his commentaries on the note of the Drafting Committee.

M. TARDIEU explained that the second part of the Drafting Committee's note had to some extent duplicated the work of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty. This latter Committee, pursuant to the instructions it had received from the Supreme Council,<sup>5</sup> had drawn up a list of the Commission[s] to be formed, and had indicated what Powers had designated their representatives on these Commissions and what Powers had not yet done so.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that this latter report should be distributed and examined prior to the meeting of Thursday, October 23d: at this time each Power should designate the Commissioners which it had not yet named.

Supreme Council considered a report, dated October 16, 1919, from the Drafting Committee (appendix D in original). After a brief discussion the Supreme Council decided, in accordance with the recommendations of the Drafting Committee, to insert in the treaty of peace with Hungary five draft articles which subsequently became articles 36-40 of the Treaty of Trianon.

<sup>4</sup> October 20, 1919.

<sup>5</sup> See Vol. I, No. 74, minute 6.

It was decided: that the Drafting Committee should submit to the Supreme Council at its next meeting:

- (1) the draft of a letter by which President Wilson should convoke the Council of the League of Nations for the day of the entry into force of the Treaty;
- (2) the draft of a letter from the Supreme Council to each of the Powers represented in the Council of the League of Nations inviting them to designate forthwith their representatives on this Council, as France and Italy had already done.

6. (The Council had before it two draft protocols prepared by the Drafting Committee concerning, first, the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace signed between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, of the Protocols signed on the same day by the said Powers, and of the arrangement of the same date between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany relative to the occupation of the Rhineland see Appendix F); secondly, the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty signed June 28th, 1919, between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland (see Appendix G).<sup>6</sup>

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that it was necessary to make a separate *procès-verbal* for each group of ratifications. It had likewise seemed important to the Committee that the hour of the signature should appear on the *procès-verbaux*. Indeed that was an important point for the agents who would then be on the spot and who should be informed in advance or, at least, by telegram, of the hour the Treaty would come into force. In these protocols Germany for the last time signed in the last place: once this act had been accomplished she would sign in her alphabetical order. He drew the Council's attention to the great importance of having Czecho-Slovakia ratify the Treaty of Versailles before it should come into force. Czecho-Slovakia would be the only non-ratifying country having a common frontier with Germany. A situation might thus arise which might create difficulties with respect to the operation of the Delimitation Commission provided for by Article 83 of the Treaty.

It was decided:

to approve the draft *procès-verbaux* of Deposits of Ratifications prepared by the Drafting Committee with respect, first, to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles June 28th, 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, as well as of the Protocol signed on the same day by the said Powers, and of the Arrangement of the same date between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany, concerning the Rhineland (see Appendix F); secondly, to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty signed June 28th, 1919, between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland (see Appendix G).<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This protocol was similar, *mutatis mutandis*, to that in appendix F.

7. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation (see Appendix H) and a note of the Drafting Committee dated October 16th, 1919 (see Appendix I).)

*Operation of  
the Plebiscite  
and Delimitation  
Commissions in  
the absence of  
American Repre-  
sentatives*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee. He explained that the question raised by M. von Lersner only concerned the Delimitation and Plebiscite Commissions, but it was insidious, because the same argument might apply to far more important Commissions such as the Reparation Commission. If Germany might maintain that the Reparation Commission could only operate if a given power were represented thereon, a very dangerous situation would arise. Consequently the Drafting Committee recommended that all Commissions should be considered regularly constituted as soon as the Powers which had ratified the Treaty—and which consequently would then be obliged to be represented on these Commissions—and the Powers which had agreed to send representatives before having ratified, should be represented. The latter Powers would be in a situation analogous to that of the Powers which were not parties to the Treaty but which, nevertheless, were by the Treaty accorded the right of designating representatives on different Commissions, such, for instance, as Holland and the Scandinavian States.

MR. POLK said that he had no objection to make to this solution but he wondered if the Germans could raise any.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that they would have no valid ground for contesting the vote of a member of a Commission designated by a Power which had not yet ratified the Treaty; when once the Treaty had come into force, the Commissions were composed of the representatives of the Powers specified in the Treaty. The Treaty nowhere provided that the representatives on the Commissions should be the representatives of Powers which had ratified.

M. TITTONI inquired if ratification and the right of being represented on Commissions should be considered in law as two distinct matters. He wished to know if the right of representation existed even in the absence of ratification, or was the foregoing only a provisional solution?

M. FROMAGEOT replied that the Drafting Committee considered the right of representation to be in law independent of ratification: the right of representation existed irrespective of ratification, whereas, on the other hand, the duty of being represented arose from ratification. But there was a second delicate point: what would happen if the Powers which had not ratified did not designate representatives? It seemed to the Drafting Committee that even in this case the decisions of the Commissions would be valid; if, in that event, the votes should be equal, the vote of the President of the Commission would be controlling as provided for in article 437 of the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the question had not been raised and wondered if the Germans would seek to raise trouble on this point.

M. TITTONI thought that if M. Fromageot's argument were legally sound, the reply to his question was impliedly contained therein: with regard to the

Powers which had ratified, and which thereby came under the obligation of naming representatives on the Commissions, there was no doubt that they must send representatives in order to validate the decisions of these Commissions; on the other hand, if the Powers which merely had the option of naming representatives did not make use thereof, that fact would in no wise affect the validity of the decisions of the Commissions and the latter could operate legally.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired whether Germany should be informed of the foregoing point of view before she had raised any question with respect thereto.

M. FROMAGEOT saw no necessity of replying and thought that there was nothing to be gained by divulging these arguments.

M. TITTONI expressed the desire that M. Fromageot should give the Council a confidential report containing the legal development of this argument.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that this would be a purely academic document, but he had no objection to M. Fromageot giving it to M. Tittoni.

M. FROMAGEOT inquired whether his Committee should reply on the first point to M. von Lersner.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it should send a note to M. Dutasta.

M. DUTASTA remarked that M. von Lersner made no secret of the fact that public opinion in Germany would be greatly disturbed if America were not represented on the different Commissions until the Senate had ratified the Treaty.

MR. POLK doubted whether, under M. Fromageot's plan, America would be represented.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he recalled distinctly that President Wilson, after some hesitation, had agreed that the United States would be represented on the Reparation Commission.

MR. POLK pointed out that this was only unofficial. Prior to ratification the United States was not authorized to be officially represented; he very much doubted whether, in view of the political situation, the United States would insist as a matter of right on having official representation on these Commissions prior to ratification. If Mr. Wilson spoke of American representation on the Reparation Commission he only meant representation after ratification.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

(It was decided:

A [*sic*]. (1) to approve the principles contained in the note of the Drafting Committee relative to the question put by Baron von Lersner (see Appendix I);

(2) that the Drafting Committee should send to the Secretary General of the Conference a note refuting the argument presented by Baron von Lersner in the course of his interview with M. Dutasta.)

8. M. TARDIEU read the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on October 15th (see H. D. 70).<sup>5</sup> The reply to the first two paragraphs of this resolution was contained in M. Fromageot's report; there remained the last question: what was the value of the means of action placed at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers by the Treaty of Peace compared with those available by virtue of the Armistice? Under the Armistice the available means were:

- Measures to be taken immediately upon the coming into Force of the Treaty*
- (1) the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads;
  - (2) the right of occupying that portion of the neutral zone from north of Cologne to the Dutch frontier;
  - (3) the occupation of the bridgehead at Kehl (measures to that effect had been taken);
  - (4) resumption of hostilities after forty-eight hours notice;
  - (5) the maintenance of the blockade;
  - (6) the retention of prisoners of war.

The coming into force of the Treaty would deprive us of the possibility of resuming hostilities; it deprived us of the weapon of blockade in so far as general measures were concerned, since the American Government did not seem disposed to admit the principle of a pacific blockade; finally, we lost the right of occupying the neutral zone to the north of Cologne. With the Treaty in force, if Germany committed hostile acts, the Covenant of the League of Nations would come into play. If, on the other hand, Germany limited itself to acts of passive resistance, Articles 12 to 18 of the Covenant would come into operation and the Council of the League of Nations would take such measures as it deemed fit. Finally, the occupation of the bridgeheads gave us another means of action. The Treaty of Peace likewise allowed us, which was not true of the Armistice, to disarm Germany and to stop the manufactures and the recruiting which she was carrying on at the present moment. He added that whatever judgment might be passed on the reply of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty, its value was only relative, for the period of decision was necessarily a very short one.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to know what the attitude would be with respect to the clauses of the Armistice which had not been fulfilled. Could their fulfilment be exacted?

M. TARDIEU replied that the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty had not considered this question. He, personally, was of the opinion that if the Treaty should be put into force without previously demanding the fulfilment of these clauses there would be no ground for such a demand after the Treaty's coming into force. If it were desired that certain clauses should be fulfilled by Germany a demand to that effect should be made before the Treaty came into force.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired what clauses Sir Eyre Crowe had in mind.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that he was thinking of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.

M. TARDIEU said that if the fulfilment of the Armistice clauses which had not been carried out was desired, the only efficacious means of action should be used, namely, an advance into Germany.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that this would be rather difficult after the Treaty had been ratified.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked the Drafting Committee to submit at the next meeting of the Council a report on this question, having especially in mind the situation in the Baltic Provinces.

(It was decided:

- (1) that the Drafting Committee should present to the Supreme Council at its next meeting a report as to whether, after the coming into force of the Treaty, the Allied and Associated Powers would have the right to demand the fulfilment of clauses of the Armistice which had not been executed, in particular, the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces;
- (2) that the Drafting Committee should point out in its report the affirmative means of action of which the Allied and Associated Governments might avail themselves in order to insure the fulfilment of these clauses after the coming into force of the Treaty.)

9. M. TARDIEU said that at its meeting of July 28th the Council had approved a recommendation of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty and had decided to create a Committee to coordinate questions relative to the interpretation and the execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany.<sup>7</sup> Up to the present moment the British Empire and Japan had alone designated their representatives on this Committee. It would be well for the United States, France and Italy to designate their representatives on this Committee.

*Appointment of  
the Commission  
for the Execu-  
tion of the  
Treaty after it  
comes into  
force*

M. TITTONI proposed that the Powers should have the right to designate an alternate delegate in case their principal delegate should not be able to sit.

(It was decided:

- (1) that the United States, France and Italy should as soon as possible designate their representatives on the Committee for the coordination of questions concerning the interpretation and execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany;
- (2) that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers might designate alternate delegates who, if necessary, should replace their delegates on this Committee.)

10.

*Allowances for Members  
of the Plebiscite Com-  
missions*

[Not printed]<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> See Vol. I, No. 21, minute 1.

<sup>8</sup> See No. 5, note 2.

11. MARSHAL FOCH stated that the reply of the German Government to the last Note of the Allied and Associated Powers relative to the *Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces* evacuation of the Baltic Provinces had just reached him, and that it would be sent that day to the various delegations. The German Government accepted the sending of an Allied General Officer as had been proposed in the Note of the Allied and Associated Powers. In view of the great importance of hastening in every way the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, he recommended that the Council should at once designate this General Officer, and he proposed the name of General Mangin.

(It was decided:

that General Mangin should be charged by the Allied and Associated Powers with the duty,

- (1) of ascertaining from the German Government the measures taken by it with a view to regulating the conditions of evacuation, and of proposing to that Government the measures which he himself should deem proper;
- (2) of exercising on the spot an effective control over the execution of these measures.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, October 18, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 2

In accordance with the resolution of October 15,<sup>9</sup> Marshal Foch has the honour to address the following proposals to the Supreme Council, concerning the composition of the Interallied occupation contingent in the territories which, by the terms of the Peace Treaty, may or must be occupied by Interallied contingents. These proposals were studied:

For: United States	Great Britain	France	Italy
By: General Bliss	Sir Eyre Crowe	M. Laroche	Count Vanutelli
	Gen. Sackville-West.	Gen. Weygand.	Gen. Cavallero.

The principles of distribution proposed for the Allied contingents are as follows: equality of expenses and responsibilities among the Powers, account being taken of their totality;

predominance in each zone of the contingents belonging to the Power which insures the Command in that zone, the other Powers being represented by a smaller contingent;

no contingent shall be less than one battalion; consequently in certain zones, two powers only will participate in the occupation.

The table hereto annexed gives the composition of the occupation contingents and their distribution among the Allied and Associated Powers.

It is desirable that, in each zone, the Presidency of the Commission and the Command of occupation forces be exercised by personalities belonging to the same nation, without making this condition compulsory in every instance.

<sup>9</sup> See Vol. I, No. 74, minute 4.

We have the honour to submit to the Supreme Council the opinion that it would be advisable, in order to insure the execution of the Treaty under the most favourable circumstances:

(1st) on one hand, to arrange for the departure of the Commissions and the occupation troops,

on the other hand, to fix the date of the entry into force of the Treaty, in order that the Commissions and occupation troops may reach their destinations at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty.

(2nd) to advise the German Government, prior to the date fixed for the entry into force and of the coinciding with that entry into force and [*sic*] the arrival of

*Composition of the Interallied Occupation Contingents<sup>10</sup>*

	<i>Strength necessary<sup>11</sup></i>	<i>Distribution between the Allied and Associated Powers</i>				<i>Command</i>	<i>Observations</i>
		<i>GREAT BRITAIN</i>	<i>UNITED STATES</i>	<i>FRANCE</i>	<i>ITALY</i>		
UPPER SILESIA .	18	3	4	6	5	French	In case of troubles, the first reinforcement battalion to be sent to Teschen will be taken from the British troops in Upper Silesia.
TESCHEN .	3		1	1	1	American	
DANTZIG .	4	2	1	1		British	No proposal is made on account of the special character of the exclusively military occupation of Memel.
MARIENWERDER .	2	1			1	Italian	
ALLENSTEIN .	4	3	1			British	
MEMEL .	2	1		1		Undetermined	
SCHLESWIG .	3	1	1	1		British	
Total .	36	11	8	10	7		

<sup>10</sup> This table is an amended version of an earlier draft, also included in the original of this appendix (not printed). The amendment was made in accordance with a brief undated memorandum, headed 'Modification proposed concerning the distribution of the contingents', which was annexed to the earlier table. This memorandum stated: 'The French Representatives propose to the American, British, and Italian Representatives that in modification of what was decreed on October 16, one French battalion be located in Memel in place of the American battalion provided for, this latter to proceed to Upper Silesia to replace the French battalion retired.' Apart from the consequent alteration in the figures relating to Upper Silesia and Memel, the present table is identical with the earlier draft.

<sup>11</sup> Note in original: 'The strength of the contingents is indicated in battalions, it being understood that the strength of one battalion is to be maintained at from 600 to 800 men.'

'*Artillery*—In the zones where artillery is necessary (Upper Silesia, Dantzig) the proportion of artillery will be 1 battery for each infantry regiment.

'*Machine Guns*—Shall be included in the organization of the battalions, or shall be formed into separate companies according to the army organizations.'

the Commissions and the occupation troops in order that the German Government be in a position to take all the necessary dispositions, and in particular to fix the date for the evacuation of the territories by its own forces.

NOTE. The Italian Military Delegate, although having participated in the study of the distribution provided for in the present plan, deems it expedient to affirm that the Italian Government has authorized the participation of only three battalions destined for Upper Silesia.

#### APPENDIX C TO No. 2

##### *Telegram from the Supreme Council to the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest*

October 18, 1919.

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers has decided to send Sir George Clerk to Budapest as its special representative. Sir George Clerk is directed to establish relations with the various Hungarian political parties and to inform M. Friedrich of the views of the Supreme Council concerning the conditions which must be fulfilled by a Hungarian government capable of maintaining order, of instituting elections and of concluding peace with the Allies. He will represent the Supreme Council in all political questions, the Interallied Military Mission retaining jurisdiction of military questions.

The special political mission of Sir George Clerk in no wise modifies the general mission of a military nature with which the Allied Generals were entrusted by the confidence of the Supreme Council. Sir George Clerk will inform the Generals of the deliberations taken by the Supreme Council pursuant to their last communications, and, in particular, their telegrams under date of October 13th and 14th.<sup>12</sup> He will inform them that the Council has decided to take all the measures necessary to force the Roumanian Government to follow the line of conduct which it was requested to adopt.

POLK, Ammission.

#### APPENDIX E TO No. 2

As the Treaty provides that, without delay, German sovereignty over certain territories be transferred either to the League of Nations or to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and as certain measures must be taken either by the Council of the League of Nations or by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, it is necessary that on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty the necessary organisms be ready to exercise the functions for which the League of Nations, or the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, will be, from that time, responsible.

1. *Concerning the League of Nations*, nothing can be regularly done except by the Council. However, the Council itself cannot exist legally and act regularly until after the entry into force of the Treaty.

<sup>12</sup> See No. 1, appendix A.

In order to obviate the difficulties which could result from that situation, the following procedure could be used as a base:

1st. By the terms of Article 5 of the Convention,<sup>13</sup> the President of the United States is to convoke the first meeting of the Council. Nothing in the text opposes the convocation before the entry into force of the Treaty or before ratification by the United States. On this latter point, in fact, if, in default of ratification by the United States, the President is not *obliged* to make this convocation, it is none the less true, in any case, that he has received the authority from the contracting Powers to do so.

The President of the United States, therefore, should be requested, at once, to convoke the Council of the League of Nations for the day of the entry into force of the Treaty, that is to say, for the day of the first deposit of the ratifications, in adding that the date shall be later specified.

The convocation should be made for the same place as the depositing of the ratifications, that is, in Paris, and should be addressed to each one of the Powers represented in the Council, that is, to the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and to Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece.

2nd. At the present time each one of the said Powers represented on the Council should be invited by the Supreme Council to designate its representative without delay, as has already been done by France and Italy.

Here also, nothing in the Treaty subordinates these designations to the entry into force or to the preliminary ratifications of the Treaty.

3rd. To meet as soon as possible, in a *non-official* meeting in the presence of the General Secretary of the Council, Sir Eric Drummond, in which should be represented the members of the Council of the League of Nations designated by the Powers. During this meeting unofficial decisions should be made concerning all the measures tending to ensure, as soon as the entry into force of the Treaty, the execution of the obligations immediately incumbent upon the League of Nations, i.e.:

(a) Provide for the government and the fixing of the boundaries of the Saar Basin, that is, designation of the Commission, and formulating of instructions to be given it—designation of the delimitation commission;

(b) Designation of the High Commissioner to Dantzic, and instructions to be given him;

(c) Sending, immediately and unofficially, of these agents to their posts, in order that they may be ready to take up their duties officially upon the day and hour of the entry into force of the Treaty.

4th. Upon the day and hour fixed for the filing of the ratifications and consequently, for the entry into force of the Treaty: *Official meeting* of the Council of the League of Nations which, from that time, shall exist legally—legalization of the measures taken unofficially—issuance of orders to agents previously sent to their posts, to immediately assume their duties.

On this same day, invitations to adhere to the League of Nations, as has already been decided,<sup>14</sup> should be sent to the third Powers enumerated in the Convention.

2. *Concerning the Principal Allied and Associated Powers*, from the present moment it appertains to the Supreme Council to take, if such has not already been done, all measures necessary to ensure the execution of the obligations which are incum-

<sup>13</sup> i.e. of the Covenant of the League of Nations and, *ipso facto*, of the Treaty of Versailles.

<sup>14</sup> See Vol. I, No. 74, minute 7.

bent on it by the entry into force of the Treaty, or at least in the few days following; that is, notably:

- (a) Provide for the Government of Memel, Dantzig, and the German Colonies.
- (b) Civil High Commission to the occupied Rhenish countries.
- (c) Plebiscite Commission: Upper Silesia—Eastern Prussia (Allenstein)—Western Prussia (Marienwerder)—Schleswig;
- (d) Delimitation Commissions: Belgium—Czecho-Slovakia (Ratibor)—Poland—Dantzig—including the High Commissioner;
- (e) Supervision Commissions: military, naval and aeronautic;
- (f) Commission on the demolition of Heligoland;
- (g) Prisoners of War Commission;
- (h) Reparations Commission;
- (i) River Commissions: Rhine, Danube, Elbe, and Oder;
- (j) List of those accused of crimes and misdemeanours against the rights of people.
- (k) Where necessary, the sending, immediately and unofficially, of these agents to their posts, in order that they may be ready to take up their duties officially upon the day and hour of the entry into force of the Treaty.

For the Drafting Committee,

HENRI FROMAGEOT

October 17, 1919.

## APPENDIX F TO NO. 2

### *Procès-Verbal*

of the deposit of ratifications of the Peace Treaty signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, Czecho-Slovak State, and Uruguay, on the one hand, and Germany on the other; as well as of the following acts: the Protocol, signed the same day by the said Powers, the Arrangement of the same date by the United States of America, Belgium, the British Empire, France and Germany concerning the occupation of Rhenish territories.

In execution of the final clauses of the Peace Treaty signed at Versailles, on June 28, 1919, the undersigned assembled at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Paris, to proceed with the deposit of the ratifications and to deliver them to the French Republic.

The instruments of the ratifications or notifications of their sending by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, i.e.:

of the British Empire, for the Peace Treaty, the Protocol and the Arrangement;  
of France, for the Peace Treaty, the Protocol and the Arrangement;  
of Italy, for the Peace Treaty and the Protocol;

and of the Allied and Associated Powers, following, i.e.:

of Belgium, for the Peace Treaty, the Protocol and the Arrangement;

of Poland, for the Peace Treaty and the Protocol;

of Siam, for the Peace Treaty and the Protocol (the Instrument to be delivered later)

as well as of Germany, for the Peace Treaty, the Protocol and the Arrangement, were produced and having been, after examination, found to be in good and due form, are confided to the Government of the French Republic, to remain deposited in its archives.

In accordance with the provisions of the final clauses above cited, the French Government will notify the contracting Powers of the depositing of the instruments of subsequent ratifications by the States which are signatories of the said Treaty, Protocol and Arrangement, and which are not in position at this time to conform with this formality.

In witness whereof, the undersigned have drawn up the present Procès-Verbal, and have affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Paris, the — day of — 1919  
at — o'clock.

Signed: GREAT BRITAIN

„ FRANCE  
„ ITALY  
„ BELGIUM  
„ POLAND  
„ SIAM  
„ GERMANY

#### APPENDIX H TO NO. 2

##### *Note from the French Delegation*

In the course of a call made on October 13th, by Baron von Lersner to Mr. Dutasta, Baron von Lersner called Mr. Dutasta's attention to the fact that the Treaty of Versailles provided for the designation of American Commissioners to take part in the Delimitation and Plebiscite Commissions. He intimated that, in case the American Commissioners might not be designated before the ratification of the Treaty by the United States of America, the Allied and Associated Governments should come to an understanding at the present time with the German Government with a view to the examination of the consequences which might result from this situation and avoid the possibility that the Commissions might be unable to be formed within the time specified.

The questions shall be submitted to the Supreme Council during the next session.

In view of this deliberation, the Secretary General of the Peace Conference has requested the Drafting Committee to kindly give their views on the point of law introduced by the President of the German Delegation.

#### APPENDIX I TO NO. 2

##### *Note from the Drafting Committee on the question introduced by Baron von Lersner regarding the functioning of plebiscite and delimitation commissions pending the appointment of American representatives*

All Commissions to be constituted by the Allied and Associated Powers shall be duly composed and shall function regularly with the representatives designated by the Powers having ratified the Treaty or who, without having ratified, have agreed to proceed with the designation of a representative to the Commission.

If all the Powers, whose representation is provided for in the Treaty, have not designated their representatives at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty, the decisions taken by the Commission shall be none the less valid. And if, in like cases, there is an equality of votes, the procedure should be as is provided for in Article 437 of the Treaty.

For the Drafting Committee,

HENRI FROMAGEOT,

October 16, 1919.

### No. 3

H. D. 73.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, October 20, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Percin.

*Italy*: M. Tittoni; SECRETARIES, M. Paterno, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*:

Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Dr. J. B. Scott, Capt. B. Winthrop.

*British Empire*: Gen. Sackville-West, Mr. Groves, Mr. Fuller, Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. Malkin.

*France*: General Belin, General Le Rond, M. Tirard, Colonel Roye, M. Fromageot, M. Escoffier.

*Italy*: M. Ricci-Busatti, Gen. Cavallero.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. M. PICHON desired to refer to the minutes of the meeting of the Council of

October 16th (See H. D. 71,<sup>1</sup> Minute 1), and read the following question of Mr. Polk (English Text, page 5):<sup>2</sup>

Reference to H.D. 71,<sup>1</sup>  
Minute 1, October 16,  
1919

'Mr. Polk said that he hoped that the matter could be cleared up. He wished to ask whether the rifles were to

be delivered to the Hungarian police at the present time and whether the Roumanian forces were to withdraw at the present time, whatever the Government in Hungary might be.

'M. Pichon replied in the affirmative.'

He stated that he wished to make his position clear in this respect. He meant that he agreed that the rifles in question were to be delivered to the Hungarian gendarmerie at the present time, but with reference to the withdrawal of the Roumanians he felt that this matter should wait upon the receipt of a reply to the Council's note to the Roumanian Government and upon the report

<sup>1</sup> No. 1.

<sup>2</sup> p. 3.

to be made by Sir George Clerk. He felt that this was the sense of the whole discussion.

MR. POLK said that he understood that the Council and the Allied Generals had already directed the Roumanians to withdraw and that, therefore, there was no reason to have their withdrawal wait upon the receipt of a reply to the Council's note to the Roumanian Government, or upon a report from Sir George Clerk.

M. PICHON said that he only wanted to make his own opinion clear.

MR. POLK desired to ascertain the Council's opinion. The Allied Generals had directed the Roumanians to withdraw and they had been supported in his action by the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that a demand for withdrawal was contained in the note sent to the Roumanian Government and that the Council were waiting an answer thereto.

M. PICHON replied that this was so, but thought that it was important to receive the reply of the Roumanian Government in order to know what it would be most practical to do.

MR. POLK pointed out that the Roumanians had been directed to withdraw prior to the sending of the note. He read from the minutes of the meeting the question asked by him, above referred to, and explained that what he meant was that it was the duty of the Roumanians to withdraw at once without waiting for any conference with Sir George Clerk.

2. (The Council had before it a draft communication of the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government relative to the signature of Peace with Austria (see Appendix A).)
- Communication to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government relative to the signature of Peace with Austria* MR. POLK stated that he wished to read the draft note to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government in order to satisfy himself as to questions of form only, and that he would communicate his conclusions thereupon to Sir Eyre Crowe later in the day.

It was decided:

to approve the draft communication from the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government relative to the signature of peace with Austria (see Appendix A), subject to the reservation that Mr. Polk would examine this draft further with reference to questions of form and would communicate his conclusions to Sir Eyre Crowe.

3. SIR EYRE CROWE said that it had been reported to him that as a result of the situation at Riga the Allied Naval Armistice Commission had decided temporarily to stop the movement of all German ships in the Baltic. Formerly it was necessary to obtain the Commission's permission for German ships to navigate but the Commission now proposed to suspend the granting of all such permissions. He wished to know if the Supreme Council agreed to this action.
- Action of Allied Naval Armistice Commission resulting from the situation at Riga*

M. PICHON said that the Council would take note of it.

MR. POLK inquired whether this would apply to all German ships in the Baltic regardless of where they might be.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that this was the case, the reason being that if ships were allowed to go out of the harbours where they now were there was no telling what their destination might be.

MR. POLK felt that if the Armistice Commission had taken such action it was quite all right.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that a British ship had been fired on by the Germans and twice hit.

(The council noted with approval the action of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.)

4. (The Council had before it a report from the Supreme War Council relative to supplies to be furnished the Polish Army (see *Report from the Supreme War Council relative to aid to be given to Polish Army* Appendix B).)

GENERAL BELIN stated that the Council had agreed on all the points embraced in this report, with the reservation by the American Representative to the effect that his Government could at the present moment not participate in any way in furnishing supplies to Poland.

M. TITTONI observed that a Polish Committee for the purchase of war material had been in contact with his Government and he hoped that the participation by Italy in the furnishing of supplies recommended under the terms of the War Council's report would not interrupt the activities of this Polish Purchasing Committee in Italy.

GENERAL BELIN observed that the same situation existed in France. General Le Rond called attention to the deficiency which would exist even if the recommendations contained in the report of the Supreme War Council were fully carried out. Marshal Foch had made it clear that 600,000 sets of warm clothing were urgently necessary for the Polish army.<sup>3</sup> The Marshal had shown that it was a political as well as a military necessity to furnish this clothing immediately to the Polish army but it now appeared that only 200,000 sets of warm clothing could possibly be sent to the Polish army; likewise, it was evident that no Power could supply sufficient rolling stock to Poland in accordance with the recommendations of the report. Anything that any Power might be able to do over and above the contribution allotted to it by this report would be of the greatest possible benefit. The gravest problem necessarily was that of clothing; if the Polish army did not receive partially adequate clothing before the setting in of a rigorous winter it was extremely liable to become imbued with the dangerous revolutionary doctrines by which they were surrounded.

MR. POLK desired to ask the officers present if they thought that an army of the present size was a necessity to Poland.

<sup>3</sup> See Vol. I, No. 69, appendix C.

GENERAL LE ROND agreed with Mr. Polk's underlying idea that the Polish army should be reduced to such a size as would be consistent with military necessity, but a question of fact was presented in that the Polish Government was obliged to clothe even those men who were now under arms and who might later be demobilized.

M. TITTONI felt that a reduction in the size of the Polish army was inevitable. He recalled that when M. Paderewski was last heard before the Council he had made it very clear that it would be impossible for Poland to continue to pay an army of that size.<sup>4</sup> The Council felt that no Power or Powers could undertake the financial burden necessary for the maintenance of the Polish army, and the examination of the question had been postponed. His immediate concern, however, was not Bolshevism, for he felt that this was rapidly tending to become less dangerous.

GENERAL LE ROND thought that it was somewhat premature to dismiss the question of the danger of Bolshevism thus lightly.

M. TITTONI reiterated that the size of the Polish army must be reduced as there was no way of paying it.

MR. POLK called attention to the fact that according to a prior report on this question 100,000 new men were being called to the colours in November and 75,000 additional men would be called up in January and March.

GENERAL LE ROND inquired whether the number of men demobilized was also shown in this report. It was a fact that the Poles had released a considerable number of the older classes.

M. PICHON pointed out that in a recent debate in the Polish Diet the Minister of War had promised that a substantial number of men would shortly be demobilized: this, however, was dependent upon the situation in Russia, and according to latest advices, the end of the Soviet regime could hardly be predicted as likely to occur prior to the month of March. It would be highly imprudent therefore to cease taking serious precautions. Certainly every effort must be made to clothe the Polish army at once.

MR. POLK said there was no doubt of that.

GENERAL BELIN pointed out that the report of the Supreme War Council had taken account of the fact that an additional effort relative to the supply of the Polish army might have to be made; it was for this reason that the report had specified that the general basis of its recommendations was a momentary one.

SIR EYRE CROWE desired to point out that if the British were to be asked to make a further effort with respect to supplying the Polish army it should be remembered what had already been done by them; for instance, the British practically alone had undertaken the complete supply of the forces in southern Russia.

It was decided: to accept the report submitted by the Supreme War Council relative to aid to be given to the Polish army and to transmit this report to Marshal Foch for execution.

<sup>4</sup> See Vol. I, No. 58, minute 1.

5. (The Council had before it a draft proclamation of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission. (See Appendix C).)

*Proclamation of the  
Inter-Allied Rhineland  
High Commission*

M. TIRARD explained that this proclamation would be published on the day the Treaty entered into force. He pointed out that in the first and second paragraphs of this proclamation mention was made only of the Allied Powers; if the United States should decide to designate a representative on this Commission the words 'and Associated' could be added to the words 'the Allied Powers' at the last moment.

MR. POLK said that the point could not be answered on that day. He would immediately transmit the draft of this document to his Government for its approval.

(It was decided:

to adopt the draft proclamation of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, with the reservations that Mr. Polk would submit this document to his Government for approval, and that in case the United States Government should communicate a decision to designate a representative on the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, the words 'and Associated' should be added in the first and second paragraphs to the words 'The Allied Powers'.)

6. (The Council had before it a draft form of letter to be signed by the President of the United States calling the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (see Appendix D), a draft letter from the President of the Conference to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris (see Appendix E),<sup>5</sup> and a draft letter from the President of the Conference to the chief delegate of the United States of America, the British Empire, Japan, Belgium, Brazil and Greece. (See Appendix F).<sup>5</sup>)

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented on these three draft letters and pointed out that it was most important to have the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations take place at the very hour when the Treaty came into effect and in the same place. Taking up the question of the Sarre territory, as an example, he showed that there was no obligation under the Treaty to appoint a Sarre Commission within any given time, but that if this were not done this district would be without any Government what-

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. The letter in appendix F was drafted in accordance with the recommendations contained in the first part of the Drafting Committee's report of October 17, 1919 (see No. 2, appendix E) and with the second resolution of the Supreme Council recorded in No. 2, minute 5; it explained the proposed procedure and requested the Powers in question to designate their delegates to the Council of the League of Nations; the presence of these delegates in Paris as soon as practicable was stated to be desirable in connexion with the holding of an unofficial meeting of the Council of the League of Nations to prepare for its first official meeting at the time of the deposit of the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles. The draft letter in appendix E to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris was an adaptation of the draft in appendix F.

soever, inasmuch as all German authority ceased the moment the Treaty came into force.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that the same thing applied to Dantzig.

M. FROMAGEOT said that this was not quite so in form, although substantially it was so.

MR. POLK stated that he had already cabled the draft of the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations to Washington.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed to the necessity of having the first meeting take place at the moment the Treaty came into effect, but he was not so convinced of the necessity of having the first meeting in Paris. The essential machinery actually existed and was in London.

M. TITTONI stated that he had just received from the Secretary General at London the agenda for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. There were two alternative agenda possible: if the United States were not represented at the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations this meeting should take place in Paris and could only concern itself with the nomination of members of the Commission of Delimitation of the Sarre Territory; whereas, if the United States should be represented at this meeting it should take place in London and the agenda would then comprise numerous questions which would necessitate protracted action.

M. PICHON pointed out that the agenda received by M. Tittoni could only be a draft. The question of the place where the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations should take place could only be decided here by the Supreme Council because Sir Eric Drummond could not act officially as General Secretary of the League of Nations before the Treaty came into force. Up to the present time all official meetings with reference to the organization of the League of Nations had taken place in Paris. M. Clemenceau and Colonel House had agreed that the first meeting should be in Paris.<sup>6</sup>

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he was not aware of any such agreement.

M. FROMAGEOT pointed out that it would be most unfortunate to have nothing but the question of the Sarre Delimitation Commission on the agenda of the first meeting.

M. PICHON said that President Wilson had agreed to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations at Paris.

MR. POLK said that he was not objecting, but that he had never known that there was such an agreement. He thought, in fact, that it was better to have the first meeting here in Paris, but that he was quite unaware that there had been an agreement to that effect. He could recall nothing further than that at a meeting between MM. Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Tittoni and the Japanese Ambassador the matter had been discussed. He had never seen the letter in question from Colonel House to M. Clemenceau, except insofar

<sup>6</sup> Certain correspondence of September 1919 between M. Clemenceau, Colonel House and President Wilson, relative to the convocation of the first meetings of the organs of the League of Nations, is printed by C. Seymour: *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (London 1926-8), vol. iv, pp. 506-8. Cf. also *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920* (Washington, 1935) vol. i, pp. 6-7.

as he had seen press reports thereof, and he did not think that President Wilson was committed by this letter.

M. PICHON remarked that if Mr. Polk had already cabled to Washington, there was nothing to do but to await a reply.

It was decided:

- (1) to adopt the draft form of letter, to be signed by President Wilson, convoking the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations;
- (2) to adjourn the consideration of the question of an unofficial meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

7. MR. POLK summarized a letter from the Commanding General of the American Forces in Germany recommending that the cost of transportation to and maintenance in the United States of German subjects convicted of serious offences against members of the American Forces or against the property or authority of American Forces in Germany be deemed a proper charge against the German Government as an item in the cost of maintenance of troops of occupation.
- Cost of Transportation to and maintenance in the United States of German subjects convicted of serious offences against members of the American Forces or against the property or authority of American Forces in Germany*

It was decided:

to refer this question to the Drafting Committee.

8. (The Council had before it a report from the Drafting Committee relative to the enforcement of unfulfilled armistice clauses after the entrance into force of the Treaty and to affirmative means of action available to the Allied and Associated Powers (see Appendix G).)

*Report of the Drafting Committee relative to enforcement of unfulfilled Armistice Clauses after the entrance into force of the Treaty, and to affirmative means of action available to the Allied and Associated Powers*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon this report.

MR. POLK asked whether a pacific blockade could be imposed by any other body than the League of Nations.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the Covenant does provide means of pressure but his Committee was considering the question independently of the provisions with respect to the League of Nations and rather from the point of view of action to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. POLK queried whether economic pressure could not be exerted by the Reparation Commission. What he chiefly desired to ascertain was what was the quickest means of bringing pressure to bear on Germany.

M. FROMAGEOT said that apart from a blockade there could be effective interdiction of commerce as well as financial measures. Furthermore there were additional means of bringing pressure to bear, for instance, it might be

provided that German goods and German freights should be subjected to a severe surtax which could go towards the payment of Germany's debt for reparations. He added that if certain Powers had objections to a pacific blockade these objections could only be valid in so far as they emanated from Powers that had ratified the Treaty. Powers who had not ratified could declare a blockade and could take measures amounting to interdiction of commerce while requesting that the Powers which had ratified the Treaty should coordinate with them.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that Mr. Polk's question was not as to what measures might be taken but as to who might take them.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that the principal Allied and Associated Powers could do so. He added that an additional means of exerting pressure was the occupation of German territory, for which there were clear precedents, for instance, the occupation of the Duchy of Schleswig and of Mitylene.<sup>7</sup> Finally there remained the possibility of retaining prisoners until the Germans should fulfil all of their obligations arising out of the armistice.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that there were a good many practical questions remaining to be settled. Certainly the various Commissions charged with the supervision of the execution of the terms of the Armistice should report on the terms of the Armistice which still remained unfulfilled and submit these reports to the Council. He said that he knew offhand several unfulfilled clauses, for instance, the naval clauses.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that each Committee charged with the supervision of execution of the armistice clauses should be asked to report within four days on any unfulfilled clauses coming within their jurisdiction.

It was decided:

- (1) that Marshal Foch and the competent Commissions (The Allied Armistice Commission at Cologne, the Allied Naval Armistice Commission at London, the Financial Commission) should report to the Council within four days all clauses of the Armistice still remaining unfulfilled;
- (2) that Sir Eyre Crowe should take the necessary measures to secure this report from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission.

9.

*Monthly Allowances to  
be assigned to General  
Officers, Members of  
Inter-Allied Commissions  
of Control in Germany,  
who are Chairmen neither  
of Commissions nor Sub-  
Commissions*

[Not printed]

<sup>7</sup> In 1901 a French fleet was ordered to seize the island of Mitylene as an act of reprisal against Turkey.

*Protest of the Greek  
Delegation against the  
Decision taken by the  
British Command to  
transport to Constanti-  
nople Turkish heavy  
artillery and munitions  
left in the Greek Zone of  
Occupation in Asia  
Minor*

11. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation on the repatriation of troops from Siberia (see Appendix J).<sup>9</sup> The substance of the note was stated to the Council.)

*Repatriation of troops  
from Siberia*

MR. POLK asked if it was settled as to who should pay the expenses of repatriation.

M. TITTONI observed that that was a different question; the only thing now to be decided was the order in which the troops were to be repatriated.

<sup>8</sup> The Supreme Council considered this protest from the Greek Delegation, dated October 14, 1919 (appendix I in original). 'M. Berthelot in commenting on the Greek protest, pointed out that the Greeks had no right to the material in question; they had only obtained the same by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Council which allowed them to occupy the Smyrna district to maintain order there. On the other hand, as the Turks were being disarmed, they should not have this material either. It belonged to the reparation fund. He thought it might be best to approve the decision of the British Command, with the understanding that this material should be received and held in the name of the Allied Powers.' The Supreme Council thereupon decided in this sense.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. This note, dated October 18, 1919, stated that according to advices from the French General Janin in Siberia to the French Ministry of War the strength of the troops to be repatriated from Siberia was: Czechoslovaks, 54,000; Poles, 12,000; Roumanians 2,700; Letts in Krasnoyarsk, 800; Letts in Vladivostok, 1,000; Serbo-Croats: (a) 'Serbian regiments', 1,400; (b) 'Jugoslav regiments', 1,600; (c) in Vladivostok 1,000. 'Furthermore, the important transportation of families must be considered. For the Polish division, in particular, there are about 2,500 persons.' The French note represented that it was indispensable that the Supreme Council should 'determine a logical and impartial plan of evacuation which would have to be rigorously carried out', and stated that General Janin had established a plan 'based on the services rendered by the different contingents and on their state of morale'. It was observed that any other procedure might entail serious consequences, occasioning rival claims and disorders, and moreover that a methodical evacuation was necessary 'in order to permit the Russians to organize the relief of the foreign contingents on the Trans-Siberian. The weak resources of Admiral Kolchak in men, the inefficiency of the railroads, would, in fact, prevent the Siberian Government from coping with any unforeseen situation.' The note therefore submitted to the Supreme Council General Janin's plan for evacuation according to the following priorities: (i) Czechoslovaks; (ii) Poles; (iii) Roumanians; (iv) Letts—detachment of Krasnoyarsk; (v) Serbo-Croats—'Serbian regiments of Krasnoyarsk and then the so-called Jugoslav regiments of Krasnoyarsk'; (note in original: 'With the exception of a few invalids, the Serbians of Vladivostok, as well as several other detachments of the same origin scattered throughout Siberia, do not deserve to be removed before the prisoners. They are deserters and elements unworthy of interest'); (vi) Letts of Vladivostok.

MR. POLK thought he had no objection as to the order in which the troops were to be repatriated, but he did not wish the question to be decided on that day. He recalled that he had heard that local conditions in Siberia made it inadvisable, for instance, to repatriate all the Czecho-Slovak troops first.

M. BERTHELOT wished to add, for the information of the Council, that it was understood that the French would bear the expenses of repatriation arising in Siberia, and that the British would bear the expense of sea transportation; afterwards a division of expenses would be made. He added that after considerable discussion M. Benes had promised him that the Czecho-Slovak Government would pay at least half of the expenses of the repatriation of the Czecho-Slovak troops, and, if possible, would do even better. There remained still unsettled the question of whether the United States would pay a part of the expenses.

MR. POLK said that the difficulty now was that his Government was prepared to pay a lump sum, but there was a question whether France and England could contribute.

(It was decided: to adjourn the discussion and decision of this question.)

(The meeting then adjourned)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, October 20, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 3

*15th October 1919.*

The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference have the honour to address to the Royal Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State an urgent reminder that the Royal Government have not yet signed and adhered to the Treaty of Peace with the Republic of Austria concluded at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 10th September last, together with the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the one part and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on the other which was signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the same date.

The Supreme Council, anxious to accord to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State every opportunity for consideration of the many important questions at present before them, have hitherto refrained from addressing to the Royal Government any demand which might be felt to embarrass their position. The Supreme Council, however, cannot accord an indefinite delay to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government for the decision which must be taken as to whether these two Treaties already signed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall also be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. The Supreme Council have always been animated by the warmest feelings of friendship for and sympathy with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State which they have been proud to consider a full ally and associate alike in the work of the Peace Conference and in the organisation and future activities of the League of Nations. It is therefore the more surprising to the Supreme Council that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State has hitherto refrained

from adhering to the Treaty of Peace with Austria in which fullest and most sympathetic account has been taken of the aspirations and needs of the Yugo-Slav people. It is true that the difficulty made by the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to the signature of the Treaty was based on the fact that an integral part of the Treaty was Article 51. This Article expanded into the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State engages the Serb-Croat-Slovene State in the same way as all other Powers concerned or involved to the solemn acceptance of certain provisions for the protection of minorities and freedom of transit in conformity with the essential principles and under the high control of the League of Nations to which the Serb-Croat-Slovene State has already adhered.

The Supreme Council, however, are loath to believe that the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government intend to persist in objections which could only be regarded as expressing intentions and foreshadowing a policy totally contrary to that on the basis of which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have accorded to the Yugo-Slav people as a whole their warm sympathy and support in their efforts towards the constitution and full international recognition of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.

Such a complete contradiction of the fundamental principles of the League of Nations it would be impossible for the Supreme Council to approve or to tolerate. The Supreme Council, however, are certain that the Allied Serb-Croat-Slovene Government can have no intention of persisting in such a point of view.

The Supreme Council, therefore, wish to remind the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government that it is impossible any further to prolong the delay to full acceptance of the Treaty.

Confident in a friendly feeling and good intentions of the Allied Serb-Croat-Slovene nation, the Supreme Council venture to express the hope that the Royal Government will be good enough to notify them forthwith that the Serb-Croat-Slovene State engages to sign the two Treaties without reservation. Failing receipt of this promise the Supreme Council will be forced to conclude that the Royal Serb-Croat-Slovene Government have decided to abandon the alliance and pursue an independent policy, hostile to the Peace Conference and the League of Nations. The Supreme Council feel that there is no need to dwell on the serious situation in which the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would thereby be placed, forced without any co-operation and support from the Powers comprising the League of Nations, to pursue an entirely isolated policy without any international recognition of its new territorial frontiers and political status.

At a moment when similar stipulations have already been accepted in treaty form by other states concerned, the Supreme Council are unwilling to believe that the Royal Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State have the intention of pursuing a policy at variance with all the principles on the basis of which the Peace Conference have supported the constitution of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. Convinced that the Royal Government, conscious of the Serb-Croat-Slovene people's wholehearted desire to co-operate with their Allies, will not fail to take into account these serious considerations, the Supreme Council have the honour to ask from the Royal Government a positive and explicit reply within fifteen days from the present date.

## APPENDIX B TO NO. 3

### *Report on Furnishing Material to the Polish Army*

#### SUPERIOR WAR COUNCIL

Military Representatives.

VERSAILLES, Oct. 15, 1919.

By a resolution under date of October 2, 1919, the Supreme Council decided:<sup>10</sup>

1st—to submit the demands for material, received from the Polish Ministry of War, and approved by Marshal Foch, for examination by the military representatives of the Superior War Council at Versailles;

2nd—to invite the military representatives at Versailles to examine the question, and to present a report thereon as soon as possible.

It has been further decided that the execution of the measures recommended by the military representatives at Versailles, after approval by the Supreme Council, shall be confided to the Staff of Marshal Foch.

#### The Military Representatives *considering*:

1st—that Poland has been, from the beginning of the war, the theatre of active operations; and that from this fact, she has been deprived of a great part of existence necessities; foodstuffs, clothing, railroad material and factories, and that it appears that she has nothing in reserve at the present time;

2nd—that by utilizing all her resources, Poland was able to organize and keep up, with the aid of the allies, an army of 500,000 men, which forced the Russian Red Armies into a rapid and extensive retreat;

3rd—that the Polish army appears at the present time to be in complete destitution from every point of view (a great number of the men being clothed in denim (*toile*); linen, mantles, and blankets are completely lacking); that this destitution has already had a depressing influence on the health and morale of the troops, and that it might develop much more serious repercussions during the first cold weather in those regions where winter is early and terribly severe;

4th—that, by considering only the requests of the Polish Government touching their needs of *immediate urgency*, the Polish army in order to continue its existence, should receive:

about 600,000 outfits, particularly warm clothing and overcoats, one-half

immediately and the other half before the middle of December;

infantry and machine-gun ammunition, shells and caissons;

100 locomotives and 1,500 cars for special army service;

5th—that the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers concerning furnishing of material to Poland was favourably considered by the Supreme Council on June 27th 1919;

#### *\*esteem:*

1st—that, as they had already recommended in their report of July 11, 1919,<sup>11</sup> relative to the material to be furnished to Poland, it would be advisable that the Allied and Associated Powers adopt: 'all measures necessary to hasten the sending to Poland of the material asked for in the numerous requests of the Polish army'.

2nd—that it would be well, as a consequence, to confide to Marshal Foch the mission:

(a) of arranging with the Allied Staffs, the participation of each one of the Allied and Associated Powers in the furnishing of material to the Polish

<sup>10</sup> See Vol. I, No. 69, minute 2.

<sup>11</sup> See Vol. I, No. 11, appendix F.

army, according to the general basis temporarily established by the Annex I hereto attached;  
 arrange for the transportation and delivery of this material to Poland, by utilizing in so far as possible:  
 1. Italian and Austrian lines, the Swiss and Austrian lines and the Czechoslovakia[n] roads;  
 2. by sea route, with debarkation at Dantzig as soon as debarkation shall have become possible, and if sea transportation presents greater advantage than railroad transportation.  
 The Military Representatives wish to respectfully call the attention of the Council to the great urgency there is to take a decision in this matter, in that the Polish army may receive warm clothing before the commencement

in accordance with the terms of a letter to his Colleagues, dated October 10, 1918, and attached hereto, as Annex II, the American Military Representative's general reservation concerning the entire participation possible of the Allies, now or later, in the furnishing of supplies of every kind destined for the Polish army.

N	SACKVILLE-WEST	CAVALLERO	BLISS
Mil.	British Mil.	Italian Mil.	American Mil.
Representative	Representative	Representative	Representative

### Annex No. I

*Disposal of the supplies which can be disposed of at the present time by the Allied and Associated Powers, for the provisioning of Poland*

*Supplies at Britain.* 10,000 rifles, 1,400 machine guns, 18 million cartridges.

*United States.* 500,000 flannel vest belts, 500,000 pairs of woollen gloves, several hundred thousand 75 mm. shells, 10,000 shells of 155 mm.

*Other States.* Has no material available, at the present time, for the provisioning of Poland.

*France.* Important number of complete outfits and several hundreds of thousands of metres of German cloth available from the stocks recently received by the French Government from the United States. Miscellaneous winter effects to be deducted from the war supplies.

### Annex No. II

WAR COUNCIL

1. Section

VERSAILLES, October 13, 1919.

American Military Representative

French, British, and Italian Military Representatives.

Reference is made to the minutes of the Session of the Military Representatives held in Paris on October 26th [sic], during which the Military Representatives of Marshal Foch's recommendation relative to the furnishing of material for the Polish army, I have the honour to communicate the following to you.

On October 7th, I telegraphed, to the Minister of War and to the Chief of Staff, the recommendation submitted by Marshal Foch to Mr. Clemenceau in a letter

dated September 29th, concerning the shipping of supplies of all kinds to the Polish army.<sup>3</sup> In the same telegram I informed the Washington Government of the extent of the needs of the Polish army, extent submitted by the Polish Minister of War and approved by Marshal Foch. In the telegram I posed the following questions:

1st. Will the United States participate in the furnishing of funds or material, or both, destined for the Polish army?

2nd. If the Government of the United States decides to participate, will it determine its own contribution or will it agree to furnish the same contribution as each one of the other Principal Allied and Associated Powers which would also participate?

In reply to this telegram, the War Department at Washington directed me to communicate the following decision to my Colleagues:

1st. The Government of the United States has no authority, under the present legislation, to take part in the aid proposed, even by furnishing supplementary assistance:

2nd. The supplementary supplies of the United States in Europe have been extensively drawn from, and new sales to Poland on credit, outside of the supplementary supplies in the United States, cannot be approved;

3rd. As an act of Congress in the United States should precede all definite action, the Government and the War Department are not disposed to recommend such a measure, considering their present views on the interests of the United States.

TASKER H. BLISS  
General, American Army,  
American Military Representative.

### APPENDIX C TO No. 3

#### *Proclamation of the Interallied High Commission to the Rhineland*

In execution of the Peace Treaty, the Interallied High Commission of the Rhineland assumes, from this date, the supreme representation of the Allied Governments in occupied territory.

Guided by the instructions of the Allied Governments, the Commission desires to make as light as possible, for the Rhenish population, the burden of occupation, under the single condition that the German Government fulfills its duties concerning the reparations due to the victims of the war.

The High Commission guarantees to the Rhenish populations the full execution, both in word and spirit, of the occupation statutes, the especially generous regime of which is unprecedented in history.

The Commission will see, moreover, in accord with the High Command of the Allied troops, that no prejudice is introduced concerning the safety of the troops. It will suppress, without needless severity but with firmness, any enterprise against the security of these troops, which in 1918 crossed the frontiers under the emotion of the spectacle of their devastated homes, the memory of the horror of the treatment inflicted on their wives, parents and children, and which, by their self control, winning the most noble of victories, have, for ten months, furnished the Rhenish populations with the benefits of order, assistance from their own supplies, and their example of discipline.

The High Commission counts upon the collaboration of the German functionaries and magistrates, in order to assure, by complete harmony in this collaboration, a regime of order, labour and peace for the populations of the occupied territory; responsible for public order, the burden of which finally falls on the troops of occupation, the Commission intends to guarantee justice, the exercise of public and private liberty, the development of the legitimate aspirations and the prosperity of the Rhenish populations.

The High Commission hopes that the contact between the troops of the Allied and Associated Nations and the Rhenish population will be, not a cause of friction, but a means to establish better acquaintance and to develop a closer relationship between labour, order, and the future peace of a better humanity.

#### APPENDIX D TO NO. 3

##### DRAFTING COMMITTEE

##### *Plan of Convocation of the First Council of the League of Nations in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention*

(To be addressed to the Governments of the United States of America, British Empire, French Republic, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, Spain, Greece.)

In compliance with Article 5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the President of the United States of America has the honour to inform the Government of ——— that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations will be held at the place, day and hour of the signature of the first procès-verbal of the deposit of the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles, of June 28, 1919.

The date upon which this act will take place will be definitely determined later by the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The President of the United States ventures to hope that the representative of the Government of ——— will not fail to attend this meeting.<sup>12</sup>

#### APPENDIX G TO NO. 3

##### *Note to the Supreme Council relative to the Execution of the Obligations imposed by the Armistice*

1st. In principle, the stipulations of the Armistice are replaced by those of the Peace Treaty; but, the obligations imposed by the Armistice may remain in force, whether by virtue of their permanent character, or as a result of their remaining in force, as expressly or implicitly provided for by the Treaty itself. This applies in particular concerning the obligations of Germany referred to in Articles 212 (Protection of Territories), 248 and 251 (Financial Obligations). It is under these conditions that the accomplishment of the non-executed clauses of the Armistice may be demanded by the Allied and Associated Powers.

<sup>12</sup> The text of this draft letter is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920* vol. i, p. 7.

2nd. Until the entry into force of the Treaty, the Powers have as a means of action the right to renounce the Armistice and resume hostilities. Rules of The Hague, Article 40; Armistice of November 11, 1918, Article 34/. After the entry into force of the Treaty, the Powers will have no other means of action to insure the execution of the obligations incumbent on Germany than the guarantees stipulated in the Treaty itself, or resulting from the general principles of the rights of peoples.

The guarantees provided for by the Treaty are, it is known, particularly those contained in Article[s] 213, 428 to 432 of [?] and, Par. 18 of Annex II of Article 244 (Reparations). Especially relative to the Baltic provinces, the Treaty contains as a guarantee for their execution, the provisions of Article 433.

As a means of coercion, according to the general principles of the rights of peoples, apart from war means, can be cited: economic pressure in default of the blockade called pacific, which raises objections on the part of certain Powers—reprisals, such as an occupation of territory, a seizure of German merchant vessels of less than 1,600 tons, a detention of prisoners of war.

Furthermore, Germany might be warned that the Treaty would not enter into force until such time as she had previously executed in their entirety the obligations assumed by her in the Armistice—or to [sic] further stipulate on the part of Germany, at the time of the entry into force, of an express renewal of certain of her Armistice obligations, by henceforth submitting their execution to the supervision of an Interallied Commission or to any other control deemed necessary.

However, it is important to remember that by the terms of the final clauses of the Treaty, the procès-verbal of deposit must be drawn up 'as soon as the Treaty shall have been ratified by Germany, on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other'. Now, it is publicly known that, in fact, Germany and three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have actually ratified. Germany might thus take advantage of the said final clauses and demand the accomplishment of the formality of the procès-verbal of deposit without further delay. But, in such an event, an adjournment of the completion of the procès-verbal by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would be justified as a measure of reprisal.

#### No. 4

H. D. 74.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, October 22, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Percin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARIES, M. Paterno, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. British Empire: Capt. G. Lothian Small. France: M. Massigli. Italy: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

3. M. TITTONI wished to announce that Italy had appointed Count Bonin-Langare, Italian Ambassador in Paris, as its Delegate on the permanent Committee charged with the execution of the Treaty, and Professor Pagliano as second Delegate.

*The Committee on Coordination of Questions relating to the Interpretation and Execution of the Treaty of Peace*

M. PICHON said that France would be represented on the Committee by himself, and by M. Berthelot as second Delegate.

pending further instructions, and therefore I request you to make inquiries and telegraph to me whether these persons can be allowed to proceed on their journey to Moscow. The Lithuanian Government, with the materials at their disposal, are unable to make any further investigations as to the identity of the various individuals, or the nature of the work to be performed in Russia.

'In my opinion it would be absolutely unjustifiable to allow them to proceed further on their journey until they have completely explained themselves, and have been granted the necessary authority by you, for the following reasons:—(1) In view of the blockade it is not permitted for an aeroplane to proceed into Russia without some form of pass; (2) The journey was avowedly undertaken to commence trade relations between Germany and Russia, which is not permitted at present; (3) The map discovered in the aeroplane gives one to suppose that some form of spying was intended; (4) The passengers have insufficient and unsatisfactory papers to enable them to undertake a peculiar journey of this kind at such a time.

'I should therefore be glad if you could make the necessary enquiries and telegraph to me at the earliest possible moment if the aeroplane and its occupants can proceed; or if not, exactly what steps are to be taken in the matter.

'I am sending copies of this letter to the Foreign Office, the British Mission in Paris, and to Colonel Tallents at Riga.'

The following is a translation from the original German of the enclosure in Col. Ward's report:

'Nuorasas.

'Mie—Kie.

Dessau, [figure illegible] October 1919.

*Instructions for Central Offices.*

#### 'I. Patents

'To establish the position of patent matters in Russia. Is the patent law to be presumed to be subject to variations of form of government? Would it be possible for patent applications to accompany a further flight? General information about the patent position.

#### 'II. Aircraft

'1. Is there any possibility as to manufacture in the future? What is the position and stability of the industry in this respect? Are there any parties interested? What internal security exists? Would it be possible to send German engineers and workmen there?

'2. Sale. Is there any demand for sale on the part of: (a) private persons, (b) authorities, (c) military? What is the demand for the purchase of completed aircraft? Does there exist any possible demand for the establishment of companies for air traffic? Describe in this connexion the great prospects and possibilities of development of the Junkers aircraft. Connected therewith is the development of a large traffic connexion from Germany to the Far East or single air traffic lines in the interior of Russia, e.g. Moscow—Petersburg, &c. or, eventually, branch lines from the Siberian railway, e.g. to the north for the fur trade, &c.

'3. Trade exchanges with the help of aircraft, possibly for own or foreign account. For example, in present conditions an air transport trade across the frontier for barter traffic could be considered. Who is to undertake the business and to supply the aircraft? Draw up a list of exchange goods to be exported here from Russia. Goods from here in exchange might, for example, be aluminium articles. What prices can be reckoned on for them?

*German and Austro-Hungarian Banks in Turkey*

4. In respect of all these prospective points it should first be established to what extent the preliminary steps and undertakings can proceed independently as far as possible of a possible change of government.

**III. General**

Investigate the general economic position. Whether the aircraft is to be sold owing to especially favourable circumstances, or owing to the impossibility of bringing it back, must be left to the general state of things. If the aircraft is damaged, try to sell the separate parts, motor, &c., on as favourable terms as possible.

On receipt by the British delegation in Paris of Col. Rowan Robinson's telegram of October 17, it was forwarded by General Groves to General Duval under cover of a letter dated October 22 requesting the latter to bring the telegram to the notice of Marshal Foch. General Groves said in this letter: 'I suggest that the aeroplane shall be confiscated, its personnel retained as prisoners, and that the German Government shall be called upon for an explanation of this flight. I would point out that in addition to being an infringement of the Air Clauses of the Peace Treaty, this flight has been carried out in direct defiance of the Supreme Council's instructions embodied in a resolution of 29th September' (see Vol. I, No. 67, minute 2).

On October 29, 1919, Col. Rowan Robinson telegraphed to the British delegation in Paris giving some of the main particulars contained in Col. Ward's report. On November 7 General Groves forwarded this telegram to General Duval under cover of a letter in which he stated: 'I consider that it is most important that this very clear and definite instance of the infringement of the Air Clauses of the Peace Treaty shall not be allowed to pass unchallenged, particularly in view of the fact that the papers carried in this machine are evidence of the official complicity of the German Authorities.

'I shall be glad if you will be good enough to inform me whether Marshal Foch can see his way to taking the action I suggested in my letter No. 720 of the 22nd October. In view of the fact that the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control is a British General (General Masterman) the responsibility for ensuring that the Air Clauses of the Peace Treaty are carried out will rest primarily with me as soon as the Commission begins to work, but in the meantime in order to strengthen General Masterman's hand it is most desirable that every possible action shall be taken with regard to the constant evasions of the Air Clauses which I report to you.'

On January 13, 1920, the Foreign Office, being in receipt of no recent information concerning this matter, addressed a letter to the Director of Military Intelligence asking what action had been taken. No reply to this letter has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

<sup>2</sup> The Supreme Council considered a note from the Financial Commission dated October 15, 1919 (appendix A in original), reporting 'receipt of a telegram in which the French High Commissioner at Constantinople requests specific and identical instructions for all delegations as to the attitude to be adopted in regard to German banks in Turkey from the date of the coming into force of the Treaty with Germany'. The Financial Commission had taken the occasion to examine and approve earlier, unspecified, action by the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople as regards German and Austrian banks in Turkey, and had drafted a telegram to them from the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers reporting this approval and giving guidance for the future. After a brief discussion the Supreme Council, having regard to the legal issues involved, referred the Financial Commission's note and draft telegram to the Drafting Committee for examination and report (cf. No. 6, minute 9).

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

*U.S.A.*: Mr. E. L. Dresel, Dr. I. Bowman, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Mr. A. Leeper, Commandant [Commander] Lucas.

*France*: Commandant Levavasseur, Commandant Aron, M. Cheysson.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. SIR EYRE CROWE said that he wished to bring to the attention of the Council a telegram which had just been received, according to which a German aeroplane had made a forced landing in the neighbourhood of Kovno. This aeroplane carried two German civilian pilots and three passengers, one of whom was Russian and the other two Turkish; this aeroplane was travelling from Berlin to Moscow and was being held until further orders.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The telegram in question was evidently one dispatched by Col. Rowan Robinson, British Military Representative at Kovno, on October 17, 1919, and received by the British delegation in Paris on October 21. This telegram gave no particulars other than those communicated by Sir E. Crowe to the Supreme Council.

On October 22 Col. R. B. Ward, Assistant British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces stationed at Kovno, sent the following report of the incident to General Malcolm, Chief of the British Military Mission in Berlin:

'Sir, I have the honour to report that a German aeroplane landed at Kovno on the afternoon of the 16th October, having been brought by the German pilot under Lithuanian escort from Abeli, close to the Bolshevik front line at Dvinsk. The aeroplane, which is a monoplane of new and interesting construction, is quite new and was built by the Junkers Flugzeugwerke A.G., Dessau. Its recent history is as follows: on October 2nd, according to the demobilized Oberleutnant Hans Hesse, of the German Flying Service, now in the employ of the Junkers firm, the Ministry of War at Berlin arranged for this aeroplane to fly to von der Goltz with an important letter. The aeroplane was not completely ready and by the 8th the German Government had changed its mind as a message was sent to Dessau to say that the machine need not fly to von der Goltz. On the same day, however, it flew to Berlin where arrangements were made for it to fly from Berlin to Moscow. It left Berlin on the 10th inst. and arrived at Koenigsberg on the 13th, having made two forced landings on the way owing to minor defects. It left Koenigsberg on the 15th and landed at Shavli at the aerodrome kept by the Russian [anti-Soviet] troops, between 12 and 3 p.m. The occupants spoke to various Russian and German officers, and the only person who was required to show his papers was Hesse. They were received very well and had their meals there, and the Russian officers, having been informed that the machine was flying to Moscow, gave various letters to be taken to Moscow and Petrograd. The fact that no attempt was made to control their journey to Moscow, let alone prevent it, and no verification of the occupants having been required, gives me to suppose that papers were taken to the Russo-German troops there of some important nature, although naturally Hesse would not say so. Soon after three they proceeded in the direction of Russia, but at four p.m. on the 15th, owing to clouds and the approach of darkness, they landed at Abeli. The occupants on landing inquired regarding their whereabouts and expressed annoyance at still being in Lithuanian territory, but immediately afterwards were taken into the charge of soldiers and kept in custody until next day, when the aeroplane, as I have explained above, was brought to Kovno with the pilot and mechanic on board, the other passengers being sent to Kovno by rail.

'The following is a list of the passengers:—

'Hans Hesse, Pilot, German subject living in Dessau, in the employ of the Junkers Flugzeugwerke A.G.

'Paul Maruszyk, mechanic, German subject in the employ of the Junkers Flugzeugwerke A.G.

'Abraham Frankl, a Russian Jew, engineer in the Junkers firm, Dessau, who states he is being taken on the trip as interpreter.

'Dr. Dmitri Nicola, alias Sayd Emin, a Christian Turk, native of Bulgaria, recently staying in Berlin, who states he is a chemist by profession and now working for the Turkish Red Cross. He explains his two names as being due to the fact that a Christian Turk must have a Turkish as well as a Christian name.

'Mohammed Ali Sami, Turkish subject recently staying in Berlin, native of Constantinople, doctor of medicine. States he is Chief of the Turkish Red Cross in Russia.

'The two latter persons have passports from the German Government in Berlin viséed by the Lithuanian Representative who about two weeks ago wrote to his Government stating that he had viséed these passports and that these two Turks should be watched during their journey through Lithuania. The others have no papers showing the business on which they are proceeding, and merely possess the usual identification papers.

'According to Hesse, he was commissioned by his firm to fly this aeroplane to Moscow in order to make inquiries as to the possibility of selling the patent and establishing a factory in Russia for the manufacture of aeroplanes of this kind. I enclose a copy of a document he had with him in connexion with this [see below]. Apart from this and the fact that he is the aeroplane pilot, he says he knows nothing about the other passengers whom he was told to take in the ordinary course of his duties.

'Maruszyk is merely a German mechanic of Polish extraction and has no importance in the matter.

'On Frankl, the so-called interpreter, we found two letters from a friend of his in the Junkers firm, named Depp, to his father in Petrograd. These letters go to prove that Hesse had two tasks to perform in flying the aeroplane to Moscow, viz., (1) to start trade relations with the Soviet Government; and (2) to take a person from Germany, who, he states, is of great importance for the Bolshevik Government. He also states in his letter that he would like his father to come to Moscow, so that he could arrange for Krasin, a well-known Bolshevik Commissar, to make the acquaintance of either Hesse or this important personage, but here the text is not quite clear.

'Dr. Dmitri Nicola, alias Sayd Emin, says that he was travelling on behalf of the Turkish Red Cross in order to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Government about the return of Turkish prisoners of war. He states that the German Government had asked him verbally to try and make arrangements for the return of some German hostages in exchange for Radek. Nicola had eighty thousand roubles on him, which he states was for the purpose of paying the expenses for the pilot and mechanic during the journey, and for buying petrol, &c. The firm is charging nothing for the trip, and is paying the salaries of the pilot and mechanic.

'Mohammed Ali Sami tells the same tale as Nicola.

'Hesse states that as the German Government did not want to compromise itself, it gave no passes or papers to any of the party to show that they were bound for Bolshevik territory. In the aeroplane was found a map made by the German War Ministry, dated 1st September, showing the number of troops which could be massed against the Bolsheviks in all countries ranged against them.

'Mohammed Ali Sami professes to be the head of the party, but the Lithuanians, who have conducted the examination of these persons, state that the one who makes the most intelligent, educated, and polished impression is Dmitri Nicola, who they think has the leading role.

'I have told the Lithuanian Government to detain these individuals and the aeroplane

3. M. TITTONI wished to announce that Italy had appointed Count Bonin-Langare, Italian Ambassador in Paris, as its Delegate on the permanent Committee charged with the execution of the Treaty, and Professor Pagliano as second Delegate.

*The Committee on Coordination of Questions relating to the Interpretation and Execution of the Treaty of Peace*

M. PICHON said that France would be represented on the Committee by himself, and by M. Berthelot as second Delegate.

pending further instructions, and therefore I request you to make inquiries and telegraph to me whether these persons can be allowed to proceed on their journey to Moscow. The Lithuanian Government, with the materials at their disposal, are unable to make any further investigations as to the identity of the various individuals, or the nature of the work to be performed in Russia.

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Dessau, [figure illegible] October 1919.

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'To establish the position of patent matters in Russia. Is the patent law to be presumed to be subject to variations of form of government? Would it be possible for patent applications to accompany a further flight? General information about the patent position.

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'3. Trade exchanges with the help of aircraft, possibly for own or foreign account. For example, in present conditions an air transport trade across the frontier for barter traffic could be considered. Who is to undertake the business and to supply the aircraft? Draw up a list of exchange goods to be exported here from Russia. Goods from here in exchange might, for example, be aluminium articles. What prices can be reckoned on for them?

*German and Austro-Hungarian Banks in Turkey*

'4. In respect of all these prospective points it should first be established to what extent the preliminary steps and undertakings can proceed independently as far as possible of a possible change of government.

**'III. General**

'Investigate the general economic position. Whether the aircraft is to be sold owing to especially favourable circumstances, or owing to the impossibility of bringing it back, must be left to the general state of things. If the aircraft is damaged, try to sell the separate parts, motor, &c., on as favourable terms as possible.'

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5.

[Not printed]

*Sequestration of property belonging to the Greek Orthodox Community of Budapest*

6.

[Not printed]

*Repatriation of Staff of Turkish Embassy at Vienna*

7.

[Not printed]<sup>3</sup>

*Permission to Work the Pecs Coal Mines*

8. (The Council had before it a revised draft of a note addressed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government dated October 20th, 1919, which had been prepared by the American Delegation (see Appendix E).)

MR. POLK said that he had asked for certain modifications of form in the draft which the Council had examined at last Monday's meeting;<sup>4</sup> the text which he had prepared had been distributed to the various Delegations.

MR. BERTHELOT said that the Serbian Delegation refused to sign the Treaty of Peace with Austria on account of the Minorities Treaty: this had not been done without hesitation on its part. The only reason that the Serbs gave for not signing immediately was that they were without a cabinet at the time. Now, however, after a long crisis, a cabinet had been formed.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Trumbic had left Belgrade and he and Mr. Patchitch had instructions to sign. Under these circumstances it was a question whether the proposed step was a necessary one. In a conversation which he had had with Mr. Vesnitch, the latter had insisted upon his demand that if the Minorities Treaty be modified to give satisfaction to the Greeks or Roumanians, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government should also benefit by these modifications.

MR. POLK said he had received a telegram from the United States Minister at Belgrade announcing the departure of Mr. Trumbic who had received

<sup>3</sup> After a brief discussion the Supreme Council decided to refer to the Economic Commission for examination and report a note from the Yugoslav delegation dated October 7, 1919 (appendix D in original), explaining the stringency of Yugoslavia's coal position and requesting 'that the exploitation of the Petchoui [Pecs] mines be, by the Treaty with Hungary, given to us for a short period of five years after which we think we shall be able to produce sufficiently for our consumption'.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 3, minute 2, and appendix A.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. No. 1, note 11.

instructions to sign the Treaty: under these conditions it was perhaps not necessary to send a note.

M. PICHON was of the same opinion.

M. TITTONI inquired whether the Serbs meant to sign the Treaty only after it had been modified.

M. BERTHELOT stated that no modifications had been made to the Treaty since the Council had last heard Mr. Vesnitch, at which meeting M. Tittoni was present.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the situation was not the same for the Treaty with Serbia as regards Minorities as for Treaties with Greece and Roumania. The Principal Allied Powers had already signed the Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government.

M. BERTHELOT said that the question had already been brought up in connexion with Poland: Poland had asked that if on any important point a more favourable situation was granted to the Roumanians, concerning the Jewish question for instance, the same advantages should be granted to Poland.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that it was important that no promise should be given.

M. BERTHELOT said there was no question of giving a promise, for should it be given, such a promise would not amount to very much. The modifications requested by the Roumanians, as a matter of fact, either concerned the very essence of the Treaty, and therefore could not be accepted, or questions such as the Jewish question [?which] did not concern the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. Under these conditions the Serbs would have difficulty in availing themselves of the Treaty with Roumania in order to ask for a more favourable regime. Should it be necessary to introduce certain modifications in the Serbian Treaty, the fact that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had already signed would not be an obstacle thereto.

M. PICHON said that for the moment it was only a question of finding out whether we could tell the Serbs that if the other Treaties concerning Minorities were modified, they should benefit by the same modifications. As far as he was concerned he thought it advisable to ask the Serbs to sign purely and simply. Mr. Trumbic had left Belgrade with instructions to sign the Treaty of Peace with Austria, therefore, it would be better to await his arrival.

SIR EYRE CROWE was of the same opinion.

It was decided:

to adjourn until a further meeting of the Council the sending of a note inviting the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government to sign the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty. (See Appendix E.)

9. (The Council had before it a note from the German Delegation dated Paris, October 17th, 1919 (see Appendix F).)

*Seizure of  
German shipping  
in the Baltic*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that a certain latitude had always been given to the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces in the Baltic, and the Council had always avoided giving a decision on the measures taken by him. We were bound to recognize the deci-

sions by virtue of which the German shipping in the Baltic had been stopped. Perhaps these decisions had been executed too strictly; in fact, he was informed that their execution sometimes entailed unnecessary inconvenience not only for the Germans but also for Neutrals, and for this reason sailings of German ships which were carrying food-stuffs from Denmark to the plebiscite zone of Schleswig had been held up. It was therefore necessary to direct the Naval Commanders to act with great discretion and to carry out their measures in such a way as not to affect without good cause navigation in the Baltic; we should instruct the Admirals to interfere as little as possible with traffic between neutral ports, and even, in certain cases, to authorize traffic between German ports.

M. TITTONI remarked that it was the intention of the Council to prevent in an effective way commerce with ports of Bolshevik Russia: its object was not to interfere with traffic in the Baltic.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it was not only a question of the blockade of Russia; he also had in mind the situation brought about by the action of the Germans in Courland.<sup>6</sup> The Naval experts should be requested to prepare the draft of an answer to the German note.

MR. POLK asked that the draft of this answer be submitted to the Council.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Allied Naval Armistice Commission should be asked to execute the measures prescribed by it with regard to the situation in the Baltic Provinces in such a way as to take into account the legitimate interests of neutral commerce and certain urgent needs with respect to supplies for German ports;
- (2) that the Naval Experts should present to the Council as soon as possible a draft answer to the German note of October 17th, 1919. (See Appendix F.)

10. (The Council had before it a note from the Roumanian Delegation dated October 18th, 1919, requesting representation on the Commissions charged with the recovery of material, which were functioning in Germany in the interests of France and Belgium in execution of the Armistice Clauses (see Appendix G).<sup>7</sup>)

*Representation of Roumania on the Armistice Commissions charged with the Recovery of material in Germany*

M. BERTHELOT said that it was difficult to accept the Roumanian demand. As a matter of fact the right which the Roumanian Delegation was demanding had been recognized by the Armistice in favour of France and Belgium alone; on the other hand, the Roumanians had not hesitated to go ahead and recover alone material in Hungary. It was therefore difficult to grant them this favour. He therefore proposed that this note should be referred back to the Reparation Commission with a request that it should examine and advise in what measure it was possible to grant it.

M. TITTONI did not think that this was a question of application of the Treaty. The Armistice only stipulated a recovery of material taken away by

<sup>6</sup> See Vol. III of this series.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

German troops in favour of France and Belgium. Once the Treaty came into force, the situation would be different, and recovery of this kind would be made in favour of all the Allies. He thought, however, that the Reparation Commission was best qualified to examine the Roumanian request.

It was decided:

to refer to the Committee on the Organization of the Reparation Commission for examination and report the note of the Roumanian Delegation dated October 19th, 1919 (see Appendix G).<sup>7</sup> requesting representation on the Commissions charged with the recovery of stolen material which are operating in Germany under the clauses of the Armistice.

11.

[Not printed]<sup>8</sup>

*Offer of the National  
Lutheran Council of  
the United States with  
regard to the execution  
of article 438 of the  
Treaty of Peace with  
Germany*

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel Crillon, Paris,  
October 22, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX E TO NO. 4

*Revised Draft of Communication from the Supreme Council to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government relative to the signature of Peace with Austria.*

*15 October 1919.*

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers have the honour to address to the Royal Government of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State an urgent reminder that they have not yet signed the Treaty of Peace with the Republic of Austria concluded at St. Germain-en-Laye on the 10th of September last, and the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State which was signed by the former on the same date.

Anxious to accord to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State every opportunity for consideration of the many important questions now before them, the Supreme Council have hitherto refrained from presenting to the Royal Government any request which might embarrass their position during a period of internal stress, for the Council have always been animated by the warmest feelings of friendship and sympathy for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, which they have been proud to consider an ally and associate alike in the conduct of the war, in the work of the Peace Conference, and in the organization of the League of Nations.

They feel confident, therefore, that the Royal Government will not persist in objections which could only be regarded as foreshadowing a policy tending to

<sup>8</sup> The nature of the offer was not specified in the minute and the examination of the question was adjourned.

separate that country from the Allied and Associated Powers, who have heartily cooperated in the creation and in the full international recognition of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

It has, however, become impossible further to prolong the delay, and the Supreme Council must earnestly request that the Royal Government be good enough to notify them promptly that they are prepared to sign the Treaties without reservation.

#### APPENDIX F TO No. 4

##### *Note from German Delegation dated October 17, 1919, on the subject of Blockade Measures enforced in the Baltic Sea.*

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

October 17, 1919.

The German Government urgently requests that the blockade measures taken concerning the Baltic Sea be limited to those which are militarily necessary and that the fishing rights, navigation between German ports, ferry navigation, the maintenance of light ships (*Seeschiffendampfer* [sic]) be unmolested.

Furthermore, the German Government requests the liberation of the German vessels captured because of unfamiliarity with orders issued, as is particularly the case concerning the coal tenders plying to Königsberg.

#### No. 5

##### No. [H.D.] 75.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, October 23, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Percin.

*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, Don Ascanio Colonna.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Dr. J. B. Scott, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

*British Empire*: Mr. Tufton, Mr. A. Leeper, Commander MacDonald, R.N.

*France*: Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Le Rond, M. Fromageot, M. Aubert.

*Italy*: M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Vannutelli-Rey.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. 'The Council had before it a communication from the President of the German Peace Delegation, dated Paris, October 22, 1919, addressed to Mr. Polk (see Appendix A.)'

*Communication from the German Peace Delegation relative to the Sending of German and Austrian Delegates to the International Labour Congress at Washington*

MR. POLK called the attention of the Council to the second paragraph of the communication from the President of the German Peace Delegation, which stated that,

'The Austrian Government will probably likewise appoint delegates who will travel together with the Germans, and whose number and names will likewise

be communicated at a very early date.'

He thought that it was most surprising that the German Peace Delegation should undertake to answer with respect to the attendance of Austrian Delegates to the International Labour Congress. He stated that a liaison officer of the American Delegation had been instructed to call Baron von Lersner's attention to this matter and that Baron Eichhoff would likewise be asked by what authority the German Delegation assumed to speak for the Austrian Government in this matter. These inquiries would be made orally and he would communicate the result thereof.

M. PICHON said that the Council approved of the action of the United States Delegation; it could not be admitted that the German Peace Delegation should assume this authority.

2.

*Report of the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany relative to the Organization of Plebiscite Commissions in Silesia, Allenstein, and Marienwerder*

[Not printed]<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Austrian Plenipotentiary at Paris in charge of Austrian relations with the Supreme Council and with France after the signature of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye.

<sup>2</sup> The report in question, dated October 21, 1919 (appendix B in original), was presented to the Supreme Council in accordance with its decision of October 18 'that a subcommittee of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty should determine the allowances to be granted to the personnel of the Plebiscite Commissions, after having consulted representatives of those Commissions' (No. 2, minute 10: not printed). The report stated that the study of the question had raised certain points, notably the governmental functions which the commissions would exercise in the several territories submitted to their authority. 'It is important therefore to place in each commission, at the disposition of the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the necessary means for the accomplishment of their difficult mission, and, in particular, a personnel of [a] technical and administrative order, destined for the supervision and control of the various branches of the administration of the territory.' The report further observed that 'the Treaty made provision, in the articles relative to each one of these commissions, only for the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in a word, the directing committee of the Commission. It authorized the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to provide for the detailed constitution of each one of these commissions with a view to responding to its particular functions. It seems that, concerning each particular commission, it appertains

3. (The Council had before it a report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany on the Commissions to be named during the first weeks following the entry into force of the Treaty. (See Appendix C).)

*Report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany on the Commissions to be named during the first weeks following the entry into force of the Treaty*

The report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty was read, and in the course of its reading the following remarks were made:

MR. POLK reminded the Council that the United States could not be represented on any Commissions prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that although he had a complete list of British appointments to the Commissions in question, he thought it inadvisable to present these piecemeal during the reading of this report and suggested that each Delegation present to the Secretary General of the Conference its nominations for the Commissions mentioned in the Committee's report. This suggestion was approved.

Sir Eyre Crowe said that with respect to the Delimitation Commission for Dantzig, the Treaty provided that three Nations should be represented on this Commission, but it had not yet been decided which three nations were to be so represented.

GENERAL LE ROND pointed out that the Council had already approved the recommendations of a prior report of the Committee on the Execution of the Treaty that the members of the Delimitation Commission for Dantzig should

to the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, which constitute the directing committee, to proceed with the detailed study relative to the composition of the commission.' The report then considered principles for the payment of members of the plebiscite commissions. In this connexion Sir Eyre Crowe stated that in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council on October 15 (see Vol. I, No. 74, note 6) 'he had referred the question of payment of members of Commissions of Delimitation by their respective Governments to his Government, which had replied that it accepted the principle that "ordinary army pay" of these members should be defrayed by their respective Governments. . . . He was not sure of the exact definition of "ordinary army pay", inasmuch as officers in the British Army were entitled, over and above such pay, to ordinary and special allowances. He would refer the question to his Government for an exact definition, but he felt confident that his Government would admit the same principle relative to the payment of members of Plebiscite Commissions.' After discussion the Supreme Council decided: (1) to approve the recommendations of the report 'with the reservation that Sir Eyre Crowe should request the agreement of the British Government to the opinion, expressed by the other delegations, that the members of such commissions should be paid by their respective Governments; (2) that the principle that the payment of troops of occupation should be a charge upon the local revenues of the territories occupied should apply to such troops as might be used as troops of occupation in Dantzig and Memel.' This latter decision resulted from Sir Eyre Crowe's having drawn attention to the fact that 'strictly speaking, the cases of Dantzig and Memel were not exactly similar' to those of Upper Silesia, Allenstein and Marienwerder: 'the Treaty had not provided specifically for troops of occupation in these two districts, and therefore there was no provision that the payment of such troops should be a charge on local revenues. The Council, however, had decided that troops of occupation might be used in these two districts. . . . He thought that on the principle laid down in the Treaty with respect to other troops of occupation the payment of such troops should be a charge upon local revenues.'

be drawn from the Germano-Polish Delimitation Commission and that the presidency of these two Commissions should be held by the same person, in this case General Dupont. Therefore, only two members of this Commission still remained to be named.

M. PICHON thought it would be well that one of these members should be British.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

M. PICHON added that since the United States could not be represented the choice lay between Italy and Japan.

GENERAL LE ROND thought it was more suitable for Italy to be represented, since Japan had fewer representatives on the Germano-Polish Delimitation Commission.

M. SCIALOJA said that although Italy did not ask to be represented it did not object to being represented.

GENERAL LE ROND pointed out that the Treaty provided that [the] Germano-Polish Delimitation Commission should be constituted 15 days after the entry into force of the Treaty, but that the Supreme Council on July 16th had decided that this Commission should be on the spot and enter into operation on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty.<sup>3</sup> The same was true of the Dantzig Delimitation Commission by virtue of the Supreme Council's decision of October 15 (H. D. 70, Minute 4).<sup>4</sup>

M. BERTHELOT observed that this brought up again the whole question of what was the proper day for putting the Treaty into force; he remarked that it had also been decided that the troops of occupation were to be on the spot on the day in question.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that there were three questions to be considered; first, the Delimitation Commissions, second, the Plebiscite Commissions, third, the troops of occupation. Did the Council fully intend to have the troops ready to be at their appointed destinations on the day the Treaty came into force?

M. PICHON said that this was the Council's opinion and he wished to know what date the troops would be ready to start.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the French troops could entrain on November 5th, and he thought the British troops were now ready. The question of the number of battalions to be furnished by Italy was still unsettled: the three battalions that Italy had agreed to furnish for service in Upper Silesia were now ready to start, but the question of whether Italy would furnish the remaining four battalions designated as her share in the report of the Special Commission (see Appendix 1, H. D. 72),<sup>5</sup> was still undetermined. He had been informed by General Bliss that, although American troops could not be used as troops of occupation prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate, troops were now on their way to Coblenz and would be held there until such time as this ratification might

<sup>3</sup> See Vol. I, No. 12, minute 3 (c).

<sup>4</sup> In error for minute 5: see Vol. I, No. 74, note 6.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 2, appendix A.

take place. They would then at once be ordered to proceed to zones of occupation. He pointed out that the question of transportation still remained to be solved. This question was most serious with respect to troops destined to occupy Upper Silesia. It was extremely difficult to ask the Germans for more transportation than they had been asked for upon the occasion of the passage of General Haller's troops.<sup>6</sup> Having in mind the transport of supplies, as well as of troops, at the rate of six trains per day, the movement would require fifteen days.

M. BERTHELOT calculated that on this basis the 11th of November might be a suitable date for putting the Treaty into operation.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that this date was satisfactory as far as the troops were concerned but it should be remembered that very little time was left in which to take various other necessary measures. The various Commissions had to arrive at their destinations prior to the entry into force of the Treaty and likewise the Germans should be informed of that date as far ahead as possible in order that they might take all necessary measures of evacuation.

MR. POLK asked, for information, whether the troops of occupation were to be at their appointed destination on the day of ratification or within fifteen days thereafter.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the troops were to be in place within fifteen days after ratification but that in order to effect this result it would be necessary for the troops of occupation to begin to arrive in their respective zones on the day the Treaty came into force: clearly these zones could not be occupied prior to the ratification of the Treaty.

M. PICHON asked again if the Council desired to decide on the 11th November as the day of putting the Treaty into operation.

GENERAL WEYGAND repeated that this would be satisfactory from a military point of view, except that the question of the contingent to be furnished by the Italians must be settled before a definite decision could be arrived at. He wished to add that the Italian Military Representative had always maintained a reservation on this point.

M. PICHON said that the distribution of forces decided upon by the Supreme Council must be followed out, and he desired to insist most pressingly upon Italy furnishing the full contingent demanded of her by the Special Commission's report, especially since, prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate, the four American battalions destined for Upper Silesia would not be sent there.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired if the absence of American troops of occupation prior to the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate would not

<sup>6</sup> During the early months of 1919 the Supreme Council had been concerned with the problem of the transport to Poland of the Polish forces under General Haller which had been formed in France. The German Government was unwilling to admit the Allied contention that this transport should be effected by way of Danzig under article 16 of the Armistice of Compiègne of November 11, 1918. In April 1919 a compromise solution was reached whereby General Haller's army was transported by rail across Germany.

adversely affect the distribution of troops of occupation provided for by the report of the Special Commission.

M. PICHON said that the eventual use of United States troops was to be considered, and added that he did not wish an attitude to be adopted which would appear to exclude United States troops from eventually participating in occupation.

MR. POLK remarked that everything depended upon the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate. He wished to repeat that United States troops were *en route* and would be held at Coblenz ready to be sent to zones of occupation.

M. PICHON asked Marshal Foch whether, in the present absence of United States troops destined eventually for participation in the occupation of Upper Silesia, he had enough troops to maintain order there.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he must first know if he was going to have at his disposal the remaining fourteen battalions, all ready to move on November 5th.

M. SCIALOJA said he would try to obtain a satisfactory reply from his Government immediately.

GENERAL LE ROND pointed out that the Plebiscite Commissions, for instance in Silesia, being essentially Government Commissions, they [*sic*] should arrive at their destination in plenty of time to confer with the outgoing German officials, so as to be able on the day of the entry into force of the Treaty to take up the government of these districts without any hitch.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that as soon as the date of the entry into force of the Treaty was definitely determined upon, someone should be designated to settle all such matters with the German Government.

M. PICHON said that Marshal Foch was the best person to do this.

M. SCIALOJA objected that Plebiscite Commissions were not of a military nature.

M. BERTHELOT replied that they were closely concerned with military affairs. Until the Armistice came to an end Marshal Foch was the properly qualified person to treat with the German Government on all such matters.

MR. POLK asked with reference to the Committee's report respecting 'Persons to be delivered by Germany', when the demand for such individuals would be made.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that, for many reasons which had already been discussed, the day of the entrance into force of the Treaty would be the appropriate date for making such a demand.

M. BERTHELOT, in pointing out the provision in the Committee's report with reference to the Government of Memel, said that in view of the small size of the Memel district there was no objection to the British Commander exercising both civil and military functions.

M. PICHON suggested that the whole question could be settled by agreeing to take all necessary measures for putting the Treaty into force on November 11th, 1919. M. Dutasta had informed him that he was going to see Baron von Lersner on that night, and he wished to inquire whether M. Dutasta

should tell Baron von Lersner that the Treaty would be put into force on November 11th.

MR. POLK observed that if Baron von Lersner were told this he would undoubtedly publish it immediately.

MARSHAL FOCH said that it would be better to simply inform Baron von Lersner that his Government would be notified of the date of entrance into force of the Treaty in sufficient time for it to take all measures necessary to be taken by it prior to that date.

(It was decided:

- (1) that the Delegations of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should immediately submit to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference the list of the representatives they desired to name upon the Commissions which, under the terms of the Treaty with Germany, must begin to operate during the first weeks following the entry into force of [the] said Treaty;
- (2) that the 11th day of November, 1919, should provisionally be considered the date of the entry into force of the Treaty with Germany;
- (3) that everything should be done to ensure the completion prior to that date of all measures constituting conditions precedent to the proper and effective entry into force of said Treaty, and to effectually dispose of all reservations hindering or preventing such entry into force;
- (4) that the German Peace Delegation should not yet be informed of the tentative date of the entry into force of the Treaty, but that in reply to this Delegation's inquiry as to such date it should be informed that the German Government would be informed of the date of the entry into force of the Treaty in ample time to enable it to take all measures necessary to be taken by it prior to such date.)

4. (The Council had before it a report of the Drafting Committee on the cost of transportation to and maintenance in foreign countries of German subjects convicted of serious offences against members of the forces of occupation or against the property or authority of forces of occupation in Germany. (See Appendix D).)

*Report of the Drafting Committee on Cost of Transportation to and maintenance in foreign countries of German subjects convicted of serious offences against members of forces of occupation or against the property or authority of such forces in Germany*

MR. POLK stated that he was entirely satisfied with the report of the Drafting Committee. He wished to add that he had already recommended to the military authorities that the procedure in question should only be followed in very serious cases and he hoped there would be very few more of these.

(It was decided:

to adopt the report of the Drafting Committee on cost of transportation to and maintenance in foreign countries of German subjects convicted of serious offences against members of the forces of occupation or against the property or authority of forces of occupation in Germany. (See Appendix D).)

5. (The Council had before it a note from the Bulgarian Delegation dated Neuilly-sur-Seine, October 12th, 1919 (see Appendix E,, and another note from the Bulgarian Delegation dated Neuilly-sur-Seine, October 21st, 1919 (see Appendix F).)

*Protest of the Bulgarian Delegation against the evacuation of Western Thrace*

M. BERTHELOT read the two notes of protest. He pointed out that a *fait accompli* now existed and that the question raised by the Bulgarian Delegation had become purely academic. He added that the occupation of the district in question by the Greek troops had taken place without any disturbance, and he thought that as the Bulgarians would deliver their answer to the Peace terms on the following day there was nothing further to be done until this answer had been received.

MR. POLK submitted a draft of the following questions to be addressed to General Franchet D'Esperey and requested that General D'Esperey should be asked to report immediately by telegraph on the following points:

- (a) whether the Bulgarians were actually evacuating Thrace.
- (b) what troops were proceeding to the evacuated territory.
- (c) whether other Allied troops than Greek were taking part in the preliminary occupation.
- (d) whether satisfactory precautions were being taken to prevent a possible Greek occupation of territory outside of their zone of occupation.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that Marshal Foch was in possession of the information requested and that he would reply to all these questions.

MR. POLK stated that if all the information was here he would merely ask Marshal Foch to give him the answers to these questions.

(It was decided:

- (1) that there was no necessity at the present time of replying to the Bulgarian protest against the evacuation of Thrace;
- (2) that Marshal Foch should supply the Council with all pertinent information relative to the conditions of the evacuation of Thrace and its occupation by Allied troops.)

5[6]. M. BERTHELOT referred to the decision of the Supreme Council (H. D. 72,<sup>7</sup> Minute 1 (7), October 18th, 1919) 'that the Inter-Allied Commissions sent into the zones of occupation should choose their own Presidents, without it being necessary for them to be of the same nationality as the Commanding Officers in the corresponding zones of occupation'. He stated that M. Clemenceau thought it better for the Council to designate the Presidents of these Commissions after the lists of appointees to these various Commissions had been transmitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference by the various Delegations.

M. PICHON said that when the lists were submitted to the Secretary-General, this question could be taken up again.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, October 23, 1919.*

# APPENDIX A TO No. 5

*President of the German Peace Delegation.*

PARIS, October 22, 1919.

Mr. Under-Secretary for State,

In reply to your esteemed letter of October 13,<sup>8</sup> I have the honour to state that, in accordance with the constitution of the German Labour Organization, the German Government is prepared to send delegates to the Conference at Washington. Provisionally, their number will be eleven; I must still reserve, most respectfully, the communication of the names of the gentlemen.

The Austrian Government will probably likewise appoint delegates who will travel together with the Germans, and whose number and names will likewise be communicated at a very early date.

I should be grateful to Your Excellency for the kind provision of places on a steamer, and for information of the time and place of its sailing.

Please accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER.

To His Excellency,

Mr. Under-Secretary for State Frank L. Polk,  
Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the  
United States of North America,  
Paris, Hotel Crillon.

# APPENDIX C TO No. 5

## *List of the Commissions*

which should be nominated during the first weeks following the entry into force of the Treaty, and measures already adopted and to be adopted.

### *A. By the Allied and Associated Governments*

<i>Time limit</i>	<i>Article or page</i>	<i>Commissions</i>	<i>Countries having designated members</i>	<i>Countries having organized the personnel</i>
15 days after entry into force	Art. 35, p. 24	I. DELIMITATION COMMISSIONS Germano-Belgian	G.B. F. I. J. yes	J. G.B. } <i>en</i> F. } <i>route</i> I. J. } yes
15 days	Art. 87, p. 50	Germano-Polish	yes	yes
15 days	Art. 101, p. 60	Dantzig	yes	yes
15 days	Art. 83, p. 48	Polono-Czecho-Slovak	in preparation	in preparation
15 days after plebiscite	Art. 3, <sup>9</sup> p. 64	Schleswig II. PLEBISCITE AND GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONS	in preparation	in preparation
Upon the entry in[to] force of the Treaty	Art. 88, annex, p. 52	Upper Silesia	G.B. } yes I } Fr. no	G.B. yes I. } F. } no

<sup>8</sup> See Vol. I, No. 72, appendix A.

<sup>9</sup> In error for article 111 (i.e. article 3 in section xii of part III of the treaty).

<i>Time limit</i>	<i>Article or page</i>	<i>Commissions</i>	<i>Countries having designated members</i>	<i>Countries having organized the personnel</i>
15 days	Art. 95, p. 56	Allenstein	G.B. } yes J. } F. } no I. }	G.B. incomplete J. } yes F. } I. } no
15 days	Art. 97, p. 57	Marlenwerder	G.B. } F. } no I. } J. } yes in action	G.B. } F. } no I. } J. } yes in action
Upon the entry in force	Art. 109, p. 63	Schleswig		
		III. MISCELLANEOUS		
No time specified	Arrangement Art. 2, p. 2	Rhine territories	in action	in action
	Art. 203 and following arts. p. 93 & following	Military control Naval Aerial	} in action	} in action
To be specified	Art. 115, p. 66	Destruction of Heligoland fortifications	To be drawn from Naval Supervision Commission	
As soon as possible after entry into force	Art. 215, p. 97	Prisoners of War	G.B. } I. } yes F. } J. }	yes
Upon entry into force	Art. 233, p. 102 and annex 2, p. 107	Reparations	G.B. } J. } yes I. } F. } no	Progressively by the Organization Commission
Upon the entry in force	Art. 354, p. 180	Rhine	G.B. } no F. }	no
Upon entry into force	Art. 346, p. 178	Danube	Nothing	Nothing
3 months	Art. 340 & 343, p. 177	Elbe	Nothing	Nothing
3 months	Art. 341 & 343, p. 177	Oder	Nothing	Nothing
		Persons to be delivered by Germany	F. } G.B. } yes I. } J. }	
Upon entry into force	Art. 99, p. 58	Government of Memel	Military occupation provided. Govern[men]t no	
Upon entry into force	Art. 102, p. 60	Temporary administration of Dantzig	English member designated to be replaced	
Upon entry into force	Art. 119, p. 68	German Colonies	Prolongation of present regime	
3 months	Art. 300 & 304, pp. 153 & 160	Mixed arbitral Tribunal	Nothing	
	Art. 296, p. 140	Verification and Compensation offices	Nothing	
No time specified	Art. 227, p. 100	International Tribunal to judge W[illia]m II	Nothing	

<i>Time limit</i>	<i>Article or page</i>	<i>Commissions</i>	<i>Countries having designated members</i>	<i>Countries having organized the personnel</i>
No time specified	Art. 364, p. 185	Delimitation of neutral zones for Czecho-Slovaks in ports of Hamburg and Stettin	(3 delegates to be named: 1 German, 1 Czecho-Slovak) nothing done.	
do.	Art. 371, 3° p. 188	Distribution of railroad material	Nothing (concerns Reparations Commission)	
1 month	Art. 359, <sup>10</sup> 3°	Reception of gold of Ottoman public debt deposited in Reichsbank	Nothing (concerns Reparations Commission)	

*B. By the League of Nations*

Upon convocation by Pres.t of U.S.	Art. 4 & 5, p. 10	Council	Yes (under reservation of telegram sent by Mr. Polk)	
15 days	Art. 48, p. 28	Delimitation of Saar Basin		
No time specified do.	Art. 50 Annex Par. 17, p. 32 Art. 103, p. 60	Government of Saar Basin High Commissioner Dantzig		

APPENDIX D TO No. 5

*Note for the Supreme Council*

October 21, 1919.

*(Expenses of penitentiary services in the occupied territories)*

By the terms of Article IV of the Armistice, the upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (not including Alsace-Lorraine) will be at the expense of the German Government.

The expenses for the maintenance of order and of the police, and consequently for the repression of crime and misdemeanours committed against the troops of occupation, are expenses necessitated by the maintenance of the said troops and must therefore be paid by Germany.

The question to regulate is, whether, in the case of serious crimes and misdemeanours, the presence of the sentenced party presents dangers for the troops of occupation and justifies removal outside of occupied territory; this is a question of fact, capable of being judged only by the military authority.

Consequently, the Allied and Associated Power, responsible for the occupying military authorities, is justified in charging Germany on the occupation expense account with the expenses above referred to. Thus it is with expenses of transport to and upkeep in the United States of parties sentenced for serious crimes to more than 5 years imprisonment by the American military authorities of occupation.

For the Drafting Committee

HENRI FROMAGEOT.

<sup>10</sup> In error for article 259.

## APPENDIX E TO No. 5

### BULGARIAN DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

No. 387.

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE, *October 12, 1919.*

From: M. K. Sarafow,

To: M. Clemenceau.

The Royal Government has just informed me by telegram, dated October 9, which arrived to-day, that the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies of the East, basing himself on Article 27 of the Peace Conditions, has asked the Bulgarian Government to proceed to the evacuation of Thrace, stipulating that this operation must be terminated on the 14th of this month, at noon.

On this subject, the Bulgarian Delegation has the honour of presenting the following remarks:

From a legal point of view, the present obligations of Bulgaria concerning its frontiers with regard to the Allied and Associated Powers are explicitly regulated by the Armistice Convention of September 29, 1918, which in none of its clauses provides for the evacuation of Thrace.

On the other hand, the evacuation of Thrace cannot be based on Article 27 of the project of the Treaty, because it has not legal force, owing to the fact that Bulgaria up to the present time has not given her adhesion to it, and consequently one cannot impose upon Bulgaria such an obligation.

The very fact of demanding this evacuation, it being based on this project, has caused a painful surprise to the entire people. The Bulgarian Delegation has just been informed by Your Excellency that the Supreme Council, granting its request, has decided that the delay for the handing over of the answer by Bulgaria to the Peace Conditions is extended for 10 days.<sup>11</sup> The execution of the demand of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies would be equivalent therefore to the application of a project on the subject of which Bulgaria has not yet even presented her remarks.

Besides, no consideration of fact whatsoever justifies at the present time the demand formulated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies of the East and its premature execution would be of a nature to raise serious difficulties in the country.

The question of the previous evacuation of Thrace at a time when the Bulgarian people is yet under the impress of the great territorial sacrifices which are required by the Treaty, and at a moment when Bulgaria is going through a political crisis of an exceptional importance, would submit the country to the most painful trials. Under these conditions, the maintenance of order and calm would constitute an overwhelming task for any government.

The delay fixed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies of the East expiring October 14, the Bulgarian Delegation by order of its Government has the honour to beg the Supreme Council not to refuse to take the necessary measures before this delay expires.

With the hope that Your Excellency will be good enough to take a kind interest in this matter, please accept, etc.

<sup>11</sup> See Vol. I, No. 71, minute 2.

## APPENDIX F TO NO. 5

### BULGARIAN DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

No. 424.

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE, *October 21, 1919.*

From: M. Th. Theodoroff,

To: M. Clemenceau.

In its note of October 12th, the Bulgarian Delegation, by order of its Government, had the honour of setting forth the reasons of right and of fact for which it begged that the unjustified demand of the General, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East, relative to the evacuation of Western Thrace by the Bulgarian authorities, be revoked.

Even before being honoured by a reply from the Conference the Bulgarian Delegation has just learned that the order, forming the subject of the note in question above, has begun to be executed.

A telegram, sent from Sofia the 13th instant, and received the 19th, informs us 'that the IX Greek Division intends to enter Xanthi on October 16th. The local population, despite the advice given it, despite encouragements tending to reassure it, has begun to leave their homes. The state in which these unfortunates are is indescribable.'

On the other hand, this morning's papers announce that the IX Greek Division, received, on October 19th, at the Xanthi railroad station by the Commander of the Allied troops in Thrace, General Charpy, entered the city and General Charpy entered Gumurdjine on the same day.

From this information it may be seen that not only the occupation of a part of Western Thrace is already an accomplished fact, but that it has been carried out by Greek troops.

Now, on October 8th again the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Madjaroff, following the declarations of the Commander of the Danube Army, General Claudel, concerning the eventual occupation of Thrace by Greek troops, categorically objected inasmuch as these facts are in absolute contradiction with Article II of the Armistice Convention, concluded on September 29th, 1918, at Salonika. The Article referred to prescribes only the occupation of certain strategic points in Bulgaria, and only by troops of the Great Allied Powers and not by Greek troops.

The Bulgarian Delegation deems it its duty to observe once more that these facts constitute a most flagrant violation of the Armistice Convention of Salonika and of the regulations known as the Rights of People. The matter concerned in this case is only a previous and compulsory execution of Article XXVII of the Peace Scheme, before the Conference received the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation which are to be submitted to the Conference in writing on October 24, before this scheme be approved and signed by the interested parties, before its being put into effect and becoming obligatory.

The Bulgarian Delegation is all the more surprised by the events which happened in Western Thrace because it has not received, so far, any information of the decision of the Conference concerning that subject. If really such a decision has been taken, the Delegation was first entitled to receive notification of it.

In regard to the foregoing, the Bulgarian Delegation, following the instructions

received by its Government, is obliged to make all necessary reserves on the subject of the arbitrary dispositions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East, concerning Western Thrace, as well as on the subject of the consequences which might result from them.

Please accept, etc.

## No. 6

H. D. 76.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, October 25, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Percin.

*Italy*: M. Tittoni; SECRETARIES, M. Paterno, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Dr. J. B. Scott, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Commander Fuller, Mr. Palai-ret, Mr. Carr, Mr. Malkin.

*France*: M. Laroche, General Le Rond, M. Cheysson, M. Fromageot.

*Italy*: M. Ricci-Busatti.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

I. M. PICHON stated that the Bulgarian counter-propositions had arrived;<sup>1</sup> they had been distributed both to the delegations and to the Commissions concerned. He thought it advisable to specify to the Commissions the time they would have to prepare their answers; he considered eight days adequate.

MR. POLK asked whether such a long time was necessary. It was only the Bulgarian answer dealing with reparations that was difficult.

M. TITTONI supported Mr. Polk's remarks, especially as the Commissions, as well as the Council itself, were familiar with the questions concerned.

<sup>1</sup> The Bulgarian counter-propositions regarding the draft treaty of peace were presented in three parts under date of October 24, 1919. An English text is printed in *Observations of the Bulgarian Delegation on the Conditions of Peace with Bulgaria* (Paris, 1919). The Bulgarian text is printed in *Bulgarskata Delegatsiya za mira: Dokumenti po dogovora v Neuilly* (Durzhavna Pechatnitsa, Sofia, 1919), pp. 131-228. (In the English text the covering notes to the three parts of the Bulgarian observations are dated October 25, 1919. The English and Bulgarian texts show certain other discrepancies, especially owing to misprints of numerical references to articles of the draft treaty. In particular, the Bulgarian text of the observations on the Labour clauses of the draft treaty refers on p. 138 to part XIII, articles 332-79, of the treaty; this wrong reference is corrected in the English text, p. 12, to part XII, articles 249-89.)

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that on previous occasions time had been lost; the several Commissions had made partial answers which an *ad hoc* Commission had been appointed to collect and coordinate. He wished to know whether M. Tardieu's Central Territorial Committee could not at once be asked to collate the answers of the Commissions and, without waiting any longer, prepare a final comprehensive answer.

MR. POLK agreed with this suggestion: the sooner the answer would be ready, the better.

M. PICHON said that the Council might decide that the reply ought to be ready on Saturday next.<sup>2</sup> He thought an earlier date would be difficult.

M. LAROCHE said that even now M. Tardieu's Committee might get in touch with the several Commissions. So far as affected points on which he did not consider himself qualified to submit a reply, he would ask the Commissions to do so.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Central Territorial Committee should collect and coordinate the answers of the Commissions concerned to the observations presented by the Bulgarian Delegation;
- (2) that the said Committee should present to the Supreme Council a draft of a final comprehensive answer to these observations by November 1st, 1919, at the latest.

2. SIR EYRE CROWE submitted to the Council two telegrams which he had just received from the Allied Naval Armistice Commission (see Appendices A and B). The second telegram partly rectified the first. He considered it might be suitable to discuss them when the general question of the violation of clauses of the Armistice by the Germans was being considered.

*Violation of  
Naval Clauses  
of the Armistice  
by the Germans*

3. (The Council had before it the draft answer to the German Note of October 17th, concerning the measures taken by the Allied Naval Authorities in the Baltic. (See Appendix C).)

*Situation in the  
Baltic Provinces.  
Measures taken  
by the Naval  
Authorities con-  
cerning Naviga-  
tion in the Baltic*

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the Council had asked the Naval Experts to prepare a draft answer to the German Note of October 17th, concerning measures taken by the Allied Naval Authorities in the Baltic.<sup>3</sup> He wished to know whether the Council would approve this draft reply.

M. PICHON said that, no comment having been made, the Council took the text as read.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that according to a telegram received from the British representative at Riga, the situation there was very grave; the attacks against Riga were still violent, to such a degree that the British representative suggested the occupation of Memel, and if possible, of Tilsit.<sup>4</sup> The representative had maintained that General Eberhardt was even

<sup>2</sup> November 1, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 4, minute 9 and appendix F.

<sup>4</sup> For the situation at Riga and generally in the Baltic Provinces see Vol. III of this series.

worse than his predecessor, General von der Goltz. The Council had decided to send an Interallied Commission to the spot.<sup>5</sup> So far nothing had been done and the Commission had not departed. He wished to know how far preparations had advanced.

M. PICHON said that General Mangin, whose name had been suggested by Marshal Foch, had preferred not to be charged with this mission. Another General had been appointed and the publication of his name would not be delayed. He considered that to occupy Memel, without waiting for the Treaty to come into force, was a serious undertaking and he would like to know if the British Government completely adopted the opinion of its representative at Riga.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he was only repeating the opinion of the Chief of the British Mission to indicate how serious he considered the situation, but he was not asking the Council to decide immediately upon the occupation of Memel.

M. PICHON proposed that the suggestion of the British representative at Riga be referred to the Military Experts for examination.

It was decided:

- (1) to adopt the draft answer to the German note of October 17<sup>th</sup> prepared by the Naval Representatives (see Appendix C);
- (2) to refer to the Military Representatives for examination and report the question of whether the situation in the Baltic Provinces was such as to necessitate occupying Memel before the prescribed date.

4. M. TITTONI desired to draw the Council's attention to the situation in Southern Russia. General Denikin, to whom the Council had in the past afforded moral and material support against the Bolsheviks, appeared to be neglecting them and to be turning against the Ukrainians. Under the circumstances ought the Council to continue its support?

*Relations between  
General Denikin  
and the Ukrainian  
Army of General  
Petlioura*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the information at his disposal did not quite accord with that of M. Tittoni.

M. PICHON felt in the same position: Denikin was fighting very vigorously against the Bolsheviks, but to hope for an end to all difficulties between Russians and Ukrainians was asking too much. France had, for that matter, just sent a military mission to General Denikin with instructions to help him in organizing the fight against the Bolsheviks and at the same time to work for the prevention of conflict with the Ukrainians.

M. TITTONI added that Italy likewise had sent a mission and for that very reason he considered it necessary to coordinate their activities.

MR. POLK stated that General Jadwin who had just been investigating the situation with Denikin's army, as well as Petlioura's, reported that it was Petlioura who was attacking Denikin: the Ukraine-Russian difficulties involved two fundamental questions, namely: the Jewish question and the

<sup>5</sup> See Vol. I, No. 70, minute 1, and No. 71, minute 4, and, in the present volume, No. 2, minute 11.

question of the independence of Ukraine. General Jadwin had even brought forward one case at least in which Petlioura had facilitated Bolshevist action against Denikin. At any rate, should the Council wish to hear General Jadwin, he could give them a résumé of the situation.

M. PICHON thought that the Council might very well hear him.

M. TITTONI considered it might be well to instruct their representatives to prevent friction between Denikin and Petlioura.

M. PICHON stated that the representatives of France as well as those of Great Britain had already received such instructions: but there was no use hiding the fact that the situation was extremely difficult.

MR. POLK added that General Jadwin had been informed by Petlioura that his best troops were Galician.

M. TITTONI stated that the Georgian representatives who had visited him represented General Denikin as making no secret of his intention to put an end to the Georgian Republic as soon as he had done with the Bolsheviks.

It was decided:

to hear General Jadwin at a future meeting of the Council on the situation in Southern Russia.

5. (The Council had before it a note of the British Delegation dated October 24, 1919 (see Appendix D).)

*Diplomatic Representation of the Allied and Associated Powers in Germany*

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the British Government believed it to be very important that the Allies should agree among themselves in fixing the conditions under which diplomatic relations with Germany should be resumed. He proposed that a special Legal Committee be entrusted with this

question.

MR. POLK inquired whether it was essentially a question of protocols.

M. TITTONI considered that a political question must first be decided: namely; would the Allies be represented by Ambassadors or by Chargés d'Affaires?

M. PICHON said that that question had already been decided. It had been agreed to send first, Chargés d'Affaires and some months later, Ambassadors.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the Council could not fix a date by which at the latest Ambassadors should be accredited; and again, what were the intentions of the Powers as regards sending diplomatic representatives to Munich and Dresden? Certainly the British Government proposed to send them.

M. TITTONI wished to know whether special representatives would be sent to Munich and Dresden as before the war, and also what would be their title.

MR. POLK stated that the United States had never had representatives in those two capitals.

M. LAROCHE said that as far as Munich and Dresden were concerned the question was as follows: did they wish to be represented there, and what title would be given to their representatives? Might not the person who was actually Ambassador at Berlin be also the diplomatic representative in those

places? In point of fact, before the war the French Ambassador at Berlin was also Chargé d'Affaires at the Court of Saxony.

M. PICHON stated that the Council was agreed to send to Berlin at present only Chargés d'Affaires, and he considered it difficult at this time to fix the date on which Ambassadors would be designated. That would depend on the situation in Germany and on the attitude of the German Government. On the other hand, they could decide at once not to send Ambassadors before having agreed on this subject.

M. MATSUI asked what would be the rank of Chargés d'Affaires.

M. PICHON thought that this was not so important. It was the title of Chargé d'Affaires that mattered. The French representative would be a Consul-General, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

M. MATSUI thought that Japan might have difficulty in sending first a Chargé d'Affaires and then an Ambassador, but he was perfectly willing to recommend such procedure to his Government.

M. PICHON stated that the French Government intended to have a representative at Munich under the same circumstances as formerly, and also to be represented at Dresden.

MR. POLK asked whether there would be at Munich and Dresden autonomous Governments independent of Berlin.

SIR EYRE CROWE answered that he had read the German Constitution; that possibly the Central German Government might find arguments therein on which to oppose the sending of diplomatic representatives to State capitals; nevertheless there was nothing in the Constitution which explicitly said that such representatives could not be sent outside Berlin.

MR. POLK asked whether the present German Government was not much more centralized than the former Imperial Government.

M. LAROCHE stated that the German Constitution had denied to particular States the right of accrediting representatives, but not of receiving diplomatic representatives.

M. TITTONI thought there might be opposition and that the Powers might, if they were to designate representatives without being assured in advance of their being accepted by Bavaria and Saxony, run the risk of not finding anyone with whom the representatives might deal.

M. LAROCHE thought that the Council might settle the question of principle and leave to the Commission that was to be appointed the task of deciding what procedure should be followed.

M. TITTONI agreed, on the condition that they keep to strictly legal grounds.

M. LAROCHE inquired whether they had agreed to recognize Germany as a more compact unit than it was in the past.

MR. POLK was of the opinion that the Treaty did not prevent Germany from deciding this internal question whichever way she wished: the question of the unity of Germany was not under discussion.

M. BERTHELOT said that the unity of Germany was indeed not under discussion; what was certain was that Bavaria and Saxony had no longer the

positive right of representation but had retained a negative right. The intention of the French Government was to be represented in each of these states by a Consul-General—a diplomatic agent.

M. TRITTONI suggested that such arrangement would be similar to what obtained at Budapest before the war, but that the title of diplomatic agent could not be accorded to these representatives without the consent of the Saxon and Bavarian Governments.

M. BERTHELOT maintained, however, that they had the right of being thus represented, which was the pre-war situation. The Treaty, however, had made no change in this respect, and Germany had not notified the Powers that she would forbid the exercise of the same prerogatives as they had before the war. They were taking into account the changes which had occurred in Germany by diminishing their representations at Munich and Dresden. It was certain that their representations would not be imposed, but at the same time would not be a matter of negotiation; he had in mind rather a courteous notification.

M. PICHON stated that as they were agreed upon the principles, they could entrust a special commission with drawing up the questions of procedure.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Allied and Associated Powers upon resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany, should be represented at Berlin by *Chargés d’Affaires* and that they should fix later a suitable date for sending Ambassadors;
- (2) that such Allied and Associated Powers as before the war had had diplomatic representatives at Dresden and Munich, be qualified to continue their representation;
- (3) that a special Committee should be charged with the study of the proper procedure to be followed in the resumption of diplomatic relations. This Committee would be composed of members as follows:

America, United States of	.	.	.	.	Mr. Grew
British Empire	.	.	.	.	Hon. C. Tufton
France	.	.	.	.	M. Berthelot
Italy	.	.	.	.	M. De Martino
Japan	.	.	.	.	M. Shigemitsu

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions containing the draft instructions of the Supreme Council to the Plebiscite Commission of Teschen, Spitz and Orava (see Appendix E).)  
*Plebiscite Procedure in the Duchy of Teschen and the territories of Spitz and Orava*  
 After a short discussion, the Commission being unanimous,

It was decided:

to approve the draft instructions to the Plebiscite Commission in the Duchy of Teschen and in the territories of Spitz and Orava prepared by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions (see Appendix E).

7. (The Council had before it a letter from the chairman of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference dated October 21st, 1919 (see Appendix F).)

*Proposed municipal  
elections in Upper  
Silesia*

M. LAROCHE thought it would be wise for the Polish Commission to verify without delay the information transmitted by Mr. Dmowski. If the information were exact it would be well that the Commission prepare a draft note to the German Delegation demanding whether the alleged facts were true and stating that, if so, the Allies could not permit any such manoeuvre. The note would also state that the municipal elections would take place after the Inter-Allied occupation and when the Plebiscite Commission should have assumed its functions.

SIR EYRE CROWE was in agreement provided it were not stated that the elections were to take place *immediately* after the Commission had taken up its duties.

M. LAROCHE thought they might say, 'as soon as possible', namely, when things had become quiet and those persons who had fled before the German repression had returned.

GENERAL LE ROND said the question had already been examined by the Commission which dealt with the Eastern Frontiers of Germany. It had been considered then that the German Government would be unable to hold any election before the Inter-Allied occupation and that it would be for the Plebiscite Commission to fix the date of the municipal election. It would obviously be very grave to let the Germans proceed to elections at that time.

It was decided:

- (1) to refer at once to the Polish Commission for examination and report the letter of Mr. Dmowski to the President of the Peace Conference showing the intention of the German Government to hold without delay municipal elections in Upper Silesia;
- (2) to ask the Commission, should these facts be found exact, to prepare immediately a draft note to the German Government in which it would be pointed out that the Allied and Associated Powers would not tolerate such a manoeuvre and that the municipal elections should be held after the occupation of Upper Silesia by the Allied troops and at such a time as the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission should deem it possible. (See Appendix F.)

8. (The Council had before it a telegram from the Chairman of the Schleswig Commission, dated October 22nd, 1919 (see Appendix G), and a note transmitted by Baron von Lersner on October 23rd, 1919 (see Appendix H).)

*Schleswig  
situation*

M. LAROCHE said that Sir Charles Marling's telegram brought up a delicate question. In the note addressed to the German Delegation on July 29th, the Allied and Associated Powers had called the attention of the German authorities to arrests which had taken place shortly before, for political reasons, in the region adjoining the plebiscite zone. To this note the Germans replied on August 10th that they desired to avoid any action of a kind that might stir national passions and that they had released the publicist Wall,

but M. Wall had been kept under observation. Did the Council still wish to go further and demand the setting at liberty of this person? It would, at any rate, be necessary that the German Government should be warned that, if arrests had been made in the plebiscite zone, the arrested persons must be released. As for the particular case of Wall, it had to be recognized that he resided in the zone not subject to plebiscite.

M. TITTONI said that the German authorities imputed to Wall an action tending to detach from Germany a country belonging to it under the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

M. LAROCHE agreed, but stated that at the time Wall came to Paris—and this was the action for which he was reproached—the intention of the Allies had been to extend the plebiscite to a third zone, namely, the one which Denmark had refused.<sup>6</sup> Obviously, they could not do much from a legal point of view, but it was to be feared that the German agents would make capital of the Wall incident with half-hearted people in the second zone, and convince them that if the result of the plebiscite left this second zone to Germany, those who had voted for attachment to Denmark would be treated as the publicist in question had been.

SIR EYRE CROWE referred to a further point in Sir Charles Marling's telegram: the French representative on the Schleswig Commission believed that the German Government had been notified that it would be called upon to evacuate immediately the third zone if arrests of a political nature should occur there. As a matter of fact, it was not so, and the Council had modified on July 16th (H. D. 8),<sup>7</sup> the proposal which had been submitted to it by the relevant Commission. He suggested therefore that the Schleswig Commission be informed accurately on this point, and was prepared, if the Council approved, to telegraph to Sir Charles to that effect.

M. LAROCHE told the Council that according to a telegram of the French representative at Copenhagen, as well as to the note from Baron von Lersner, the Germans had sent troops to Flensburg on the pretext of preventing incidents arising out of unemployment. It was clear that there was therein an attempt at bringing pressure to bear on the eve of the plebiscite. They could not oblige the Germans to withdraw their troops, but could they not send to the spot warships charged with watching what was taking place?

M. PICHON thought that it would be wrong to let this action of Germany pass without protest.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed, but, at the same time, thought that up to the time when the Treaty came into force the German Government had both the right and the duty to maintain order in these regions; and they were not in a position to say *a priori* that any such manœuvre was intended.

M. LAROCHE drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the Ger-

<sup>6</sup> For the revision of the earlier proposal to conduct the plebiscite in Schleswig in three zones see Vol. I, No. 12, appendix B. Cf. also A. Tardieu and F. de Jessen: *Le Slesvig et la Paix, janvier 1919-janvier 1920* (Paris 1928), *passim*. Also printed *ibid.*, pp. 312-27 *passim*, are French texts of the present minute (H.D. 76, minute 8) and appendices.

<sup>7</sup> See Vol. I, No. 12, minute 3 (b).

mans had deemed it their duty to advise it of this despatch of troops; doubtless their conscience was not perfectly at ease. The Council could reply recognizing the Germans' right, but adding that they, on their side, were going to send ships to demonstrate the fact that when the moment arrived they were equally interested in the maintenance of order.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether they were in a position to send ships.

M. LAROCHE answered that a French ship must be on the eve of arriving at Copenhagen.

SIR EYRE CROWE also asked whether they had the right to send ships into German ports.

MR. POLK thought that they were no more justified in that than in sending troops into Upper Silesia before the Treaty came into force.

M. LAROCHE thought it was exactly because that right was debatable that he proposed the formula he had just indicated.

GENERAL LE ROND reminded the Council that since the Armistice the cruiser *Marseillaise* had already been at Flensburg and Sonderburg.

M. LAROCHE remarked that certainly the Germans had objected, but on the grounds of a particular incident which had arisen. The note might say that, in order to avoid any misinterpretation resulting from the despatch of warships to Flensburg, the Allies on their part would send ships into the harbour without disembarking.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that it would be well to make sure that they had ships available.

M. PICHON concluded that the naval representatives would come to an agreement.

It was decided:

- (1) that Sir Eyre Crowe should make known to the Chairman of the Schleswig Commission in the name of the Supreme Council, the exact sense of the decisions taken by the Council at its meeting of July 8th [16th], 1919, with regard to Schleswig;<sup>7</sup>
- (2) that on account of recent events at Flensburg, and with the reservation that the naval representatives should deem it possible to send warships, a note should be sent to the German Delegation to inform it that the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to send warships to Flensburg.

9. (The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee dated October 23rd, 1919 (see Appendix I).)

*German and  
Austrian Banks  
in Turkey*

M. CHEYSSON said that in the draft telegram which the Financial Commission had already prepared<sup>8</sup> it had been indicated to the High Commissioners at Constantinople that the Council supported them in such measures as they had taken. This indication did not appear in the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee. It would perhaps be wise to communicate to the High Commissioners the note of the Drafting Committee.

MR. POLK asked what the Drafting Committee thought about it.

<sup>8</sup> See No. 4, note 2.

M. FROMAGEOT said he could only reply for himself. It seemed to him preferable to send the telegram as it had been prepared by the Drafting Committee and to address also to the High Commissioners a copy of their note. They would thus have complete security for the past as well as for the future. The considerations developed in their report would give the High Commissioners all the arguments tending to justify, if that should be necessary, the attitude they had taken in the past. The Drafting Committee would further suggest to the Council the advantage of inserting in the Treaty with Turkey a clause which should give to the High Commissioners final discharge in respect of all operations carried out by them, and which should fix the allocation of sums accruing from liquidations carried out up to the time of the coming into force of the Treaty with Germany.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the note of the Drafting Committee dated October 23rd, 1919, relative to German and Austrian banks in Turkey;
- (2) to send to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople the draft telegram enclosed in the above note and at the same time to send a copy of this note to the Allied High Commissioners (see Appendix I).

10. M. PICHON proposed at the next meeting, which at Mr. Tittoni's request would be on Tuesday,<sup>9</sup> to discuss the violations of the Armistice as well as the nominations for Chairmen of the different Government Commissions.

*Determination of  
agenda for the  
next meeting*

11. MR. POLK asked whether the question of the boundaries of Albania could not be referred forthwith to the appropriate Commission for examination and report.

*Boundaries of  
Albania*

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether this question could be detached from the whole Adriatic question.

M. TITTONI did not think one could separate from the Adriatic question that of the mandate claimed by Italy for Albania, but the specific question of boundaries might quite well be considered separately.

MR. POLK thought that the boundary question was indeed a question apart. The line of the Albano-Greek frontier would be fixed shortly; elsewhere the problem of the Albanian frontiers involved Serbian and Montenegrin questions, but nevertheless if the question were studied now, time would be saved. When the proper time arrived the Council would have a report before it.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed but thought on the whole that in such a country as Albania the limitation of boundaries was largely a matter of political compromise: the solutions arrived at in neighbouring regions should be known. He would like the matter discussed provided the problem was discussed in all its bearings.

M. TITTONI said that the Council was already in possession of a report on the subject of the line of boundary between Albania and Greece; why not

<sup>9</sup> October 28, 1919.

prepare a report on the Albano-Serbian frontier? When the Council came to discuss the question there would be nothing to hinder its examining the matter as a whole. Then would be the time to introduce considerations of a political nature. For the moment let the Commission investigate the line guided by ethnographical considerations.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if he might remark that the Territorial Commissions charged with the determination of frontiers were not guided in the work simply by ethnographical considerations.

M. BERTHELOT thought that so far as concerned Albanian frontiers, Treaties prior to this war supplied already a general basis. If they were to modify the frontiers which had then been traced it would be in virtue of essentially political considerations and these considerations were bound up with decisions still to be arrived at affecting the Adriatic.

M. TITTONI added that this bond existed particularly for Italians who had associated the question of the mandate in Albania with the concessions that they made in Dalmatia, the two problems being inseparable.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked why not then tackle the problem as a whole at once.

M. PICHON remarked that as Mr. Polk and M. Tittoni were to meet that day they might await the result of their conversation.

MR. POLK then withdrew his proposal.

It was decided:

to adjourn the discussion of this question until a future meeting.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, October 25, 1919.*

## APPENDIX A TO No. 6

### *Memorandum from the British Delegation*

The following telegram, addressed to the Supreme Council, has been received from the President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission:

'Considering that Admiral Goette<sup>10</sup> persists in paying no attention to the orders emanating from the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, it is proposed to send Admiral Goette the following telegram tomorrow night:

'(Beginning of the telegram):

'Considering that you persist in paying no attention to the orders which are given you by the President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission, particularly as relates to:

- I. The delivery of tank vessels;
- II. The sending to the Firth of Forth of five ships, in execution of the order of the Supreme Council,<sup>11</sup> which was the object of my telegram No. 1840 of October 16th;

<sup>10</sup> President of the German Naval Armistice Commission.

<sup>11</sup> See Vol. I, No. 74, minute 1 and appendix A.

III. The sending of the ships *Estonia* or *Estland* [*sic*] (see my telegrams 1300 of October 17th, 1930 of October 17th and 1100 of October 18th);

IV. The answer to my telegram No. 1200 of October 7th, asking for a statement on the measures taken on the occasion of the Claymore incident;

V. The case of several merchant ships which have not been delivered;

You are informed by the present, that as long as the orders given by the Inter-allied Naval Armistice Commission are not executed, no German ship will be given freedom of the seas, either Baltic waters, or elsewhere. (Here ends the telegram.)

'The approval of the Supreme Council is requested.—1329.'

Pending the arrival of instructions from London, the British Delegation is not able to discuss this question.

October 24, 1919.

## APPENDIX B TO No. 6

### *Memorandum from the British Delegation*

The following telegram, addressed to the Supreme Council has been received from the President of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission:

I refer to telegram 319 from the President of the Interallied Armistice Commission, dated October 22nd. On account of the decision of the Supreme Council on the subject of the German note, asking that the embargo put on navigation in the Baltic be only applied when military reasons make it necessary,<sup>3</sup> the telegram which it was proposed to send to Admiral Goette, has not been sent.

Since October 22nd requests numbers 3 and 4 have been complied with, but the important points numbers 1, 2 and 5, have not yet begun to be executed.

October 25, 1919.

## APPENDIX C TO No. 6

### *(Embargo on German Shipping in the Baltic)*

#### *Proposed Draft Reply to the German Delegation Note of October 17, prepared by the Allied Naval Advisers*

The Allied and Associated Governments have examined the request contained in the Note of October 17 from the German Government, concerning the restrictions placed on the sailings of German fishing vessels and other small craft in the Baltic,<sup>3</sup> and have instructed A.N.A.C. to take whatever steps are possible to meet the requests of the German Government, in so far as these steps do not interfere with any military measures that are considered necessary.

October 24, 1919.

## APPENDIX D TO No. 6

### *Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council*

The Governments of the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan have agreed on a uniform course of actions as regards the resumption of diplomatic

relations with Germany and propose to be represented at Berlin at first by *Chargés d'Affaires*.

The British Government would be glad to know the views of the Supreme Council on the following points:—

1. How should the names of the representatives chosen and the dates of their arrival be notified to the German Government? Should this be done through the neutral Governments which now represent the five Powers at Berlin—in the case of Great Britain, the Netherland Government?
2. Should the credentials of the five representatives be in the usual form?
3. Should the five representatives follow the procedure customary in the case of a newly arrived Head of a Mission as regards official calls, etc., while of course abstaining from any relations with the Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish Missions till the Treaties of Peace with their respective Governments have been ratified?
4. Should the procedure agreed on, whatever it may be, be also followed at Munich and Dresden?
5. When should the five representatives proceed to their posts?

*October 24, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX E TO No. 6

##### *Joint note of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in the Duchy of Teschen and the Territories of Spisz and Orava.*

A decision taken by the Supreme Council under date of September 27th last,<sup>12</sup> established the method of carrying out the plebiscite to be instituted in the territories of Teschen, Spisz and Orava, and determined the powers of the Interallied Commission charged with the task of organizing the plebiscite and of supervising its execution.

The Commissions which elaborated the plebiscite plan consider it necessary that the instructions given to the Interallied Commission by virtue of the above cited decision be made clear on certain points, and that at the same time more latitude in interpretation be accorded the Commission in order that it may more easily cope with the difficulties which might be encountered locally on account of the difference of views of the Poles and of the Czecho-Slovaks.

To this end the Commissions have the honour to submit herewith, for the approval of the Council, the following resolution which, if it is adopted, should be communicated in the form of instructions to the members of the Plebiscite Commission:

The Supreme Council judges it desirable to define as follows the provisions of the resolution of September 27th, as well as the powers confided to the International Plebiscite Commission by this resolution.

As stated by the decision of September 27th, the Commission alone shall have authority to interpret this decision, to decide just what are the administration and police powers which it appears to it necessary to exercise to insure the maintenance of order and the normal existence of the country. It may hear the Polish and Czecho-Slovak representatives, but merely in a consultative capacity.

*Competence of  
the Commission*

<sup>12</sup> See Vol. I, No. 66, minute 8.

Also, in its decisions, the Commission should not consider itself as bound by the various indications contained in the minutes of the sessions of the Paris Commissions, or in the other documents placed at its disposition. It should only consider them as indications facilitating the study of the problem: it shall be solely guided by the decision of September 27th and by the present instructions.

The Polish and Czecho-Slovak Delegations have requested that modifications be introduced in the conditions governing the right of suffrage as fixed in Article 5 of the resolution of September 27th.

*Conditions governing the right of suffrage* The Poles consider that domicile ought to be taken as the sole basis of a right to vote, in order that this right may be refused to persons who have, for some time, ceased to inhabit the country. They consider, further, that domicile ought to entail a right to vote if it is prior to November 3rd, 1918.

The Czechs, on the contrary, desire that 'indigénat' (*Heimatsrecht*) alone be taken into consideration.

It is impossible to accede wholly to either one or the other of these propositions.

The Czecho-Slovak proposal refuses the right to vote to a number of inhabitants who, although not possessing 'indigénat', have none the less been located in the region for some time.

The modification of date proposed by the Poles tends to accord voting rights to elements too recently arrived in the country, and to the participation in the plebiscite of that part of the population whose floating character is difficult to contest and whose admission to voting rights could only be justified on political grounds and not by durable bonds of attachment to this region.

In establishing the list of voters, the Commission should not only conform to the letter of the provisions of Article 5, paragraph c, but be guided also by their spirit, in order fully to respond to the *clear intention* of the Supreme Council. The right to take part in the plebiscite should only be accorded to those who may be considered in good faith as meeting the conditions fixed by the Supreme Council, that is:

1. To those who possessed 'indigénat' prior to August 1st, 1914.
2. To those who, without having fulfilled that formality, had their habitual residence in the region from a date which could not be subsequent to August 1st, 1914.

Thus, one could only accord the vote to persons who possessed 'indigénat' previous to the 1st of August, 1914, if their behaviour showed that they had not disinterested themselves from the region or allowed their connections with the region to be severed. On the other hand, the right to vote could only be based upon residence previous to the 1st of August, 1914, if that residence had been habitual, actual, residence prolonged until the date of the plebiscite. Persons could not be admitted to the vote who, after having resided outside of the region during this period, only returned to participate in the plebiscite. *Force majeure* (military service, etc.) could only be invoked if the person in question has shown his attachment to the country by the fact that he had been there for a considerable period previous to 1914, or by other evidence of a nature to leave no doubt as to his intention of making that region the place of his habitual residence (property holding and the maintenance of his family in the country, etc.).

Within these limits, the Commission has full power without appeal to decide the conditions of the vote.

## APPENDIX F TO No. 6

### POLISH DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

PARIS, *October 21, 1919.*

From: Roman Dmowski,

To: President Clemenceau.

The German Government has decided to take advantage of the short period remaining before the occupation of Upper Silesia by Allied troops, to conduct communal elections in that province. Electoral lists have already been prepared and exposed to the public. The electoral colleges will be convoked in the very near future.

The purpose of this measure, put into operation in great haste, is clearly evident. Following the insurrection of the Polish population in Upper Silesia, provoked intentionally by the Germans, thousands of Poles were arrested and deported to German provinces; more numerous still are those who were obliged to take refuge in Polish territory already liberated. The amnesty recently discussed between the Polish and German Governments has not yet been realized. Under these conditions, an important number of electors are unable to take part in the election; thus the result of these preliminary elections must in no sense be considered as the true expression of opinion in the country. All electors subject to the exceptional regime still in force in Upper Silesia will be deprived of an opportunity to express their opinions. But this is exactly the reason why the German Government hastens to conduct the elections; it wishes to prove to the inter-allied occupation authorities, and to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers that the universal suffrage as applied to the communal elections gives Germany full justification and confirms her assertions regarding the German character of Upper Silesia. Moreover, the communal authorities, elected under similar circumstances, will be docile instruments in the hands of the German Government, with which she intends to influence the result of the plebiscite. It is also certain that the German Government will do everything in its power to insure the election of persons who, by remaining in the country, would serve as supporters of her policy.

The Polish Delegation, in a note dated July 5th last, indicated that it is important to proceed with the communal elections, but under a regime of occupation by Allied troops, because this occupation alone could furnish sufficient impartiality guarantees [*sic*] concerning the organization and conduct of these elections.

Considering that the communal elections decreed for Upper Silesia are to be regarded as a manoeuvre on the part of the German Government tending the result [*sic*] of the plebiscite, the Polish Delegation has the honour to request the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to kindly take any measures it may deem necessary to cause a revocation of the communal elections in Upper Silesia by the German Government, and to have these elections operated under the control of the Inter-Allied occupation authorities after a reasonable electoral period, and upon a basis of the lists which are to be prepared after the evacuation of the province by the German Authorities.

Accept, etc.

ROMAN DMOWSKI.

## APPENDIX G TO No. 6

### *Telegram to the Supreme Council from Sir C. Marling, Chairman of the Slesvig Commission, relative to Political Arrests in Slesvig.*

COPENHAGEN, October 22, 1919.

About July 20th the Slesvig Commission at Paris suggested to the Supreme Council that a request should be addressed to the German Government to give strict instructions to the German officials in the Third Zone to abstain from political arrests, on the understanding that the evacuation of that zone would be immediately required in case any instances of such arrests, which could not but vitiate the results of the plebiscite, were reported by the International Commission.

The Commission was never authoritatively informed whether the Supreme Council approved this proposal<sup>7</sup> and addressed the necessary communication to the German Government on the subject, but my French colleague believes this to be the case.

A concrete instance has now occurred in the case of the publicist Wall. This man was arrested last July and released at the instance of the late French Minister, yet the German authorities have since confined him to his own house, and the Commission hereby requests authority to demand of the German Delegate that Mr. Wall shall be restored to complete liberty, and to quote in so doing, the above mentioned resolution of the Supreme Council.

## APPENDIX H TO No. 6

### *Note delivered by Baron von Lersner, October 23, 1919.*

For several weeks Flensburg has been suffering from gross excesses committed by strikers and members of the seamen's league. Crews who wish to work are threatened; provisioning is jeopardized. On the 16th instant the Hôtel de Ville was taken by assault and impossible demands made on the magistrates. Consequently, we were obliged to comply with the urgent request of the authorities and of the citizens of Flensburg to take measures for military protection.

## APPENDIX I TO No. 6

### *Note for the Supreme Council concerning German and Austrian Banks in Turkey.*

1st. The measures taken since the Turkish Armistice and until the entry into force of the German Treaty (and afterwards the Austrian Treaty) are protected from German or Austrian Claims: 1st. By virtue of Articles 19 and 23 of the Turkish Armistice which forbids the presence of Austrian or German subjects in Turkey or of any relations between Turkey and Germany (and Austria); and 2nd, by virtue of Article 439 of the German Treaty (Article 377 of the Austrian Treaty) by virtue of which Germany (and Austria) renounced any claim concerning measures taken by the Powers prior to the entry into force of the Treaty.

2nd. After the entry into force of the German Treaty (and afterwards the Austrian Treaty) the control measures taken or to be taken by the Powers are covered: 1st, by the articles of the Turkish Armistice above referred to; 2nd, by

the right vested in Powers occupying a territory to supervise, for reasons of military security, any enterprise whatsoever situated in occupied country.

The Drafting Committee has no knowledge as to whether the Principal Allied and Associated Powers intend to operate liquidations after the entry into force of the German Treaty (and of the Austrian Treaty), but if such liquidations are to be operated it would be advantageous to have these measures covered later in the Turkish Treaty.

In fact, the Allied and Associated Powers have, in relation to Germany, Article 155 of the German Treaty (and in relation to Austria, Article 86 of the Austrian Treaty), entire authority to fix the fate of the said German and Austrian Banks in the Turkish Treaty, and Germany and Austria agree at the present time to all stipulations of this nature between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey.

If these considerations are fully founded, it would be opportune to instruct the High Commissioners at Constantinople as follows:

*Draft of Telegram to the High Commissioners at Constantinople*

Replying to your telegram 1.792 of September 23rd with regard to the attitude to be adopted concerning the German and Austrian banks in Turkey, the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agree to not proceed [sic], after the entry into force of the German Treaty, and afterwards of the Austrian Treaty, with the operation of any liquidation measures, but they reserve the right to take, even after the entry into force of these Treaties, all supervision measures deemed necessary concerning the said banks. These measures will be justified: 1st, by Articles 19 and 23 of the Turkish Armistice; and 2nd, by the right vested in Powers occupying the territory to supervise, for reasons of military security, any enterprise whatsoever situated in said occupied territory.

It will be expedient to fix the fate of the said banks in the stipulations of the arrangements with Turkey, as Germany (Article 153<sup>13</sup> of the German Treaty) and Austria (Article 86 of the Austrian Treaty) have already agreed to any stipulations of this nature between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey.

For the Drafting Committee

HENRI FROMAGEOT.

October 23, 1919.

<sup>13</sup> In error for 155.

No. 7

H. D. 77.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, October 28, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Tittoni; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. British Empire:

Capt. G. Lothian Small. France: M. Massigli. Italy: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

*U.S.A.*: General Tasker H. Bliss, Brig. Gen. Cheney, Rear-Admiral McCully, U.S.N.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Commandant [Commander] Lucas, General Groves, Colonel Kisch, Captain Fuller.

*France*: Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Niessel, M. Laroche, M. Kammerer, Commandant Le Vavasseur, Cap[i]tain[e] de corvette Fabre, Captain Roper.

*Italy*: General Cavallero, C. Amiral Grassi, Lieut.-Col. Scelzo, Capt. de corvette Ruspoli.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. (The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch, dated October 15th, 1919, to M. Clemenceau, with annexed note (see Appendix A).)

*Constitution of Inter-  
Allied Military Organi-  
zation for the execution  
of the clauses of the  
Treaty with Germany*

MR. POLK observed that he only received the letter and note in question late the night before.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if he desired to adjourn the consideration of this question.

MR. POLK thought that it would be useful to discuss the questions involved although he did not think that any conclusions could be reached at that meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if Sir Eyre Crowe was in the same situation, and briefly summarized the letter and note, adding that he intended to appoint Marshal Foch as the French Representative on the Inter-Allied Military Organization which it was intended to constitute and he thought that he should have the presidency thereof.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had hurriedly read the letter and note in question but he had not been aware that this point was on the agenda for that day. He was not clear as to the exact machinery which it was proposed to set up. There were already in existence Commissions of Control which would supervise in Germany the execution of the Treaty, and on these Commissions representation of all the Allied and Associated Powers was provided for.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the proposed Military Organization was not an ordinary Commission. It was rather a question of creating an Inter-Allied Military Organization with executive functions. After the Treaty came into force Marshal Foch, as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, would no longer have any command to exercise. He proposed to transfer those powers to the Council existing at Versailles and to endow it with executive functions.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if it was not desired to retain an Inter-Allied command.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it was, but that it would be in a different form.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that there was already in existence a Council sitting at Versailles which, however, had no executive powers but purely

advisory ones. He felt that he would have to refer the question of the organization now proposed to his Government. Command of the troops of occupation on the Rhine was already settled, the command being vested in the Commanding Officer of the French troops of occupation on the Rhine, and he thought it was unnecessary to create another intermediate body exercising functions of command.

MARSHAL FOCH pointed out that the troops of occupation on the Rhine were not the only ones concerned. He was now asking to be relieved as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces. It was, however, necessary to ensure the execution of the clauses of the Treaty. It was true that in large part this was already confided to the Commissions of Control in Germany, but for various reasons a central organization like that at Versailles was necessary, with an Inter-Allied staff: first, it was necessary to have a central organization in order to give directions to the various Commissions of Control which otherwise would deal with their respective Governments, so that confusion and disorder would necessarily ensue. For the same reasons a central organization was necessary in view of the different conditions applying to the Inter-Allied troops of occupation, inasmuch as they were to be stationed in different localities, were of different composition and were subject to different conditions of administration. If it became necessary to proceed to affirmative measures on the Rhine, for instance, it would be necessary to have a medium for reaching an agreement with Belgium with respect to the cooperation of her troops. In like manner if it were also desired to take similar measures on the eastern frontier the same necessity existed for coming to an understanding with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. For the foregoing reasons it was necessary to have an Inter-Allied staff. The Council at Versailles did not at present have executive powers, but in February and March, 1918, with Mr. Lloyd George's consent, the Executive War Board sitting at Versailles had been invested with executive as well as consultative powers. He proposed the retention of the present Council of Versailles with the added attribution of extensive executive powers, otherwise the proper execution of the various military measures would become impossible.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that his delegation had already discussed this matter and that, although differing on certain points, it had come to a similar conclusion. The necessity for a centralized organization with executive powers was fully realized. He thought that the Council already existing at Versailles was sufficient but that it should remain under the orders of the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that of course this would be so.

MR. POLK suggested that the Conference might no longer be in session at the time referred to.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that this was true but that the necessity of consulting the respective Governments would still exist and that, therefore, a central body with executive power became more necessary than ever. If the various decisions of the Allied and Associated Powers were to be communi-

cated to their respective military commanders much confusion would inevitably result: it would be preferable to have these orders transmitted by a central body sitting at Versailles which would include representatives of the Governments concerned.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that a Committee for the coordination of questions concerning the interpretation and execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany had already been decided upon.<sup>1</sup>

MR. POLK thought that the idea was that such a Committee would have no other powers than the winding up of the work of the Conference: it had not been contemplated that this Committee of Coordination should resolve itself into a continuation of the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that for whoever knew the Germans it was unquestionably true that if we did not see to the proper execution of the clauses of the Treaty they would never be executed.

MR. POLK inquired whether it would be equally necessary to have some central body of naval control.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that he did not see why not; that he should like that to come about.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought that the Committee of Coordination which had been decided upon was essential: moreover, that as it could transmit orders from the various Governments concerned to their Naval and Military Representatives it, in his opinion, was sufficient.

M. TITTONI in summarizing what Sir Eyre Crowe had said, took it that he meant that the existing Council at Versailles should be maintained and that it should have the same relations towards the proposed Committee of Coordination as it now occupied with respect to the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the Versailles Council had no executive powers at all.

MARSHAL FOCH added that he himself now had all executive power.

M. TITTONI thought that the Council of Versailles should exist under the presidency of Marshal Foch with executive powers, receiving its orders from the Committee of Coordination in the same manner as it now received such orders from the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that the Supreme Council or the Committee of Coordination was always to retain the power of decision; that the military organization proposed was to be endowed with full executive powers for carrying out the orders of the Supreme Council or of the Committee of Coordination. He thought it was necessary to have Marshal Foch at the head of this proposed military organization at Versailles inasmuch as in view of his great prestige, as well as his ability, it would never do for the Germans to think that they were finally rid of him.

MR. POLK inquired if it was Marshal Foch's idea that the Interallied troops of occupation in Dantzic, Silesia, and other regions would all be under the supreme command of the organization at Versailles with its Interallied General Staff.

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. I, No. 21, minute 1.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that this was the case. He thought that the questions involved were now clearly understood by everyone and he suggested that their decision be postponed to a future meeting.

(This was agreed to.)

2. (The Council had before it telegrams from Sir Edward Grey<sup>2</sup> to Lord Curzon and from Lord Curzon to Sir Eyre Crowe, both dated October 25th, 1919 [see Appendix B].)

*Communication from the British Delegates to the International Labour Conference at Washington urging the Ratification of the Treaty with Germany*

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented on the telegrams in question.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that a great many other important questions were awaiting upon the possibility of setting a definite date for the coming into force of the

Treaty, which, needless to say, would be done as soon as possible.

3. (The Council had before it draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces [see Appendix C].)

*Draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces*

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that in the place of General Mangin, General Niessel had been appointed to the Presidency of this Commission: the General had lived for a long while in Russia and was familiar with

the Russian tongue.

MR. POLK suggested that the representatives named on this Commission meet and discuss the draft instructions to General Niessel and report back to the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they could meet immediately in another room.

GENERAL NIESEL remarked that as he had had a conversation with the British Representative, General Turner, the day before, he could speak for him at this meeting.

(At this point the military representatives on this Commission left the room.)

M. TITTONI observed that the draft instructions brought up a great many political questions also.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that these be discussed immediately.

M. BERTHELOT then began to read Section 5 of the draft instructions.

M. TITTONI, with respect to the last paragraph of Section 5, suggested that the wording used implied that the Commission would be superior and in fact replace the local *de facto* governments, thus assuming responsibilities which properly attached to them. He thought that this clause should be so altered that it would be clear that these *de facto* governments were to be consulted by the Commission. He suggested that the clause be made to read: 'The local governments in agreement with the Commission, will take, etc.'

M. BERTHELOT observed that this change could easily be made: it was clear that the Commission could not replace these *de facto* governments.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Grey was H.M. Ambassador in Washington.

MR. POLK, with respect to the first paragraph of Section 5, inquired whether the recognition of the Governments of Latvia, Esthonia and Lithuania was implied.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was not, that it was only a question of dealing with these *de facto* governments.

MR. POLK observed that he had asked the question because the United States had not yet recognized these Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE, with respect to the last paragraph of Section 6, inquired whether it was contemplated that the President of this Commission would surely be the representative of the Allied and Associated Powers at Petrograd.

M. BERTHELOT said that this was not exactly the meaning: what was meant was that the President of this Commission might eventually be designated by the Conference as representative in Petrograd of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. TITTONI thought it would be better to provide that this Commission might eventually represent the Allied and Associated Powers at Petrograd, rather than that the President thereof should be such representative.

MR. POLK wished to raise the point whether there was not great danger of this Commission doing much more than it had been meant to do. The primary intention was to constitute a commission which should see to it that the Germans were driven out of the Baltic Provinces. Under the instructions now presented the Commission was apt to engage the Allied and Associated Powers in a large number of delicate questions.

M. BERTHELOT replied that it was difficult to separate the questions. The Germans were in those regions in all conditions and guises and for that reason it was necessary to provide for a great number of contingencies and to enable the Commission to treat with all the local authorities. It had been attempted to formulate a clear and continuous policy with respect to the Baltic Provinces; this was a thing which heretofore had been lacking and had frequently been a cause of reproach.

MR. POLK agreed that a clear and continuous policy was certainly necessary, but queried whether this was the time to begin to formulate one. He found this difficulty: if this Commission was to extend its activities beyond driving the Germans out of the Baltic Provinces he would have to refer the matter to his Government, inasmuch as many questions would be involved which he had always maintained must be settled directly by the Government of the United States and not here in Paris by the Council. Especially with reference to Russian questions had he always maintained this point of view.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed with Mr. Polk. He added that the Allies had had a representative in these regions, namely General Gough. He felt that this present Commission was being vested with powers which were formerly held by General Gough. It was a new question for him and he would have to refer the matter to his Government.

M. BERTHELOT had not thought that this was a new question to the British Delegation because General March [Marsh], who had succeeded General Gough, had told the French Military Representative at Riga that

he understood that his mission was being terminated on account of the organization of the present Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that his Government had appointed General Hicking<sup>3</sup> with detailed instructions.

M. BERTHELOT thought that this was a different matter, inasmuch as General Hicking's<sup>3</sup> purely British mission was only to operate in case of the eventual taking of Petrograd.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that however that might be, he felt that the scope of this Commission was being unduly extended. He did not wish to be in the position of supporting a Commission whose powers might conflict with the instructions already given to General Hicking's<sup>3</sup> mission.

M. TITTONI said that to his mind the only way of settling the conditions of anarchy existing in these regions was to send a Commission with powers substantially similar to those embodied in the draft instructions. He was in favour of sending this Commission now.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that inasmuch as no troops were assigned to this Commission it must be given other means of making its decisions and authority respected. Unless it clearly represented the Council it would only obtain vague promises at Berlin, and on the spot it would, as had happened before, merely be laughed at by the Germans.

M. CLEMENCEAU hoped that the American and British representatives would consult their Governments as soon as possible.

MR. POLK replied that he would of course do so, but he thought he should point out that he did not believe that his Government would be disposed to have a military Commission handle matters of this kind, which were, rather, diplomatic in their scope and nature.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in such a delicate question all Governments should take their share of the responsibility. If this Commission did not have a very great moral authority it would be able to accomplish nothing. It was also very necessary not to engage in any undertaking of this kind with such inadequate means, or under such conditions, that it could not be carried to a successful conclusion. He was in favour of granting to this Commission powers substantially as laid down in the draft instructions. But, at any rate, even if some modifications were to be made, the instructions finally given to General Niessel must be absolutely clear.

MR. POLK agreed that the instructions to the Commission should be absolutely clear and added that in Russian and Baltic Provinces questions the Allied and Associated Powers had heretofore not been in sufficient agreement and had hesitated unduly. For instance, it would be very advantageous to settle at once, if possible, the questions of the recognition of Admiral Kol-

<sup>3</sup> In error for Haking. General Sir R. Haking had been sent upon a special mission to General Yudenitch under instructions of October 22, 1919, from the War Office. General Haking was instructed to proceed at once to Reval where he should meet General Marsh from Helsingfors prior to the return of the latter to England. General Haking's mission was accredited only to the Russian forces commanded by General Yudenitch and was thus distinct from the Allied Mission under General Niessel concerned with the withdrawal of German forces from the Baltic Provinces.

chak's government and of the provisional governments of the Baltic Provinces. He wished again, however, to reiterate that he did not feel that these questions should be raised in connection with the instructions to this present Commission.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the draft instructions did not involve recognition. He again recalled that the Council had already sent various *ultimata* in vain. If this Mission were despatched with no other power than to order the Germans to evacuate the Baltic Provinces failure was bound to result. Another alternative was presented: the Germans could be told that if they did not evacuate, the Allied and Associated Powers would refuse to ratify the Treaty, but this was entirely a different question.

MR. POLK agreed but felt that there was some confusion as to the matters being discussed. The Germans asked that a Commission should be sent to the Baltic Provinces to assist in the evacuation of their troops, and this had been accepted. He agreed entirely that the Commission should have ample power, but he did not see that that had any connection with giving instructions as to what would happen after the capture of Petrograd. It might be advisable to contemplate such a contingency but he doubted if his Government would consent to the matter being handled by the sending of this Commission.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that Bermont<sup>4</sup> had announced that he intended to enter Petrograd at the same time as General Yudenitch; it was for this reason that he had first wished to occupy Riga. Moreover, Bermont had certain relations with elements of Yudenitch's army. Therefore it was difficult to separate these questions. Even if there were to be modifications with respect to details he hoped that the main principle could be agreed upon.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Delegations should consult with their Governments at once.

MR. POLK thought that perhaps after studying the draft instructions it might not be necessary for him to consult his Government on certain points, but he doubted whether points such as the relations to be established with Esthonia could be settled in this manner.

GENERAL WEYGAND called the attention of the Council to a telegram received from General Dupont desiring that the Commission be sent as soon as possible, for two reasons: first, the question was raised as to whether the evacuation should take place via the ports of Memel and Königsberg, and this necessarily involved many complicated questions of detail which could only be settled on the spot: secondly, Noske<sup>5</sup> had made it known that if the blockade continued until the completion of evacuation the supply of iron ore for the Silesian mines would be cut off and some 200,000 men would be thrown out of work. The conclusion necessarily was that this Commission should be sent at the very earliest moment possible.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel Prince Bermond-Avalov was in command of Russo-German forces in the Baltic Provinces: see Vol. III.

<sup>5</sup> German Minister of Defence (Reichswehr).

(At this point the Military Representatives on this Commission re-entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if the Military representatives were unanimous in their conclusions.

GENERAL NIESSEL said that two or three points still remained to be cleared up. It was proposed to add to Section 3, paragraph C, the following clause: 'The German Government will give to the Commission and its Agents complete authorization to circulate in all the territory occupied by German troops.' (This was agreed to.)

General Niessel desired to add to the first paragraph of Section 4 the following clause: 'German diplomatic and civil officials shall leave the Baltic Provinces at the same time as the troops.'

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether there was any basis of right for this action. He maintained that under the terms of the Armistice there existed a perfect right to compel the evacuation of the troops but he doubted whether there were any legal grounds for compelling the withdrawal of diplomatic and civil officials.

GENERAL NIESSEL said that this additional clause was suggested by reason of the request of the British Representative at Riga, who felt that these diplomatic and civil officials should be compelled to leave at once.

M. TITTONI pointed out that this was equivalent to forbidding Germany to have any diplomatic relations with the *de facto* governments of the Baltic Provinces and he inquired whether the Council wished to go that far.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that the British Representative at Riga had made the request in question on account of the excessive number of German diplomatic and civil officials now in those regions. However that might be, the question remained whether there were any legal grounds for this action and he wished to ask what would happen if the Germans would simply refuse to recognize the right to demand the withdrawal of these diplomatic and civil officials.

MARSHAL FOCH suggested that to the clause proposed by General Niessel there be added the following words: 'with the exception of those recognized by the *de facto* governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania'. (This was agreed to.)

GENERAL NIESSEL also desired to add the following clause at the end of Section 9: 'The Allied Navies will supply the Commission with all transportation necessary and will ensure transmission of the Commission's telegrams.'

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that he would have to refer this to the British Naval Advisers. As a general observation he inquired whether an agreement could not be reached on military matters leaving the political questions for further consideration.

GENERAL NIESSEL explained that unless adequate naval transportation were assured the Commission could not reach the necessary localities nor function properly. If the Commission had to travel through regions in revolt it would surely fail at the very outset.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired if this transportation in any wise referred to troop transportation.

GENERAL NIESSEL explained that it did not.

(It was agreed to accept the clause proposed by General Niessel to be added to Section 9.)

GENERAL NIESSEL commenting upon Section 10 of the draft instructions, thought it should be made clear that the Commission was to be superior to all military missions in the regions in question, including a British military mission under Colonel Tallents.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that Colonel Tallents, a retired Colonel, represented the civil power; it would obviously be impossible to subordinate a civil mission to a military mission.

GENERAL NIESSEL observed that he did not desire such subordination if the scope of Colonel Tallents' mission was clearly indicated.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that this mission was accredited to the *de facto* government of Lithuania and was a diplomatic mission.

GENERAL NIESSEL said that this was satisfactory to him and that he therefore would not suggest adding anything to Section 10.

SIR EYRE CROWE, referring to the same Section 10, inquired where General Niessel intended to establish his headquarters.

GENERAL NIESSEL explained that he could not determine that point until he reached Berlin. His headquarters would have to be established at the spot where he could obtain the best local assistance against the Germans.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the provision as to the location of headquarters was so indefinite that he feared that it might possibly be situated at Dantzig, which, of course, would lead to fatal complications.

GENERAL NIESSEL replied that there was no danger of that. He wished to know what provision had been made relative to money to be furnished the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that the Council would settle that question.

GENERAL NIESSEL said that the Commission would need some money immediately. For instance part of its duty was to bring about the dissolution of Bermont's Germano-Russian Corps. If it succeeded in this it doubtless would have to incur large expenditures by way of payments relative to present members of that corps. If the *de facto* governments of the Baltic Provinces should be asked to incur extra expenditures on this account it was important that they should be assured of reimbursement by the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. POLK thought that this matter could be discussed later.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

GENERAL NIESSEL pointed out that Bermont had close relations with the Germans, and at the same time was corresponding with Yudenitch. He wished to know whether he should utterly refuse to deal with Bermont, or whether he should act towards him in such a manner that it might later be possible to make use of him.

M. TITTONI thought that the Commission should be authorized to use its entire discretion.

GENERAL NIESSEL then brought up the question of the supply of war material. He pointed out that it was most essential for the organization of any strong local force in the Baltic Provinces to have an ample and regular supply of material. The lack thereof had already proved most embarrassing to General Gough, and he felt that he could not succeed any better unless he were assured of adequate supplies.

MR. POLK wished again to revert to the difficulty he had formerly felt. It might perhaps be advisable to broaden the powers of the Commission, but it had not been contemplated that a mission with the powers now contained in the draft instructions should be organized; for instance, powers to deal with questions of supplies, representation in the future, etc.

GENERAL NIESSEL again pointed out that the Germans could understand nothing but force, and the only available forces were the local ones in the Baltic Provinces. If these forces were properly armed and equipped the Germans, if necessary, could be thrown out of the Baltic Provinces, by force.

MR. POLK observed that what he had in mind in his preceding remarks was the relations with Bermont which had been discussed.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this question should be reserved for future discussion.

GENERAL NIESSEL observed that a most important point was the attitude to be taken with respect to the German Government. He wished to know the Supreme Council's views with respect to the attitude to be taken if the evacuation were not properly carried out.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Niessel should always insist with the utmost firmness on the proper execution of the measures for evacuation, but that he should avoid going into any further detail. He suggested that the proposals relative to military action contained in the draft instructions be adopted and that the discussion of all political questions involved in the said draft instructions should be adjourned until such time as the various delegations could refer these questions to their respective Governments and receive answers which could be agreed upon. The instructions could then be sent on to the Commission.

GENERAL NIESSEL remarked that the Commission could not leave before the end of the week.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that possibly the Commission could then get its instructions before it left.

(It was agreed to accept M. Clemenceau's suggestion.)

(It was decided:

to adopt the following Sections of the draft instructions to the Inter-allied Commission charged with the examination of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces,—Sections I to IV inclusive, Section IX, and Section X, with the following corrections:

- (1) at the end of Section III, paragraph C, the following words should be added: 'The German Government will give to the Commission and

- its Agents complete authorization to circulate in all the territory occupied by German troops.'
- (2) at the end of the first paragraph, Section IV, the following words should be added: 'German diplomatic and civil officials shall leave the Baltic Provinces at the same time as the troops, with the exception of those recognized by the *de facto* governments of Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.'
- (3) at the end of Section IX the following words should be added: 'The Allied Navies will supply the Commission with all transportation necessary and will assure the transmission of the Commission's telegrams.'

It was further decided:

that the Commission should leave as soon as possible and perform the duties entrusted to it without awaiting the instructions as to political questions which would be forwarded to the Commission after discussion and decision thereupon by the Council at a future date.)

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, October 28, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 7

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

GENERAL STAFF, 1ST SECTION, No. 4960

G.H.Q. *October 15, 1919.*

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President of the Peace Conference.

The state of war with Germany will cease upon the entry into force of the Treaty of June 28, 1919.

The occupation troops have been reduced to definite proportions and their command is assured in conformity with the decisions of the Peace Conference. Under these conditions the command of the armies, which was confided in me through the confidence of the Allied and Associated Governments, is no longer necessary.

Consequently, I have the honour to request that you kindly solicit the French, American, British and Italian Governments that I be relieved of the duties attributed to me during the conferences of Doullens, Beauvais and Abbeville under date[s] of March 26, April 3, and May 2, 1918.

F. FOCH

P.S. I enclose herewith a note concerning the constitution of an interallied organ which appears to me necessary to ensure the execution of the treaty, and the solution of the interallied military questions yet pending.

F. F.

(Enclosure)

*Note*

The military execution of a Treaty signed by the Allied and Associated Governments can only be carried out, and satisfactorily terminated, by the constitution

of an Interallied Military organ operating under a single head, in the interest of these Governments.

This organ should have:

supreme command of the Control Commissions, entrusted with ensuring the execution of the military clauses of the Peace Treaties with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey.

supreme command of the Allied occupation forces established in the Rhineland and in the plebiscite zones.

the settlement of questions of a military order which might result from any unsatisfactorily regulated European situation, in particular concerning the military aid to be supplied to the armies struggling for order.

This organ should be constituted in the general form of the Executive Committee, created at Versailles in February 1918 for the coordination of military operations, which would include the assembly of the military representatives of the Superior War Council under the Presidency of General [sic] Foch.

## APPENDIX B TO NO. 7

### Document 1

*Telegram from Sir E. [sic] Grey to Lord Curzon.*

WASHINGTON. 25th October 1919.

Over 30 states have announced their intention of being represented at the International Labour Conference, which has been convened by the United States Government under the Treaty of Peace and opens on Wednesday next, October 29th. Their delegates are now arriving at Washington. The Conference, however, has no status until the Treaty of Peace has become operative and delay may necessitate an adjournment. This will cause great inconvenience and have an unfortunate effect on the labour situation in many countries. Can you ensure that the Supreme Council at Paris, which, it is understood, is now considering the date of the formal exchange of ratifications on which the coming into force of the Treaty depends will bear in mind the great importance for the Labour Conference of bringing it into force at the earliest possible date? I am sending this telegram after consultation with Barnes, and Delevingne,<sup>6</sup> who attach great importance to it and it is obvious that a most embarrassing situation must arise for the delegates here unless by the exchange of ratifications at Paris the Labour Conference is regularised by Wednesday next, October 29th.

### Document 2

*Telegram from Lord Curzon to Sir E. Crowe*

October 25, 1919.

Please bring the matter immediately to the notice of the Supreme Council and urge that everything possible may be done to ensure that the Conference shall be able to begin at the earliest possible moment although we fear, in view of

<sup>6</sup> Sir M. Delevingne was an Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Home Office and had been a British representative on the Commission of the Peace Conference on International Labour Legislation.

your reports, that it will be impossible to fix the date of ratification before November 11th.

## APPENDIX C TO No. 7

*Draft*

### *Instructions for General Niessel*

#### *1. Decision of the Supreme Council*

The persistent violation, on the part of the German Government and the German Generals operating in the Baltic Provinces, of the prescriptions of Article 12 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918 (confirmed by Article 433 of the Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919 with Germany) has caused numerous protests from the Supreme Council, and a resolution under date of October 10th deciding upon the constitution of an Inter-Allied Commission to supervise the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces by German troops.<sup>7</sup>

#### *2. Composition of the Inter-Allied Commission*

General Niessel is selected to exercise the Presidency of this Commission, which shall comprise the following members:

British Representative: General . . . <sup>8</sup>		
American	„	Brigadier General S. A. Chenay
Italian	„	Brigadier General Marietti
Japanese	„	Major G. Takeda, Infantry.

#### *3. Evacuation Supervision*

The German Government alone is held responsible for the execution of the evacuation.

The Inter-Allied Commission is authorized to exercise, with full liberty of action, wherever it may judge necessary, control of the execution of the evacuation measures ordered by the German Government.

To this end, the Commission:

- (a) shall acquire full knowledge, through the German Government at Berlin, of the measures taken by Germany with a view to establishing the conditions of the evacuation.
- (b) shall receive communication of the instructions, given by the German Command of the Baltic regions, concerning the application of these measures.
- (c) shall, should it judge necessary after a local examination of the situation, address any proposal to the German Government of a nature to facilitate, ensure and hasten the execution of the evacuation.

#### *4. Conditions governing the Evacuation*

The execution of the provisions of Article 12 of the Armistice implies not only the retreat of the constituent German unities [*sic*] now located in the Baltic provinces with their staffs and full service, but also the recall of all German

<sup>7</sup> See Vol. I, No. 71, minute 4.

<sup>8</sup> Thus in original. The British representative was General A. J. Turner (see minute 3 above).

military who, after demobilization, individually or in groups, entered the service of the Russian corps organized in the said provinces.

The supervision shall cover, not only the execution of the evacuation movements, but as well the verification of the material accompanying the German troops, in order to prevent the removal of any material or supplies that does not belong to these troops.

#### 5. *Relations with the Local Governments*

The Commission shall establish a liaison with the *de facto* governments in Latvia, Esthonia and Lithuania, which have been recognized as such by the Allied Governments, and with whom they entertain unofficial relations.

The Commission shall see that the authority and prerogatives of these Governments are respected by the German or Germano-Russian troops and shall stop all interference of these troops in the internal affairs of the said states.

The Commission shall attempt to develop relations of military solidarity between the Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian Governments with a view to a union of effort, in the struggle which they have undertaken, to liberate their countries of German occupation, and in their common defence against the Bolsheviks.

The Commission shall take, in concert with these Governments, all measures necessary for the maintenance of order in the evacuated territories, proportionate with the retreat of the German troops, and the dissolution of the Germano-Russian troops.

#### 6. *Relations with the Governments and the Russian Armies operating in the Baltic Provinces*

##### (a) *Russian Government*

The Inter-Allied Commission is not to assert itself, as for or against the Russian Government, called Northwest, presided over by Mr. Lianosof,<sup>9</sup> concerning which the Government of Admiral Koltchak has made no definite decision, and which has not yet been recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers, even as a local, or *de facto*, Government.

The Commission shall refuse to recognize the doubtful, Pseudo-Russian Government, recently created at Mitau by Count Phalen [Pahlen], with the assistance of important German bankers and Russian reactionaries.<sup>10</sup>

##### (b) *Russian armies*

The Inter-Allied Commission will make every effort to bring about the dissolution of the Bermont Germano-Russian corps which, with German assistance, is attacking the Lettish troops under pretext of contributing to the defeat of the Bolsheviks.

The Commission shall keep in constant contact with the Russian army, commanded by General Youdenitch, operating against the Bolsheviks with a view to delivering Petrograd from their tyrannical anarchy. The Commission shall serve as an intermediary between the Russian General and the Allied and Associated Powers.

In the event that the Russian Capital be occupied, the President of the Commission shall be authorized to eventually represent the Allied and Associated

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Vol. I, No. 38, minute 2.

<sup>10</sup> For this administration see Vol. III in this series.

Powers therein, to ensure the protection of their interests, and prevent the execution of massacres or reprisals.

#### *7. Relations with Finland*

The Inter-Allied Commission shall keep in constant contact with the Allied Military Missions located in Finland. It will inform the Supreme Council concerning the negotiations which might be established between the Russian and the Balkan [Baltic] provinces, and the Finnish Government, and would eventually communicate the views of the Allied and Associated Powers to them.

#### *8. Relations with Poland*

The Commission shall keep in constant contact with the Allied Military Missions operating with the Polish Government. It will make every effort to ensure an understanding between the Lithuanians and the Poles concerning the decisions of the Conference, and shall inform the Supreme Council to that effect.

#### *9. Action of the Allied Navy in the Baltic*

The Commission shall establish relations with the Interallied Maritime Command in the Baltic, which shall furnish information relative to the naval operations undertaken, either to support the liberation of Petrograd, or to block the provisioning of the Bolsheviks by sea, in conformity with the decisions of the Conference. The Commission will serve as an intermediary between the Supreme Council and the Allied Navy.

#### *10. Powers of the Commission*

In order to accomplish its mission, the Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the British and French Allied Missions now operating in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania with a view to prevent any isolated initiative or divergence of action.

The Commission may appeal to the personnel of the French Military Mission in Poland if need be, and in accord with General Henrys.

The Commission, in accord with the Baltic Governments at Reval, Riga and Kowno, shall be assured of the cooperation of the local authorities if such assistance is deemed necessary.

The General, President of the Commission, shall determine the location of his headquarters in the Baltic provinces. He shall have free use of the telegraphic and radio-telegraphic lines and stations for his communications.

#### *11. General Instructions*

The primordial and essential purpose of the Commission is based on the necessity of liberating the Baltic States of all German occupation and enterprise of every kind, and keeping in mind the fact that Germany alternatively aids the Sovietist authorities and the autocratic Russian organizations, as she has repeatedly done since the commencement of the Russian revolution.

The Commission will also make every effort to preserve the Baltic province from tyranny and Maximilian (Maximalistest) [*sic*] anarchy.

The Allied and Associated Governments desire to favour the legitimate aspirations of the populations of Esthonia, Lithuania and Latvia who wish to definitely organize their internal life on stable bases.

Although the Allied and Associated Governments are opposed to the dismember-

ment of Russia, and favourable to a reconstitution of its unity they deem it equitable to ensure the interior independence, acquired at the price of great sacrifice, of the Baltic countries, and essential to the free development of their individual personality. The declaration made by the Allies to Admiral Kolitchak on May 27, 1919, provided for, on one hand, the autonomy of the Baltic States and the free constitution of the Government, and, on the other, the guarantees due to Russia concerning her access to the sea and the liberty of her economic exchange.

It will be within the province of the League of Nations to intervene for the definite establishment of relations in the Baltic States and of the future Government of Russia, if a direct agreement is not consummated.

## No. 8

H. D. 78.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, October 29, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.

*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Tasker H. Bliss, Mr. E. L. Dresel, Colonel J. A. Logan, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

*British Empire*: General Groves, Air Commander Smith, Captain Fuller, Lieut. Commander Dunne, Lieut. Colonel Kisch.

*France*: Marshal Foch, General Weygand, M. Henry Bérenger, M. Laroche, Commandant Levavasseur, M. de Celle, Capitaine de Corvette Fabre, M. Kammerer, Capitaine Roper, General Niessel.

*Italy*: M. Sranieri, Lieut. Col. Piccio, Capt. de Corvette Ruspoli.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. (The Council had before it a report from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies dated October 23, 1919 (see Appendix A), a note in three parts from the British Delegation dated October 23, 24 and 25, 1919 (see Appendix B)<sup>1</sup> and a letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies (see Appendix C).)
- Violations by the Germans of the Armistice Clauses*

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the report dealing with

<sup>1</sup> The filed original of this appendix, as printed below, contained a note from the British delegation in two parts dated respectively October 23 and 25, 1919.

the violations of the clauses of the Armistice, the preparation of which had been entrusted to the Armistice Commission at Cologne.

CAPTAIN FULLER read and commented upon the notes from the British Delegation dealing with violations of the Naval Clauses of the Armistice.

M. DE CELLE read and commented upon the letter from the Minister of Finance to the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, and added thereto the following observations:

The Germans were to have supplied a complete list of the plunder and thefts committed by them; there were numerous omissions in the lists supplied. It had been indicated clearly to the Germans that in matters of specie and personal property omission might occur only in exceptional cases and that they should be made known within twenty-four hours of their discovery. The despatch of a new truckload of property had just been made known to them. They had to acknowledge that the German delegates in Paris were actually doing their best to give satisfaction.

Similarly, the documents which Clause 13 of the Protocol of Spa, dated December 1st, 1918, had in mind, concerning notes issued by towns during the German occupation (list of printed notes, lists of notes whose issue had been authorized, list of notes actually issued, list of water-marked paper stocks, etc.,) had not so far been supplied, notwithstanding the formal promise made by Germany to send them before December 10th, 1918. Those lists were of extreme importance in order to discover and suppress possible forgery.

Lastly, as for the recovery of *objets d'art*, if those that belonged to public museums had been restored this was not the case with *objets d'art* or furniture taken from private houses. The Germans professed that there had been no official storage of these objects: they knew, however, that the experts who had superintended their collection had worked publicly and that furniture and pictures had been carefully packed for transport. It was impossible to admit, as the Germans pretended, that the vanished furniture had been used merely for furnishing posts of command or dugouts.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether a member of the Council wished to make any remark.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished for the moment to leave aside the two most serious violations of the Armistice, namely, the question of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident, to which he intended to return. As for the other violations it was important to adhere to this: that obligations incurred by the terms of the Armistice be retained when the Treaty came into force. Guarantees to this effect were necessary. If their legal advisers were of the opinion that the stipulations of the Armistice would no longer subsist with the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, it was absolutely necessary to oblige the Germans to sign a special Protocol assuring to the Powers every possible guarantee corresponding to the guarantees of the Armistice.

MR. POLK agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that the legal advisers should be consulted.

M. SCIALOJA found the difficulty to arise out of the fact that the conventions of the Armistice, while constituting a veritable treaty, had been imposed

in military form. He thought there were grounds for preparing a Protocol enumerating all the obligations still to be fulfilled, but what sanctions would the Council still wield since the coming into force of the Treaty would deprive it of the sanctions which the Armistice afforded? It was necessary that the Protocol itself incorporate sanctions.

SIR EYRE CROWE maintained that for the very reason adduced by M. Scialoja he had drawn the distinction between the more important and the less important violations of the Armistice: was not such sanction necessary for the less important violations?

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they did not wish to commit themselves to a perfectly futile manifestation; a definite date had to be fixed. As a matter of form it would be well to say that unless the obligations undertaken were fulfilled they would have to demand sanctions which, as it seemed to him, ought to be of a military nature for in reality there were no others. Therefore, in the Protocol a list of all the so-called secondary violations of the Armistice had to be prepared. He thought it hardly possible to say to the Germans that they would not have the Treaty come into force until after the execution of those clauses: it would be sufficient to say that if the clauses were not fulfilled, sanctions of military nature would be imposed. The questions of Scapa Flow and of the Baltic Provinces remained. In the former matter they had done nothing; on the latter they had decided upon a course of action the preceding day.<sup>2</sup> Would it not be necessary to know what sanctions they would employ if the mission of General Niessel arrived at no success?

MR. POLK asked whether it was intended to tell the Germans what sanctions would ultimately be applied.

M. CLEMENCEAU said there certainly was no such intention. It would be sufficient to say that there would be some sanction: but of course the Germans would have to sign the Protocol before the Treaty would come into force.

MR. POLK remarked that the Protocol should be submitted first to the Council, which would then have to discuss the question of sanctions.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. POLK inquired whether the Council had communicated to the Dutch Government the note sent to Germany relative to the delivery of ships she had sold to Holland.<sup>3</sup>

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Dutch Government had been informed of such a note having been sent and told that if it claimed property rights in the ships in question, it would have to justify its claims before the Council.

Sir Eyre Crowe reverted to the violation of the Armistice committed in the Scapa Flow incident. The Council had been apprised some time ago of a British proposal on the subject. The sinking of the ships could be considered either the individual act of the officers and crews, or an act for which the German Government was responsible. The British Delegation believed

<sup>2</sup> See No. 7, minute 3.

<sup>3</sup> See Vol. I, No. 74, minute 1 and appendix A.

that there were grounds for holding the government responsible. In the latter case reparation was due for the value of the sunken ships, cost of salvage of the ships, cost of surveying the anchorage, buoying the wrecks and any subsequent expenses incurred, e.g., in clearing the anchorage of wrecks, etc. It was proposed further that reparation should be in kind, for example in the surrender of the five light cruisers that Germany still possessed and of floating docks, cranes, harbour craft, etc.; that the Germans should be asked further to supply to the Armistice Commission a complete list of this material, delivery of which the Armistice Commission would be authorized to accept.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they were agreed in considering the German Government responsible.

MR. POLK stated that he did not yet have the report of his naval experts on the question and asked that it be adjourned.

SIR EYRE CROWE maintained that if they held the German Government responsible, they could, as the British Delegation believed, repatriate the German officers and seamen of the crews which had been taken prisoner on the destruction of the fleet.

M. CLEMENCEAU proposed to discuss that question on the following day.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to remark further that in the matter of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces the terms of the Armistice were repeated in the body of the Treaty. In that respect, therefore, they did have guarantees.

It was decided:

- (1) to ask the Drafting Committee to prepare a Protocol to be signed by the representative of the German Government before the Treaty came into force and to contain, along with the list of the unfulfilled clauses of the Armistice, an undertaking by Germany to fulfil those clauses within a prescribed time under penalty of such measures which the Allied and Associated Powers would reserve to themselves in the event of non-compliance;
- (2) that the question whether the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces and the Scapa Flow incident were to be explicitly mentioned in this Protocol be provisionally reserved. (See Appendices A, B and C.)

2. GENERAL NIESSEL wished to point out to the Council that it would be difficult for his Mission to leave the Monday or Wednesday following;<sup>4</sup> his Italian colleague had not yet arrived and General Turner's officers would not be in Paris before the end of the week. Lastly there would be difficulties from the point of view of railroad transportation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that General Niessel would leave on Wednesday at the latest.

M. Clemenceau thought that they might agree provisionally that the expenses of the Mission would be divided between the Allies.

<sup>4</sup> November 3 or 5, 1919.

M. BERTHELOT explained that for the moment it was only a question of the immediate expenses of maintenance and voyage.

MR. POLK said that it would be best that each Power supply the expenses of its own representatives.

It was decided:

that, subject to later examination of the question by the Supreme Council, each Power should pay the expenses of its representatives on the Inter-Allied Baltic Provinces Military Commission.

3. The Council had before it a note from the New States Commission asking the Supreme Council for instructions see Appendix D,<sup>5</sup>)

*Request for instructions from the New States Commission relative to the Bulgarian Counter-propositions*

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the first part of the note.

M. SCIALOJA thought it preferable to insert in the Bulgarian Treaty a clause by which Serbia and Roumania would incur the same obligations as those of article 46 of the Treaty with Greece [*sic*].

M. KAMMERER suggested that if, in the Treaty with Bulgaria, the same terms were inserted which had prevented Serbia from signing the Treaty with Austria, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would not sign the Bulgarian Treaty; the result would correspond to the second procedure suggested by the Commission.

MR. POLK wondered whether, if they made it possible to sign the Bulgarian Treaty without inserting therein the same terms as in the Austrian Treaty, they might not leave it optional to certain powers to sign one Treaty and not the other. It was most important, he thought, to tell the Roumanians and the Serbs that if they did not sign the Austrian Treaty neither would they sign the Bulgarian Treaty.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This note is printed with verbal variation by D. H. Miller in *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York, 1924 f.), vol. xiii, pp. 494-6. The first part of the note was mainly concerned with the observation of the Bulgarian delegation that in the draft treaty with Bulgaria 'while there is an article (46) stipulating with regard to Greece the acceptance of the principle of the protection of minorities, no analogous clause was inserted with regard to Serbia and Roumania'. The Commission on New States considered that this observation 'is founded. There are two methods of complying with this request: (a) To insert in the text of the Treaty with Bulgaria a provision obligating Roumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State; a provision analogous with that taken concerning Greece in Article 46. (b) To insert no new Article in the Treaty with Bulgaria, but to inform the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations that they will not be permitted to sign the Treaty with Bulgaria before having signed the Treaty with Austria and the Treaty on Minorities.

'Although the case of Roumania is different from that of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, as, by the Treaty with Bulgaria, Roumania does not acquire any territory, yet, considering the existence of an important Bulgarian minority in the Dobrudja, it has occurred to the Commission that an analogous solution could be applied in both cases.

'The Commission thinks that the Supreme Council should decide which of these two methods should be adopted.'

M. KAMMERER agreed that the insertion of a new article might be possible; he thought, however, that it would be disagreeable to the States concerned for the Council to tell them that they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty before signing the Austrian Treaty.

MR. POLK did not see that they had to modify a treaty so as to satisfy a power that refused to sign.

M. PICHON considered the second method preferable; they would inform the Roumanians and Serbs that they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty unless they signed the Austrian Treaty. The Council would thus be in possession of a further means of bringing pressure to bear upon them.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered that there should be on the agenda of an early sitting of the Council, the question of the signature of the Austrian Treaty by the Roumanians and Serbs.

M. PICHON said Mr. Trumbic had arrived<sup>6</sup> and that General Coanda<sup>7</sup> had left Bucharest the previous day. According to a telegram he had received that morning, he thought the signature probable.

SIR EYRE CROWE's information did not give him the same impression.

MR. POLK was in a similar situation. He had the feeling that the Roumanians wished simply to gain time.

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the second part of the report of the New States Commission.<sup>8</sup>

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what right Bulgaria had to set up as champion of the Turkish cause.

M. KAMMERER explained that it was not Turks properly speaking, but Turkish subjects who had taken refuge in Bulgarian territory. The Italian Delegation was afraid that Serbia was preventing their exercising that right of option which the 1913 treaty gave them, but which the outbreak of war had made impossible. There was no doubt that the insertion of special clauses in the Treaty would be unpleasant enough for Serbia.

SIR EYRE CROWE maintained that it was always dangerous to modify a treaty once it had been signed, and that the Allied and Associated Powers had already signed the Minorities Treaty.

M. KAMMERER explained that it was the Italian Delegation that insisted upon that solution.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. No. 4, minute 8.

<sup>7</sup> Former Roumanian Prime Minister. General Coanda was proceeding to Paris as a special Roumanian plenipotentiary.

<sup>8</sup> The second part of the report dealt with an observation by the Bulgarian delegation which called 'attention to the situation of persons formerly residing in Macedonia, Dobrudja or Thrace and who, before, during, or since the war, have taken refuge in Bulgaria, and requests that these persons be given the right to opt for the nationality of the State in which is now located the territory where they were formerly domiciled. . . . The Commission recognizes that the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation are, in part, justified concerning the Ottoman subjects who were unable to exercise the right of option provided for by the Treaty of 1913, and took refuge in Bulgaria before or since the war. It is true that among these refugees there is, according to indications which have been received, an important proportion of Bulgarian agitators whose return to Macedonia, Thrace or Dobrudja might present serious dangers with regard to the pacification of these territories.'

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if there were any evidence to show the Turks intended returning into Serbian territory.

MR. POLK explained that it was a question of Macedonian refugees.

M. PICHON asked whether, instead of changing the text of the Treaty, a procedure which as Sir Eyre Crowe had pointed out, presented serious disadvantages, they could not demand of Serbia written declarations on the point.

M. KAMMERER was of the opinion that Serbia would prefer that solution.

M. SCIALOJA pointed out that in the Bulgarian Treaty a clause could be inserted analogous to that in which Greece was placed by Article IV of the proposed Greek Treaty.

M. KAMMERER said that the Commission had judged that this involved difficulties and that there was no point in concealing the fact that the insertion of a clause of such nature in the Bulgarian Treaty would be extremely disagreeable to the Serbs.

M. SCIALOJA maintained that Serbia would have to restore to its refugees the right of option which the outbreak of war had prevented them from exercising in the prescribed time.

M. PICHON believed that Serbia should make the declaration in a letter.

(It was decided:

- (1) that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should make known to the Roumanian and Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegations that these latter countries would not be allowed to sign the Treaty with Bulgaria before having signed the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty;
- (2) that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government be asked to make known by written declaration that it would authorize its Ottoman subjects who, owing to the war, had not been able to avail themselves in the prescribed time of the right of option envisaged by the Treaty of 1913, to take advantage of that right. (See Appendix D<sup>5</sup>).)

4. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 27th (see Appendix E).)

*Request for Instructions  
from the Chairman of the  
Inter-Allied Aeronautical  
Commission of Control in  
Germany*

(After a short discussion it was decided:

to refer to the military representatives at Versailles, for examination and report, the request for instructions addressed to the Supreme Council by the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany.

(See Appendix E).)

5. (The Council had before it a draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Polish Commission (see Appendix F).)

*Note to the German  
Government on the Muni-  
cipal Elections in Upper  
Silesia*

(It was decided:

to approve the draft note to the German Government on the question of municipal elections in Upper

Silesia as prepared by the Polish Commission. (See Appendix F).)

*Salaries and Allowances  
for the Administrator of  
Dantzig and his staff  
and for the Administrative  
Staff of Memel*

7. (The Council had before it a report of the Commission entrusted with examining the question of the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from Siberia (see Appendix H).<sup>10</sup>)  
*Repatriation of Allied Contingents and Enemy Prisoners from Siberia* CAPITAINE DE CORVETTE FABRE read and commented upon the report of the Commission.

MR. POLK thought that the order of repatriation could be modified by financial considerations. As regarded the Czechs, an agreement had been arrived at, which placed the immediate expenses of repatriation on Great Britain, the United States and France. No account had been taken so far of the Poles, the Roumanians and the Serbs. Perhaps the United States would be led to assume responsibility for this repatriation. In any case, he was

<sup>9</sup> On the proposal of the British delegation (appendix G in original) the Supreme Council decided (i) that these salaries and allowances should be a charge upon local revenues; (ii) that the rate of these salaries and allowances should be fixed by the Sub-Committee on the Execution of the Treaty with Germany.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed. In this report the committee constituted in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council of September 27, 1919 (see Vol. I, No. 66, minute 7), stated that it had learnt from 'a telegram from Gen. Janin on October 11th that the personnel to be repatriated from Siberia amounts to a minimum of 250,000 men and comprises the following different categories:

'(A) Contingents of volunteer friends, called allogene contingents, recruited from among the Czecho-Slovak, Polish, Roumanian, Serbian, and Yugoslav prisoners, and who, under the orders of General Janin, fought against the Germano-Bolshevists in Siberia, or participated in the maintenance of order: about 75,000 men, to whom will have to be added several thousand persons constituting the families of these soldiers.' (Later in the report it was stated that 'according to information which the Commission has been able to obtain, instructions have been sent to General Janin to concentrate and maintain volunteer contingents of sufficient strength in the Kharbin and Vladivostock region to justify the commencement and continuance of [? repatriation] operations from the present time. It would be advisable to have the question of sea transportation regulated as soon as possible'.)

'(B) Prisoners of war who belonged to the German or Austro-Hungarian armies, but who, by their place of origin, now belong to Allied Governments, Poland, Roumania and Serbia. These men are to be distinguished from the preceding in that they did not agree to accept service in the above cited contingents; they are dispersed throughout various prison camps, and their number is yet to be determined.' (It was here noted that 'this category does not include any Czecho-Slovaks, all having been mobilized'.)

'(C) Deported civilians belonging to the same Allied nationalities.

'(D) German, Austrian, and Magyar prisoners (belonging to Germany, Austria and Hungary, according to their new boundaries).

'(E) Deported civilians belonging to the same enemy nationalities under the same conditions.'

The report then drew attention to the consequent complications in determining procedure for repatriation and asked that the membership of the committee might be expanded in accordance with the wider issues involved, as explained by Capitaine de Corvette Fabre to the Supreme Council and approved by its decision.

obliged to remark that the financial rulings of the United States Treasury Department forbade his government from participating in expenses of a provisional nature that might be subject to a later readjustment among the Powers; the United States could only make direct advances to the small nations concerned.

M. PICHON held that the thing to do at the moment was for each Power to appoint a financial expert and a political representative to be attached to the Commission actually existing.

CAPITAINE DE CORVETTE FABRE remarked that the Commission was qualified to deal only with prisoners. It was therefore asking the Council to decide whether it would be competent to deal likewise with the volunteers of friendly nationalities who ought to be repatriated.

M. KAMMERER insisted on the necessity of the Commission being empowered to deal with volunteers as well as prisoners. The two questions were bound together from the point of view both of transport and of finance.

SIR EYRE CROWE did not think his government inclined to participate in the expenses of repatriating 250,000 German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners; they had the repatriation of their Allies to consider.

M. BERTHELOT held that distinction must be made between repatriation of their Allies and of prisoners belonging to one of the enemy powers: from the humane point of view these were alike; politically, there were raised questions of quite different kinds. The Council had already decided that the repatriation of enemy prisoners should wait until after that of Allied volunteers. They were informed that the Germans had already been trying to conclude private contracts with Japanese ship owners. If they were to let Japanese shipping companies repatriate enemies who were ready to pay a very high price, the effect would be disastrous, and it was important that M. Matsui should draw the attention of his government to the question.

M. MATSUI stated that his government had informed him that the statement that ships had been chartered on behalf of Germany was incorrect. The Japanese Government had no ships at its disposal; and private ship owners had concluded agreements to charter ships for the purpose of repatriating Czechs. Once the Treaty came into force it would be for each government to get into direct touch with the ship owners. He had already acquainted Tokio with that decision of the Supreme Council, which had in mind giving priority to the repatriation of the Allies.

M. KAMMERER held that they could and, indeed, ought to leave to the Germans the care of arranging the repatriation of their prisoners. It was for the Commission only to make sure that that repatriation should not precede the repatriation of volunteers of friendly nationalities.

CAPITAINE DE CORVETTE FABRE pointed out that it was exactly for that reason that the Commission had asked enlargement of its powers. It had been formed originally to organize the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners of war, but had found itself confronted by a resolution of the Supreme Council which specified that the repatriation of those prisoners should not take place until after the repatriation of volunteers of friendly

nationalities. So long as the repatriation of those volunteers had not been begun, the Commission could not work to any purpose.

MR. POLK thought that the Commission could confine itself to examining the repatriation of prisoners without taking any executive steps.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked why the Commission should have to concern itself with German and Austrian prisoners of war at all. Article 215 of the German Treaty envisaged the setting up of a special commission, for the repatriation of prisoners. This question was its peculiar concern, and he understood that it was forming a Sub-Commission to take care of this particular case.

CAPITAINE DE CORVETTE FABRE stated that the Commission referred to in article 215 had to deal exclusively with enemy prisoners taken by the Allied and Associated Powers; the repatriation of prisoners from Siberia taken by the Russians did not concern it. Indeed practically all the prisoners in Siberia had been taken by the Russians, and it would be impossible to repatriate them without authorization of the Government of Omsk which might wish to retain them as hostages.

M. PICHON acknowledged that they had no legal obligation towards enemy prisoners who had been retained in Siberia.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Commission entrusted by the Supreme Council with studying the repatriation of German and Austrian prisoners from Siberia should examine at the same time the question of repatriating the volunteers of friendly nationalities;
- (2) that, in view of the consequent extension of their powers and because of the complexity of the problems raised by the question of repatriation, each of the Allied and Associated Powers should nominate to the Commission representatives for political and financial questions. (See Appendix H.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, October 29, 1919.*

## APPENDIX A TO No. 8

### Document 1

*Translation.*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES  
General Staff, 1st Section. 5080

G.H.Q., October 23, 1919.

From Marshal Foch

To President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference. (Secretariat General)

In compliance with the prescriptions of a resolution of the Supreme Council,

under date of October 20th,<sup>11</sup> I have the honour to enclose herewith the list of the Armistice clauses <sup>12</sup> which have not yet been executed by Germany.

WEYGAND  
Major-General.

## Document 2

### *Armistice Convention of November 11.*

#### *Delivery of Railroad Material. Clause VII*

This clause imposed on Germany the delivery of 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars.

At the present time there are still 42 locomotives and 4,460 cars to be received.

But it cannot be said that at the present time the Germans have not executed or are not executing the obligations imposed on them by that clause, as certain obligations necessitate delays concerning which the Germans advance explanations or excuses, and, furthermore, certain delays are caused by the very nature of the operations and differences of interpretation arising from the narrowness with which the Germans wish to apply the Protocol.

#### *Provisions Relative to the Eastern Frontiers of Germany (Clauses XII and XIV,*

##### *Clause XII.*

Clause XII stipulates that the German troops in territories which before the war formed part of Russia must withdraw to Germany at such time as the Allies judged proper, consistent with the interior situation of these territories.

On June 18th the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers ordered the German Government to evacuate Libau and Windau and to expedite the evacuation of all territories which, before the war, formed a part of the former Russian Empire.

In view of the procrastinations of Germany, the Supreme Council successively renewed these injunctions on August 1st, August 24th, September 27th, and October 10th.<sup>13</sup>

In fact, the German Government continues to contend that it is powerless to enforce its orders on the troops in the Baltic. The orders for withdrawal supposed to have been given by the Government were not executed. On the other hand, the local German Command favoured the transfer of a large part of its effectives into the Germano-Russian corps constituted under its protection. Reinforcements in men and material assistance continued to arrive from Germany.

##### *Clause XIV.*

Furthermore, and in violation of Clause XIV, the German troops have continued to exercise abusive requisitions in the Baltic countries; to paralyze the economic life and the organization efforts of these countries, disarming their contingents, mixing in their internal affairs and even having recourse to abuse of authority (*coup d'état*) by enforcing a government in Latvia, instrument to its cause (April 1919).

<sup>11</sup> See No. 3, minute 8.

<sup>12</sup> Note in original: 'Initial convention of November 11, 1919 [1918], renewal of conventions and protocols.'

<sup>13</sup> See Vol. I in this series.

*Financial Clauses. Clause XIX*

Clause XIX provides, in particular, for '... the<sup>14</sup> immediate delivery of all documents, specie, values (of property and finance with all issuing apparatus) concerning public or private interests in the invaded countries'.

It has been impossible to obtain complete statements of the specie and securities (bank values, property confiscated belonging to persons repatriated, removal of specie qualified as fines, bail funds, etc. . . .<sup>14</sup>) removed, collected or confiscated by the Germans, whether in the invaded territories or in the prison camps. These lists are indispensable to the Restitution Service.

*The Beaux Arts Protocol of December 17, 1918.*

The Beaux Arts Protocol of December 17, 1918, annexed to the Armistice Convention, enjoins Germany to restore all objects of art and documents of an artistic character removed from France and Belgium.

The restoration of the objects of art abandoned by the Germans in France, in Belgium, or in the territories of the left bank of the Rhine, at the time of their retreat, was effected without difficulty.

The restoration of the objects of art which had been transported into non-occupied Germany, on the contrary, is being operated with slowness on account of the difficulties of such operation, and also from lack of complacency on the part of the Germans, who surrender such objects reluctantly.

It cannot be said, however, that they are not executing this clause: its execution is being operated.

*Convention of January 16, 1919.*

*(2nd Renewal of the Armistice)*

*Clause III. Delivery by Germany of Agricultural Implements to France and Belgium.*

This clause imposed on Germany the delivery of agricultural implements in lieu of the supplementary railroad material imposed by virtue of the first Armistice renewal as a penalty for delay in delivery.

The deficit of the material which Germany was to have delivered to France by October 1, 1919, is actually as follows:

40 'Heucke' ploughing outfits.

The personnel necessary to operate the apparatuses.

All the tools which the German Government agreed to furnish before October 1st, by virtue of *additif* 3 of the Protocol 392/T, of July 25, 1919: 1,500 Spades, 1,130 Ploughs T.M. 23/26, 1,765 Ploughs T.F. 18/21, 1,512 Ploughs T.F. 23/26, 1,629 Belgian Ploughs T.F. 0 m. 20, 1,205 Belgian Ploughs T.F. 0 m. 26, 4,282 Harrows of 2 k. 500, 2,157 Cultivators—11 teeth, 946 Steel Rollers, 966 Fertilizer Spreaders 2 m. 50, 1,608 Fertilizer Spreaders 3 m. 50.

*Clause VI. Restoration of the Industrial Material removed from Belgian and French Territory.*

It cannot be said that the Germans have not executed this clause; but the restoration of the industrial material is being carried out very slowly, due partially to the difficulties introduced by this operation and partially to the numerous discussions to which an interpretation of the text (the French word is 'taxes') of this clause gave rise and still gives rise between the Allied Commissions on one hand and Germany on the other.

<sup>14</sup> Punctuation as in original.

*Brussels Conferences of March 13 and 14.*

*Annex V.c. List of Objects which Germany was forbidden to export.*

The 'black list' of objects which Germany was forbidden to export during the Armistice period was drawn up in the course of the Conferences held in Brussels on March 13 and 14, 1919.

This black list was headed as follows:

*'War material of every nature, including the naval fleet'.*

In violation of this provision, the Germans have exported aerial apparatus (whole airplanes, or detached parts, to neutral countries Sweden, Holland and Denmark).

On four occasions<sup>15</sup> the Supreme Council reminded the German Government 'that it was forbidden to export aeronautical material . . .<sup>14</sup> that all such material should be stored . . .<sup>14</sup> that the German Government would have to reimburse the Allies the value of all aeronautical material sold or exported since the Armistice.'

The German Government has not complied with these decisions. It simply replied concerning them by the two notes hereto annexed<sup>16</sup> in which reservations are cited concerning the interpretation of the ruling made by the Supreme Council and requests that the questions relative to aeronautic material be submitted to the Aerial Supervision Commissions which are to operate in Germany upon the entry into force of the Peace Treaty.

At the same time, the Government continued to authorize the exportation or at least the utilization of its aeronautical material. For example: on October 7th, that is to say, subsequent to the notification of the resolution of the Supreme Council forbidding the utilization of German aeronautical material and ordering that it be stored, the German dirigible *Bodensee* commenced a regular dirigible service between Berlin and Stockholm, and on the same day German planes took part in the offensive against Riga.

Document 3

*Telegram*

WAKO No. 641

DÜSSELDORF, September 8, 1919.

From: German Armistice Commission

To: Interallied Permanent Armistice Commission.

Representative of the German Government's Note No. 8401 dated Sept. 8, 1919.

I have the honour to reply as follows to your notes No. 1494/G, 1525/G<sup>17</sup> and 1622<sup>18</sup> of August 2 [28] and August 27th:<sup>15</sup>

'The German Government has, relative to the matters referred to in the notes indicated, instituted the necessary investigations. The Government, however, remarks that, in principle, it cannot agree on all points with the interpretation of

<sup>15</sup> Note in original: 'Telegrams to the Permanent Armistice Commission on August 7 August 26, September 30 and October 18th.' (See Vol. I in this series.)

<sup>16</sup> Documents 3 and 4 in this appendix.

<sup>17</sup> Note in original: 'Addressed to Marshal Foch as a report.'

<sup>18</sup> Note in original: 'Transmission of Telegrams Nos. 3765 of August 7th and 4111 of August 27th.'

law as expressed in the notes indicated, and that an opportunity to engage in verbal pourparlers concerning the execution of Part V of the Peace Treaty will be presented in the near future with the Commissions of the Allied and Associated Powers which are daily expected in Berlin. The German Government deems it its duty to propose, for this reason, that the final settlement of the questions in suspense be reserved until after negotiations with these Commissions.'

WACHENDORF.

I. P. A. C.

9/9/19  
No. 2,294

Transmitted to Marshal Foch

GENERAL NUDANT  
President of the I.P.A.C.,  
Assistant Chief of Staff of the I.P.A.C.

#### Document 4

*Note from the Representative of the German Government A.A.I. 6061 roem,  
October 12, 1919.*

*Urgent Telegram*

DÜSSELDORF, *Wako* No. 3639. 12. 10

Replying to your note of October 1st, No. 1764/G(1)<sup>13</sup>, I have the honour to communicate the following:

1st. The point of view exposed, by the Supreme Council of the Allies in the note above indicated, is expressed as a 'final decision'. The German Government must protest against a like declaration expressed in this sense. It must be determined concerning the matters in question: whether, at this time, they are actual obligations imposed on Germany by the Peace Treaty. It cannot be admitted, that on account of this, the Allied and Associated Powers have the exclusive right to adopt a final decision.

2nd. As long as the Peace Treaty shall not have been ratified by the Allied and Associated Powers, and for this reason, cannot be considered as in force, the formal obligations imposed on Germany by the Treaty cannot be exacted.

For this very reason, the point of view expressed by Marshal Foch in his note No. 4111 dated August 27, 1919, according to which all German war material in excess of that accorded to Germany by this Treaty, is already the property of the Allies, cannot be admitted; even after the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, a similar demand on the part of the Allied and Associated Powers, concerning the delivery of war material which would be in excess, would become useless, if according to Article 169 of the Peace Treaty it is provided that such material be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers to be destroyed or rendered useless, this article would therefore mean that the employment of such material for military ends should be excluded without reservation. A like delivery of material to the Allied and Associated Governments is in no sense necessary to them for such service, and is in no wise justified by the text of the Convention.

3rd. Furthermore, the point of view of the Allied and Associated Governments, according to which all aviation material in Germany must be considered as military material without exception, without even taking into consideration apparatus of certain type, could not be admitted.

Among the aviation material now in Germany there exist machines whose character leaves no doubt as to their civil construction, and which from this fact, are not included under the conventions of Article 198. That there exists, beyond doubt, such civil material has been already recognized by the verification of contracts concerning the civil aerial circulation which emanate from a civil firm in Germany. It is completely inconsistent to consider such aviation material as military material at this time. On the contrary, Germany may legally dispose, without hindrance, of such material, in so far as such material shall not be considered, after the entry into force of the Treaty, as material of aerial circulation by the rulings of the Supervision Commission.

4th. The German Government, under every reservation and in consideration of its point of view herein exposed, and guided by this base is ready to commence at this time, and in so far as possible, the execution of the military provisions of the Treaty which it has ratified. It was upon this same basis that the German Government proposes, in its note A.A.I. 5401, under date of September 8, to definitely settle the questions herein referred to, by means of pourparlers with the Commission now sitting in Berlin. Up to the present time no discussions have taken place, but it seems desirable to reach a solution in this way.

## APPENDIX B TO No. 8

### Document 1

*Memo[randum] submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation.*

*23rd October 1919.*

#### ARMISTICE CONDITIONS OUTSTANDING

##### *German Mercantile Marine*

The following Armistice requirements in connection with the surrender of the German Mercantile Marine have not yet been compiled [complied] with by the German Government:—

1. 14 Tank Steamers, total tonnage 63,143, at Hamburg which had been temporarily exempted from the surrender which was agreed to in the Armistice terms, were directed, by the decision of the Supreme Council of 27th September, to proceed to the Firth of Forth for delivery to the Allied and Associated Governments' representatives.<sup>19</sup> These vessels have been detained in Hamburg on the pretence of a sympathetic strike in that port and have not yet sailed.

2. 5 steamers, total tonnage 62,456 lying at Bremerhaven, Geestemünde and Bremen have not been handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers, the German Government alleging that these 5 vessels were sold to Dutch Shipping Companies in 1915-16. On 15th October, 1919, the Supreme Council ordered these vessels to be delivered,<sup>3</sup> as the Allied and Associated Governments have consistently refused to recognize the validity of any transfers of enemy shipping to neutral flags during hostilities. The German Government has disregarded the orders of the Supreme Council for the despatch of these 5 vessels to the Firth of Forth.

3. A certain number of merchant vessels which should have been delivered

<sup>19</sup> See Vol. I, No. 66, minute 1.

under the Terms of the Armistice to the Allied and Associated Powers have not yet been handed over. These vessels are dealt with in detail as follows:—

- (a) The German Government has alleged that the following ships have not been handed over owing to the difficulty of obtaining labour and materials for repairs or completion of construction:—*Rügen, Kaiser, Kehrwater, Columbus, Tirpitz, Berlin, Wigbert, Pungo (ex Moewe), J. L. Lassen, Rickmer Rickmers, Ibbercury, Ittajahy, Hermonthes, Bosnia, Esiland.*
  - (b) A large number of sailing vessels in German Waters and also in Neutral Ports, mainly South American, are still undelivered.
  - (c) A certain number of German steamers in Dutch East Indies and other Neutral Ports still remain to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Governments' representatives in spite of repeated demands for their surrender.
4. The Roumanian Tank Steamer *Arthur von Gwinner* was ordered to be sent to the Firth of Forth but has not yet been despatched.
5. S.S. *Verus* lying at Dordrecht, which is one of the vessels to be surrendered under the Armistice, has not yet been delivered to the Belgians although repeated demands have been made to the German authorities by the Sub-Commission of the A.N.A.C.

## Document 2

*Memorandum submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation.*

N. 19814.

25. 10. 19.

### NAVAL QUESTIONS AFFECTED BY THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY

*Submarine engines to be surrendered as reparation for submarine U.C. 48.*

The German submarine U.C. 48 was interned in Spain at the date of the armistice; under the terms of the armistice she was surrendered to the allies. She escaped from custody at Ferrol and, on being chased by a Spanish torpedo boat, she was sunk by her crew. Admiral Goette has acknowledged that the sinking of the boat was the act of her commanding officer. A.N.A.C. has demanded as reparation the complete engines and motors of the submarines U. 137, U. 138 and U. 158, but in spite of repeated demands they have not been delivered.

In addition to the above there are three motors ex submarine U. 146 which remain to be delivered.

*Reparation for the Scapa Flow Sinkings.*

In the opinion of the Admiralty the sinking of the German warships interned at Scapa Flow constituted a direct violation of the terms of the armistice, and it should be regarded in every way as a term of the armistice which Germany has failed to fulfil. Reparation as penalty for the breach of the armistice should be obtained.

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 8

From: Mr. Klotz.

To: Marshal Foch.

By despatch No. 5034 of the 20th inst., you asked me to indicate those of the

financial clauses, imposed on Germany [?by] the Armistice Convention or the Protocols annexed, which have not yet been entirely executed.

I have the honour to inform you that the execution of the Armistice Convention, from a financial point of view, raises the following two questions:

1. The German Government refuses at the present time to continue making payments, in Reichsbank bank bills, towards the upkeep expenses of the Armies of Occupation, an obligation imposed by virtue of clause IX of the Armistice Convention of November 11th, 1918. The German Government bases its refusal on the fact that the marks previously remitted were used, not to apply towards occupation expenses, but for the expenses of various civil administrations. Now, the upkeep expenses of the Armies of Occupation, except in cases of local purchases or requisitions, which constitute the smallest share, are payable, not in marks, but in *francs*, or any other legal tender consistent with the origin of the products destined as army supplies, consequently, it is evident that the marks to be paid by Germany could not be considered as a reimbursement unless they be freely placed at the disposition of the French Government to be used for the various needs for which they were intended. It appears, therefore, indispensable to have the claim of the German Government, pretending to obtain justification of use, repulsed purely and simply, and to insist on the immediate resumption of the payments to be applied on the upkeep expenses of the Armies of Occupation.

2. It has been impossible to obtain complete statements of the specie and securities (bank values, property confiscated belonging to persons repatriated, removal of specie qualified as fines, bail funds, etc.) removed, collected or confiscated by the Germans, whether in the invaded territories or in the prison camps. These lists are indispensable to the Restitution Service.

The documents provided for by Clause XIII of the Protocol of Spa, under date of December 1st, 1918, (city bonds) have not reached me either; however, according to the statements of the Germans, they were enclosed with the bonds themselves which were restored and deposited in the Bank of France in sacks. Until a verification of these sacks, which will take a long time, it appears to me unnecessary to insist further on this question.

Concerning the restitutions themselves, it is to be noted that the cash of the Bank of France, and of the Crédit du Nord Bank especially, has not yet been restored; but owing to the present state of the negotiations, I do not think it advisable to take these delays into account.

I add that my remarks only refer to the strictly financial clauses and relate neither to the industrial restitutions, agricultural and railway materials, nor to archives or works of art.

KLOTZ.

#### APPENDIX E TO No. 8

##### *Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council*

(19781)

BRITISH DELEGATION, PARIS. 27 October, 1919.

The Chairman of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany has asked for decisions of the Supreme Council with regard to the following points:—

1. The distribution of the airship sheds in the occupied areas.

Some members of the Commission have claimed that these sheds belong to the Powers in occupation.

With regard to this claim, the British Delegation would observe that, in its report on the distribution of the aeronautical material in Germany, the Supreme War Council recommended that the material should be distributed in the following proportion:

England and France, each 30%  
Italy and the United States each 15%  
Belgium and Japan, each 5%.

It was also agreed, as regards airship sheds that, for reasons of geographical proximity and convenience, France should be permitted to have the first choice from among the airship sheds in the area occupied by her troops and in Belgium. This report was agreed to by the Supreme Council. Throughout the discussions on this subject, both at the Aeronautical Advisory Commission and at the Supreme War Council, there has never been any question of the sheds in an occupied area being the property of the Power in occupation.

2. The interpretation of the phrase occurring in Article 198 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, 'No dirigibles shall be kept'.

Does this mean no dirigibles whatever, or no dirigibles for military or naval purposes?

It appears that when this Article was prepared by the Aeronautical Commission, no clear decision was arrived at on this point. The Commission put up a strong recommendation to the Supreme Council to the effect that Germany should not be permitted to engage in civil aviation for a period of years, but this recommendation was not agreed to and the Supreme Council, by refusing to accept it, permitted Germany to possess civil aircraft.<sup>20</sup> Presumably, therefore, she is permitted to possess airships for commercial work.

As a matter of fact, the airship is far less dangerous than the aeroplane for war purposes, while its immediate commercial value is probably far greater.

In view of these considerations, the British Delegation does not think it possible to uphold the view that the phrase 'No dirigibles shall be kept' applies to civil airships.

As regards the method of deciding whether any particular aircraft is to be considered to belong to the military or the civil type, the Supreme Council, at its meeting on August 6th, 1919,<sup>21</sup> passed the following resolution:

'That the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types of aircraft are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise.'

3. The question whether Article 200 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany gives to the Allied and Associated Powers the right to send military machines into unoccupied German territory, pending the complete evacuation of German territory by the Allies.

The British Delegation is of opinion that this right, which is disputed by the Germans, is clearly established by the provisions of the Article in question and that it should be maintained. The Drafting Committee, moreover, have expressed the unanimous opinion that this right is not confined to occupied German territory.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Vol. I, No. 56, note 6.

<sup>21</sup> See Vol. I, No. 29, minute 14.

## APPENDIX F TO No. 8

### Document 1

#### *Polish Affairs Commission*

##### *Note to the Supreme Council*

1st. An overture made by Mr. Dmowsky,<sup>22</sup>

2nd. A telegram issued by General Dupont, represent the German Government as preparing to conduct municipal elections in Upper Silesia very shortly.

For these reasons, the Polish Affairs Commission has the honour to propose that the Supreme Council communicate the letter hereto annexed to the German Delegation.

PARIS, October 27, 1919.

### Document 2

#### *Draft of Letter for the German Delegation*

October 27, 1919.

Mr. President:

According to information brought to the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments, the German Government is preparing to conduct municipal elections in Upper Silesia before the entry into force of the Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Powers request information as to whether this news has any foundation.

The Allied and Associated Powers could not admit, in fact, that elections be held in Upper Silesia before the Commission, which, according to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, is directed to organize a plebiscite in this region, has commenced its operations. This Commission alone, should it judge necessary, will be authorized to conduct elections during the period prior to the plebiscite. These elections would take place under its supervision and under the proper conditions requisite to the liberty of votes.

<sup>22</sup> See No. 6, appendix F.

## No. 9

H. D. 79.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, October 30, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*:

Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned.

*U.S.A.*: Rear-Admiral N. A. McCully, U.S.N., Captain Madison, U.S.N., Lieut-Commander H. W. Koeller, U.S.N., Dr. J. B. Scott, Dr. I. Bowman, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

*British Empire*: Commander MacNamara, Captain Fuller, Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. H. W. Malkin.

*France*: Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, Commandant Le Vavasseur, M. Fromageot.

*Italy*: C. Amiral Grassi, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri, Capt. de Corvette Ruspoli.

*Japan*: Commandant Ohsumi, M. Nagaoka, M. Shigemitsu.

1. The Council had before it a draft note of the Drafting Committee on the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty. See Appendix A.)

*Note of the  
Drafting Com-  
mittee on the  
Notification to  
the German  
Government of  
the Coming into  
Force of the  
Treaty*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon this note.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to raise a point of mere form relative to the second paragraph of this draft note. He desired that this paragraph be changed to read as follows:

‘The President of the Peace Conference has the honour to inform the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire,

France and Italy, have ratified the Treaty, and Germany, on the other hand, having likewise ratified it, the above mentioned condition is fulfilled.’

This change was merely designed to prevent the note being drafted in such form as to notify the German Government that it had ratified the Treaty.

M. PICHON said that the question of the date to be fixed for the coming into force of the Treaty should not be discussed at the present time.

M. FROMAGEOT concluded his commentaries on the draft note by saying that, as a result of the decision taken the preceding day by the Council relative to the unexecuted Armistice clauses and to the drafting of a Protocol,<sup>1</sup> he thought that a paragraph should be added at the end of the draft note to the effect that the German Government should send a representative to Paris prior to the ratification of the Treaty, with power to sign a Protocol relative to the unexecuted Armistice clauses. (This was agreed to.) The Drafting Committee thought that a large majority of the unexecuted Armistice Clauses were covered by provisions in the Treaty itself: in most cases the Treaty in terms imposed upon the German Government the same obligations as did the Armistice, and a large number of these Treaty provisions likewise specified the penalty for nonfulfilment of these obligations.

M. PICHON observed that for such violations of the Armistice clauses as the Scapa Flow incident no penalties were provided.

M. FROMAGEOT said that this was true, and that likewise no penalties were provided for the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, although in this case the Treaty did take care of this obligation (Article 433). With

<sup>1</sup> See No. 8, minute 1.



representative must be in Paris. He thought that an arrangement of the note on such a basis would solve all difficulties.

M. BERTHELOT inquired if it was intended that the representatives of the German Government should all be in Paris and not in the various regions where Allied Commissions and troops of occupation were to arrive.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the German representatives must be here and come to an agreement before the Treaty could be put into force.

M. BERTHELOT brought up the example of Silesia. Should it be decided here in Paris what German officials would remain there in order to effectuate a transfer of authority in that territory without a hitch?

GENERAL LE ROND replied that German representatives should be here in Paris to settle the general principle involved, and that officials should likewise remain in Silesia and other territories where the same situation was presented in order to effect the necessary arrangements with the incoming Allied Commissions and troops of occupation. The procedure to be adopted consisted of two phases.

GENERAL WEYGAND thought it would be better not to put these details in the draft note, as confusion would certainly be caused thereby. It was most important that the summoning to Paris of the German representatives should not be bound up with the question of settling the date of deposits of ratifications.

M. PICHON agreed that *pourparlers* should certainly start in Paris before the date of deposit of ratifications was necessarily fixed.

MR. POLK, referring to Marshal Foch's idea as to rearrangement of the draft note on a time-table basis, inquired whether this was to include the unfulfilled Armistice clauses. He supposed that it was only meant to refer to movement of troops, evacuation, and similar points.

M. PICHON said that this was so.

M. SCIALOJA thought that the draft note should be modified so that the invitation to the German Government to participate in the deposit of ratifications should be eliminated so long as that date remained unsettled. It would be enough to merely inform the German Government that as the time for deposit was approaching, it became necessary for it to fulfil the conditions precedent thereto.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the German Government should be informed why the deposit of ratifications had not yet taken place.

M. SCIALOJA thought that representatives of the German Government should be summoned to Paris immediately to discuss the matters still remaining unsettled prior to the fixing of a date for the deposit of ratifications.

M. FROMAGEOT still thought it would be better to retain the framework of the draft note to the extent of acquainting the German Government with the proposed procedure; this in order to avoid any argument on their part that the Treaty should now automatically be put into force.

M. PICHON summed up by suggesting that the draft note should be changed so as to accord with the views above expressed by Marshal Foch, M. Scialoja, Sir Eyre Crowe and M. Fromageot, and that as so modified, it

should be submitted to the Council on the following Saturday,<sup>3</sup> together with the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses. This was agreed to.

(It was decided:

- (1) to accept in principle the note of the Drafting Committee on the notification to the German Government of the coming into force of the Treaty (see Appendix A), with the following modifications:
  - (a) in the first part of said draft the German Government should be invited to participate in the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty at a date specified as not yet being determined.
  - (b) that the German Government, at the same time, should be informed that the date of the coming into force of the Treaty would later be communicated to it in ample time but that without awaiting the notification of said date it should immediately send representatives to Paris to discuss the settlement of the matters constituting conditions precedent to the putting into force of the Treaty.
  - (c) to add at the end of said draft a paragraph to the effect that the German Government, prior to the date of deposit of ratifications, should send representatives to Paris with power to sign a Protocol dealing with the unexecuted clauses of the Armistice.

It was further decided:

- (1) to change the form of the second paragraph of said draft so that it should read as follows: 'The president of the Peace Conference has the honour to inform the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely: the British Empire, France and Italy, have ratified the Treaty, and Germany, on the other hand, having likewise ratified it, the above mentioned condition has been fulfilled.'
- (2) that the draft note of the Drafting Committee should be modified as above indicated and submitted to the Council on the following Saturday,<sup>3</sup> together with the Protocol relative to the unexecuted Armistice Clauses.)

2. CAPTAIN FULLER R.N. explained to the Council that the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had met on the preceding day; no report had been made by them to the Council, but the report which he was now going to read had been agreed to by the British, French, Italian and Japanese representatives, and in great part had been agreed to by the United States representative, who, however, wished to submit a minority report. He then read the majority report (see Appendix B). He added that it was understood that in the event of the surface vessels being broken up and sunk, the same procedure should not be adopted in the case of floating docks.

MR. POLK asked if Rear Admiral McCully might read his minority report.

REAR ADMIRAL McCULLY then read his minority report (see Appendix C).

MR. POLK said that the point of view of the minority report was this: although it had already been decided that the German Government should

give up certain ships, their disposition had never been definitely determined. At one time there had been some question of sinking them. Now the ships in question had actually been sunk. The majority report proposed to take mercantile material, which of course could not be destroyed, in reparation for the vessels sunk. This mercantile material would be useful to the Reparation Commission. It seemed to him better, by way of reparation for the vessels sunk, to take from the German Government naval material which could be destroyed if so desired. The point he wished to emphasize was that he thought that the proposal to take over mercantile material raised a question which distinctly affected the Reparation Commission.

M. PICHON remarked that the French Government had never agreed to the sinking of these ships.

MR. POLK replied that such was not his contention. That was not the point now at issue. His question was whether it were not better to leave this mercantile material to be devoted to such purposes that it would become useful to the operations of the Reparation Commission, rather than, by taking it away, to diminish Germany's power of making adequate reparation.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that several questions were now being confused. He pointed out that the British Government had been willing to make a big concession; it was willing to bear all the loss resulting from the Scapa Flow incident; therefore, it seemed to him that the opinion of his Government should now bear some weight. To him it seemed pointless to take over from the German Government ships which were useless to them and were equally useless to the Allied and Associated Powers. He thought that such an action might indeed be pleasing to the German Government. Likewise the docks which it was proposed to take over were so large that they were only useful for large sized ships of which the Germans now had none, and certainly it was not desired to encourage them to build any.

M. BERTHELOT thought that Mr. Polk's observations had shown that the argument of the United States was entirely based upon the sinking of the ships. The question had now, however, reached a further stage. Neither the French nor the Italian Governments had ever agreed to the sinking of the ships and they had demanded their distribution. Certainly there was no point in distributing the ships if they were thereafter to be sunk. He recognized the force of Sir Eyre Crowe's argument and he wished to point out that the British Government had even made another concession: although the British Government was prepared to have the ships sunk and thought that the American Government would agree, nevertheless, it was ready to admit the right of France and Italy to dispose of their share of the ships as they saw fit. He thought it was important to settle now the question whether or not the ships were to be sunk.

MR. POLK inquired if M. Berthelot meant to say that naval material ought not to be replaced by naval material. However the Council was not then discussing the disposition of ships; he merely wished to repeat that he thought the question now under discussion was one that interested the Reparation Commission. The action proposed by the majority was to give a priority,

on account of reparation, for the ships sunk. To his mind three points were involved: there was no question at the present time of the disposition of the ships; he understood and appreciated the attitude of the British Government; he thought that this was a question for the Reparation Commission. He pointed out that his position was purely a matter of principle inasmuch as the United States would not get any ships.

M. PICHON thought that this presented a new phase of the question.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that this would make it impossible to settle the Scapa Flow incident prior to the drafting of the Protocol relative to unexecuted Armistice clauses and would indefinitely postpone the entry into force of the Treaty.

M. PICHON agreed, and observed that Marshal Foch had pointed out to him that as this was a question of a violation of the Armistice the Reparation Commission could not yet be interested therein. The American argument could equally be applied to all material to be handed over by virtue of the Armistice clauses.

MR. POLK asked if the financial experts had not been consulted with respect to the delivery of locomotives and similar questions.

MARSHAL FOCH said that they had not, for the reason that the Reparation Commission had not yet existed and did not yet exist.

MR. POLK thought that on that basis it would be easy for the Armistice Commissions to seriously embarrass the Reparation Commission.

M. PICHON remarked that all matters heretofore adjusted had been controlled by the Supreme Council.

M. SCIALOJA added that the conception of reparation only existed by virtue of the coming into force of the Treaty.

MR. POLK said that he was surprised to learn that the financial experts had not been consulted. He thought that the American financial experts had at least given an opinion on these matters.

M. PICHON said that the French Government could not yield on this point.

MR. POLK remarked that if the docks and similar material now proposed to be demanded were received, the United States would get something, otherwise they would not.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the principle of demanding floating docks and similar material should be maintained, at the same time giving instructions that only the large ones and those belonging to the German Government or in which it had a predominating interest should be taken.

MR. POLK thought that the Naval Representatives could easily agree on that basis.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Naval Representatives should immediately meet and settle this question.

M. PICHON remarked that the question was a very urgent one inasmuch as it had to be settled before the Protocol, which was to be submitted the following Saturday, could be drafted. The Naval Representatives should come to a conclusion by the following day at the latest and communicate the same to M. Berthelot and M. Fromageot.

CAPTAIN FULLER, R.N., said he understood then that the Committee of Naval Experts might call upon the German Government to make over by way of reparation: (1) Government docks; (2) docks, cranes, etc., in which the German Government had a predominating interest; and, (3) docks, cranes, etc., the removal of which would not affect the working of ports in which they were situated either from the Allied or from the German point of view.

(It was decided:

- (1) to accept the principle of the responsibility of the German Government for the sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow.
- (2) that the Committee of Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should meet immediately and agree as to the reparation to be exacted from the German Government for the sinking of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, being guided by the principle that docks and similar material belonging to the German Government or in which it had a predominating interest, or too large to be suitable for present German maritime uses, should be taken by way of reparation.)

3. (The Council had before it a report of the Naval Representatives of the *Dispatch of Naval Principal Allied and Associated Powers relative to the despatch of naval vessels to Flensburg* (see Appendix D).)

M. PICHON suggested that the recommendations contained in this report be adopted.

(This was agreed to.)

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he only wished to recall the fact that although it had been intended to send three battalions to Schleswig, only two battalions would go there. It was worth considering, in view of the adoption of the Naval Representatives' recommendation not to send Allied warships to Flensburg, whether this force was sufficient.

(It was decided:

to accept the report of the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers relative to despatching naval vessels to Flensburg (see Appendix D).)

4. M. PICHON thought that, as the Central Territorial Committee was not unanimous, the best procedure was for it to submit majority and minority reports which would be discussed and settled by the Council at its meeting on the following Saturday.<sup>3</sup>

*Request of the Central Territorial Committee for Instructions on the Questions of Dobrudja and of the Serbo-Bulgarian Frontier, in connexion with the Reply to the Bulgarian Counter-Proposals*

M. LAROCHE observed that certain delegations had stated that the opinion held by them relative to the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier might be influenced by the Council's solution of the Dobrudja question; certain other delegations had stated that their opinion would not be changed by such a solution.

MR. POLK inquired if the question of Dobrudja were not a short one susceptible of being settled immediately.

M. PICHON remarked that he could only say that the opinion of the French Government was that Dobrudja, a province belonging to an Allied Government, should not be taken away from it and given over to Bulgaria, an enemy.

MR. POLK pointed out that he was not insisting on that matter being settled now. The only point before the Council was what kind of an answer should be sent to Bulgaria. He quite understood that in this answer there would be nothing relative to transferring Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

M. LAROCHE said that the settlement of the Dobrudja question was intimately connected with that of Bessarabia.

MR. POLK replied that in his opinion the question of Bessarabia should not be discussed at the present moment particularly on account of the situation in Russia.

M. PICHON agreed.

M. LAROCHE said that if the question of Bessarabia were not to be raised he thought the question of Dobrudja should likewise not be raised.

MR. POLK thought that at some other time or in some other form, by the medium of another Treaty or action on the part of the League of Nations, the question of Dobrudja could be brought up.

M. PICHON said the French Government absolutely did not agree to any solution contemplating the transfer of Dobrudja to Bulgaria.

M. LAROCHE thought that if the matter were left for future action in the manner intimated, with the implication that Dobrudja would eventually be transferred to Bulgaria, it was equivalent to certainly depriving Roumania of this province.

MR. POLK remarked that the chief trouble was that Roumania had been given everything she wanted in a territorial way without any equivalent being demanded. The time to bargain would have been when Roumania's territorial requests had been freely granted.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that it would be sufficient to say in the answer to the Bulgarian counter-proposals that in a Treaty with Bulgaria the question of Dobrudja could not be raised.

M. BERTHELOT agreed. He thought that it would be inadvisable to mention anything further, particularly in regard to the League of Nations.

(The suggestion of Sir Eyre Crowe met with approval and the discussion of the questions of Dobrudja and the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier were fixed for the meeting of Saturday, November 1st, 1919.)

5. M. BERTHELOT, referring to the draft instructions to the Inter-Allied

*Instructions to Inter-  
Allied Commission  
charged with examining  
into the evacuation of the  
Baltic Provinces*

Commission charged with examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces, called attention to Section X thereof (H.D. 77,<sup>4</sup> Appendix C).

In the first paragraph of that Section it was provided that: 'In order to accomplish its mission, the Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the British and French Allied Missions now operating in Esthonia, Latvia and

<sup>4</sup> No. 7.

Lithuania with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action.' He observed that no mention had been made of Italian and American Commissions. He thought that the paragraph should be redrafted so as to include the personnel of the Military Missions of all the Allied and Associated Powers. He understood that there was no Italian Military Mission in that region but that there was an American one.

MR. POLK stated that there was no American Military Mission in that region, but that he had no objection to the change proposed.

(It was decided:

to modify Section X of the draft instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission charged with examining into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (H.D. 77,<sup>4</sup> Appendix C), so that the first paragraph thereof should read as follows: 'In order to accomplish its mission, the Inter-Allied Commission shall have at its disposal the personnel of the Military Missions of all the Allied and Associated Powers now operating in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action.')

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, October 30, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 9

##### *Project of a Note to the German Government*

By the terms of the final provisions of the Treaty signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, it has been stipulated that:

'A first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand.'

The President of the Peace Conference has the honour of calling to the attention of the German Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire, France and Italy on the one hand, and Germany on the other, have ratified the Treaty and that the condition above referred to has been fulfilled.

The other Allied and Associated Powers who have, up to the present day made known their ratification, are Belgium, Poland and Siam.

In execution of the said provisions, and if the various acts necessary to the coming into force of the Treaty be fulfilled in time, there will take place in Paris on November ..... 1919, at .....<sup>5</sup> o'clock, the procès-verbal of the deposit of these ratifications. The German Government is requested to be kind enough to participate.

The final provision[s] of the Treaty add:

'From the date of this first procès-verbal, the Treaty will come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it. For the determina-

<sup>5</sup> Punctuation as in original.

tion of all periods of time provided for in the present Treaty, this date will be the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.'

This entry into force of the Treaty entails certain consequences which should be considered:

1. The beginning of operations by the Inter-Allied High Commission of the Rhineland. (Arrangement,<sup>6</sup> Article 2);

2. The beginning of operations by military, naval and air delegations, at the present time in Germany, as military, naval and air commissions of control (Treaty, article 203);

3. The beginning of operations by the Reparations Commission; Treaty, article 233 and annex II paragraph 5);

4. Transfer of sovereignty for Memel (Treaty, article 99, and for Danzig (Treaty, article 100), resulting in the evacuation of the troops, and German authorities, and the taking possession of these territories by the Interallied troops;

5. Transfer of Government in the Saar Basin (Treaty, article 49 and annex, paragraph 16);

6. Transfer of temporary Government in the territory of Upper Silesia, submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty, article 88 and annex, paragraphs 1 and 2 ; resulting in the evacuation of German troops, and authorities to be designated by the Commission, and the occupation by the Inter-Allied troops as well as the beginning of operations by the Commission of Government and of Plebiscite on this territory;

7. Transfer of temporary administration in the territory of Schleswig submitted to a plebiscite (Treaty, article 109), resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and occupation by the Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commission of Administration and of Plebiscite on this territory;

8. Beginning of the 15 day period in which must be effected the evacuation and the transfer of temporary administrations in the territories submitted to a plebiscite: Eastern Prussia, Allenstein (Treaty, article 95) and Eastern Prussia, Marienwerder (Treaty, article 97), resulting in the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and occupation by the Inter-Allied troops, as well as the beginning of operations by the Commissions of Administration and of Plebiscite on these territories.

9. Beginning of the 15 day period in which the Commissions of Delimitation must begin their operations.

The German Government is invited to send to Paris for the . . . . .<sup>5</sup> duly accredited representatives to:

1. Agree with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers as to the conditions of establishment of the Commissions of Government and of administration and plebiscite, the handing over of powers, the transfer of services, the entry of Inter-Allied troops, the evacuation of German troops and authorities, and all other measures above provided for.

Attention is now called to the fact that the German authorities must leave on the spot all installations of service or dwelling as well as the documents which are to be used upon the immediate entry into action of the Inter-Allied authorities; that the German troops must also leave on the spot all installations occupied by them.

2. Agree with the Staff of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies, as to conditions of transport of Inter-Allied troops.

<sup>6</sup> i.e. the Rhineland Agreement of June 28, 1919 (Treaty Series, 1919, No. 7. Cmd. 222).

## APPENDIX B TO NO. 9

*Conclusions arrived at by the British, French, Italian and Japanese Naval Advisers to the Peace Delegation[s] on the subject of Reparation for the sinking of the German Warships at Scapa at Meeting held at Ministry of Marine at 3.00 p.m. on 29th October 1919.*

*Note:* The U.S. Naval Adviser has a minority report.

In view of the reparation claims that German[y] had already incurred under the terms of the Peace Treaty, it was not considered feasible to make any further financial or material demands other than the following, which, however, cannot be regarded as complete compensation to the Allied and Associated Powers for the losses incurred through the sinking of the modern German men-of-war at Scapa.

2. The further claims which it was considered should be put forward are as follows:

(a) *For the capital ships sunk.*

A number of floating docks now in German ports, whose total lifting capacity is equivalent to that of the capital ships sunk, should be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers. The aggregate tonnage is 370,740 tons.

(b) *For the five light-cruisers sunk.*

The following light-cruisers, left to Germany under the Peace Treaty, should be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers:—

*Königsberg*

*Pillau*

*Graudenz*

*Regensburg*

*Strassburg*

(c) *For the fifty T.B.D.s sunk.*

A number of small floating docks, floating cranes, tugs, dredges, and other floating port material of an equivalent displacement to the fifty destroyers should be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers. The aggregate displacement is 41,800 tons.

*Note:* A certain number of these ships have since been salvaged and are in a bad condition. The raising of these vessels has incurred a considerable expenditure, and consequently it is not considered that these vessels can be placed to the credit of the German Government in the above demands.

3. With a view to carrying out the above conditions the German Government shall undertake to supply to the Allied Naval Commission of Control within ten days of the deposit of the ratifications of the Peace Treaty, a complete list of all floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges, etc., now in German possession, and to surrender such floating docks and additional material as may be notified to them by the Allied Naval Commission of Control.

4. The distribution of docks, cranes, tugs, and dredges, etc., surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers, under the above conditions, should be considered in conjunction with the disposal of the enemy surface vessels.

5. That on the understanding that the Supreme Council have decided to hold the German Government solely responsible for the sinking of these ships at Scapa, it is desirable that all the German officers and men belonging to these ships should be repatriated as early as possible, with the exception of any whose surrender is

required under Article 228 of the Treaty of Peace. The German Government should, however, agree to the reparation demanded, before it is effected.

6. With regard to the moneys salvaged from the German warships at Scapa, it was considered that such moneys should be placed to the credit of the Reparation Fund. Individual claims can be made good by the German Government.

7. It was not considered that the torpedo boat destroyer B-98 could be retained as compensation for one of the destroyers sunk at Scapa; but that she should be claimed as one of the forty-two torpedo boat destroyers to be surrendered under the Peace Treaty.

## APPENDIX C TO No. 9

OFFICE OF NAVAL ADVISER

*Hotel Crillon, Paris, France.*

*October 30, 1919.*

From: U.S. Naval Adviser.

To: Supreme Council.

*Subject:* Minority Report on Memorandum submitted to Supreme Council by the British Delegation regarding Responsibility for sinking of German warships at Scapa Flow, and other questions connected therewith.

*Reference:* (a) Report Board of Admirals, June 23, 1919.

(b) Letter of M. Clemenceau to German Delegation of June 25, 1919.

(c) S. H. Bulletin 756 of October 22, 1919.

(d) S. H. Bulletin [1]148 of October 25, 1919.

(e) Report Board of Admirals, October 29, 1919.

1. The German Government was responsible for failing to take preventive measures against sinking of the interned German vessels. In consequence the Armistice was violated, and this justifies a demand for Reparations.

2. The German Naval Officials in command at Scapa Flow were responsible as active agents in sinking the vessels. This justifies a demand for the trial and punishment, if convicted, of such officers.

3. The Reparations demanded should in principle be confined to further delivery of naval material. German naval material available for Reparations, according to reference (a) consists of:—

*(a) Of Military Value.*

(1) Five (5) Light Cruisers (*Graudenz, Koenigsberg, Pillau, Regensburg, and Strassburg*).

(2) Fourteen (14) Destroyers (1908-9 program).

(3) Eight (8) Torpedo Boats.

*(b) Of Small Military Value.*

(1) Fourteen (14) Pre-Dreadnaughts (1900-1906 types) (about 182,000 tons in all).

(2) Nine Light Cruisers (*Gazelle* and *Hamburg* Classes).

(3) One (1) Cruiser (*Roon*).

(4) Twenty-three (23) Destroyers (1906-7 program and later).

(c) *Of Little or No Military Value.*

- (1) Seven (7) Battleships (Kaiser Friedrich and Brandenburg Classes).
- (2) Eight (8) Coast Defence ships (Hagen Class).
- (3) Two (2) Cruisers (*Prinz Heinrich* and *Fürst Bismarck*).
- (4) Six (6) Light Cruisers (5 of Hertha class and *Kaiserin Augusta*).
- (5) Thirty-six (36) Destroyers.
- (6) Sixty-four (64) Torpedo Boats.

(d) *Naval Docks (At Wilhelmshaven).*

- (1) Three (3) Large Docks, one of 40,000 tons.
- (2) One (1) Pntonn [Pontoon] Dock, 1,500 tons.
- (3) Four (4) Torpedo Boat Docks 4,000 tons.

The entire Reparations could be taken from classes (a), (b) and (d) mentioned above, reckoning either on tonnage basis, or based on value for scrap. In class (c) would still remain sufficient Naval Forces for Germany's needs to assist in maintaining internal order.

*Note:* At time of sinking of German vessels in Scapa Flow, there were in port 50 German Destroyers, of which fifteen (15) were not sunk, four were salvaged later, another is being salvaged. Majority Report, reference (c), demands Reparations for fifty (50) Destroyers.

4. In regard to the sum of 34,642 marks, 20 pfennings, the Germans have claimed some of this money as personal property of officers and men. Such of this money as can be proved by them to be personal property, should be paid to German officers and men entitled to it, as personal property of war prisoners is not subject to confiscation. The remainder should be placed in Reparation Fund.

5. The German Destroyer B-98 was engaged in bringing mails to German vessels interned at Scapa Flow, was provided with proper authority to make the trip, and was flying the white flag. It is not alleged to have had any part in the sinking of the German vessels, or to have been guilty of any warlike act. However justifiable her seizure may have been at the moment, her indefinite retention is not justified by International Law, and she should be released and restored to Germany pending further dispositions.

N. A. McCULLY.

## APPENDIX D TO No. 9

### *Report of Allied Representatives on Dispatch of Naval Vessels to Flensburg.*

According to the decision taken on October 25 by the Supreme Council,<sup>7</sup> the Naval Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers met on Monday, October 27, at 15 o'clock, in the Ministry of Marine, in order to determine whether, on account of the recent events at Flensburg, they deem it possible to send battleships to that port.

The<sup>8</sup> Naval Representatives express the following opinion:

*First:* From a maritime point of view, the sending of light ships (light cruisers, destroyers or gunboats) is possible, but it is unnecessary for them to enter the port and stay there.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 6, minute 8.

<sup>8</sup> French texts of the ensuing portion of this report and of M. Pichon's proposal for its adoption (see minute 3 above) are printed by A. Tardieu and F. de Jessen, op. cit., pp. 327-8.

*Second:* Great Britain, the United States and France are the only great powers which have ships available to fulfil this mission.

*Third:* They think that, in case one or several battleships were sent immediately, the Commander-in-Chief would be placed in a difficult situation, if, as is probable, the Danes would ask him for assistance which he would be unable to give; and, as he would be in a German port, the Germans might assume a hostile attitude towards him, which would necessitate immediate action on the spot, and an ulterior action of the Supreme Council.

*Fourth:* In case the Supreme Council should decide to send ships, it is indispensable for it to determine in a precise manner what line of conduct the Commander-in-Chief must observe.

*Fifth:* The Naval Representatives think that it is not judicious to send Allied battleships for 'demonstration' purposes only, before the day under which the Allied Naval Forces are to arrive, with troops, for the plebiscite of Schleswig, according to the stipulations of the Peace Treaty.

## No. 10

H. D. 80.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 1, 1919, at 10.00 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire:* Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France:* M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy:* M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan:* M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Mr. B. Winthrop. *British Empire:* Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France:* M. Massigli. *Italy:* M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

*U.S.A.:* Dr. J. B. Scott, Rear Admiral McCully, Mr. A. W. Dulles, Dr. I. Bowman, Colonel J. A. Logan, Commander Koehler, Captain Gordon.

*British Empire:* General Sackville-West, Admiral Groves R.N., Hon. C. H. Tufton, Mr. A. W. Malkin, Mr. A. Leeper, Commander Smith R.N., Commander Dunne R.N., Captain Fuller R.N., Commander McNamara R.N.

*France:* Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Desticker, General Le Rond, M. H. Bérenger, M. Laroche, Commandant Le Vavasseur, M. Fromageot, Capitaine Roper.

*Italy:* General Cavallero, Contre-Amiral Grassi, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Vannuttelli-Rey, M. Galli, M. Pilotti, Capitaine de Corvette Ruspoli, Prince Boncompagni.

*Japan:* M. Adatci, Commandant Ohsumi, M. Nagaoka, M. Shigemitsu.

1. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated *Powers of General* October 28, 1919 (see Appendix A).)

*Milne in Asia Minor* SIR EYRE CROWE stated the question was a very simple one, and was summarized in the note from the British Delegation which had

been circulated among the members of the Council. The Council had appointed, at some prior time, General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in Asia Minor: it seemed that neither the French nor the Italian authorities had been informed of the decision of the Council.

M. PICHON thought indeed that the question could not raise any difficulty so long as the beginning of the note, as submitted to the Council, was altered slightly: the British Delegation had said that the General Officer commanding the British troops at Constantinople and in Asia Minor (Syria excepted) had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in those regions. This assertion was correct, as far as Turkey in Asia was concerned, but the question of the command at Constantinople was the object of negotiations between the British and French Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed with this remark, but asked, above all, that the French and Italian military authorities be informed of the decisions of the Supreme Council, which had recognized the authority of General Milne.

M. BERTHELOT thought that there could be no doubt whatsoever on this question, and added he could not understand the misunderstanding which had taken place, for the necessary information had been given at the same time to M. de France<sup>1</sup> and to General Franchet d'Esperey.

M. SCIALOJA asked that the same instructions be repeated to the Italian military authorities.

M. PICHON agreed that this information should be reiterated.

(It was decided:

that the French and Italian Delegations take the necessary steps to inform their representatives in Turkey that the Supreme Council had appointed General Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Asia Minor, Syria excepted. (See Appendix A).)

2. (The Council had before it a draft note prepared by the Drafting Committee (see Appendix B).)

*Draft Note to the  
German Government  
relative to putting  
the Treaty into  
force*

M. FROMAGEOT commented upon this draft note and remarked that the Drafting Committee had taken account of the observations made at the preceding meeting of the Supreme Council, and also that the new draft was presented by all the members of the Committee.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the draft, as prepared by the Drafting Committee, invited the German Government to send representatives to Paris on November 6th.<sup>2</sup> He would like to know whether on the 6th of November they could profitably discuss with the German delegates: would the Commissions be ready on that date?

M. BERTHELOT said that he had proposed November 6th to take into account the wish expressed by General Weygand himself that the conference should take place as soon as possible, but it could easily be put off for a few days.

<sup>1</sup> M. DeFrance was French High Commissioner at Constantinople.

<sup>2</sup> In the text of appendix B in the filed original this date had been altered to November 10 in accordance with M. Pichon's proposal below.

GENERAL WEYGAND thought that from a military standpoint they would certainly be ready on November 6th, but that perhaps that date might be a little early for the Commissions.

M. PICHON proposed the 10th instead of the 6th.

(This proposal was adopted.)

(It was decided:

that the draft note to the German Government, prepared by the Drafting Committee, relative to putting the Treaty into force, be approved, and that the German Government be asked to send representatives to be in Paris on the 10th, and not on the 6th, of November, 1919. (See Appendix B).)

3. (The Council had before it a draft Protocol, prepared by the Drafting Committee (see Appendix C).)

*Draft Protocol  
between the Allied  
and Associated  
Powers and Ger-  
many relative to  
confirming the obli-  
gations imposed  
upon the German  
Government by the  
Armistice*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee, and remarked that there was occasion to modify the draft on the following points:<sup>3</sup>

(1) Page 1, point 3 [2]<sup>4</sup>: Eliminate in the second line the word 'immediately' and add after the words, 'in Russian territory,' the words, 'as soon as the Allies judge opportune.'

(2) Page 1, point 4 [3]<sup>4</sup>: Substitute the word, 'coercive' for the word, 'consecutive.'

(3) Page 1, point 5 [4]<sup>4</sup>: Substitute the word 'fiduciary' for the word, 'judicial'.

(4) Page 2, point 6 [5]<sup>4</sup>: Add to the end of the paragraph, 'destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over.'

(5) Page 3, point 11 [10]<sup>4</sup>: Add to the end of the paragraph, 'and various other merchant vessels.'

(6) Page 4: Add to the end of the second paragraph,<sup>5</sup> 'and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over.'

(7) Page 4, point 2<sup>6</sup>: Add to the end of the paragraph 'also the three submarine engines of U-146, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for submarines destroyed in the North Sea.'

He explained that in point 1 of page 1 they had mentioned an interval of thirty-one days expiring December 11th, 1918. Was this exact?

MARSHAL FOCH said it was not quite right; the time limit had been exceeded by mutual consent and in consequence of various agreements. There was no need to mention it. On the other hand, he considered that as regarded handing over of rolling stock, the Germans had not, properly speaking,

<sup>3</sup> From the following amendments and observations it appears that the text in appendix C had been substantially revised to take account of them. The page references to the text before the Supreme Council do not invariably correspond with the original of appendix C.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. resolution (3) at the end of this minute.

<sup>5</sup> Paragraph beginning: 'Lastly, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot overlook . . .'

<sup>6</sup> The antepenultimate paragraph of the draft protocol in appendix C.

committed any real violation of the Armistice. There had been certain slowness of execution. It would be a mistake therefore to treat as equally serious the nonfulfilment of that clause and specific violations of the Armistice like the Scapa Flow incident and the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. It would perhaps be better to mention in the beginning of the note the more important questions, and to consider secondary violations in a final paragraph.

M. FROMAGEOT said that they had followed the order of the clauses of the Armistice conventions; obviously that might be modified. From a legal point of view, on the other hand, he felt obliged to remark that the fact of an obligation being in course of fulfilment did not prevent their considering it unexecuted.

MARSHAL FOCH thought that it would be sufficient to say that, on that point, the Allied and Associated Powers had not received full satisfaction. He wished to repeat, in that case, that there was no formal violation of the Armistice, and that it would be well not to confuse in the same category formal violations and incomplete execution.

M. BERTHELOT said it had seemed advantageous to make a complete enumeration, but he wished to remark that, in the last part, they had to take into account the arguments the Marshal had in mind, and that, doubtless, it would be sufficient to omit in that last part, paragraphs Nos. 4 and 5 of page 4.

M. PICHON summed up that they were agreed to modify the first paragraph of page 1 in the following manner: 'The obligations, etc., have not been carried out, or have not received full satisfaction.'

(This suggestion was adopted.)

MARSHAL FOCH wished to remark that as for point 2,<sup>4</sup> they could not reproach the Germans with not having made the reimbursement of the upkeep expenses of the troops of occupation, for the simple reason that they had not yet told them the total amount of these expenses. It would therefore be better to omit the paragraph.

M. BERTHELOT thought it was all the easier, as the obligation was covered by the Treaty.

M. PICHON concluded that the Council decided to omit this paragraph.

M. FROMAGEOT stated that with regard to Germany's obligation to deliver documents, specie, valuables carried away by her troops, they had not felt in a position to mention the valuables removed from the prisoners' camps, as the Minister of Finance had demanded, because the Armistice did not speak of it.

MR. POLK thought that, although he did not suppose that his Naval Experts would raise objections on the point, he wished to make a reservation on point 6 [5]<sup>4</sup> of the Committee's draft. Similarly, he felt he must make a reservation on point 11 [10]<sup>4</sup> of the draft, concerning the handing over of the fourteen tank vessels which had been demanded. He believed, further, that on this point it might be possible to find a text which would satisfy at once

the American Delegation on the one hand, and the British and the French on the other.

M. BERTHELOT stated they had already taken care to avoid a text which appeared to imply a decision by the American Government on property in these vessels.

MR. POLK added that the American Government did not consider that the demand for the handing over of those tank vessels could be maintained.

M. BERTHELOT wished to remark that the Supreme Council had taken a decision on the subject, namely that a German obligation existed although, as between the Allies, the question might be examined anew.<sup>7</sup>

MR. POLK did not wish to raise, at that time, the question in its entirety, but could not help remarking that if the decision which M. Berthelot recalled had not been taken, there would not have been a violation of the Armistice, in that case, on the part of the Germans. He was hoping that the Drafting Committee would prepare a text which would permit of an agreement.

M. HENRY BÉRENGER stated that they did not at that time have to examine the question of real property in the tank ships, nor what was the legal position of the Deutsche Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. That was a question that belonged to the Reparations Commission; for the moment the question was: why had the ships which had been demanded in virtue of certain clauses of the Armistice, not been delivered, especially at a time when tonnage and fuel were everywhere in universal need? He thought the British Delegation believed, as he did, that there was there a real obstruction on the part of Germany.

MR. POLK thought that the question before this meeting was to revise the protocol and not to discuss in its entirety the question of the tank ships which, however, he was ready to discuss. He simply wished to make a reservation, and he was convinced that the Drafting Committee would manage to agree on a text which would not bring up the whole question.

M. BERTHELOT said that a distinction should be made between the two points: 1st, the attitude of the Allies towards the Germans: the Germans had been asked to deliver the ships; they ought to do it. 2nd, if the Supreme Council had several times decided that the tank ships were to be sent to the Firth of Forth it was no longer a matter of settling the question in substance; and discussion remained possible as between the Allies and America. But it was important to introduce in the protocol a clause. If they were not to do so they would unintentionally be deciding the question in substance and to the advantage of Germany.

MR. POLK thought that the remarks of M. Berthelot might be accurate, but as time was short, he would for the moment confine himself to making a reservation.

M. CLEMENCEAU concluded that it was understood, then, that the protocol would contain a clause on that subject, but for the moment the Council decided to reserve the text.

<sup>7</sup> See Vol. I, No. 66, minute 1.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked with regard to point No. 12 [11]<sup>4</sup> of the Committee's draft whether it would not be advisable to examine it at the same time as the draft reply to the German note of October 10th [12th] on the sale of aeronautical material which figured on the agenda of that morning.<sup>8</sup>

M. FROMAGEOT thought that the question would present itself more profitably a little later. He would have some observations to make which would satisfy the technical experts; and at that time could also be examined the draft reply which Sir Eyre Crowe mentioned. He added that, following point No. 12 [11],<sup>4</sup> it would be right to alter the text of the paragraph beginning with the words, 'A certain number of stipulations, etc.'; it should read: 'Unexecuted or incompletely executed stipulations' so as to take into account the observations offered some time before by Marshal Foch.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they then had to decide what reparations they were going to exact for the Scapa Flow incident.

CAPTAIN FULLER pointed out that the Naval Experts had not been able to come to an agreement. The Representative of the United States had made a reservation on the subject of floating docks that ought to be exacted.<sup>9</sup>

COMMANDANT LE VAVASSEUR stated that he for his part had submitted—and his British, Italian and Japanese colleagues were of the same opinion—that it was inadvisable to specify the percentage of large and small docks that ought to be demanded for the tonnage that was to be replaced. They had thought it sufficient to fix only the total, leaving it to the Commission of Naval Control to make the choice. The American Delegate alone had been of a different opinion.

Commandant Le Vavas seur repeated that they had all been agreed upon the principle that the handing over of naval material ought to be demanded and agreed also upon the amount of tonnage that should be claimed as reparation. Their difference existed in the proportion as between large and small docks.

CAPTAIN FULLER agreed that was the situation.

MR. POLK wished to ask for what reason they could not specify at this time the proportion of great docks and small docks to be delivered.

CAPTAIN FULLER replied that it was because this raised the question of the docks at Dantzig, for it was at Dantzig that two of the biggest docks Germany possessed were situated.

MR. POLK said that, in the absence of his naval experts, it was difficult for him to take a decision. He felt, however, as he had already stated to the Council, that this question brought up the problem of the extent of Germany's ability to make reparation, and for that reason came within the province of the Reparations Commission; he confined himself to making a reservation and proposed that the discussion be resumed that afternoon. (This proposal was adopted.)

M. FROMAGEOT wished to draw the attention of the Council to the third obligation which the protocol imposed on Germany, to take into account the

<sup>8</sup> See minute 4 below.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. No. 9, minute 2 and appendix C.

remarks which had been presented to the Committee by technical experts. They, therefore, proposed to alter the text which the Council had before it in the following manner:

‘third—to make over to the Allied and Associated Governments the value of the aeronautical material which had been exported, according to the decision that would be given, and the estimate made or notified by the President of the Commission on Aeronautical Control, as provided in article 210 of the Treaty of Peace, before the 31st January, 1920’.

It was the President of the Commission who would decide whether the exported material were civil or military, and who as a result of that decision, would determine the sum that Germany ought to pay.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that the notification to Germany would be made by the President, but that the decision would have to be taken by the Commission itself.

M. FROMAGEOT explained that the technical experts had agreed that the President be trusted with the power of deciding whether the material in question were civil or military.

CAPTAIN ROPER stated that the Supreme Council had had to make a decision on this point on the 29th September (H.D. 63),<sup>10</sup> on the point being raised by the British Delegation. In the text prepared by the British Delegation the President had been mentioned, but in their minds it was clear that the President was merely the interpreter of the Commission.

M. BERTHELOT added that this meant the decision of the Commission as notified by the President.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that of course the Commission could always delegate its powers to the President.

M. FROMAGEOT made the comment that the two following paragraphs, Nos. 4 and 5 on page 4, ought to be omitted in the light of the explanations just offered by Marshal Foch, but that the Drafting Committee thought that there was still ground for adding to the final paragraph the following phrase which was dictated by the analogous terms of paragraph 18 of the annex to part VIII of the Treaty: ‘Germany pledges itself not to consider these measures as acts of war.’

M. CLEMENCEAU did not think this a very happy addition. What were they going to do if Germany should refuse to sign that phrase?

MARSHAL FOCH announced himself quite hostile to that phrase.

M. SCIALOJA wished to raise another question. In his opinion it would be well to ask the Germans to come armed with full powers to sign the protocol, but expressly on the understanding that that protocol would not be still subject to ratification by the National Assembly. Were they not to take this precaution they would expose themselves to the anomaly that the Treaty would have come into force while the protocol was in the air; for certain articles of the German Constitution left it an open question whether the document that they wished to have the German representatives sign would be valid without ratification by the legislative authorities.

<sup>10</sup> See Vol. I, No. 67, minute 2.

M. FROMAGEOT wished to point out that in their draft note it was stated on page 2 that the German representative who was to sign the protocol must be armed with full powers.<sup>11</sup>

M. SCIALOJA explained that this meant full powers to sign, but it was necessary that this signature should hold Germany without ratification.

M. FROMAGEOT thought it would be sufficient to modify the first paragraph on page 2 of the draft note in the following manner:

'The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives, authorized to sign the *procès-verbal* for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement.'

(It was decided:

to approve the draft Protocol prepared by the Drafting Committee (see Appendix C) to be signed by a representative of the German Government upon the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace, with the following modifications:<sup>12</sup>

- (1) Page 1, paragraph 1: 'The obligations [ . . . ] have not been executed or have not been entirely fulfilled.'
- (2) Page 1, paragraph 2:<sup>13</sup> Eliminate the words 'within a period of thirty days ending on December 11, 1919 [1918].'
- (3) Page 1, paragraph 3:<sup>14</sup> This paragraph to be entirely eliminated.
- (4) Page 1, paragraph 4:<sup>15</sup> Eliminate in the second line the word, 'immediately' and add to the fourth line the words, 'as soon as the Allies judge opportune.'
- (5) Page 1, paragraph 6:<sup>15</sup> In the third line substitute the word 'coercive' for 'consecutive'.
- (6) Page 1, paragraph 7:<sup>15</sup> In the third line substitute the word, 'fiduciary' for the word, 'judicial'.
- (7) Page 2, paragraph 2:<sup>15</sup> Add at the end of this paragraph the words, 'and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over'.
- (8) Page 2, paragraph 3:<sup>15</sup> This clause is provisionally reserved.
- (9) Page 2, paragraph 4:<sup>15</sup> line 1, substitute for 'Clauses of the Armistice', 'Armistice Convention'.
- (10) Page 3, paragraph 3:<sup>16</sup> The first part of this paragraph is reserved, and at the end thereof are to be added the words, 'and various other merchant vessels.'
- (11) Page 3, paragraph 5:<sup>17</sup> Between the words, 'unexecuted' and 'stipulations' insert the words, 'or incompletely executed'.

<sup>11</sup> See appendix B.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. note 3 above.

<sup>13</sup> Numbered paragraph 1 in appendix C.

<sup>14</sup> Omitted from appendix C.

<sup>15</sup> The paragraph references in resolutions 4-9 correspond respectively to numbered paragraphs 2-7 in appendix C.

<sup>16</sup> Draft paragraph in lieu of numbered paragraph 10 in appendix C (cf. note 3 above).

<sup>17</sup> Paragraph immediately following numbered paragraph 11 in appendix C.

- (12) Page 4, paragraph 2:<sup>5</sup> Add at the end of this paragraph, 'and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines on their way to England to be handed over'.
- (13) The next paragraph<sup>18</sup> was reserved provisionally.
- (14) Page 4, paragraph 4:<sup>6</sup> This paragraph to be modified so as to read: 'To deliver within a period of ten days, from the date of the signature of the present Protocol, the machinery and engines of submarines U-137, U-138 and U-150 by way of reparation for the destruction of submarine UC-48, as well as of the three engines of submarine U-146, which still remained to be delivered in reparation for the submarines destroyed in the North Sea.'
- (15) Change paragraph 5 on page 4,<sup>19</sup> to read: '... according to the decision that will be taken, the estimate made and modified [notified]<sup>20</sup> by the Aeronautic Control Commission as provided for in Article 210 of the Treaty of Peace and before January 31, 1920.'
- (16) To omit the two last paragraphs<sup>14</sup> of the same page.

It was further decided:

that on account of the changes made in the Protocol, the first paragraph on page 2 of the draft note to the German Government<sup>21</sup> should be modified in the following manner:

"The German Government is therefore asked to give to the German representatives authorized to sign the *procès-verbal* for the deposit of ratifications, full powers to sign at the same time the Protocol of which a copy is hereto attached and which provides without further delay for this settlement.")

4. (The Council had before it a draft reply prepared by the French Delegation (see Appendix D).)

*Draft reply to the  
German Note upon the  
Sale of Aeronautical  
Material*

SIR EYRE CROWE proposed to refer this draft back to the Drafting Committee for examination, and also to state whether the text thereof agreed with the resolutions which had just been taken.

(This proposition was adopted.)

(It was decided:

- (1) to refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the German Government dated October 12th. (See Appendix D);
- (2) that the Drafting Committee would decide whether the note and the protocol which the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to send, did not render superfluous the sending of that specific reply.)

<sup>18</sup> Paragraph in appendix C beginning: '1st (A) to deliver as reparation for the destruction of the German fleet at Scapa Flow. . . '.

<sup>19</sup> Penultimate paragraph in appendix C.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. the text in appendix C.

5. (The Council had before it the report from the Central Territorial Committee concerning the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier (see *Repl. to the Bulgarian Counter-Propositions. Questions of the Dobrudja and of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier*, Appendix E), and a draft reply from the same Committee to the Bulgarian note concerning Thrace (see Appendix F).<sup>21</sup>)

M. LAROCHE explained that the Committee had not been able to agree. Although it was unanimous, as far as Thrace was concerned, in refusing the Bulgarian claims, on the contrary, a disagreement existed on two other points. Two delegations, the American and the Italian, were of the opinion that there should be a modification of the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier line as it was defined in the conditions of Peace, in two places, namely in the region of Tsaribrod and in the region of Bossilegrade. On the contrary, the three other Delegations were of the opinion that the original conditions should remain. With regard to the Dobrudja, the Committee was equally divided. On September 5, the Supreme Council had decided to examine the question of the Dobrudja when it would reply to the Bulgarian propositions.<sup>22</sup> At the preceding meeting, Sir Eyre Crowe had proposed that they should confine themselves to answering the Bulgarians that the question should not come up in a Treaty between Bulgaria and the Allied and Associated Powers,<sup>23</sup> but the American and Italian Delegations insisted that the question should be examined anew: as far as they were concerned, the question was bound up with that of the Serbian frontier. That was the opinion of the majority of the Commission. In justification of the changes which they proposed to make in the conditions of Peace, the American and Italian Delegations laid stress on arguments which were already known, and they also emphasized the feeling which was being shown in Bulgaria: they were afraid that the decision of the Conference would leave behind them lasting marks of resentment. These arguments were not of sufficient value for the majority. The majority, as a matter of fact, pointed out that the Serbian Delegation was familiar with the Peace conditions: should the Council change them at the last minute, the Serbian Allies would be the ones to experience that feeling referred to by the minority Delegations. The majority was of the opinion that the reasons which had modified the line of the former Serbo-Bulgarian frontier were still good: they had wished to protect in the Vranje region the Belgrade-Salonika railroad

<sup>21</sup> Not printed. The draft note in this appendix was in two paragraphs. The first read as follows: 'The Allied and Associated Powers have examined the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation relative to the frontier of Thrace with most scrupulous attention. Before determining this frontier line, such as it is indicated in the Peace Conditions with Bulgaria, the Allied and Associated Powers did not fail to fully consider all reasons of an ethnical, geographical and even historic order having any influence on their decision. The same care has been exercised in studying all arguments presented by the Bulgarian Delegation. For these reasons, the Allied and Associated Powers see no reason to introduce modifications in the outline of the frontier.' The second paragraph of the note was identical with the last paragraph of appendix B to No. 11.

<sup>22</sup> See Vol. I, No. 52, minute 2.

<sup>23</sup> See No. 9, minute 4.

from a Bulgarian aggression; indeed, it should not be forgotten that it was in that region, and by reason of the proximity of the railroad to the former frontier, the Bulgarian attack had begun in 1915.

MR. POLK wished to remark that as far as the Dobrudja was concerned, he thought it might be sufficient to insert a phrase on the subject in the covering letter; that the Allied and Associated Powers would declare, for instance, that the time had not come to discuss the question. Should the majority insist, he would not oppose himself to that decision, but he wished to state that he would have to make a formal reservation in the name of the American Government. The Dobrudja might become a cause of future war in the Balkans, and America would have some difficulty in interfering in a conflict which might be brought about by that question. He therefore wished to ask that this reservation be set forth upon the record: that the American Delegation would prefer the insertion in the covering letter of a line stating that the matter would be taken up with Roumania. Was the Supreme Council hostile to this solution? He did not wish to hide the fact that it seemed to him a great pity, at a time when they were guaranteeing the protection of minorities, to go against the rights of these minorities in the Dobrudja.

M. PICHON remarked that the Treaty of 1913 which had decided the future of the Dobrudja was prior to the war; there was no reason why they should change it as far as Roumania was concerned.

M. SCIALOJA did not wish to insist that the question of the Dobrudja should be taken up, but he, however, thought that it could very well be said that it did not concern the Treaty with Bulgaria.

MR. POLK reiterated the fact that he did not ask for the insertion of a disposition to that effect in the Treaty itself, nor even for the addition of a phrase in their reply to the Bulgarian counter-propositions; he was only asking that some words to that effect might be put in the covering letter.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this amounted to the same thing; such a phrase would be offering a pretext for war.

M. LAROCHE continued his comment, and said that in the region of Tsaribrod, the Serbians had asked for a rectification of frontiers as far as the Dragoman Pass which protected Sofia. The Conference did not wish to go so far, but they had to point out that there was a series of mountain railways which in that region converged on Pirot and which consequently were the roads leading to Nisch; that was the traditional road of the Bulgarian invasions. It had appeared to them that there was reason for giving to the Serbians the strategic key of that road: indeed Serbia did not have any more claims to set up against Bulgaria, and therefore it was right to believe that there would be no further ambition to satisfy in that direction. On the contrary, Bulgaria would not cease to claim Serbian territories and on that side, the reasons for aggression subsisted. As a matter of fact the rectification of frontiers in question would only have the effect of passing approximately 20,000 inhabitants under Serbian authority.

M. Laroche stated that the report of the minority had been distributed and that he was ready to read it.

MR. POLK wished to bring out certain points: first, should they consider the text of their first Peace conditions as intangible? Secondly, when the question had come up for the first time, M. Tardieu had told them that it was only a matter of 7,000 Bulgarians being turned over to Serbian authority. On verifying these figures, it was found that as a matter of fact, it was a total of nearly 42,000 Bulgarians being turned over as against 93 Serbian inhabitants. The only possible justification for this proposed change was to give the Serbians the means to attack Sofia without being stopped by any intermediary obstacles. He therefore urged the Supreme Council to think over the consequences entailed in a decision which meant the handing over of 40,000 Bulgarians to the Serbians, so as to facilitate a Serbian attack upon Sofia. Even in Serbia the wisest people had seen that this would be a mistake which would make more difficult their mission of conciliation. He did not wish, however, to retard in any way the hour of Peace, but he felt it was his duty to express a very definite protest on this question.

M. LAROCHE wished to answer Mr. Polk's arguments by stating briefly that 40,000 Bulgarians in a total population of 4,000,000 inhabitants did not represent a very large figure. They had not left Sofia without protection since they had let the Bulgarians keep the Dragoman Pass which formed a defensive strategic position of the greatest value; and should it be found correct that they had ensured advantages to the Serbians, the reason was that they were convinced it was the Bulgarians who would attack. A concession at Staribord [Tsaribrod] would not make the Bulgarians forget either Stroumitza or Monastir.

M. SCIALOJA agreed with the American thesis. The arguments of the majority, as a matter of fact, did not seem convincing in the least. The ethnographic question was a clear one: this was a question of a population purely Bulgarian, of a territory which was Bulgarian by its nature and history. The only argument which had been invoked was that of the railway; on this point, he wished to bring their attention to the fact that there were other points on which the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier came nearer thereto than in the Bossiligrade region. Why then base upon the existence of a railroad the determination of a frontier? From the military standpoint, they could no more give Serbia the means of invading Bulgaria than give Bulgaria the means of invading Serbia. If Serbia had legitimate fears, one might, to allay these, impose on Bulgaria the disarmament of the entrenched camp of Smilitza [?Slivnitza]. The truth was that Serbia wished to have an open door on Sofia. They ought to be working to ensure equilibrium; they should not admit the violation of those very principles of peace which they were striving to establish. There would always be causes for war; it was not for them to try and bring them about. It was clear that Bulgaria would never admit that the Serbs get an open road to Sofia. Lastly, he wished to remark that the text which they had communicated to the Serbs was only a draft, and that they had a perfect right to change it.

M. LAROCHE stated that at the present time, from a strategic point of view, the Serbs were in a position of clear inferiority. It was the line of the present

frontier which had allowed in 1915 the Bulgarian invasion. The Peace conditions which they had handed to Bulgaria, at the same time as to all their Allies, were more than a simple draft. They would be taking a very serious responsibility should they modify these conditions. As for the disarmament of Smilitza, which M. Scialoja proposed, this would appear to the Bulgarians as much more serious than the loss of Staribrod [*sic*].

MR. BOWMAN resumed the arguments of the minority as follows: first, he thought it was useless to reinforce the feelings of reciprocal hostility between the Bulgarians and the Serbs; secondly, the minority did not consider that reasons existed to foresee an invasion of Serbia by the Bulgarians. Bulgaria was vanquished, and the Treaty disarmed her as well on land as on sea. Precautions had been taken to prevent her reorganizing an army; under these conditions she could not think of starting a new war for a long time. It was correct that in the Bossiligrade region, the railroad was at a distance of about ten miles from the frontier. It was proposed to withdraw this frontier to twice that distance, although the population was entirely Bulgarian; the minority would consent to accept this modification, but the case of Tsaribrod was entirely different. The frontier on that point formed a salient which protected the railroad, and on the other hand, in the southwest, on a point where they had been asked to rectify the line, the frontier came much nearer to the railroad. The American and Italian Delegations were aware of the fact that if one wished to modify the frontier line, the new line as proposed was a good one, but the question was whether such modification was necessary. They still thought that no sufficient reasons were adduced to justify such a change; and when, on the other hand, they pointed out that this was the question of greatest interest to Bulgarian opinion, that it would likewise in itself be sufficient to prevent a *rapprochement* between Serbia and Bulgaria, that further the draft proposed to them was even opposed by influential men in Serbia, they deemed it their duty to maintain their conclusions.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that Mr. Polk was perfectly right in saying that the Peace conditions which they had handed to the Bulgarians were not inalterable. Any modification was difficult when it bore upon a question which had been discussed for many months and which had been the result of compromise. As a matter of fact the only new point brought up at this meeting was more complete statistical information. All the other arguments had already been discussed, and he admitted that, in the first Commission, all the military experts had agreed that the proposed frontier did not give the Serbians offensive military advantages, but only defensive. They were now told that the idea of protecting a railroad had no sense, and that a strategical argument could never be adduced as against an ethnical one; he would point out that the Yugo-Slavs had said the same thing about the line proposed for the new Italo-Slav frontier. In preparing the treaties, they had had to make compromises on all points. Why maintain that in this question particularly principles were sacred? Would it not be wiser to stand by the clauses on which they had agreed? They were as a matter of fact assured that the Bulgarian Delegation would sign the Treaty in any event: on the contrary

the conversations he had had with the Serbs had convinced him that if they were to make concessions to Bulgaria so as to facilitate in Sofia a signature which appeared certain, they were running the risk of having the whole treaty jeopardized at Belgrade. The Serbian Delegation which had arrived in Paris was in a difficult situation: it was ready to sign the Treaty with Austria. If this new sacrifice were imposed on Serbia, would the delegation still be able to sign? Their common desire was to sign Peace as soon as possible. They were sure to have the Bulgarian signature; ought they to jeopardize the Serbian signature?

M. PICHON wished only to add one word to Sir Eyre Crowe's statement. The Serbian Delegates had told him that a concession would mean for certain political men a decisive argument in favour of the refusal of Serbia's signature. On the other hand, the intentions of Mr. Trumbic were conciliatory. Had the Bulgarians deserved that the Allies should bully the Serbs? He did not think so.

MR. POLK wished to rectify on one point the statements of Sir Eyre Crowe: the American and Italian experts had never accepted the new line of frontier; they had always pointed out its dangers. The new line was not the work of the Commission; the Supreme Council alone had decided in its favour. He did not wish to complicate a difficult situation and he accepted that the Council should maintain its former decision, but in that case he felt it his duty to protest, to point out once more the dangers of such a decision, and to repeat that this decision was made against the advice of the American Delegation. The American Delegation did not wish to assume any responsibility whatsoever in the event of future conflicts which this decision might bring about.

M. SCIALOJA wished to associate himself with Mr. Polk's declaration.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 1, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 10

##### *Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council*

On July 18th the Council of Five passed certain resolutions. (Attached Appendix A.)<sup>24</sup> From these resolutions it will be seen that the General Officer Commanding the British troops in Constantinople and Asia Minor, other than Syria, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in those parts. As Commander-in-Chief, he was given the specific duty of demarcating a line beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops were to be permitted to move. It would appear that the fact of this officer's appointment as Commander-in-Chief was not communicated to the Allied troops, as will be seen from the following telegrams:—

1. The British Commander-in-Chief, Constantinople, reported to the War

<sup>24</sup> Not printed. This annex recapitulated the resolutions printed in Vol. I, No. 14, minute 4.

Office on September 23rd that the Chief of the French Staff had informed his British liaison officer that no intimation had been received from the French Government that General Milne had been appointed to the command of the Allied troops in Asia Minor.

2. On the 26th October General Milne reported that for the last two months he had been endeavouring to obtain from the General commanding the Italian troops in Asia Minor a line of demarcation between the Italian and Turkish troops as directed in the instructions referred to above. In a letter to General Milne, dated September 30th, the Italian General definitely states that he has no knowledge of instructions in the above quoted telegram regarding a line of demarcation between the Italian and Turkish Forces.

General Milne therefore states that so long as the Italian General declines to acknowledge his authority, he is unable to take any action in conformity with the orders of the Supreme Council, and that he cannot accept the responsibility put upon him.

The British Government, therefore, requests that General Milne's status may be communicated by the respective Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers to their subordinates in Constantinople and Asia Minor.

28.10.19

## APPENDIX B TO NO. 10

### *Note to German Government*

*November 1, 1919.*

By the terms of the final provisions of the Treaty signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, it has been stipulated that:

‘A first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the Treaty has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on the other hand.’

The President of the Peace Conference has the honour of calling to the attention of the Government that three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, namely, the British Empire, France and Italy have ratified, and Germany on the other hand, having also ratified the Treaty, the condition referred to above has been fulfilled.

The other Allied and Associated Powers who have up to the present time made known their ratification are Belgium, Poland and Siam.

In compliance with the said provisions, and if the various acts necessary to the coming into force of the Treaty be fulfilled in time, there will take place in Paris, at a date which will be announced later and notification of which will be given five days in advance, a procès-verbal of the deposit of these ratifications, at which the German Government is requested to participate.

The final provisions of the Treaty add:

‘From the date of this first procès-verbal the Treaty will come into force between the High Contracting Parties who have ratified it. For the determination of all periods of time provided for in the present Treaty this date will be the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.’

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers have decided that the Treaty shall

not go into force until the execution of the obligations which Germany had by the Armistice Convention and the additional agreements undertaken to fulfil and which have not received satisfaction, shall have been fully carried out.

The German Government is, therefore, asked to give to the German representative, authorized to sign the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications, also full powers to sign at the same time the Protocol, of which a copy is hereto annexed,<sup>25</sup> and which provides without further delay for this settlement.

Furthermore, the entry into force of the Treaty involves certain consequences which, at the present time, it is important to consider. . . .<sup>26</sup>

The German Government therefore is now invited to send to Paris, for November 10th, 1919, duly qualified representatives for this purpose, to:

1. Arrange in agreement with the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers the conditions for the setting up of the Commissions of Government, of Administration and of Plebiscite, the handing over of powers, the transfer of services, the entry of Inter-Allied troops, the evacuation of German troops, the replacement of the said German authorities and all other measures above provided for.

Attention is now called to the fact that the German authorities must leave intact all service organizations and offices, as well as the documents required by the Inter-Allied authorities for the immediate entry on their duties; and that the German troops must also leave intact all the establishments which they occupy.

2. Agree with the Staff of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Powers, as to the conditions of transport of Inter-Allied troops.

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 10

### *Protocol*

At the very time of proceeding to the first deposit of ratifications of the Peace Treaty, it was ascertained that the following obligations which Germany had agreed to execute, in the Armistice Conventions and the complementary agreements, have not been executed or have not received full satisfaction, viz:

1st. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918,<sup>27</sup> Clause VII: Obligation of delivering 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars. Forty-two locomotives and 4,460 cars are still to be delivered.

2nd. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XII: Obligation of withdrawing within the frontiers of Germany the German troops which are in Russian territory, as soon as the Allies judge the time proper. This withdrawal of troops has not been as yet executed, in spite of the reiterated injunctions of August 27, September 27 and October 10, 1919.

3rd. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XIV: Obligation to discontinue immediately all requisitions, seizures or coercive measures in Russian territory. The German troops continue to use these methods.

4th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XIX: Obligation of immediately delivering all documents, specie, values (of property and finance,

<sup>25</sup> See appendix C below.

<sup>26</sup> There followed the nine consequences as enumerated in the previous draft in appendix A to No. 9.

<sup>27</sup> Text in *British and Foreign State Papers (1917-1918)*, vol. cxi, p. 613 f.

with all issuing apparatus', concerning public or private interests in the invaded countries. The complete statement[s] of the specie and securities removed, collected or confiscated by the Germans in the invaded countries, have not been delivered.

5th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XXII: Obligation of delivering all German submarines. Destruction of the German submarine U. C. 48, off Ferrol, by order of her German Commander, and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines proceeding to England for delivery.

6th. Armistice Convention of November 11, 1918, Clause XXIII: Obligation of maintaining in the Allied ports the German battleships designated by the Allied and Associated Powers, these ships being destined to be ultimately delivered; Clause XXXI: obligation of not destroying any ships before delivery—on June 21, 1919, destruction at Scapa Flow of the said ships.

7th. Protocol of December 17, 1918, annexed to the Armistice Convention of December 13, 1918:<sup>28</sup> Obligation of restoring all works of art and artistic documents removed from France and Belgium. All works of art which were transported into unoccupied Germany have not been restored.

8th. Armistice Convention of January 15, 1919,<sup>29</sup> Clause III and Protocol 392, 1, additional Clause III, of July 25, 1919: Obligation of delivering agricultural implements in lieu of the supplementary railroad material provided for in Tables 1 and 2 annexed to the Protocol of Spa, of December 17, 1918.—The following were not delivered on the date fixed (October 1, 1919): 40 'Heucke' ploughing outfits; all the personnel necessary to operate the apparatus, all the spades; 1,500 shovels, 1,130 ploughs T.M.<sup>30</sup> 23 26; 1,765 ploughs T.F. 18 21; 1,512 ploughs T.F. 23 26; 629 Belgian ploughs T.F. 0 m. 20; 1,205 Belgian ploughs T.F. 0 m. 26; 4,282 harrows of 2k. 500; 2,157 steel cultivators; 966 fertilizer spreaders 2m. 50; 1,608 fertilizer spreaders 3m. 50.

9th. Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VI: Obligation of restoring the industrial material removed from French and Belgian territories. All this material has not been restored.

10th. Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VIII: Obligation of placing the entire German Merchant Fleet at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. A certain number of ships, of which delivery had been requested by virtue of this clause, have not yet been delivered.

11th. Protocols of the Brussels Conferences of March 13th and 14th, 1919: Obligation of not exporting any war material of any nature. Exportation of aerial material to Sweden, Holland and Denmark.

A certain number of the above unexecuted or incompletely executed stipulations were renewed by the Treaty of June 28, 1919, the going into force of which will of right render applicable the sanctions provided for. This applies, in particular, to the various payments in kind stipulated as reparation.

On the other hand, the question of the evacuation of the Baltic provinces was the object of an exchange of notes and decisions, which are in course of execution. The Allied and Associated Powers expressly confirm the contents of their notes, the execution of which Germany, by the present protocol, agrees to carry out loyally and strictly.

<sup>28</sup> Text: op. cit., p. 627.

<sup>29</sup> In error for January 16, 1919; text in *British and Foreign State Papers (1919)*, vol. cxii, pp. 896-9.

<sup>30</sup> In error for T.F.

Lastly, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot overlook, without sanction, the other infractions committed against the Armistice Conventions, and violations as serious as the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, the destruction of the submarine U. C. 48 off Ferrol, and the destruction in the North Sea of certain submarines proceeding to England for delivery.

Consequently, Germany agrees:

1st. (A) to deliver as reparation for the destruction of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow:

(a) Within a period of sixty days from the signing of the present protocol and under the conditions provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 185 of the Treaty of Peace, the following five light cruisers: *Königsberg, Pillau, Graudenz, Regensburg, Strassburg*.

(b) Within a period of ninety days from the signing of the present protocol, and in all respects in good condition and ready to function, such a number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs, and dredgers, equivalent to a total displacement of 400,000 tons, as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers may demand.

As regards the docks, the lifting power will be considered as displacement. In the number of docks above provided for, there should be about seventy-five per cent. of docks of over 10,000 tons. The totality of this material must be delivered *in situ*.

(B) To be delivered within a period of ten days from the signing of the present protocol:

A complete list of all the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers which are German property. This list, which will be delivered to the Inter-Allied Naval Control Commission, provided for by Article 209 of the Peace Treaty, will include the material which, on the 11th of November, 1918, belonged to the German Government, or in which the German Government had an important interest at that date.

(C) The officers and men who formed the crews of the battleships sunk at Scapa Flow, and who are actually detained by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, with the exception of those whose surrender is provided for by Article 228 of the Peace Treaty, will be repatriated at the latest when Germany will have complied with the above paragraphs A and B.

(D) The destroyer B 98 will be considered as one of the 42 destroyers, the delivery of which is provided for by Article 185 of the Peace Treaty.

2nd. To deliver within a period of ten days from the signing of the present protocol: the machinery and engines of the submarines U-137, U-138 and U-150, to offset the destruction of the submarine U. C. 48, as well as the three engines of the submarine U-146, which is still to be delivered, to offset the destruction of submarines in the North Sea.

3rd. To pay to the Allied and Associated Governments: the value of the exported aerial material, according to the decision and the estimation which will be made and notified by the Aerial Control Commission, provided for by Article 210 of the Peace Treaty, and before the 31st of January, 1920.

In case Germany should not fulfil these obligations within the time above specified, the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to have recourse to any coercive measures, military or other, which they may deem appropriate.

Done in Paris 1919.

## APPENDIX D TO NO. 10

### THE FRENCH DELEGATION

*Draft of Reply to a Note of the German Government of the 12th of October.<sup>31</sup>*

Wido Nr. 353a

1. The refusal, expressed in paragraph one, to admit that the Allied and Associated Powers have the right to spontaneously make definite decisions, is in contradiction with the Terms of Article 204, paragraph 2, of the Peace Treaty, drawn up as follows:

'They [Inter-Allied Commissions of Control] will communicate to the German authorities the decisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (therefore the Supreme Council) have reserved the right to take, or which the execution of military, naval and air clauses may necessitate.'

2. The objection raised by the first alinea of paragraph 2 of the German note has been considered by the Supreme Council in its meeting of the 23rd of August, 1919.<sup>32</sup> After having examined the text of the convention of Brussels and of the telegram from the Economic Supreme Council under date of the 25th of March, account being taken of the lifting of the blockade, the Supreme Council, considering that the agreement made by Germany to execute the terms of Article 202 confers on the Allied and Associated Powers property rights over the material to be delivered, has decided that:

'The Allied and Associated Powers will inform Germany that they insist upon the principle established that Germany must not alienate her aeronautical material. However, the Allied and Associated Powers, *making use of their property rights*, upon this material, reserve . . .'<sup>33</sup>

3. The assertion contained in the second alinea of paragraph 2, according to which 'Article 169 of the Treaty provides for the delivery of the material, in order to be destroyed or rendered unserviceable', is inaccurate in the particular case of the aeronautical material, because Article 159,<sup>34</sup> chapter 2 of Section 1, 'Military Clauses', only relates to the munitions and the war material referred to in this section of the Military Clauses 'and does not provide at all for the fate of the aeronautical material, which is the object of Section 3 "clauses concerning the military and naval air service"'.<sup>35</sup>

The fate of this material is decided by Article 202, which does not provide for any destruction, but 'for the *delivery*, in a period of two months, *to the places* which will be indicated'<sup>36</sup> with interdiction 'to *shift* this material without *special authorization* of the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.'<sup>37</sup>

4. According to paragraph 3 of the German note, the Allied and Associated Powers refused to admit that there exists any German civilian aircraft. This assertion is not mentioned in any of the notes sent to the German Government but

<sup>31</sup> See document 4 in appendix A to No. 8.

<sup>32</sup> See Vol. I, No. 41, minute 5.

<sup>33</sup> Punctuation as in original.

<sup>34</sup> In error for 169.

<sup>35</sup> Inverted commas as in original.

<sup>36</sup> The text of the treaty reads: 'Delivery must be effected at such places as the said Governments may select, and must be completed within three months.'

<sup>37</sup> The quotation is in the sense, but not the words, of the treaty.

on the other hand this Government has been informed by telegram, communicating the decision taken by the Supreme Council on the 6th of August,<sup>38</sup> that:

'The Allies are aware that military aeroplanes are transformed into commercial aeroplanes. The President of the Inter-Allied Aerial Control Commission will be the only judge to declare whether an aeroplane is military or not.'

The reason for this is that the Supreme Council has admitted that 'aircraft constructed since the Armistice according to entirely new plans, might be considered as civilian aircraft'. Therefore, there could only be in Germany a limited number of aircraft. Consequently, until the Inter-Allied Aerial Control Commission has given its opinion on the subject of this aircraft, which the German Government claims to be of a civilian nature, it has been decided (29th of September, 1919)<sup>10</sup> that:

'All aeronautical material existing in Germany must be considered as war material, and for this reason, can be neither exported nor alienated, nor loaned, nor utilized, nor destroyed, but must be stored until the Inter-Allied Aerial Commission of Control has decided upon its nature.'

5. It is true that concerning the execution of the aeronautical clauses of the Peace Treaty, a great number of details were settled by direct negotiations between the German Government and the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission, 'especially appointed to supervise the execution of these clauses'<sup>37</sup> (Article 203) and 'especially directed with [*sic*] the supervision of the execution of the deliveries provided by the obligations of the German Government (Article 204—paragraph 1)'.<sup>37</sup>

But this Commission cannot, in any case, definitely 'settle the questions at stake' (German Note—paragraph 4) but will often have to call for *orders* from the Supreme Council, and 'to inform the German authorities of the *decisions* which the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take, or which the execution of the aeronautical clauses might necessitate.'<sup>37</sup> (Article 204—paragraph 2.)

## APPENDIX E TO NO. 10

### CENTRAL TERRITORIAL COMMITTEE

#### *Report to the Supreme Council on the Bulgarian Demands concerning the Serbo-Bulgarian Frontier*

On the question of the frontiers between Serbia and Bulgaria, the Central Territorial Committee has not succeeded in reaching a unanimous decision.

The British and French and Japanese Delegations are of the opinion that the line of the frontier as described in the peace conditions with Bulgaria should be maintained.

This line was in fact adopted by the Supreme Council after having been unanimously proposed by the Commission on Jugo-Slav Affairs, which took its decision only after having considered all the elements of the problem. None of the arguments stated by the Bulgarians has appeared of a nature to justify any changes in the line adopted.

In these circumstances, the British, French and Japanese Delegations do not believe that the only hope [*sic*] of facilitating for Bulgaria the accomplishment of

<sup>38</sup> See Vol. I, No. 29, minute 14.

the treaty which is imposed upon her can counter-balance the grave inconveniences which there would be in modifying a decision made with full knowledge of the facts and which has been notified not only to Bulgaria, but to the Allied Serb-Croat-Slovene Government.

*Report of American and Italian Delegations*

The American and Italian Delegations propose that in the regions of Tzaribrod and Bossilegrade [Bosilovgrad] the rectifications in favour of Serbia be withdrawn and that the boundary in these districts be maintained at the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier of 1914.

In support of this proposition the two Delegations submit the following:—

1. The population concerned, numbering more than 40,000, is almost 100% Bulgarian—

(Tzaribrod district—Bulgarians 20,384; Serbs 79;  
(Bossilegrade „ — „ 21,839; „ 12,  
(Bulgarian statistics—1910.,

2. The natural economic outlets of the districts are towards Sofia.

3. The proposed frontier would bring the Serbian frontier 10 kilometres nearer Sofia, leaving it only 54 kilometres from the Bulgarian capital.

4. The new frontier possesses no natural advantages over the former frontier, in general it follows lower ridges, and in the Bossilegrade district cuts two valley heads, which are apparently inaccessible by road from the Serbian side.

5. By the present Treaty the Allies have already made concessions to Serbia at the expense of Bulgaria in granting the districts of Strumitza and Koula (Vidin), where the population is overwhelmingly Bulgarian.

6. By accepting the new strategic frontiers the Allies may well expose themselves to the charge brought against Austria-Hungary, when in the second Treaty of Bucharest, 1918, the latter advanced the Hungarian frontier in Transylvania, on purely strategic grounds, to include the valley heads of the Roumanian streams.

7. The cession of Tzaribrod and Bossilegrade will result in augmenting the large number of refugees already in Bulgaria (now some 400,000), who are a danger for the public security of the country and form centres of propaganda against Bulgaria's neighbours.

In case the Serbians consider that the entrenched camp at Slivnitza is a danger for their own frontier, the Allied Powers can make provisions for its destruction.

In supporting the frontier proposed in the draft of the Bulgarian Treaty for the districts of Tzaribrod and Bossilegrade, the British and French Delegations emphasize strategic considerations and the inconvenience of modifying a frontier already notified.

In reply the American and Italian Delegations assert that strategic considerations should not outweigh clear ethnic considerations and the wishes of the people concerned. As regards the modification of a previous decision, in the cases of neither the German nor the Austrian Treaty have the Allies hesitated to make rectifications where such appeared justified.

The American and Italian Delegations are firmly convinced that the maintenance of the proposed frontier, by its flagrant violation of ethnic considerations in favour of strategic frontiers, by its perpetual threat and humiliation to the Bulgarian capital, can only render more difficult the maintenance of peace in the Balkans.

The American and Italian Delegations contend that Bulgarian public and official opinion is more strongly opposed to the changes on the western frontier than to any other boundary alterations. We believe that so unexpected a blow, one which is peculiarly painful because it strikes at the security and pride of the national capital, will serve as the basis of protracted propaganda and eventually of war. That the blow was unexpected gives no assurance that its effects will soon pass. The deciding question is this: does the act fall within the general rules or principles of the Conference? We assert that it does not.

## No. 11

H. D. 81.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 1, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Rear Admiral McCully, Lt. Commander Koehler, Dr. I. Bowman, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

*British Empire*: Hon. C. H. Tufton, Lt. Col. Kisch, Captain Fuller, R.N., Commander Dunne, R.N., Commander McNamara, R.N., Mr. A. Leeper.

*France*: General Weygand, General Desticker, M. Sergent, M. Henri Bérenger, M. Laroche, M. Larnaude, Commandant Le Vavasseur, Commandant La Combe, M. de Montille.

*Italy*: General Cavallero, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Manciola, Capt. de Cor. Ruspoli, Prince Boncampagni.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka, M. Adatci, Commandant Ohsumi.

### I.

*Protocol Relative to  
Unexecuted Clauses  
of the Armistice*

[Not printed]<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 'Sir Eyre Crowe stated that he had reached an agreement with Mr. Polk and M. Henri Bérenger' with respect to numbered paragraph 10 of the draft protocol (see No. 10, minute 3 and appendix C), which now read: '10. Convention of January 16, 1919, Clause VIII: Obligation to put the entire German Mercantile Marine at the disposal of the Allied and Associated Powers. A certain number of vessels, whose delivery had been demanded by virtue of this clause, have not yet been handed over.' The Supreme Council adopted this text. Sir E. Crowe observed that 'the question of the final distribution of tank ships remained undecided as between the Allies'.

2. (The Council had before it the draft reply prepared by the Central Territorial Committee [see Appendix A].)

*Reply to the  
Bulgarian Counter-  
Proposals*

M. LAROCHE stated that, as a result of the decision taken by the Council at its morning meeting, this Committee had prepared a draft reply relative to the frontiers of Bulgaria (see Appendix B).

(He then read the text of this draft reply, which was approved.)

(The draft replies concerning Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), Part III, Section IV (Protection of Minorities), Part IV, Section II (Naval Clauses), and Part IV, Section III (Clauses concerning Military and Naval Aviation), were approved, with the exception that the third paragraph of this draft reply (Part IV, Section III) was eliminated.)

M. LAROCHE said that the Military Representatives were in favour of suppressing Secret Articles I, II and III of the Military Convention. The Naval Commission, which had met that morning, was likewise in favour of suppressing Secret Article IV. Thus, all the Secret Articles were suppressed,<sup>2</sup> and the answer could be made to Bulgaria that she would not have to concern herself with expenses of occupation after the coming into force of the Treaty, inasmuch as after that time there would be no occupation. The Military Representatives were disagreed on two points of the Military Clauses. Three Delegations thought that Bulgaria's demands concerning the reintroduction of obligatory military service could not be accepted at the present time, but that the question should later be examined anew. This was the opinion of the American, French and Italian Delegation[s]. The Japanese Delegation was not represented. The British Delegation was opposed to this concession. Likewise, the British Delegation could not agree to the recommendation of the majority of the Military Representatives that Bulgaria should be authorized to form a corps of frontier guards consisting of 3,000 men.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the first question was one on which the British Government could not change its position. If the head of his Government were there, he was sure that he would not yield; for a principle was at stake on which there could be no compromise. If a concession were made to Bulgaria on this point she would be granted an advantage which no other enemy had obtained. Moreover, having in mind the principle of eventual disarmament, the abolition of conscription was an unquestioned step in advance. The British Empire had introduced this principle and he thought the United States would likewise do so. On the other hand, with respect to the second point, the British Delegation might accept a compromise; it would accept the view of the majority if it were distinctly understood that the corps of frontier guards should only be recruited by voluntary enlistment.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> For a text of the secret articles of the Bulgarian armistice convention of September 29, 1918, see *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: The Paris Peace Conference* (Washington, 1942 f.), vol. ii, p. 242.

<sup>3</sup> The text of the part of the reply in question contained in appendix A had evidently been corrected in the light of the discussion in the Supreme Council.

M. PICHON said that he agreed with the British argument. This principle had been applied with respect to other enemy Powers, and there was no reason to make an exception here.

GENERAL DESTICKER explained that all the Military Representatives had realized that it was a serious matter to modify an accepted principle, but that Bulgaria had adduced concrete arguments which appeared to be of considerable weight; he pointed out that, for a population of 65,000,000 inhabitants in Germany, the Council had allowed an Army of 100,000 men. Being an agricultural country, Bulgaria, with 5,000,000 inhabitants could never recruit 20,000 men. If the proportion was to be maintained, either the Bulgarian Army should be reduced to 7,000 or 8,000 men, or the German Army should be increased to 260,000 men.

M. PICHON pointed out that the same reasoning could have been applied to Austria. Nevertheless the army of Austria, with a population of 6,000,000, had been fixed at 30,000. To violate a principle is more serious than to be illogical in a matter of proportion.

GENERAL CAVALLERO observed that the Military Representatives had not failed to bear in mind the question of Austria; they had thought, however, that Austria, a country with a large urban population and comprising in its territory the remnants of a large army, would only encounter difficulties of a financial nature in recruiting a volunteer army. On the other hand, Bulgaria was an agricultural country whose population showed no taste for military service. They had thought that an army of 20,000 men was necessary to Bulgaria. She should be able to recruit such an army, or else the contrary to what was necessary for the maintenance of order would be arrived at. Finally it should not be forgotten that there were in Bulgaria extreme elements, comitadjis and others. It was almost certain that these elements would constitute the bulk of the army, and they were elements of disorder.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the arguments advanced by General Cavallero proved that the Council had been right in adopting the principle of voluntary recruiting. The difficulties which the Balkan States would encounter in the formation of volunteer armies would deter them from adopting a warlike policy.

M. PICHON thought that the most reasonable course was to maintain the principle which had been adopted.

MR. POLK agreed.

M. MATSUI likewise agreed.

M. SCIALOJA suggested that it could be said that the Council of the League of Nations would be competent to modify the Peace conditions on this point.

M. LAROCHE thought it would not be well to put this in writing.

M. PICHON pointed out that it was a reply that could be delivered orally to the Bulgarians if the question were raised.

The draft replies concerning Part V, Section I (Prisoners of War and Graves), Part VI (Penalties), Part VII (Reparations), Part VIII (Financial Clauses), Part IX (Economic Clauses) and Part XI (Ports, Waterways and Railways), were approved.

The draft reply concerning Part XII (Labour), was adopted after suppressing the second paragraph thereof.<sup>3</sup>

It was understood that if the Bulgarian Delegation asked that Bulgarian Representatives should attend the International Labour Conference at Washington a favourable reply should be given them orally.

M. LAROCHE pointed out that in the draft covering letter the Bulgarian Delegation was accorded 10 days within which to submit its reply. This delay had seemed necessary on account of the distance and of the fact that there were no daily trains to Sofia.

MR. POLK asked if such a long delay was absolutely necessary.

M. PICHON observed that the reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals would be delivered on November 3rd and that the time for the Bulgarian final reply would run until November 13th. He proposed to grant the Bulgarians 10 days but not to consent to any prolongation.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that when the reply was delivered the Bulgarian Delegation could be orally informed that it would be useless for it to ask for a further delay.

Sir Eyre Crowe wished especially to thank the Commissions entrusted with preparing the replies to Bulgaria and the draft protocol, for the energy and ability they had shown: thanks to their untiring efforts two very important questions had been settled in an exceedingly short time.

MR. POLK wished to join in this expression of thanks.

M. PICHON said that the Council was glad to extend its hearty congratulations to these Commissions.

It was decided:

- (1) to accept the draft reply prepared by the Central Territorial Committee to the three letters of the Bulgarian Delegation dated October 24th (see Appendix A), with the following modifications:
  - (a) Military Clauses.<sup>3</sup>—In the reply to the Bulgarian Delegation it should not be stated that the Allied and Associated Powers reserve the right to examine anew article 65 of the Treaty of Peace, at such time as the Commissions of Control which will be sent to Bulgaria shall have given them exact information as to the possibilities for recruiting the Bulgarian Army.
  - (b) Military Clauses.—It should be stipulated that the special corps of frontier guards whose creation is authorized and whose strength may not exceed 3,000 men, cannot be recruited in any other way than by voluntary enlistment.
  - (c) Clauses concerning Military and Naval Aviation.—The third paragraph of the draft reply on this point should be eliminated.
  - (d) Part XII (Labour).<sup>3</sup>—The second paragraph of the draft reply on this point should be eliminated.
- (2) that the draft covering letter should likewise be approved.

It was further decided:

to approve the reply prepared by the Central Territorial Committee, relative to the frontiers of Bulgaria, in conformity with the decisions taken by the Council at its preceding meeting. (Appendix B.)

3. M. BERTHELOT communicated to the Council a memorandum from Marshal Foch concerning a request for assistance made by the Latvian Government and a draft reply to this request. (See Appendix C.)

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the recommendations of Marshal Foch with respect to the reply to be made to the Latvian Government's request for assistance;
- (2) that Marshal Foch should communicate this reply to the Latvian Government. (See Appendix C).

4. CAPTAIN FULLER read a report of the Naval Representatives dated November 1st, 1919. (See Appendix D.)

*Reparation for the sinking of the German fleet at Scapa Flow* SIR EYRE CROWE asked how much of this report should be inserted in the protocol to be signed by the representative of the German Government. Part of the report only concerned the Allied and Associated Governments and could only be discussed between them.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 1 and all of Section 2 should be inserted in the protocol.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether Section 3 should likewise be inserted.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that it was not necessary.

MR. POLK felt sure that during the coming week it would not be difficult for an agreement to be reached as to the details of this Section but he thought it better to insert in the protocol only the provisions essential thereto.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that with respect to delivery of the light cruisers it should be specified that their delivery should take place within two months, that is to say, within the period which had elsewhere in the Treaty of Peace been provided for the delivery of vessels. On the other hand, the list of material to be delivered should be transmitted to the Allied Naval Commission of Control within 10 days as provided in the report. The majority of the naval representatives thought that the Allied Naval Commission of Control should itself draw up the list of material whose delivery was demanded in accordance with certain principles indicated in the report. The American representative had asked that the powers of this Commission of Control should be limited to determining the percentage of the different classes of maritime material demanded. In order to arrive at an agreement with the American Representative the majority had been prepared to ask as much as 80% of the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers which belonged to the German Government on November 11th, 1918, and 80% of the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers in which the German Government had a predominant interest on November 11th, 1918, but it had not been possible to arrive at an agreement.

MR. POLK said he had no objection to make with respect to light cruisers but that his Naval Advisers had made reservations with respect to floating docks of over 10,000 tons whose delivery was provided for.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that it was, nevertheless, necessary that the protocol indicate the total tonnage demanded from the Germans.

MR. POLK inquired if it would not suffice to state in the protocol that the Germans should deliver a number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers equivalent to the displacement of 400,000 tons.

CAPTAIN FULLER thought not; he thought it important that the Germans should have definite information as to what they would be asked to deliver.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the question was complicated by the fact that two of the most important floating docks owned by Germany were at Dantzig. If they were taken there was a risk of incurring protests on the part of the Free City of Dantzig and of the Polish Government. Therefore, it was important to specify the percentage of docks of over 10,000 tons displacement which were to be demanded.

MR. POLK asked if paragraph (b) of Section I of the report could not be drafted as follows:

‘Such number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, up to a total displacement of 400,000 tons, as the Allied and Associated Powers may demand.’

CAPTAIN FULLER thought that it was better to say: ‘equivalent to the displacement’, otherwise the Germans might think that the 400,000 tons constituted a maximum, and the Allied and Associated Powers would run the risk of not obtaining the full amount.

MR. POLK said that he did not wish to make the Allies lose a single ton to which they were entitled, but if a wording was insisted upon which might involve stripping the German ports of all their maritime material he would have to ask for instructions from his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the information at his disposal showed that there was no question of stripping the German ports.

MR. POLK said that he could not unreservedly accept the figures given by the majority because they had not yet been verified. However, he was ready to accept the wording proposed by the majority, if it was clearly understood that the German ports would not be stripped of all their material and that the composition of the reparation to be demanded would only be decided by the Council after he had received instructions from Washington on that point.

CAPTAIN FULLER pointed out that Sections 4 and 6 should equally be inserted in the protocol.

(This recommendation was adopted.)

(It was decided:

- (1) that paragraph 1 (b) of the report of the Naval Representatives concerning the compensation to be demanded of the German Government for the sinking of its warships at Scapa Flow (see Appendix D) be modified to read: ‘Such number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, equivalent to the displacement of 400,000 tons, as the Allied and Associated Powers may demand. The lifting power of a dock to be taken as displacement, and approximately 75% of the docks over 10,000 tons are to be included’; and that as

thus modified, the said report should be approved; provided that the composition of the compensation to be taken from the German Government should only be decided by the Supreme Council after Mr. Polk had received the instructions of his Government on that point.

- (2) that paragraph 1, modified as above, paragraph 2, paragraph 4 and paragraph 6 of the said report be incorporated in the Protocol relative to unexecuted clauses of the Armistice.)

5. M. BERTHELOT stated that the Drafting Committee had found, after examination, that it would be superfluous to send the draft *Draft Reply to the German Note of October 12th, relative to the Sale of Aeronautical Material* reply submitted to it by the Council, in view of the stipulations contained in the Protocol to be signed by Germany. (See H.D. 80,<sup>4</sup> Minute 4.) (The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,  
Paris, November 1, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 11

##### *Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the Bulgarian Delegation on the Conditions of Peace*

##### Document 1

PEACE CONFERENCE  
*The Chairman.*

PARIS, November 3, 1919.

To: His Excellency Mr. Theodoroff, Chairman of the Bulgarian Delegation,  
Neuilly.

Sir,

The Allied and Associated Powers have considered, with the greatest care, the observations submitted to them by the Bulgarian Delegation, in its three letters dated October 24.<sup>5</sup>

They have taken cognizance with satisfaction of the Bulgarian Government's favourable reception of those clauses in the conditions of peace which relate to the League of Nations, the Protection of Minorities, and to Labour. They are pleased to observe in this adherence by Bulgaria to the various conditions of Parts I, III and XII of the Treaty, that country's desire henceforward to conduct her policy in accordance with the broadly humanitarian principles and ideas of international solidarity which have inspired the Allied and Associated Powers.

In a second document, the Bulgarian Delegation further asked that alterations should be made in some of the provisions of the Treaty, and more especially those relating to the military, financial and economic clauses, etc.

Finally, in another letter relating to territorial questions, the Bulgarian Delegation, discussing the responsibilities incurred by its country through having entered

<sup>4</sup> No. 10.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 6, note 1.

the war against the Entente Powers, attempted to mitigate the same by urging that Bulgaria was forced into the war by a party Government, the large majority of the population being in favour of the Entente. In this connexion the Bulgarian Delegation alleges that the German alliance was merely an accident as far as Bulgaria was concerned, whilst representing for other Balkan States the permanent basis on which they conducted their policy. It also denied the charge that Bulgaria ever entertained ideas of hegemony calculated to imperil the peace of the Balkans. On the other hand it denounced the ambitions of neighbouring countries, to whom it ascribed the responsibility for the war.

The Allied and Associated Powers do not wish to follow the Bulgarian Delegation in this discussion. The eloquence of facts is sufficient for them.

If it were true that Bulgarian public opinion was not unanimously favourable to the idea of an alliance with the Central Powers, the support of the country was nevertheless given to a Government which satisfied its territorial cravings by undertaking a policy of conquest.

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot forget that the Bulgarian troops, sustained by popular sentiment, did not hesitate to attack the Serbian army from the rear and without provocation, thus paralyzing the heroic resistance which that army was opposing on another front to invaders who menaced the independence of Serbia.

When the Bulgarian troops were led against Roumania, not only did they seize the territories on the right bank of the Danube claimed by Bulgaria, but they also crossed the river, acting as the vanguard of the German armies. Everywhere they showed by their attitude that they wished to slake their hatred of the occupied country. There, as in Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria waged a war of conquest and pillage and public opinion applauded the success of her armies.

The Bulgarian Delegation alleges that its country did not believe that in the war which it had declared it would be opposed by the Powers of the Entente. How could the Bulgarian people believe for an instant that the Serbian Army would be left without help from its Allies, when the terrible struggle in which that Army was engaged with the Central Empires had for its origin the aggression of Austria-Hungary against Serbia? If the slightest doubt could have existed in this respect amongst the Bulgarian troops, how can it be explained that, when they found themselves in contact with the troops of the Entente, their country showed no disposition to withdraw and renounce a combat against the Powers who had contributed most towards Bulgarian independence? It was not until the Bulgarian Army was conquered in the field and forced to lay down its arms that Bulgaria asked for peace. She waited until that moment to disavow the Government which had dragged her into a fatal adventure.

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot lose sight of the fact that, by ranging herself on the side of the Central Empires and by remaining in that alliance until the moment when their defeat appeared certain, Bulgaria broke the principal line of communication between Russia and her Allies, opened to Germany the road to the east, and thus rendered inevitable the prolongation of the war. She is, therefore, responsible for the terrible evils which resulted therefrom.

Nevertheless, it is no idea of vengeance which has animated the Allied and Associated Powers in preparing the conditions of peace handed to the Bulgarian Delegation on September 19.

These Powers do not dream of making Bulgaria expiate all her faults of the past. They wish merely to establish a peace which shall be just and consequently durable

and fertile. They feel that the conditions of peace, drawn up in no heat of passion, are calculated to ensure the peaceful development of Bulgaria and to allow her to re-establish her normal economic existence within a short period. In this connection, they would remind her of the fact that she is guaranteed a free economic outlet on the Aegean.

The Allied and Associated Powers have, none the less, examined the observations formulated by the Bulgarian Delegation with the most scrupulous attention. The appended Notes<sup>6</sup> answer the various requests contained in the letters of October 24, but must not be considered an authorized interpretation of the Treaty.

If the Allied and Associated Powers do not answer all the questions raised by the Bulgarian Delegation it is because, after examining them, they did not feel able to settle them as requested. Non-receipt of a reply must not, therefore, be held to mean consent.

The Allied and Associated Powers have acceded to the wishes expressed by the Bulgarian Delegation in a certain number of points. The alterations thus made in the draft Treaty are final.

On all other points the text presented to the Bulgarian Delegation remains unchanged, as appears from the document appended to the present letter. This text can now only be accepted or rejected as it stands.

The Bulgarian Delegation will be so good as to inform the Allied and Associated Powers, within a period of ten days from the date of the present communication, whether it is prepared to sign the Treaty in its present form.

After that period, the Armistice concluded on September 29, 1918, will be considered at an end and the Allied and Associated Powers will take any steps they may think fit.

I remain, etc.

G. CLEMENCEAU.

## Document 2

### PART I

#### THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(*Articles 1 to 26*)

In expressing her wish to be received into the League of Nations as soon as possible, Bulgaria declares herself especially anxious to prove her good faith before an august legal Association capable of judging her according to her real deserts and her zeal to acquit herself of her international obligations.

The Allied and Associated Powers note this statement, which conforms to their ideas, with satisfaction. The future attitude of Bulgaria, if agreeing with the intentions above set forth, will no doubt be such as to facilitate and hasten her admission to the League of Nations.

### PART II

#### FRONTIERS OF BULGARIA

(*Articles 27 to 35.*)

[Not printed]<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Document 2 below.

<sup>7</sup> Part II of the draft reply was the same in substance, though not in detailed drafting, as the text in appendix B below, approved by the Supreme Council.

PART III  
POLITICAL CLAUSES  
SECTION IV. PROTECTION OF MINORITIES  
(Articles 49 to 57)  
[Not printed]<sup>8</sup>

PART IV  
MILITARY, NAVAL, AND AIR CLAUSES  
SECTION I. MILITARY CLAUSES  
(Articles 64-82)

After consideration of the counter-proposals formulated by the Bulgarian Delegation, the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers have the honour to communicate below their decision with regard to the Military Clauses.

*Military Clauses*

1. The modification proposed to Article 65 would result in allowing the Bulgarian State to incorporate each year more than half of the annual class, and thus to give a military training to the majority of the able-bodied population.

However strong the social and economic arguments, put forward by the Bulgarian Delegation, may be, the institution of a military regime based on compulsory service is absolutely contrary to the principle of the reduction of armaments that the Allied and Associated Powers have agreed to impose on their former enemies, as alone being able to ensure the peace of the world in the future.

*This modification cannot be accepted*

2. The modification proposed to Article 66 would result in raising the strength of the Bulgarian army from 20,000 to 25,000 men. This addition would be contrary to the principle of the reduction of armaments mentioned above; it is also in no way justified by any argument contained in the Bulgarian counter-proposals.

*This modification cannot be accepted*

3. The modification proposed to Article 69 and which would result in the creation of a 'Special corps of Frontier Guards' would appear to facilitate the maintenance of order on the Bulgarian frontiers, without forming any appreciable danger for the Powers neighbouring on Bulgaria.

*This modification can therefore be accepted on condition that the corps in question shall be recruited by voluntary enlistment and shall not exceed 3,000 men.*

4. The modification proposed to Article 66 and intended to raise the proportion of officers from one-twentieth to one-fifteenth, would allow the Bulgarian Army to form supplementary cadres.

<sup>8</sup> The first two paragraphs of this section were, subject to variation in phraseology, of the same general sense as those of the draft printed by D. H. Miller in *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (New York, 1924-6), vol. xiii, p. 491. In place of the last paragraph of the draft there printed, the text in the present appendix concluded: 'The Bulgarian Delegation has also drawn the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments to the position of Ottoman nationals formerly resident in the Dobrudja, Thrace and Macedonia and at present refugees in Bulgaria. The Allied and Associated Powers have noted this remark and will take all necessary steps with a view to remedying the position in question.'

And also there is no reason to allow the demobilization of officers by echelons within a two years' time limit, this method not having been authorized for any of the former enemies of the Allied and Associated Powers.

It should furthermore be observed that the argument based on the impossibility of paying pensions to the large number of officers who are to be discharged immediately, appears to have but little value, since the Bulgarian Government, if it maintained these officers on the Active List, would have to bear a much greater financial burden.

*This modification cannot be accepted*

5. The modification proposed to Article 73 has for its object the creation of a school for non-commissioned officers. It is incumbent on the Bulgarian State to organize the training of its non-commissioned officers in their corps, and there is no need for instituting a special school.

*This modification cannot be accepted*

#### *General Clauses*

The request for the suppression of Article 102, in its entirety, cannot be accepted since the Allied and Associated Powers must ensure, through the organs of control at their disposal, that the conditions of the Armistice have been completely carried out.

However, the part relative to the military convention (Secret Articles, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4)<sup>2</sup> will cease to be applicable at the moment of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace.

Furthermore, in order to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding, the Allied and Associated Powers agree that only those dispositions of the Armistice Convention which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace shall remain in force.

They agree, therefore, that Article 102 of the Treaty of Peace shall be replaced by the following Article:

#### *Article 102*

'The following dispositions of the Armistice of September 29th, 1918, namely, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 6, remain in force in so far as they are not inconsistent with the stipulations of the present Treaty.'

#### SECTION II. NAVAL CLAUSES

Though of opinion that they cannot accept in its entirety the request made by the Bulgarian Delegation concerning Naval Clauses, the Allied and Associated Powers authorize Bulgaria to retain a small number of lightly-armed vessels for police and fishery duties.

In these circumstances, the following addition will be made to Article 83 of the Treaty:—

'Bulgaria will, however, have the right to maintain on the Danube and along her coast, for police and fishery duties, not more than four torpedo-boats and six motor-boats, all without torpedoes and torpedo apparatus, to be selected by the Commission referred to in Article 99.

'The personnel of the above vessels shall be organized on a purely civilian basis.

'The vessels allowed to Bulgaria must only be replaced by lightly-armed patrol craft, not exceeding 100 tons displacement and of non-military character.'

The Allied and Associated Powers further agree that the scientific material claimed by Bulgaria for use in her Aquarium may, at the direction of the Commission referred to in Article 99, be allotted to her after the losses sustained by the Allies have been made good.

### SECTION III. MILITARY AND NAVAL AIR CLAUSES

#### *Articles 89 to 93*

The Allied and Associated Powers consider that no change is admissible in the clauses concerning military and naval aviation.

Article 89, which gave rise to the claims contained in Section III of C from the Bulgarian Delegation, was drafted with full knowledge of the matter in hand and with the firm intention of refusing to Bulgaria the right to possess any air squadrons or airships for any purpose whatsoever.

The Allied and Associated Powers see no reason for granting to Bulgaria a privilege which has been refused to Germany and Austria.

### PART V

#### PRISONERS OF WAR AND GRAVES

##### SECTION I. PRISONERS OF WAR

#### *(Articles 105 to 115)*

[Not printed]

### PART VI

#### PENALTIES

#### *(Articles 118 to 120)*

Articles 118 to 120, concerning penalties, cannot be altered in accordance with the Bulgarian request without endangering the very principle of justice on which they are based.

In claiming the right to bring the authors of acts in violation of the laws and customs of war before military tribunals of countries against whose nationals Bulgarian troops have committed such crimes, the Allied and Associated Powers are only conforming to the usual legal principles concerning competence. If, despite criticism based on the relations between the Balkan nations, the Allied and Associated Powers considered this jurisdiction preferable to a tribunal of which their own representatives were members, still less would they agree to establish jurisdiction from which belligerent Powers would be excluded whose competence was greatest (Greece, Roumania, Serbo-Croat-Slovene State).

Finally, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot agree that any weight be attached to legal proceedings, prosecutions or sentences instituted or pronounced by Bulgarian tribunals since Article 118 is only a necessary result of the system of legal proceedings which they desire to organize, failing which such proceedings would be absolutely without effect.

## PART VII

### REPARATIONS

*(Articles 121 to 131)*

I. The Bulgarian Delegation asks for a reduction of the sum mentioned in Article 121 of the Conditions of Peace as representing the obligations imposed on Bulgaria by way of reparation; having calculated the various charges assumed by the country after Peace is signed—in which are included moreover her normal fiscal expenditure, the service of her public debt, and her war pensions and the upkeep of the army—the Delegation complains the Treaty will leave Bulgaria plunged in debt, and unable to bear the liabilities imposed on her.

Bulgaria will undoubtedly have heavy liabilities to bear. These will not, however, be the result of the Conditions of Peace, but of the war of aggression in which she voluntarily took part, into which she entered of her own free will, in a spirit of domination and conquest. Bulgaria has failed in a scheme undertaken contrary to the law of nations and of liberty, in the hope of illicit territorial and material gains. It is right and just that she should now atone. Are there not certain nations among the Allied and Associated Powers who, without sharing Bulgaria's guilt, have merely defended their life and independence, but who will be obliged for generations to toil and endure hard sacrifices in order to regain their past strength and prosperity?

The Conditions of Peace are just and even lenient; the obligations imposed on Bulgaria have been limited to a sum which is decidedly lower than the amount of damage sustained by the Allied and Associated Powers by reason of her entry into the war. If the latter acted in this manner, it was precisely because they wished to take into account Bulgaria's capacity for payment, which they made every effort to estimate with absolute impartiality. The second paragraph of Article 124 of the Conditions of Peace—which provides for Germany's renunciation of a debt of Bulgaria's transferred to the Reparation Commission for the benefit of the Allied and Associated Powers by the Treaty of Versailles—is proof positive of this desire not to demand from Bulgaria anything which may exceed her resources. There can therefore be no question of cancelling the figure of 2 milliard 250 million gold francs. But if, against all probability, it should in future become evident that Bulgaria's position not being as now estimated, she is at any particular time unable to pay the instalment corresponding to her contribution towards reparation, Article 122 of the Conditions of Peace is amply sufficient to permit of any justifiable modification being granted to her.

II. In connection herewith, the Bulgarian Delegation asks, in the first place, that a total sum be fixed representing the entire amount of liabilities devolving on its country under the various provisions of the Treaty, and secondly that the yearly payments mentioned in the fifth paragraph of Article 121 of the Conditions of Peace shall not be higher during the first few years, when the resources of the State will be most restricted, than during subsequent years.

As regards the first point, the Allied and Associated Powers are unable to give satisfaction to Bulgaria. The reasons for refusal are obvious when it is remembered that Bulgaria wishes to see her own military expenditure included in the total to be limited in advance. It would thus be very easy for Bulgaria to reduce to a minimum her obligation to share in the reparation for damage.

With regard to the second point, on the contrary, the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation did not appear unfounded. The Allied and Associated Powers

agree therefore to insert an alteration in the fifth paragraph of Article 121, the second clause of which shall henceforth read as follows:—

‘Therefore, each half-yearly payment shall include, over and above the payment of interest at the rate of 5%, five per centum per annum, the provision of a sinking fund sufficient to extinguish the total amount due by Bulgaria in 37 years from January 1, 1921.’

In this manner, the yearly payments to be made by Bulgaria would not necessarily become less as time goes on, and instructions could be given to the Interallied Commission to arrange for these payments in accordance with practical possibilities.

III. It goes without saying that the Allied and Associated Powers cannot consider the possibility of fixing the reparation debt in levas, as requested by the Bulgarian Delegation; it is obvious that in that case Bulgaria would have no further interest in maintaining the international value of her currency, and could indeed reduce the actual value of her payments indefinitely.

It does not seem impossible under this head, however, to grant to Bulgaria certain facilities for payment by permitting the Interallied Commission, if necessary, to accept payment in levas—at their current value, which the Commission itself would fix—or various payments in kind.

The Allied and Associated Powers therefore consent to the insertion in the Treaty of a clause similar to Par. 19 of Annex II of the Chapter on Reparations of the Treaty of Versailles. This clause, which would be a fresh paragraph of Article 121 inserted between the former paragraphs 5 and 7, should read as follows:

‘Payments required to be made in specie in virtue of the above provisions may at any time be accepted by the Reparation Commission in the form of chattels, properties, commodities, businesses, rights and concessions, within or without Bulgarian territory, ships, bonds, shares, or securities of any kind, or currencies of Bulgarian or other States, the value of such substitutes for gold being fixed at a fair and just amount by the Reparation Commission itself.’

IV. It would be superfluous to dwell on the fact that it is impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to contemplate the deduction of interest from the sums due from Bulgaria as reparation. Strictly speaking, the payment of reparation for damage already committed could be demanded immediately. It is merely out of consideration for *de facto* impossibilities that this payment has been deferred. The obligation to pay interest exists from the first day when a debt is acknowledged; it cannot be avoided.

The Bulgarian Delegation also requests that a delay of 50 years from 1st April 1925 (in reality, a delay of 54 years) be substituted for the delay of 37 years provided for in Article 121 of the Conditions of Peace; it is sufficient to remark that such a measure is at any rate unnecessary, seeing that Article 122 gives the Interallied Commission the power to grant any delays in payment which it shall consider necessary.

V. The Allied and Associated Powers are also unable to reconsider Articles 127 and 128 of the Conditions of Peace. These Articles have limited, by means of a special arrangement, the right of certain of the said Powers whose territories have been violated and looted by Bulgarian troops, to receive entire restitution. This arrangement risks indeed being unduly favourable to Bulgaria, nevertheless the last paragraph of Article 127 and that of Article 128 both illustrate the moderation and scrupulousness with which this undeniable right will be applied.

VI. Finally, the suggestion by the Bulgarian Delegation that some of the Allied and Associated Powers might pay for the works of military importance which Bulgaria carried out on their territory for the purpose of fighting against them, is not worthy of discussion.

## PART VIII FINANCIAL CLAUSES

(*Articles 132 to 146*)

The Allied and Associated Powers have most carefully considered the observations submitted by the Bulgarian Delegation concerning the clauses inserted in Part VIII of the Conditions of Peace.

The present reply will not discuss each of the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation, but confine itself to indicating the points on which it seemed necessary to supply further details, either for the purpose of removing a misunderstanding on the part of the Bulgarian Delegation or of proving the slight foundation of some of its observations.

*Article 133.* The observations of the Bulgarian Delegation on the obligation to pay for the upkeep of armies of occupation refer:—

- (1) to occupation before the coming into force of the Treaty;
- (2) to occupation after the coming into force of the Treaty.

As regards the first point, the Allied and Associated Powers see no valid reason for renouncing provisions inserted in the Treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain, according to which Germany and Austria undertook to pay the total cost of the armies of occupation. The Allied and Associated Powers cannot, furthermore, enter into any discussion with the Bulgarian Government as to the strategic use of the military units sent to Bulgaria.

As regards the second point, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed in stating that they have no intention of continuing military occupation after the coming into force of the Treaty.

Consequently, and in order clearly to indicate this intention as well as to avoid any ambiguity which may have misled the Bulgarian Delegation, the wording of the first phrase of Article 133 will be altered as follows:—

*Instead of:* 'There shall be paid by Bulgaria the total cost of all armies occupying territory within her boundaries, as defined in accordance with the present Treaty, from the date of signature of the Armistice of September 29, 1918', *read:* 'There shall be paid by Bulgaria the total cost of all armies . . .<sup>9</sup> occupying territory within her boundaries, *as these are defined in the present Treaty*, from the signature of the Armistice of September 29, 1918, *and until the coming into force of the present Treaty.*'

*Article 136.* The Allied and Associated Powers have agreed that only the value of material of a non-military character surrendered in execution of the Armistice or of the Treaty shall be credited to the State surrendering the same, and that the value of war material shall not be credited to the general Reparation account. The Bulgarian Delegation brings forward no arguments against this principle; and the Allied and Associated Powers agree that the text of Article 136 should be retained.

Nevertheless, to ensure unity of opinion in decisions establishing the non-

<sup>9</sup> Punctuation as in original.

military character of material surrendered by Germany. Austria and Bulgaria, the penultimate line of the second paragraph of Article 136 shall be altered as follows:—

*Instead of:* 'There shall be credited to Bulgaria . . . the value . . . of material . . . for which, as having non-military value, credit should, in the judgment of the Reparation Commission *acting through the Inter-Allied Commission*, be allowed', *read:* 'There shall be credited to Bulgaria . . . the value . . . of material for which, as having non-military value, credit should, in the judgment of the Reparation Commission, be allowed.'

*Articles 134-141.* The Bulgarian Delegation asks that Powers to whom Bulgarian territory is ceded may assume responsibility for part of the Bulgarian public debt as it shall stand at the date of signature of the Treaty, and not as it stood on August 1, 1914.

Were such a claim allowed, the Powers to whom Bulgarian territory is ceded would have to bear the burden of part of the debt which Bulgaria contracted in order to wage an unjust war against those Powers. The Allied and Associated Powers cannot consider such a possibility. They agree, however, that part of the Bulgarian Debt contracted between August 1, 1914, and October 11, 1915, at which date Bulgaria entered the war against Serbia, was used for the benefit of territory surrendered by Bulgaria in virtue of the Treaty, and they consider that the date of October 11, 1915, may be substituted for that of August 1, 1914 in Article 141.

They nevertheless consider that such part of the Bulgarian public debt as was contracted between August 1, 1914, and October 11, 1915 and directly used to prepare for war, cannot be divided among the Powers to whom Bulgarian territory is surrendered, and they leave it to the Reparation Commission to determine that part of the debt.

Consequently, the wording of Article 141 has been altered as follows:—

*Instead of:* 'Any Power to which Bulgarian territory is ceded . . . undertakes to pay . . . such contribution towards the charge for the Bulgarian Public Debt as it stood on August 1, 1914 . . .', *read:* 'Any Power to which Bulgarian territory is ceded . . . undertakes to pay such contribution towards the charge for the Bulgarian Public Debt as it stood on October 11, 1915 (including . . . laid down in Article 134). The Reparation Commission, acting through the Inter-Allied Commission, shall determine the amount of the Bulgarian Public Debt on October 11, 1915, taking into account, in the case of the debt contracted after August 1, 1914, only that part of the debt which was not used by Bulgaria to prepare a war of aggression. The part of the Bulgarian Public debt to be paid by each Power to which territory is surrendered shall be that which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers . . . etc.'

*Article 139.* This Article settles the question of the loan contracted by Bulgaria in July 1914 with German Banks.

The Bulgarian Delegation claims that as the Loan Agreement was not carried out by the German creditors, it is now null and void, and asks for the omission of Article 139 as useless. According to certain information received, however, the German banks which signed the Loan Agreement consider the same to be perfectly valid and intend to stand by it.

To avoid all discussion, the Allied and Associated Powers therefore feel it necessary to retain Article 139. They prefer to run the risk of inserting a supererogatory provision in the Treaty, rather than expose themselves to future controversies.

Moreover, they wish to point out that the obligation imposed on the Bulgarian Government of transferring to the Reparation Commission all rights, interests and securities of every kind retained by Bulgarian nationals under loan agreements and conventions does not exceed the conditions imposed on Germany by Article 235 of the Treaty of Versailles and that this obligation has not been improperly imposed, as stated by the Bulgarian Delegation. In reality the value of all these rights, interests and securities will be credited to Bulgaria by the Reparation Commission, to be deducted from sums due as reparation.

*Articles 129 and 145.* The Allied and Associated Powers intend to credit Bulgaria (on account of the total amount fixed in Article 121 of the Treaty of Peace and owed by Bulgaria as reparation) with all sums and shares which the Reparation Commission may recover from sums owed to Bulgaria under the financial and economic clauses of the Treaty and the clauses concerning Ports, Waterways and Railways.

In order completely to reconcile the wording of Articles 129 and 145, Article 129 is altered as follows:—

‘the following shall be placed to the credit of Bulgaria in respect to her reparation obligations:—Any amounts which the Reparation Commission may consider due to Bulgaria under Part VIII (Financial Clauses), Part IX (Economic Clauses), and Part XI (Ports, Waterways and Railways) of the present Treaty.’

*Article 146.* The Allied and Associated Powers have no desire to claim from Bulgaria payment in gold currency of sums owed by her under the Treaty.

The Bulgarian Government may procure as it thinks best the necessary foreign bills and cheques to meet the payments required of it.

## PART IX

### ECONOMIC CLAUSES

#### SECTION I. COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

*Article 151.* With the object of safeguarding as far as possible the fiscal revenues of Bulgaria, the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to alter the text of Article 151 in such a way as to make it clear that customs duties upon their imports shall be payable in gold in all cases where, in virtue of Bulgarian law, such payment in gold could be demanded on 28th July, 1914, on condition that the rate of exchange of gold for notes shall be periodically fixed by the Reparation Commission.

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot, however, consider any alteration of Article 151 as regards the rates of duty applicable to their imports into Bulgaria within the period of one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty. Only the most favourable duties in force on July 28, 1914, may be applied to these imports.

Nor can the proposal to reduce the period of application of Article 151 to six months be accepted. In Treaties previously concluded with Allies of Bulgaria provisions were introduced which, in the case of the products of certain adjacent countries, provided for free import or the benefit of conventional tariffs during a specified period sometimes extending to five years. Bulgaria has been spared similar provisions in the present Treaty.

The stable and uniform regime provided by Article 151 for the period of one year is necessary to allow of the resumption of international trade with Bulgaria,

especially in view of economic conditions caused by the war, which the Bulgarian Delegation does not fail to recognize.

## SECTION II. TREATIES

*Article 162.* The Bulgarian Delegation suggests that all multilateral Treaties existing before the war should be revived. It mentions, however, no omission as regards the list given in Article 162 and offers no definite suggestions.

The Allied and Associated Powers have provided for revival of all multilateral Treaties which they thought compatible with fresh conditions resulting from the war. They therefore see no reason to alter the Article in question.

The requests of the Bulgarian Delegation either arise from an insufficient comprehension of the text under discussion or are not founded upon specific instances, and cannot be granted.

*Article 168.* The Bulgarian Delegation states that it cannot agree to the revival of bilateral Treaties under the conditions laid down in that Article, since Bulgaria will not enjoy the same rights as the Allied and Associated Powers.

Germany and Austria have accepted a text identical with that of Article 168, and Bulgaria must do likewise.

The Bulgarian Delegation, however, commits a double error in the interpretation of this Article.

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot arbitrarily set aside certain provisions of a bilateral Treaty which they desire to revive. They can and should only omit from such a Treaty any provisions which do not agree with the general dispositions or specific provisions of the Treaty of Peace. The third paragraph of Article 168 is very clear on this point.

On the other hand, while the Article provides that the League of Nations shall be called upon to decide, this is only in case of a divergence of opinion between the Allied and Associated Powers.

*Article 164.* Article 164 gives Bulgaria the opportunity of participating in the drawing up of the proposed new radio-telegraphic Convention. It does not imply that the text of that Convention will be dictated to her and that she must accept it *ne varietur*; but merely provides against a systematic refusal to conclude the Convention or claims rendering its conclusion impossible in practice.

*Article 165.* The Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to substitute the following text for the text of this Article, viz:—

‘Until the conclusion of a new Convention concerning fishing in the waters of the Danube to replace the Convention of November 29, 1901, the transitory regime to be established will be settled by an arbitrator appointed by the European Commission of the Danube.’

*Articles 166 and 167.* The period fixed by these Articles was considered sufficient by the Powers allied to Bulgaria; it cannot be prolonged, in view of the necessity for establishing as soon as possible the guarantees indispensable for economic relations between the nations concerned.

*Articles 169, 171, and 172.* It is not for the Allied and Associated Powers to free Bulgaria from charges and indemnities caused by her own fault; but it is to be recalled that Germany and Austria have undertaken in advance to accept the clauses of the present Treaty affecting them.

*Article 175.* This Article does not imply the perpetual maintenance of the Capitulations, since it expressly envisages the possibility of abolishing that regime by means of special conventions.

It is not for Bulgaria to revive the agreements she had concluded or prepared with certain Allied and Associated Powers, but for the Allied and Associated Powers to lay down, in conformity with the general principles of the present Treaty, the manner in which equitable treatment may be secured for foreigners in Bulgaria.

### SECTION III. DEBTS

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot consider relinquishing the system of Clearing Offices.

Should certain Allied and Associated Powers opt for this system, even if they apply it only in their relations with Bulgaria, the result would not be, as the Bulgarian Delegation imagine, a more considerable depreciation of the Bulgarian leva than by application of the system of direct recovery; whether it is a question of settlement by the Bulgarian State or direct settlement by Bulgarian nationals, payment may always be claimed in the currency of the Allied or Associated State concerned.

Nevertheless, to allow Bulgaria to procure means of payment with less haste, the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to substitute the following text for the first paragraph of all the Annex to Section III:—

‘The balance between the Clearing Offices shall be struck every three months and the credit balance paid in cash by the debtor State within a month.’

### SECTION IV. PROPERTY, RIGHTS AND INTERESTS

[Not printed]

### SECTION V. CONTRACTS, PRESCRIPTIONS, JUDGMENTS

[Not printed]

### SECTION VII. INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

[Not printed]

### SECTION VIII. SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO TRANSFERRED TERRITORY

[Not printed]

### RESUMPTION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS

The Bulgarian Delegation ask for reciprocity as regards the right reserved by the Allied and Associated Powers, in virtue of Article 159, of appointing consuls in Bulgarian towns and ports.

The Allied and Associated Powers are not prepared to grant Bulgaria this right; it should, however, be noted that nothing in that Article is opposed either to the revival under the terms of Article 168 of Consular Conventions between individual Allied and Associated Powers and Bulgaria, or to the conclusion of fresh agreements between Bulgaria and these Powers concerning the admission of Bulgarian consular officers to their territory.

PART XI  
PORTS, WATERWAYS & RAILWAYS

*(Articles 212-248,*  
*[Not printed])*<sup>10</sup>

PART XII  
LABOUR

*(Articles 249 to 289)*

While appreciating Bulgaria's intentions, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot alter the provision of the Treaty of Peace which only admits the original members of the League of Nations as original members of the Labour Conference.

APPENDIX B TO NO. II

PART II  
FRONTIERS

*(Articles 27 to 35)*

The Bulgarian Delegation has asked that modifications be made concerning the frontiers as assigned to her in the Peace Conditions, both in Thrace, and on the Serb-Croat and Slovene side. The Delegation furthermore exposed Bulgaria's claims to Dobrudja, and asked that the 'final statutes'<sup>11</sup> of that region be regulated by the Allied and Associated Governments.

On this last point, the Allied and Associated Governments esteem that, in view of the object of the present Treaty, the Dobrudja question is out of place.

As to the outline of the other frontiers referred to in the observations of the Bulgarian Delegation, it was adopted only after an attentive study taking into account all the elements of the problem. However, the Allied and Associated Powers have examined the arguments invoked with care, but, without disregarding their value, they were unable to recognize any motive of a nature to justify a change in these carefully studied decisions. The Allied and Associated Powers, therefore, are unable to accord Bulgaria the modifications solicited.

The Allied and Associated Powers were, furthermore, particularly attentive to protect the economic interests of Bulgaria by guaranteeing, in particular, this country an outlet to the Aegean Sea. In numerous cases, the Powers were obliged to have recourse to the same procedure in order to reconcile the interests under debate, and they do not doubt, that if Bulgaria loyally accepts this solution, the future will show that the guarantees which have been given her will be in no manner illusory.

<sup>10</sup> 'As regards the questions affecting Ports, Waterways and Railways, the Allied and Associated Powers have noted with satisfaction that the sentiments expressed by the Bulgarian Delegation were similar to those which had always inspired its deliberations.' With regard to Bulgarian objections, it was not, however, considered possible to alter the text of any of the articles in question.

<sup>11</sup> The text in document 2 of appendix A above (cf. note 7) read 'final status'.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES  
GENERAL STAFF, No. 5226.

October 31, 1919.

### *Memorandum*

In an interview with the Chiefs of the Military Missions of the Entente, which took place at Riga on October 27, the Lettish Government has renewed its request for assistance, and made precise the conditions of the support to be given to it by the Allies, with a view to enable it to continue to fight against the Germans and the Boishhevists.

Following are the conditions:

- 1st. Active assistance against Germany, and reinforcement of the direct help given by the fleet.<sup>12</sup>
- 2nd. Cession of army and war material, to be sent immediately.
- 3rd. Advance in the form of a loan of two millions pounds sterling.
- 4th. New shipments of food supplies.
- 5th. Interdiction to the Germans to send to Germany any Lettish provisions, absolute closing of the German frontier—surrender of the German material in Latvia.
- 6th. Transfer to the Lettish authorities of the Riga-Libau railway, actually in the hands of the Germans, as this town (Riga) will, in six weeks, be blockaded by ice.

The Lettish Government asked for a reply by the 3rd of November in order to be able to determine its line of conduct.

It seems that, on account of the difficult situation in which this Government is placed, consequent to the fight engaged in on two fronts and the demands of the Esthonian Government,<sup>13</sup> its neighbour, there is every advantage in answering its request within the proper time, in order to deprive it of any pretext to negotiate with its enemies.

#### *1st. Active assistance against Germany:*

(a) By its resolution of the 10th of October,<sup>14</sup> the Supreme Council had decided to send to the Baltic provinces an Inter-Allied Mission for the purpose of assuring the control of the evacuation of the German troops, and to provoke all measures which may facilitate and accelerate this evacuation. This Mission is about to leave.

(b) All supplies of food and raw materials, and all financial facilities are refused to Germany as long as the latter will not have obeyed the order of evacuation (decision of the Supreme Council of the 17th of September).<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Since October 15, 1919, Allied naval units had been supporting the Lettish forces against the Russo-German forces under Colonel Prince Bermond-Avalov in the second battle of Riga (cf. Vol. III of this series).

<sup>13</sup> The Esthonian Government had demanded that, in return for Esthonian military co-operation against the forces of Colonel Prince Bermond-Avalov, the Latvian Government should comply with certain conditions which included the cession by Latvia to Esthonia of the district of Walk.

<sup>14</sup> See Vol. I, No. 71, minute 4.

<sup>15</sup> The decision taken by the Supreme Council on September 17, 1919, in connexion with the evacuation of German forces from the Baltic provinces (see Vol. I, No. 59, minute 1) appears to have been confused with its operative decision in this matter, taken on September 27 (see Vol. I, No. 66, minute 3).

(c) Finally, the German navigation has been stopped in the Baltic, with the reserve of taking into consideration the trade necessities of neutrals (order of the Inter-Allied Naval Armistice Commission of October 10, confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Council of October 22nd).<sup>16</sup>

Thus, the Allied and Associated Governments give to the Baltic provinces an active assistance, by imposing upon Germany an effective military control and serious economic penalties, the effect of which will be deeply felt by her.

These Governments, on the other hand, reserve the right to take, if necessary, all new measures which they may deem necessary, in order to obtain from Germany the executions of her agreements.

2nd. *Cession of Arms and War Material:*

The Allied and Associated Governments have already granted to the Lettish Government important cessions of war material and supplies.

During the first days of November a ship transporting armament and equipment for 10,000 men will leave the port of Boulogne for Latvia.<sup>17</sup>

Study is being made at the present time as to what extent it will be possible to satisfy a new request for material for 40,000 men.

3rd. *Advance under the form of loans to the amount of 2,000,000 lbs [sic] sterling* } The question will be submitted to an examination by the Governments.

4th. *New shipments of supplies in foodstuffs.*

5th. (a) *Interdiction that Lettish provisions be sent into Germany by the Germans.*

Any requisition, seizure, or coercive measure with a view to obtaining resources destined for Germany is forbidden to the German troops. (Article 14 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918).

In execution of this provision, the Interallied Commission to the Baltic Regions has received an order: 'to prevent the removal of any material or provisions which does not properly belong to the German troops'.

(b) *The surrender of German material in Latvia.*

This surrender cannot be exacted by law. It may, however, be the object of transactions with the German Government.

However, the Supreme Council decided that after October 11th the Interallied Control Commission at Berlin would be authorized to order the delivery of munitions and Russian war material, deposited in Germany, to the Russian armies recognized by the Allied and Associated Governments.<sup>18</sup> This provision shall be applicable to the Lettish army.

(c) *Closing of the frontier.*

In notes dated October 3rd and 16th,<sup>19</sup> the German Government itself specified that it had ordered the closing of the frontier, the discontinuance of supplies and munitions, and that it had organized, to this end, frontier surveillance posts, which were ordered to fire on German troops attempting to enter Courland.

The Inter-Allied Mission shall be especially entrusted with the strict execution of these prescriptions.

The occupation of the territory of Memel, which shall be effected upon the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, will facilitate the execution of this supervision,

<sup>16</sup> See No. 4, minute 9.

<sup>17</sup> Note in original: 'There remains about 40 cars, in course of transport, and which will not reach Boulogne before November 4th, to be shipped.'

<sup>18</sup> See Vol. I, No. 72, minute 6.

<sup>19</sup> See respectively Vol. I, No. 70, appendix A and in the present volume No. 2, minute 11.

by permitting the greater part of the ways of entry to Latvia to be barred by *Allied* troops.

5th. *Transfer of the Riga-Libau railway line administration to Lettish authorities, now controlled by Germans.*

This question is within the competence of the Inter-Allied Control Mission, the departure of which is announced above. The attention of the Head of this Mission shall be called to the necessity of solving this question as soon as possible.

F. FOCH.

#### APPENDIX D TO NO. 11

*Report of Meeting of the Naval Advisers concerning the Compensation to be demanded of the German Government for the Sinking of their Men-of-War at Scapa Flow on 21st June, 1919*

1st November 1919

1. In view of the reparation claims that Germany had already incurred under the terms of the Peace Treaty, it is not considered feasible to make any further financial or material demands other than the following, which however cannot be regarded as complete compensation to the Allied and Associated Powers for the losses incurred through the sinking of the modern German men-of-war at Scapa:—

(a) The five Light Cruisers

*Königsberg*

*Pillau*

*Graudenz*

*Regensburg*

*Strassburg.*

(b) Such number of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers equivalent to the displacement of 400,000 tons as the Allied and Associated Powers may demand. The lifting power of a dock to be taken as displacement, and approximately 75% of the docks over 10,000 tons are to be included.

2. In order to put the above conditions into effect, the German Government shall undertake to supply to the Allied Naval Commission of Control within 10 days of the deposit of the ratification of the Peace Treaty, a complete list of all floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers in German possession. This list is to notify the material which was in the possession of the German Government on 11th November, 1918, or in which the German Government had considerable interests on that date.

3. The Allied Naval Commission of Control will select the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers in accordance with the following provisions:—  
The priority of selection will be:—

(i) Government docks, cranes, tugs and dredgers which were Government property on 11th November 1918.

(ii) Floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers in which the German Government had large interests on 11 November 1918.

(iii) Floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, the removal of which will have the least effect on the working of the port in which they are situated.

4. The German officers and men belonging to the men-of-war which were sunk at Scapa and which are at present retained by the Allied and Associated Powers

will, with the exception of any whose surrender is required by Articles 228 of the Treaty of Peace, be repatriated on the German Government giving their guarantee to the conditions contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 above being carried out.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers are placing any monies salvaged from the German men-of-war at Scapa which cannot be traced to any particular individual to the credit of the Reparation Fund. The amount of monies salvaged is 42,086 Marks 20 Pfennigs.

6. The Torpedo Boat Destroyer B. 98 can be considered as one of the 42 T.B.D.s to be surrendered under Article 185 of the Peace Treaty.

United States of America.  
Great Britain  
France  
Italy  
Japan

N. A. McCULLY.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Thus in original.

## No. 12

H. D. 82.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 3, 1919, at 10.00 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Dr. James Brown Scott, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Lieut.-Col. Kisch, Commander Dunne, Captain Fuller, R.N., Mr. H. W. Malkin, Mr. A. Leeper.

*France*: General Weygand, General Desticker, M. Kammerer, Commandant Lacombe, M. Fromageot.

*Italy*: General Cavallero, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri, Prince Boncompagni.

1. (The Council had before it a report from the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the occupation of Memel prior to the ratification of the Treaty (see Appendix A).)  
*Report of the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the Occupation of Memel prior to the Ratification of the Treaty* GENERAL DESTICKER read and commented upon the report.  
(After a short discussion,  
It was decided:

to approve the report as prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles, and that no troops should be sent to Memel before the entry into force of the Treaty.)

2. (The Council had before it the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles relative to the suppression of the Inter-Allied Transport Commission (see Appendix B).)  
*Report of the Military Representatives at Versailles suggesting the Suppression of the Interallied Transport Commission* GENERAL DESTICKER read and commented upon the report.

(It was decided:

to suppress the Inter-Allied Transport Commission, as proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles in their report.)

[3] 'The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation on the Hungarian situation (see Appendix C).)

*Roumanian and Hungarian Questions*

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the note prepared by the French Delegation. He wished to bring to the attention of the Council that in paragraph 2 of page 4<sup>1</sup> the phrase relative to the Inter-Allied force under discussion should be understood in the sense that the force include only Serbian, Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak troops, under an Inter-Allied command.

MR. POLK stated that he had not yet seen a final report from Sir George Clerk and he thought it might be advisable to await this information before discussing the question. He should, however, inquire how the Council intended to treat the Inter-Allied Commission of Generals; if this Inter-Allied Commission had not succeeded, it was because the Supreme Council had not backed it up sufficiently.

M. BERTHELOT thought that they had not carried out with sufficient authority the instructions given them by the Supreme Council, and on the other hand, they had not shown initiative, and did not seem to have had a consistent policy. As for Sir George Clerk, he did not seem to have succeeded in his mission with M. Friedrich. The affair seemed to be dragging along; M. Friedrich had not yet retired and the Democratic Government had not been formed as was expected by the Council. He added that the French proposition was not to belittle the mission of Sir George Clerk in any fashion, but it was important to clear up the situation and settle this vexatious question.

M. PICHON thought it was extremely important to solve this question as soon as possible.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Roumanian and Hungarian questions of course involved each other. Sir George Clerk had insisted on the importance of getting the Roumanians out of the country, and a stable government could not be formed until this had been settled. The information from Sir George Clerk said there might be disadvantages, but the balance of advantage was that the Roumanians should be gotten out. The Roumanians were defying the Council. M. Bratiano was dragging on negotiations with no intention of following the instructions of the Council. He certainly thought that they should insist on getting an answer from Roumania and he thought that the Council should publish the note which has been sent to Roumania. M. Bratiano was spreading false versions of the note, sent in the course of the

<sup>1</sup> The antepenultimate paragraph of appendix C.

electioneering campaign which was going on in Roumania, and was pretending that there was no disagreement as between the Allies and Roumania.

M. BERTHELOT stated it was quite evident that the Roumanian troops should first get out but there was great danger if the Roumanian troops were to leave the country before other troops were sent to replace them. In that case, the Allies would find before them at Budapest only a Friedrich Government which had in its hands a force of police; outside of Budapest was Admiral Horthy with an army of 20,000 men or so; at any rate he was reactionary and was a symbol of the Hapsburgs. In conclusion, first: the Roumanians should get out; secondly: the Roumanian troops should be replaced in such a way that the Allies would be in a position to impose their policy at Budapest; but the departure of the Roumanians would be dangerous if the Allies did not have other means of controlling the situation. As far as the Roumanians were concerned, there was no doubt whatever they should be obliged to answer the note which had been sent them, and it might become advisable to publish this note, although this might not be of very great practical value, as elections were being held at this time. M. Bratiano was pretending that this note had never been delivered to the Roumanian Government by the Conference. According to his theory, only three out of the four Principal Allied and Associated Powers had presented the note, and the Italian representative had not associated himself with this step. General Coanda, who had just arrived in Paris, claimed that there was no need to reply to a note which had not been received.

MR. POLK had noticed in the French note a reference to the American General which he did not approve. He thought the American General had been doing his best to follow his instructions. His only contention was that Roumania was not on trial, but that the Supreme Council should be obeyed. The impression was going abroad in Roumania that the orders which were being executed by the Commission did not correspond to the real orders of the Supreme Council and also that if the text of the note did not sound quite French, it was due to the fact that it was a translation from an English text. Effort was being made to create the impression that America was against Roumania; that was not so; it was only a question, as he had said before, of the orders of the Supreme Council being followed. If there were so little co-ordination of action between the Allies in this case, it argued badly for the future, and the United States would hesitate to join future Inter-Allied Commission[s].

M. PICHON said they were all agreed that the Inter-Allied cohesion should be maintained.

MR. POLK asked how it was possible after they had ordered the Roumanians to leave Hungary, to think of leaving them in the Inter-Allied forces referred to in the latter part of the French note.

SIR EYRE CROWE said M. Berthelot's remark—that the Supreme Council's note had not been received—was a surprise. If that were so, then they could not insist upon its being carried out. That lack of cooperation in Bucharest was very serious.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that he had no information on the non-presentation of the note by the Italian representative; he would, however, get more information on the subject.

M. PICHON stated that according to a telegram from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest there had been delay in presentation of the note to the Roumanian Government for the reason that the Italian representative had not received his instructions. A second telegram had informed him that the note had been delivered by three out of four representatives of the Allies without awaiting any longer the instructions of the Italian representative. He did not know whether the Italian representative had now received these instructions, but he wished to point out that the Roumanians were still maintaining that they had not received the note.

SIR EYRE CROWE mentioned that M. Bratiano was spreading the report that this was an Anglo-American intrigue.

M. PICHON was of the opinion that the note should be published so as to put a stop to these rumours, and also a further note, should the Council so decide.

MR. POLK wished to point out that the Council could only repeat the conclusions it had adopted at its meeting of August 5th or thereabouts.<sup>2</sup>

M. BERTHELOT wished to point out that one could not reproach the French Government with having opposed itself to any of the orders sent to Bucharest. The French representative had always delivered the notes either in the name of the Allies or in the name of the French Government. Should M. Bratiano wish to try and cause disagreement between the Allies this should carefully be avoided. He repeated that two points were to be distinguished; on the Roumanian question there was no discussion possible as to the attitude to be taken, but the Hungarian question remained. The departure of the Roumanians from Budapest ran the risk of bringing about a state of anarchy or the reappearance of the Hapsburg monarchy.

MR. POLK thought that early in September the Council had ordered the Roumanians to turn over 10,000 rifles to the Hungarian police which was to be organized, and he understood that only 1,000 rifles had been delivered up to this time without bayonets,<sup>3</sup> without sufficient ammunition, and that the machine guns had been delivered without tripods. He thought there would be no use sending another Mission to Budapest if there was to be no compliance with the orders already sent out by the Council. If the present Mission had not done its work, it would then be advisable to recall it.

M. PICHON agreed that this might be exact, but there remained the danger of an armed force under the orders of Admiral Horthy, with the shadow of a Hapsburg reaction. The Roumanians might be lying, but they again affirmed that they had given up these arms; it would be easy to verify this through the Mission and the orders should then be carried out. He again pointed out how dangerous it would be to recall Roumanian troops without being able to oppose an Inter-Allied force to the Horthy force. It was

<sup>2</sup> For the conclusions in this matter adopted by the Supreme Council on August 5, 1919, see Vol. I, No. 28, minute 2.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Vol. I, No. 67, appendix I.

important to organize a democratic Government at Budapest or it would be impossible to sign peace with Hungary.

MR. POLK wished to remark that four of the Powers had sent representatives to report on conditions in Hungary—he personally had great confidence in General Bandholtz—and if the Council did not have confidence in these representatives it was for it to recall them. Later the Council had sent Sir George Clerk, in whom also he had the greatest confidence. He thought the Council should have confidence in the men they sent on these Missions, and he considered it had been well represented so far.

M. BERTHELOT said that if the police force at Budapest was armed, that did not inspire great confidence, for it was in the hands of the Friedrich government. It was quite clear that the Council got its information from representatives whenever sent; it had also the advantage of a general view of all the problems. The important question was that there should not remain a dangerous and ridiculous centre of disorganization in central Europe; a negative policy was not sufficient. They should have a positive policy.

M. PICHON asked what was to be done about Hungary. Were they going to deliver it to the Friedrich government or to the Archduke? As the Allies would not have forces available to send there, it seemed that the best solution would be to have the occupation force composed of Serbian, Roumanian and Czecho-Slovak troops under an Inter-Allied command. If the Council had in mind a better solution, this was the time to put it forward.

MR. POLK asked whether the question should not also be examined by the Financial Experts to see how this expedition could be paid for. The United States could pay nothing.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that Sir George Clerk should be informed by telegram of the discussion, and asked for an opinion on the possibility of employing Roumanian, Serbian and Czecho-Slovak troops.

MR. POLK agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe, that the Council should not think of acting without Sir George Clerk's opinion.

M. PICHON remarked that Sir George Clerk could also consult the Generals.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether, in the existence of the disturbed state of the country, it would be expedient to use Roumanian troops, and whether a force containing Roumanian and Serbian troops would work well.

M. BERTHELOT thought that this was simply a question of command. He thought, however, that the Roumanians might be excluded, especially if this exclusion might be used to show them how little confidence was put in them by the Supreme Council. But it was most important that they should have the symbol of an Inter-Allied force, so as to disarm Horthy. Telegrams would not be sufficient to do this. This occupation would not be very long, and with an efficient high command it would be easy to await the formation of a democratic Government.

M. PICHON summed up, stating that the Council was agreed to send immediately a telegram to Bucharest, insisting that the Roumanian Government should answer the last note sent by the Council. M. Berthelot would now prepare the text of this telegram.

M. BERTHELOT submitted to the Council a draft telegram which was approved (see Appendix D). He thought it advisable to give the text of this telegram to the Roumanian Delegation that same afternoon, and to publish the new and the former note the next day.

SIR EYRE CROWE informed the Council he had at that moment received a telegram from Sir George Clerk, which he proceeded to read to the Council.

(The Council unanimously agreed to adjourn the examination of the draft telegram to be sent until the next meeting of the Council.)

(It was decided:

- (1) to send a note to the Roumanian Government insisting on a prompt answer to the note which had already been sent by the Council on October 12th;<sup>4</sup>
- (2) that this note should be immediately delivered to the Roumanian Government at Bucharest by the four representatives of the Powers without waiting for further instructions from their respective Governments;
- (3) to give the Roumanian Delegation at Paris a copy of this note that same afternoon;
- (4) that the present note, and also the original note, should be published the following day.)

4. (The Council had before it a report from the New States Commission (see Appendix E),<sup>5</sup> and a draft Treaty with Greece (see *Greek Minorities Treaty* Appendix F).)<sup>6</sup>

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the report of the New States Commission and the draft Treaty with Greece. He added that the proposed Treaty concerned European territory only and should any

<sup>4</sup> See Vol. I, No. 72, minute 2 and appendix B.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. The draft of this undated report, which was substantially though not verbally the same as that before the Supreme Council, is printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 445-6. (The last paragraph of the draft, on p. 447, was omitted from the text submitted to the Supreme Council.)

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This draft, dated October 22, 1919, was, subject to minor drafting amendment, the same as the text of the treaty signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920 (Treaty Series, Series, 1920, No. 13. Cmd. 960) except for the following:

- (i) The United States was included as a signatory power in the draft but not in the treaty. (By an evident oversight, however, the last sentence of the first paragraph of article 16 of the treaty, as printed in Cmd. 960 of 1920, reads as follows: 'The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.' This is identical with the corresponding sentence in the draft, but the United States was not a signatory to the treaty.)
- (ii) The second paragraph of article 7 and articles 11 and 15 of the treaty were not included in the draft.
- (iii) Article 14 of the treaty omitted the second paragraph of the corresponding draft article 13, which read as follows: 'The Greek government shall take measures to assure the nomination of a Reis ul Ulema.'
- (iv) In the draft of the concluding formula of the treaty it was provided that it 'shall come into force at the same time as the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria' and should be signed at Paris in 1919.

Asiatic territory be attributed to Greece at a later time, a new treaty would be necessary. Greece should also be informed that the Treaty would be communicated to her at this time, but that the signature would only follow upon the final attribution to her of certain territories.

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece, prepared by the New States Commission:
- (2) that in communicating the text of this treaty to the Greek Delegation the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference should inform the Delegation that it only applied to territories situated in Europe, and that Greece would not be asked to sign the Treaty before the territories to be attributed to her had been determined.)

5. M. FROMAGEOT wished to inquire which Powers should figure in the preamble of the Treaty with Bulgaria, and also which Powers were to sign. America and Japan were not at war with Bulgaria, but it seemed anomalous that they should not sign, taking into account the different dispositions of the Treaty.

MR. POLK understood that the question had already been settled and that it was agreed that all the Principal Powers sign.

M. FROMAGEOT said that, as for the other Allied and Associated Powers, a certain number had not declared war against Bulgaria, but their full powers had already been presented to the Bulgarian Delegation; under those circumstances they had a right to sign. He proposed that a circular letter should be sent them asking whether they intended to sign, and he thought this would not delay the delivery of the reply to the Bulgarian counter-proposals.

It was decided:

- (1) that all the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign the Treaty with Bulgaria;
- (2) that a circular letter should be addressed to the other Allied Powers which had not declared war against Bulgaria, to inquire whether it was their intention to sign the Treaty.

6. The Council had before it the note from the Dutch Government (see Appendix G) and the draft reply prepared by the Drafting Committee to this note (see Appendix H'.)

*Draft reply to the note from the Dutch Government regarding German ships sold to Dutch Navigation Companies* M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon both documents. He wished to add that the note sent by the Supreme Council on October 15th to Germany<sup>7</sup> conformed to the declarations made in March at the Conference in Brussels concerning the question of ships in course of construction.

He wished to point out that the decision was formerly that all ships in course of construction were to be delivered to the Allies.

M. SCIALOJA remarked that, in the reply to the Dutch Government, paragraph 7, Annex 3 to Part VIII of the Treaty with Germany should

<sup>7</sup> See Vol. I, No. 74, minute 1 and appendix A.

be had in mind. A possible objection from the Dutch Government should be foreseen: the Treaty stated that Germany agreed to take any measures that might be necessary for obtaining the full title to the property in all ships which might have been transferred during the war to neutral flags. It therefore followed that Holland might very well tell the Allies that they should address their demands to Germany and not to her. He would like the Drafting Committee to take into consideration the possibility of that objection in the note to be sent to Holland.

MR. POLK stated that apparently the said paragraph tied the hands of the Supreme Council; but as a matter of principle, this would not be in accord with the American view of International Law. Should not this note be sent back to the Drafting Committee to prepare a text which would satisfy all the members of the Council?

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to remark that if an argument were begun with the Dutch Government, it would be difficult to foresee how long this discussion might last.

(It was decided:

to refer back to the Drafting Committee the draft reply to the note from the Dutch Government for further examination.)

7.

[Not printed]<sup>8</sup>

*Proposal of the Allied  
Railways Commission  
in Poland to open for  
Commercial Traffic the  
three Railroads cross-  
ing the German-Polish  
frontier north of Warsaw*

8. (The Council had before it a request of the European Danube Commission on the International Conference to establish the regime of the Danube, as provided for in Article 349 of the German Treaty (see Appendix J).)

*Request of the European  
Danube Commission on  
the International Confer-  
ence to establish the  
regime of the Danube, as  
provided for in Article  
349 of the German  
Treaty*

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to refer this request to the Drafting Committee for examination and report as to points of law.)

<sup>8</sup> The commission, as reported in a dispatch dated October 4, 1919, from the French Minister at Warsaw (appendix I in original), stated that on the lines in question (Bialystok-Lyck, Warsaw-Miawa-Danzig, Lowicz-Thorn) 'the only traffic existing at the present time for merchandise is that which is exploited by the Allied Commissions on Supplies, and the movement of travellers consists only in a bi-weekly courier that only persons accredited to the various missions are authorized to make use of'. The commission proposed that the American, British, and French Ministers at Warsaw should ask the Polish Government if it had any objections to opening the railways in question for general traffic, 'and if it has, at what date shall it decide to open the frontiers'. After a short discussion the Supreme Council approved the commission's conclusions subject to the stipulation that the Allied Military Representatives charged with Polish-German Affairs should be the channel for communicating to the German Government 'the agreements, if any, concluded at Warsaw'.

*Request of the European  
Danube Commission for  
the Attribution of two  
Tugs to that Commission*

[Not printed]

10. (The Council had before it the note from the German Delegation to the Reparations Commission regarding the transport by sea of potatoes purchased by Germany in Denmark see Appendix L.)  
*Note from the German Delegation to the Reparations Commission regarding the transport by sea of potatoes purchased by Germany in Denmark:*

(It was decided:

to refer back to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission this question for examination and report.)

'The meeting then adjourned.

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 3, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 12

SUPREME WAR COUNCIL, MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

VERSAILLES, 30th October, 1919.

S.W.C. 477. (89th M.R.)

#### *Report on the occupation of Memel.*

By a resolution dated October 25th, 1919, the Supreme Council decided 'to refer to the Military Representatives at Versailles for examination and report the question of whether the situation in the Baltic Provinces was such as to necessitate occupying Memel before the prescribed date'.<sup>9</sup>

The Military Representatives *taking into consideration:*

(1) That Germany maintains her sovereignty over the Memel district until the moment when the Treaty shall have come into force,

(2) That the occupation of Memel before the Treaty shall have come into force would expose the troops of occupation to possible attack by German troops from East Prussia on the West, or from Lithuania on the East, or from both these directions, and that as long as the allied force intended for the occupation of the Plebiscite areas (Danzig, East Prussia, &c.) are not in position (which will not be the case until after the coming into force of the Treaty) the allied forces in the Territory of Memel would be left without any reserves,

(3) That the combatant strength of the German forces in East Prussia and Lithuania appear to be approximately 20,000 and 40,000 respectively,

(4) That it would be impracticable to occupy Memel in sufficient force to make the troops of occupation safe against such an attack,

(5) That the Supreme Council has already decided (on October 14th, 1919)<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> See No. 6, minute 3.

<sup>10</sup> In error for October 15, 1919: see Vol. I, No. 74, minute 3.

to occupy Memel after that region shall have passed to the hands of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers,

*are of the opinion*

That the occupation of Memel before the prescribed date would offer certain advantages in providing the Inter-Allied Commission proceeding to the Baltic Provinces with an efficient means of action, but that in view of the considerations reviewed above, this occupation should not be effected before the coming into force of the Treaty.

DESTICKER	SACKVILLE-WEST	CAVALLERO	EMBICK
Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council.	Major-General, Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council.	Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council.	Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council.

#### APPENDIX B TO NO. 12

S.W.C. 476. (89th M.R.)

#### JOINT NOTE NO. 46

*Joint Note to the Supreme War Council by its Military Representatives*

*Subject: Suppression of the Inter-Allied Transportation Committee*

To the Supreme War Council.

By its decision dated February 1st, 1918, (3rd Session), the Supreme War Council approved Joint Note No. 8 of the Military Representatives in which they proposed 'The Constitution of an Inter-Allied Transportation Committee . . .<sup>11</sup> to report to the Supreme War Council.'

This Committee was charged 'to draw up a statement of the existing position of affairs as regards Inter-Allied Transportation, the projects now under way, the present state of, and future possibilities in, construction . . .<sup>11</sup> and to make definite recommendations as to their co-ordination on the most efficient lines . . .<sup>11</sup> to advise as to execution, and to report as to progress.'

The Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council *having taken into consideration*

1. That the principal reasons for the formation of the Inter-Allied Transportation Committee have ceased with the State of War,

2. That all the questions which have been sent for examination and report to the said Committee, by the Supreme War Council, or [sic], all preliminary technical examination having been completed, have at present been submitted to the decision of the interested Governments or of the Supreme Council,

3. That though, at the present moment, there may still exist numerous questions interesting any two Governments, there no longer exist from the point of view of transportation any questions common to all, beyond those dealt with by the Supreme Economic Council,

*are of opinion*

That the maintenance of the Inter-Allied Transportation Committee is no

<sup>11</sup> Punctuation as in original.

longer necessary, and that it would be advisable in consequence to decide on its suppression.

DESTICKER	SACKVILLE-WEST	CAVALLERO	ELMBICK
Military Representative, French Section, Supreme War Council.	Major-General, Military Representative, British Section, Supreme War Council.	Military Representative, Italian Section, Supreme War Council.	Military Representative, American Section, Supreme War Council.

*Given at Versailles 30th October, 1919.*

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 12

### *Note from the French Delegation*

#### *The Situation in Hungary*

The Supreme Council has, on many occasions, studied the situation in Hungary. Recently, it directed Sir George Clerk to proceed to Budapest, bearer of a decision made by the Allies in which the Friedrich Ministry was notified that it was invited to modify its Government and include democratic elements without delay.<sup>12</sup>

Since the arrival of the emissary of the Conference, the ministerial situation in Hungary has undergone no modification. If decisive measures are not adopted and put into execution by the Supreme Council, the situation in Hungary is very liable to become decisively more aggravated.

The position of the three powers now co-existing in Budapest may be presented in the following manner:

1st. Mr. Friedrich continues to elude the wishes of the Allies and to refuse to constitute a democratic Ministry, representative of all the elements of the country, the only Ministry which would be capable of conducting equitable elections and concluding a peace with the Allies in the name of the entire country.

On the other hand, Admiral Horthy, who is an energetic, ultra-reactionary personality, susceptible of intriguing for his own military dictatorship, has constituted a force comprising about 20,000 men who are fully armed and devoted to him.

These two elements (Mr. Friedrich and Admiral Horthy) represent, each on his side, a mask of the former absolutism and in particular the Archduke Joseph. If the Allies do not intervene, they will probably witness, immediately after the departure of the Roumanian troops, and even if a small police force has been constituted in the capital, the re-appearance, under one form or another, of the Hapsburg dynasty. The democratic policy, which is the policy of our Allies in Roumania, Bohemia, Jugoslavia, France [*sic*], England, the United States and Italy, will be justified in reproaching the Conference for allowing the establishment of a clerical and reactionary government which would finally re-establish fatal ties with Vienna and Berlin.

It must be added that Admiral Horthy, whose clique seems to favour a military dictatorship, in no wise dissimulates his intention to take advantage of the momentary difficulties existing in Slovakia to resume on the very first pretext the struggle against the Czechs and to commence by taking possession of Presbourg; the vital danger of that situation was pointed out by Mr. Benes.

<sup>12</sup> See No. 1, minute 2.

2nd. The Roumanian army, despite the reproaches made toward it concerning requisitions and the evident abuses of force committed by it, represents, however, the only material force which is capable of preventing the reconstruction of the Royalist Government at Budapest. The Allies esteem, however, that the Roumanian army must evacuate the capital as soon as possible in order to permit a regular Government to be constituted and operate freely. The Roumanians declare that they are ready to withdraw their troops to the rear, in view of the present situation, but point out that if such decisions are taken, the situation will become still more embarrassing for the Allies. They have, moreover, furnished the armies [? arms] necessary for the organization of the city police force.

3rd. The Commission of Generals, it must be admitted, has not succeeded, despite all efforts, to satisfactorily accomplish its general mission, nor the special missions with which it was entrusted by the Supreme Council on several occasions. The French General has taken no action. His English colleague appears to be acting in accordance with the original views which, however, do not conform with the decisions and instructions of the Conference. The American General and his Italian colleague, despite their efforts of loyal documentation, do not appear to have been clearly conscious of the views of the Allies. Under these circumstances, it does not appear that the Commission of Generals is capable of resolving, in itself, no matter what instructions may be sent them, the difficulties of the Hungarian problem.

To find a practical solution of the difficulties of the Hungarian situation, and to place the country in a position to sign peace with the Allies, a primary condition to the re-establishment of order and for the functioning of a regular government, the following provisions may be considered:

1st. Mr. Friedrich having shown that he could not or would not constitute a Government in which all the democratic elements of the population would be represented, should be obliged to retire and make place for a democratic government, the elements of which exist in Budapest.

2nd. An Inter-Allied force of two divisions, placed under the orders of an Allied Staff, in command of a General selected by the Conference, and comprising Roumanian, Czech and Serbian contingents, could replace the Roumanian troops which are to fall back to the Theiss.

This small occupation corps would supervise the organization of a local police, disarm Admiral Horthy's army of adventurers, and would guarantee freedom in the elections and the operations of the new Hungarian Government. As soon as the situation would have been regulated, and the return of the fallen dynasty averted, the Allies would withdraw their troops. The signing of the peace would finally be made possible and the country would resume its normal situation.

If the Allies allow the situation at Budapest to continue, and if they do not adopt a complete and precise plan of action, the Hungarian situation is liable to compromise the entire condition in [? of] Central Europe.

## APPENDIX D TO NO. 12

### *Telegram*

Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the French Minister—Bucarest.

The Supreme Council has decided to request the Allied Ministers at Bucarest to notify, jointly, without delay, the Roumanian Government of the fact that it was

unfavourably impressed upon learning that General Coanda, sent as special envoy to Paris by the Roumanian Ministry, arrived without the Roumanian reply to the last note from the Powers, under the pretext that the Italian Minister had not taken this step at the same time as France, England and United States. The Supreme Council expresses the formal desire to obtain, within the shortest time, a brief and clear reply from the Roumanian Government on all the points discussed. As the situation in Hungary demands an early decision in order to ensure the re-establishment of normal conditions which is absolutely essential for the security of Central Europe, the principal Allied and Associated Powers cannot allow to Roumania to [*sic*] prolong dilatory negotiations on the three questions stated October 12th last.<sup>4</sup>

Please communicate this in the name of the Conference, collectively with your colleagues, who need not wait for special instructions from their Governments, owing to the urgency of the situation.

PICHON.

#### APPENDIX G TO NO. 12

PARIS, October 28, 1919.

From: Roosmale Nepveu<sup>13</sup>

To: Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Dutch Government has noted the text, as published in the papers, of a note addressed to the German Government by the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers.<sup>7</sup> It is shown in this note that the Supreme Council has requested the delivery of the following five ships to the Allied Governments: *Johan Heinrich Burchard*, *William Oswald*, *Braunschweig*, *Denderah*, *Nassau*.

The 'Koninklijke Hollandsche Lloyd' Dutch Navigation Company purchased the *William Oswald* and the *Johan Heinrich Burchard* on the 15th of June 1916. The other three ships were purchased by the 'Holland-Amerika Lijn' Dutch Navigation Company on July 29, 1915 and August 7, 1915.

These ships, the purchase price of which was paid by the two Companies in question, were in course of construction at the time of the transaction. With reference to these ships, they were never at any time, properly speaking, German property and were never carried on the register of German ships. They were provided for the first time with Dutch clearances.

As a consequence, the ships in question are incontestably Dutch property, the more so in that at the time of the transaction there existed no prescription prohibiting the sale of German ships, in course of construction, or the purchase of German ships, by neutrals.

The Dutch Government has indicated the rights of the Dutch Companies to the German Government.

The Government of the Queen thought it advisable to bring the preceding to the knowledge of the Supreme Council. The Government entertains the hope that the Supreme Council will recognize the rights of the Dutch Companies, and that [? no] measures will be taken which would thwart the delivery of the ships in question to their legitimate owners.

By order of my Government, I have the honour to apply to your Excellency to act as intermediary in presenting this communication to the Supreme Council.

Please accept, etc.

<sup>13</sup> Netherlands Secretary of Legation in Paris.

## APPENDIX H TO NO. 12

A. S. German Ships ceded to Holland.

October 31, 1919.

### *Note from the Drafting Committee*

The Drafting Committee is of the opinion that the letter from the Dutch Minister, dated October 28th, calls for the following response:

A ship of enemy origin cannot, during the war, escape the practice of the rights of belligerents, that is to say the liability of capture during hostilities, by sale or cession, nor upon the reestablishment of Peace, escape the Peace Conditions covering enemy ships.

The letter from the Dutch Minister contends that upon the dates when the purchase of these ships took place, there existed no prescription prohibiting the purchase of German ships by neutrals.

The Minister of the Netherlands appears to forget that by international law, the purchase of enemy ships in the course of war cannot, in principle, be opposed to the belligerents.

HENRI FROMAGEOT.

## APPENDIX J TO NO. 12

The European Danube Commission:

Whereas Article 349 of the Peace Treaty with Germany provides for the early meeting of an International Conference to establish the regime which is to apply to the Danube throughout its entire internationalized course; whereas it is indispensable that the European Danube Commission be represented in this Conference to indicate the interests it represents and to furnish the benefits of its experience in Danubian affairs;

Decides: to request the Supreme Council of the Allies to kindly assure the representation of the European Danube Commission in the said Conference.

## APPENDIX L TO NO. 12

*Note handed to Mr. Loucheur by the President of the German Peace Delegation*

PARIS, October 27, 1919.

On account of the threatening nature of the food situation in Germany, a contract has been concluded with Denmark for the delivery of 50,000 tons of potatoes.

It is absolutely necessary that these potatoes be transported before the commencement of the frosts.

It is impossible, however, to make the shipments in time without having recourse to German tonnage and to cross the Baltic sea. The transportation should be made by steamers and German lighters of about 500 to 750 tons.

For this reason petitions have already been addressed to the Allied and Associated Governments by Denmark on this subject.

H. D. 83.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 4, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de St. Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino, SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were interested:

U.S.A.: Dr. J. B. Scott.  
*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Captain Fuller, R.N., Mr. A. Leeper, Commander Dunne, Mr. Malkin.  
*France*: Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Desticker, General Le Rond, M. Fromageot.  
*Italy*: General Cavallero, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Dell'Abbadessa, M. Pilotti, Prince Boncompagni.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

1.

*Curtailment of  
 Service on Ger-  
 man Railroads*

[Not printed]<sup>1</sup>

2. (The Council had before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council dated November 1st, 1919 (see Appendix B,.)  
*Hungarian Question* M. BERTHELOT said that it was evident from reading Sir George Clerk's telegram that everyone in Hungary desired the departure of the Roumanian troops; they were an embarrassment both to the Friedrich Government and to the Allied Generals, whose authority was compromised by their presence. But, in spite of this fact, it remained necessary to have an Inter-Allied force on the spot. This seemed to him all the more essential as he noted that the only Allied representative having a real influence in Hungary was Admiral Troubridge, and he supposed that this was because of the vessels under the Admiral's command. So the Roumanians should leave, but on the other hand, it was necessary to have an Inter-Allied force which

<sup>1</sup> Marshal Foch explained that the German authorities had 'informed the Allied representatives that the German Government had decided to stop all passenger train service from the 5th to the 15th of November, both in the occupied and unoccupied parts of Germany. After the 15th of November passenger traffic would be restored but all express trains would be suppressed.' The Supreme Council 'decided to approve the communication to be sent by Marshal Foch to the German Government notifying it that the Allied and Associated Powers could not permit a substantial curtailment of service on railroads in the occupied territories'. (Appendix A in original.)

would be more than a moral force. Sir George Clerk's telegram also indicated that the Friedrich Government would retire as soon as the Roumanian troops had left. Under these conditions it seemed to him that the order of events should be as follows: (1) formation of an Inter-Allied force, if it were decided to form one; (2) departure of the Roumanian troops, as soon as this Inter-Allied force could reach its destination; (3) withdrawal of the Friedrich cabinet; and, (4) formation of a democratic government which would take charge of elections. Sir George Clerk, as a perfect gentleman, seemed to feel confidence in Admiral Horthy, in whom he had found a pleasing personality. As far as he was concerned, it seemed to him that the word of an Hungarian Admiral, however likeable he might be, and whose intentions moreover were known, was not sufficient.

M. DE MARTINO said that the Italian Delegation was of the opinion that the occupation of Hungary by an Inter-Allied force composed of Jugo-Slavs and Czechs would result in trouble; these troops, particularly the Jugo-Slav troops, had shown in the past that they were not averse to pillaging. Moreover, there existed a profound hatred between Hungarians and Serbs. The Italian Delegation therefore thought that the troops which it was proposed to send to Hungary would only increase disorder. The Italian representative at Budapest had proposed an alternative plan of charging the Inter-Allied Military Mission with supervising the organization of the Hungarian army and of ensuring that it did not fall into the hands of the reactionaries. Such a mission for the Generals could be considered as falling within the terms of the Armistice and would not constitute an illegal interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. In any case it would be well to know what kind of government it was desired to establish in Hungary. Sir George Clerk's report seemed to place confidence in Friedrich and Horthy, while, on the other hand, the French Delegation had characterized them as tools of Archduke Joseph; a definite policy should be adopted.

M. BERTHELOT replied that if the Serbs and Czechs were to be commanded by Serb and Czech officers it would evidently be impossible to use them, but it was proposed to place these troops under Allied command. Moreover, whatever bitterness might exist in Hungary against the Serbs, he thought that Hungarian public opinion was resigned to the loss of certain territories. In the next place, it seemed scarcely possible that Admiral Horthy's army could be controlled by a Commission which had no material force at its disposition: to follow any such line of action would be tantamount to insisting on a policy of impotence. Finally, as to the question of knowing what government should be supported, he thought that there was no difference of opinion, and that M. de Martino himself had no doubts concerning the true aims of Friedrich. This point of paramount importance remained: as long as the Roumanians were there, the Hungarian Government had been able to do nothing. The day the Roumanians left and nothing remained but the moral force of the Allied Generals, the country would be delivered over to reaction and monarchical restoration. It was vital to have a real force in Hungary; the question was to know what this force should be.

MR. POLK asked who would pay the Czecho-Slovak and Serbian troops placed under Allied Command. It was evident that it would not be their governments.

M. BERTHELOT observed that the financial question would have to be examined but that it was less important than the question of principle which should be decided first.

M. PICHON pointed out that it was necessary to know if it was agreed to organize an Inter-Allied force. For his part he thought it indispensable. As long as Friedrich was there the establishment of a democratic form of government could not be counted upon. Friedrich had proved that he was either unable or unwilling to establish one.

MR. POLK said that his difficulty was that the plan now proposed had not been suggested either by Sir George Clerk or by the Allied Generals; it was being discussed at long range. Moreover, he thought that there would be difficulties in obtaining the necessary cooperation of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs; it would also be difficult to persuade the Roumanians to withdraw completely, and the Council would find it hard to maintain control of the situation. Finally, he doubted if an Allied command would suffice to prevent the pillaging and disorders that M. de Martino mentioned.

M. PICHON said that evidently no decision could now be taken and that Sir George Clerk and the Allied Generals should be consulted.

M. BERTHELOT observed that it would certainly be preferable to send Allied troops into Hungary, but that none were available. It was also clear that it would be difficult to eliminate the Roumanians, and that if the three countries bordering on Hungary participated in that operation the difficulties would be less. On both sides there were adverse considerations between which a choice would have to be made.

M. DE MARTINO requested that his proposal be submitted also to Sir George Clerk. He was, moreover, greatly impressed by the fact that Sir George Clerk thought that Horthy could be persuaded to keep his promises.

M. PICHON thought it was extraordinary that Admiral Horthy, who had raised an army with certain well known intentions, should suddenly renounce his designs.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that Sir George Clerk had also indicated the possibility of trusting Friedrich and had spoken of private negotiations relative to the formation of a Ministry, whereas M. Berthelot had said that the Council had already pronounced against Friedrich.

M. BERTHELOT said that it should be recalled that after Sir George Clerk's first trip, the Council had agreed that Friedrich must be eliminated. A draft telegram to this effect had been prepared. In order not to seem to intervene in the internal affairs of Hungary this telegram had not been sent and it had been decided to entrust Sir George Clerk with a new mission, but Sir George Clerk's instructions were contained in the draft telegram.<sup>2</sup> This draft had been prepared by Sir George Clerk and himself. Sir George had pointed out to him that it would be best not to give Friedrich an order to withdraw and

<sup>2</sup> See No. 1, minute 2.

to only tell him that for the last time he was asked to form a democratic government—a thing which they judged it impossible for him to do. He recalled also that the Council had thought of publishing the telegram in order to strengthen the hands of the Hungarian democratic elements. It was clear that if Friedrich had been able to form a democratic government he would long since have done so. Sir George Clerk, moreover, did not seem to have any doubt of his withdrawal. It seemed to him that the Friedrich Government, like any monarchical Government which attempted to establish itself in Hungary, should withdraw.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he entirely agreed that Sir George Clerk should be consulted; he himself had suggested it at the preceding meeting of the Council. There was first of all a point which had to be clarified, namely: what was being asked of Hungary? It was to have a stable Government which would preside over the elections and with which Peace could be concluded. The occupation, which M. Berthelot thought would be a short one, was therefore bound up with the question of elections, and might well be prolonged. Furthermore, Sir George Clerk thought that Friedrich would withdraw after the departure of the Roumanians and he manifested a great deal of confidence in Admiral Horthy's assurance that he would recognize a Government resulting from the elections. Sir George must have had serious reasons for this opinion and he, himself, attached great weight to it. Moreover, it was well known that the majority of the Hungarian population favoured the establishment of a conservative form of government; if the elections took place without mismanagement it was almost certain that the resulting Government would not be democratic. However, there existed no right to prevent the Hungarian people from forming a government corresponding to its own tendencies, provided there were no question of restoring the Hapsburgs. He thought, indeed, that Admiral Horthy was counting on the elections to bring about in Hungary a Government satisfactory to himself, and that doubtless explained his attitude and the assurance he had given to Sir George Clerk. Ought military intervention to be resorted to, in order to prevent such elections? The whole question lay there. In the meantime, elections were impossible in Hungary until the Roumanians had retired beyond the Theiss. The intervention of the Czechs and Serbs might likewise create difficulties. He doubted whether that intervention could be obtained since the Czechs were probably not inclined to favour the formation of a Government whose tendencies would cause them anxiety. Moreover, if the intervention of the Jugo-Slavs were requested they might ask to be guaranteed against an Italian attack; what would be done then? He thought, for his part, that Sir George Clerk ought first of all to be asked if he thought it expedient to form the Inter-Allied force which had been suggested. Why not be satisfied with the departure of Friedrich and the formation of another Government? That was what had been desired by the Council. There had been no thought of military occupation and no new fact had occurred to justify that occupation.

M. BERTHELOT thought that there was a new fact, namely: the organiza-

tion of Horthy's army. He was very nearly in agreement with the essential part of Sir Eyre Crowe's statements. It was indeed probable that the elections would be favourable to politicians of the same shade of opinion as Friedrich, but the principle should be agreed to that the return of the Hapsburgs could not be tolerated. It was impossible to intervene in opposition to the opinion of the country, nevertheless this opinion could not be allowed to do what it pleased. Moreover, he did not think that the Czechs would create any difficulty over giving the assistance which would be asked of them, for Mr. Benes had been the first to point out the danger. There was no doubt that the police of Friedrich and the army of Horthy would, at the time of the elections, act favourably to the reactionary elements.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that Sir George Clerk should be asked if he was sure of the good faith of Friedrich and Horthy.

M. DE MARTINO said that Sir Eyre Crowe had alluded to a question which the Jugo-Slavs would doubtless raise if they were asked to send troops into Hungary. He could not better reply than by reiterating the opposition of the Italian Delegation to the sending of Serbian troops into Hungary.

M. BERTHELOT asked the reasons for this opposition.

M. DE MARTINO said the reasons were those that he had already pointed out; he was willing, however, for Sir George Clerk to be consulted on this point provided that his (M. de Martino's) suggestions were also submitted to him.

M. PICHON pointed out that Sir George Clerk had made another recommendation, namely: sending an Inter-Allied Mission to Transylvania. For his part he approved of this recommendation.

MR. POLK asked if the members of this proposed Mission could not be taken from the Allied officers at Budapest.

SIR EYRE CROWE recalled that Transylvania was to be given to Roumania, and inquired whether such a Mission could be sent without previous negotiations with Roumania.

MR. POLK suggested that Sir George Clerk be asked what part of Transylvania was referred to in his telegram.

M. PICHON added that he might also be asked to specify the accusations made against the Roumanians.

M. BERTHELOT read a draft telegram which he had prepared in conformity with the views expressed in the course of the discussion.

MR. POLK asked if the sense of the Council was that the Roumanians should eventually be represented in the Inter-Allied force.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he, just as did the American Delegation, saw difficulties in such a course.

M. PICHON said that he was not desirous to have the Roumanians included in this force, but he thought that their exclusion would create additional difficulties.

MR. POLK remarked that he had only said that it seemed to him difficult for the Roumanians to accept exclusion from the Inter-Allied force.

SIR EYRE CROWE called attention to the fact that Sir George Clerk had asked if he was authorized to state that the Allies would recognize a Govern-

ment, acceptable to him, which did not include Friedrich. A reply on this point should be sent to him.

MR. POLK said he took it as understood that the telegram would be submitted to the Council before being despatched.

It was decided:

that at its next meeting the Council would examine a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk to be prepared by M. Berthelot in conformity with the discussion of this question at the meeting of November 4th.

3. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation dated November 3, 1919 (see Appendix C).<sup>3</sup>)

*Conference preparatory  
to putting into force  
the Treaty with  
Germany*

GENERAL LE ROND said that there had already been preliminary conferences between the British and French delegates on the various Plebiscite Commissions. It would be very advisable for the Italian delegates to participate as soon as possible in these conferences. The Council should not forget that these Commissions were important bodies, that each country had to organize a numerous personnel and that such organization would necessarily entail a long delay. In these preliminary conferences it would be necessary to agree on the personnel to be furnished by each Allied country and to prepare the negotiations with the Germans.

M. DE MARTINO thought that November 7th was somewhat early. The 8th or 9th would be better.

GENERAL LE ROND observed that there was no obligation to commence negotiations with the Germans exactly on the 10th.

M. PICHON wished to draw the attention of the Italian Delegation to the question of the contingent to be supplied by Italy for the forces of occupation; the Council did not yet know if Italy had withdrawn her reservation.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that the instructions he had just received authorized him to withdraw that reservation. The Italian contingent would consist of five battalions and two batteries of field artillery, that is to say,

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. In this note the French Delegation, referring to the Allied note of November 1, 1919, which had invited the German Government to send to Paris, for November 10, representatives qualified to arrange with Allied representatives the necessary measures relative to the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles (see No. 10, appendix B), drew attention to the necessity for preliminary interallied meetings in this connexion and proposed that: '(1) the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, designated at the rate of at least one delegate for each Power and for each Commission, assemble on November 7 at the Quai d'Orsay: (2) sessions of the Commissions which are to commence operations on November 10, in participation with the Germans, be held. In view of these early conferences the French Delegation calls the attention of the Supreme Council to the necessity of regulating the two following questions as promptly as possible: (1st) *Strength of Occupation Forces*: American troops will not participate in the occupation before the ratification of the Treaty by the United States. However, the emplacement of their battalions is reserved, in accord with the American Government.' The note then referred under this head to the Italian contingent, for which see the discussion in the Supreme Council. (2nd) *Presidency of the Inter-Allied Commissions in the Zones of Occupation*: see the discussion in the Supreme Council.

three battalions and two batteries of field artillery would be sent to Upper Silesia, one battalion to Marienwerder and one to Teschen. He would come to an agreement with Marshal Foch's staff to have the strength of the three battalions destined for Upper Silesia sufficiently reinforced to equal approximately the five battalions demanded.

MARSHAL FOCH said that this plan ought to be examined more closely but in principle it seemed admissible.

M. PICHON said that the Presidents of the Commissions should be named. The Council had decided on the 18th October that the Presidents should be elected by the Commissions themselves,<sup>4</sup> but it later seemed preferable to have the Council appoint them directly.<sup>5</sup> Ought it to wait until the Commissions had been formed?

GENERAL LE ROND thought that it was important to make these appointments as soon as possible. Indeed the Presidency carried with it certain obligations; the nations furnishing the Presidents would also have to furnish a larger personnel. They, therefore, should be settled upon as soon as possible. If it were decided that the Presidency of each Commission should be given to the Nation to which had been entrusted the command of the troops in the same zone, he wished to recall that at Allenstein the military command would be British, at Marienwerder Italian, in Upper Silesia French, and at Teschen American; but as for Teschen the American participation was awaiting the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate, and the question was all the more urgent inasmuch as only two months were left in which to hold the plebiscite.

M. PICHON said that the Council felt that it was fitting that the military command in each territory to be occupied, and the Presidency of the plebiscite Commission in the same territory, should pertain to the same Nation.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that while waiting for America to assume the Presidency of the Teschen Commission it should be held by France, which already administered the neighbouring territory of Upper Silesia.

MR. POLK agreed.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that a telegram had just been received from General Henrys containing information of the agreements concluded between the Germans and Poles with respect to regulating the taking over by Poland of territories to be immediately ceded to it by virtue of the Treaty of Peace. The application of these agreements, moreover, raised certain difficulties; for instance, it involved the passage over part of the territory of the free city of Danzig of German troops. Under these circumstances he thought it important to notify the Poles to send here representatives qualified to continue their negotiations with the Germans under the auspices of the Conference. (This recommendation was approved.)

It was decided:

- (1) that the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on Plebiscite or Administrative Commissions, to the extent of at least one

<sup>4</sup> See No. 2, minute 1.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 3, minute 6.

- Delegate from each Power on each Commission, should assemble at the Quai d'Orsay as soon as practicable—November 7th if possible;
- (2) that the Polish Government should be invited to send to Paris representatives empowered to conduct with the German Government—under the auspices of the Conference—the negotiations rendered necessary by the cession to Poland of German territory, at the same time as the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers discussed with the German Delegates questions raised by the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace.

It was further decided:

- (1) that the Presidency of the Plebiscite Commissions should at Allenstein be held by the British Representative, at Marienwerder by the Italian, in Upper Silesia by the French, and at Teschen by the American; although provisionally it should be held at Teschen by the French Representative;
- (2) that the question of the strength of the Italian troops of occupation should be settled by Marshal Foch and the Italian Military Representative.

4-

*Transportation on the  
Baltic of wood des-  
tined for Belgium*

[Not printed]<sup>6</sup>

5. GENERAL WEYGAND stated that with respect to their railway system the Baltic Provinces were in a peculiar situation. During the war the Germans changed the tracks to normal gauge with the result that at present only German material and transformed Russian material could circulate on the Baltic system. It was evident that in order to assure the continuance of the economic life of the country part of the German material should be retained on the spot. Neither the Armistice nor the Treaty accorded the right to demand this. He proposed that the German Government be informed that, by reason of Germany's deliberate transformation of the railways of the Baltic Provinces, General Niessel should be empowered to determine the amount of German material to be retained in those territories.

It was decided:

that the German Government should be informed by Marshal Foch that, in consequence of the transformation of the railways of the Baltic Provinces effected by the Germans during the war, General Niessel would be

<sup>6</sup> In accordance with the view expressed by Sir E. Crowe, the Supreme Council 'decided to transmit to the Allied Naval Armistice Commission the note from the Belgian Delegation [dated October 25, 1919: appendix D in original] relative to German vessels laden with wood destined for Belgium, and to inform the Commission that the Supreme Council was of the opinion that the instructions previously given by it involved the granting of the Belgian request' for the early clearance of 'several ships loaded with wood in Finland and ultimately destined for Belgium' which had 'been stopped in Baltic ports as a result of the blockade proclaimed by the Supreme Council'.

empowered to determine the amount of German rolling stock which should be left in those regions.

6. The Council had before it the draft letter to the *Chargé d'Affaires* of the Dutch Government relative to the vessels sold by Germany during the war to Dutch Navigation Companies. Appendix E.

*Note to the  
Chargé d'Affaires  
of the Dutch  
Government*

It was decided:

to approve the text of the note to the *Chargé d'Affaires* of the Dutch Government relative to German ships sold during the war to Dutch Navigation Companies.

7. The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 3rd, 1919 (see Appendix F.)

*Representation of  
the European  
Danube Commis-*

*sion in the Con-  
ference provided  
for by Article 349  
of the Treaty of  
Versailles*

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the only thing to do was to approve the recommendations of the note. The Council at that moment agreed that the Secretary-General of the European Danube Commission, that is to say, Colonel Rey, should be Secretary-General of the Conference provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(It was decided:

- (1) to approve the recommendations of the note prepared by the Drafting Committee (see Appendix F)<sup>7</sup> relative to representation of the European Danube Commission in the Conference provided for by Article 349 of the Treaty of Versailles;
- (2) that the Secretary-General of the European Danube Commission should act as Secretary-General of the said Conference.)

8. M. FROMAGEOT said that the Drafting Committee wondered whether it would not be expedient to have Bulgaria sign a Protocol similar to those signed by the German and Austrian Delegations at Versailles and at St. Germain. It was difficult to take the Versailles Protocol as a guide for the Protocol in question. On the other hand, the St. Germain Protocol<sup>18</sup> contained provisions which it would be advantageous to have Bulgaria sign. For instance, it provided, in Section 1, that the list of persons to be handed over to the Allied and Associated Governments by Austria pursuant to Article 173, paragraph 2,

*Protocol to be signed  
by Bulgaria*

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. The conclusion of this brief note, prepared in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council recorded in No. 12, minute 8, was that 'on the one hand, it does not seem possible . . . that the Danube Commission be designated as a Power, member of the Conference: on the other, it appears necessary to establish a close contact between the Commission and the Conference.'

'These two viewpoints could be easily reconciled, if the Supreme Council, in naming the Powers which are to compose the Conference, give them the following recommendation:

'1. Not to come to any decision without first having heard the Danube Commission, and  
'2. To choose as Secretary-General of the Conference a qualified representative of the Commission.'

<sup>18</sup> Printed in Treaty Series (1919) No. 11. Cmd. 400, pp. 115-16.

of the Treaty, should be sent to the Austrian Government within a month of the coming into force of the Treaty. A similar clause could be inserted in the Bulgarian Protocol. The provisions contained in Section 2 seemed inapplicable to Bulgaria. The same was not true of the provisions of Section 3; but as the Bulgarian Treaty, with respect to reparations, differed greatly from the Austrian Treaty, he thought that the opinion of the Reparation Commission should be asked on that point. Finally, Section 4 could be advantageously reproduced. Austria had also signed at St. Germain a declaration by which it undertook to communicate to the Allied and Associated Governments all the information at its disposal relative to vessels sunk or damaged by Austrian naval forces during the war.<sup>9</sup> It might not be very beneficial to have Bulgaria sign a corresponding declaration, but at least it could not be prejudicial.

(It was decided:

- (1) that the Drafting Committee should prepare, to be signed at the same time as the Bulgarian Treaty, a draft protocol similar to the protocol signed September 10, 1919, at Saint Germain,<sup>8</sup> by the Austrian Delegation, subject to the decision of the Reparation Commission as to the expediency of repeating in the said protocol the provisions or [of] Sections 2 and 3 of the Protocol of Saint Germain;
- (2) that the Drafting Committee should prepare, to be signed by the Bulgarian Delegation at the same time as the Treaty of Peace, a declaration similar to the one signed on September 10, 1919, by the Austrian Delegation.<sup>9</sup>)

9. M. MATSUI stated that he had been telegraphically informed that the Emperor of Japan, on October 30th, had ratified the Treaty of Versailles. Under the final clauses of the Treaty of Peace it became his duty to make a formal notification of this ratification. Should he do so at once or await the signature of the procès-verbal relative to the deposit of ratifications? It seemed to him that he might await this latter date.

M. PICHON said that the Conference would approve the procedure prescribed by the Drafting Committee.

M. FROMAGEOT said that that Committee had provided for this contingency in the draft procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications which had been approved by the Council. This draft had spoken of 'deposit of ratifications or of notifications of ratifications'.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 4, 1919.*

<sup>9</sup> Printed *ibid.*, p. 117.

APPENDIX B TO No. 13

Telegram from Sir George Clark, Budapest, to Sir E. Grey, London, Austria

D. November 1st 1913. R. November 2nd 1913.

No. 3.

Following for Supreme Council No. 2.

Situation here is extraordinarily complicated and difficult. Three or two months ago provisional coalition government could have been made comparatively easily. Since then anti-Semitic crusade has grown to a great height and though really genuine has been to some extent fostered for political purposes. Result is that it is impossible to ignore popular sentiment which unless handled with great care will break out in violence and unrest throughout country.

I have seen important representatives of every shade of opinion and my general conclusions are as follows:

1. Immediate evacuation of Roumanian forces is essential. Whatever risks, I have not found one Hungarian apart from extreme Jewish and social democrats who are not agreed upon this. Until Roumanians go nothing serious can be done here and it is only this tangible proof of betterment that will enable me to handle problem of Christian National party which is name of this mass of excited popular feeling which looks on Friedrich as the standard bearer. M. Diamandi assures me that immediately on my arrival he telegraphed urgently to Bucharest pressing for withdrawal but so far has had no reply. Possible Roumanian elections which I understand are at present taking place in Bucharest may account for this but I beg Supreme Council will exercise all possible pressure on Roumanian Government to secure earliest possible withdrawal. I trust Roumanian[s] will be required to evacuate all occupied territory that is to say that they will not be allowed to remain on . . .<sup>11</sup> A further reason for early evacuation is that there are signs of an early and very hard winter and this means that with a frozen Danube vessels of inter-allied Danube Commission will be immobile and only force we possess to assist in maintaining order will be powerless.

2. Once I have this definite assurance of Roumanian evacuation I can approach Friedrich and I hope obtain from him a definite assurance that he will make way for a government which corresponds with wishes of Supreme Council.

3. Private negotiations are in train for formation of such a Government. In view of great weight and excited feeling of Christian National Party they must be fully represented and care taken not to give them occasion to think they are being swamped by Jews and Socialists. If however all goes well there will be a government which will fully meet requirements of Supreme Council. I shall of course satisfy myself main Hungarian parties . . .<sup>10</sup> Christian National Party are content with their representatives in this government. As it may be of great importance before they settle transfer of government from Friedrich to his successor at short notice I venture to ask that I may if necessary assure new government of provisional recognition of Supreme Council. Time necessary only to exchange telegrams after formal [?formation] new government may upset whole scheme.

4. I have seen Admiral Horthy. He inspires confidence. He will give me a formal assurance that he will accept new government and keep his troops in hand. In order to quiet *en bloc* apprehension of Jewish and Socialist convention here

<sup>10</sup> The text here is uncertain.

I have told Admiral Horthy that on the strength of his assurance I shall give my personal assurance to these people that order will be maintained. Otherwise there may be something like panic.

6. It would be practically impossible to include a Jew in the new Provisional government. Nor do Jews themselves wish it. I shall however see that they are satisfied with composition of government.

7. Reports reach me here as to Roumanian action in Transylvania which leaves little doubt Roumanians are acting there not only with great harshness but in flagrant violation of conditions of peace treaty. If it were possible for an inter-Allied commission to visit Transylvania to report on situation confidence and trust of this people in justice of Allies would be firmly established. I am sending by despatch report on conditions in Transylvania.

#### APPENDIX E TO No. 13

##### *Proposed Letter to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Netherlands*

PARIS, November 4, 1919.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 28 last,<sup>11</sup> in which you kindly requested me to communicate to the Supreme Council the views of the Netherlands Government relative to German ships, claimed by Holland as having been sold during the war by the Hamburg-Amerika-Line and the Kosmos-Line to the profit of the Netherlands companies Lloyd Royal Holland and Holland-Amerika-Line.

I have the honour of informing you that the conditions under which this transaction was made do not permit the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to recognize the property right to these ships by the Dutch companies interested.

It may be noted that, on the other hand, according to the terms of the Armistice Convention of January 16, 1919, Germany must hand over all her commercial vessels to the Allies, and that between the signing and the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, no act of Germany could be tolerated which would infringe upon the execution of her obligation to hand over her commercial vessels to the Allied and Associated Powers, according to the provisions of the Treaty.

Under these conditions the Supreme Council has requested me to advise you that the claims of the Dutch companies interested cannot be complied with.

If these interested parties have any claims to enter, they should present them to Germany, whose intervention in this respect is provided for in paragraph 7 of Annex III of Part VIII (Reparations) of the Peace Treaty with Germany.

<sup>11</sup> See No. 12, appendix G.

H. D. 84.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, November 5, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. POLK; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire:* Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France:* M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.  
*Italy:* M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.  
*Japan:* M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire:* Capt. G. Lochian Small. *France:* M. Messigli. *Italy:* M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Bliss.  
*British Empire:* General Sackville-West, Commander Lucas, R.N., Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. E. H. Carr.  
*Italy:* General Cavallero, General Marietti, M. Vannutelli-Rey, Prince Boncompagni.  
*Japan:* M. Shigemitsu.

1. The Council had before it a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk (see Appendix A).<sup>1</sup>

*Telegram to Sir George Clerk* SIR EYRE CROWE wished to remark that he proposed to replace paragraph 2 on page 1<sup>1</sup> by the following paragraph: 'The Roumanian troops shall evacuate Hungary completely and shall withdraw to the other side of the frontier as fixed by the Conference: it is indispensable that they should allow full liberty to the Hungarian elections.' In the following paragraph he suggested that the words, 'immediately thereafter' should be omitted. He wished to give Sir George Clerk discretion on the question of the time when the Friedrich cabinet should withdraw. If he were to await the complete evacuation by the Roumanian troops, this might be found too long.

M. DE MARTINO asked that a change be made in paragraph 1 of page 2,<sup>2</sup> so as to follow the suggestion made by the Italian representative at Budapest.

(The text was agreed to read as follows: 'Another suggestion had been made which charged the Inter-Allied Military Mission with the supervision of the organization . . . etc.' (see Appendix B).)

MR. POLK suggested that the beginning of paragraph 3 on page 2<sup>3</sup> be changed to read as follows: 'The Council would like to know whether, after having consulted the Inter-Allied Mission, and after . . . &c.'

<sup>1</sup> The second paragraph of the draft telegram.

<sup>2</sup> The fifth paragraph of the draft telegram.

<sup>3</sup> The seventh paragraph of the draft telegram.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to add to paragraph 3 of page 2,<sup>3</sup> after the words, 'by the Hungarian gendarmerie' the following words, 'which might be placed under the Control, direct or indirect, of the Inter-Allied Military Mission.'

(This change was adopted, and it was agreed to put after paragraph 3 of page 2,<sup>3</sup> the paragraph suggested by M. de Martino.)

(It was decided:

- (1) that Sir Eyre Crowe should send to Sir George Clerk, in the name of the Supreme Council, the telegram as shown in Appendix B;
- (2) that the telegram sent by the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government at its meeting of November 3rd, 1919,<sup>4</sup> should be communicated to Sir George Clerk.)

2. M. PICHON inquired whether Mr. Polk had received an answer on the subject from President Wilson.

*First Meeting of  
the Council of  
the League of  
Nations* MR. POLK said that the President would surely issue the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations; the only question was the form of letter which the President should write. This was still open and he expected an answer within a short time.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to state that the British Government had agreed upon Paris as the place of the first meeting of the Council.

M. BERTHELOT stated it had been understood between Sir Eric Drummond, Colonel House and the French Representative that this meeting should only nominate the Commission charged with fixing the boundaries of the Sarre district. There still remained the appointment of the Commission for the Government of the Sarre district. As soon as the Treaty was put into force, the German Government might ask, to whom should the sovereignty over this territory be transferred. The difficulty might of course be solved by prolonging the military occupation regime until the Commission for the Government of the Sarre had been appointed; but it was important that the Allies should agree on this intermediary solution. From the French standpoint, however, it was quite certain that it would be wiser to appoint the Government Commission at once and that it was to especially please the American and British Governments that this solution might be accepted.

MR. POLK remarked that he understood that this was the view of his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE feared that the Germans might cause trouble, if this were not fixed; Sir Eric Drummond however having agreed with his French and American colleagues, he (Sir Eyre Crowe) concluded that M. Berthelot's solution was correct.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that of course Germany would be very likely to send notes to the Allies on the subject but as it was only a question of a few weeks at the most, he thought it would be easy to gain the necessary time.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 12, appendix D.

It was decided:

- (1) that Paris should be the place of the first meeting of the Council of [the] League of Nations;
- (2) that on the agenda of the first meeting of the Council the only matter taken up would be the appointment of the Commission charged with fixing the boundaries of the Sarre territory;
- (3) that the present military occupation of the Sarre territory should continue until the Commission charged with the government of the Sarre district had been appointed.

3. The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation (see *Report of the Provisional Government of the Allied Governments of France and Great Britain*, Appendix C.)

(After a short discussion.

It was decided:

that Sir Eyre Crowe should notify the Delegates of the provisional Government at Meusel that the permission requested could not be granted but that as soon as the Treaty of Peace was put into force the Allied and Associated Powers would welcome the co-operation of the local Officials who are natives of the country.

4. The Council had before it instructions to General Niessel, President of the Commission charged with the control of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces. (See Appendix D.<sup>5</sup>)

*Instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission to examine into the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces* SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the last phrase of paragraph 1, Section 5 entitled, 'Action of the Allied Navy in the Baltic,' beginning with the words, 'the Commission will serve as an intermediary' [?] should be removed. (This was agreed to.)

Sir Eyre Crowe also wished to remark that as far as transportation was concerned, the British Government would do all in its power, but could not guarantee transportation.

M. BERTHELOT stated that General Niessel had already insisted before the Council on his Commission getting the necessary credits: it had adjourned the examination of this question,<sup>6</sup> but General Niessel called the attention of the Council to a case which needed its immediate decision. From the information at hand, it seemed that Colonel Bermont's troops would probably be

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. These instructions were as follows:

*Sections 1-4* identical with sections 1-4 of the original draft (see No. 7, appendix C, subject to the amendments adopted by the Supreme Council on October 28, 1919 (see No. 7, minute 3, and to the insertion in section 2 of the name of General Turner.

*Section 5* identical with section 9 of the original draft subject to the amendment adopted by the Supreme Council on October 28, 1919.

*Section 6* identical with section 10 of the original draft subject to the amendment adopted by the Supreme Council on October 30, 1919 (see No. 9, minute 5).

*Section 7*, which read: 'It is further decided that the Commission shall leave as soon as possible and shall commence the labours with which it is entrusted, without awaiting the political instructions which may be sent ulteriorly after discussion and approval by the Supreme Council.'

<sup>6</sup> See No. 7, minute 3.

dissolved, and it was important to know what would happen to the Russian troops which made up his forces. Of course every effort would be made to have these troops put under General Yudenitch's command, but a certain period might elapse before this could take place, and meanwhile it would be necessary to supply them if one did not want to throw them into the hands of the Bolsheviks. He thought it necessary to allot a certain amount of money to General Niessel which could be shared between the three Allies.

MR. POLK wished to state that, as far as America was concerned, it could provide no funds for that purpose.

SIR EYRE CROWE also remarked that he questioned the likelihood of his Government's participation.

M. BERTHELOT stated that it was already well understood that each power should stand the expenses of its representatives; but there surely were bound to be common expenses, and it seemed impossible to send this mission without a credit: France might decide to advance the sum for this purpose, it being well understood of course that the other Governments would reimburse it later.

MR. POLK remarked that the appropriations of the United States Government were so made that it could only pay the share of expenses for its own mission, and for a determined purpose.

M. BERTHELOT explained that was the reason he suggested a fixed amount. He thought the Council should recognize the importance of the solution.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired why they should not adopt M. Berthelot's solution, which was on the same lines as the procedure in the missions of Sir George Clerk and General Gough, where the British Government paid at first and the expenses were later shared.

M. BERTHELOT agreed that France was ready to follow this procedure, if it was understood that the other Allies would reimburse her for their share.

MR. POLK stated that his Government could not give a penny towards a Mission of a political nature.

SIR EYRE CROWE emphasized that his Government understood the mission to be a reply to the German demand for some body to supervise the German evacuation, and therefore it could not countenance its becoming involved in political activities.

M. BERTHELOT thought the question was a more complex one.

MR. POLK said he was quite sure that General Niessel understood that the American representative had strict instructions not to become involved in questions of a political nature.

M. DE MARTINO thought that it might be very difficult to make a difference between political questions and purely military questions; the one might involve the other; and he thought it important that the Generals should get definite instructions in advance on political questions which might come up, so that the action they took should be covered by a common agreement.

M. PICHON answered that it would be for the Generals to ask the Council for instructions. He summed up that the Commission would be the best judge of what measures it should take, and should they include or involve

questions of a political nature, then the Council should be informed immediately and a decision given.

(It was decided:

1. that in the section of instructions to General Niewel, entitled 'Action of the Inter-Allied Navy in the Baltic' the phrase which read: 'The Commission will serve as an intermediary between the Supreme Council and the Inter-Allied Military Mission' should be omitted;
2. that the Commission should keep strictly to the wording of their instructions and should refer to the Supreme Council any questions of a political nature involved in the carrying out of these instructions.)

5-

*Recapitulation of  
Questions still  
remaining to be  
taken up by the  
Supreme Council*

[Not printed]<sup>1</sup>

6. MR. POLK stated that the Supreme Council had made a decision on the question of the tank ships on September 27th<sup>2</sup> this decision stood, but he personally had decided without knowledge of the full facts, and wished to have the question raised at a later date when he had all available information. He simply wished this set upon the record.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 5, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 14

##### *Draft of a Telegram from the Supreme Council to Sir George Clerk, Budapest*

PARIS, November 5, 1919.

The Supreme Council has taken note of your various communications and is willing to comply with the principle of your suggestions. It is of the opinion that:

1st. The Roumanian troops must withdraw; it is indispensable that they allow full liberty to the Hungarian elections;

2nd. The Friedrich cabinet must resign immediately thereafter, and be replaced by a really different Government, comprising democratic elements, Governments [*sic*] which would hold the elections, and the recognition of which by the Allies you would be now authorized to guarantee.

<sup>1</sup> In the draft in appendix D of the original, as in appendix C to No. 7, this phrase read: 'The Commission will serve as an intermediary between the Supreme Council and the Allied Navy.'

<sup>2</sup> At the suggestion of M. Berthelot the Supreme Council 'decided that each Delegation should prepare a list of all questions which still remain to be taken up by the Supreme Council, and that the Secretary-General of the Conference should collate these lists for the Council's examination'.

<sup>3</sup> See Vol. I, No. 66, minute 1.

The Council was presented with a suggestion that, in order to prevent the elections and the Hungarian Government from being influenced by the local police, which is under the authority of Friedrich, and by the small army of Admiral Horthy, whose tendencies are plainly reactionary, the Roumanian military force should be replaced by an Allied military force capable of inspiring confidence in the population and to strengthen the moral authority of the commission of the generals and of the conference itself; the facts seemed to demonstrate that, without being supported by armed force, their decisions ran the risk of remaining unexecuted.

Another suggestion has been made that the control of the Hungarian army of Horthy by the commission of generals should be considered as sufficient.

It must not be forgotten that on one hand the Allies do not wish to hinder the expression of the free will of the Hungarians, but that on the other hand they have decided to prohibit the re-establishment of the fallen dynasty, either in a direct or indirect form.

The Council desires to know whether, after having considered all authorized views, you think that the Roumanian force should be replaced by an Inter-Allied force, or whether the assurances of Admiral Horthy and the guarantee of order represented by the Hungarian gendarmerie can be trusted.

The question of sending an Inter-Allied force raises the following difficulties: As the great powers have no force available, they consider sending two divisions of Czech and Serbian soldiers and subaltern officers, commanded by English, Italian, American and French superior officers, under the command of an energetic general, nominated by the Supreme Council.

The Italian Delegation objects to sending any Jugo-Slavs on account of the state of mind of the Hungarian population. On the other hand, all delegations realize the inconveniences which might result from the presence of contingents from small countries, neighbours of Hungary, and hostile, even under a firm Allied command. The essential question is to know whether the presence of a force at the disposal of the Allies is not necessary.

The Supreme Council, trusting to your judgment and your information on the ground, asks you for precise and prompt advice.

#### APPENDIX B TO NO. 14

##### *Telegram from Supreme Council*<sup>10</sup>

*November 5, 1919.*

To: Sir George Clerk, Budapest.

The Supreme Council has taken note of your various communications and is ready to adhere, in general, to your suggestions. It esteems that:

1st. The Roumanian troops must completely evacuate Hungary and withdraw beyond the frontiers fixed by the Conference; it is indispensable that the Hungarian elections be conducted with full liberty;

2nd. The Friedrich Ministry must withdraw to make room for a really different government comprising the democratic element. This Government would proceed with the elections, and you would be authorized to guarantee its recognition by the Allies.

<sup>10</sup> The telegram in this appendix is printed by F. Deák in *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1942), pp. 526-7.

The Council, as presented with a suggestion tending to emphasize the necessity, in order to prevent the election, and the Hungarian Government being subject to the influence of the local police - which is in the power of Friedrich, and by the small army of Admiral Horthy - first condemned - are openly reactionary, of replacing the Roumanian military force by an Allied military force capable of inspiring confidence in the population and strengthening the moral authority of the Commission of Generals and of the Conference itself. These facts appear to indicate that without material force their decisions are liable to remain non-executed.

On one hand, the fact that the Allies do not in any wise wish to impede the expression of the free will of the Hungarians must be clearly understood, but on the other hand they have decided to prevent the restoration of the fallen dynasty, in any form, either direct or indirect.

The Council would like to know if after consultation with the Commission of Generals, and having had recourse to all the authorized advice - which you are surrounded, you are convinced that the Roumanian forces ought to be replaced by Inter-Allied forces, or whether the assurances of Admiral Horthy and the guarantee of order represented by the Hungarian Government can be trusted, which might perhaps be placed under the direct or indirect control of the Commission of Generals.

Another suggestion was made to the effect of entrusting the Commission of Generals with the supervision of the organization of the Hungarian army, and to see that it is not employed for political purposes contrary to the views of the Allies. The Commission of Generals should also see that the occupation of the capital and of the country be conducted without excesses and without disturbing public order.

The question of sending an Inter-Allied force presents the following difficulties: as the Great Powers have no effectives available, they would be envisaged with the sending of two divisions of Czech and Serbian *non-commissioned officers and soldiers*, commanded by English, Italian, American and French superior officers under the orders of an energetic General nominated by the Supreme Council.

The Italian Delegation objects to sending any Jugo-Slavs, owing to the state of mind of the Hungarian population. For that matter, all Delegations realize the inconveniences which might result from the presence of contingents from the small neighbouring hostile countries of Hungary, even under a firm Allied command. The main question is to ascertain whether the presence of a force at the disposition of the Allies is not necessary.

The Supreme Council, confident in your judgment and your local information, asks you for precise and prompt advice.

#### APPENDIX C TO NO. 14

##### *Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council*

The British Delegation has received through the British Mission at Berlin the following telegram:—

‘Oberbürgermeister Altenberg and three representatives of the provisional Government of Memel request permission to proceed to Paris from Berlin to lay their case before the Supreme Council. German Foreign Office do not object. May permission be granted?’

The delegation proposes to reply that the permission requested should not be granted but that the Delegates may be assured that, in the execution of the Treaty of Peace at Memel, as elsewhere, the co-operation of local officials who are natives of the country will be welcomed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

4th November, 1919.

## No. 15

H. D. 85.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 6, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Dr. J. B. Scott.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Mr. A. Leeper.

*France*: General Walch, Colonel Roye, M. Fromageot.

*Italy*: Lieut-Colonel Toni, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Pilotti, Prince Boncompagni.

*Japan*: M. Nagaoka.

1. (The Council had before it two telegrams from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council dated November 4th (see Appendix A) and November 5th (see Appendix B), a telegram from the Inter-Allied Military Mission dated November 5th (see Appendix C), and another telegram from the same source dated November 3rd, (see Appendix D).)

M. PICHON pointed out that the telegram sent by the Council to Sir George Clerk on the preceding day<sup>1</sup> [satisfied]<sup>2</sup> in great measure the requests contained in his two telegrams. Both Sir George Clerk and the Inter-Allied Military Mission were opposed to the despatch of Jugo-Slav and Czech troops. As the suggestion of the French Delegation had not met with approval the point would not be insisted upon.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that Sir George Clerk had asked authority to recognize at once the coalition government which he hoped would be formed. It would be well to give him this authority. The telegram of the preceding day gave him as a matter of fact, an answer on this point. Sir George Clerk likewise desired not to be obliged to insist on the immediate withdrawal of Friedrich. On this point also the Council should meet his views.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 14, appendix B.

<sup>2</sup> The text here is defective.

M. PICHON said that a telegram should be sent to Sir George Clerk confirming the previous instructions of the Council and stating, moreover, that the Council relied on his tact. But the question still remained: what would happen after the departure of the Roumanian troops? Would not the presence of an Inter-Allied force be necessary? Would the Inter-Allied Mission suffice for the maintenance of order?

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that that question had already been raised in the telegram sent on the preceding day, which had crossed Sir George Clerk's telegrams. He wished to call attention to another point: would it not be well to request the Jugo-Slavs and the Czechs to retire immediately within their frontiers as laid down by the Council? According to the telegram of November 3rd from the Inter-Allied Military Mission the Czechs were raising difficulties with respect to the evacuation of the mines of Salgo-Tarjan: they were demanding as a condition precedent, reimbursement for their expenses relative to the supply of the Hungarian population. Would it not be well to request the Czechs to withdraw, at the same time assuring them that the Council would take into consideration the question of reimbursement for their expenses? Likewise, in the south, the Jugo-Slavs were still occupying the mines at Pecs, whereas, according to the decisions of the Council, that territory was to remain in the possession of Hungary.

M. DE MARTINO thought that that was the time to insist upon all States bordering on Hungary recognizing the frontiers of the Hungarian State.

MR. POLK observed that the Governments concerned had been notified of the lines laid down as the northern and eastern frontiers of Hungary; he wished to inquire whether there had been a similar notification with respect to the frontier between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN explained that at the time the Council had disallowed the Jugo-Slav claims in Baranya and Batchka,<sup>3</sup> the Serbian Delegation had been notified of its decision. As a result of this notification the Serbs had formulated new proposals: they had, in particular, asked the right of exploiting the mines of Pecs for five years. The Serbian request had been referred to the Reparation Commission and the Economic Commission<sup>4</sup> but both of these considered themselves without jurisdiction, as the question, to their minds, was essentially a political one; however, the Serbian request had neither been examined by the Central Territorial Committee nor the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Jugo-Slavia.

M. PICHON said that the Serbs must be informed that the territorial question had been settled, but that this decision would not prejudice the decision to be taken by the Council with respect to the exploitation of the mines of Pecs. He suggested that the latter question should be referred to the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Jugo-Slavia.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that a new fact had occurred; on October 25th the Serbian Delegation had asked that the evacuation of the territories

<sup>3</sup> See Vol. I, No. 25, minutes 6 and 7.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 4, note 3.

actually held by the Yugo-Slav troops should be deferred until the question of the exploitation of the mines had been settled.

M. BERTHELOT thought the Yugo-Slav request inadmissible from the territorial point of view.

M. PICHON said it was agreed that the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs, as well as the Roumanians, should be asked to evacuate. Moreover, M. Berthelot would prepare a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

M. BERTHELOT read a draft telegram prepared in accordance with the views expressed by the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt it useless, since it had been decided not to send Czech and Yugo-Slav contingents into Hungary, to ask Sir George Clerk if he deemed it expedient to send an Interallied force.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the question should nevertheless be raised, because if Sir George Clerk should say that such a force was necessary it would be worth while studying the plan anew. In view of Sir George's report as to the attitude of Friedrich it might be well to reflect on what would happen when Friedrich, with 30,000 men, found himself opposed to the Supreme Council and a mission of Generals without any troops.

SIR EYRE CROWE wondered what would happen if Sir George Clerk indicated that the sending of an Inter-Allied force was essential or even desirable. The only possible reply would be that no one could be sent.

M. BERTHELOT acknowledged that the situation would be difficult but he thought that it would not present an absolute impossibility.

M. DE MARTINO remarked that Italy would certainly not send any troops.

M. PICHON agreed that the French also would find great difficulty in sending any.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the question was purely an academic one. The wording proposed by M. Berthelot presented the difficulty that Sir George Clerk might well think that he was being offered something which the Council could not give him.

M. PICHON agreed that the telegram should be modified in the light of Sir Eyre Crowe's remarks and should state that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would find it very difficult to send any troops if the need should arise.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that Sir George Clerk should also be asked if he deemed the Hungarian Police force adequate to cope with the situation.

M. DE MARTINO desired a further addition to the effect that the police force could be placed under the control of the Interallied Military Mission.

It was decided:

- (1) that Sir Eyre Crowe should send to Sir George Clerk, in the name of the Supreme Council, the telegram prepared by M. Berthelot (see Appendix E);
- (2) that the Czech and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments should be requested to withdraw their troops immediately beyond the frontiers of Hungary as laid down by the Council;
- (3) that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government should be informed that the decisions taken by the Council with respect to territorial questions

- were final, but that the evacuation requested would not prejudice the solution of the question of the exploitation of the mines at Peas:
4. that the request of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation proposing the grant to that Government for five years of the exploitation of the mines of Peas should be referred to the Committee for the study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania and Yugo-Slavia.

2. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that the German<sup>5</sup> had given to the Press a fairly complete summary of the note and annexed protocol sent to them by the Council.<sup>6</sup> He inquired, if, under the circumstances, it would not be advisable to publish the complete text of that note.

*Publication of the note and the Annexed Protocol addressed to the German Government by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers*

After a short discussion.

It was decided:

to publish the text of the note addressed to the German Government relative to the putting into force of the Treaty of Peace as well as the draft protocol annexed to that note.

3. The Council had before it a letter from General Nollet dated October 27, 1919 see Appendix F,<sup>7</sup> a note from the Drafting Committee dated October 28th [29th] 1919 see Appendix G,<sup>8</sup> and a letter from Marshal Foch dated November 3, 1919 see Appendix H.<sup>9</sup>

*Salaries of the personnel of Commissions of Control in Germany*

GENERAL WALCH read and commented upon Marshal Foch's letter.

MR. POLK, with respect to the organization of the personnel of the Commissions of Control, asked why it was necessary to call upon civilian engineers.

GENERAL WALCH explained that the military technical personnel was inadequate to control the manufacture of war material. It was necessary to call upon competent specialists who could not be found in the regular army.

General Nollet had called upon about 10 engineers and about 40 university graduates. In so doing he had only followed the example furnished by the British Commission of Control.

(It was decided:

that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany not belonging to regular military forces should be assumed by Germany.)

4. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated November 3, 1919 (see Appendix I).)

*Publication of the Correspondence with the Austrian Delegation*

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the note of the British Delegation specified that extreme care should be exercised with respect to the publication of the Austrian notes marked 'Confidential'.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 10, appendices B and C.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. See appendix H below.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. In this note the Drafting Committee, having regard to articles 207 and 249 of the Treaty of Versailles, gave an affirmative answer to General Nollet's question: see appendix H below.

MR. POLK said that evidently such notes could not be published without the consent of Chancellor Renner.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that Dr. Renner could be asked if he still objected to the publication of those notes.

M. DE MARTINO observed that the publication of the notes raised some questions which were delicate from an Italian point of view, and he asked that a decision on this point be postponed.

(The question was adjourned.)

5. (The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference dated October 30th, 1919 (see Appendix J),<sup>8</sup> and a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 5th, 1919 (see Appendix K).<sup>8</sup>)

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon these documents.

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to approve the recommendations of the note of the Drafting Committee relative to demobilized Poles who had borne arms against Germany.)

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission dated October 31st, 1919 (see Appendix L).<sup>9</sup>)

*Financial Measures of Coercion taken against Germany on account of the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces* M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon this note. He observed that it was not correct to speak of the annulment of authorizations which might have been given: the question was one of revocation of said authorization. Germany could not now create

<sup>8</sup> Not printed. In his letter Marshal Foch reported that the Polish Government were stated to have asked the Allied Powers to obtain authorization from the German Government that demobilized soldiers of the Polish army organized in France under General Haller should be free to return to their homes situated in districts which were (a) properly speaking, German; (b) to be attributed by plebiscite; (c) attributed to Poland but not yet occupied by her. It appeared to Marshal Foch that such authorization could not be demanded of Germany 'since, until the ratification of the Peace Treaty, this Power has the right to consider the parties concerned as deserters from the German Army'. The Drafting Committee in its note agreed with Marshal Foch that 'neither the Armistice nor the Treaty contains stipulations expressly binding Germany not to institute proceedings against German Poles having served in the Polish Army for having taken up arms against Germany'. The Committee, however, considered that, having regard to articles 88, 91, 95, 96, 277 and 278 of the Treaty of Versailles, 'in undertaking these suits, Germany jeopardizes the loyal execution of the engagements above referred to. On this point, to put Germany under the necessity of annulling and ceasing the said proceedings would be justified.

'On the one hand, if Poles are to return to German territory, on the contrary there are Germans on Polish territory. Both should be equally protected from all interference and any obstruction in the free exercise of their right of option and vote, and transfer of domicile.

'An understanding on this subject would be of a nature to put an end to and prevent all difficulties in the future. The presence at Paris on November 10 of German representatives for the settlement of questions raised by the coming into force of the Treaty, appears to furnish a favourable opportunity to proceed to this accord.'

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. In this note M. Loucheur drew the attention of M. Clemenceau to the last four paragraphs of the Allied note of September 27, 1919, to the German Government

new pledges by attaching itself to authorization previously given inasmuch as any such authorization would be revoked.

It was decided:

that the Drafting Committee should prepare a reply to M. Loucheur's letter dated October 31st, 1919, relative to the interpretation of the financial measures of coercion taken against Germany on account of the non-evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (see the Note of September 27th, 1919).

7.

[Not printed].

*Liquidation of the  
Property of In-  
habitants of  
Schleswig*

6. M. BERTHELOT reminded the Council that at a previous meeting the question of an American Military Mission reported to be at Riga had been brought up.<sup>10</sup> According to his present information there appeared to be at Riga, besides a mission of relief and supply and a Red Cross mission, a mission under Colonel Holliday, who was reported to have arrived at Riga on October 15th. The Colonel was reported to have stated that he did not desire to collaborate with the Anglo-French Mission.

MR. POLK explained that Colonel Holliday was there alone. His duties were purely to collect information, and he had no political role to play. Moreover, General Cheney would see that he did not exceed his powers.

9. M. DE MARTINO informed the Council that the Italian delegates to the Plebiscite and Delimitation Commissions would arrive at Paris on November 10th. They would be ready from that day on to confer with their Allied colleagues.

*Plebiscite and  
Delimitation  
Commissions*

M. PICHON said that Marshal Foch would be informed of this.

relative to the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces (see Vol. I, No. 66, appendix E), and continued: 'The Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission assumes that the passage above applies only concerning the requests presented by the German Government upon dates subsequent to the sending of the note, and that it is not the intention of the Supreme Council to annul authorizations previously accorded for the sale or security of titles with a view to the purchase of foodstuffs for Germany.'

<sup>10</sup> 'M. Fromageot stated that the Danish Government had pointed out that after the plebiscite the inhabitants of Schleswig would become Danish citizens. What would become of the interests of those newly-made Danish subjects whose property in the meantime might have been liquidated by one of the Allied and Associated Powers as belonging to enemy subjects? . . . M. Pichon suggested that the Drafting Committee should come to an agreement with the Economic Commission, which had the question in hand, on the draft of a resolution to be communicated to the other Allied Powers. Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the Danish Government would have to be approached. Mr. Polk took it as understood that the draft resolution would be submitted to the Council. He pointed out that he would have to refer the matter to his Government.'

<sup>11</sup> See No. 9, minute 5.

11. MR. POLK said that his Government wished to know if the question of the recognition of Luxembourg was to be decided by the Council. *Luxembourg Affairs* M. BERTHELOT summarized the history of the question: when the question first arose five or six months ago the French Government declared that, from a political point of view, it would refrain from active participation in the Luxembourg question, and that it thought that the Belgian Government should be the first to make a decision. Belgium had told the French Government that it was opposed to recognizing the Grand Duchess.<sup>13</sup> The French Government had transmitted this information to Rome, Washington and London and the Principal Powers abstained from recognizing the Grand Duchess. Eventually, and after at first refusing, Belgium consented that the fiancé of the Grand Duchess should be allowed to go to Luxembourg. The marriage was taking place that very day. Two days previously the Belgian Government had asked the French Government if it intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. He himself had replied by putting the same question to the Belgian Ambassador, since France had decided that Belgium should have the first word in political questions concerning Luxembourg. The Belgian Government had not yet replied. The French Government had been informed from other sources that the British Government intended to recognize the Grand Duchess and to be represented at the marriage ceremony. The French Government had then acquainted the British Government with the exact situation, at the same time informing the Italian Government.

M. PICHON said that the Council would arrive at a decision on the Luxembourg question.<sup>14</sup>

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 6, 1919.*

<sup>12</sup> On a point raised by M. de Martino, 'M. de Saint Quentin explained that it had been decided to send to Vienna a provisional Commission [for the distribution of rolling stock] which would become a permanent Commission when the Treaty came into force. The character of the Commission was apparent from the fact that Hungary, an enemy country, was represented on it; it would therefore be difficult to deny representation to the Serbs and Roumanians' who, according to M. de Martino, claimed it: a claim which seemed inadmissible to M. de Martino inasmuch as neither power had signed the treaty of peace with Austria. In conclusion 'M. de Martino said that he would examine the question anew.'

<sup>13</sup> The relevant sequence of events had been as follows: on January 15, 1919, it was announced that the Grand Duchess Adelaide of Luxemburg had abdicated in favour of her younger sister, the Grand Duchess Charlotte. A referendum held in Luxemburg on September 28, 1919, decided by a large majority in favour of the maintenance of the monarchical form of government and, in particular, of the rule of the Grand Duchess Charlotte. The Grand Duchess married Prince Felix of Bourbon-Parma, brother of the former Empress of Austria.

<sup>14</sup> See further No. 21, minute 6.

## APPENDIX A TO NO. 15

*Telegram from Sir G. Clerk to the Supreme Council No. 3.*

BUDAPEST, November 4<sup>th</sup>, 1919

Monsieur Blumandry came to see me this afternoon to tell me officially that Roumanian troops would begin their evacuation from Budapest November 9<sup>th</sup> and finish on November 15<sup>th</sup>. He was immediately followed by Count Sernsich, Minister for Foreign Affairs. He told me that Friedrich was absolutely definite: that if Allies insisted on his giving up post of Minister President he would go into opposition with nine of his present ministers and that after all it was not Hungary but Allies who wanted peace.

I told Count Sernsich that I still hoped that wiser counsels would prevail but that if Friedrich maintained this short-sighted attitude I could do no more and should have to leave when Roumanians withdrew. I was not here to turn out Friedrich government and set up Opposition as a government: I was only here to ask Hungarians to form a temporary coalition government with whom Allies could deal.

I still hope that Friedrich may be induced to see reason but it is all the more necessary that I should have authority to recognise coalition government immediately on its formation if that proves to be possible.

## APPENDIX B TO NO. 15

*Telegram No. 4 from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council*

BUDAPEST, November 5<sup>th</sup>, 1919

Monsieur Cerruti, civil member of Italian mission, has just informed me of a telegram received by mission from Paris from which I understand following proposals are under consideration by Supreme Council.

1. That Friedrich shall be required to resign at once as he has been unable to form democratic government.
2. That Roumanians shall be required to evacuate at once.
3. That two divisions composed of Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slav troops under Allied command shall be sent into Hungary.

With regard to (1) I venture to ask for two or three days' delay. I hope I am on the point of securing coalition government which all parties in Hungary will accept. I have got so far as to get provisional consent of Friedrich to resignation of office of Minister President. It is a task of great difficulty to bring various parties together and secure general consent but I shall know by end of week whether I can really count on success.

(2) As I reported in my telegram No. 3<sup>15</sup> Roumanian High Commissioner has definitely informed me that Roumanians intend to begin evacuation on November 9<sup>th</sup>. There is however one very important point on which I trust Allies will insist namely that Roumanians shall not remain on the Theiss but withdraw from limits of all territory that is to remain Hungarian. For one reason alone this is desirable namely because elections cannot be held until country is clear of foreign troops. But also difficulties are being raised by Friedrich party and others who say that Roumanian evacuation will not be genuinely carried out.

<sup>15</sup> See appendix A above.

(3) I venture to express my earnest hope that under no circumstances will Jugo-Slav and Czecho-Slav [*sic*] divisions be sent into Hungary even under Allied officers. Result in country would be indescribable and I am convinced that Hungarians would for once sink all their differences and resist with such arms as they have to last man.

#### APPENDIX C TO NO. 15

PARIS, *November 5th, 1919.*

The Secretary General of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace has the honour to transmit herewith for Mr. Dutasta's information a very urgent telegram which has just been received from the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest:

BUDAPEST, *November 5th.*

To the Supreme Council,  
Peace Conference,  
Paris.

No. 775, Double priority. This Mission is aware that a telegram has been received in Budapest from Paris covering three points: first, the Friedrich Cabinet, second, the immediate Roumanian evacuation, and third, the occupation of Hungary by two divisions under Interallied officers, one division of Czecho-Slovaks and one division of Yugo-Slavs. Against this third proposition the Interallied Military Mission unanimously and urgently protests. Such procedure it is believed would stir Hungary into revolution and would destroy all prospects for an early solution of the Hungarian question. It is further urged that the Roumanians, the Yugo-Slavs and the Czecho-Slovaks be all required to retire at once behind their respective lines of demarcation.

(Signed) Interallied Military Mission.

#### APPENDIX D TO NO. 15

*Telegram to the Supreme Council, Paris*

BUDAPEST, *November 3, 1919.*

*Supplement to Telegram No. 740 of October 31*

The Czecho-Slovak Government subordinates the evacuation of Salgó Tarján to three conditions:

- 1st. The Hungarians are to be capable of insuring order;
- 2nd. The Hungarians are not to attack the Czecho-Slovaks;
- 3rd. The Hungarian Government is to reimburse the amounts advanced by the Czecho-Slovaks to feed the population.

The Commission has given the two first assurances. It is of the opinion that the execution of the third condition would be the cause of a new delay which must be avoided at any price. The Budapest mills are without coal.

The Commission replied to this effect.

The Commission asks the Supreme Council to use its influence with the Prague Government.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE DAY.

## APPENDIX Z TO NO. 13

Telegram

PARIS, November 6, 1919.

From: Supreme Council

To: Sir George Clerk, Budapest.

The Supreme Council has taken note of your telegrams of November 4 and 5th and of the telegrams from the Commission of Generals of November 2 and 5th.

Although very precise indications were given you in our telegram of yesterday, the Supreme Council desires to reply to your further suggestions and specify its views on the following points:

1st. The Czech and Serb Governments will receive a formal invitation from the Conference to evacuate Hungarian territory, and to retire to the interior of the frontiers determined by the Supreme Council, of which notification has already been made. A similar invitation was telegraphed to Roumania on October 12th.<sup>16</sup>

2nd. It is to be understood that the evacuation by Roumanian troops is to be complete; these troops are not to remain on the Theiss, but to withdraw beyond the boundaries of the territory which will remain Hungarian, in order that the elections may take place without being influenced by the presence of Roumanian troops.

3rd. A telegram will be sent to Prague requesting the Czech Government to not subordinate the shipments of coal to a previous agreement concerning the payment of the coal supply indispensable in the operations of the Budapest mills. The Czech Government will be assured at the same time that the Allies will arrange the question without delay with the Hungarian Government in a legitimate manner.

4th. The unanimous opinion of the Commission of Generals, as well as your own, relative to the danger which the presence of Czech and Serb troops would present, even under an Allied Command, in Budapest, has decided the Supreme Council to renounce that idea.

However, you are requested to make a reply on the question which was posed yesterday, relative to the utility, or even the necessity, of a *bona fide* Inter-Allied force to support the authority of the Commission of Generals and the orders of the Conference. The attitude of defiance adopted by Mr. Friedrich, referred to in your telegram of November 4th, immediately after the decision calling for the evacuation of the Roumanian troops leads us to fear that the reactionary elements will offer resistance as soon as the Allies will no longer have a sufficient local military force to force respect for their decisions. You must be aware, for that matter, that, under the present conditions, the sending of Allied troops by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would encounter serious difficulties. Do you consider that the local gendarmerie would be sufficient under the control of the Commission of Generals?

<sup>16</sup> See Vol. I, No. 72, minute 2 and appendix B.

## APPENDIX H TO NO. 15

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

General Staff, No. 5249

G.H.Q., November 3, 1919.

From: Marshal Foch

To: The President of the Council, the President of the Peace Conference (Secretariat General).

By letter No. 146, under date of October 21, 1919, General Nollet, President of the Military Commission of Control in Germany, requested you to be kind enough to have the Supreme Council decide whether the pay of officers and troops in the Commissions of Control should be included in the upkeep expenses of the said Commissions, and later be charged to Germany.

No decision has been taken on this subject.

It follows that General Nollet experiences great difficulty in recruiting the civil personnel necessary—interpreters and engineers, this personnel at the present time receiving no pay, but only having the right to allowances allotted to the members of Commissions of Control.

This state of affairs is prejudicial to the good operation of the Commissions of Control.

Consequently, I have the honour to ask you to be kind enough to advise the Supreme Council of this question as soon as possible.

P.O. The Major General  
WEYGAND

## APPENDIX I TO NO. 15

### *British Delegation*

*November 3, 1919.*

My dear Ambassador:<sup>17</sup>

I have the honour to transmit herewith to Your Excellency a draft of resolution<sup>18</sup> concerning the publication of the correspondence exchanged with the Austrian Delegation. I should be glad to see it on the calendar of the Supreme Council as soon as possible.

The question has been raised in the British Parliament as to whether this correspondence should be published and my Government is awaiting a decision of the Supreme Council before deciding in that matter.

By the way, I think I must remind you that, concerning the correspondence exchanged with the German Delegation, the Council of Four decided to communicate to the press all the German notes and Allied answers, without any change, gradually as they were received or sent. This procedure has been observed in certain cases but not for all the Austrian notes and those which were sent to them.

However, there seems to be no objection to the publication of the Austrian correspondence; only, exception should be made for certain notes marked 'Confidential' by the Austrian Delegation (Nos. 360, 863, 906 and 1070).

<sup>17</sup> i.e. M. Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.

<sup>18</sup> Not annexed to original of this appendix.

While writing these notes the Austrian Delegation talked in the assembly room of the name of M. Clemenceau. Dr. Ranner (these notes would be of an absolutely confidential character and could not be communicated to the members of the Supreme Council).

While writing and rendering the Austrian notes intelligible, it will be necessary, as it was for the German notes, to publish text-in-part of the original 'peace conditions', which were slightly modified and replaced by the final text of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

Your Excellency will remember that M. Clemenceau has now removed the objections first raised by him against this method concerning the German correspondence. I informed Mr. Polk, Mr. Tatum and Mr. Matsui of it, and I told them that my government proposed to publish the extracts in question.

EYRE A. CROWE.

R. O. Vol. I, No. 21, 1919, p.

## No. 16

H. D. 86.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegation of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 7, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Dr. I. Bowman, Dr. James Brown Scott, Mr. A. W. Dulles.

*British Empire*: Brigadier-General Groves, Lieut.-Colonel Kisch, Mr. Palairat, Mr. E. H. Carr, Mr. H. W. Malkin.

*France*: M. Ignace, M. Laroche, General Le Rond, M. Fromageot, Commandant Lacombe, M. Escoffier.

*Italy*: Lieut.-Colonel Piccio, Commandant Scanagatta, M. D'Amelio, M. Stranieri, M. Pilotti.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

1. SIR EYRE CROWE stated he could not nominate the British Representatives as the experts of the British Delegation on that subject were in London.

*Execution of Articles  
228 and 229 of the  
Treaty with Germany*

M. DE MARTINO wished to remark that there already was a Commission of Responsibilities.

M. ESCOFFIER said the Commission of Responsibilities has [had] finished its

this was a question for a special Commission charged with the preparation of the execution of Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty with Germany. PROCHON said that the Council agreed that the nomination of this Commission should be adjourned, but it was important that this should be settled as soon as possible. DE MARTINO thought an adjournment necessary as he would have to consult with his Government.

It was decided:

- that a Commission would be nominated,
  - (a) to compare the lists of individuals charged with crimes to be delivered by the German Government;
  - (b) to decide the composition, procedure and seat of the mixed tribunals to be set up under Article 229 of the Treaty with Germany;
- that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers nominate as soon as possible their representatives on this Commission.

The Council had before it a report of the Military Representatives at Versailles on the subject. (See Appendix A).<sup>1</sup>

*Chairman of Allied Aero-Commission of Germany* After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to approve the report of the Military Representatives at Versailles dated November 5th. in answer to the request for instructions received from the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany (see Appendix A).<sup>1</sup>

EYRE CROWE regretted that this declaration had been delayed by numerous communications with his Government.<sup>2</sup> The present proposal resulted from the proposition which had already been made by the American Delegation and also by the Polish Commission; in a few words, this proposition was to eliminate anything in the nature of a temporary arrangement. The Government was opposed to anything leading to a final union of Galicia and Poland. It had also discussed the question with Mr.

In this report, dated November 4, 1919, in the appendix, the American, French, and Italian Military Representatives recapitulated the three requests for instructions received from the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control and referred to them by the Supreme Council on October 29, 1919 (see No. 8, and appendix E). They answered the requests as follows:

*regards question 1:* That the Airship sheds and all other Aeronautical Material in occupied areas in Germany shall be pooled and counted in for distribution with the Aeronautical Material in unoccupied Germany. . . .

*regards question 2:* That the phrase "No dirigible shall be kept" in Article 198 of the Peace Treaty, shall be held to mean "No dirigible of Naval or Military type," but the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall decide whether a dirigible is of civil type or of military type.

*regards question 3:* That Article 200 of the Peace Treaty applies to the whole of Germany and not merely to the areas occupied by the forces of the Allied and Associated Powers.

<sup>2</sup> See Vol. III of this series.

Paderewski and had pointed out to the latter that Poland would be acting in a sense diametrically opposed to the claims made by Poland for the district of Teschen. A large majority of the population in Eastern Galicia was not Polish. The British Government thought that they ought not to shut the door to the real aims of Eastern Galicia which would allow its population to join other nationalities. It wished, therefore, to adopt the following suggestion, namely: Poland would get a Mandate for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations for a determined period, such as 15 years; the League of Nations could then consider whether Eastern Galicia should be joined to Poland or make some other political arrangement. The British point of view insisted that the settlement should be provisional. He personally had done his best to conciliate the views of the Council with those of the British Cabinet.

MR. POLK regretted that they were unable to reach an agreement on this subject; but he added he had not given up hope of finding a satisfactory solution. What impressed the American Delegation was that if a date were fixed for a Mandate, it would mean that Galicia would be in a state of ferment, and Poland remain in uncertainty over this grave question. This case was not the same as that of other countries where a Plebiscite was asked for; it would be difficult to see where Eastern Galicia would go, if not to Poland. The problem was all the more difficult for Eastern Galicia on account of fighting taking place between Ukrainia and the Bolsheviks on one side and Denikin on the other side. He wished to ask Sir Eyre Crowe the difference he made between the position of the British Government at this time and the position that it had taken before.

SIR EYRE CROWE answered that it was no longer a question of a plebiscite, but of giving a Mandate to Poland for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations.

MR. POLK suggested that the views of the British Delegation should be referred to the Polish Commission for examination and report for Monday, November 10th.

M. PICHON agreed.

It was decided:

to refer to the Polish Commission for examination and report to the Supreme Council on November 10th, 1919, the proposal made by the British Delegation tending to give Poland a Mandate for Eastern Galicia under the League of Nations for a determined period.

4. (The Council had before it a note from the German Delegation dated October 3rd, 1919, on the organization of the plebiscite in Eupen and Malmedy (see Appendix B), and the observations presented by the Belgian Delegation in its letter of October 14th, 1919 (see Appendix C).)

MR. POLK said this matter had been brought to his attention and he understood the good faith of the Council was involved. He would suggest that this be referred to the Belgian Committee for examination.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Belgian Commission should prepare a draft answer to the German Note which the Council would have before it on Monday.

It was decided:

- (1) to refer back to the Commission on Belgian Affairs for examination the Note from the German Delegation dated October 3rd, on the organization of the plebiscite in Eupen and Malmedy (see Appendix B), as well as the observations of the Belgian Delegation dated October 14th. 1919 (see Appendix C).
- (2) that the Commission on Belgian Affairs should present to the Supreme Council at its meeting on November 10th, 1919, a draft reply to the German Note.

5-

*Removed by German  
Authorities of  
material belonging to  
the German Govern-  
ment at Dantzig*

[Not printed]<sup>3</sup>

6. MR. POLK repeated what he had said at a preceding meeting: the President would be very glad to call the first meeting of the Council, but the question had been raised in Washington as to his power under Article V of the Covenant to call the meeting before the Treaty had come into force: under Article V his power existed only from the date of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty: his suggestion was that the meeting should take place on the following day, but he had no objection to the procedure adopted by the Drafting Committee and in turn adopted by the other members of the Council. The real trouble was that the letter would be issued at a time when the pact had not yet come into force.

M. PICHON thought in that case that the convocation of the first meeting might be issued on the day when the ratifications were exchanged, and then that the meeting could take place the following day.

MR. POLK made it clear that he did not wish to insist on this, if the other members of the Council preferred the other solution.

<sup>3</sup> On the suggestion of Mr. Polk the Supreme Council referred back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report the following message from the American Minister at Warsaw (appendix D in original) transmitted under date of October 29 as the substance of a report from the American Representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Mission in Poland:

'On the protest of the workmen in the shipyards the German authorities have refrained from removing floating cranes and dry-docks from Dantzig, which they considered they had the right to do under the terms of the Treaty. They have, however, removed a large amount of other materials, claiming that this was allowable under the Treaty.

'The American representative on the Inter-Allied Railway Mission added that the foregoing information had been transmitted to Paris, and that the Mission had taken no other action in the matter which pertained exclusively to the Armistice authorities.'

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that the difficulty lay in the period which would elapse between the deposit of ratifications and the first meeting of the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that the President of the United States could now advise the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations that as soon as the Treaty had been put into force by the deposit of ratifications, the President, acting under Article V of the Covenant, would send a telegram calling the first meeting, and it would be advisable to take all the necessary measures in provision of this convocation.

MR. POLK thought that Sir Eyre Crowe's suggestion was already covered by M. Clemenceau's letter.<sup>4</sup> He also suggested that the State Department in Washington, on being advised of the exact hour of the deposit of ratifications, could notify to the representatives at Washington of the Powers which were to be represented on the Council of the League of Nations, the first meeting of the Council; on the other hand, all the necessary measures would have been taken for the first meeting to take place.

M. FROMAGEOT said he understood the American argument, but thought there was great analogy between this case and the convocation of the Labour Conference at Washington.

MR. POLK said that everyone in America was attacking the legality of this convocation.

M. FROMAGEOT thought that if the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations considered only the question of nominating the Commission charged with the delimitation of the boundaries of the Sarre district, the Council of the League of Nations would then have fifteen days within which to nominate the Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested there was the possibility of a ratification by the United States, in which case the first meeting might have a longer agenda: it was therefore important that the convocation of the first meeting should be considered immediately.

M. PICHON proposed that the question be referred to the Drafting Committee to examine whether it was possible to take into consideration the remarks made by Mr. Polk.

It was decided:

to refer back to the Drafting Committee for examination and report the question of procedure to be followed for the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, taking into account remarks of a legal character made by the American Delegation.

7. M. BERTHELOT said that they had reasons to think that the Germans were going to answer their last Note<sup>5</sup> by proposing that the conferences which were made necessary by the execution of the Treaty, should take place in Berlin on account of the great number of experts the German Government wished to send; and only the final conferences would take place in Paris.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 3, minute 6 and note 5.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 10, appendix B.

GENERAL LE ROND thought that all the questions which could not be considered in Paris should be taken up on the spot, and that it was not necessary to have conferences in Berlin. He also wished to add that, as the conferences between the Allies could not begin before November 10th, it would not be possible to meet the German representatives before November 15th.

8. M. PICHON stated that Mr. Venizelos would ask to be heard by the Council on the day that the report of the Inquiry Commission on the Agenda of the Supreme Council Smyrna came under discussion.

9. MR. POLK asked whether the question of the temporary regime of Western Thrace should not be studied by a competent Commission. He suggested that it might be referred to the Central Territorial Committee. (This was agreed to.)

It was decided:

to refer back to the Central Territorial Committee for examination and report the question of the temporary regime of Western Thrace.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 7, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX B TO No. 16

PRESIDENT, THE GERMAN DELEGATION OF PEACE

No. 28.<sup>6</sup>

VERSAILLES, October 3, 1919.

From: Von Lersner

To: President Clemenceau.

The provisions contained in Article 34, paragraph 2, of the Peace Treaty concerning the plebiscite at Eupen and Malmedy, are, in comparison with the provisions provided for regarding the other territory submitted to a plebiscite, so extraordinarily brief that a mass of important questions are either not at all resolved or remain very unclear. The Allied and Associated Powers, in the several declarations made in the notes sent by them before the signing of the Treaty,<sup>7</sup> made clear how these questions must be resolved. These declarations constitute some precious general principles; they still need, however, a more ample development in their detail. The German Government considers it urgent that this development be perfected as soon as possible by an exposé of the precise conditions. The German Government believes it their duty to insist on the necessity of com-

<sup>6</sup> The German text of this note is printed in *Reichstagsdrucksache* No. 600 of 1920, p. 2 f. (as cited by F. Berber: *Das Diktat von Versailles*. Essen, 1939, vol. i, pp. 281-6.)

<sup>7</sup> Cf. the 'Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace', dated June 16, 1919, in *British and Foreign State Papers* (1919), vol. cxii, pp. 250 and 260-1.

plete clearness in all the questions treating the plebiscite; a necessity which is increased by the worry of the populations concerning the uncertainty which governs the application of the details of the plebiscite and concerning which the Belgian authorities adopt an attitude which flagrantly contradicts the solemn assurances of the Allied and Associated Powers which no longer furnish the least guarantee of a free and uninfluenced vote.

The German Government calls attention to the following points, which are of special importance:

I. In opposition with the provisions provided concerning all the other territories submitted to a plebiscite, it has not been exactly defined what persons are qualified to participate in the vote at Eupen and Malmedy. In Article 34, paragraph 2, the question concerns only 'inhabitants'. It is evident that the definition of the term 'within the shortest possible time', is indispensable. The German Government believes it is in accord with the Allied and Associated Governments by proposing to resolve the question in the same manner as for the other territories submitted to a plebiscite, a right of vote being accorded to every person, without distinction of sex, who:

(A) shall have attained the age of 20 years at the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, and who:

(B) shall either have been born on the territory or shall have resided therein for a determined period. In this regard, it would be opportune, in the opinion of the German Government, to fix the date as November 11, 1918. It would be, furthermore, understood that the persons having left the territory after the fixed date, but who have still retained their domicile, would have the right to vote and that the persons living outside of the territory and enjoying the right to vote therein, could either return to vote or send their declaration, written, after having been previously legalized.

II. The question of settling what districts shall be subject to plebiscite also needs to be regulated. Article 34, paragraph 2, states that the registry shall be opened in Eupen and Malmedy, but immediately after, Eupen and Malmedy are spoken of as 'these territories' ('the said territories', 'the above territory'); it cannot therefore refer to the cities, but rather to the spheres (*cercles*). The question concerning where the registers are to be opened has not been resolved. The German Government believes also that it is the intention of the Allied and Associated Governments to have the plebiscite take place by commune or, if the districts appear too small, by localities possessing a burgomaster. A like regulation would accord with the desires of the population, to whom it was indicated that, if the registers of only the cities of Eupen and Malmedy were opened, a number of inhabitants from distant localities would be unable to participate in the vote. Moreover, it appears opportune to remark that only by a vote by commune could the League of Nations be furnished with the precise data necessary in order to decide, which is its mission, whether the territories are to remain in part of [or] wholly German.

III. A particular unrest appears to reign on the point of just what question the inhabitants are to resolve by their vote. In Article 34, par. 2, it is stated that the inhabitants are, on the registers, to express the desire that 'these territories remain entirely or partially under German sovereignty'. If it is to be supposed that by these words the question which shall be introduced for the plebiscite is already formulated, that would then signify that each inhabitant should state not only if his own commune should remain German, but also make a similar declaration for all the other communes of the territory, even if they are entirely foreign to him.

One would therefore have to require that each inhabitant make precise declarations concerning the outline of the entire frontier, such as it would be, from his point of view, desirable. But a very small number of the persons who are to participate in the vote are in a position to answer such a question. In view of the manifest impossibility for its execution, the provision mentioned in Article 34, paragraph 2, must not be interpreted to the letter. Its true sense only appears when the several declarations of the Allied and Associated Powers on the plebiscite question are taken into consideration. In Mr. Clemenceau's note, dated June 15th, it is stated that an annexion of territory to Belgium should be operated only on a basis of the decision of the population, and in the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the German counter-proposals, assurance is given that an attachment of territory to Belgium shall occur 'only in case the petitions addressed by the population of the territory shall be sufficiently supported'.<sup>7</sup> In that way, it is expressly declared that the population will be asked to declare whether they desire reunion with Belgium. If to this is added the text of the Treaty which speaks of a manifestation of the desire of the inhabitants to remain attached to Germany, and if it be considered that, in the note, above referred to, by President Clemenceau, the cessions of territory to Belgium are treated in the same phrases and under the same terms as the cessions of territory to Denmark, it results that the question which is to be decided by vote will be: Reunion with Germany or with Belgium. This method of formulating the question is, moreover, the only one which corresponds with the natural interpretation of a plebiscite which it is possible to reconcile with practical necessities.

IV. It has just been shown that for reasons of a juridical nature the question to be posed for a plebiscite must be in the sense of a decision either for Germany or for Belgium. There remains to be shown that this manner of formulating the question is also indispensable in the interest of the liberty of the vote. If, in fact, the inhabitants were asked to declare only if they wished to remain German, everyone who would participate in the vote would be considered as a protester and would run the risk of being treated at a disadvantage by the Belgian authorities on account of his vote.

If, therefore, guarantees are to be given to assure a free vote not subject to any influence, it is necessary, in the first place to be careful that the plebiscite question be formulated in the method indicated.

The Allied and Associated Powers have fully recognized the importance of guarantees for a free vote, not subject to any influence, and have made reiterated solemn and nonequivocal declarations in this matter. In particular, Mr. Clemenceau, President of the Council, declared in his note of June 16th that: 'The decision of the inhabitants must be sought under conditions in which the complete liberty of the vote is assured.'<sup>7</sup> There also results from the perfect comparison established on this subject between Belgium and Denmark that, in the opinion of the Allied and Associated Governments, the Eupen and Malmedy plebiscite vote should be conducted under the same guarantees as the Schleswig vote. A still greater assurance is found in the reply to the German counter-proposals in which it is stated: 'The Treaty provides for the consultation of the population under the auspices of the League of Nations.'

More clear and precise assurances could not possibly have been given. The German Government is justified in admitting that the Allied and Associated Powers, at the time that these assurances were given, had an absolutely definite plan in view, and the Government is of the opinion that, in order to soothe the

population, the publication of this plan should not be longer delayed. If the plebiscite is to take place under the auspices of the League of Nations this method of procedure could not, in the opinion of the German Government, give efficacious results unless a Commission appointed by the League of Nations, and on which there should not be any Belgian or German member, is constituted and given the authority to take all measures which it may consider necessary to assure a free and untrammelled vote. In order to be free it is necessary above all that the vote be secret.

With regret, the German Government is obliged to remark that the attitude taken up to the present time by the Belgian authorities in the Eupen and Malmédy districts does not coincide with the solemn assurances given by the Allied and Associated Powers. Numerous complaints and reclamations have reached the German Government from these two districts which indicate how Belgian authorities are at the present time attempting to impede a free and untrammelled vote. While refraining from presenting new documents on this subject at this time, the German Government restricts itself, for the time being, to bringing the following facts to the knowledge of the Allied and Associated Powers: promises of an economic order and of other natures are made to the inhabitants by the Belgian authorities indicating that in case they did not vote in favour of Germany they would enjoy certain advantages, for example, exoneration of war charges; decrease in taxes; free entry of raw materials; construction of general utility establishments, &c. The Belgian administrative inspector at Eupen is particularly active in these influence procedures. His attitude regarding the future vote is characterized by the following: as the German Government is able to incontestably prove, he has declared that the first person who would vote unfavourably, would be thrown down stairs by him. In another circumstance, he declared that if an excessive number of persons came to vote he would close up the establishment and would keep several persons locked up for several days. His secretary, in the presence of a high Belgian functionary, made the declaration that no vote would take place. Other Belgians have stated that if a vote did take place, it would only be for form.

The Belgian functionaries are trying to influence the inhabitants by threats and by proceedings which are of a veritable [?veritable] blackmail nature. For some time, on occasions when the inhabitants had to address these functionaries in connexion with requests of some nature or other, the Belgian authorities only agreed to their demands in case they gave a written declaration that they accepted annexation and would not vote against Belgium. Facts of this nature have been brought to the attention of the German Government in great numbers. Declarations of this nature are extorted from the repatriated German soldiers in particular. In the City of Malmédy, a sort of plebiscite rehearsal has been undertaken; lists called protests were drawn up in which all persons who wished to vote for Germany figured. The registration of this decision was made in the presence of a Belgian officer, who warned the people that whoever voted for Germany would have to leave the country within a very short time. In other cases on the Belgian side those who would vote for Germany were threatened with expulsion, a threat which naturally has a powerful influence on the inhabitants living on their lands and properties. Consequently, even in the most enlightened circles the opinion is current that whoever votes for Germany would at the same time opt for Germany. This erroneous conception was intentionally encouraged from the Belgian side, as it was affirmed to the inhabitants that the vote and the option was [*sic*] the same thing,

although, in Article 37 of the Peace Treaty, the right of option is treated separately and has absolutely no connexion with the vote. Furthermore, from the Belgian side, it is pretended that the vote shall be public and that whoever may vote for Germany must make a complete exposition of the motives actuating his vote. Although the Belgian functionaries have, concerning the abuse of power which has been many times described, declared that they were acting on orders received from Brussels, the German Government does not wish to believe that these functionaries act in accord with the Belgian Government. The German Government awaits, hoping that the Belgian Government will immediately put a stop to the machinations of its representatives, machinations which intimidate the population and invite errors.

The best means for preventing a renewal of these regrettable acts is, in the opinion of the German Government, to have immediate light shed on all the points above referred to and which are constituted by the existing doubtful questions of the plebiscite. The German Government, consequently, requests the Allied and Associated Powers to give them a prompt declaration on these points.

Accept, &c.

BARON VON LERSNER.

#### APPENDIX C TO No. 16

*Note from the Belgian Delegation dated October 14, 1919, relative to Eupen and Malmedy*

PARIS, October 14, 1919.

From: The Belgian Delegation

To: Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

Pursuant to the communication from the General Secretariat of the Peace Conference under date of October 11, and after having duly noted the note No. 28 from the German Delegation dated October 5 [*sic*], concerning the Eupen and Malmedy territories, the General Secretary of the Belgian Delegation has the honour to expose herewith the views of the Government of the King concerning Article 34 paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Versailles.

The German note of October 5 [*sic*] tends to admit the organization of a plebiscite in the districts of Eupen and Malmedy under certain conditions which are judged commendable, and with a view to determining if these territories shall be finally attributed to Germany or to Belgium.

Now, the entire question of the final attribution of these territories and of the intervention in this settlement of the vote of the population is wholly regulated by the above cited provision (Article 34, alinea 2) drawn up as follows:

'During the six months which shall follow the entry into force of the Treaty, voting booths shall be opened by Belgian authority in Eupen and Malmedy and the inhabitants of the said territories shall have the opportunity to express in writing their desire to have all or a part of these territories maintained under German sovereignty.'<sup>8</sup>

And the third and last alinea of Article 34 adds: 'The Belgian Government shall be expected to inform the League of Nations, whose decision Belgium agrees to

<sup>8</sup> The quotation is in the sense, but not the words, of the treaty.

accept, of the result of this popular consultation in English: "public expression of opinion").<sup>18</sup>

This text appears sufficiently clear in itself to require no further comment, and if, in the views of the German Delegation, it seems necessary to interpret and complete it, it is wholly because that Delegation admits *a priori* that the plebiscite question is analogous to the plebiscite which shall take place in the Saar Basin and Upper Silesia, in Eastern Prussia and in Schleswig, the conditions of which were minutely defined in the special provisions of the Treaty concerning them.

By admitting this plebiscite procedure concerning Eupen and Malmedy, the German note tends, naturally, to take into no account alinea [2] of Article 34 of the Treaty, which regulates the question and which in no wise provides for a plebiscite.

In the first part of the German note, it is therefore proposed to define the attribution of a pretended right of vote 'as resolving the question in the same manner as for the other territories submitted to a plebiscite'. But in such an event it would be necessary to commence by establishing, contrary to Article 34, that the territories of Eupen and Malmedy shall be the object of a plebiscite.

Part 2 of the note tends further to substitute for the two registers opened in Eupen and Malmedy, as indicated in Article 34, a system of voting by communes.

Continuing to deviate from the very clear text of Article 34, which gives each inhabitant of the districts of Eupen and Malmedy the opportunity to express their desire to see all or part of the district in which he lives maintained under German sovereignty, Part 3 of the note proposes that the vote be based on a question thus put: 'Reunion with Germany or with Belgium'.

Finally, the 4th part of the German note ends by stating that the plebiscite should take place under the auspices of the League of Nations. The League is to name a commission 'in which there should be neither Germans nor Belgians' and which would organize a free and secret vote.

Thus, under an appearance of juridical argument, the note from the German Delegation ends by completely changing the sense, although very clear and simple, of the provision stipulated in alinea 2 of Article 34 of the Treaty.

Article 34 states that registers shall be opened by Belgian authority at Eupen and Malmedy and that the inhabitants shall have the opportunity to express in writing whether they desire to see all or a part of these territories maintained under German authority. And, in place of these open registers in the two principal towns, the German Delegation offers to substitute a system of voting by communes, a sort of a plebiscite according to which the inhabitants would be invited to choose between Belgium and Germany, and finally, although Article 34 expressly states that the registers shall be opened by *Belgian authority*, and further states that it appertains to the *Belgian Government* to bring the result of this popular expression to the knowledge of the League of Nations, which is not called to intervene in any matter up to this time, the system of the German Note consists in prescribing a plebiscite and of confiding its organization to the League of Nations.

It is clearly evident that this series of considerations developed in the German note amounts only to a wish to substitute for the prescriptions of Article 34, alinea 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Versailles, a plebiscite system which is in no wise provided for in the Peace Treaty, at least as far as the territories of Eupen and Malmedy are concerned, and which can only be based on an idea of preference for the German Government.

It cannot be assumed for an instant that the representatives of the Governments

who drafted Article 34 wished to organize for Eupen and Malmedy a plebiscite system similar to that which was instituted for the Saar Basin, Upper Silesia, Eastern Prussia and Schleswig, and which, being clearly defined concerning these territories, was not defined in the same manner concerning the territories of Eupen and Malmedy. Since such is the case, it is evident that it was intentional.

In due time and place, the Belgian authorities shall not fail to comply with Article 34, alinea 2 of the Treaty of Versailles, by opening at Eupen and Malmedy registers by which the inhabitants of these territories shall have the opportunity to express by writing, whether they desire to see all or a part of these territories maintained under German authority. Furthermore, the Belgian Government shall inform the League of Nations, whose decision Belgium has agreed to accept, of the results of this expression of opinion.

It shall be, therefore, the Belgian Government which shall act, itself and alone, by permitting the inhabitants who may be hostile or unfavourable to her to express themselves freely, and the League of Nations shall not intervene until later to study the value of these oppositions and the action to be taken concerning them.

By instituting this system of popular expression, the Allied and Associated Powers expressed their confidence in the loyalty of Belgium. The German Government, in reality, is attempting to influence the Powers, by false interpretations, to substantially modify the system established in formal terms by Article 34 of the Treaty of Versailles.

With evident intent to influence the Supreme Interallied Council, the German note concludes the considerations of a juridical order which have just been analysed with a certain number of criticisms and accusations relative to the attitude of the Belgian authorities in the districts of Eupen and Malmedy.

Two other notes bearing the respective dates of October 6 (No. 30) and October 11 (No. 32) have arrived containing new accusations. The latter refers directly to Lieut. General Michel, Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian troops in occupied German territory, who is accused of having issued a measure of expulsion regarding certain individuals who evidenced a spirit of open hostility against Belgian occupation. A detailed report concerning these acts is requested from the Belgian authorities in occupied territory.

In the name of the Belgian Delegation,  
Secretary General.

P.O. Signed: GUILLAUME.

H. D. 87.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 8, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigii. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Bliss.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Mr. Forbes-Adam.

*France*: M. Gout, General Bunoust.

*Italy*: M. Galli, Commandant Mazzolini, Prince Boncompagni.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. SIR EYRE CROWE stated that in the next to the last meeting the Council had had to pass upon a proposal made by General Walch *Rectification of Procès-Verbal H. D. 85,<sup>1</sup> Minute 3* on behalf of General Nollet. He had understood that it was a question of laying upon Germany the payment of the salaries of all the personnel of Military Commissions of Control in Germany. That proposition conformed to the point of view maintained by the British Government. He read, however, in the procès-verbal, that Germany was only being charged with the payment of the salaries of personnel not belonging to the regular military forces, that is to say, the civilian personnel. There was no civilian personnel in these Commissions, or at least among the military members there were many who were civilian technical experts put on the footing of officers.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that Sir Eyre Crowe's rectification called for no objection.

(It was decided:

to modify resolution No. 3 of H. D. 85,<sup>1</sup> so as to read as follows: 'It was decided that the payment of the salaries of the personnel of the Military Commissions of Control in Germany should be assumed by Germany.')

2. M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the agenda brought up the discussion of the report of the Commission of Investigation in Smyrna *Report of the Commission of Investigation in Smyrna* (see Appendix A). M. Venizelos had asked to be heard. It seemed to him that there were two questions to be asked of M. Venizelos. First, he should explain the massacres of which the Greek

<sup>1</sup> No. 15.

troops were accused. Moreover, he himself was much struck by reading in the Commission's report that the Greeks would not be able to maintain themselves in Smyrna by their own efforts. The Greeks had been sent to Smyrna on the clear understanding that their occupation should not be taken as equivalent to a definite attribution of territory to them. He noted that the Greeks had gone beyond the limits of the Sandjak of Smyrna without the permission of the Council and had done so upon a telegram from M. Venizelos. He thought that it was necessary to remind them that the Turkish question was not settled and to ask them to state definitely if they could maintain themselves at Smyrna by their own efforts. The information received indicated that in many respects the conduct of the Greeks had been abominable, and that Turkey would never accept, unless obliged to by force, Greek occupation, or, to a certain extent, Italian occupation. As far as the Greeks were concerned, he thought this information was correct. The question would not have arisen if the Greek occupation had not given rise to certain incidents. It was not the Council's fault if the question had to be raised. The Turkish problem was not settled. He felt that the Council would be more and more led to respecting the integrity of Turkish territory; under these circumstances it would be well to warn the Greeks that they should not behave as conquerors of Asia Minor.

M. DE MARTINO wished to associate himself with what M. Clemenceau had just said: the military occupations in Asia Minor were clearly only provisional and should in no way prejudice the final settlement of the Turkish question. This question could not be divorced from the more general question of the fate of the territories of the former Ottoman Empire which was of interest to all Mediterranean powers. Italian opinion was clearly favourable to the principle of respecting the integrity of these territories. Moreover, he wished to point out that the relations between the Italian troops and the Turkish population in Anatolia were excellent and that no conflicts had taken place between them; on the contrary, on many occasions the local populations and authorities had indulged in manifestations of gratitude.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that the Council was entering upon a basic discussion of Greek occupation. He thought that the conclusions of the Commission went beyond the instructions received by it. The Commission had been formed, at the request of M. Venizelos himself, to investigate the massacres. Its report treated, in general terms, the whole problem of Greek occupation, and also questioned the decisions of the Supreme Council. What would happen if the Council, as the report suggested, asked the Greeks to leave Smyrna? Would they be replaced by Turks or was an Inter-Allied occupation contemplated? The affair of the Vilayet of Aidin had just shown how difficult of realization such an occupation was:<sup>2</sup> the French Government had felt it impossible to send a battalion and, under these conditions, the British Government had not felt that it could assume this burden. If Inter-Allied occupation was impossible could the Council really think of allowing the

<sup>2</sup> See Vol. I, No. 70, minute 9, and in the present volume No. 18, minute 4.

Greeks to retire when there was no one to replace them? Could it possibly think of evacuating the country before peace had even been concluded?

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it clearly could not. He felt, with Sir Eyre Crowe, that it was impossible at the moment to ask the Greeks to retire but it would perhaps be well to have some officers on the spot who could inform the Council as to the situation at Smyrna.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the Greeks unfortunately claimed that many of the difficulties arose from the fact that they did not have complete authority in that region. In any case it seemed impossible to agree with the conclusions of the Commission which proposed a regime under which the Greeks might perhaps occupy but the Turks would govern. Rather than create an organ of supervision it would be better to give the Greeks greater liberty of action and at the same time a larger and more definite share of responsibility.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the danger was that the Greeks would take too much latitude.

MR. POLK wished to know what the attitude of the Council was. It seemed to him that there was some thought of rejecting the conclusions of the report now before it. He was not so inclined. The Commission had thought its mission was to establish the responsibility for the events at Smyrna; it had pointed out these responsibilities as it saw them and had not hesitated to question the acts of the Council itself. The report contained serious matters. Did the Council intend or not to take them into consideration? For instance, paragraph 37 of the report<sup>3</sup> pointed out that M. Venizelos himself had ordered the reoccupation of Aidin without taking the Entente into consideration. He felt that it was impossible not to repose confidence in the investigators whom the Council had chosen, or else another Commission should be sent.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the order given by M. Venizelos had already been discussed by the Council of Four.

M. DE MARTINO felt that it was impossible not to discuss the report inasmuch as it emanated from a Commission set up by the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the report would be discussed after M. Venizelos had been heard. (At this point M. Venizelos entered the room.)

M. VENIZELOS hoped that the Council would permit him to give a brief historical summary of the conditions under which the investigation had been conducted; he felt that this recapitulation would show that he had good reason to ask that this investigation should be considered null and void and that another investigation should take place. On the 18th of July, after he had asked the British Government, as a result of a question which had been put in the House of Commons, to send an investigating officer to Smyrna, the Supreme Council had decided to create a Commission of Investigation.<sup>4</sup> No Greek officer sat on that Commission. He had protested to the President of the Conference and had received the reply that a Greek representative

<sup>3</sup> Paragraph 37 of document 3 in appendix A.

<sup>4</sup> See Vol. I, No. 15, minute 4.

should follow the work of the Commission.<sup>5</sup> On August 22nd he had been obliged to inform the Supreme Council that his representative, Colonel Mazarakis, was not allowed to be present at the taking of testimony, under the pretext that his presence might intimidate certain witnesses. The Commission had declared that it would confine itself to communicating the depositions to him. He, M. Venizelos, had protested against that decision, which was contrary to elementary rules of justice. Later on the Commission had made it known that the Greek representative would be put upon the same footing as the Turkish representative who was permitted to follow its work. Such similar treatment, offensive to an Allied people, forced him to protest. On the 14th of September he had again been obliged to protest because the Commission had refused to call the witnesses which the Greek Delegate had proposed should be heard, and because it had refused to communicate to Colonel Mazarakis the testimony which had been taken. The President of the Conference had replied to him that the Greek Delegate was not entitled to insist on being present at all deliberations of the Commission, but that the minutes, including the hearings of witnesses, would be delivered to Colonel Mazarakis who could then present his observations thereon to the Commission before the latter reached its conclusions. Nevertheless the Commission had not wished to communicate to the Greek Delegate the depositions made before it on the pretext that secrecy had been promised certain witnesses. In so acting it had violated the most elementary principles of justice and it put, unintentionally doubtless, a positive premium upon false testimony. He had addressed himself to the Conference which had answered that it could not go behind a promise given by the Commission.<sup>6</sup> He wished to press this point upon the Council; an investigation conducted under such conditions could not be trustworthy. It was impossible thus to pass judgment upon the honour of an army without having given that army the means of defending itself. He felt that he was entitled to satisfaction, since it was a question of a State which had always been faithful to its alliances and friendships, and since this request was formulated by a representative of that State who had always borne himself loyally towards the Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if General Bunoust had any remarks to make as to the materiality of the facts in question.

GENERAL BUNOUST said that he did have some remarks to make. The Commission had never decided to communicate the depositions taken; it had unanimously decided that the depositions would lack sincerity if the Greek representatives had to be informed of them. The Turks would not have opened their mouths in the presence of a Greek officer. In spite of that precaution the Commission had sometimes had difficulty in finding witnesses; thus at Aidin no Turkish witnesses had been found. When the Supreme Council's telegram of September 30th<sup>6</sup> reached the Commission it had not yet ended its labours; it had only concluded the summary of the established

<sup>5</sup> See Vol. I, No. 16, minute 5.

<sup>6</sup> For the foregoing summary of the sequence of events cf. Vol. I, No. 68, minute 6, and in the present volume No. 1, minute 3.

facts and it had transmitted this in full to Colonel Mazarakis. Colonel Mazarakis had presented observations on this subject which the Commission had taken into account on one point.<sup>7</sup>

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether, after the Commission had received the telegram of September 30th, it had taken depositions which it had not communicated to M. Venizelos' representative.

GENERAL BUNOUST thought that the Commission might, after that date, have taken the second deposition of Colonel Smith.<sup>8</sup>

M. VENIZELOS did not wish to insist upon that point. He felt, however, that he might say, without offending anyone, that civil investigators would have been more anxious not to violate cardinal principles of justice, and that they would not, for instance, have allowed witnesses to be heard without being sworn. At Aidin the Commission might well have taken non-Turkish testimony and have been satisfied therewith. He felt finally that he might remark that the procedure adopted inevitably exposed the investigators to the danger of being carried away by false depositions and reaching unjust or inaccurate conclusions. The animosity between Turks and Greeks was an incontestable fact; moreover, it was certain that many Europeans in Smyrna preferred the continuance of the Turkish regime which, with respect to strangers, was a regime of special privileges, rather than the establishment of the Greek regime, which was a regime of equality.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if M. Venizelos did not intend to discuss the facts brought out in the report.

M. VENIZELOS said that he did not want to discuss conclusions based on testimony which had not been brought to the knowledge of the Greek representative.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that it was a serious matter to make such a reply. The Council had expected from M. Venizelos precise answers on questions of fact. As head of the Government he must know if the alleged facts had really happened. He was astonished that M. Venizelos did not wish to discuss them.

M. VENIZELOS recognized that there had been excesses but he thought that they were readily to be explained. He admitted equally that the conditions under which the debarkation took place created an administrative responsibility of the Greek Command. The Greek Government moreover had inflicted heavy penalties. But the Council could not forget that the day before the occupation the Turkish population had assembled, and that protests against the occupation had been posted up.

GENERAL BUNOUST said that these posters were not appeals to resistance. The Turks were only asked to assemble in order to prove that the Turkish element was in the majority; the crowd of Turks, moreover, was not armed.

M. VENIZELOS observed that in any event there was a tendency to resistance, inasmuch as the day before civil prisoners had been released.

GENERAL BUNOUST explained that they had only been released during the

<sup>7</sup> See documents 4 and 5 in appendix A below.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. paragraph 21 of document 3 in appendix A below.

night preceding the debarkation. The Commission's report, moreover, had recognized the responsibility of the Turkish Governor in these circumstances.

M. VENIZELOS added that stores of arms had been looted by the crowd. Under these conditions the debarkation took place. The officer commanding the Greek troops had been guilty of imprudence. The Council knew how gunshots, coming from parts unknown, had provoked a reply on the part of the Greek troops. A panic followed and that was the beginning of the excesses. He thought he ought to point out that the next day or the day after a court-martial had been organized, that in the first five days of its sitting this court-martial had condemned three Greeks to death, one of them being a looting soldier, and that it had totalled seventy-four convictions, of which forty-eight were of Greeks. Nothing more could be asked of the most civilized country. As for the massacre of the prisoners who were being led on board vessels in the harbour,<sup>9</sup> Colonel Mazarakis' investigation, which had resulted in severe condemnation of the Lieutenant commanding the escort, had established that the excesses of which the prisoners had been the victims were largely due to the crowd, and that only about twenty prisoners had been killed. In any event, forty-eight hours after the debarkation of the troops, order had been reestablished. He wished to ask General Bunoust if since that time the city had not been perfectly calm.

GENERAL BUNOUST replied that such was the case.

M. VENIZELOS stated that Colonel Mazarakis did not agree with the Commission on the affair of Menemen.<sup>10</sup> According to the Colonel, a Greek battalion which had evacuated Pergamum, after having suffered serious losses, while entering Menemen had been attacked by Turkish fanatics. This attack had provoked excesses. The Commission, which did not consider that Turkish aggression had been established as a fact, had certainly been led into error by the witnesses which it had heard; it spoke of three hundred Turks killed; according to his information, only twenty had been killed. It was evident that on this point an investigation in the nature of a cross-examination would have been suitable.

GENERAL BUNOUST observed that the Commission had attached very little importance to the figures furnished it; it was perfectly aware of their inexactness. In any event it had not based its conclusions on a Turkish report, according to which one thousand were killed, but on an investigation made the day after the uprising by a French officer.

M. VENIZELOS stated that in the affair of Nazli<sup>11</sup> the fault lay with the Greek officer who, threatened with attack, thought he could evacuate the town prior to the time ordered by the English Admiral. In any event, in that affair, it was the Greeks who had suffered most. As for Aidin,<sup>12</sup> he maintained

<sup>9</sup> See paragraph 13 of document 3 in appendix A below.

<sup>10</sup> See paragraphs 41-3 of document 3 and paragraph 12 of document 5 in appendix A below.

<sup>11</sup> See paragraphs 27-30 of document 3 and paragraph 9 of document 5 in appendix A below.

<sup>12</sup> See paragraphs 32-7 of document 3 and paragraph 10 of document 5 in appendix A below.

that twenty-five hundred Greeks perished and that the number of Turkish victims was far less.

GENERAL BUNOUST explained that the Commission had relied upon a French investigation, according to which there were reported to be about twenty-five hundred Greek victims and fifteen hundred Turkish. The estimation of the number of Turkish dead was moreover difficult on account of the exodus of the population.

M. VENIZELOS acknowledged that Aidin, occupied by the Greeks and then evacuated, had been re-occupied on an order given by him, which order had had unfortunate results. He wished to give the reasons which had caused him to issue that order. The Greeks were in a state of war with the Turks. If the Turks could boast of having expelled the Greeks from Aidin, their situation at Smyrna would have become impossible; therefore he had given the order to re-occupy the town. Moreover, he had informed the Council of what he was doing. Already, prior to that time, he had instructed the Greek military authorities not to hesitate, in the event of attack by Turkish bands, to go beyond the limits of the zone of occupation in order to break up centres of hostile resistance. In any event these incontestable facts remained: the Greek section of Aidin was entirely destroyed, twenty-five hundred out of eight thousand Greeks had perished, the Greek element formed the richest and the most civilized part of the population, and it was the Greeks who had suffered most. He regretted that the procedure adopted by the Commission had not allowed the Turkish losses to be ascertained. Finally, he felt obliged to protest against the passage of the Commission's report which repeated an accusation of the Sheik-ul-Islam to the effect that the Greek Red Cross had introduced arms into Smyrna.

GENERAL BUNOUST observed that the Commission had not considered this accusation well founded.

M. VENIZELOS said that it was true that prior to the Greek occupation the Greek Sanitary Officer had insisted that the boxes of the Red Cross which were unloaded at the customs be not inspected, and that the Turkish Governor had consented thereto; but he could not allow the Greek Red Cross to remain under the shadow of suspicion. The Sheik-ul-Islam also pretended that the Greeks had taken advantage of their occupation to bring about an influx of Grecian population in those regions.<sup>13</sup> That was entirely false: since the events of May, 1914,<sup>14</sup> there had been in Greece 300,000 refugees from Asia Minor. He had ordered them to be repatriated, but it had been pointed out to him that the dwellings they had left were being inhabited by Turks whose lodging would have to be ensured, and that the question was a delicate one. Under those circumstances the repatriation had been postponed. There had only been isolated cases of repatriation and he did not think that there were more than 5,000 or 6,000 persons who had returned. He felt sure that the excesses, which he deplored, had not gone

<sup>13</sup> See Vol. I, No. 14, appendix A.

<sup>14</sup> At that time the Greek population in Asia Minor had been subjected to hostile Turkish treatment and eviction. Cf. paragraph 1 of document 3 in appendix A below.

beyond what should have been expected under analogous circumstances on the part of any army. The affair had certainly been exaggerated; moreover General Buncust did not deny that severe punishment had been meted out to those found guilty. The Greek army had not deserved ill of its Allies and the Greeks had ensured the maintenance of order. If certain fugitive Turks had not returned to Smyrna that fact could be attributed to the pressure brought to bear on them by the Turks in the interior.

GENERAL BUNCUST remarked that it was quite possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what was the importance of the Turkish bands with whom the Greeks had to deal.

GENERAL BUNCUST said that the Commissioners had spent a day with these bands; they did not seem to have great cohesion and they had no offensive capacity. The Nationalist movement, however, was a serious matter and it could arrest all military progress in Asia Minor unless an operation on a large scale should be decided upon.

M. VENIZELOS said that there was no question of that.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that that, however, was just what M. Venizelos had done. Greece had had a Mandate from the Conference and had not kept within the limits of that Mandate. Some members of the Council were wondering what would happen if the Turkish attacks should increase in severity. Could Greece, without the support of her Allies, make the necessary military and financial effort until such time as the country should be completely pacified? That was the troublesome point.

M. VENIZELOS replied that certainly the longer the question was dragged out the more financial difficulties would increase for a small country such as Greece. She had an army of 12 divisions of 325,000 men; an army stronger than it was at the time of the Armistice. He felt assured that if the Conference should charge Greece with the task of defeating Turkey she would be able to do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had put the question the other way.

M. VENIZELOS said that with 12 divisions he had nothing to fear. Mustapha Kemal only had 70,000 men. It was evident that if the present situation was unduly prolonged Greece would have financial difficulties, but he hoped that would not be the case.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked M. Venizelos in the name of the Council for his presentation of the case. (At this point M. Venizelos left the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the discussion be postponed until the following Monday.<sup>15</sup> (This was agreed to.)

(The meeting then adjourned).

*Hôtel de Crillon, Paris,*

*November 8, 1919.*

<sup>15</sup> November 10, 1919.

## APPENDIX A TO NO. 17

### *Commission Interalliée d'Enquête sur l'Occupation grecque de Smyrne et des Territoires adjacents*

#### Document 1

##### *Lettre d'Envoi au Président de la Conférence de la Paix.*<sup>16</sup>

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 14 octobre 1919.

Nous avons l'honneur de vous adresser le dossier renfermant tous les documents relatifs à l'enquête faite en Asie-Mineure en exécution de votre décision du 22 juillet 1919.<sup>5</sup>

En plus des procès-verbaux des séances et leurs annexes parmi lesquelles se trouvent *in extenso* les dépositions des témoins,<sup>17</sup> le dossier comprend, conformément aux instructions données par votre télégramme du 26 juillet:<sup>18</sup>

1° Un exposé des faits survenus depuis l'occupation.<sup>19</sup>

En suivant le plus possible l'ordre chronologique, cet exposé présente tous les faits qui nous ont semblé avoir eu une répercussion sur les événements et en particulier ceux qui sont relatés dans la plainte adressée par le Cheik-ul-Islam à la Conférence de la paix.<sup>13</sup>

A cet exposé est annexé le rapport établi par le Colonel désigné par le Gouvernement hellénique pour suivre les travaux de la Commission.<sup>20</sup>

Cet officier supérieur a reçu communication de l'exposé des faits établis, mais nous n'avons pas cru devoir lui communiquer les chapitres des responsabilités et des conclusions, estimant que cette manière de faire était conforme à l'esprit de vos instructions du 22 et 26 juillet susvisées.

Ainsi que nous l'avons fait connaître par la réponse à votre décision du 30 septembre<sup>6</sup> qui vous a été transmise le 3 octobre par l'intermédiaire de Monsieur le Haut Commissaire français en Orient, nous n'avons pas cru pouvoir, sans manquer à nos engagements d'honneur, communiquer au représentant hellénique les dépositions des témoins qui ont été faites sous promesse de secret.

2° Un chapitre relatif à l'établissement des responsabilités;<sup>21</sup>

3° Les conclusions présentées par la Commission.<sup>22</sup>

Ces conclusions ont été adoptées à l'unanimité des voix.

*Les membres de la Commission :*

R. H. HARE, BUNOUST, A. DALL' OLIO, MARK BRISTOL.

#### Document 2

##### *Historique de la Commission Interalliée d'Enquête sur l'Occupation grecque de Smyrne et Territoires adjacents*

La Commission d'enquête a été créée à la suite de la plainte adressée par le Cheikh-ul-Islam à la Conférence de la Paix en date du 15 juillet.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>16</sup> In the original this document was preceded by a table of contents enumerating the documents contained in this appendix.

<sup>17</sup> Not included in file copy of this appendix.

<sup>18</sup> See Vol. I, No. 17, minute 12.

<sup>19</sup> Document 3 below.

<sup>21</sup> Document 6 below.

<sup>20</sup> Document 5 below.

<sup>22</sup> Document 8 below.

Elle a été composée des Membres suivants:

*Pour l'Amérique:* Contre-Amiral Bristol;

*Pour la France:* Général de Brigade Bunoust;

*Pour l'Angleterre:* Général de Brigade Hars [Hare];

*Pour l'Italie:* Lieut-Général Dall' Olio.

A été nommé Secrétaire général, le Lieutenant Luigi Villari. Les autres officiers attachés à la Commission sont les suivants:

*Pour les États-Unis d'Amérique:* Lieutenant Dunn, Lieutenant Stewart (remplacé plus tard par le Lieutenant Jones), M. Caessbrough (interprète de turc);

*Pour la France:* Lieutenant Rumerchène, Sous-Lieutenant Vitalis (interprète de grec), et Sous-Lieutenant Dugoureq;

*Pour l'Empire Britannique:* Commandant Thomson (interprète de turc), Capitaine Harris et Lieutenant Higham (pendant le séjour de la Commission en Asie Mineure).

*Pour l'Italie:* Lieutenant Villari et Lieutenant de Bosis.

Elle a tenu sa première séance à l'Ambassade d'Italie à Constantinople le 12 août. A cette occasion il fut décidé à l'unanimité que la présidence serait tenue à tour de rôle par chaque membre de la Commission, que si deux séances avaient lieu le même jour, elles seraient présidées par le même Commissaire, et que chaque séance à Constantinople ait lieu à l'Ambassade de l'État auquel appartient le président du jour.

Six séances furent tenues à Constantinople, la dernière le 19 août. La Commission s'est ensuite rendue à Smyrne où elle s'est réunie pour la première fois le 23 août à l'école Sultanieh, mise à sa disposition par les autorités ottomanes. Elle a tenu douze séances à Smyrne, la dernière (la dix-huitième) le 5 septembre.

Le 6 septembre elle est partie pour Aidin où elle est restée jusqu'au 12 de ce mois. Trois séances ont eu lieu à Aidin même; le 10 septembre elle s'est rendue à Girova dans la zone italienne pour entendre les dépositions des réfugiés turcs d'Aidin, le 11 à Mazli [Nazli] dans la zone occupée par les forces du mouvement national turc, où elle a interrogé entre autres, des réfugiés grecs également d'Aidin.

Le 12 la Commission est rentrée à Smyrne où elle a tenue encore neuf séances; quatre autres ont été tenues respectivement à Odemisch, à Ménémén, à Magnésie et à Aivali. La dernière séance à Smyrne (la 35<sup>e</sup>) a été tenue le 26 septembre. La Commission après avoir terminé l'audition des témoins, à l'exception de quelques-uns qui se trouvaient à Constantinople, est rentrée dans cette ville où elle s'est réunie en séance pour la 36<sup>e</sup> fois le 1<sup>er</sup> octobre. Encore onze séances y ont été tenues, dont la dernière le 15 octobre.

En tout les séances ont été 46.

Le nombre des témoins entendus est de 175 appartenant à toutes les nationalités et à toutes les catégories sociales.

Le dossier est composé de la façon suivante:

A chaque séance les dépositions des témoins, les délibérations de la Commission et dans les cas les plus importants aussi leurs discussions ont été reproduites. Un court résumé du procès-verbal, avec indications des questions discutées ou décidées et les noms des témoins interrogés, y est annexé, ainsi que les lettres, rapports et autres documents se rapportant spécialement à la séance en question.

Les autres documents sont réunis dans un dossier spécial. -

Le rapport final de la Commission consiste en trois parties:

a) Les faits établis qui forment un exposé chronologique des événements dont la Commission s'est occupée;

b) L'exposé des responsabilités qui, de l'avis de la Commission, résultent des faits établis, et

c) Les conclusions et recommandations que la Commission a cru utile de proposer dans le but de remédier aux inconvénients constatés dans la situation du pays.

*Le secrétaire général,*  
LIEUTENANT LUIGI VILLARI.

### Document 3

#### *I. Exposé des Faits survenus depuis l'Occupation qui ont été établis au cours de l'Enquête entre le 12 août et le 6 octobre 1919.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 7 octobre 1919.

N° 1.—Depuis l'armistice la sécurité des chrétiens n'était pas menacée dans le vilayet d'Aïdin.

Les populations hellènes avaient été incontestablement persécutées en 1914 et au cours de la guerre et traitées sans aucune bienveillance pendant les premiers mois qui suivirent l'armistice, par le Vali Noureddin pacha; mais depuis l'entrée en fonction du Vali actuel Izzet bey tous les habitants, sans distinction de races, étaient traités avec impartialité.

Malgré la présence de quelques bandes de brigands dans la région on peut affirmer que le calme était [sic] revenu.

Les craintes de massacres de chrétiens n'étaient pas justifiées. Des enquêtes prouvent que les proclamations appelant les musulmans au massacre des Grecs qui, quelques semaines avant le débarquement, sont tombées entre les mains des autorités grecques et ont été envoyées à Athènes n'ont pas été écrites par les officiers de gendarmerie turque dont les signatures figurent sur ces pièces. Ces pièces ne sont pas certainement authentiques.

N° 2. — Les conditions de sécurité dans le vilayet d'Aïdin et à Smyrne en particulier ne justifiaient point l'occupation des forts de Smyrne par application de l'article 7 des clauses de l'armistice.<sup>23</sup> (Voir au procès-verbal de la trente-septième séance, les réserves faites à ce sujet par le Général Représentant italien<sup>24</sup>).

La situation intérieure du vilayet ne motivait pas davantage le débarquement de troupes alliées à Smyrne.

Au contraire, depuis le débarquement des Grecs, la situation est troublée à cause de l'état de guerre existant entre les troupes grecques et les irréguliers turcs.

N° 3. — Les forts de Smyrne furent occupés le 14 mai 1919 par des forces alliées britannique, française, italienne et grecque, sur l'ordre de l'amiral Calthorpe, de la marine de Sa Majesté britannique, l'un des Hauts Commissaires alliés en Turquie pour l'exécution des termes de l'armistice. L'ordre d'occupation portait qu'elle se faisait en exécution de l'article 7 de l'armistice entre la Turquie et les Puissances alliées.<sup>23</sup>

N° 4. — Dans la nuit du 14 au 15 mai, à la suite de proclamation, un rassemblement de plusieurs milliers de Turcs a eu lieu dans le quartier turc du côté du cimetière juif, mais ce rassemblement n'avait pas pour objet d'organiser la résistance par

<sup>23</sup> Article 7 of the Armistice of Port Mudros provided that: 'The Allies have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.' (Cf. *British and Foreign State Papers (1917-1918)*, vol. cxi, p. 612.)

<sup>24</sup> Document 7 below.

la force au débarquement des Grecs. Son but était de prouver la majorité et la prédominance des habitants turcs sur les éléments étrangers.

N° 5. — L'occupation de Smyrne par les troupes grecques fut ordonnée par la Conférence de la Paix.<sup>25</sup> Les ordres pour l'occupation furent donnés par l'Amiral Calthorpe, représentant cette Conférence.

La Ville de Smyrne fut occupée le 15 mai 1919 par les forces grecques, assistées des forces navales de l'Amérique, Grande-Bretagne, France, Grèce et Italie.

Les forces navales britanniques, françaises, italiennes et américaines débarquèrent de petits contingents armés pour garder leurs consulats respectifs.

Les forces navales grecques débarquèrent un groupe destiné à garder les points de débarquement des troupes grecques. Cette force était insuffisante pour préserver l'ordre et exécuter sa mission.

Les forces grecques se composaient de trois régiments. Le débarquement eut lieu à la pointe et sur le quai en face l'Hôtel Kramer. Les troupes commencèrent à débarquer à 8 heures du matin.

N° 6. — Aucune résistance au débarquement n'a été organisée par les autorités turques, les coups de fusil tirés par les Turcs furent des actes isolés.

N° 7. — Plusieurs centaines de prisonniers de toutes sortes se sont échappés des prisons voisines de la caserne quelques heures avant l'occupation.

Les autorités turques n'ont pas pris de mesures efficaces pour prévenir ou empêcher ces évasions.

Quelques-uns de ces prisonniers purent se procurer des armes, au dépôt d'armes situé près de la caserne.

N° 8. — Le Commandement supérieur grec n'a pris aucune mesure préalable pour assurer l'ordre pendant la marche des troupes hellènes à travers la ville. Des détachements de marins grecs avaient seulement été placés dans le voisinage immédiat des deux points choisis pour le débarquement. Conformément aux ordres du Représentant de l'Entente, les troupes turques étaient maintenues dans leurs casernes.

Aucune liaison n'avait été établie pour permettre au Commandement grec de faire parvenir ses ordres aux autorités turques et pour se renseigner sur l'état d'esprit de la population.

N° 9. — Les autorités grecques, militaires, civiles et religieuses n'ont rien fait pour essayer de calmer la foule.

La cérémonie faite par le Métropolite pour bénir les troupes à leur débarquement n'a pu avoir qu'une influence fâcheuse.

La foule, massée sur le parcours des troupes, a eu une attitude de nature à déchaîner la colère des habitants turcs et à entraîner des actes de violence de la part de fanatiques isolés.

N° 10. — Les ordres relatifs au débarquement n'ont pas été strictement exécutés. Ils ont été modifiés sans l'approbation du Commandement, à la suite de l'intervention du Commandant de l'*Averoff*, qui avait été prévenu de la formation de nombreux rassemblements tur[c]s du côté de Carantina.

Les Compagnies d'Evzones qui devaient débarquer à Carantina pour occuper les hauteurs qui dominent la ville du côté du Sud, ont été ramenées au quai de la douane où elles ont débarqué derrière les autres fractions du régiment. Pour les itinéraires à suivre, les Commandants des colonnes se sont conformés aux indications des guides qui leur ont été donnés. Ils ne savaient pas que les troupes turques étaient consignées dans leurs casernes, près du Konak.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Vol. I, No. 10, note 8.

N° 11. — Les premiers coups de feu ont été tirés vers le coin de la place du Konak, à l'entrée de la rue qui conduit à Cocarialy.

Il est impossible d'établir avec certitude par qui furent tirés ces premiers coups. Les troupes grecques n'ont pas ouvert le feu et ont seulement riposté à ces premiers coups.

N° 12. — A la suite de ces premiers coups une vive fusillade a éclaté. Les soldats grecs qui se trouvaient dans les jardins de la place du Konak ont dirigé un feu violent contre les fenêtres de la caserne et du Konak.

Il a été impossible de savoir exactement si quelques coups de feu ont été tirés de certaines fenêtres de la caserne après le commencement de la fusillade.

Aucune trace de balle n'a été trouvée sur les murs des bâtiments qui font face à la caserne.

Quelques rares coups de feu paraissent aussi avoir été tirés par les Turcs en certains points des quais et de la ville, en particulier du côté du Consulat hellénique où, d'après les rapports grecs, le détachement de garde fut obligé de se défendre à coups de fusil contre une attaque turque.

N° 13. — Sur le chemin qu'ils ont parcouru entre la place du Konak et le bateau *Patris* où ils furent enfermés, les premiers convois de prisonniers comprenant des officiers et soldats, ainsi que le Vali et des fonctionnaires furent l'objet de brutalités de la part de la foule qui les accompagnait et même de quelques soldats grecs qui les escortaient.

Tous ces prisonniers furent volés. Tous devaient crier 'Zito Venizelos' et marcher avec les mains levées. Quelques-uns furent massacrés.

A part une ou deux exceptions, les officiers grecs n'ont exercé sur leurs hommes aucune action pour empêcher les violences.

N° 14. — Le 15 mai et jours suivants les troupes grecques ont arrêté arbitrairement environ 2,500 personnes, parmi lesquelles un certain nombre d'enfants de moins de 14 ans. Le personnel et les élèves de quelques écoles furent même enfermés sur le *Patris*. Bon nombre de ces prisonniers furent maltraités, pillés et détenus pendant plusieurs jours dans des conditions d'hygiène inadmissibles.

N° 15. — Pendant les journées du 15 et du 16 mai de nombreux actes de violences et de pillages furent exercés en ville contre les personnes et les habitations turques. Les fez furent arrachés et les Turcs n'osèrent plus sortir avec cette coiffure. De nombreuses femmes furent violées. Quelques assassinats furent commis. Ces violences et pillages furent exercés le plus souvent par la populace grecque de la ville, mais il a été prouvé que des soldats y prirent part et que l'autorité militaire ne prit que tardivement des mesures efficaces pour y mettre fin.

N° 16. — Le nombre de tués et blessés le jour de l'occupation de Smyrne par les troupes grecques est estimé de façon différente par les autorités turques et grecques. Ces nombres sont environ les suivants :

*Grecs*: soldats: 2 tués, 6 blessés; civils: 20 tués, 20 noyés, 60 blessés.

*Turcs*: 300 à 400 victimes (tués ou blessés).

N° 17. — Après que la nouvelle du débarquement des forces grecques à Smyrne fut connue dans les villages des environs, les habitants grecs commencèrent à piller les maisons turques et à voler le bétail turc; quelques Turcs furent également tués dans différents villages.

N° 18. — Le Colonel commandant les troupes d'occupation grecques avait reçu dès le 21 mai le télégramme envoyé de Paris le 20 mai par M. Venizelos qui réglait les conditions d'occupation du Sandjak de Smyrne et du Caza d'Aivali ainsi que de certaines régions situées en dehors du Sandjak de Smyrne.

N° 19. — M. le Commodore FitzMaurice, représentant de l'Entente à partir du 28 mai, n'a reçu que le 1<sup>er</sup> juin les instructions lui faisant connaître ses attributions vis-à-vis des autorités helléniques en ce qui concerne l'extension de la zone d'occupation.

Depuis le départ de l'Amiral Calthorpe (21 mai) jusqu'au 28 mai, le représentant de l'Entente était le Vice-Amiral français Sagoy du Vauroux.

N° 20. — Le Haut Commissaire du Gouvernement hellénique arrivé à Smyrne le 21 mai a agi contre les ordres contenus dans le télégramme du 20 mai, en autorisant le Colonel commandant les troupes à donner le 23 mai un ordre d'opération visant :

a, L'occupation de Aïdin;

b L'intervention dans les régions de Magnésie et de Cassaba, sans avoir, au préalable, demandé l'autorisation au représentant de l'Entente.

Le Haut Commissaire grec a reconnu, devant la Commission, sa responsabilité à ce sujet.

N° 21. — Pour justifier l'extension de la zone grecque le Haut Commissaire hellénique s'est appuyé :

a, Sur les renseignements non vérifiés reçus par l'autorité militaire, d'après lesquels la sécurité publique aurait été menacée dans les régions susvisées;

b) Sur une interprétation donnée par l'autorité militaire à des conversations tenues avec le Colonel anglais Smith qui n'avait aucune qualité pour remplacer le Représentant de l'Entente.

Le Colonel Smith n'avait pas eu connaissance du télégramme envoyé le 20 mai par Monsieur Veniselos au Colonel Zafiriou. Il n'a jamais donné à celui-ci aucune autorisation même verbale, de se porter à Aïdin-Magnésie et Cassaba. Il avait seulement exposé au Colonel Zafiriou l'utilité d'envoyer quelques troupes le long de la voie ferrée jusqu'à Trianda pour protéger la ligne, si le Colonel Zafiriou avait l'autorisation de pousser ses troupes en avant.

Le Colonel Smith ajouta que toute occupation au delà de Trianda pourrait occasionner des désordres.

Il rendit compte de cette conversation à son Supérieur.

N° 22. — La marche en avant et l'installation des troupes grecques aussi bien dans la direction de Magnésie que dans la direction d'Eudémich, d'Aïdin et jusqu'à Nazili s'est d'abord faite dans des conditions satisfaisantes malgré l'émotion soulevée dans le pays par la nouvelle des événements de Smyrne. Le Commandement grec fit une faute en tolérant l'action de civils grecs armés qui sous prétexte d'aider les troupes grecques se livraient au pillage et commettaient toutes sortes d'excès.

Une cour martiale constituée à Smyrne dès le 16 mai par le Commandement grec avait prononcé (à la date du 15 août) 74 condamnations, dont 3 à mort pour les seuls événements des 15 et 16 mai. Parmi ces condamnés figurent :

48 Grecs; 13 Turcs; 12 Arméniens; 1 Juif.

N° 23. — L'excitation produite dans le pays par les événements de Smyrne augmenta progressivement pour les raisons suivantes :

a) Une grande incertitude régna au sujet des limites du territoire à occuper par les forces grecques jusqu'au 2 juin, date à laquelle le Commodore FitzMaurice, de la Marine britannique, fut chargé de déterminer les limites de l'occupation.

b) L'avance rapide des troupes grecques vers l'intérieur du pays augmenta le trouble des populations. Les notables turcs commencèrent à quitter la région occupée. Les réguliers turcs et la gendarmerie désertèrent. Des civils grecs

s'armèrent ouvertement. L'activité des brigands augmenta en même temps que le nombre des actes de violence, les vols et les pillages.

c) Les perquisitions faites par les troupes grecques aidées par des civils armés dans les maisons turques pour la recherche des armes, portèrent au plus haut point le mécontentement de la population, car la violation du domicile musulman constitue une mesure particulièrement vexatoire susceptible de provoquer une grande irritation.

Cette excitation créa dans tout le vilayet d'Aïn une apparence de désordres qui tendait à justifier l'extension des limites de l'occupation par les forces grecques.

N° 24. — Les armes dont les civils grecs étaient porteurs leur ont été probablement fournies depuis l'armistice par la contrebande opérant entre les îles et la côte.

Il n'y a pas lieu de retenir l'accusation portée par les Turcs contre la Croix-Rouge grecque au sujet du débarquement, à Smyrne, d'armes contenues dans des caisses portant les marques de cette institution.

Il est seulement prouvé que, au cours du mois de février, un grand nombre de caisses furent, à plusieurs reprises, déchargées du bateau grec *Adriaticos* et échappèrent au contrôle de la douane. Des témoins turcs, entendus, ont affirmé que certaines de ces caisses renfermaient des armes et des munitions.

Les autorités grecques n'ont autorisé que dans les premiers jours de mars le contrôle des caisses par les fonctionnaires turcs du service de la douane.

N° 25. — Ayassoulouk a été occupé le 25 mai; Deunendjid a été occupé le 25 mai; Baladjik a été occupé le 25 mai; Aïdin a été occupé le 27 mai; Eudémich a été occupé le 1<sup>er</sup> juin; Nazili a été occupé le 3 juin.

N° 26. — Divers coups de main exécutés sur des postes grecs par des bandes ou des insurgés turcs ont amené de la part des Grecs des représailles dont quelques-unes pouvaient être justifiées par la situation militaire. Toutes ces représailles ont été faites brutalement. Quelques assassinats furent commis de part et d'autre.

N° 27. — L'évacuation de Nazili a été faite dans la nuit du 19 au 20 juin sur l'initiative du commandant du bataillon d'occupation. Cette évacuation n'a pas été faite conformément aux ordres du représentant de l'Entente donnés depuis le 14 juin, d'après lesquels les autorités locales turques devaient être prévenues à l'avance du départ des troupes grecques.

N° 28. — Les autorités militaires grecques expliquent ce mouvement en disant que le commandant du bataillon craignait une attaque et que pour ne pas renseigner l'ennemi sur son mouvement de retraite, il n'a pas prévenu les autorités turques de son départ. Les ordres relatifs à l'évacuation de Nazili n'ont été donnés par le Commandement supérieur que le 19.

N° 29. — Après ce départ les autorités turques n'ont pas eu le temps de créer un service d'ordre pour remplacer la gendarmerie désarmée et désorganisée pendant l'occupation grecque. Elles n'ont pas été en mesure de s'opposer au pillage et au massacre de quelques familles grecques par des bandes turques entrées à Nazili quelques heures après l'évacuation par les Grecs.

N° 30. — Les habitants arrêtés à Nazili par les Grecs comme suspects au nombre d'une trentaine environ ont été emmenés avec les troupes en retraite.

L'un d'eux fut tué en route sous prétexte qu'il ne pouvait marcher.

Parmi les autres quelques-uns purent s'échapper mais le plus grand nombre fut tué au village de Kiosk au cours d'une bagarre survenue pendant la traversée de ce village, pendant laquelle un officier grec a été tué.

N° 31. — Après l'évacuation de Nazili par les troupes grecques les attaques des Turcs contre les postes grecs et les soldats isolés se sont multipliées.

Dans toute la région d'Aidin la population était armée, aussi bien les Turcs que les Grecs.

N° 32. — Les troupes grecques ont exécuté aux environs d'Aidin des reconnaissances armées. Au cours de ces reconnaissances quelques villages furent brûlés.

Le 27 une de ces reconnaissances a été repoussée par les bandes qui l'ont poursuivie jusqu'à l'entrée d'Aidin. Le combat a continué le 28. Les assaillants ont fait usage de canons de 105 dès le 28.

Les Grecs ont reculé.

Le Commandant et les témoins grecs affirment que des coups de feu ont été tirés par les habitants turcs sur des fractions de troupes grecques en retraite, au moment où elles traversaient le quartier turc au sud de la voie ferrée. Quelques-uns des incendies qui ont éclaté dans ce quartier turc dans la matinée du 29 ont pris naissance au cours du combat.

D'autres incendies éclatèrent aussi dans ce quartier sur divers points isolés.

Un grand nombre de Turcs, hommes, femmes, enfants qui essayaient de sortir du quartier en flammes ont été tués sans raison par les soldats grecs qui gardaient toutes les issues conduisant de ce quartier vers la partie nord de la ville.

Le Commandement et les troupes grecs ont incontestablement perdu tout sang-froid.

Les Grecs évacuèrent la ville dans la nuit du 29 au 30 après avoir commis de nombreux attentats et des crimes. Un grand nombre de civils grecs qui voulaient s'enfuir en accompagnant les troupes dans leur retraite en ont été empêché par le Commandement.

N° 33. — L'incendie du quartier grec est dû aux bandes turques du chef Yuruk Ali qui y sont entrées dans la matinée du 30 juin et l'ont brûlé complètement après avoir pillé les maisons dont elles ont tué les occupants.

Sans distinction d'âge ni de sexe un grand nombre d'habitants grecs rencontrés dans la rue furent impitoyablement tués par les bandes.

Les habitants qui échappèrent à la mort, mais non pas au vol, furent ceux qui, au nombre de 2,000 ou 3,000 environ, purent se réfugier, avant l'arrivée des bandes, dans le couvent des religieuses françaises, d'où elles se rendirent au Konak sous la protection du Colonel Cheffik Bey, commandant la 57<sup>e</sup> Division ottomane.

De même quelques notables qui avaient pu se rendre au Konak eurent en partie la vie sauve, mais quelques-uns furent exécutés.

Il n'a pas été possible d'établir avec certitude le chiffre des victimes grecques ou turques.

Le représentant du Gouvernement grec entendu par la Commission le 7 septembre estime que le nombre des victimes grecques est de 2,000 environ, 900 cadavres étaient déjà retrouvés à cette date. Un témoin anglais estime ce nombre à 400 environ.

Un officier français qui a fait une enquête sur place quelques jours après les événements évalue le nombre des victimes à

1,500 à 2,000 Grecs;

1,200 à 1,500 Turcs;

en reconnaissant toutefois que l'évaluation des victimes turques a été très difficile à faire.

N° 34. — Les troupes grecques, à l'aide des renforts envoyés par le Général Nider, ont repris Aidin le 4 juillet. Elles ont incendié le quartier turc situé à l'ouest de la ville, où se trouvent aussi des usines grecques.

N° 35. — L'ensemble des incendies allumés entre le 29 juin et le 4 juillet ont

certainement détruit les deux tiers de la ville d'Aidin, dont la population s'élevait à 20,000 habitants parmi lesquels environ 8,000 Grecs.

Les maisons non brûlées ont toutes été pillées.

N° 36. — Avant la rentrée des Grecs à Aidin la plus grande partie de la population turque a quitté la ville et les environs pour se réfugier dans la zone italienne ou dans la région de Nazili-Dénizli, où elle est encore.

Un millier de Grecs ont été emmenés dans la zone turque où ils étaient encore dans une situation matérielle très pénible, au moment de la visite de la Commission à Nazili le 11 septembre.

N° 37. — La réoccupation d'Aidin a été ordonnée par le Commandement supérieur grec malgré les ordres formels du représentant de l'Entente.

Les autorités grecques ont agi sur ordre formel envoyé de Paris par M. Veniselos le 2 juillet. Cet ordre n'admettait à ce sujet aucune intervention du représentant de l'Entente.

N° 38. — La plupart des villages situés le long de la voie ferrée entre Baladjik et Aidin ont été détruits par les incendies allumés au cours des opérations militaires qui se sont déroulées dans la région.

N° 39. — Actuellement le calme est à peu près rétabli, sauf dans la zone très voisine du front où se livrent encore des combats d'avant-postes qui causent des pertes et qui entraînent des mesures militaires dont souffrent les habitants.

Il en est de même dans la région d'Eudémich où l'occupation grecque s'est faite dans de bonnes conditions.

N° 40. — L'occupation du vilayet d'Aidin par les forces grecques a causé de grandes pertes matérielles au point de vue récoltes et propriétés.

Les unes, impossibles à estimer, sont dues aux pillages, aux vols et à la destruction du bétail, dont une partie a été utilisée comme nourriture par les troupes grecques.

Les autres, de moindre importance, furent la conséquence des opérations militaires et des rencontres qui eurent lieu entre les forces grecques et les bandes turques.

D'autre[s] enfin, très considérables, sont dues à l'incendie des maisons, des villages, et de la ville d'Aidin. On peut estimer que les pertes provenant de l'incendie d'Aidin représentent approximativement une valeur de huit millions de livres sterling.

Lorsque les habitants turcs abandonnèrent leurs maisons et s'enfuirent des districts occupés par les Grecs, ils laissèrent leurs récoltes sur pied ou les abandonnèrent. Les pertes en haricots, racines à liqueur et en figes peuvent être estimées à un million deux cent mille livres.

La récolte des olives souffrira également si les conditions ne s'améliorent pas avant le mois de novembre.

N° 41. — Pergame a été occupée le 12 juin. Cette ville étant dans le nord du Sandjak de Smyrne, les Grecs avaient le droit de l'occuper d'après les ordres de l'Entente donnés par le télégramme du 20 mai.

La Commission n'a pas été à Pergame.

D'après les renseignements dignes de foi qui ont été recueillis il résulte que les irréguliers turcs qui ont repris Pergame ont tué les habitants turcs qui avaient bien accueilli les Grecs. Ils ont également massacré et souvent torturé tous les soldats grecs faits prisonniers au cours de cette affaire de Pergame.

N° 42. — Le 17 juin, après l'évacuation de Pergame, les troupes grecques rassemblées à Ménémén se sont livrées, sans raison sérieuse, à un véritable massacre de Turcs inoffensifs. Les autorités municipales affirment que plus de 1,000 habitants

turcs ont été tués, mais ce nombre paraît exagéré. D'après l'enquête faite dès le lendemain de l'événement par un officier français, le nombre des victimes turques seraient de 200 tués et 200 blessés.

Ce massacre n'a pas été organisé par le Commandement grec. Il fut le résultat d'une panique qui s'est emparée de jeunes troupes non aguerries, fatiguées, encore sous l'impression causée par les événements de Pergame et que les officiers n'ont pas su calmer.

N° 43. — Le Commandement militaire grec affirme que la répression grecque a été la conséquence d'une attaque des Turcs qui, d'une maison près de la gare et du Konak, auraient tiré des coups de feu sur des soldats grecs.

De nombreux témoignages ont été entendus à ce sujet. Ceux des Grecs sont imprécis et quelquefois contradictoires.

La Commission estime que l'affirmation du Commandement grec ne peut pas être regardée comme exacte.

N° 44. — L'occupation de Magnésie, en dehors des limites du Sandjak de Smyrne a eu lieu le 25 mai sans autorisation du représentant de l'Entente et sans que cette Haute Autorité ait été prévenue.

Pour des raisons militaires cette occupation a été poussée et maintenue jusqu'à Ahmedli, à l'est, et jusqu'à Papazli, au nord-est de Magnésie. Les troupes grecques avaient même momentanément occupé Ak-hissar, mais n'y sont pas restées.

L'occupation de la zone de Magnésie s'est faite au début sans difficultés. Les rapports sont devenus moins bons entre la population et les troupes grecques à la suite de mauvais traitements subis par quelques habitants, des dégradations et ces [? des] vols commis dans certaines propriétés et à la suite des perquisitions faites pour la recherche des armes.

Les autorités civiles turques sont restées à Magnésie à l'exception du Mufti qui, convoqué à Smyrne par les autorités grecques, s'est enfui à Constantinople.

La situation actuelle est calme. Des rapports corrects existent entre le Général commandant la division d'occupation et les autorités turques.

N° 45. — Après l'armistice des bandes grecques de Mytilène ont fait quelques incursions dans les environs d'Aïvali, volant et tuant quelques Musulmans. Des représailles furent exercées par certains Turcs de la région. Ces actes de brigandage réciproques n'empêchaient pas la situation d'être normale et satisfaisante.

Dès les premiers jours de l'occupation d'Aïvali, l'autorité militaire a enrôlé et armé des démobilisés et civils grecs. Ils se sont assez mal comportés et furent notamment accusés d'avoir incendié deux villages. Ils furent, peu après, désarmés et licenciés.

La population turque est très faible à Aïvali où il n'y a, actuellement, qu'une vingtaine de Musulmans.

Le pays est tranquille, mais le commerce est presque complètement arrêté.

N° 46. — Les réfugiés turcs qui ont quitté les territoires occupés par les Grecs paraissent retenus loin de leur domicile, soit par manque de confiance dans les Grecs, soit par les irréguliers turcs qui les retiennent peut-être pour raisons politiques.

Le nombre de ces réfugiés est extrêmement considérable; la Commission n'a pas pu l'évaluer exactement.

Dans certaines régions, comme dans la vallée du Méandre, des villages entiers, même parmi ceux qui n'ont pas été brûlés, ont dû être abandonnés.

N° 47. — Au sujet du transport de Grecs dans la province de Smyrne, signalé par

la plainte du Cheik-ul-Islam Moustafa-Sabir à la Conférence de la Paix,<sup>16</sup> l'enquête a montré que:

a, D'après le télégramme envoyé le 7, 20 mai, par M. Veniselos, l'occupation avait en partie pour but de rendre possible le rapatriement dans le Sandjak de Smyrne et le Caza d'Aïvali, des réfugiés se trouvant en Grèce;

b, Dans quelques régions, en particulier du côté de Pergame et de Phocée, des réfugiés grecs sont venus s'installer et l'exode des populations turques a facilité leur installation.

c, En présence des troubles qui ont accompagné l'occupation, les autorités helléniques ont donné l'ordre d'arrêter le rapatriement en masse. Quelques familles aisées, dont les moyens d'existence étaient connus, ont seules été autorisées à rentrer.

D'autres réfugiés ont certainement pu rentrer en débarquant en dehors des ports où les autorités grecques exercent un contrôle mais leur nombre ne saurait être grand.

L'accusation portée par le Cheik-ul-Islam n'est donc pas complètement justifiée.

*Les membres de la Commission d'enquête:*

L'AMIRAL BRISTOL,  
*Délégué des États-Unis d'Amérique.*

LE GÉNÉRAL HARE,  
*Délégué de la Grande-Bretagne.*

LE GÉNÉRAL BUNOUST,  
*Délégué de la France.*

LE GÉNÉRAL DALL'OLIO,  
*Délégué de l'Italie.*

Document 4

*Annexe I. Lettre de la Commission à Monsieur le Colonel Mazarakis,  
Chargé par le Gouvernement Hellénique de suivre les Travaux de la Commission.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 14 octobre 1919.

Nous avons l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre rapport du 11 octobre 1919<sup>20</sup> que nous avons demandé par notre lettre du 7 octobre, afin que la Conférence de la Paix après avoir pris connaissance de l'exposé des faits établis par la Commission, pût également examiner les observations que vous aurait suggérées la lecture de ce document.

Votre rapport sera joint au dossier de l'enquête en même place que l'exposé qui l'a motivé.

Les diverses pièces que vous avez communiquées à la Commission au cours de l'enquête et auxquelles vous faites allusion dans votre rapport seront également jointes au dossier.<sup>17</sup>

La Commission a tenu compte des observations que vous avez présentées sous le numéro 14 au sujet de l'occupation d'Aïvali et a modifié le texte du numéro 45 de son exposé. Nous vous adressons ci-joint un exemplaire rectifié.<sup>17</sup>

Comme il vous l'a été dit au cours de la séance du 13 octobre, il n'y a pas lieu d'être surpris en constatant que, sur certains points, l'opinion de la Commission n'est pas en concordance avec le [la] vôtre malgré les affirmations des témoins que vous avez produits.

En effet, non seulement l'appréciation d'un même fait diffère avec les individus, mais encore, en présence des contradictions malheureusement trop nombreuses présentées par les témoignages turcs et grecs, la Commission a quelquefois été obligée, pour essayer de dégager la vérité, d'attacher une importance particulière à des témoignages ou à des rapports émanant de personnalités n'appartenant pas aux

nations trop directement intéressées dans le règlement de la question de Smyrne.

En résumé, après en avoir délibéré, la Commission a estimé que, à l'exception du changement à apporter à la rédaction du n° 45, il n'y avait lieu de modifier son exposé primitif qui a été adopté à l'unanimité des voix.

R. H. HARE, BUNOUST, A. DALL'OLIO, MARK BRISTOL.

## Document 5

### *Annexe II. Observations<sup>26</sup> du Colonel Alexandre Mazarakis sur l'Exposé de la Commission Interalliée d'Enquête.*

1. Dans le paragraphe n° 1, il est affirmé que, depuis l'armistice, la sécurité des chrétiens n'était pas menacée dans le vilayet d'Aïdin. Cependant, la Commission admet que, non seulement depuis 1914 et durant la guerre, les populations hellènes avaient été incontestablement persécutées, mais même les premiers mois qui suivirent l'armistice, elles furent traitées sans aucune bienveillance. Elle admet aussi la présence de quelques bandes de brigands, mais elle affirme que les craintes de massacres n'étaient pas justifiées.

La Commission me permettra d'être persuadé que l'étude de l'histoire et l'expérience récente sur le sort des populations chrétiennes en Turquie ne justifient pas cette affirmation. Tous les massacres et toutes les persécutions qui ont maintes fois provoqué l'intervention européenne, on ne les avait pas prévus, et c'est pour cela que cette intervention arrivait toujours trop tard, après que les actes étaient consommés. Je me permets de rappeler à la Commission qu'une liste de meurtres, brigandages, persécutions de toute sorte commis par les Turcs entre l'armistice et l'occupation de Smyrne, lui a été soumise; qu'une grande partie de la population grecque se trouvait pendant cette période et se trouve encore exilée en Grèce, ayant abandonné toutes ses propriétés occupées par les Turcs, tandis qu'une autre partie revenait de l'intérieur de l'Asie mineure, où elle avait été transportée, réduite à la moitié ou au tiers, dans une misère terrible et un état de santé piteux, privée de tout moyen de s'installer et de vivre. Je regrette de ne pouvoir pas, dans ces conditions, affirmer avec la Commission que le calme était revenu et les craintes d'une nouvelle explosion du fanatisme musulman n'étaient pas fondées, surtout à la veille des décisions de la Conférence qui naturellement pouvaient et devaient exciter ce fanatisme.

2. La Commission estime (n° 2) que l'occupation des forts et de la ville de Smyrne n'était pas justifiée par l'application de l'armistice. Ce n'est pas à moi d'exposer les raisons pour lesquelles la Conférence de la Paix a ordonné cette occupation et a spécifié qu'elle serait exécutée par les troupes helléniques. Je me permets cependant de remarquer que l'exécution de l'armistice était illusoire, que les armes théoriquement gardées dans les magasins étaient, comme les faits l'ont prouvé, à la merci des Turcs, que les irréguliers, tolérés sinon encouragés par les

<sup>26</sup> Note in original: 'Ce rapport était accompagné de la lettre d'envoi suivante:

Constantinople, le 29 [septembre]/12 octobre 1919.

'Monsieur le Président,

'J'ai l'honneur de soumettre à la Commission quelques observations que m'a suggérées l'exposé des résultats de l'enquête que vous avez bien voulu m'envoyer.

'Veuillez agréer etc.,

'Colonel Alexandre Mazarakis.'

autorités turques, étaient armés même avec de l'artillerie lourde; que sans cette occupation, le retour, l'installation dans leurs propriétés saisies et le travail des réfugiés grecs serait impossible; qu'enfin sans entrer dans les desseins de la Conférence à propos du sort de cette région, qui doit cependant avoir joué un rôle sur le choix de l'armée d'occupation, ce choix était suffisamment justifié par le fait que des populations grecques compactes habitent depuis des siècles cette région. En effet, dans le seul Sandjak de Smyrne et le Caza d'Aïvali vivaient, avant 1914, 495,174 Grecs et 219,583 Turcs. Si cette population a été pendant la guerre réduite par les persécutions, la famine, les meurtres c'était une raison de plus pour que l'Entente victorieuse prît des mesures pour sa protection efficace. Je crois donc que l'occupation était non seulement justifiée mais imposée par la justice, la morale politique et les raisons ethnographiques plus que toute autre occupation effectuée par les Alliés victorieux.

3. La Commission constate que depuis le débarquement des Grecs la situation est troublée à cause de l'état de guerre. Je prierais la Commission de vouloir bien distinguer, comme elle le fait dans plusieurs paragraphes suivants, que dans la zone occupée par l'armée hellénique le calme et l'ordre ont été dès les premiers jours rétablis tandis que la situation est troublée et même anarchique dans les régions voisines non occupées et que la situation serait complètement parfaite si l'indécision cessait, les autorités grecques pouvaient fonctionner, les attaques du dehors et l'espoir d'influencer les décisions de la Conférence n'encourageraient les Turcs de montrer un similaire [*sic*] d'effervescence nationale, si au contraire les Turcs savaient que l'armée d'occupation envoyée par la Conférence respecterait leurs droits mais ne tolérerait pas dans une situation passive des atteintes contre sa sécurité ou sa dignité. L'histoire de toutes les occupations faites dans le passé et de nos jours, beaucoup plus mouvementée et plus longue, est là pour prouver qu'aucune armée ne s'est jamais trouvée devant une pareille situation et n'a montré plus de sang-froid, d'abnégation et de discipline et il serait par conséquent injuste de la rendre responsable de quelques faits isolés, comme on en voit même en temps de paix et dans les pays les plus civilisés.

4. La Commission constate (n° 4) qu'un rassemblement de plusieurs milliers de Turcs a eu lieu la nuit avant l'occupation, mais croit que ce rassemblement n'avait pas pour objet d'organiser la résistance par la force du débarquement des Grecs. Elle constate aussi (n° 7) que plusieurs centaines de prisonniers de toute sorte se sont échappés des prisons quelques heures avant l'occupation, que les autorités turques n'ont pas pris des mesures efficaces pour prévenir ou empêcher l'évasion et que quelques-uns de ces prisonniers se sont procuré des armes au dépôt d'armes voisin, enfin, que les coups de fusil tirés par les Turcs (n° 6) furent des actes isolés.

La Commission permettra que je ne puisse pas affirmer avec la même certitude que le but des rassemblements turcs était tellement pacifique après les proclamations enflammées dans les mosquées, dans la presse et dans les places publiques, après la libération et l'armement des prisonniers et de considérer qu'en réalité peu importe, au point de vue des responsabilités, si les coups tirés contre l'armée hellénique étaient le résultat d'une organisation ou l'initiative de quelques individus. L'armée hellénique au moment où elle fut attaquée sans s'y attendre marchant en colonne par quatre et les armes non chargées ne pouvait pas faire cette distinction; elle devait, comme ferait toute autre armée, réprimer sévèrement le mouvement, arrêter les coupables et les suspects.

Je dois en plus remarquer avec regret que pendant que les rassemblements turcs sont jugés avec indulgence, la cérémonie religieuse et l'expression d'un sentiment

naturel de la population grecque sont jugées (n° 9) de nature à provoquer la colère des habitants turcs et à entraîner des actes de violence. Si on voulait tout de même trouver la cause profonde de l'excitation du fanatisme turc c'est beaucoup plus naturel de la chercher dans la présence même de l'ennemi vainqueur, du chrétien méprisé ; il est cependant difficile d'éviter cette excitation sans laisser sous le joug de l'ennemi vaincu, les populations chrétiennes qu'il a fait tant souffrir pendant cinq siècles et dont les sentiments sont au moins aussi dignes de ménagement que ceux de l'opresseur.

Partout où après la victoire les troupes alliées ont occupé un pays sous le joug jusqu'alors de l'ennemi le peuple congénère les a accueillies avec une joie légitime. Si par prévoyance le Commandement grec devait agir avec plus de circonspection, j'ai été le premier à le dire ouvertement dans mon rapport — ce n'est pas une raison pour attribuer l'attaque turque à l'expression des sentiments de la population grecque quand il est incontestable que jusqu'ici au moment où les premiers coups ont été tirés par les Turcs aucun acte hostile envers eux n'était signalé.

Je dois aussi remarquer (n° 9) qu'il n'existaient pas des autorités grecques civiles et que les autorités militaires naturellement absorbées par le côté militaire pendant quelques heures — la répression de la résistance — ne pouvaient pas assurer immédiatement l'ordre dans une grande ville contenant des éléments divers et que la gendarmerie turque avait laissée sans aucune surveillance.

Je rappelle aussi qu'il ne s'agissait pas de quelques rares coups de fusil tirés par les Turcs, mais d'une fusillade nourrie non seulement aux environs du Konak et des casernes mais tout le long du chemin que les premiers éléments devaient parcourir pour aller à leur objectif, la crête de Carantina.

5. La Commission constate (n° 14) que le 15 mai et jours suivants les troupes grecques ont arrêté arbitrairement environ 2,500 personnes. Dans un pays où l'armée d'occupation est attaquée, où tout le monde est armé, je ne vois pas comment l'ordre pouvait être rétabli sans que les autorités militaires procèdent à des arrestations des coupables ou des suspects. La procédure pour l'arrestation en temps ordinaire ne pourrait être exigée dans des circonstances où de fait existait l'état de guerre. Immédiatement après le rétablissement de l'ordre une Commission dont le Moufti faisait partie a visité les prisonniers et en a libéré le plus grand nombre.

Si quelques actes de pillage ou de mauvais traitements ont été signalés envers ces prisonniers et, en général, dans la ville, pendant le premier jour, l'autorité militaire a été la première à les réprimer. Elle le fit avec tant de sévérité, que l'ordre était presque complètement rétabli le lendemain.

La Commission me permettra cependant de croire que nombre de crimes et notamment de viols n'ont eu lieu que dans l'imagination de ceux qui les ont dénoncés. Pendant mon séjour à Smyrne, plusieurs plaintes à ce sujet étaient reconnues, après une enquête minutieuse, comme provenant de femmes d'une moralité douteuse. Je ne comprends pas d'ailleurs comment ces actes dont se plaignent facilement les Turcs, ne sont pas immédiatement dénoncés aux autorités grecques, qui ont sévi avec une extrême sévérité dans les rares cas où la culpabilité était prouvée, et je regrette de ne pas ajouter foi aux dires des témoins qui savaient qu'ils ne seraient pas contredits, ces accusations ayant été faites en secret.

6. Quant au nombre des victimes turques à Smyrne (n° 16), à Aïdin ou ailleurs, le champ était libre aux évaluations les plus fantastiques, d'autant plus que bon nombre des habitants turcs ayant fui de la zone occupée pouvaient facilement être cités parmi les disparus comme victimes des Grecs.

7. Quant à l'excitation créée dans le vilayet d'Aïdin (n° 23), je me permets de croire qu'elle serait vite calmée, si les populations turques se rendaient compte qu'une décision ferme de la Conférence fixât définitivement le sort du pays. La preuve est que, pendant presque un mois, l'occupation de toute la région actuellement occupée: Magnésie, Eudémich, Aïdin et même Nazili a été effectuée, comme la Commission le reconnaît, dans des conditions satisfaisantes. J'ajoute même que 150 zéïbek qui étaient jusque là hors la loi sur la montagne se présentèrent aux autorités militaires grecques promettant de vivre tranquillement et ils ont été laissés libres; que dans presque toutes les villes occupées, la population musulmane a très bien accueilli les troupes helléniques. Je suis donc complètement d'accord avec la Commission de [?que] l'incertitude qui règne au sujet des limites du territoire à occuper par les forces grecques a contribué à créer et à augmenter l'excitation, en ajoutant que cette incertitude continue déjà pendant cinq mois et je suis même convaincu que toute l'agitation turque serait comme par miracle dissipée, le jour où ils se verraient placés dans une décision définitive de la Conférence, où ils ne pourraient plus espérer que cette agitation pourrait influencer cette décision, où ils sauraient que l'armée hellénique aurait les mains libres pour défendre la région qui lui aurait été confiée. La fausse situation dans laquelle se trouva et se trouve encore placée l'armée hellénique est pour moi la cause principale sinon unique de l'effervescence turque. D'ailleurs, malgré toutes les plaintes qu'ils ont pu présenter, nous avons des preuves suffisantes que les habitants turcs, qui ont quitté au début leur pays, ne demandent qu'à y rentrer, convaincus qu'ils pourront vivre tranquillement, mais ils en sont empêchés par les bandes; plusieurs de ces Turcs trompant la vigilance des bandes sont rentrés notamment dans les régions de Pergame et de Magnésie.

La Commission attribue (numéro 23) en partie l'excitation dans le pays aux perquisitions faites pour la recherche des armes. Ces perquisitions seraient la mesure la plus légitime et la plus logique que prendrait une armée d'occupation dans un pays où les populations turques étaient armées et presque tous les magasins d'armes pillés. Cependant, sauf de cas isolés où l'autorité militaire se vit obligée d'entrer dans des maisons d'où des coups de feu étaient tirés où elle était convaincue que des armes étaient cachées, le Commandement et le Haut Commissaire ont tellement insisté pour que ces perquisitions ne soient pas faites que toute la population turque notamment à Aïdin se trouva armée et le Colonel Skinas accusé devant la cour martiale de ne pas avoir pris des mesures pour prévenir les tristes événements de cette ville, se défendit en alléguant les ordres formels qu'il avait de ne pas perquisitionner dans les maisons turques. Les Turcs savaient bien cette défense et c'est pourquoi toutes les proclamations des autorités militaires pour que les habitants rendent les armes sont restées sans aucun résultat, et aujourd'hui encore nous sommes sûrs que toute la population turque est armée.

Je prie donc respectueusement la Commission, quand elle constate que des civils grecs, qui ont vécu pendant cinq ans dans la terreur, étaient porteurs d'armes, de vouloir bien admettre au moins que les populations turques étaient au moins aussi bien armées, d'autant plus que presque tous les magasins d'armes se sont trouvés pillés malgré les clauses de l'armistice.

8. La Commission veut bien reconnaître que l'accusation portée par les Turcs contre la Croix-Rouge hellénique au sujet d'armes contenues dans ses caisses ne doit pas être retenue. Elle constate cependant que des caisses ont été débarquées au mois de février et que quelques témoins turcs affirment qu'elles contenaient des armes. Il n'y a rien de plus facile que de dénoncer sans aucune preuve. La Croi-

Rouge hellénique n'avait aucune obligation de présenter ses caisses de matériel au contrôle des autorités turques; si elle l'a spontanément fait, c'était pour couper court aux diffamations de la presse turque. J'ai déjà expliqué à la Commission que ces caisses renfermaient des habits pour les réfugiés et que ces caisses ont été montrées dans l'Hôpital par le Directeur à des fonctionnaires turcs et même au Procureur général; je note en passant que ces fonctionnaires ainsi que la population turque affluait dans cet hôpital pour être soignés et prendre des médicaments, que le Vali lui-même y est allé le jour de Pâques. Les grands services qui ont été rendus par cette institution à toutes les populations, sans distinction de race ou de religion, prouvés par les statistiques qui vous ont été soumises, pas seulement à Smyrne mais dans tout le pays ont été payés par les Turcs par cette calomnie ainsi que par le meurtre du médecin Manolas, Directeur de la Croix-Rouge à Makri. Dans ces conditions je prierais la Commission de juger s'il est juste de retenir même incidemment une accusation non prouvée.

9. La Commission constate (n° 29) qu'à Nazili après le retrait du bataillon grec les Turcs ont massacré des familles grecques et pillé les maisons et elle attribue ces actes à la désorganisation et au manque de temps de la part des autorités turques. Il m'est permis de croire après l'expérience de Pergame, où le Kaïmakam et les officiers turcs ont présidé aux massacres, d'Aïdin, où le Commandant de la Division était dans la ville quand les massacres en masse ont été exécutés, qu'il n'existe en réalité aucune distinction entre autorités turques et irréguliers. Il est curieux d'ailleurs que les mémoires turcs publiés dans la presse avouent que les brigands étaient les maîtres de la situation de Nazili.

Je prierais la Commission de vouloir bien constater aussi que non seulement dans la ville de Nazili ont eut lieu ces massacres mais aussi dans les villages environnants; à Aktché 47 Grecs ont été tués et le prêtre brûlé vif, à Kiosk 47 tués dont un médecin et le prêtre, dont ils ont précédemment coupé le nez, les oreilles et crevé les yeux, à Soultan Hissar 3 tués et 7 blessés, à Omourlou plus de 90 Grecs ont été tués, 70 cadavres ont été retrouvés après la réoccupation.

10. En relatant les événements d'Aïdin la Commission admet (n° 32 page 6) qu'un grand nombre de Turcs, hommes, femmes, enfants qui essayaient de sortir du quartier en flammes ont été tués sans raison par les soldats grecs qui évacuèrent la ville dans la nuit du 29 au 30 après avoir commis de nombreux attentats et de crimes.

Je ne peux qu'exprimer ma surprise pour une telle affirmation: j'ai étudié les nombreuses enquêtes qui ont eu lieu sur ces événements et où des Musulmans, Arméniens, etc., avaient déposé, j'ai moi-même avec insistance recherché en interrogeant tous les militaires et civils présents si en vérité de tels actes avaient été commis. La conclusion que j'ai tirée de toute cette étude est que les Turcs, irréguliers ou habitants de la ville, tiraient contre l'armée, que l'armée ripostait et que naturellement il y a eu des victimes des deux côtés pendant ce combat qui a duré presque deux jours. Je suis donc en droit de ne pas ajouter foi aux dépositions des témoins qui ont présenté les événements sous cet aspect. Je me demande aussi comment on pourrait évaluer le nombre des victimes turcs vu que presque toute la population turque a suivi, consciente de sa complicité, les irréguliers avant la réoccupation de la ville.

Je ne peux pas aussi admettre que les survivants grecs furent au Konak sous la protection du Colonel Cheffik bey, commandant la 57<sup>e</sup> division ottomane. Je crois au contraire que cet officier, qui est entré à Aïdin avec les bandes, est aussi responsable des cruautés commises d'autant plus qu'il est avéré que plusieurs des

notables grecs ont été emmenés du Konak et exécutés sans que la protection de cet officier supérieur se fît sentir.

Si l'on veut chercher la cause profonde du malheur d'Aïdin on la trouvera dans l'étroitesse d'esprit avec laquelle le commandement a exécuté les ordres qu'il avait de ne pas dépasser au sud la ville, qu'il a interprétés comme lui interdisant même les mesures les plus élémentaires de la sécurité de sa troupe et de ne pas procéder au désarmement, ce qui a permis aux habitants turcs d'attaquer la troupe de concert avec les irréguliers. Si l'exécution en a été malheureuse, ces ordres, montrant la loyauté du commandement hellène et le profit que les ennemis en ont tiré, sont dignes d'attirer l'attention de la Commission.

11. La Commission constate (n° 40) que l'occupation du Vilayet d'Aïdin par les forces grecques a causé de grandes pertes matérielles. Elle me permettra d'estimer que ces pertes, dont d'ailleurs les Grecs, surtout d'Aïdin, ont eu la plus large part, sont dues non à l'occupation grecque qui n'a occasionné pendant un mois presque aucune perte matérielle, mais aux irréguliers turcs qui à Pergamos, à Nazili, à Aïdin, ont été les agresseurs.

12. La Commission considère (n°s 42 et 43) comme non exacte l'affirmation des témoins grecs sur les coups de feu dirigés par les Turcs de Ménémén contre les soldats grecs et qui ont provoqué les troubles dans cette ville. Cependant l'enquête qui a été faite le lendemain des événements par le juge militaire M. Papageorges et l'ancien préfet de Drama musulman M. Naïb Zadé bey, celle faite par le capitaine Apostolakis et les dépositions de plus de vingt témoins que j'ai personnellement examinés sont unanimes et concordantes à ce sujet et spécialement sur le meurtre d'un caporal grec, sur les coups de feu tirés de la maison Hassan Azap et du Konak ainsi que sur le nombre des victimes évaluées à 40.

Je ne suis pas en état de savoir les raisons pour lesquelles la Commission s'est arrêtée à cette conclusion et qui ont pesé sur l'importance et la véracité des témoins entendus et ne peux par conséquent que constater cette différence, qui peut-être n'existerait pas si la procédure était celle qui avait été dès le début proposée par le Gouvernement hellénique.

13. La Commission constate (n° 44) que l'occupation de la zone de Magnésie s'est faite sans difficulté et que plus tard les rapports entre la population turque et les troupes grecques sont devenus moins bons à la suite de mauvais traitements, perquisitions, etc.

Je regrette d'être obligé de protester contre l'accusation jetée toujours exclusivement sur l'armée d'occupation à la suite des plaintes des Turcs. J'ai, dès le début, soumis à la Commission une longue liste qui contenait alors 115 Grecs victimes des bandes turques dans la région de Magnésie; dans le même rapport étaient relatés les massacres en masse des Grecs à Yorktchékiôï, Papazli, Yakakioï, etc.

Je prierais donc la Commission, une fois qu'elle a jugé bon de relater les plaintes des Turcs, de vouloir bien enregistrer aussi dans son rapport les massacres des Grecs de cette région, dont la vie vaut bien les quelques dégâts mentionnés, sans quoi la lecture de l'exposé donnerait une impression qui ne correspond pas à la réalité.

Je ne sais pas si la Commission a eu connaissance, pendant sa visite à Magnésie, que plusieurs habitants turcs, se soustrayant à la défense des bandes, rentrent dans leur pays. C'est un fait qui prouve plus que toute déposition ou plainte, préparée dans un but politique, quelle est la confiance de la population musulmane à la justice et à l'ordre régnant dans la zone occupée en contraste avec l'anarchie et la pression des bandes dans la zone non occupée.

14. La Commission émet une appréciation à propos des sentiments d'une moitié

de la population grecque d'Aïvali (n° 45 p. 4) qui m'a fortement surpris. Je ne comprends pas comment la Commission peut prétendre qu'elle a connu les sentiments de la population grecque d'Aïvali, puisque dans les quelques heures qu'elle est restée là, elle n'a pas eu le temps d'entendre un seul des nombreux habitants qui attendaient d'être appelés et dont je lui avais soumis la liste, excepté les autorités militaires et religieuses. Même dans le cas où une personne quelconque lui aurait fourni cette appréciation, je crois qu'elle ne devait pas figurer comme une constatation catégorique de la Commission elle-même, si elle n'était pas confirmée par une consultation populaire beaucoup plus générale et plus approfondie.

Si la Commission pensait un seul instant aux souffrances séculaires de la race grecque en Asie mineure, à la guerre d'extermination qu'elle a subie pendant les cinq dernières années et qui loin d'affaiblir ont au contraire raffermi son sentiment national, elle se serait sûrement gardée d'émettre cette appréciation qui est de nature à blesser profondément le sentiment national du peuple hellène et contre laquelle je proteste de la façon la plus ferme et la plus catégorique.

Les réfugiés turcs qui ont quitté les territoires occupés par les Grecs (n° 46) sont retenus loin de leur domicile par les irréguliers ou plutôt par l'organisation turque qui — ce n'est un secret pour personne — se confond avec le Gouvernement turc. Le but politique en est évident : influencer, pendant cette période d'indécision et d'attente, la Conférence sur le sort politique de cette partie de l'Empire ottoman.

Le fait que, notamment dans les régions de Pergame et de Magnésie, plusieurs Turcs sont rentrés prouve la confiance que l'Administration grecque a su leur inspirer, malgré les entraves multiples contre lesquelles elle a à lutter : présence des autorités turques qui reçoivent leur mot d'ordre du Gouvernement ottoman, impuissance d'agir librement dans les différentes branches de l'administration imposée par la situation hybride du pays, préoccupation continue pour la sécurité de la zone menacée par les bandes du dehors, etc. J'ai la ferme conviction basée sur l'examen attentif de l'histoire récente dans le proche Orient et sur l'étude approfondie du caractère du peuple turc que nous sommes en état de connaître mieux que tout autre, ayant vécu pendant des siècles à côté de lui, que si le peuple voyait que telle ou telle était la décision de la Conférence, il resterait ou il rentrerait dans ses foyers heureux, sauf quelques agitateurs ou exploiters de profession, de pouvoir enfin vivre en paix et échapper à une administration aussi néfaste, oppressive, arriérée, indifférente pour les Turcs que pour les Chrétiens.

16 [sic]. Au sujet du transport de Grecs dans la province de Smyrne, signalé par la plainte du Cheik-ul-Islam (n° 47), je déclare que je n'ai pas eu connaissance de ce document pour savoir exactement sur quels faits est basée cette plainte. Je précise cependant qu'il ne s'agit pas de 'transport de Grecs', mais du rapatriement des Grecs originaires de l'Asie Mineure expulsés par les Turcs dès 1914.

Ce rapatriement, si logique et si légitime, devait naturellement préoccuper le Gouvernement hellénique qui, pendant des années, a dépensé des sommes considérables pour leur entretien.

J'ai fourni à la Commission la correspondance échangée à ce sujet entre le Commissariat hellénique de Smyrne, dès son installation, et les autorités du Royaume, d'où il résulte que des ordres sévères ont été donnés et exécutés pour empêcher ce rapatriement.

Personnellement, je trouve que cette mesure inspirée par le désir de ne pas créer des difficultés, vu que les propriétés des Grecs expulsés étaient saisies et occupées par des Turcs, et de ne pas créer des froissements entre les deux éléments a été même trop sévère. Au point de vue de la justice absolue, je me demande lequel a plus de

droits, le propriétaire expulsé et désirant réintégrer son foyer ou celui qui l'occupe arbitrairement et quel serait le jugement d'un tribunal dans un pareil cas; au point de vue politique elle n'a pas été appréciée puisque non seulement les Turcs basent des plaintes même à ce sujet, mais ils en profitent encore pour prétendre et vouloir persuader le monde entier qu'ils ont la supériorité numérique dans la région, et ils sont peut-être crus par ceux qui, traversant le pays, voient des villages grecs, dont les habitants sont encore en exil ou ont péri dans l'intérieur de l'Asie Mineure, habités par des Turcs.

17. Je voudrais prier la Commission de vouloir bien, à côté des faits établis contenus dans son exposé, relater aussi les nombreux meurtres commis par les Turcs contre la population grecque non seulement dans les endroits où elle a procédé à son enquête, mais aussi dans des régions où l'armée hellénique n'a jamais mis le pied et où, par conséquent, les responsabilités ne peuvent pas être brouillées: 47 à Philadelfia et régions voisines, 110-115 au sud du Méandre, 14 à Makri, etc., qui sont contenus avec les noms et les dates dans les documents que j'ai eu l'honneur de soumettre dès le premier jour à la Commission.

Je me permets de résumer:

1<sup>o</sup> L'occupation militaire était imposée pour rétablir l'ordre, sauver ce qui restait des populations chrétiennes persécutées, exilées, massacrées pendant cinq ans et pour prévenir une nouvelle explosion de fanatisme turc.

2<sup>o</sup> Que tous les événements qui ont eu des conséquences regrettables ont eu lieu après une attaque des Turcs contre l'armée hellène;

3<sup>o</sup> Que les autorités helléniques non seulement ont agi partout promptement pour rétablir l'ordre, mais même j'ose dire ont montré et montrent une faveur pour la population musulmane;

4<sup>o</sup> Que même les fautes de prévision du Commandement grec à Smyrne peuvent jusqu'à un certain point être expliquées si l'on pense que personne, ni le représentant de la Grèce ni ceux de l'Entente à Smyrne, ne s'attendaient pas à l'attaque de la part des Turcs et n'ont pris aucune mesure efficace pour éloigner les troupes turques et empêcher les rassemblements et la circulation du peuple;

5<sup>o</sup> Un ordre parfait règne dans la zone occupée par l'armée hellénique, une anarchie complète en dehors de cette zone.

COLONEL ALEXANDRE MAZARAKIS,  
*Délégué du Gouvernement hellénique.*

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 11 octobre 1919.

## Document 6

### *II. Établissement des Responsabilités*

CONSTANTINOPLE, le 11 octobre 1919.

N<sup>o</sup> 1. — L'enquête a prouvé que depuis l'armistice, la situation générale des chrétiens dans le Vilayet d'Aïdin était satisfaisante. Leur sécurité n'était pas menacée.

Si l'ordre d'occupation de Smyrne a été donné par la Conférence de la Paix à la suite de renseignements inexacts, la responsabilité première des événements incombe aux individualités ou aux Gouvernements qui ont établi ou transmis sans les vérifier des renseignements de ce genre tels que ceux dont il est parlé au n<sup>o</sup> 1 des points établis. (Le Général représentant italien renouvelle à ce sujet les réserves qui sont insérées au procès-verbal de la 37<sup>e</sup> séance.)<sup>24</sup>

N° 2. — La cause initiale des événements doit être recherchée dans les haines de religion. Les Grecs n'ont rien fait pour en empêcher les manifestations. Leur occupation, loin de se présenter comme l'exécution d'une mission civilisatrice, a pris immédiatement l'aspect d'une conquête et d'une croisade.

N° 3. — La responsabilité des faits qui se sont passés à Smyrne les 15 et 16 mai, ainsi que dans les environs immédiats de la ville au cours des premières journées qui ont suivi ce débarquement, incombe au Commandement militaire supérieur grec ainsi qu'à certains officiers qui ont manqué à leur devoir.

Le Gouvernement grec a reconnu cette responsabilité par les sanctions qu'il a prises.

Une part de responsabilité incombe toutefois aux autorités turques de Smyrne qui n'ont pris aucune mesure pour empêcher l'évasion et l'armement des prisonniers de droit commun avant l'arrivée des Grecs.

N° 4. — Dans la personne de la Haute Autorité civile qui le représente à Smyrne, le Gouvernement hellénique est responsable des troubles graves qui ont ensanglanté la zone intérieure du pays pendant l'avance des troupes grecques parce que :

a) L'autorité susvisée ne s'est pas conformée aux instructions du Conseil suprême données par le télégramme du 7/20 mai de M. Veniselos. Sans avoir demandé aucune autorisation au représentant de l'Entente elle a permis au Commandement militaire de donner le 10/23 mai l'ordre d'envoyer des troupes à Aïdin-Magnésie et Kassaba en dehors des limites du Sandjak de Smyrne.

b) La même autorité a volontairement laissé les populations dans l'ignorance de l'étendue de l'occupation. Elle a ainsi contribué à augmenter la surexcitation des habitants musulmans et par suite les désordres.

N° 5. — La responsabilité des autorités supérieures grecques est engagée par le fait qu'elles ont permis la circulation de civils armés dans le pays.

Pour quelques-unes de leurs opérations militaires ou de police, elles ont même toléré l'emploi de ces civils armés en même temps que celui des troupes régulières.

N° 6. — La cause première des troubles qui se sont produits dans la vallée du Méandre résulte de l'occupation même, faite sans justification.

Les faits regrettables qui ont accompagné la marche et l'établissement des troupes grecques, sont la conséquence de l'état de guerre dans lequel s'est trouvé le pays dès que ces troupes ont avancé.

Les haines qui existent depuis des siècles entre Turcs et Grecs en ont incontestablement augmenté la fréquence et la sauvagerie.

Les Grecs ne sauraient, en toute justice, en être rendus seuls responsables.

Les mêmes considérations s'appliquent aux événements qui se sont déroulés dans les régions de Pergame et aux environs de Magnésie et d'Eudémich.

N° 7. — Les Grecs sont au contraire seuls responsables du massacre de Ménémén. Ce massacre n'a pas été préparé. Mais le Commandement grec connaissant l'état de surexcitation de ses troupes à la suite de l'affaire de Pergame aurait dû et pu prendre des dispositions pour remettre en mains des troupes auxquelles l'énerverment, la fatigue et la peur ont fait commettre, sans aucune provocation, un véritable massacre de civils turcs sans défense.

Les officiers grecs présents à Ménémén ont complètement manqué à leurs devoirs.

N° 8. — Bien que la situation actuelle soit meilleure, le calme n'est pas encore rétabli dans le Vilayet d'Aïdin.

Presque toutes les transactions commerciales avec l'intérieur de l'Anatolie sont arrêtées.

Cette situation est incontestablement le résultat de l'occupation et de l'état de

guerre qui persiste entre les irréguliers turcs et les troupes grecques, bien que celles-ci n'étendent plus leur zone d'occupation.

Les chefs du mouvement national turc, qui agissent de concert avec d'anciens chefs de bandes de brigands, n'ont pas toujours une autorité suffisante sur leurs forces pour les empêcher de se livrer quelquefois à des incursions. Il en résulte qu'une part de responsabilité leur incombe en ce qui concerne la situation actuelle du pays.

Derrière leur responsabilité apparaît celle du Gouvernement turc qui, jusqu'à ce jour, n'avait aucune autorité sur les chefs du mouvement national.

*Les Membres de la Commission:*

MARK BRISTOL, BUNGUST, A. DALL'OLIO, R. H. HARE.

## Document 7

### *Trente-septième séance*

*Le 2 octobre 1919.*

Le Général Dall'Olio fait la communication suivante:

La Commission d'enquête doit examiner les faits qui ont accompagné et suivi l'occupation des troupes grecques dans les régions de Smyrne, Aïdin et Aïvali, indiqués en particulier dans la protestation adressée à la Conférence de Paris par le Cheik-ul-Islam.<sup>13</sup> Par conséquent, et puisque ces instructions sont renforcées par la prescription que la période à examiner est comprise entre l'occupation hellénique et le 26 ou 29 juillet, je ne suis pas d'avis qu'on doit parler des raisons qui ont motivé le débarquement et l'occupation des forts. Cette question n'est pas du ressort de la Commission d'enquête, mais de la Conférence, et par conséquent, je crois de mon devoir de maintenir mon point de vue, et je prie vivement mes collègues de bien vouloir reconnaître les raisons présentées par moi à ce sujet.

En tout cas, je prie que cette déclaration qui a un caractère général de réserve, soit inscrite dans le procès-verbal.

## Document 8

### *III. Conclusions présentées par la Commission*

*CONSTANTINOPLE, le 13 octobre 1919.*

I. — La situation créée à Smyrne et dans le Vilayet d'Aïdin par l'occupation hellénique est fautive parce que:

a) L'occupation, qui n'avait en principe pour but que le maintien de l'ordre, présente en réalité toutes les formes d'une annexion.

Le Haut Commissaire grec exerce seul une autorité efficace.

Les autorités turques qui sont restées en fonction n'ont plus aucun pouvoir réel. Elles ne reçoivent plus d'ordre de Constantinople et par suite de la disparition presque complète de la police et de la gendarmerie turques elles n'ont plus les moyens nécessaires à l'exécution de leurs décisions;

b) L'occupation impose à la Grèce des sacrifices militaires considérables hors de proportions avec la mission à remplir si cette mission est temporaire et ne doit avoir pour but que le maintien de l'ordre;

c) Elle est incompatible, dans sa forme actuelle, avec le retour de l'ordre et de la tranquillité dont les populations, menacées par la famine, ont grand besoin.

## II. — La Commission estime :

a) Que si l'occupation militaire du pays ne doit avoir pour but que le maintien de la sécurité et de l'ordre public, cette occupation ne doit pas être confiée aux troupes grecques, mais aux troupes alliées, sous l'autorité du Commandement supérieur allié en Asie-Mineure ;

b) Que l'occupation par les Grecs seuls ne doit être maintenue que si la Conférence de la Paix est résolue à prononcer l'annexion complète et définitive du pays à la Grèce.

Dans ce cas la liberté d'action devra être laissée au Commandement grec vis-à-vis des forces turques ;

c) Que l'annexion pure et simple envisagée ci-dessus serait contraire au principe proclamant le respect des nationalités, car dans la région occupée, en dehors de la ville même de Smyrne et d'Aïvali, la prédominance de l'élément turc sur l'élément grec est incontestable.

Il est du devoir de la Commission de faire remarquer que le sentiment national turc, qui a déjà manifesté sa résistance, n'acceptera pas cette annexion. Il ne cédera qu'à la force, c'est-à-dire devant une expédition militaire que la Grèce seule ne pourrait conduire avec quelque chance de succès.

## III. — Dans ces conditions, la Commission propose les mesures suivantes :

a) Faire relever le plus tôt possible tout ou partie [*sic*] des troupes grecques par des troupes alliées beaucoup moins nombreuses.

b) Si, pour sauvegarder l'amour-propre grec, il est décidé qu'une partie des troupes grecques coopéreront à l'occupation, répartir ces troupes à l'intérieur de la région occupée pour leur éviter tout contact direct avec les forces nationales turques.

c) Dès que l'occupation par les Alliés sera réalisée, exiger du Gouvernement turc la réorganisation de la gendarmerie sous la direction et le commandement d'officiers interalliés.

Cette gendarmerie devra être mise le plus tôt possible en état d'assurer l'ordre dans toute la région et de remplacer dans ce but les détachements alliés.

d) En même temps que la réorganisation de la gendarmerie, le Gouvernement turc devra restaurer l'administration civile.

IV. — Les chefs du mouvement national ayant affirmé à plusieurs reprises que leur opposition n'est dirigée que contre les Grecs, les mesures proposées doivent leur enlever tout motif de résistance armée et rendre au Gouvernement central de Constantinople l'autorité qu'il n'a plus.

Rien ne devra plus empêcher le licenciement des troupes irrégulières.

Dans le cas contraire, l'Entente saura enfin le cas qu'elle doit faire des protestations de loyalisme faites par les Turcs, soit par les chefs du mouvement national, soit par les membres du Gouvernement.

### *Les membres de la Commission :*

L'AMIRAL BRISTOL,  
*Délégué des États-Unis d'Amérique.*

LE GÉNÉRAL HARE,  
*Délégué de la Grande-Bretagne.*

LE GÉNÉRAL BUNOUST,  
*Délégué de la France.*  
LE GÉNÉRAL DALL'OLIO,  
*Délégué de l'Italie.*

H.D. 88.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 10, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Colonel Embick, Mr. W. H. Buckler, Dr. I. Bowman.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Colonel Kisch, Mr. Tufton, Mr. Forbes-Adam, Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. H. W. Malkin.

*France*: M. Cambon, M. Laroche, General Le Rond, General Buroust, M. Fromageot, M. Escoffier, M. de Percin.

*Italy*: Commandant Mazzolini, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Galli, M. Stranieri, M. Pilotti.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

1. M. DE MARTINO asked if he might deliver a message from M. Tittoni who wished to express his great regret at not being able to be present at that meeting; he was obliged to leave on the following day and was still ill in bed. He had particularly hoped to be able to come to that meeting to bid farewell to his colleagues. At the same time he had asked M. de Martino to submit to the Council a consideration which had occurred to him with respect to its work. The Supreme Council had organized a Committee for the execution of the Treaty and that Committee, called the Committee of Ambassadors, although other than Ambassadors might sit upon it, was to be entrusted with everything concerning the execution of the treaties;<sup>1</sup> the Supreme Council, on the other hand was entrusted with all work preparatory to the same treaties. In order to facilitate this division of labour and inasmuch as the large questions were at the moment not ready for settlement—such as the Treaty with Hungary, the question of the former Ottoman Empire and the Adriatic question—M. Tittoni wished to ask the Council to consider the possibility of adjourning, after the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty, until one of those questions should be ready for settlement. In the meanwhile all remaining unfinished work relative to the execution of the treaties could be entrusted to the Committee of Ambassadors.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that this question could not be raised without

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. I, No. 21, minute 1.

the consent of the Governments concerned. Of course three questions were raised by this suggestion: he thought that the Hungarian question would be satisfactorily settled. The question of Turkey was a difficult one, but he was willing, and thought it necessary, to take it up, and he felt that the British and American Governments would agree with his views. The question of the Adriatic was a most delicate one but it must be admitted that the Council was not at fault. The responsibility lay entirely with Italy. The Italian Government had been incapable of executing the orders given by the Council. The Council had formally decided that only one Italian battalion should remain at Fiume,<sup>2</sup> but this order had been flagrantly violated in such a manner that it seemed clear that the Italian Government had no control over its army and navy. The command at Fiume had passed to D'Annunzio. He was not hostile to Italy but he was obliged to point out that the Italian Government had not been able to make its orders respected. He had supported the Italian point of view in a long telegram that he had sent to President Wilson, but he was very much embarrassed as to what he should further say, since he had received a courteous but emphatic reply from President Wilson to the effect that it was useless to make agreements with a Government which assumed obligations that it could not fulfil. French soldiers had been killed at Fiume and the French Government had taken no action; but such a situation could not be prolonged indefinitely.

M. DE MARTINO wished to be allowed to remark that a Government existed in Italy as well as in any other country. As to the point of being obeyed or not by the army at Fiume, it was in agreement with the Allied Governments that Italy abstained from attacking Fiume. If Italy was confronted with difficulties, of which the Council was well aware, that did not mean that the Italian Government had not taken up the question of Fiume with the very best intentions of settling it properly. The Italian Government had shown a spirit of conciliation which he thought M. Clemenceau would appreciate.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that nevertheless the fact remained that the Italian Government was not obeyed by its Navy. The greatest spirit of good will had been shown. For this reason no action had been taken as a result of the incidents at Fiume, but that situation must be put an end to. The postponement of the work of the Council could not be agreed to as long as that would result in the consolidation of the existing situation at Fiume.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed with M. Clemenceau, but felt that the points at issue with Germany and the Bulgarian question must first be settled before there could be any thought of postponement. He thought that these questions might be settled before the end of the month, by which time he hoped that all other questions, except the Turkish one, would also be out of the way. He therefore felt that there was no great difficulty in practice; the object aimed at by M. de Martino could be met without necessarily adopting his plea for an adjournment of the Conference now.

MR. POLK also agreed with M. Clemenceau and observed that there were two or three questions which had to be settled before an adjournment could

<sup>2</sup> See Vol. I, No. 42, minute 1 and appendix A, and No. 43, minute 2.

be thought of. He was of the opinion that those questions could be settled before December 1st. He also felt that it would not be fair to turn such questions over to the Committee of Ambassadors, which was only supposed to coordinate questions relating to the interpretation and execution of the Treaties.

M. CLEMENCEAU appreciated the troubles the Italian Government had had to encounter. However, that Government must settle the question of Fiume and get its army and navy under control.

M. DE MARTINO repeated that the Italian Government had the army and navy under control and was obeyed by them. If it had not wished to take military action against Fiume, it was because the Allied and Associated Powers had likewise not wished it. They had not wished to attack Fiume and *a fortiori* Italy had not wished to either. The situation there did not prevent his declaring that there was a Government in Italy and that the army and navy were under control of the Italian Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU declared that he must formally state that M. Tittoni had said, not once but many times, that the Italian Government could not take Fiume because the army and navy would not obey the Government. He thought M. Tittoni could not contest this, and he wished this to be formally put on record. The fact that the Italian Government had to contend with a very delicate question was no reason for attempting to place the responsibility on the other Allied and Associated Powers, who clearly could not be burdened therewith.

M. DE MARTINO said that such was not his intention, and that the sole question raised was one of expediting the work of the Council. M. Tittoni, who had to leave for Italy on account of the political situation, had hoped to return to take up the discussion of the important questions alluded to.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that such a solution would greatly embarrass him in any reply to President Wilson.<sup>3</sup>

M. DE MARTINO said that he had transmitted the suggestion, but that if it were going to occasion great inconveniences he did not wish to insist upon it.

(It was decided:

to take no action on the Italian suggestion relative to the prolongation or postponement of the work of the Supreme Council.)

2. (The Council had before it a note from the President of the German Delegation dated November 7th, 1919 relative to municipal elections in Upper Silesia (see Appendix A).)

*German municipal  
elections in  
Upper Silesia*

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the proposed action of the German Government was in utter defiance of the decisions of the Supreme Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that strictly speaking the Council could not prevent such action on the part of the German Government before the Treaty came into force, but it could say that it had already warned that Government that such elections would not be recognized.

<sup>3</sup> For negotiations at that time concerning the question of the Adriatic see Vol. IV in this series.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. POLK also agreed. He presumed that the Council was sure of its legal ground when sending such an answer.

It was decided:

that the Allied and Associated Powers should again inform the German Government that the municipal elections proposed to be held by it in Upper Silesia, prior to the coming into force of the Treaty, would not be recognized as valid.

3-

[Not printed]<sup>4</sup>

*Note from the Swiss  
Legation relative to  
insertion in Treaties  
still to be drafted and  
signed of clauses rela-  
tive to Swiss neutrality*

4. MR. POLK informed the Council that he had just received a telegram from Admiral Bristol to the effect that fighting between Greeks and Turks had taken place near Soma because the Greeks had not obeyed the orders of General Milne not to advance the line of occupation until the 15th of November and to wait until the Turkish army obeyed the orders given it to retire on November 12th, and that the Greeks had acted on the orders of their own Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired if this point had not already been raised by M. Venizelos at the preceding meeting of the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it had not.

GENERAL BUNOUST was sure that it had not. The point Sir Eyre Crowe had in mind was the incident at Nazilli.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that M. Venizelos should be asked to explain the incident referred to in the telegram read by Mr. Polk.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the information contained in the telegram be sent to M. Venizelos and that he be asked for explanations.

(This was agreed to.)

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Investigation at Smyrna dealt with two questions. The Commission had been appointed to investigate the complaints made by the Sheik-ul-Islam. The Council might unwittingly have given the Commission too large a mandate but it had never contemplated that the Commission should go so far as to advise it whether or not there should have been a Greek occupation. He proposed to separate the report into its two component parts. The question raised by the second part of the report had already been presented

<sup>4</sup> The Supreme Council 'decided to act favourably upon the request of the Swiss Legation [appendix B in original] relative to insertion in Treaties still to be drafted and signed of clauses relative to Swiss neutrality, analogous to Article 435 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and Article 375 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria'.

in an acute form as a result of M. Venizelos ordering Greek troops beyond the zone of occupation laid down by the Council without consulting it. He thought that there was a good deal to be said for M. Venizelos in this connexion inasmuch as he had sent many pressing communications to the Council which, owing to the great pressure of work, had not been promptly answered. The Council had ordered General Milne to determine the Greek zone of occupation; he had done so and on the other hand the Greek and Italian Governments, after satisfactory negotiations, had agreed to a line of demarcation between their zones.<sup>5</sup> He felt that the other conclusions of the report might be accepted; but he was struck by the fact that a great deal of pertinent testimony had not been heard by the Commission, therefore it was difficult for the conclusions of the report to be accepted unreservedly, although he might have been inclined to do so if he had not heard M. Venizelos's explanations at the preceeding meeting. For instance, with respect to the affair at Menemen,<sup>6</sup> M. Venizelos had pointed out that the Greek authorities had made an accurate count of the victims and found that only 20 had been killed, identifying them by name, whereas the number fixed by the Commission as a result of an investigation made by a French officer had placed the number at several hundred. He did not feel qualified to state that a different procedure could have been adopted, but he felt that if the Greek side of the case could have been heard the conclusions of the report might have been different. In his opinion this was the one reservation to be made when accepting the report.

GENERAL BUNOUST observed that some question had been raised as to the Commission going beyond the mandate given it. He wished to point out that the report submitted consisted of three parts: a summary of the facts, the fixing of the responsibilities, and the conclusions. This conformed not only to the spirit but to the letter of the Council's mandate contained in its telegram to the Commission of July 26, 1919 (see H.D. 13,<sup>7</sup> minute 12). It had been suggested that the Commission was not justified in taking up the question of the expediency of the Greek occupation. He wished to reply that the complaint of the Sheik-ul-Islam to the Supreme Council had formed the basis of the investigation, and this complaint had pretended that the Greek occupation was unjustified. The Commission had therefore necessarily examined that question. To take up a question of detail, in an affair such as that at Menemen it was impossible for anyone to make an accurate estimate. The Commission did not insist upon the exactness of its figures but it was convinced that figures submitted by the Greeks could not be any more accurate. With respect to contradictory testimony he wished again to cite the affair at Menemen, where all the Turks had testified in one way and all the Greeks in another. The Commission had therefore tried to take the testimony of the witnesses who seemed to be the most reliable and it had taken a great deal of testimony from French, English and Italian witnesses. The

<sup>5</sup> See Vol. I, No. 14, minute 4, and No. 70, minute 9.

<sup>6</sup> See paragraph 42 of document 3 in appendix A to No. 17.

<sup>7</sup> No. 17 in Vol. I.

testimony of M. Laplanche, a French employee of the railroad, had established that the day before the massacre in question the Turks had claimed that they feared a massacre and the Greeks had been informed of this but had taken no precautionary measures. The Greek battalion retreating from Pergamum had indeed been subjected to outrages, but when it once reached Menemen not a single shot had been fired at it. Many Greek witnesses claimed to have heard and seen shots but not one of them had been able to substantiate his evidently false statements. The Commission did not insist that the Greeks had prepared this massacre, but it was convinced that they had done absolutely nothing to prevent it and that the Greek authorities were obviously incompetent.

SIR EYRE CROWE had never doubted that the Commission had proceeded in the most sincere and honourable way, but, as M. Venizelos had pointed out, the principal accused parties had not been heard. He had felt that although it had possibly been well not to acquaint the Greek representative with the names of the witnesses, it might have been possible to give him the depositions without giving him the names of the witnesses. But even this had not been done. He could not say that the conclusions of the report would have been different had such procedure been adopted, but it was evident that they might have been; therefore these conclusions were not entirely satisfactory. When the procedure adopted by the Commission had been brought to the attention of the Council it had not approved thereof; but it had then been too late to make an effective change.<sup>8</sup> However, he did not wish to insist unduly upon this point for on the whole M. Venizelos had accepted the substance of the report, inasmuch as he recognized that abuses had been committed and had meted out punishment therefor. Furthermore, calm now reigned in and around Smyrna, and in fact everywhere except those points where Greeks were in armed contact with Turks. He felt that the Greeks had done their best and that on the whole they had succeeded rather well.

M. CLEMENCEAU wished to ask General Bunoust if he felt that calm did in fact reign in the occupied territories.

GENERAL BUNOUST said that it did in the town of Smyrna, but that elsewhere the calm was only apparent and might well cease to exist at any moment. Furthermore, the town of Smyrna was nothing in comparison with the entirety of the occupied territories. There certainly was no calm at Aidin.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if the Greeks had withdrawn again within the Sandjak of Smyrna.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that General Milne had established a line beyond which the Greeks were to retire,<sup>5</sup> and they had done so. There was, however, a small triangle in the region of Aidin where General Milne had proposed the following alternative: either the Greeks should be permitted to advance beyond the line of occupation previously laid down, or they should withdraw to a line behind the one at present held by them. In the latter event, General Milne had recommended an Inter-Allied occupation—i.e.

<sup>8</sup> See No. 1, minute 3.

Greek, French and English—of the triangle comprised between the present line of Greek occupation and that to which they would be forced to withdraw. This solution, including the exclusion of Italian troops from the proposed Inter-Allied force of occupation, had been discussed and approved by the Supreme Council (see H.D. 66),<sup>9</sup> although he himself had found it difficult to agree with that conclusion. He felt that an Inter-Allied occupation would be the best solution possible, but it had not proven feasible. He was convinced of the impossibility of telling the Greeks to evacuate and of letting the Turks in.

MR. POLK inquired if the town of Soma was in the vicinity of Aidin.

M. DE MARTINO explained that it was to the north of Smyrna. He wished to point out the following facts with respect to the region of Aidin. When the question was submitted to the Council as a result of General Milne's report three solutions became possible: to leave the Greeks where they were, to let the Turks occupy this territory, or else to effect an Inter-Allied occupation, necessarily including the Greeks in such a force since they were already there. Turkish occupation had not been considered. But when the point of Inter-Allied occupation was raised there was no longer a question of a line of demarcation between Greek and Italian zones of occupation; it was a question, on the one hand, of Italian occupation, and on the other hand, of Inter-Allied occupation. He felt that when the word 'Inter-Allied' was used Italy could not be excluded. What had been decided upon was, he thought, contrary to the view of the French Government, because M. Pichon had told him before the meeting that M. Clemenceau's point of view favoured Inter-Allied occupation with Italian troops. He did not intend to resuscitate that question, which had already been decided, but he did wish to say that according to information he had received from Constantinople the solution which had been adopted had produced a very bad impression, inasmuch as it had been interpreted as a proof of discord between the Great Powers. He felt that if the Allies, all of whom had interests in Moslem countries, did not give evidence of solidarity towards the Moslem world they would expose themselves to the greatest danger in the future. He had spent eleven years in Moslem countries and could affirm that within ten or fifteen years the Allies would have the greatest difficulty in maintaining their Moslem colonies. The exclusion of Italian troops had made the Turks think that something queer was happening. When he had read the minutes of the meeting, at which he had not been present, he had seen that the reason given for exclusion of Italian troops from Aidin was the fear of disagreement and conflict with the Greeks. He wished to insist that these fears had no foundation. The Italian Government had come to two agreements with Greece. One of lesser importance, relative to the provisional line of demarcation between Greek and Italian troops,<sup>10</sup> the other a more general agreement.<sup>11</sup> He knew that the Allies were pleased that this latter agreement had been

<sup>9</sup> No. 70 (minute 9) in Vol. I.

<sup>10</sup> See Vol. I, No. 14, minute 4.

<sup>11</sup> A text of this agreement is printed by A. Giannini: *I documenti diplomatici della pace orientale* (Rome [1922]), pp. 27-30.

reached. In view of the terms of this latter agreement, which laid down a common line of action with a view to avoiding any cause of disagreement or conflict, he felt sure that if the Italian troops had encountered the Greek troops at Aidin no conflict would have taken place between them. He would like to have M. Venizelos himself questioned on this point. He wished to bring all this to the attention of the Council as a matter of record, although he did not intend at that time to reopen the question of Aidin.

MR. POLK inquired if the agreements referred to had been put on record.

M. DE MARTINO replied that the agreement respecting the line of demarcation had been put on record<sup>10</sup> and that the other had not.

MR. POLK presumed that there was no objection to it being put on record.

M. DE MARTINO thought not, and said that he would speak to M. Tittoni on the matter.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that General Milne had proposed three solutions: as two of them were impossible, he suggested the other be adopted.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he had asked M. Venizelos if the Greeks were certainly able to hold the territory in question and had been told that they could.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the Greeks should then be allowed to remain at Aidin.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that it should not be forgotten that all those questions of occupation were purely provisional.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

M. DE MARTINO agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that General Milne had asked that the Greeks, if they alone were to supply the occupying forces, be allowed to advance beyond the present line of occupation, as that was a necessary condition of their being able to hold the Aidin region.

MR. POLK asked if General Milne had not made it clear that this proposed advance would necessarily mean further fighting between the Greeks and Turks.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied in the affirmative.

MR. POLK stated that he would have to make a reservation on this point. His Government had no troops to send, therefore although he could not unconditionally object to this solution, his Government did not wish to assent thereto, and felt that it must decline all responsibility.

SIR EYRE CROWE said it had been found impossible to find French or British troops to occupy this territory, but he hoped the point might again be raised and that M. Clemenceau might once more examine the possibility of sending French troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would again raise the question and would let Sir Eyre Crowe know on the following day, but he felt that he would not be successful inasmuch as France had no troops to spare. He thought it was no use for the Council to shut its eyes to the fact that the Turks would continue to harass the Greeks. If troops were sent to this region it would result

in protecting the Greeks from attacks which they had brought upon themselves.

MR. POLK said that he hesitated to express an opinion inasmuch as his Government could do nothing to help the situation by sending troops. But he wished to put himself on record as insisting that any further difficulties or fighting in Asia Minor would certainly make the ultimate settlement of the Turkish question more difficult. The Turks and Greeks would always fight each other; therefore, he felt that any decision which would necessarily bring them into closer and further armed contact was bad in principle.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that even if it were found possible to send an Inter-Allied force, that would not solve the question of conflicts between the Greeks and Turks. The fact of having [?the]<sup>12</sup> troops at Aidin would not have prevented fighting in Soma. M. Venizelos had rather taken the Council to task and it could not leave unanswered some of the points raised by him. It was perhaps true that the procedure adopted had not always been the best. He suggested that an answer be sent to M. Venizelos stating in substance that, although M. Venizelos' complaints as to the procedure adopted might have been justified in certain particulars, nevertheless he himself (M. Venizelos) had recognized that abuses had been committed, and further recommending to M. Venizelos the use of extreme caution in the future. In the same letter M. Venizelos should be informed of the decision taken with respect to maintaining Greek troops in Aidin and he should be forcibly reminded that all occupation was purely provisional.

GENERAL BUNOUST wished to point out that the Council proposed to tell M. Venizelos in effect that the Commission had not proceeded in the way it should have. He wished to warn the Council that any such action would be an impeachment of its own decisions. The Council in its instructions of July 26th had marked out the exact line of action which had since been followed by the Commission, and subsequently had decided that Colonel Mazarakis should not be present at the meetings of the Commission (see H.D. 31).<sup>13</sup> He wished to add that the Commission, in recommending an Inter-Allied occupation, had desired to test the sincerity of the Turks who had repeatedly proclaimed that they only objected to an occupation by the Greeks.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that the Council had no wish to blame the Commission in any way. The question was whether the instructions had been well worded. He suggested that M. Berthelot prepare an answer to M. Venizelos, to be submitted to the Council, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting.

It was decided:

- (1) to ask M. Venizelos for explanations relative to the conflict between Greeks and Turks near Soma, reported in a despatch from Constantinople dated November 8, 1919;
- (2) that M. Berthelot should prepare, for submission to the Council, a reply to M. Venizelos, taking into account the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.

<sup>12</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<sup>13</sup> No. 35 (minute 3) in Vol. I.

5. The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation regarding the exportation to Russia of German munitions and war material (see Appendix C).)

*Exportation to Russia  
of German munitions  
and war material*

SIR EYRE CROWE summarized the note from the British Delegation. He thought there was a good deal to be said in favour of helping General Denikin but he wished to point out that his Government was already heavily committed in supplying the northern Russian forces.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the manufacture and exportation in question could be stopped as soon as the Treaty had been put into force.

MR. POLK asked if it was proposed to do anything at that moment.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the manufacture and exportation could be stopped at once.

MR. POLK wondered if this was wise. He inquired if any right existed to stop this manufacture and exportation at the present time.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that this right existed even under the Armistice. This was clear from the fact that the Germans themselves, in asking permission for this manufacture and exportation, recognized that the right to prohibit it existed under the Armistice.

MR. POLK wished to know what the reason was for prohibiting this manufacture and exportation; was the idea that ammunition factories should not be put into operation or was it in order not to help General Denikin?

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Germans be told that they could not manufacture and export the munitions and material in question.

MR. POLK said that he objected to these supplies being furnished by Germans but he did approve sending such supplies to General Denikin. If anyone else could supply him with the material in question he would be in favour of it. He wished to know who was going to pay for this material and how the payment would be made.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that he was not sure. He thought that perhaps Bolshevik money would be used in payment.

M. BERTHELOT observed that the trouble was that there was no way of controlling the destination of this material.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the same group of manufacturers and exporters also supplied Colonel Bermont.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that a reply be sent that inasmuch as the Council had no control over the use and destination of the munitions and war material in question, and could not even be sure that part thereof would not find its way into the hands of elements hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers, the Council could not sanction the manufacture and despatch of the munitions and war material in question. He asked who would convey this information and to whom the communication would be sent.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would send this answer to the British Military Representative in Berlin, in the name of the Council, for transmission by him to the proper parties.

It was decided:

that Sir Eyre Crowe, in the name of the Council, should inform the

British Military Representative at Berlin, for transmission by him to the proper parties, that inasmuch as the Council had no control over the use and destination of the munitions and war material in question, and could not even be sure that part thereof would not find its way into the hands of elements hostile to the Allied and Associated Powers, the Council could not sanction the manufacture and despatch of the munitions and war material in question (see Appendix C).

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee relative to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (see Appendix D).)

*Reply of President Wilson regarding the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee and explained that what was proposed therein was not a formal convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations prior to the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty with Germany but only informal warning information.

MR. POLK asked whether, assuming that the only thing the Council would do at its first meeting would be to nominate the Commission of Delimitation for the Sarre District, it would not be sufficient to call the meeting for the day after the deposit of ratifications.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that if it was sure that nothing further had to be done it would be sufficient. It was possible, however, that many and serious questions would have to be taken up especially in the event of the United States ratifying the Treaty prior to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. It was therefore better to take all preliminary precautions even if they should eventually prove useless.

MR. POLK thought that he would have to ask for an adjournment. He did not see the necessity for all these various notices. The question had once been very simple but it was not [now] becoming very complicated. The only question he wished to raise was: did the President of the United States have the power to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations before the deposit of ratifications? If not, he thought the President could issue such a call on the day of the deposit of ratifications and that the meeting could be held the following day.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the solution proposed by the Drafting Committee involved no convocation which might be deemed premature.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that a further point had been raised: the United States might or might not ratify the Treaty prior to the date of the deposit of ratifications. Mr. Polk's point was only based on the United States not having ratified. The proposal of the Drafting Committee covered both contingencies.

MR. POLK said that he would refer the matter to his Government although he felt confident that there would be no objection.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would have to make a small reservation with respect to the place of the first meeting. There had been some previous discussion on this point of whether the meeting should be in Paris, or in London

where the machinery of the League of Nations already existed. When the point had come up before the Council the British Delegation had not agreed that the meeting should be held in Paris. Since that time he had obtained his Government's consent to holding the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in Paris if no other business was to come before the Council than the nomination of the members of the Commission of Delimitation for the Sarre District. That was all that he could agree to at the present time but he would try to obtain further consent for the first meeting of the Council to be held in Paris irrespective of the business to be transacted at that meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that he of course could not make any statement as to what would be on the agenda at the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

MR. POLK thought that there was a great deal of unnecessary trouble in connection with this question. It was proposed to be entirely prepared for an important meeting of the Council on the day of the deposit of ratifications. Apparently that day would be somewhere in the neighbourhood of November 25th. If that was so his Government's Delegate could not reach Paris in time, even if the United States had already ratified the Treaty.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the deposit of ratifications could be effected on or about November 27th, as far as the Allied and Associated Powers were concerned. It had become evident from various sources that the Germans would not sign the protocol without raising various difficulties. If the deposit of ratifications were delayed it would be on account of the German attitude.

It was decided:

to approve the recommendations of the Drafting Committee relative to the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (see Appendix D) with the following reservations:

- (1) that Mr. Polk would refer the matter to his Government.
- (2) that Sir Eyre Crowe would refer to his Government the question of holding the first meeting of the Council in Paris irrespective of the business to be transacted at said first meeting.

7. (The Council had before it a draft answer, prepared by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, to the note of the German Delegation of October 3rd,<sup>14</sup> relative to the organization of the Plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy. (See Appendix E).)

*Reply to the note of the German Delegation of Oct. 3rd relative to the organization of the Plebiscites at Eupen and Malmedy*

It was decided:

to approve the draft answer, prepared by the Commission on Belgian Affairs, to the note of the German Delegation of October 3rd, relative to the organization of the Plebiscites at

Eupen and Malmedy. (See Appendix E.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 10, 1919.*

<sup>14</sup> See No. 16, appendix B.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 18

PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION.

PARIS, *November 7, 1919.*

No. 48.

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: President Clemenceau.

I have the honour to reply as follows to the note of the Allied and Associated Powers of October 30, 1919, No. 1251.<sup>15</sup>

The news that the Prussian Government expects very shortly, or more exactly, on November 9, 1919, to conduct municipal elections in Upper Silesia, is authentic.

In Prussia, prior to the revolution, the so-called three-classes right of vote was in force, according to which the electors were divided according to taxation into three classes each one of which elected one-third of the municipal representatives. Thus, the greater were the differences in the taxations represented by the electors of one commune, the greater was the weight of the votes of the superior classes, and the more plutocratic was the right of vote. This institution of the former state was abandoned immediately after the revolution in favour of equal universal suffrage.

Although the elections have already taken place throughout the rest of Prussia, according to the new form, the municipal representation in Upper Silesia is still operated according to the old form. This situation is the more insupportable in that the local professional development has greatly exaggerated the difference between the poor and rich, and as, up to the present time, especially in the communes in which are located the mines and factories, the first and second classes are almost exclusively composed of the owners, contractors and directors of these establishments, and these classes choose from among themselves about two-thirds of the municipal commissioners.

For this reason, and now that tranquillity and order have been restored in Upper Silesia, the German Government can no longer defer the municipal elections, delayed for numerous motives, and especially on account of riots. This is the more necessary in that the municipal elections are conducted in anticipation of the intermediary elections for the Landtags of districts and provinces, in particular the new provincial constitution of Upper Silesia can only be applied as a basis of these elections.

In the course of the municipal elections, the interests of the portion of the population of Polish tongue will also be given due consideration. It is known that the Polish elements in Upper Silesia are found among the poorest part of the population, and for that reason it is clear that the maintenance of the superannuated voting system, and of the municipal representation thereby instituted, would be unrepresentative of the rights of that part of the population.

All guarantees are given for full liberty in the conduct of the elections. In particular, the Government has ordered, in favour of the Upper Silesia[n] fugitives, that upon their return to their domicile they will be given an opportunity to register on the supplementary lists of electors.

Finally, concerning the Peace Treaty, there is no motive given therein, in particular in the annex of Article 88, tending to prevent the Prussian State from exercising its sovereignty rights by insuring, until the entry into force of the Treaty, the administration of the territory which is to be submitted to a plebiscite in the future, or that the question of the elections is to be in any manner submitted to the competency of the International Council.

<sup>15</sup> See No. 8, minute 5 and appendix F.

The German Government entertains no doubt that, under these circumstances, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers will forego their original objections to these elections in Upper Silesia, considering that the Powers have declared their intention to pave the way for democratic principles in their establishment of peace.  
Accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER.

#### APPENDIX C TO NO. 18

##### *Note by the [British] Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council*

The British Delegation has received a despatch from the British Military Representative at Berlin containing the following information:—

‘There is a definite Group in Berlin known as the Anti-Bolshevik League. They meet at the Adlon Hotel.

The members are:—

*German:*—General von Lettow Vorbeck.

Graf. von Donau.

Prof. Schiemann.

‘Staff’ Officers—Hauptman von Lubers.

Lieut. Danks.

*Russian:*—Bogdanoff, Russian merchant from Rostow.

Podalinski, formerly Governor of S. Russia.

Beck. Marmarcheff (formerly mixed up with Bermont).

Noske sometimes attends meetings. Probably only internal anti-Bolshevik measures are discussed in his presence.

This group have been, and still are, engaged in organizing the despatch of munitions to Denikin and munitions and money to Bermont.

They obtain their munitions from the Schilde Konsortium, Schwäbische-strasse, 30, Berlin, W. 30. Krupps and Stiler have representatives working with Schilde in this office.’

At its meeting on Saturday, October 11th, the Supreme Council decided that the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control set up by Articles 203–210 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany should direct, if they found it possible, that Russian arms, munitions and war material retained by Germany should be delivered to the Russian Armies recognized by the Allied and Associated Governments.<sup>16</sup>

The transaction described in the above quoted extract from General Malcolm’s despatch, however, is apparently concerned with new ammunition manufactured by a firm in which Krupp is largely interested, and is therefore not covered by the Supreme Council’s resolution of October 11th.

It would accordingly appear necessary for the Supreme Council to decide the two following questions of principle:—

- (1) Whether Germany is to be encouraged to proceed with the manufacture of ammunition.
- (2) Whether it is desirable to facilitate the supply of German war material to the Army of General Denikin.

*November 7th, 1919.*

<sup>16</sup> See Vol. I, No. 72, minute 6.

## Document 1

*Note for the Supreme Council relative to the First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations*

1. It would seem to be acknowledged on the one hand, that the order of the day for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations depends on the ratification of the Treaty by the American Senate, the important questions being reserved until that time,—and on the other hand, that the designation of the representatives may depend on this order of the day, that is to say on the importance of the questions to be considered.

2. However, in case the American ratification would allow the consideration of important questions in the first meeting of the Council, there would be a great advantage in having this consideration take place at as early a date as possible, because, if this ratification had to be awaited to prepare the first meeting of the Council, there would be a regrettable loss of time.

It would therefore seem useful at the present time to anticipate the first meeting, while reserving the order of the day and the liberty of the Powers to designate their representatives in consequence.

3. With this end in view, the President of the United States could, at this time, notify the Powers that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations will be held at Paris immediately after the signing of the Procès-Verbal of the deposit of the ratifications of the Treaty and that an official convocation will follow, as soon as possible, giving the date and order of the day.

4. This note might be addressed by the President of the United States to the interested diplomatic missions at Washington, and the official convocation, addressed by the President of the United States, conformably with the Treaty, could be delivered on the spot by the American representative at the Peace Conference to the President of the Conference, and by the latter to the representative of each interested Power.

## Document 2

*Proposed Note to be addressed by the President of the United States to the Interested Diplomatic Missions at Washington relative to the First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nations*

The President of the United States of America has the honour to inform the Government of . . .<sup>17</sup> that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations will be held at Paris immediately after the signing of the first Procès-Verbal of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles.

The date, hour and order of the day of this meeting will be advised in the official convocation which the President of the United States will request the American representative to the Peace Conference to transmit on the spot to each interested Power, through the kindness of the President of the Conference.

<sup>17</sup> Punctuation as in original.

*Proposed Reply to the Letter of the German Delegation of October 3 on the Question of Eupen and Malmedy, submitted to the Supreme Council by the Commission on Belgian Affairs*<sup>18</sup>

Mr. President:

In reply to your letter of October 3 last, relative to the circles of Eupen and Malmedy,<sup>14</sup> I have the honour to inform you that the interpretation given to this communication is not in conformity either with the letter or the spirit of Article 34 of the Treaty of Versailles.

A glance at this article suffices to show immediately that the intention of the Allied and Associated Powers was not to institute a plebiscite at Eupen and Malmedy similar to that to be operated in Upper Silesia or Schleswig, but to allow those of the inhabitants of the interested circles, who desire to see the territory to which they belong maintained under German sovereignty, to freely express their wish.

If furthermore, reference be made to the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers made to the observations of the German Delegation under date of June 16, 1919, the interpretation of Article 24 [34] leaves no room for doubt.

In the covering letter accompanying this reply, it is said that the plebiscite provided for in Article 34 will be organized 'with such precautions that the freedom of vote shall be entire'.<sup>19</sup> Belgium, who is to assume full responsibility for all the necessary measures, will not fail to assume, in conformity with this obligation and under the conditions provided for by the Treaty, the free manifestation of the will of the inhabitants.

The last paragraph of Article 34 furthermore obliges Belgium to report the result of the popular expression to the League of Nations, and to accept its decision. The League of Nations, under whose auspices the plebiscite will thus take place, as confirmed by the reply of June 16 (Part II, Section I),<sup>20</sup> will therefore be fully qualified to deal with the conditions under which the plebiscite will be effected, which is to be the base of its decision, and to take, in consequence, the necessary measures.

Please accept, etc.,

<sup>18</sup> The original French text of this note, dated November 10, 1919, and signed by M. Clemenceau, is printed in the *Journal Officiel* of the League of Nations for 1920, No. 4, p. 165.

<sup>19</sup> The quotation is in the sense but not the words of the original. Cf. *British and Foreign State Papers* (1919), vol. cxii, p. 250.

<sup>20</sup> Op. cit., vol. cxii, pp. 260-1.

H.D. 89.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 11, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: *U.S.A.*: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: *U.S.A.*: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*U.S.A.*: Dr. I. Bowman, Mr. A. W. Dulles.  
*British Empire*: Lieut.-Colonel Kisch, Mr. E. H. Carr, Mr. H. W. Malkin.  
*France*: M. Cambon, M. Hermitte, M. Kammerer, M. Fromageot, M. Escoffier, M. de Percin.  
*Italy*: M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri, M. Pilotti.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

1. M. BERTHELOT said that the members of the Council had received the draft reply to M. Venizelos which he had been asked to prepare. *Draft reply to M. Venizelos* He called the attention of the Council to the fact that two questions on the subject of Smyrna had not been discussed the day before: M. Venizelos, on one hand, complained of the conditions which had governed the censorship, and expressed his intention of establishing a Greek censorship at Smyrna; on the other hand, the Inter-Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople had sent them on November 3rd a note in which they criticized the attitude of the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna; the latter tended more and more to substitute his action as well to that of the High Commissioners as to that of the Turkish officials. In the draft reply which he had prepared he had taken those two points into consideration.

SIR EYRE CROWE was of opinion that the question should be examined at the next meeting, but he wished to state immediately that he did not entirely agree with M. Berthelot: was it possible for the Allies to supervise the Greek authorities at Smyrna from Constantinople? Besides, perhaps the draft letter pointed out too clearly to Venizelos that he was wrong.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed to adjourn the examination of the draft prepared by M. Berthelot.

(The examination of the draft reply to M. Venizelos was adjourned.)

2. MR. POLK wished to read a telegram addressed to the Supreme Council by the Secretary of Labour of the United States in his capacity as President

of the International Labour Conference (see Appendix A).<sup>1</sup> He explained that the American Delegation would not assume the responsibility for the terms of this communication. On the other hand, from the information he had received from Baron von Lersner, most of the German delegates had reserved berths which were leaving between November 15th and 20th. He would know the next day whether all the delegates had been able to secure berths.

*Communication from the Labour Conference at Washington*

M. CLEMENCEAU did not see what they could do for the time being.

3. (The Council had before it a letter from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation (see Appendix B)<sup>2</sup> and a report from the New States Commission, dated November 8th, 1919, (see Appendix C).<sup>3</sup>

*Observations of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation regarding the Minorities Treaty*

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the report of the Commission, and upon the draft letter to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation appended to said report. He wished to call the attention of the Council to the fact that the Commission had been unanimous in thinking that it was satisfactory to send to the Serb Delegation a reply which would interpret the Treaty. The only disagreement was on one point. The drafting of Article 11 in the Serbian

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The telegram in question, dated from Washington on November 8, 1919, read as follows: 'The officers of the International Labour Conference at Washington are authorized to state that the Conference considers that it is of the highest importance for the success and value of the work of the Conference, that the German and Austrian Delegations should participate in all deliberations and decisions in regard to the questions on the agenda. They would recall the fact that the decision in favour of the participations of these nations was approved by the whole conference with only one dissentient vote.'

'The Conference can hardly prolong its sittings beyond the end of November.'

'They would therefore request the Supreme Council to take such action as will (facilitate) the arrival of the German and Austrian Delegations at Washington at the earliest possible moment.'

'They also think that they should point out that engagements have been entered into at Paris in this matter. W. B. Wilson, President, H. B. Butler, Secretary-General.'

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This letter to M. Clemenceau, dated at Paris, November 5, 1919, was in two parts. The first concerned the treaty of peace with Austria and stated that 'although several of our very important requests have not been admitted in the Treaty with Austria, the Royal Government is ready to sacrifice them to the general interest, in order not to create difficulties for the Peace Conference. Yet this Delegation considers it necessary to draw the careful attention of the Supreme Council to an economic question of vital interest to our country and which should be discussed now, it being in close connexion with the Treaty of Peace with Austria.' This question concerned the assignment to Yugoslavia of a just and adequate proportion of the tonnage of the former Austro-Hungarian merchant fleet. The matter was considered by the Supreme Council under minute 4 below (not printed); it was decided that the Reparation Commission should be requested to hear a Yugoslav representative regarding such distribution of shipping between Italy and Yugoslavia, and that the 'Commission be informed that it is the desire of the Supreme Council that the Yugo-Slav request be considered with the utmost care.'

The second part of the Yugoslav letter concerned the Minorities Convention and is printed with minor verbal variation by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 508-13.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This report is printed with minor verbal variation, ibid., vol. xiii, pp. 515-19.

Treaty was different from the corresponding article in the other Minorities Treaty. Following M. Tittoni's suggestion, the Supreme Council had indeed decided on September 1st to replace in the article in question, for the Serbian Treaty, the words '*procéder de telle manière*' by the words '*prendre telles mesures*.'<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, the corresponding English text was the same in all the Treaties, viz: 'take such action.' The majority was of the opinion that this difference in the drafting of the French text did not alter the sense and that nothing opposed itself to their informing the Serbs thereof. On the contrary, the Italian Delegation was of the opinion that it would be wiser to abide, without further explanation, with the decision of the Supreme Council. On the whole, they believed that their reply was of such a nature as to satisfy the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, except with regard to the Macedonian question. However, one difficulty still remained: it was likely that the Serbian Delegation might feel it hard to accept the decision of the Council which asked that it should recognize the right of option under the conditions provided in Article 4, for persons of Turkish nationality. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation would perhaps put forward objections on this point.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether there were any reasons to believe that the Serbs would make difficulties on this point.

M. KAMMERER said that in a private conversation, at a time when the question of a special clause on the subject had come up in the Minorities Treaty, M. Trumbic had expressed some doubt. He thought that the Belgrade government would find it easier to make a simple declaration.

MR. POLK said he approved the report of the Commission; but asked whether it would not be easier to obtain the assent of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation if they were to give M. Trumbic the satisfaction of being heard by the Council. This would facilitate his task in his own country, for it could not then be said that the Conference had refused to hear the Serb Delegation.

M. KAMMERER said that from the very beginning the New States Commission had decided to hear no one.

MR. POLK remarked that one of the grievances of the Roumanians, which was unjustified, was that they had not been heard by the Council. He did not wish to insist, but they might give them such satisfaction if they were heard; this might be the best way of obtaining their signature.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether this might not be the source of further delays.

MR. POLK asked whether the Commission felt sure that the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation would be content purely and simply with the letter which was going to be sent.

M. KAMMERER answered that except with regard to Article 4, they had every reason to think the Serbs would sign. It might perhaps be wise to send them immediately the letter which the Commission had prepared: if they had any objections to make, the Council might hear them.

<sup>4</sup> See Vol. I, No. 48, minute :.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the Italian Delegation maintained its reservations regarding article 11.

M. DE MARTINO stated that they did not insist for the sake of conciliation, but it was understood that the two expressions were of the same value; one could not conceive an intervention of the League of Nations if the League could not take such measures as might be opportune.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the report presented by the New States Commission with regard to the observations of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the Minorities Treaty;
- (2) that the President of the Conference should send to that Delegation the draft reply as prepared by the New States Commission.

4.

[Not printed]<sup>5</sup>

*Allotment of merchant  
tonnage to Italy and  
the Serbo-Croat-  
Slovene State*

5. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 7th, 1919 (see Appendix D).)

*Removal of German  
Material from  
Dantzig*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee.

M. CLEMENCEAU wished to ask who would make the distinction between German Government property and private property.

M. FROMAGEOT answered that this distinction should not be very difficult to make.

MR. POLK inquired whether they could not await the arrival of the German Delegates to solve this question.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether they would have the necessary powers.

MR. POLK said it was a violation of the Treaty: he thought that it would be saving time to follow his suggestion rather than send a new note.

SIR EYRE CROWE said they were confronted by a difficulty of form. They had before them a question which had been brought up only by an American report<sup>6</sup> which stated, besides, that the Germans had ceased to remove, at least partly, the material in question. They did not know whether the material which was being removed did or did not belong to the state. Perhaps it would be sufficient to warn the German Government that they would not permit the removal of government owned material.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the first thing to do was to verify on the spot to whom belonged the material which had been removed.

MR. POLK said that there were at Dantzig representatives of the Inter-Allied Railway Mission in Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was for them to give the necessary information.

<sup>5</sup> See note 2 above.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 16, note 3.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Inter-Allied Railway Mission in Poland be requested to advise immediately whether material removed by the Germans from Dantzic is State or private property;
- (2) that the Drafting Committee prepare a draft note warning the German Government that the Allied and Associated Powers will not allow removal or sale by German authorities of naval material at Dantzic, which belonged to the Reich, to the German States, or had been requisitioned by them.

6. (The Council had before it a note from the Secretary-General of the Conference dated November 8, 1919 (see Appendix E).<sup>7</sup>)

*Commission charged with preparing the organization of mixed tribunals set up under article 229 of the Peace Treaty with Germany*

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

that the Allied and Associated Powers having drawn up a list of individuals charged with crimes to be delivered by the German Government, should have a representative on the Commission whose appointment had been decided on

November 7th, and which was charged with the organization of mixed tribunals set up under Article 229 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. (See Appendix E).<sup>7</sup>

7. (The Council had before it a note from the Commission on Polish Affairs dated November 10th, 1919 (see Appendix F) and a letter from the Secretary General of the Polish Delegation dated November 9th, 1919 (see Appendix G).<sup>8</sup>)

*Status of Eastern Galicia*

M. CAMBON said that before commenting upon the report of the Commission he wished to call the attention of the Council to the letter from the Secretary-General of the Polish Delegation. The American, Italian and Japanese Delegations were of the opinion that the request addressed to the Council should be granted. The British and French Delegations, on the other hand, thought that it was time to solve this irritating question.

M. BERTHELOT said that Mr. Paderewski had already explained to the Council the Polish point of view. They did not see the use of hearing another Polish representative.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. This note referred to the decision in this matter adopted by the Supreme Council on November 7, 1919 (see No. 16, minute 1) and stated that 'this Commission has been composed of the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Certain other Allied Powers, notably Belgium, were alarmed on account of their eviction from the composition of this Commission. Besides Belgium, other Powers (Greece, Poland, Roumania and Serbia) may have to claim accused persons of German nationality and have an interest in the organization of the mixed tribunals.' The note therefore proposed the solution adopted by the Supreme Council.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed. This letter to M. Clemenceau expressed the hope that the Supreme Council would come to no decision upon the 'new plan' for Eastern Galicia without first hearing the Polish Delegation, and stated in particular that 'in view of the fact that Mr. Dmowski is, unfortunately, seriously ill and that Mr. Paderewski is absent from Paris, the Polish Delegation has the honour to request the Supreme Council to kindly postpone its decision on the fate of the Eastern part of Galicia until the Polish Delegates return to Paris and are allowed to present their case to the Peace Conference.'

M. DE MARTINO said if it only meant a few days' delay it might be courteous to grant it.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether Mr. Patek<sup>9</sup> would be informed of the new conclusions arrived at by the Commission. In that case he would discuss them before the Council. Or would the conclusions be kept secret?

M. CAMBON said that they were not to be transmitted, but as usual there would be some leakage.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that if at each step they were to hear the Poles, they would never finish. They had come with great difficulty to an agreement. It would be imprudent to reopen the compromise which had been arrived at. However, he himself did not wish to oppose the granting of a short delay of three days for instance. In that case it should be taken into account that Mr. Patek would make objections and that he would ask for time to receive instructions from Warsaw. (The American, Italian and Japanese Delegates stated that they did not insist.)

MR. POLK thought they might discuss the report and take a decision, with the reservation that they would give Mr. Patek a further hearing.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

M. CAMBON read and commented upon the report of the Commission. He said that no disagreement existed between the members of the Commission except in regard to Article 16 which concerned the representation of Eastern Galicia in the Polish Diet.<sup>10</sup> While the text of the majority provided for a representation of Eastern Galicia in the Diet and defined the attributions of its representatives, the minority on the other hand, i.e. the British Delegation, wished to have the question of Eastern Galicia's representation in the Polish Diet discussed between Galicians and Poles. The majority was afraid that such a procedure would result in endless and violent conflict between Poland and Galicia.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated with satisfaction that the majority had made an effort to meet the minority half way. On his side the minority felt obliged to make some concessions. Three points would have to be discussed: with regard to the duration of the Mandate which the League of Nations would give to Poland in Eastern Galicia, he had received instructions from Mr. Lloyd George to see that the duration of this Mandate should be limited to 10 years.<sup>11</sup> He himself (Sir Eyre Crowe) proposed 15 years, the Commission had proposed 30 years, and finally 25 years had been agreed upon. He would be prepared to take the responsibility to accept this figure. If they did not agree on this point the American Delegation would come back to its former proposition and the question would be reopened. With regard to the military service, he had already had occasion to express the reluctance of his Government to accept the principle of conscription in the territories placed under the control of the League of Nations. He accepted, however, in a spirit of conciliation, the proposed arrangement. Lastly, with regard to

<sup>9</sup> Member of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference.

<sup>10</sup> See Vol. I, No. 61, minute 3 and appendix C.

<sup>11</sup> See Vol. III in this series.

article 16, he wished to say that the British Government was in no way opposed to a representation of Galicia at Warsaw. He only thought that the problem was of so complex a nature that it would be better to let the interested parties solve it themselves. He undoubtedly could accept the text proposed by the majority, but they should take into account the case where Poles and Galicians would agree upon another system; would they be bound by article 16, as proposed by the majority? The British Delegation could not accept the majority's text except with the following addition, 'this arrangement shall be subject to revision by common agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia.'

M. DE MARTINO accepted the British Amendment.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that all the Delegations accepted the same.

M. CAMBON said that the changes which the Council had approved might necessitate some alteration of the articles originally adopted. He asked that the Council give the Commission on Polish Affairs the mandate to effect in accord with the Drafting Committee such changes of texts which would appear necessary.

MR. POLK said they were agreed not to publish anything concerning the decisions that had just been taken until the text of the Treaty had been definitely agreed upon.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the report prepared by the Commission on Polish Affairs or its majority, with regard to the text of the preamble and Articles 2 and 38 (see Appendix F);
- (2) that Article 16, as proposed by the majority, be adopted with the following addition, 'This arrangement shall be considered as subject to revision by common agreement between the Polish Government and the Ministry of Eastern Galicia.'
- (3) that the Commission on Polish Affairs, in agreement with the Drafting Committee, should modify the articles concerning the status of Eastern Galicia, which had already been adopted, so as to conform with the two preceding decisions;
- (4) that said decisions should not be final until a representative of the Polish Delegation had been heard by the Council;
- (5) that the decisions of the Council with regard to the status of Eastern Galicia should remain secret until further order.

8. (The Council had before it a list prepared by the French Delegation of the questions still to be decided by the Supreme Council. (See Appendix H).)

*Questions still to be  
decided by the  
Council*

MR. POLK thought that the Russian and Baltic questions could not be settled by the Council. Would it not be better to agree now that they should be dealt with by the respective Foreign Offices?

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question of Bessarabia should, however, come before the Council.

MR. POLK said the American Delegation was of the opinion that the Bessarabian question could not be settled at that time.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated they were clearly of the opinion that Bessarabia should go to Roumania.

MR. POLK said he was willing to discuss the question, but that this was not the time to make this session.

M. BERTHELOT said that the question of the Aland Islands had already been put before the Council and that it had been decided to adjourn the settlement of same until it knew what attitude Sweden would take in regard to the blockade of Russia.<sup>12</sup> In the same way, the problem of repatriation of Allied contingents and of enemy prisoners from Siberia belonged to the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Committee of Ambassadors might deal with the settlement of these three questions: they were questions of execution of the Treaty. It was understood that the Delegations would send in to the Secretariat-General the additional lists which they had been asked to prepare.<sup>13</sup>

MR. POLK asked whether the Dutch-Belgian Treaty would be ready in time for examination by the Council.

M. BERTHELOT thought so. An agreement seemed imminent.

MR. POLK asked whether the distribution of merchant ships was to be settled by the Supreme Council or the Reparation Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Council would discuss it and refer it back to the Reparation Commission if it were deemed necessary.

9.

[Not printed]

*Allowances to members  
of Boundary Commis-  
sions*

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 11, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX D TO No. 19

##### *Note for the Supreme Council Concerning Naval Material at Dantzig.*

The Drafting Committee is of the opinion that the removal, or the sale by the German authorities of the maritime material which is at Dantzig and belongs to the Empire or to the German States, or was requisitioned by them, is contrary to the stipulations of Article 107 of the Peace Treaty, and that by taking such measures, at this time, Germany is jeopardizing the loyal execution of the Treaty.

The same solution would be difficult to support, if the matter concerned private properties, and the individuals interested spontaneously disposed of them.

November 7, 1919.

For the Drafting Committee:

HENRY FROMAGEOT.

<sup>12</sup> See Vol. I, No. 68, minute 8.

<sup>13</sup> See No. 14, note 8.

*Note from the Commission on Polish Affairs on the question of Eastern Galicia*

November 10, 1919.

*Note presented to the Supreme Council by the Commission on Polish Affairs*

Question of Eastern Galicia.

In a resolution, under date of November 7, the Supreme Council decided to forward for consideration, to the Commission on Polish Affairs, the proposition made by the British Delegation, with a view to having the League of Nations give Poland a mandate of definite duration over Eastern Galicia.<sup>14</sup>

The Commission on Polish Affairs, with an intention of conciliation, unanimously decided to accept the principle of a mandate. Although recommending to the Council the adoption of this solution, which, alone, under the present circumstances seems of a nature to realize the unanimity of the Delegations and to lead to a concrete result, the Commission deems it its duty to call attention to the fact that no mandate has been considered so far for the countries situated in Europe, and that Eastern Galicia profoundly differs from the territories to which the principle of the mandate has so far been applied.

With respect to the duration of the mandate conferred on Poland, four Delegations<sup>15</sup> were of the opinion that it should be fixed at twenty-five years, thinking that it is necessary that the destinies of a sorely tried and profoundly troubled country cannot be treated again before the legal age of a new generation which will have grown up protected from the agitations and the shocks caused by the world war. The British Delegate, nevertheless, has declared that his instructions did not permit him to accept an extension to twenty-five years of the ten-year period considered by the British Delegation. However, he agreed to call the attention of the British representative to the Supreme Council, to the arguments set forth by the majority of the Commission.

At last the Commission unanimously concluded that it would be desirable that, at the expiration of a period during which the mandate would have been granted to Poland, the League of Nations receive full authority to maintain, revise, or modify the statute defined by the Treaty. This provision should be liberally interpreted and would imply for the League of Nations the power to entirely dissolve the system of mandate, and to pronounce, for instance, either the annexation of Eastern Galicia to Poland, or to another State, or to choose any other solution which it might deem proper.

<sup>14</sup> See No. 16, minute 3.

<sup>15</sup> Note in original: 'However, the American Delegation desires that it be specified that it accepted a limitation of the duration of the mandate only in the hope of coming to a unanimous agreement. Therefore, if the British Delegation should not accept, definitely, this period of twenty-five years, the American Delegation reserves the right to stand by its first proposition, which consisted in entrusting Poland, under the conditions determined by the Treaty, with the mandate of administering Eastern Galicia as long as this system should give satisfactory results, the Council of the League of Nations remaining free to bring about a change in status at any time such change might seem to it desirable.'

Aside from the question of the mandate, the Commission attempted to compromise concerning the two points on which a disagreement existed between the majority and the minority of the Commission (see *Discussion of Article 16 and of the Draft of Treaty* Report No. 5),<sup>10</sup> that is to say, on the principle of the representation of Eastern Galicia in the Diet of Poland (Article 16 of the Draft of Treaty)<sup>10</sup> and on the military organization (Article 38).

On the first question the divergence could not be settled, the British Delegation having maintained the text proposed for Article 16 by the minority of the Commission. He [*sic*] deemed, in fact, that it was a matter of principle which ought to be decided by the Supreme Council itself. He declared himself willing, however, to set forth to the British plenipotentiary the arguments presented by the majority to support its point of view.

On the question of the military organization, on the other hand, the Commission unanimously agreed to propose a new draft of Article 38, which would give to the Polish Government the right to apply in Eastern Galicia the military legislation in effect in Poland, with the reserve that the contingent thus recruited would constitute special units which, in peace time, would be located in Eastern Galicia and be at the disposal of the Polish Government in time of war for the defence of the national territory. This last expression is designed to forbid Poland the use of forces recruited in Eastern Galicia in any war which had not been forced upon her, but it must not be interpreted as implying the interdiction to use the troops of Eastern Galicia in a defensive war outside of the Polish frontiers.

If the propositions presented above by the Commission are adopted by the Supreme Council, it would be advisable to modify the text of the draft of Treaty, such as it appears in Report No. 5 of the Commission, as follows:<sup>16</sup>

(a) In the preamble, suppression of the clause thus conceived:

'Until the moment when they will be invited to express, by vote, at present postponed on account of the troubled state of Eastern Europe, their desires relative to the definite political statute in those territories.'

(The Supreme Council, on the other hand, in its meeting of September 19th,<sup>10</sup> decided on the suppression of the paragraph mentioned in Report No. 5 of the Commission and thus conceived:

'Considering that Eastern Galicia formed part of the former Kingdom of Poland until the dismemberment of the latter.')

(b) Article 2 would be thus drawn up:

'Poland accepts, in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty, the mandate of organizing and governing Eastern Galicia, which will constitute an autonomous territory, within the limits determined by Article 1.

'This mandate, which is conferred for a period of twenty-five years,<sup>17</sup> at the expiration of which the Council of the League of Nations will have full authority to maintain, revise, or modify the statute defined by the present Treaty.'

<sup>16</sup> Note in original: 'On account of the short time available for the preparation of the report of the Commission, which ought to be submitted to the Council at its meeting of November 10, the new text proposed by the Commission could not be submitted for the consideration of the Drafting Committee.'

<sup>17</sup> Note in original: 'The British Delegate makes, concerning these twenty-five years, a reservation which has been defined above.'

(c) At last Article 38 would thus be drawn up:

'The legislation on military service in effect in Poland can be applied by Poland to Eastern Galicia, with the reserve that the contingent thus recruited will constitute special units, which, in peace time, will be located in Eastern Galicia and will, in time of war, be at the disposal of the Polish Government for the defence of national territory.'

In case these suggestions be admitted, it would seem that the Commission should be directed to study in concert with the Drafting Committee, the modifications in form which it would be advisable to make in the other articles of the Treaty.

## APPENDIX H TO NO. 19

### *Questions for Regulation by the Supreme Council*

#### *I. Special Questions*

##### *A. Execution of the Treaty with Germany*

Conditions governing the resumption of diplomatic relations. (A report to be furnished by the Special Commission.)

Reorganization of the Superior War Council at Versailles to centralize the measures of execution concerning the military clauses of the Peace Treaty, in Germany and in the different occupied territories.

Extradition and trial of the Kaiser.

Nomination of the members of the Commission entrusted with the comparison of the lists of culprits presented by the different Powers and to regulate a procedure for the mixed tribunals (article 229). Question of the representation of small Powers on the Commission.

Convention between Poland and the free city of Dantzic (a report to be furnished by the Commission on Polish Affairs).

Togo and Cameroun: employment of the contingents for the defence of the metropolitan and colonial territory.

##### *B. Execution of the Treaty with Austria*

Signing of the Treaty with Austria and of the treaties for the protection of minorities by: (a) The Serb-Croat-Slovene State; (b) Roumania.

##### *C. Execution of the Treaty with Bulgaria*

Question of the attribution of Bulgarian Thrace.

##### *D. Treaty with Hungary*

Question of the total or partial payment of the Roumanian occupation expenses;

The furnishing of coal to Hungary by Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State; (Article 207);

Exploitation of the Pecs Mines (report to be furnished by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugoslav affairs).

#### *II. Questions in common*

##### *A. Distribution of enemy ships*

###### *(1) Battleships*

(a) German and Austro-Hungarian battleships.

(b) Reparations demanded by France and Italy for the interruption in their naval constructions during the war and for the employment of their shipyards and mills in the manufacture of war materials for themselves and the Allies.

- (2) *Commercial ships*
  - (a) General distribution of the merchant tonnage between those concerned.
  - (b) German ships; question of tankers.
  - (c) Austro-Hungarian ships. Distribution of the tonnage between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.
- B. Cost of upkeep of the armies of occupation.*

### III. General Political Questions

#### A. Question of the Adriatic

Frontiers between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

Fiume.

Montenegro.

Albania.

#### B. Russian and Baltic Question

(a) Recognition of Admiral Koltchak.

(b) Finland (Petchenga and Carelia).

(c) Aland Islands.

(d) Baltic States.

(e) Eastern frontiers of Poland.

(f) Ukrania.

(g) Bessarabia.

(h) Caucasus State.

(i) Repatriation of the Allied contingents in Siberia.

(j) Repatriation of enemy prisoners in Russia.

#### C. Treaty with Turkey

#### D. Treaty with Belgium and the Netherlands for the revision of the Treaties of 1839

## No. 20

H.D. 90.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, November 12, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire:* Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France:* M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy:* M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan:* M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire:* Capt.

G. Lothian Small. *France:* M. Massigli. *Italy:* M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Mr. W. H. Buckler.

*British Empire:* General Sackville-West, Mr. Forbes-Adam, Mr. A. Leeper.

*France:* General Weygand, M. Laroche.

*Italy:* M. Galli, M. Vannutelli-Rey.

*Japan:* M. Shigemitsu.

1. (The Council had before it a draft note to M. Venizelos relative to the report of the Commission of Inquiry, prepared by the British Delegation (see Appendix A), a telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated Nov. 3 (see Appendix B), and a letter from the Greek Delegation, dated Nov. 4 (see Appendix C).)

*Note to M. Venizelos  
relative to incidents at  
Smyrna*

M. BERTHELOT read the draft note prepared by the British Delegation.

M. CLEMENCEAU raised the following point of form: on page 2 he thought the word 'observed' should be changed to read 'felt' in the sentence reading: 'It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself felt along the limits of the Greek occupation.'<sup>1</sup>

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that in drawing up this note the British Delegation had wished to avoid mixing up two questions; he realized, however, that other questions, referred to on the previous day by M. Berthelot<sup>2</sup> but not touched upon in this draft note, still remained to be settled. The question of the administration of Smyrna was a rather complex one and it might be well to turn it over to a Commission. A Commission on Greek Territorial Claims was already in existence. He understood that M. Venizelos had a good deal to say on this question and it would perhaps be better for him to be heard by that Commission.

M. DE MARTINO agreed, particularly as he thought it was time that a decision should be reached relative to the relations between the Greek army of occupation and the local authorities on the one hand, and the central Government of Constantinople on the other. It would be well to be guided by the principles of The Hague Convention. On the other hand, it would be well to show consideration to M. Venizelos, who throughout the war had shown qualities of the highest value and whose difficulties were well known.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the question be referred to the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims which, if necessary, could solicit the advice of the military experts.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that as General Bunoust, who was entirely familiar with the situation, was present he might give the Commission valuable advice.

MR. POLK called the attention of the Council to a paragraph of the draft note authorizing the Greeks to advance from Aidin up to the river Kochak Chai.<sup>3</sup> That clause was a very important one. It should be remembered that any further advance meant fighting between the Greeks and Turks. General Milne himself had recognized that fact. He therefore wished to ask if the Council deemed it advisable to assume the responsibility for such further conflict.

<sup>1</sup> The last sentence of the sixth paragraph of the draft note. In the text of the file copy of appendix A, as printed below, the sentence has been redrafted so as to obviate the use of either of the words in question.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 19, minute 1.

<sup>3</sup> This authorization is not contained in the file copy of the note, as printed below in appendix A; the text was evidently amended in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council at resolution (2) of this minute.

M. CLEMENCEAU again pointed out that he could send no troops; he felt that possibly the best solution would be to have M. Venizelos withdraw his troops from the region of Aidin where they had gone without the consent of the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that that meant letting the Turks occupy this region.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if the Italians were far distant from the Greeks in this region.

M. DE MARTINO explained that they were not; that the Italian forces were within six hundred meters of the line of the River Meander and the parallel railroad. The Greek line was along the north bank of the river.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that if the Greeks retired a triangle would be left between the river, the railroad and the Greek line, which included Aidin. To the south the line had been fixed by agreement between M. Venizelos and the Italian Government. He thought that it would not be advisable to withdraw the Greeks from the triangle in question and turn it over to Italian occupation.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that he had not made any such suggestion.

M. CLEMENCEAU then suggested that the Greeks could be left at Aidin, but that they should not be allowed to advance.

MR. POLK asked if General Milne himself had not said that a further advance by the Greeks would inevitably result in serious trouble.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that General Milne had rather said that he would be willing to authorize a further advance if the Council was prepared for the fact that such an advance would mean encountering armed opposition. General Milne had favoured that advance on strategic grounds.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that as M. Venizelos felt capable of conquering Asia, the Greek troops certainly should be able to maintain their ground at Aidin. He agreed with Mr. Polk that if the Council ordered a further advance it would be in a position of creating further trouble.

MR. POLK said that he could not agree to a letter authorizing the Greeks to advance in view of the fact that the authorities on the spot had said that trouble would certainly ensue. He thought that this would be tantamount to authorizing the Greeks to advance and conquer additional territory.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the only alternative was to let in the Turks who would then unquestionably start to massacre the Greeks.

MR. POLK asked if Sir Eyre Crowe felt convinced of this.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did.

MR. POLK said that his personal view was that if this line of action were followed all Asia Minor would eventually have to be occupied.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Greeks be left at Aidin but that they be not authorized to advance further. (This was agreed to.)

M. DE MARTINO wished to ask Sir Eyre Crowe if he could give him some information on the intentions of the British Government relative to the occupation of Aidin. According to a telegram which he had received from Italian Authorities on the spot, English troops were reported to be ready to

advance on Aidin. General Montague Bates, commanding the 83rd Infantry Brigade, was said to be in command of those forces. On November 4th more than 70 cars were reported to have left for Afium Karahissar in order to transport the British troops.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the British arrangement had been made in contemplation of Inter-Allied occupation. As no French troops could be sent he thought that the British troops would likewise not approach Aidin.

It was decided:

to approve the draft note to M. Venizelos relative to the report of the Commission of Inquiry at Smyrna prepared by the British Delegation (see Appendix A) after making the following modifications therein:

- (1) on the second page of this draft note<sup>1</sup> the sentence: 'It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself observed along the limits of the Greek zone of occupation', should be changed to read, 'It hopes that the dangerous tension which at the present time does not seem to have ceased to make itself felt along the limits of the Greek zone of occupation';
- (2) the clause: 'In the meanwhile allowing the Greek troops to advance from Aidin up to the river Kochak Chai, according to General Milne's recommendation' should be eliminated.<sup>3</sup>

It was further decided:

to refer to the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims the questions pertaining to the administration of Smyrna (see Appendices B and C), and that the Commission should be at liberty to take the advice of Military Experts, in particular that of General Bunoust.

2. (The Council had before it a reply from the Roumanian Government transmitted by the Chargé d'Affaires of France, dated November 2nd, to the note of the Allied and Associated Powers dated October 20th<sup>4</sup> (see Appendix D).)

*Reply of the Roumanian Government to the note of October 20th*

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the answer was very unsatisfactory and was even of a nature to cause anxiety.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed. He felt that the answer was practically a refusal of all the demands presented by the Supreme Council. The only point upon which the Roumanians had even partially agreed was the evacuation of Hungary, and even on that point the Roumanian Government had made a most formidable reservation with respect to the extent of the Hungarian territory to be evacuated. The Roumanian answer gave no satisfaction to the Council's demand relative to the evacuation in so far as concerned the withdrawal beyond the river Theiss. On all other points the answer was evasive and defiant. The Council should carefully examine the present situation in Roumania. Its authority must be respected. M. Bratiano was merely dilly-dallying and playing for time, and the measures adopted by him had resulted in deluding the majority of his countrymen into thinking him a great patriot. He (Sir Eyre Crowe) felt that if the King and the majority of the

<sup>4</sup> The reference was evidently to the note printed in Vol. I, No. 72, appendix B.

Roumanians were made clearly to see that a persistence in their present attitude would necessarily mean a breach with the Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania's exclusion from the Alliance, then Roumania would adopt a more compliant attitude. He thought that in such an event the present Government would be forced to retire and that a Ministry would be constituted which would see the wisdom of meeting the Council's just demands and would act accordingly. He thought the above considerations should be put very plainly to Roumania and that it should be told that if its reply to the communication proposed to be sent by the Council were not satisfactory it would mean the breaking off of relations between Roumania and the Allied and Associated Powers. The Roumanians could not be driven out of Hungary by force as the Council had no force to dispose of, and it seemed to him that the only alternative was the line of action he had proposed.

MR. POLK said he welcomed any strong action.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the action proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe was strong enough to meet the requirements of the situation.

M. DE MARTINO inquired if it would be wise to adopt in its entirety Sir Eyre Crowe's suggestion, which involved threatening Roumania. The resulting situation if the Roumanians should refuse to agree to the action proposed should be examined. If the Roumanians refused the situation would be worse than it was before.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the terms of the communication to be sent to Roumania were reasonably clear. They could be plainly told that they would be no longer in the Alliance.

M. BERTHELOT reminded the Council that at the time of signing the Austrian Treaty it had considered telling Roumania that Bukovina would not be attributed to it, but that in the Austrian Treaty it would be given to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.<sup>5</sup> This had not been done as it had seemed too severe a measure to be judicious at that time. However, as it was now proposed to exert pressure on Roumania, it was well to examine the means of bringing this pressure to bear and a similar plan might now be considered. Roumania might be told that her claims to Transylvania would not be recognized and that the question of Bessarabia would not be discussed until it could be taken up with a reconstituted Russia. He pointed out that the Roumanian reply was satisfactory in so far as it announced the imminent withdrawal of the Roumanian forces to the Theiss; the result had been to facilitate negotiations with the Hungarians. What he was now suggesting was primarily theoretical. The question of the advisability of taking such measures must still be decided, for when considering the question of punishing a Government it would be well not to lose sight of the fact that the population should not be wholly antagonized.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the Council that Sir George Clerk had referred in a former telegram to Roumanian atrocities in Transylvania and the Council had inquired what part of Transylvania was meant.<sup>6</sup> This question

<sup>5</sup> See: Vol. I, No. 53, minute 5.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 13, minute 2 and appendix B.

had not yet been answered but he had that day received a mass of documents relative to outrages in Transylvania, an examination of which might lead to the conclusion that the inhabitants of Transylvania were not as favourable to Roumania as might have been thought.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that two distinct questions were raised. First, was there a basis of right for taking away from Roumania the Hungarian territories in question? The second question related to the outrages committed by the Roumanians in Transylvania.

MR. POLK said that he had always felt that if Roumania refused to accede to the very reasonable demands of the Council she should not have Transylvania given to her. He thought that such action was entirely too generous.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that the difficulty was that if Transylvania were withheld from Roumania that would involve an occupation by Allied troops, which was obviously impossible.

MR. POLK observed that if these territories were withheld from Roumania she would at least be in a position of never having been given them. Although occupation by the Allies was out of the question, he thought that such action would at least have a great moral effect.

M. DE MARTINO thought that the point of prime importance was to rehabilitate the prestige of the Council. The action proposed by M. Berthelot was certainly rather severe. He would have to consult his government on that point. In the meantime he thought that the Ministers at Bucarest might be instructed to take further action.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not think this advisable inasmuch as the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Bucarest had already done all they could do.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in his personal opinion a communication should be sent to Roumania in the nature of a real ultimatum. He would, however, have to consult his government before agreeing to send such a communication.

MR. POLK inquired if it were necessary to send a communication of that nature. Could not an answer be sent to Roumania pointing out that her latest communication to the Council was no answer at all, and demanding a satisfactory answer from her?

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that the time for such action had gone by and that the present was the time to act firmly and decisively.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. POLK also agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that Roumania should be informed that the Allied and Associated Powers would withdraw their representatives from Roumania and that the Roumanian representatives in the various capitals, as well as her representatives at the Peace Conference, must also be withdrawn. He further suggested that M. Berthelot should draft a note, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting, this note to be submitted to the Council as soon as the Heads of Delegations had been able to consult their respective governments.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that a diplomatic rupture was a serious matter and inquired if it was to be resorted to at once.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that his patience was utterly exhausted. He had been long-suffering with the Roumanian Government and had even been reproached for that attitude. The Roumanians always tried to prolong *pourparlers* indefinitely, and this must be put an end to.

M. MATSUI agreed to the action proposed. He, of course, would have to consult his government, which he thought would not raise any objections. He wished to point out that his government had no diplomatic representation in Roumania. In the meantime, inasmuch as he might not be able to receive an answer from his government until some time after the other members of the Council had heard from their respective governments, he was willing to agree with the view which would be adopted.

M. BERTHELOT summarized the contents of the communication to be prepared by him. He would recall to Roumania all that had been done for her and in her behalf by the Allied and Associated Powers and would point out the refractory attitude consistently maintained by Roumania with respect to the just demands of the Supreme Council.

M. DE MARTINO called attention to one paragraph of the Roumanian note which seemed to him to have some merit. That was the paragraph dealing with the granting of authority to the Sub-Committee of the Reparations Commission to receive complaints relative to unauthorized requisitions. Roumania had pointed out that in this respect she had been treated worse than the Jugo-Slav State had been in the matter of its requisitions in the Banat.

M. BERTHELOT explained that the situations were not at all analogous. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had never been in opposition to the Council on this question.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that he had lately received a visit from Colonel Dimitrescu. He did not know the Colonel and was unaware how much importance should be attached to his statements. By way of information, however, he wished to tell the Council that Colonel Dimitrescu had complained of the Council's attitude towards Roumania and had pointed out that the present Government in Roumania, mainly composed of Generals, was only able to attend to internal affairs; he therefore hoped that the Council would have patience with Roumania until elections had been held and a government constituted which was qualified to deal adequately with foreign affairs as well as internal matters.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that no importance should be attached to these remarks of Colonel Dimitrescu; M. Bratiano was behind the whole matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the Ministry of Generals had been put in power so that precisely that argument could be advanced.

It was decided:

That M. Berthelot should draft a note to the Roumanian Government, for submission to the Council, taking into account the views expressed by the Council at that meeting.

3. (The Council had before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 9th (see Appendix E), and a telegram from the Inter-  
*Situation in Hungary* Allied Military Mission dated November 10th (see Appendix F).

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that the situation in Hungary seemed to have greatly improved. He called attention to Sir George Clerk's request that about 20 officers be sent to Hungary to be attached to various army and police units.

M. DE MARTINO said that he was in favour of sending these officers if the other members of the Council were also.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the question of their payment would surely be raised. It seemed to him that they might well be paid by the Hungarian army.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed and said that he also favoured sending these officers.

MR. POLK said that at present Colonel Yates, he believed, was in charge of the reorganization of the Hungarian Gendarmerie. He thought that his Government would have no objection to sending a few officers to Hungary temporarily but he would of course have to consult his Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that it might be well in replying to Sir George Clerk to warn him to be on his guard against a restoration of the Hapsburgs under any guise.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that this might be unnecessary inasmuch as Sir George Clerk had indicated that Friedrich's departure was imminent.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that his retirement in many ways resembled that of M. Bratiano. Although nominally retiring he would still be remaining in power. He thought it would be well to include a general phrase of the tenor above suggested by him.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

It was decided:

- (1) that Sir Eyre Crowe should prepare, for submission to the Council at its next meeting, a telegram to Sir George Clerk in answer to the telegram, dated November 9th, received from him, and taking into account the telegram received from the Inter-Allied Military Mission dated November 10th;
- (2) that the Heads of Delegations should examine the question of sending a total of about 20 Allied officers to Hungary.

4.

*Expenses of transportation of the Inter-Allied troops of occupation, and of maintenance of said troops and of Commissions, for Plebiscite Areas*

[Not printed]<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> After discussion the Supreme Council referred to the Drafting Committee, for examination and report, a note from General Weygand dated November 11, 1919 (appendix G in original) relative to the expenses of transporting the inter-allied troops of occupation for the plebiscite areas; it was further decided 'that at the same time the Drafting Committee, after receiving from Marshal Foch an estimate of the expenses of maintenance of the Inter-Allied troops and Commissions in the plebiscite areas, should determine by whom such expenses should be borne in case the local revenues were not in all cases sufficient.'

5. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that a telegram had been received from Sofia saying that the Bulgarians were prepared to sign the Treaty without any conditions whatever. M. Stambouliski<sup>8</sup> was anxious to be present at the signature of the Treaty, but as he was just leaving Sofia he would not reach Paris for several days. He, (M. Berthelot) thought there would be no harm in awaiting M. Stambouliski's arrival before proceeding to the signature of the Treaty, all the more so as there were several details still to be settled. For instance the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government which had to sign the Austrian Treaty before signing the Bulgarian Treaty, was prepared to sign the former when the question of the distribution of tonnage had been adjusted. The Council had also decided that certain clauses were to be inserted in the Bulgarian Treaty relative to the neutrality of Switzerland.<sup>9</sup>

(It was agreed that there was no objection to awaiting the arrival of M. Stambouliski before proceeding to the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty.)

6. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that according to a telegram from Prague the Czecho-Slovak troops had already been ordered to evacuate the mining district of Salgo Tarjan without awaiting a prior reimbursement of the Czecho-Slovak Government for expenses incurred by it on behalf of Hungary. M. Benes had desired to remain in occupation of two points in the neutral zone by way of guarantee, but if the Council did not agree with him he was not prepared to insist.

7. GENERAL WEYGAND reminded the Council that at its meeting of November 4th it had approved the communication sent by Marshal Foch to the German Government relative to the interruption of railroad traffic in the occupied regions of Germany.<sup>10</sup> The German Government had complied with the terms of this communication. Therefore, the day before Marshal Foch had consented to allow certain reductions in railroad traffic in the occupied territories. The matter was at that time settled satisfactorily to both sides.

8. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that a telegram from Belgrade had announced that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government was ready to sign the Austrian Treaty as soon as the distribution of Austrian commercial tonnage had been adjusted.

M. DE MARTINO stated that he had been informed the previous day that his Government and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government had reached a complete agreement on this point.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 12, 1919.*

<sup>8</sup> Bulgarian Prime Minister in succession to M. Theodorov.

<sup>9</sup> See No. 18, note 4.

<sup>10</sup> See No. 13, note 1.

## APPENDIX A TO NO. 20

### *Note to Mr. Venizelos relative to Report of the Smyrna Commission of Inquiry*

Mr. President:

The Supreme Council has received the letter which you were good enough to send it on the subject of the Smyrna Commission of Inquiry. It has also taken note of the report of that Commission, and has examined their conclusions.<sup>11</sup>

During your hearing by the Supreme Council on Nov. 8th, you made certain reservations respecting the conditions imposed by that Commission on the Greek representative, Colonel Mazarakis. These conditions appear to have prevented him from questioning the Turkish witnesses, and even from reading and examining their depositions. As you already know, the Supreme Council had not been notified beforehand of the procedure contemplated by that Commission, and at the time when it decided to comply with your request relative to the communication of the testimony to the Greek Commissioner, the work of the Commission was already so advanced that it was no longer possible to give effect to the Council's instructions.

While thus admitting the reasonableness of the reservations which you thought fit to express, the Supreme Council does not think that the results of the Inquiry can be regarded as wholly vitiated, in so far as the excesses and acts of violence committed by the Greek troops are concerned. The Council has paid its tribute to the impartiality of the Members of the Commission, and to the scrupulous conscientiousness with which their work was performed.

The Council agrees that the incidents, which took place after the debarkation of the Greek troops at Smyrna, appear to indicate an almost total absence of the precautionary measures on the part of the Greek civil and military authorities, which the circumstances required; this omission was the principal cause of the unfortunate incidents reported by the Commission.

It is of opinion that, on the whole, the responsibility for the excesses committed and for measures the severity of which was not justified by the actual circumstances, rests upon the Greek military authorities. You yourself, moreover, with the loftiness and sincerity of your character, have recognized these faults and these abuses, and have ordered the punishment of the guilty.

The Supreme Council invites your most serious attention to these grave mistakes and trusts that the experience acquired by the Greek administration will enable it to avoid repeating them in the future. It takes note of your declarations respecting the order now prevailing in the city and in its neighbourhood. It hopes that the dangerous irritation which at present appears not to have entirely ceased along the limits of the zone of Greek occupation will gradually be diminished by the wisdom and justice of the Greek administration, and through the work of delimitation recently completed by General Milne, Commander of the Allied Forces in Macedonia.

Respecting the region of Aidin, the Powers have decided that in view of the practical difficulties and of the political drawbacks which the organization of an Inter-Allied occupation might entail, they prefer to maintain the situation as it actually exists and the Greek occupation.

From another standpoint the Council wishes to obtain from you information as to the circumstances under which, in violation of the decisions of General Milne,

<sup>11</sup> See No. 17, minute 2 and No. 18, minute 4.

the Greek troops are said to have crossed at Soma, under orders from the Greek Government, the line of demarkation fixed by the Inter-Allied High Command.

Lastly, the Supreme Council reminds you that the *de facto* occupation by the Greek troops of Smyrna and of the neighbouring district was only decided upon because of existing circumstances, and creates no new right for the future. This is merely a provisional measure which leaves entire liberty to the Peace Conference to settle the various problems presented by the Eastern Question upon consideration of the general position of the world and of the wishes and interests of the populations concerned.

#### APPENDIX B TO NO. 20

##### *Telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople*

CONSTANTINOPLE, November 3, 1919.

The Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople have the honour to inform their respective Governments that the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna is attempting, more and more, to replace the authority of the Delegates of the High Commissioners and of the Turkish Government by taking complete charge of all matters.

The Allied organizations controlling the press censorship, the port and the industries are interfered with to a great extent. The local police and courts are unable to function, as the Greek authorities refer not only the cases resulting from acts which would come regularly under military justice, but also all crimes or misdemeanours and even cases coming under the sole competence of civil courts, to the Greek Court Martial.

On several occasions the Allied High Commissioners have called these facts to the attention of the Greek Minister at Constantinople, but without result. They request that the Supreme Council take any steps which it may judge opportune to provoke a change in Mr. Sterghiadis' attitude, in order that the Interallied Organizations may perform the role which is assigned to them, and that the Ottoman Government functionaries may exercise their authority in accordance with the conditions covering the Greek military occupation.

#### APPENDIX C TO NO. 20

GREEK DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONGRESS

PARIS, Nov. 4, 1919.

From: Venizelos,

To: President Clemenceau.

I have the honour to call to the attention of the Supreme Council of the Conference the situation created in Smyrna on account of the method employed by the Delegates of the Allied and Associated Powers concerning preventative censorship of the local press.

They have been particularly severe in treating all publications favourable to Greek occupation. Recently, they suppressed an article, in *La Liberté* in which Mr. Sartiaux, a French Engineer, maintained that French and Greek interests in

Asia Minor, far from conflicting, were in perfect accord, and another in which the Greek High Commissioner was praised for his action in insuring the public lighting system, which was totally compromised by municipal negligence.

On the other hand, they show a growing sympathy toward the so-called Turk nationalists, by allowing the publication of articles tending to excite the Mussulman populations to revolt against the Greek authorities. In this way they give the impression to the agitators that their actions are tolerated and even encouraged by the Powers.

An incident which occurred last week in Smyrna furnished undeniable proof of this attitude.

The Turkish journal, the *Sark*, was allowed to publish a signed article, which was extremely violent in injuring Greece. This article stated, notably, that the Greeks and, in general, those who have fought against Turkey, are, 'poisonous insects, sucking the blood of the Turks for a century and a half'. This publication produced a profound impression in Mussulman circles, who interpreted, as is natural, the toleration of the Inter-Allied censorship as an indication both of disfavour toward the Greek and sympathy toward the young-Turk revolution.

Greek authority immediately instituted proceedings against the author of the article, proprietor of the journal,—a Turk of Bulgarian origin, formerly secretary of the Bulgarian Consulate at Smyrna,—and the responsible editor, before a court-martial which sentenced the first two to one year imprisonment and a fine of 2,000 drachmas, and the third to six months imprisonment and a fine of 3,000 drachmas. The latter, having a good record, was put on probation and accorded immediate liberty. The French and Italian Delegates, at first alone, then accompanied by their English colleague, immediately protested to the Greek High Commissioner, stating that they could not agree to the actions taken against the publications authorized by the Inter-Allied censorship. The High Commissioner replied, with reason, that the Greek army assumes a triple responsibility in Smyrna, that of its own security, and th[at of]<sup>12</sup> maintenance of public order, and finally the common interest of all the Allies, which is to see the vanquished enemy kept powerless to prejudice the Allied victories and resist the future decisions of the Conference as long as the armistice lasts. Conscious of these responsibilities, he fully approved the decision of the court-martial, as it was his strict duty to neglect nothing to prevent, in the zone of Greek occupation, an uprising of the Mussulman population. Mr. Sterghiadis further remarked that, from a juridical point of view, the visa of the censorship has no competence to suppress the publications of unlawful character, nor to prevent the proceedings to which such publications might give rise and which can, strictly speaking, include, in cases of extreme fault or fraud, the censors themselves.

He did not fail to add that these censors assumed a heavy responsibility by showing such great severity toward everything favourable to Greek interest and so much indulgence toward everything which encouraged revolutionary actions on the part of the Turks. As to himself, if it were possible for him to be disinterested in the suppression of publications helpful or in praise of Greek occupation, it would be impossible for him to recognize that the Inter-Allied censorship has the right to protect the liberty of the Turkish press to the detriment of the security of the Greek army and of the maintenance of order.

I have hastened to give my full approval to this statement and to prescribe the proper measures for a checking of the dangers created by this state of affairs.

<sup>12</sup> The text here is uncertain.

The occupation of Smyrna should have, naturally, caused the censorship of the press to be confided to Greek military authority. Desirous, however, of not wounding the susceptibility of the Allies, the Greek Government has tolerated the Inter-Allied censorship—and it is inclined to continue to do so—but in order to parry the serious incidents which have just been indicated, the Greek Government has decided to have a parallel and independent censorship exercised by the Greek military authorities. Thus, in the future, if the Inter-Allied censorship continues to prevent all publications which appear reprehensible to it, the Greek censorship can, in its turn, prevent all publications contrary to Greek interests. This procedure can be a particular advantage, and is authorized by the Salonika precedent, by which, during the war, the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern armies reserved the right to exercise, parallelly with the Greek censorship, and [an] Inter-Allied censorship, although the occupied country was Greek, and therefore Allied. This system would have still greater justification in Smyrna, as the army of occupation is in enemy country, and has more to fear for its security.

In bringing the preceding to the attention of Your Excellency, I seize the opportunity to point out that certain agents of the Powers disregard the intentions of their Governments, and continue to manifest, in a most unpleasant fashion, the ill humour which they feel in seeing Smyrna occupied by Greek forces. Considering the responsibilities which it has assumed by virtue of the mandate vested in it in Asia Minor, the Greek Government is unable—despite the deference which it is disposed to show toward the Delegates of the Allied Powers—to allow the security of its army to be imperiled, or the maintenance of public order confided to its trust to be compromised.

I am persuaded that by these actions, the Greek Government complies with the real intentions of the Allied Powers, which for these reasons, should instruct their agents at Smyrna to consider the situation with the objectivity necessary in order to avoid the regrettable complications which the enemies of the Entente alone are able to take advantage of.

Please agree, etc.<sup>13</sup>

VENIZELOS.

## APPENDIX D TO NO. 20

### *Verbal Note*

The Roumanian Government thanks the Supreme Council for the expressions of friendship and confidence which have been expressed and which are in accord with the firm desires of Roumania to maintain and develop her alliance and close collaboration.

The Roumanian Government leaves nothing undone to accord the interests of Roumania with those of the Representatives of the Conference in every instance.

To that end, anxious to avoid any delays which, under the present circumstances in Hungary, might aggravate the situation, it hastens to reply to the proposals of the Conference regarding the institution and operation of Inter-Allied Commissions at Budapest. The Roumanian Government thinks it opportune to not postpone [*sic*] their operation until the solution of the other two points presented in the last

<sup>13</sup> Intended as a translation of *Veuillez agréer, etc.*

note from the Supreme Council concerning the Roumano-Hungarian frontiers and the Peace Treaty with Austria,<sup>4</sup> relative to which the Roumanian Government begs to again call the attention of the Peace Conference by exposing the Roumanian point of view which it will have the honour to forward later.

The Roumanian Government is also happy to see that the Supreme Council, after having received and examined the Roumanian point of view as presented by Mr. Bratiano, affirm that there is not any noticeable difference of opinion on the general principle, in conformity with which the question of the requisitions made by the Roumanian army in Hungary is to be resolved.

As to the application of these principles, Roumania gladly accepts the proposal of the Supreme Council to have an Inter-Allied Commission instituted at Budapest, and is ready to designate a Roumanian representative to that Commission.

It further accepts—although not recognizing the necessity—that Inter-Allied organizations be established at Szolnok and Csongrad without delay for the control and verification of the car clearance of the trains crossing these bridges en route to Roumania. However, it would be opportune to accord other duties to these Commissions and in particular give them full authority to enforce the unloading of merchandise.

Concerning the abusive application of the general instructions relative to requisitions, the Roumanian Government regrets to note that the Supreme Council considered them of an importance and nature which correspond neither with the spirit of the order or the discipline of the Roumanian army.

The isolated cases which have been indicated to the Roumanian Government shall be investigated and any abuses confirmed shall be repaired and punished. However, to give the Sub-Commission on Reparations authority to receive complaints concerning abusive requisitions would be submitting the Roumanian military authorities to an International treatment to which none of the other Allied armies of occupation have been subjected. Under similar circumstances, it is well known that the Serbian army refused to admit the application of analogous measures in the Banat, at the time the French command made a proposal to that effect, and the representatives of the Conference did not insist on compliance by the Government at Belgrade, despite numerous complaints from those affected.

The Roumanian Government fully shares the point of view of the Supreme Council with regard to the nature of the Hungarian Government and the conditions it must comply with. Having already turned over the rifles and ammunition destined for the police and Hungarian gendarmerie, the Roumanian forces have received orders to evacuate Hungary as far as the Theiss. They have postponed this evacuation up to the present time only at the request of the Allied representatives. They will also leave the territories between the Theiss and the new frontiers as soon as the Hungarian Government is in a position to furnish the necessary guarantees for the security of these territories.

According to the agreement established between the Roumanian High Command and the Representative of the Conference at Budapest, the retreat of the Roumanian troops will commence on November 10, with a margin of 3 days more or less, according to necessity.

The Roumanian Government is now preoccupied entirely with the work of reconstructing the Roumanian countries drained and impoverished by the countless extortions effected by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies during their occupation.

*November 2, 1919.*

GENERAL VAITOIANU.

*Telegram from Sir George Clerk, Budapest, to the Supreme Council, November 9th, 1919*<sup>14</sup>

No. 6.

With reference to telegrams Nos. 3 and 4.<sup>15</sup>

I venture to express my sincere opinion that decisions of Supreme Council in regard to evacuation by Roumanians, Czechs and Serbians and to action to be taken at Prague on question of coal will greatly help situation here. Atmosphere generally is much better than it was a fortnight ago and much uneasiness and mistrust has been dissipated. Most significant sign is that Admiral Horthy and leaders of extreme left met in my house two days ago and Admiral Horthy's declaration of impartiality and discipline of his army was fully accepted. There will always be a certain risk of incidents when Roumanians evacuate Budapest and Hungarians take over control but I had made up my mind as soon as I came here that such risk must be taken as nothing can really be done until Roumanians have left and I feel today danger is immeasurably less. Inter-Allied Mission of Generals, Admiral Troubridge and I have complete confidence in Admiral Horthy's loyalty and sincerity and there is every reason to believe his hold over army is really effective.

Question of police and gendarmerie is somewhat different. I had already discussed matter with Inter-Allied Mission and I feel that their authority over police and gendarmerie is a guarantee against latter abusing their power. It is scarcely possible for Allies to send troops or even police in sufficient numbers and my considered opinion is that we must trust to our influence over Hungarian troops, gendarmerie and police.

Inter-Allied Mission of Generals agree but we would suggest immediate despatch of 20 Allied officers, rank of major and captain, to be attached to various armies and police units would be valuable safeguard and assistance.

Political situation is developing satisfactorily though there are still many obstacles to be overcome before complete solution can be reached. It must be realised that great bulk of opinion, mostly ignorant, in country stands behind Friedrich. Pendulum has swung violently from left to right but is now beginning to come slowly towards centre. But allowance must be made for present state of populace and to some extent to natural prejudice, and changes of Government must be effected with as little disturbance of populace as possible.

All responsible politicians, even these in Friedrich's cabinet, now realize that coalition government must come and idea is becoming familiar to masses. Difficulties now are mainly reconciliation of personal interests and private political ambitions. I am not without hope of overcoming these difficulties, only patience is required.

General sentiment of political leaders in country today so clearly recognises lines on which solution must be found and general atmosphere is so much better than it was a fortnight ago that I am fairly confident that law and order will be maintained. Impartiality of my mission is I think universally recognised as well as desire of Allies to help Hungary and confidence felt in mission of Generals and Admiral Troubridge is a moral factor of immense value.

It may take a little time to get satisfactory solution and Friedrich may resign and talk big but I am now much less anxious about internal peace and quiet here

<sup>14</sup> This telegram is printed by F. Deák, op. cit., pp. 528-9.

<sup>15</sup> See No. 15, appendices A and B respectively.

and Hungarian forces being used for reaction and oppression. While we are all here Hungarians will behave soberly.

Mission of Generals and Admiral Troubridge agree with terms of this telegram.

## APPENDIX F TO NO. 20

No. 831.

BUDAPEST, November 10, 1919.

From: Inter-Allied Military Mission,

To: Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, Paris.

The Roumanian Command today submitted a plan for the evacuation of Hungary as far as the Theiss river. The evacuation will commence on November 13th and will last 10 days. The Roumanian representative was requested to give details concerning the continuation of the retreat to the frontier, but replied that orders covering the evacuation beyond the Theiss had not yet been received from Bucarest. The Roumanian plan implies the removal of all temporary bridges on the Theiss. The Mission will demand that these bridges and also the pontoon bridges be preserved until the retreat toward the frontier be completed. At the request of the Roumanians, the Allied guards will take over the Danube bridges and those which unite Bude to Pest on the morning of the 14th, until such time as the Roumanians will have evacuated the city. An Inter-Allied Commission has been designated to supervise the Hungarian Government in its disposition of the war prisoners detained by the Roumanians. The Mission recommends that all war prisoners be released by the Roumanians and given a chance to choose between Hungarian and Roumanian nationality without any conditions as to their former residence.

INTER-ALLIED MILITARY MISSION.

*Budapest.*

## No. 21

H. D. 91.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 13, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A. Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*British Empire:* General Sackville-West, General Groves, Lt.-Colonel Kisch, Commander Lucas, Mr. L. [A.] Leeper, Mr. Palairat.

*France:* Colonel Roye, Captain Roper, M. Laroche.

*Italy:* Lt.-Colonel Piccio, M. Vannutelli-Rey.

*Japan:* M. Shigemitsu.

M. PICHON stated that M. Clemenceau had asked him to apologize for being unable to be present at the opening of the meeting. He proposed to start with the second item on the agenda, viz.: the draft telegram to Sir George Clerk.

1. (The Council had before it a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk prepared by Sir Eyre Crowe (see Appendix A).)

*Draft Telegram to Sir George Clerk* SIR EYRE CROWE called the attention of the Council to the last paragraph of the draft telegram. He had thought it necessary to call the attention of the Hungarian Government very specially to the necessity of its troops evacuating the Comitadjes of Western Hungary, which had been given to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

It was decided:

to approve the draft telegram to Sir George Clerk (see Appendix A).

2. (The Council had before it a note from the Drafting Committee dated November 3rd (see Appendix B) and a note from the British Delegation dated November 11th (see Appendix C).)

*Instructions to the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany* SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the Supreme Council at its meeting of November 1st had decided to obtain the advice of the Drafting Committee on the draft note prepared by the Aeronautical Representatives in answer to a communication of the German Government dated October 12th. The Drafting Committee, having alluded to the fact that the question was already covered by a paragraph of the protocol to be signed by the German Plenipotentiaries, had concluded that it was useless to send that note.<sup>1</sup> Since then, the question had again been discussed by the Aeronautical experts and the Drafting Committee. They had come to the conclusion that the protocol did not cover all the violations which the Germans had committed under that heading. Under these conditions it appeared advisable to reply to the German note of October 12th, and he thought that it would be necessary to put the question once more before the Drafting Committee.

M. DE MARTINO agreed that Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal was very opportune. It was a most important point which they should not leave in the air, and he insisted that the proposal of the British representative be taken into consideration.

CAPTAIN ROPER said it was indeed extremely advisable that the views of the Supreme Council on that point should be made clear. There were, however, two ways of proceeding: they could either reply directly to the German Armistice Commission, or confine themselves to sending instructions to

<sup>1</sup> See No. 10, minute 4, and No. 11, minute 5.

General Masterman. The draft instructions could be sent immediately, but the Drafting Committee was of the opinion that it would be advisable to await the coming into force of the Treaty before answering the Germans.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Drafting Committee might prepare at the same time draft instructions for General Masterman and a reply to the German Armistice Commission, which would be sent at a later date.

MR. POLK wished to ask to what extent the Germans could dispose of their aeronautical material, balloons, Zeppelins, etc.

GENERAL GROVES stated that the Germans could not dispose of anything which might be considered military or naval aeronautical material.

MR. POLK inquired who was the court of appeal on the military or naval character of that material.

GENERAL GROVES answered that it was the Aeronautical Commission of Control.

It was decided:

to entrust the Drafting Committee to prepare in agreement with the technical experts:

- (1) draft instructions for General Masterman;
- (2) a reply to the German note of October 12th, concerning German aeronautical material. (See Appendices B and C.)

3. (The Council had before it a draft letter to the German Delegation regarding elections in Upper Silesia (see Appendix D).)

*Municipal Elections in  
Upper Silesia*

MR. POLK said that the elections which had just taken place in Upper Silesia were partly favourable to the Poles.

Would it not be inadvisable, under these circumstances, to oblige the Plebiscite Commission to hold these elections in all cases null and void?

M. LAROCHE said he had asked himself the same question. The Polish Press considered those elections a great success for the Polish cause. The German papers, however, brought out the fact that the Poles had not obtained half the votes recorded. From a legal point of view it seemed difficult to annul the elections only in part; he thought it better to stick to the principle of declaring all elections void. The Plebiscite Commission might take on the spot all necessary administrative measures to maintain, in extraordinary cases, the election in certain municipalities.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that Mr. Polk's observation might be satisfied by changing the last paragraph. They might use, instead of saying, 'That the Powers will consider as null and void', the words, 'That they will hold themselves entitled to consider null and void, etc.' On the other hand, the Powers wished this note to put an end to the exchange of correspondence with the Germans on that question. He, therefore, thought it more advisable to omit the paragraph beginning with the words, 'in this connection the observations, etc.'<sup>2</sup> as a matter of fact that paragraph contained allegations of fact which

<sup>2</sup> The paragraph in appendix D beginning: 'In this respect the statements etc.' It is evident from Sir E. Crowe's quotations that the text before him was not verbally identical with that in appendix D.

the Germans would be tempted to answer. If this omission were approved, the fifth paragraph beginning with the words, 'It is, however, a matter of surprise, etc.' might well be placed at the end of paragraph 2 which began with the words, 'if the Versailles Treaty, etc.'

It was decided:

to approve the draft letter to the German Delegation concerning municipal elections in Upper Silesia, with the following changes:

- (1) omission of paragraph 4, beginning with the words, 'In this connection, etc.';
- (2) paragraph 5, beginning with the words, 'It is, however, a matter of surprise, etc.' should be placed at the end of paragraph 2, which begins with the words; 'If the Versailles Treaty, etc.'
- (3) in the last paragraph replace the words, 'that they will consider as null and void' by the words, 'that they will hold themselves entitled to consider null and void, etc.' (see Appendix D).

4.

[Not printed]

*Allowances to General  
Officers attached to  
Military Missions of  
Control who are not  
Chairmen either of  
Commissions or sub-  
commissions*

5. (The Council had before it a draft note to the Roumanian Government prepared by M. Berthelot (see Appendix F).)

*Draft note to the  
Roumanian Government*

M. BERTHELOT read the draft note.

M. CLEMENCEAU<sup>3</sup> wished to inform the Council that he had been asked to receive General Coanda and M. Antonescu; he would receive them that afternoon, and he intended to confine himself to advising them to accept without further delay all the demands which were formulated by the Conference.

MR. POLK asked whether, in making reference in the second last paragraph of the letter to: 'arrangements to be concluded with Hungary, Bulgaria and Russia'<sup>4</sup> they did not seem to commit themselves to giving Bessarabia to Roumania, in the event of the latter country complying with the Council's demands.

M. BERTHELOT did not think so; the question certainly had been discussed by a Commission which had come to the unanimous decision to give the whole of Bessarabia to Roumania, but the Council had not taken any decision to that effect, and its liberty of action remained unimpaired.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated they would wait before taking a final resolution until all the delegates had received their instructions.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated he had already received his.

<sup>3</sup> M. Clemenceau had entered the meeting during the discussion of the previous item.

<sup>4</sup> The phrase is not present in the text of the file copy of appendix F as printed below.

MR. POLK thought that the instructions he already had gave him sufficient authority to accept the draft under discussion. He would, however, let the Council know his decision at the next meeting.

M. DE MARTINO said that, as far as he was concerned, he expected to receive his instructions that very evening. He felt the greatest confidence in the outcome of the interview which M. Clemenceau would have that afternoon with General Coanda and M. Antonescu. He expressed the hope that M. Clemenceau would speak to them with the firmness which he so well knew how to employ, and felt certain that he would obtain the results the Council desired. General Coanda was very intimate with M. Bratiano and capable of having a good influence upon him. He wondered whether it was wise to discuss, as they were doing in the draft before them, the behaviour of Roumania during the war. They were running the risk of starting a polemic, for Roumania would certainly be sure to answer that she had herself been abandoned by Russia.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that they also had been abandoned by Russia, which had not prevented their carrying on the war to an end. Three months before the Bucharest Peace<sup>5</sup> he had warned M. Bratiano that he was committing his country to a disastrous policy. M. Bratiano had protested that he would never conclude a separate peace, a protest which had not prevented his doing so.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether a period of six days was not a little short.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied he thought there was point in giving the Roumanians a rather short period; they would thus bring them to ask for a prolongation which the Council would grant. But the very fact of their having asked for a prolongation would, as a matter of fact, commit the Roumanians to an answer.

M. DE MARTINO thought it would be necessary to impose upon the Roumanians a definite time for the evacuation of the Hungarian territory to the east of the Theiss.

M. CLEMENCEAU wished to know whether the Council would give him authority to acquaint unofficially the Roumanian delegates he was to see that afternoon with the draft under discussion.

MR. POLK said he would very willingly give this authority, especially as this document seemed to him remarkably well drafted.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what their attitude would be should the Roumanian delegates, after having been unofficially acquainted with the draft note, ask for a postponement of the official communication of the note.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they should in any case send the note as soon as it had been definitely approved.

It was decided:

to authorize M. Clemenceau to communicate unofficially to the Roumanian delegates the substance of the draft note to the Roumanian Government (see Appendix F).

<sup>5</sup> The reference was to the Treaty of Bucharest concluded on May 7, 1918, between Roumania and the Central Powers.

6. MR. POLK wished to ask, as a matter of information, whether the situation had been modified since the Luxemburg question had been discussed in the Council.<sup>6</sup> He had been informed that the British Government had recognized the Government of the Grand Duchess.

*Recognition of the Grand-Ducal Government of Luxemburg*

M. CLEMENCEAU had not heard that there had been any such recognition on the part of the British Government. Great Britain had only sent a representative to the wedding of the Grand Duchess. He would, however, be glad if Sir Eyre Crowe would acquaint himself with the exact situation. The situation as between France and Luxemburg was as follows: the majority of the Luxemburgers was favourable to a 'rapprochement' with France, but the French did not wish to commit themselves to a policy which might involve them in difficulties with Belgium. As for the present Government of Luxemburg, the Grand Duchess was German by birth, and he believed, by sympathy. She was, however, obliged at this time to appear very francophile. There were no present difficulties between France and Belgium on the general question. The only question in dispute was a certain railroad administered by the Alsace-Lorraine Railroads, which Bismarck had taken away from France in 1871. The Belgians were claiming this railroad, which the French could not give them. That was a very small difficulty, which furthermore, was on the point of being settled. It was essential that the Principal Powers should act in accord concerning the recognition of the present Luxemburg Government.

M. BERTHELOT said the Belgians had asked the French whether they intended to recognize the Grand Ducal Government. They had answered it was for the Belgians first to take a decision on that point. The Belgians had then said they preferred to abstain provisionally from recognizing the Government of the Grand Duchess, and the French had based their attitude upon the Belgian. The sending of a representative by the British Government to the wedding of the Grand Duchess had been a mere act of courtesy. Nevertheless from information they had received, it would appear that there had been at the same time recognition of the Luxemburg Government by Great Britain.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he would get information on the subject<sup>7</sup> and communicate it to the Council. (The question was then adjourned.)

<sup>6</sup> See No. 15, minute 11.

<sup>7</sup> Sir G. Grahame, Minister in H.M. Embassy at Paris, had reported in telegram No. 1154 of November 5, 1919, to Lord Curzon: 'I have notified [French] Ministry for Foreign Affairs of decision of His Majesty's Government to recognise Grand Duchess of Luxemburg. Ministry for Foreign Affairs expressed astonishment at action of His Majesty's Government, it having been understood that the two countries would act together in regard to such recognition. Belgian Government had told French Government that they were not recognising Her Royal Highness and French Government replied that [they] were not doing so either.' The matter was investigated at the Foreign Office and on November 14, 1919, the following telegram, No. 1257, was sent by Lord Curzon to Sir G. Grahame: 'Please express to French Government sincere regret of His Majesty's Government that in according recognition to Luxemburg Government previous assurance that no such action would be taken without consultation with the French Government was unfortunately overlooked by

7. MR. POLK wished to say a few words to the Council on the question of German oil tank ships. On September 27th, the Supreme Council by a vote to which he was a party, had decided to ask the Germans to deliver the 14 German oil tank ships which were lying at Hamburg.<sup>8</sup> Since that date he had several times discussed the question with Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr. Henry Berenger. There was a good deal of feeling in America on that question: for that reason he earnestly wished that, pending the outcome of negotiations, the ships under discussion should stay where they were. He thought his proposal would not raise any difficulties, as he hoped to arrive at a solution within three or four days.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what were his objections to these ships being taken to an Allied port.

MR. POLK said that certain declarations Mr. Hoover had made had given the impression in America that the fate of these ships was already settled. Out of that arose the question which was the object of the negotiations then in progress.<sup>9</sup>

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that in the protocol submitted for the German signature<sup>10</sup> the Council had confirmed the decision of September 27th by asking the delivery of all these ships, without specifying them by name. It did not seem possible to ask the Germans now to keep these ships; that would be to publish a difference of views between the Allies. It was to be hoped, however, that the Germans had not yet delivered the ships in question. If by chance they had already done so it would be sufficient to instruct the Naval Armistice Commission to retain these ships without doing anything with them for the moment. He hoped Mr. Polk would not see any objection to this procedure.

MR. POLK said that the record of the meeting of September 27th showed that those ships were to be delivered to the Allies, but did not specify under what conditions the temporary operation of these ships should be regulated. He feared that if these ships were to be delivered by the Germans in the Firth of Forth a wrong interpretation of this measure would spread in America.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that the discussion be adjourned to the following day.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 13, 1919.*

us. Question was raised suddenly by enquiry of Belgian Government whether the King would be represented at wedding of Grand Duchess, when it was erroneously assumed that this involved prior recognition of Belgian Government. It is too late to recede but His Majesty's Government are sincerely vexed at having given even momentary ground for the impression which had no foundation in fact, that they desired in the smallest degree to go behind backs of French and Belgian Governments. Repeated to The Hague No. 1496, Brussels No. 208.' H.M. Ambassador at Brussels was authorized to speak to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a similar sense.

<sup>8</sup> See Vol. I, No. 66, minute 1.

<sup>9</sup> See No. 22, minute 2.

<sup>10</sup> See No. 10, appendix C.

APPENDIX A TO NO. 21

*Telegram from the Supreme Council to Sir George Clerk*

PARIS, November 12, 1919.

The Supreme Council have this morning considered your telegram No. 6 of November 9th.<sup>11</sup> They desire to express their satisfaction at the success with which your efforts to unite different parties in a temporary coalition government are meeting. The Supreme Council are gratified to learn that in your opinion Admiral Horthy's assurances that the troops under his command will submit themselves to the wishes of the Peace Conference may be regarded as inspiring confidence. You will no doubt continue to bear in mind and to impress on all parties concerned that whatever political arrangements are now arrived at, they must afford no opportunity for aiding or favouring the return, whether by overt or covert methods, of the Hapsburg dynasty, an event which the Allied and Associated Powers would regard as a disaster and would in no case permit.

You will by this time have received the communications of the Supreme Council to the Roumanian, Czecho-Slovak and Serb-Croat-Slovene Governments, dated November 7th calling on them to evacuate such parts of Hungary as are at present occupied by their forces.<sup>12</sup> Satisfactory assurances have already been received from the Czecho-Slovak Government.<sup>13</sup> In a note from the Roumanian Government received yesterday,<sup>14</sup> an undertaking is given of immediate evacuation of Hungary, but only as far as the Theiss. The Supreme Council have already, as you know, informed the Roumanian Government that they are required to evacuate the whole of Hungary at present occupied by them. The Roumanian note is unsatisfactory in every respect and the Supreme Council are now considering what attitude they should adopt to make their authority respected. As soon as a decision is reached, you shall be duly informed.

The Supreme Council have also considered your proposal that the Allies should despatch twenty officers with the rank of major and captain for the Hungarian gendarmerie. They are favourably disposed to this proposal, but a reference to the several Governments is necessary before it can be definitely approved. The expenditure involved would no doubt be borne on the budget of the gendarmerie and be at the charge of the Hungarian Government.

The<sup>15</sup> Supreme Council continue to receive from Vienna complaints that the troops of General [*sic*] Horthy refuse to evacuate the districts of Western Hungary assigned to the Austrian Republic by the treaty of St. Germain. They ask you to call the attention of the Hungarian military authorities to the necessity of agreeing to the territorial frontiers fixed by the Peace Conference as a preliminary to any measures of recognition or support.

<sup>11</sup> See No. 20, minute 3 and appendix E.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. No. 15, minute 1.

<sup>13</sup> See No. 20, minute 6.

<sup>14</sup> See No. 20, appendix D.

<sup>15</sup> Note in original: 'Note by the British Delegation. This paragraph has been added as it seems opportune to settle this question at the same time as the evacuation of the Hungarian territory.'

APPENDIX B TO NO. 21

*Note for the General Secretariat*

In view of the clauses of the Protocol addressed to Germany, it did not appear, in accord with the Inter-Allied High Command, opportune to reply to the German Note of October 12, relative to aeronautical material, at the present time.<sup>1</sup>

In case, however, that the Inter-Allied Aviation Service would deem it necessary to not leave the said German note without response, it would be advisable to wait until the entry into force of the Treaty, as the stipulations of the Treaty could be more forcefully supported by the Aeronautic Control Mission which at that time will be definitely qualified to act officially.

For the Drafting Committee.  
HENRI FROMAGEOT.

*November 3, 1919.*

APPENDIX C TO NO. 21

*11 November, 1919.*

My dear Ambassador:

. . . I<sup>16</sup> have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, since this decision was taken, the French and British aeronautical experts and the French and British Legal Advisers have again discussed the question and have arrived at the conclusion that the paragraph in the Protocol referred to above does not adequately deal with all the offences committed by the Germans in connection with this matter and that notably the following resolutions passed by the Supreme Council are not covered by the paragraph:

'That the German Government shall be informed that the Allies are aware that service types of aircraft are being converted to commercial use, and that the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control shall be the sole judge as to whether any aircraft is of a service type or otherwise.

That the German Government shall be informed that the 500 engines sold to private companies shall be delivered to the Allies at once at a place to be specified, and all other material of this description shall forthwith be handed over to the Inter-Allied Commission of Control. (August 6th).

Most particularly, Germany may neither sell, give away or export any aeronautical material (aircraft, motors, spare parts) including motors captured from the Allies, or converted aircraft known as civil aircraft, which are in fact war material. (August 22nd).

That all aeronautical material existing in Germany shall be considered as war material and may in consequence be neither transported, removed, lent, used nor destroyed, but shall be stored until such time as the Inter-Allied Supervisory Air Commission shall have made a pronouncement with regard thereto. (September 29th).'

The propriety of some of these resolutions is indeed even questioned in the

<sup>16</sup> The first two paragraphs of this note are omitted. They corresponded to Sir E. Crowe's verbal recapitulation to the Supreme Council of the relevant events of November 1, 1919, leading up to the acceptance by the Supreme Council that afternoon of the conclusion of the Drafting Committee that no note regarding this matter should be sent to the German Government: see minute 2 and note 1 above.

German note of October 12th, to which the draft, suppressed by the Council,<sup>17</sup> was intended to be the reply.

It appears most desirable that these resolutions, which have been transmitted to the German Government, should if possible be rigorously enforced, and it would appear that this can be done by the Chairman of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control as soon as ratifications of the Treaty have been deposited and the Commission begins to work.

If this is the case, it would seem advisable that the Supreme Council should address a communication to that effect to the Chairman of the Commission who, if he attempted to enforce the resolutions in present circumstances, would doubtless lay himself open to the retort that the German authorities have received no answer to the communication which they have addressed to the Supreme Council questioning its right to pass these resolutions.

It should further be noted that the German note referred to also raises certain points regarding the interpretation of the Treaty which require decisions of the Council for the guidance of General Masterman, to whom the German Aeronautical authorities have communicated the substance of the note.

I would accordingly venture to suggest that the Legal Advisers should be requested to examine the German note of October 12th in connection with the resolutions above-quoted and to draft a communication to General Masterman on the subject for submission to the Supreme Council.

Believe me, etc.<sup>18</sup>

His Excellency Monsieur P. Dutasta,  
Ambassador, Secretary General of the  
Peace Conference, Paris.

#### APPENDIX D TO NO. 21

##### *Proposed Letter to the German Delegation*

To Baron von Lersner, President of the German Delegation.

In response to the question asked on October 30 last by the Allied and Associated Powers, the German Delegation replied, on November 7, that the municipal elections in Upper Silesia would take place on the 9th instant.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, it explained the motives for which the Prussian Government thought it could disregard the observations of the Allied and Associated Powers.

If the literal meaning of the Treaty of Versailles be strictly adhered to, there can be no question but that the Prussian State has the right, up to the coming into force of the Treaty, to administer the territory of Upper Silesia to be submitted to a plebiscite.

In fact, there is no doubt but that the results of the municipal elections conducted under these circumstances, being the first popular vote since the signing of the Treaty, would be interpreted by the national parties in opposition as an indication of their respective strengths, which indication might be falsified in such a manner as to prejudice the result of the plebiscite. It would therefore seem probable that these elections are to serve as pretext to an agitation destined to influence the future vote relative to the destiny of the country, although the conditions under

<sup>17</sup> For this draft see No. 10, appendix D.

<sup>18</sup> Signature lacking in original of this appendix.

<sup>19</sup> See No. 8, appendix F and No. 18, appendix A.

which the balloting is taking place at the present time are far from resembling those which are to govern the operations of the plebiscite.

In this respect, the statements contained in your letter of November 7 relative to voting facilities to the Poles, and even to refugees, could not even be alluded to. Everybody knows that a large number of Poles had to leave Upper Silesia on account of recent troubles. As to those who remained, the Allied and Associated Powers have good reasons to fear that they are not in the proper condition to express their vote with all the desired freedom.

Moreover, it is surprising that the Prussian Government, in order to proceed to these elections, has awaited the moment when the coming into force of the Treaty, it cannot deny this, is near.

Under these conditions, the Allied and Associated Powers are obliged to inform the German Government that they consider the municipal elections which have been held by Germany in Upper Silesia before the coming into force of the Treaty, and against their motivated advice, null and void. The International Commission will therefore be invited to take the proper measures in this respect immediately upon its going into operation.

Please accept, etc.

#### APPENDIX F TO NO. 21

##### *Draft of a Note to the Roumanian Government*

*November 13, 1919.*

The Supreme Council has fully noted the Roumanian reply dated November 2nd and signed by General Voitoianu.<sup>14</sup> The Council is obliged to affirm that this note is entirely unsatisfactory to the Allied and Associated Powers, and very seriously compromises relations between Roumania and the Allies. The Allies must request the Roumanian Government to make an unconditional answer.

Since the commencement of August, that is, from the time of the Roumanian occupation of Budapest, the Peace Conference has unceasingly requested Roumania to adopt an attitude in Hungary consistent with the principles of the Allies in common, and the engagements by which they are bound.

With indefatigable patience, and animated by the respect of the Allies for one another, and with the hope that the Roumanian Government would finally realize that it cannot with impunity disregard these principles, and escape the reciprocal engagements of the Allies, the Peace Conference has made every effort to maintain the ties which unite the Allies with Roumania and to obtain Roumania's compliance with the decisions of the Supreme Council: on August 4, August 5, August 6, August 7, August 14, August 23, August 25, September 5, October 12, November 3, and November 7 urgent requests were communicated to that end to the Government at Bucarest.<sup>20</sup>

All these patient efforts resulted only in the reply of November 2, appeasing in words, but negative in fact: concerning the three questions asked, acceptance of the frontiers fixed by the Supreme Council; signing of the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty; arrangement of the Hungarian situation; the note disregards the first two and replies only to the third.

Even on the third, none of the demands have been satisfactorily agreed to. The principle of discontinuing requisitions in Hungary is admitted, it is true, and also the institution of an Inter-Allied Commission at Budapest for the application of

<sup>20</sup> See Vol. I *passim*, and, in the present volume, No. 12, minute 3 and No. 15, minute 1.

these principles, but Roumania, in making this latter concession, does not agree that the Commission have authority to unload the merchandise which has accumulated in Hungarian cars on account of being held up for verification at the bridges, at this time, or that the Commission be qualified to receive complaints or to conduct inquiries into the abuses committed by the Roumanian military authorities. The retreat of the Roumanian troops is agreed to only as far as the Theiss, which does not comply with the decision of the Powers which specifies the evacuation of all Hungarian territory and their retreat to beyond the frontiers definitely fixed by them, a decision which was immediately agreed to by the other neighbouring States, Czecho-Slovakia and Serbia.

To sum up, the Roumanian Government has continued for three months and a half to negotiate with the Conference, from Power to Power, and has not taken into account any other rights or interests than her own, and by refusing [*sic*] to accept the responsibilities of solidarity, although wishing to benefit from any advantages resulting therefrom.

The Conference makes a last appeal to the wisdom of the Government and of the Roumanian people before deciding the serious resolution of severing all relations with Roumania. The right of the Conference to be heard is based essentially upon the fact that Roumania owes to the Allied victory the incalculable service of having reconstituted her national unity by doubling her territory and her population. Without the immense sacrifices of the Allies, Roumania would be decimated, ruined and in bondage, and without any possible hope at the present time. Roumania entered the struggle for her own freedom at the end of the second year of the war, and by dictation [*dictating*] her own conditions; it is true she made great sacrifices, and suffered hard trials, but she finally agreed to treat separately with the enemy and to submit to his law at a time when she still had under arms an army of more than 400,000 men; her liberty and her victory, as well as her future, she owes to the Allies.

How can such a situation be lost sight of, and so soon forgotten by Roumanian statesmen?

In any event, the Supreme Council can wait no longer; Roumania is therefore invited to comply, without discussion, reservations or conditions, with the following resolutions:

(1st) to entirely evacuate Hungarian territory by withdrawing to beyond the frontiers definitely fixed by the Conference;

(2nd) to agree to the constitution of an Inter-Allied Commission for deciding, controlling and judging the requisitions made in Hungary from the commencement of Roumanian occupation;

(3rd) to sign the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty.

The Supreme Council will wait six days for an affirmative or a negative reply by the Roumanian Government.

If this reply is not satisfactory to the Supreme Council of the Allies, the Allies have decided to inform Roumania that she has become separated from them. They shall invite Roumania to immediately recall her Delegates to the Peace Conference, and will withdraw their diplomatic missions at Bucarest.

As to the fixing of frontiers still undetermined, the Peace Conference shall cease to sustain the territorial claims of Roumania.

It would be with the deepest regret that the Supreme Council of the Allies would be forced to break with Roumania, but the Council feels that it has been patient to the extreme limit.

H. D. 92.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 14, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Rear-Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Lt.-Commander Koehler, U.S.N., Mr. E. L. Dresel, Mr. W. H. Buckler, Mr. A. W. Dulles.  
*British Empire*: General Hammond, Commander Dunne, Mr. A. Leeper.  
*France*: M. Henry Berenger, M. Laroche, General Le Rond, M. de Montille, M. Arnaroy, M. Aron.  
*Italy*: M. Vannutelli-Rey, Comdt. Ingiani.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU reported his conversation of the previous day with General Coanda and M. Antonescu. They had asked that the period for a reply be extended from six to eight days inasmuch as they declared that they were able to assure him that within that time the Supreme Council would receive a favourable answer, without qualifications, from the Roumanian Government. They had also asked that the sentence dealing with the conclusion of peace, while a Roumanian army of 400,000 men was still in the field, be expunged. His impression was that the Roumanians were really ready at last to give satisfaction on all points. He thought that when so doing they might try to discuss the question of the Minorities Treaty, but he did not think that they would offer serious resistance on this point and that any such discussion would really amount to nothing.

M. DE MARTINO reminded M. Clemenceau that at the previous meeting he had expressed the greatest confidence in the outcome of the interview between M. Clemenceau and General Coanda and M. Antonescu, and he was glad to see that his confidence had in every way been justified.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it was as a result of his association with his Italian colleagues that he had acquired diplomatic skill. He suggested that a decision as to sending the draft note to the Roumanian Government be postponed until all the delegates had received the instructions of their Governments.

. (This suggestion was agreed to.)

2. MR. POLK desired briefly to summarize the present status of the question of oil tank ships. On September 27th, after the matter had been discussed at several prior meetings, the Supreme Council had decided to allocate the tankers in accord with the plan of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive. At that time he had accepted and joined in the decision without being fully aware of the purport of the prior discussions and of the attitude of his Government. The position taken by the United States was that behind this question the ultimate and beneficial ownership of the tankers was a question for the Reparation Commission. The remaining question, which was the troublesome one, was as to the temporary allocation of these tankers. Messrs. Davis and Hoover had thought that this latter question had already been decided in a sense contrary to that of the decision of September 27th, which had temporarily allocated these vessels between Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium. When that decision had been communicated to his Government it had protested against it because it felt that this was contrary to a decision already taken. He now wished to suggest that pending a final decision, which he hoped would very shortly be arrived at, nine of the fourteen tankers in question be allowed to remain where they were so that there would be no change in the situation. He wished to explain the reasons for this suggestion. There was a great deal of feeling in the United States, and if the temporary allocation decided upon by the A.M.T.E. were to be put into effect it would cause his Government great embarrassment. If the decision of September 27th could be rescinded, and the tankers could be held where they then were pending a final decision, the shipping question he thought would become very simple.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked why only nine of the tankers were spoken of. How many were there?

M. BERENGER replied that there were fourteen.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired why Mr. Polk had raised the point with respect to only nine of them.

MR. POLK explained that nine of these tankers were claimed by a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he then understood that no question was raised as to the temporary allocation of the other five tankers.

~~Mr.~~ POLK said that that was the case.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that a formal demand had been made upon the Germans to deliver these tankers. Furthermore, in the protocol drawn up for their signature, the point of the undelivered tankers had been specifically brought up. With respect to the attitude to be taken towards the German Government it seemed to him quite impossible to modify this demand which had already been formally made. The Germans had been playing for time and counting on dissension between the Allied and Associated Powers. If the Germans had not yet delivered these tankers, and did not do so within a week or two, Mr. Polk's views would be partially met and the situation would be facilitated. If the ships had been delivered he was willing in deference to Mr. Polk's urgent representations to agree that the decision

of September 27th be modified, but only to the following extent: if the tankers had been delivered to the Armistice Commission they should remain in the hands of the Armistice Commission instead of being temporarily allocated in the manner theretofore decided upon by the A.M.T.E.

M. BERENGER read the decision of September 27th H.D. 62, Minute 1. This decision had been arrived at unanimously after a long and careful study of the question.

MR. POLK said that was not so as far as he was concerned.

M. BERENGER mentioned several instances showing that the United States Representatives on various Committees had been thoroughly familiar with the question in all its phases. Mr. Polk himself had had the question put on the agenda on September 23rd. Previously there had been a full discussion at a meeting at which Mr. Dulles and others had been present. Telegrams had been exchanged and certainly the question was one of such importance that the United States Government must have been fully aware of it. As soon as the decision had been made known great pressure had been brought to bear both in New York and Berlin. The first effect of that pressure was that the Shipping Board had committed an act of violence in holding up the steamer *Imperator* and other passenger ships in contravention of the decision of the Supreme Council. Furthermore pressure had been exerted in Berlin to keep the tankers in Hamburg and not have them go to the Fifth of Forth. This pressure had been brought by the Standard Oil Company which claimed the ownership of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. In October 1914 the tanker *Leda* had been taken by the British as a prize of war and condemned by a Prize Court, but thereafter, as a result of American representations, this ship had been given up by England to the American Government for the Standard Oil Company. The *Leda* had been given up by the British Government as a result of the Standard Oil Company's claim of ownership of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft. Twenty seven other ships of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft in United States ports had been recognized as belonging to the Standard Oil Company, and judgments of competent courts had affirmed the Standard Oil Company's ownership of the stock in question prior to the time the United States entered the war; but the contention of the United States that the tankers now at Hamburg were in the same situation could not be sustained. He had heard rumours from well informed sources that before the United States entered the war, i.e., in 1916, the Standard Oil Company had alienated its stock-holdings to a German concern. He agreed with Mr. Polk that the question of final ownership of the tankers could only properly be settled by the Reparation Commission. He wished to emphasize the fact that the solution of this question was most pressing; in fact it was vital inasmuch as some 50 thousand tons were involved and the scarcity of petroleum was world wide. On the other hand he agreed entirely with Sir Eyre Crowe with respect to the present disposition of these tankers. It would obviously not do to let the Germans see that there was still

dissension on this point between the Allied and Associated Powers, dissension resulting from a question of private ownership and interests. The German need for petroleum had been recognized and that difficulty had been settled. The Germans had only begun to emphasize their lack of petroleum in July and they had requested the use of ships to remedy the existing scarcity. The Supreme Council had decided that these tankers could circulate under the Inter-Allied flag for one voyage; it had been thought that this would supply the German needs. He took note of what Mr. Polk had said regarding the feeling of the United States but he wished to point out that before any concession could be made to the views of the United States Government the Shipping Board would certainly have to release the *Imperator* and the other passenger steamers which were being illegally retained in United States ports. The questions were closely connected. If the Shipping Board released the ships referred to the nine tankers in question might go to the Firth of Forth and be held there until a final decision on this question was reached. In the meanwhile the other five tankers should be disposed of pursuant to the decision of the A.M.T.E. relative to their temporary allocation.

MR. POLK did not wish to take up the Council's time by replying separately to all the points raised by M. Berenger, but he felt obliged to make a few remarks. Of course he also felt that it was advisable not to show that there was any lack of solidarity between the Allied and Associated Powers but he felt that as far as this question was concerned the Germans were well aware that there was a division of opinion. The question of the ultimate ownership of the tankers was a technical and an involved one, which should be decided by competent courts and the Reparation Commission. With regard to the rumoured sale by the Standard Oil Company of the stock of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft that was far more than a rumour; in fact it had been referred to by the United States representatives in reports submitted by them to their colleagues on Commissions. The question to be settled was what the legal effect of that sale was.

M. BERENGER said that that was the first time he had known definitely about that sale.

MR. POLK said that he meant the sale of the shares of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft, and he wished to point out that [the] said sale had not been recognized by the Alien Property Custodian who had seized the German securities. This had been set forth in a note presented by the United States representatives. It was not within his province to discuss the propriety of the action of the Shipping Board; what he wished to point out was that his Government felt, rightly or wrongly, that the question of title had been discussed long ago and that because such a question existed, the ownership of these tankers had not been settled, nor had the allocation thereof been settled at Brussels. The matter had been brought up at London where the United States was only formally represented; then it had been referred to the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels, where the United States was not represented at all. At that time it had been unknown to him that an agreement existed covering the division of passenger ships and tankers between

Great Britain and France, and that the allocation made depended thereon.

M. BERENGER said that he had not heard of any such arrangement between Great Britain and France.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he would have something to say on that point.

MR. POLK said that this agreement contemplated the delivery of passenger ships to Great Britain and tankers to France; he understood that a French company had been formed to enter the oil carrying trade. He was not stating these facts with any desire to engage in a controversy. He merely wished to show the feeling which existed in the United States. He had not been fully informed of all the points of discussion in this controversy, although as to that he was not seeking to present any excuses, but he could not help feeling that the other countries concerned had been fully aware of the delicate nature of the questions under discussion. The question had arisen in the French Chamber and a modification of the temporary allocation decided upon had been discussed. Public opinion in America had looked upon this as a permanent change in the allocation, contrary to the understanding which Mr. Hoover thought had been reached. He repeated that the Germans knew that there was a division of opinion on this question. He himself had done his utmost to see that the Protocol to be signed by Germany should not specifically mention these tankers. He only asked that the tankers should remain where they were. He wished to inquire if M. Berenger meant to say that if the *Imperator* and other passenger ships were not released by the Shipping Board the tankers should be allocated according to the decision of September 27th.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that it was a notorious fact that whenever the question of oil was touched upon, great difficulties resulted. With reference to the German knowledge of the division of opinion between the Allies, he thought he could not agree with Mr. Polk's point of view. A first decision had been taken and formally notified to the Germans. They had then received information from Standard Oil Company sources that no attention need be paid to this decision.

MR. POLK said that this was something that he did not know.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that from the information in his possession, he felt sure that it was so. There had then been further discussion in the Supreme Council and the Germans had been a second time instructed to deliver the tank ships. The Germans had been aware that there had been disagreement prior to that final decision, but they did not know that such disagreement had continued thereafter. The situation was not now as Mr. Polk thought, and the question had become one of the honour and prestige of the Allied and Associated Powers in the eyes of the Germans. Mr. Polk had made two statements which it seemed to him might be interpreted as raising a question of the good faith of the British Government and to these, of course, he must object. The first statement was Mr. Polk's reference to a decision taken at a meeting of the A.M.T.E. in London where the United States was only formally represented, and the subsequent reference of the question to the Supreme Economic Council at Brussels where it was known the United

States was not represented. He wished to point out that the decision to hand over the ships was taken at a meeting at which a representative of the United States was present. The matter was then referred to the Supreme Economic Council. The suggestion therefore was that the decision had been arrived at over the heads of the Americans. He would emphasize that the proposal to refer the matter to the Supreme Economic Council was made by the United States representative himself with the implication that the United States would accept. He did not wish any possible impression to remain that the decision at Brussels was the result of taking advantage of the United States not being represented there.

MR. POLK said that of course he had meant to imply nothing of the kind.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the second point referred to by him was the alleged secret agreement between the French and British Governments.

(He then read from a letter received from the Ministry of Shipping on the subject).

There was no such agreement in existence.

There was an agreement between Mr. Kemball Cook<sup>2</sup> and M. Loucheur in regard to allocation of passenger steamers which was perfectly plain and above-board. In fact, Mr. Cook had announced it himself to the A.M.T.E. and had it circulated to all the Delegates with the minutes. The following wording occurred in that agreement: 'in consideration of the allocation to France of the tank steamers as decided by the A.M.T.E.' Mr. Cook presumed that Mr. Polk was referring to that clause. If so it was a mare's nest, as that simply referred to the withdrawal of Great Britain's claim to certain tank steamers which was disclosed by the first examination of the percentage due to her on a rigid ton for ton basis in comparison to losses. As a matter of fact no bargain was possible with the French as neither were they in a position to make one nor were the British in a position to guarantee the delivery of the tank steamers. All the British had said was that they would not claim what they considered their just proportion of the tank steamers. The French Oil Shipping Companies were, of course, preparing for the management of these tankers. As it was then five weeks since the Supreme Council had allocated a considerable proportion of the steamers to France it did not seem unreasonable that the French should have been making preparations to take them over.

M. BERENGER pointed out that the agreement was dated November 10th and could therefore have had no effect on the decision taken by the Supreme Council on September 27th.

MR. POLK said that he had not claimed that the agreement was a secret one but had merely said that he had not known of it.

SIR EYRE CROWE said the whole trouble was that the United States claimants would not admit that the allocation was purely temporary: they wished to mix it up with the question of permanent ownership. He now found himself in a difficult position. The question had been raised of the 10 passenger steamers illegally held by the Shipping Board in the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Director of Naval Sea Transport in the British Ministry of Shipping.

7. In the month of September British crews were sent to New York to bring back the S.S. *Imperator* and all arrangements were concluded with the U.S. military and naval authorities to move her, but at the last moment the American Shipping Board interfered and refused to allow the vessel to be delivered to the British representatives, stating that their instructions were that the *Imperator* and the seven other vessels had been assigned to them. All arguments failed to induce them to admit that such was not the case.

8. The vessels are, consequently, lying idle, and His Majesty's Government is incurring a cost of hundreds of pounds daily in feeding and housing these British crews, which were sent to America to bring these ships over.

9. Neither the U.S. Shipping Board nor the U.S. Government have the smallest conceivable right to detain these vessels.

10. The most pressing representations have been made by the British Ambassador at Washington to the U.S. State Department on several occasions, and the State Department admit that the ships ought to be handed over, but its efforts have failed to move the American Shipping Board.

11. Early in October, Sir Joseph Maclay, the British Shipping Controller, made a personal appeal to the Chairman of the American Shipping Board to release these vessels, but with no result.

12. A complete deadlock has been reached owing to the unjustified action of the Shipping Board.

13. In these circumstances the British Government requests the Supreme Council to address a formal request to the U.S. Government to hand over the above mentioned vessels to properly appointed agents of the British Government without delay.

*November 14, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX H TO NO. 24

##### *Draft of Instructions to be sent [to] General Masterman*

Note to be handed to German Government:

According to Article 202, last alinea, of the Peace Treaty, Germany agrees to displace no aeronautic material, this material to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers.

Germany, with a view to escaping this agreement, continually operates the displacement, and even the sale and exportation of this material. By attempting to thus render valueless the obligations which she assumed, she compromises the loyal execution of the Treaty signed and rectified [? ratified] by her.

The Allied and Associated Powers remind Germany that the measures thus taken by her cannot be justified, and that, in consequence, the said displaced, sold or exported material must be delivered to them according to the terms of the Peace Treaty, or, in default thereof, its equivalent value, upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

reached; while the other five tankers should be allocated according to the decision of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

MR. POLK said he would cable his Government with respect to this point.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the only point of agreement was that the ownership of the tankers in question should eventually be determined by the Reparation Commission. He agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that the question raised by the action of the Shipping Board in the United States should not be taken up at that meeting. He thought it would be better to have the nine tankers go to the Firth of Forth until a final decision were had on the question. He appreciated the difficulties of the United States Government and wished to be of assistance to it as far as possible, because he thought it was not ultimately responsible for what had happened. He wished to point out, however, that with respect to the United States, the question was fundamentally one of private interests, whereas in France and England the question was one of general interest which affected everybody. Under these conditions he felt that private interests should give way. He trusted that when Mr. Polk, as he had said he would, sent a telegram to his Government relative to the suggestion that the nine tankers should go to the Firth of Forth and stay there until a final decision had been reached on the matter, he would at the same time take into consideration the view he (M. Clemenceau) had just expressed, and that feeling in France and England was as fully aroused as it was in the United States.

MR. POLK wished to make it clear that his Government's solicitude was not for the Standard Oil Company; his Government felt that a matter of principle was involved. He thought that the Standard Oil Company did not consider that the present administration was in its favour.

3. (The Council had before it three joint notes from the Polish and Czechoslovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in Teschen (see Appendix A).<sup>3</sup>)

*Joint Report from the Polish and Czechoslovak Commissions relative to the Plebiscite in Teschen*

M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the joint report of the Polish and Czechoslovak Commissions consisting of these three joint notes.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This appendix comprised: (i) A note to the Supreme Council, dated November 8, 1919, concerning the date of the plebiscite to be held at Teschen, Spisz, and Orava. This note proposed that the French Government should, on behalf of the Supreme Council, notify the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments that 'on account of the delay occasioned by the circumstances at the beginning of the operations of the International Plebiscite Commission', the period of three months within which the commission should proceed to hold the plebiscite, as provided in article IV of the Act of September 27, 1919 (cf. Vol. I, No. 66, minute 8), 'will begin, not from the date of the notification of October 1, but only from the day when the International Commission, arrived on the ground, will inform the Principal Allied and Associated Powers that it is beginning its operations'. (ii) An undated note of the Supreme Council proposing a draft letter from M. Clemenceau to the Polish and Czechoslovak delegations assuring them that the Allied and Associated Powers, in coming to the decision of September 27, 1919, had taken into consideration the observations of the two delegations concerning conditions of voting, and had given appropriate instructions to the plebiscite commission. 'These instructions are inspired by the idea that only persons

It was decided:

to accept the recommendations of the joint report of the Polish and Czecho-Slovak Commissions relative to the plebiscite in Teschen, contained in the three joint notes (see Appendix A).<sup>3</sup>

4. MR. POLK explained that Colonel Haskell, Inter-Allied High Commissioner for Armenia, was leaving Paris that night and that prior to his departure he thought it would be well for him to give the Council a brief summary of the conditions in Armenia.

COLONEL HASKELL informed the Council that the three republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were at daggers drawn with each other on almost all points. Georgia and Azerbaijan had perhaps some slight degree of good feeling towards each other, evidenced by a loose defensive alliance concluded between them as a protection against a possible advance southward of General Denikin's army. Armenia had refused to join this alliance. Political and economic conditions in each of the three countries were in as bad a condition as could be imagined. He wished to point out that these three countries had been arbitrarily carved out and delimited. The only railway system from the Black Sea through to Persia traversed all three of these republics and either one of them had it in its power, under present conditions, to paralyze traffic. Aside from the animosity existing between these states, further material difficulties resulted from their arbitrary delimitation: for instance, all the railway repair shops were in Georgia and all the fuel for the operation of the railway system came from Baku in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, between these three republics there were various contested districts, and neutral zones which had been marked out by the British which it had not been possible to change because they gave rise to such burning questions that no change could be adopted until all three republics were consolidated under one administration. He had been entrusted by the Supreme Council with representing it in Armenia,<sup>4</sup> but he could not efficiently carry out the necessary work as long as Georgia and Azerbaijan remained without his jurisdiction. Moreover, owing to the fact that these two latter republics did remain without his jurisdiction, an anomalous situation was presented. Thousands of inhabitants of Azerbaijan were receiving relief in Baku and other localities, and the same was true of many Georgians at Tiflis and other points; though those destitute people were entirely dependent on the relief they received, the Relief Administration had no control whatever over the who, in good faith, can be considered as having tangible ties with the country, will be allowed to participate in the plebiscite. The Commission has received plenary powers from the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to apply this decision.' (iii) A note to the Supreme Council, dated November 11, 1919, proposing a draft letter from M. Dutasta to the President of the existing Interallied Control Commission at Teschen concerning the communication of its archives and information to the Plebiscite Commission. 'As to the powers of the Control Commission, they will cease when the Plebiscite Commission, assembled at Teschen, will officially inform it, at the same time as the Conference, that it begins its operations.'

<sup>4</sup> See Vol. I, No. 3, minute 3.

local administration. If all these republics were put under one administration the neutral zones referred to could be eliminated, and a definite frontier temporarily fixed. Such a solution would preclude the existence of a situation such as now existed, where a large number of Armenians found themselves within the political limits of Georgia. The Georgians would not feed them because they were of Armenian nationality, and on the other hand, the Armenians refused to give them any assistance inasmuch as they were living within the territorial limits of Georgia. There were no foodstuffs available anywhere, and all three of the republics were virtually living on the salvage of the Russian collapse. Economic life was at a standstill. Practically nothing could be imported inasmuch as the money of all three of the republics had no purchasing value. The Caucasian rouble, which should be worth 51 cents was now only worth about 1 cent, and it had actually been found impracticable to issue paper money in smaller denominations than 10 roubles because the value of the paper was greater than the money. Foreign merchandise shipped on the railroad through to Persia was liable to be requisitioned by any one of the three Republics, as their need for everything was so great. The most essential need, perhaps, was to control the system of through railway transportation. In Armenia alone some 800,000 destitute were being relieved and about 15,000,000 francs per month was being spent on this relief work. Armenians in foreign countries did indeed attempt to send some relief to their starving countrymen. Although those supplies got through the port of Batum and its surrounding territory, where the British had an efficient administration, they were held up at various points in the interior by the Georgian authorities, and the same situation applied to all railway traffic.

MR. POLK explained that the Council had sent Colonel Haskell as its representative for relief work in Armenia and Colonel Haskell felt that it was necessary for him to have the same functions in Georgia and Azerbaijan in order to efficiently accomplish his mission. That matter could be settled later when the experts had been heard. As Colonel Haskell was leaving Paris that night, he (Mr. Polk) had thought that it might be of interest to the Council to hear his views.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked Colonel Haskell for his presentation of the question.

(At this point Colonel Haskell left the room.)

5. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation relative to *British proposition regarding measures to be taken to remedy the dearth of rolling stock in Austria* measures to be taken to remedy the dearth of rolling stock in Austria. (See Appendix B).<sup>5</sup>)  
M. PICHON suggested that the British note be referred to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This note, dated November 13, 1919, stated: 'Sir Francis Dent, President of the Commission of Experts for the Distribution of Rolling-Stock under Article 312 [318] of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, has drawn attention to the fact that the main cause of the

It was decided:

to refer to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission the British note relative to measures to be taken to remedy the dearth of rolling stock in Austria. (See Appendix B).<sup>5</sup>

6. (The Council had before it a proposal from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal. (See Appendix C).)

*Proposal of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal.*

MAJOR ARON read and commented upon this proposal.

GENERAL LE ROND suggested that paragraph 2 of the proposal of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal be modified so as to provide that the requirements of Upper Silesia should first be satisfied.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft decision submitted by the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal (see Appendix C), after modifying it so that the end of paragraph 2 should read as follows:<sup>6</sup>

'A—to Upper Silesia . . . .				the tonnage which the Commission shall judge suitable to attribute to it.
to Austria . . . .				200,000 tons per month.
to Poland . . . .				250,000 tons per month.
B—to Germany . . . .				the surplus.'

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 14, 1919.*

conditions which threaten the economic life of the Central European States is the want of movement of rolling-stock, which is in turn largely due to the hesitation shown by the various States to allow their wagons, including those claimed by them as booty, to pass out of the limits of their own territory. . . . The matter is very urgent as the economic conditions, and in particular the question of coal supply, are critical. . . . The Governments of Italy, Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Roumania and Jugo-Slavia should be invited to send representatives to form a Committee at Vienna, which should hold its first meeting on December 4th. These representatives should have full powers to enter into arrangements for free wagon exchange without prejudice to the ownership of rolling-stock established or claimed, and based on the right of maintaining equally [? equality] of wagon exchange subject to special arrangements agreed to by the Government concerned, of which the Committee should be advised. The Committee would have the right to make representations to the Governments concerned. Sir George Clerk might be asked to arrange for the nomination of a representative for Hungary. It would be desirable that the Ukrainian representative on the existing Committee at Vienna should become a member of the proposed new Committee. It is recommended that the Supreme Economic Council should suggest the desirability of appointing an independent Allied Chairman and designate for this post Sir Francis Dent, acting, when necessary, through a deputy. In the above proposals the American, French and Italian representatives on the Allied Railway Missions at Vienna agree.'

<sup>6</sup> This modification was embodied in the text of appendix C.

*Draft Decision to be submitted to the Supreme Council*

I. The Upper Silesia Commission is invited to come to an agreement with the Reparation Commission, and pending the constitution of the latter, with the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission regarding everything which concerns the distribution of Upper Silesian coal.

A Liaison Officer appointed by the Reparation Commission or by the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission will be placed at the disposal of the Upper Silesia Commission, both to accelerate the solution of this question and to study any other questions which may fall within the sphere of the Reparation Commission.

For technical questions relating to coal the Upper Silesia Commission will take the opinion of the Coal Sub-Commission for Mährisch Ostrau.

II. Previous to a concerted decision, as said above, with regard to the distribution of Upper Silesian coal, the Upper Silesian Commission will adopt provisionally the following distribution of the present output:

- |                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| (A) to Upper Silesia . . . | the tonnage which the Commission shall judge suitable to attribute to it; |
| to Austria . . .           | 200,000 tons per month;   |
| to Poland . . .            | 250,000 tons per month;   |
| (B) to Germany . . .       | the surplus.  |

No. 23

H. D. 93.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 15, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Captain Matteson, U.S.N., Mr. A. W. Dulles, Mr. Buckler.

*British Empire*: Mr. Forbes-Adam, Mr. A. Leeper.

*Italy*: M. Vannutelli-Rey.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the drafting of the resolution of November 11th concerning the status of Eastern Galicia<sup>1</sup> did not seem to him to agree entirely with the decision which had been actually taken by the Council. He had understood that their decision was an absolutely final one and that the Polish Delegates would be heard, not by the Council, but by the Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not agree with Sir Eyre Crowe on that point; if his recollection was correct, the text of the resolution quite agreed with what they had decided. It was understood, however, that the hearing of the Polish Delegates would only be an act of courtesy on the part of the Council. Their declarations would have no influence on the Council's decisions, and should not take more than one-half to three-quarters of an hour.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN stated that in accordance with the resolution of November 11th, the Secretary General had informed the Polish Delegation that M. Patek would be heard by the Council as soon as he arrived in Paris, and had insisted on the extreme urgency presented by the question of Eastern Galicia.

2. (The Council had before it the draft note to the Roumanian Government, inserted in the minutes of November 14th<sup>2</sup> (see Appendix A).<sup>3</sup>)

*Draft Note to  
the Roumanian  
Government*

M. BERTHELOT read the draft note.

MR. POLK asked whether it would not be advisable to refer, at the end of the third paragraph, to Sir George Clerk's Mission at Bucharest.

M. BERTHELOT said that, so as to take into account Mr. Polk's remark, which appeared to him quite justified, one might insert at the end of the third paragraph the following phrase: 'in order to show the importance which the Conference attached to obtaining the reply of Roumania, it had even entrusted a special delegate, Sir George Clerk, to go to Bucharest.'

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that in recognition of the goodwill shown by General Coanda and M. Antonescu in the interview he had with them two days previous, he proposed to omit in paragraph seven the words: 'the time when Roumania still had under arms an army of over four hundred thousand men.' He also suggested granting to Roumania a period of eight days to make its answer known, instead of six days which they had proposed to give them in their original draft.

MR. POLK suggested adding in Section 3 (on top of page 4)<sup>4</sup> the following words: 'under the conditions shown by the note from the Supreme Council, dated October 12th.'<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See No. 19, minute 7.

<sup>2</sup> In error for November 13.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. The draft in this appendix, dated November 15, 1919, was the same as that in No. 21, appendix F, subject to drafting variation and the incorporation of the amendments proposed by Mr. Polk, M. Clemenceau, and Sir E. Crowe in the ensuing discussion. (Cf. the resolution recorded in No. 32, minute 4.)

<sup>4</sup> The third of the numbered resolutions with which Roumania was invited to comply.

<sup>5</sup> See Vol. I, No. 72, appendix B.

that the Roumanian Government should not take advantage of their silence to present the facts to Roumanian public opinion in a false light.

M. DE MARTINO remarked that the telegram to which he had referred previously and which directed the Italian Minister at Bucharest to join in the step taken by his colleagues was dated November 10th, 12:47 a.m.

M. BERTHELOT said that as the note of the Allies was dated November 7th, the slight misunderstanding which had taken place was easily explained by the interval of three days which occurred between the note and the telegram.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft note to the Roumanian Government (see Appendix A).<sup>3</sup>

M. de Martino made the reservation that his final approval of the note would be made known in the course of the afternoon. If the instructions received by the Italian representative should not allow him to adopt the note, the Italian Minister at Bucharest would receive telegraphic instructions to abstain from associating himself with the step taken by his colleagues.

It was further decided:

not to publish, for the present, the note addressed to the Roumanian Government.

3. MR. POLK read the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on July 5th on the subject of Colonel Haskell's mission (see *Extension to Georgia and Azerbaijan of the Mission already entrusted to Colonel Haskell for Armenia* I.C. 201A).<sup>7</sup> He proposed to add after the word 'Armenia' the words 'Georgia and Azerbaijan'. The Council had heard at the preceding meeting Colonel Haskell's declarations. He simply wished to submit this proposal to the Council without insisting that it should be accepted.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he had submitted this question to his Government. He thought he could already say that they would not object to the extension of Colonel Haskell's mission for the organization of relief in Georgia and Azerbaijan. He would, however, call to the attention of the Council the fact that in the resolution which had just been read Colonel Haskell was entitled High Commissioner. He wished to make his reservations on that title, all the more so as he did not think that it corresponded with the functions with which Colonel Haskell had been entrusted.

MR. POLK said as the British were already represented in those regions, he proposed that Sir Eyre Crowe be good enough to submit a draft resolution at a later meeting.

M. DE MARTINO said that the Italians also had officers in the Caucasus. He would therefore consult his military experts, but he could already say that he was in favour of the American proposition.

It was decided:

that Sir Eyre Crowe, after consultation with the competent experts, would put before the Council a draft resolution extending the powers

<sup>7</sup> Vol. I, No. 3, minute 3.

already conferred upon Colonel Haskell for Armenia (see I.C. 201-A of July 5th, 1919)<sup>7</sup> to include Georgia and Azerbaijan in matters concerning relief work.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was advisable to take up as soon as possible the important questions which still remained to be decided by the Council. He wished to ask whether they should not examine the list of questions on the agenda of the Council which had been drawn up by M. Berthelot.

*Agenda of  
the Conference*

5. SIR EYRE CROWE wished to call attention to the urgency of taking a decision concerning the provisioning of Vienna. Their information depicted the situation of the Austrian capital in a terrible light. To enable the Austrians to buy food, it seemed necessary to grant them a loan. But he thought the guarantee for this loan should be a charge upon the Reparations Fund. That was an important question which the Reparation Commission ought to deal with immediately.

*The question of  
provisioning Vienna*

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether it did not rather concern a financial commission.

MR. POLK said the Reparation Commission was already acquainted with the question. Mr. Rathbone<sup>8</sup> had cabled Washington to explain the situation and to ask how far the American Government would consent to be committed.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if immediate measures were not taken, it was to be feared that there would be from 300,000 to 400,000 dead that winter in the streets of Vienna. The Austrians realized the situation and were resorting to every possible means to get money. They were at the moment engaged in selling their art collections, pictures, jewels, etc., a procedure which was, as a matter of fact, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.

M. BERTHELOT said it was correct that the Austrians had tried to sell their 'objets d'art', but in fact they had not managed to sell anything with the exception perhaps of a few isolated objects. He had, moreover, seen M. Benes, who had also depicted the situation at Vienna as tragic. He had stated that if the Powers were willing to help him, he would be in a position to send coal and food to Vienna.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that M. Benes might be asked to discuss the question in agreement with the Reparation Commission.

It was decided:

- (1) to refer to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission for examination and report the problem of means to be adopted to ensure the provisioning of Vienna;
- (2) that M. Benes be asked to make known to the Committee his views on the subject.

<sup>8</sup> Financial adviser to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace and representative of the United States on the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

6. M. BERTHELOT summarized Sir George Clerk's telegram, dated November 13th (see Appendix B). He said that the information conveyed in this telegram was not very reassuring, and it seemed that the formation of a coalition cabinet was more uncertain than ever.

*Telegram from Sir George Clerk on the Hungarian situation*

M. CLEMENCEAU wished, in that connection, to say a few words concerning the attitude of Admiral Troubridge. No one contested the fact that the Admiral was a distinguished and capable man, but he was a partisan of Archduke Joseph. He had a right to be, but he wondered whether the Admiral was not going a little far in following his preferences, which apparently were not those of his Government. The information he was giving on Admiral Troubridge's attitude came from an excellent source and he wondered if it were not advisable for the British Government to take this situation into account, all the more so because the Admiral's influence throughout Hungary was considerable.

SIR EYRE CROWE said the Admiral had received instructions to comply with the policy of Sir George Clerk. He would not fail, however, to take up the question raised by M. Clemenceau.

7. MR. POLK said he would have an important statement to add to the declarations he had made at the preceding meeting on the oil tank ships, but as the French and British experts were not present, he proposed to adjourn this question to the next meeting.

*German Oil Tank Ships*

8. M. BERTHELOT said that in the question of distribution of enemy ships, the naval experts had not yet succeeded in arriving at a complete agreement. He thought that an understanding would be made easier if the Council heard the question, inasmuch as the differences of views which existed seemed to him of slight importance.

*Distribution of Enemy Ships*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they could put the question on Monday's agenda.

9. M. BERTHELOT said that they had informed the Serbs that they would not be authorized to sign the Bulgarian Treaty until they had signed the Austrian Treaty. The Serbs had answered they could not sign the Austrian Treaty before the question of the distribution of Austro-Hungarian tonnage had been solved. That question could be discussed on Tuesday, for the British expert would then have received his instructions.

*Distribution of Austro-Hungarian Tonnage*

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that if that question was settled on Tuesday, the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty could be set for Wednesday or Thursday.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 15, 1919.*

9 November 17, 1919.

# APPENDIX B TO NO. 23

## *Telegram from Sir G. Clerk to the Supreme Council*

D. November 13th, 1919.

R. 10.00 November 14th, 1919.

No. 7.

My telegram No. 6.<sup>10</sup> On my arrival here I at once realised two things. One, that Hungarians would do nothing until Roumanians left, and the other, that since Archduke's resignation Friedrich has acquired for various reasons into which I need not enter at present, a following in country so large and so excited against Communists and Jews, that it would be fatal to seem to override or fail to take into account opinions and feelings of those who are at present his followers. I have explained position of Allies to Hungarians of all parties and opinion is generally ripe for formation of coalition government. But personal position of Friedrich is main difficulty. Since [*sic*] method of telling him to resign premiership and to let someone else take it and form a government will not work because it would simply mean that Friedrich and great bulk of his followers, that is, by far the majority in country, would if he went at all go into opposition, and nobody could be found to make a Government in which the Christian National Party did not participate. It has therefore been necessary to proceed by way of telling Friedrich that he must first show what he can do towards satisfying Allies. His attempts have not yet succeeded and I informed him on the morning of November 12th that unless he was prepared to summon a general conference by today, November 13th, I should ask all political leaders, including himself and his Ministers, to meet me informally in order that I might explain the situation to them. As a result he has just informed me that he will at once issue invitations for a general political Conference.

Meanwhile I have seen the parties of the Left, viz., Social Democrats, Liberal Democrats, National Land Party also small Proprietors and Christian Social Democrat Party. These five Parties have united themselves into a block and they will meet Friedrich the Christian National in Conference. They will probably there declare that they will not accept Friedrich as Minister President, though they are ready to work loyally with Christian National block apart from Friedrich and that they will only enter a Government in which all of their five parties are represented. Government Parties will probably say they cannot give up Friedrich and there may be a deadlock unless Christian National Parties have sense enough to see Friedrich must go.

I have a meeting with the Christian National leaders to-night and may get them to see what is at stake for Hungary. If nevertheless there is this deadlock it is possible that some influential person outside party politics such as the Cardinal Primate will try to effect a solution, but if such efforts fail I shall have to explain the position in the Press and say that as Hungarians cannot in this crisis agree upon a temporary Coalition Government where all Parties are fairly represented and insist on maintaining the rule of a single party I can do no more and intend leaving Budapest forthwith. Consequences will of course be that Hungary will have neither peace nor help from the Allies but will be left severely to her own devices. It is for Hungarians to decide if this is what suits them. I shall also dispel various delusions which Friedrich has endeavoured to create in the public mind, such as that I really represent only the Paris policy which is the French policy and that

<sup>10</sup> See No. 20, appendix E.

when I have gone and the French policy is shown to be a failure, then the English policy which is really favourable to Friedrich will have its day.

I still hope that the end may be satisfactory, but I send this telegram in order that the Supreme Council may know what I am doing and may realize that in the present state of feeling in the country, violently anti-semitic and anti-socialist, Friedrich must be gradually pushed from office and cannot simply be turned out. Process is long and extremely trying but it is the only one which will not leave Hungary worse off than she is at present.

## No. 24

H. D. 94.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 17, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Arnavon.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Mr. Ellis L. Dresel, Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Captain Madison, U.S.N.

*British Empire*: Captain Fuller, R.N., Commander Macnamara, R.N., Commander Dunne, R.N., Mr. A. Leeper, General Groves.

*France*: M. Henry Berenger, M. Laroche, Ct. du Chayler, Ct. Le Vasseur.

*Italy*: Amiral Cagni, General Cavallero, M. D'Amelio, M. Vannutelli-Rey, Capt. de corvette Ruspoli, Comt. Ingianni, Comt. Rugin.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

- i. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation (see Appendix A), a historical résumé of the question by Captain Fuller (see Appendix B) and a new British proposal dated November 14th, 1919 (see Appendix C).)

SIR EYRE CROWE said he had asked the British naval representative to summarize the proposals made by the British Admiralty, which he hoped would be approved by the Council.

CAPTAIN FULLER read and commented upon the Historical Summary (see Appendix B) on the distribution of enemy warships, and upon the new British Proposal (see Appendix C).

M. CLEMENCEAU wished to ask whether this proposition which had just been read was an entirely new one.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that it was. The American and French Dele-

gations had discussed this proposition but had not read the new text. The Italian naval expert had read the proposition and agreed with it.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was impossible for him to make up his mind on a proposition which was quite new to him. He should first have to discuss the proposition with his naval experts.

MR. POLK asked Captain Fuller with reference to paragraph 3 what could prevent any country breaking up ships allotted.

CAPTAIN FULLER explained it was a question of labour and of shipyard facilities.

MR. POLK also asked why battleships, etc., should be loaned for one year.

CAPTAIN FULLER replied this was for experimental and propaganda purposes. The percentages laid out in the proposition were based only on information in their hands; other countries could furnish their own figures and it would be possible to come to an agreement.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked that the further examination of this question be postponed until the next day as he wished to examine the question closely with his naval experts.

(The question was adjourned until the next day.)

2. MR. POLK stated that in the discussion which had taken place at the meeting of November 14th (see H.D. 92)<sup>1</sup> he had omitted to bring out an important point and wished to make the record complete. He had omitted in his discussion to go into the history of the question. Originally it had been agreed that all the German ships should be turned over to the Allies, who were to use them to furnish to Germany food which she needed, the charges to be attributed to the Reparation fund. At a meeting which had taken place at Brussels it had been voted that the 14 German oil tank ships should not be delivered. The Germans had asked to use these. At that time Messrs. Hoover and Davis had talked with their colleagues about the question of letting the Germans get oil; no record was made of these conversations, but the resolution read that temporarily the ships should be exempted from allocation. Since that time the American contention was that the Germans could operate the vessels under the Inter-Allied Flag and with an Inter-Allied representative on board, but it had been said that this could not be done. According to his information their records showed that exceptions had been made and that the Germans had operated certain ships with German crews on board, for instance: the *Fritz von Straus* from Hamburg to Hull, the *Kehrwieder* and the *Paul* from Hamburg to New York, to obtain oil, also a number of other ships in the Baltic Sea, also certain ships used in the Mediterranean to repatriate German prisoners. In the discussion which followed the Scapa Flow sinking the question again came up; they maintained that it was not contrary to the Allies' views to let the Germans operate these ships to bring oil to Germany. On July 13th the question was again discussed in the Reparation Commission; but on August 15th the President of the A.N.A.C. had cancelled the exemption without

<sup>1</sup> No. 22, minute 2.

giving notice to the United States' representative until the following day. The United States had always questioned that decision. The difficulty arose in this way: their understanding was, first, that the ships should be exempted to get oil and secondly that the ships could be operated by German crews under the Inter-Allied flag and with an Inter-Allied Representative on board. They held further that other German ships had been given a free sailing to Constantinople and other ports. They had taken this to constitute a precedent.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it seemed to be a question of whether or not German crews should be used on these steamers. He confessed it puzzled him very much why the American Government insisted upon the use of German crews. He asked what inspired that policy.

MR. POLK said that was the original American view and that contracts for transporting oil to Germany should be carried out.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that oil could reach Germany without using German crews; there must be another reason.

MR. POLK said there was no mystery about this. It was simply the question of the disposal of the ships: they wanted to let the Germans have a temporary use of the ships until the permanent title was decided upon.

SIR EYRE CROWE maintained that the United States' position amounted to ignoring the unanimous decision of the Supreme Council which had attributed the temporary management to the Allies.

MR. POLK repeated the view of his Government that the question had been discussed and agreed upon at Brussels.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that he must insist that at the time of the decision the Germans had made no demand for oil. The Allies did not take these ships simply because they had no need of them.

MR. POLK regretted the unfortunate situation created by the lack of minutes; there were the recollections of Mr. Hoover on the one hand and those of his colleagues on the other.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that with regard to the precedents which Mr. Polk had cited, he wished to make the following remarks. First, in the Baltic, the Germans had long been allowed to navigate. As for the particular case of the *Fritz von Straus*, this was a ship of only 800 tons: there was very little interest to the Reparation Commission in this boat on account of its small tonnage. As to the other ships mentioned, it would be easy to ascertain the reason for their operation, and probably their small tonnage was again the reason. As for the German ships in the Mediterranean, that was a different question; the crews were Turkish and not German. The Supreme Council, as a matter of fact, had decided that the Allied Naval Armistice Commission was wrong and insisted on taking those crews off and putting on the Inter-Allied flag in place of the German. Under these conditions it appeared that the precedents cited by Mr. Polk did not carry much weight. He emphasized the fact that he had received formal instructions from his Government that these ships should not sail with a German crew. No other position could be taken by the British Government.

M. DE MARTINO stated that he had no objection to the first trip being

taken, even with German crews on board, provided that the final distribution of these ships should not be prejudiced by this trip, and as a matter of fact, the final distribution belonged to the Reparation Commission.

M. CLEMENCEAU then read a telegram from Admiral Goette to A.N.A.C., dated November 15th (see Appendix D), from which it appeared that the Germans had informed the Allies that steps were being taken for the delivery of these steamers. That appeared to him to be a decisive fact which did not leave them any choice. What impression would the Council give to the whole world if it were to let the Germans keep these ships at that time? There seemed to him to be two questions. First, there was the question of final ownership which the Council had agreed should be settled by the Reparation Commission. There remained the question of operating the ships. He did not quite understand the position of the United States. What objection did the Americans have to an Allied rather than a German crew? He personally saw a very grave political and moral objection to German crews being used which he thought was even more important than the economic objection. There had just occurred at Berlin demonstrations in favour of Hindenburg which were of a disquieting nature and had given a great deal of trouble to the German Government. These seemed to bear the marks of a Nationalist uprising. Therefore would it be opportune to let those ships sail with German crews and under the German flag? For himself, he had the greatest objections. There was no doubt whatsoever that the Principal Powers had pledged themselves to stand by the decisions of the Reparation Commission; that was full security for America. He therefore earnestly requested Mr. Polk to accept Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal so as to not make the situation more difficult. It seemed to him all the more important to come to an agreement on this question as there were a number of vital matters to be settled with the Germans, such as the delivery of guilty individuals. Should the Germans be allowed to operate these ships there would be general stupefaction in France. He had often shown readiness to make concessions, but always on one condition that public opinion should understand them. This would not be the case in the present instance. He understood there might be some American emotion on the subject, but he felt sure that America would understand France's position in the matter and he hoped that secondary considerations which moved American opinions would give way to the stronger, and, to his mind, more justified feeling of public opinion in France.

M. DE MARTINO stated that in view of the strong case presented by M. Clemenceau he was ready to agree with his views.

MR. POLK remarked that M. Clemenceau's declarations carried much weight and he also saw that the use of the German flag at this time might be misconstrued in France. They maintained however, that an arrangement had been made which had not been carried out. He also wished to point out that his position with his Government made it difficult for him to give his entire approval to the Chairman's views. As he understood the proposal which Sir Eyre Crowe had made at a preceding meeting, the 14 oil tank ships were to go to the Firth of Forth; 5 were to be operated, and 9 were to remain

there until a compromise had been reached. He would recommend that proposal to his Government. He wished, however, to have the Council take note of the feeling in the United States on the question of the allocation of these vessels. He had not put up an imaginary case; they did not agree and had not accepted the present system of distribution. He referred to the last sentence of the telegram from the British Ministry of Shipping to the British Delegation<sup>2</sup> and he wished to ask Sir Eyre Crowe whether this phrase did not sound like a threat.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that the phrase occurred in an inter-departmental telegram and represented simply the attitude of the Shipping Controller which was uncompromising.

MR. POLK asked whether it was not advisable to instruct the Naval Armistice Commission that no disposition of these 9 oil tank ships be made at this time.

M. DE MARTINO wished to ask what was to be done with the other five.

M. BERENGER replied that according to his information only 11 ships remained which therefore would leave only two for the Allies.

M. DE MARTINO added that should this information be correct it would be very serious for Italy, as she had counted absolutely on sharing the five ships with France and Belgium to remedy the scarcity of oil fuel.

M. BERENGER wished to point out how important it was to prevent a further waste of these tank ships considering the shortage of oil fuel in Europe. Mr. Dulles, an American representative on the Committee of Organization of the Reparation Commission, had written to M. Loucheur on August 28th protesting that such a waste of fuel oil should not be permitted. Since that time these ships which could carry 60,000 tons could have made two trips and thus been able to bring 120,000 tons of fuel oil which had been lost to the Allies and Germany as well. If Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal were to be sustained by the Council, that would mean a continuation of this waste for three months or more as the Reparation Commission would not be taking a decision in the matter until then. The explanation of the Brussels meeting given by Mr. Polk could not be accepted. If Mr. Hoover had promised the Germans to give them exemption in favour of certain ships in order to get them oil, this was something that the Allies had never heard of and it did not figure in a single Allied record. On March 29th M. Clementel had written, as President of the Supreme Economic Council, a letter which clearly showed that the Germans at that time were not in need of fuel oil, and he was not aware that an agreement had been reached between Mr. Hoover and the Germans. The Germans had emphasized on July 30th for the first time their need for fuel oil, and the real reason for exempting those tank ships had been that at that time there was sufficient tonnage in the way of tank ships. He could not tell whether the rumour were true that there had been an agreement between Messrs. Hoover and Davis and the Germans, and that a part of the payment had been made by the latter without any knowledge of the Reparation Commission.

<sup>2</sup> See appendix D below.

MR. POLK stated that there had been no secret agreement between Mr. Hoover and the Germans. He could assure the Council of that.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked how it came that there should be at this time such a need for oil tonnage when a few months previous that tonnage had been sufficient.

M. BERENGER explained that the use of fuel oil had been authorized recently by a law which had been passed by the French Parliament. This law had resulted in a great demand for fuel oil all the more as there was a great shortage of coal, and oil was needed for lighting, heating and transportation. He had asked the Standard Oil Company for tank ships and had been told that not a single one could be spared.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Berenger to let him have the exact figure of the needs of France and Italy in fuel oil.

M. BERENGER said he would.

M. CLEMENCEAU hoped that in the cable which Mr. Polk would send his Government submitting Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal, he would also point out the needs of France and Italy, and ask it to take into consideration this aspect of the question.

MR. POLK said he hoped they could reach a compromise on the distribution of those ships.

M. BERENGER said that they had considered the question of using a part of these German oil tank ships after a first trip by the Standard Oil Company.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he trusted Mr. Polk would explain the whole question to his Government with his customary liberality.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked he had based his proposal on Mr. Polk's hope of arriving at an arrangement.

MR. POLK agreed.

M. DE MARTINO said he had just been informed that there actually were fourteen tank ships in German ports which would therefore leave five ships instead of the two which M. Berenger had previously spoken of.

M. BERENGER said there were nine oil ships claimed by an American corporation. There were two boats according to his information at the disposition of the Allies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said they would await the result of Mr. Polk's cable for instructions.

SIR EYRE CROWE summed up that meanwhile they would instruct the Allied Naval Armistice Commission in the sense of his proposal.

It was decided:

- (1) to instruct the Allied Naval Armistice Commission to take delivery of the German oil tank steamers for the Firth of Forth;
- (2) to retain the nine oil tank steamers claimed by American interests without using them pending a further decision by the Council;
- (3) that the remaining ships be delivered for temporary management to the Allied and Associated Governments according to the decision taken by the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, September 7th, 1919;

- (4) that Mr. Polk, while agreeing to the three above points, reserves to himself the right of again raising the question in the event of not obtaining his Government's approval;
- (5) that Mr. Polk should call his Government's attention to the very urgent needs of oil by France and Italy, which make necessary an immediate decision on the temporary allotment of the German oil tank ships.

3. (The Council had before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 13th (see Appendix E).<sup>3</sup>

*Situation in  
Hungary*

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented upon Sir George Clerk's telegram. This telegram showed that Friedrich was very obstinate and that the formation of a coalition cabinet met with great difficulties. Sir George Clerk had felt it necessary to inform Friedrich that his mission would come to an end if the present situation continued. He, Sir Eyre Crowe, had also read a telegram in the *Morning Post* that a coalition government had been formed at Budapest and would assume office. However, he had only seen this in the newspaper; and it seemed that Mr. Polk had received a telegram from General Bandholtz stating that the situation was still very acute at Budapest, and that Sir George Clerk had declared he would have to leave.

M. BERTHELOT alluded to declarations which the Hungarian War Minister had made on the entry of the National Hungarian Army in Budapest. These declarations were of a purely monarchist tendency and were clearly in favour of the return of Archduke Joseph.

MR. POLK said that from a telegram he had just received from General Bandholtz, Admiral Horthy was making a number of arrests and that Sir George Clerk and his Inter-Allied Military Mission had threatened to withdraw if these arrests were continued.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it advisable to await further information before doing anything.

(The question was then adjourned.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that M. Venizelos had made a protest against the declaration in the letter which the Supreme Council had recently sent to him to the effect that the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks should have a temporary character.<sup>4</sup> He would like this question brought up at the next meeting as he did not wish such a statement to go unchallenged.

*Occupation of Smyrna  
by the Greeks*

5. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated November 14, 1919 on the subject. (See Appendix F).)

*Detention in the United  
States of ex-German  
passenger vessels allo-  
cated to Great Britain  
for Management*

SIR EYRE CROWE said he felt all the more embarrassed at raising a subject which he knew was likewise embarrassing to his American colleague especially after the conciliatory spirit just shown by Mr. Polk; he was obliged, however, to bring it up according to the instruc-

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This appendix was identical with No. 23, appendix B, q.v.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 20, appendix A.

tions he had received. He believed it was not claimed by anybody that the Shipping Board had any right to retain the ships in question, but unfortunately, perhaps on account of the President's illness, which gave opportunities of administrative independence, nobody seemed to be in a position to give the Shipping Board the necessary instructions. Possibly also the Board was confusing this question with that of the oil tank ships and was adopting an attitude which seemed to him one of mere retaliation. The need for these ships was very acute. A very large number of passengers were awaiting transportation. Civilians, including business men, could not go to the East this year owing to the lack of passenger vessels. The vessels in question had enormous tonnage and included the *Imperator* a ship of over 50,000 tons. These vessels had been temporarily allocated to the United States for the repatriation of its army. As it had been unanimously decided at a meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive in July 1919 that all the steamers under discussion should be allocated to Great Britain for management, British crews had been sent to New York to bring them back but the Shipping Board had refused to give them up. The State Department agreed with the British Government but said it had no authority over the Shipping Board. The British Government had instructed him to present this memorandum to the Supreme Council believing that a resolution of the Council would oblige the Shipping Board to deliver the vessels and that it might help the American Government to get over the difficulty.

MR. POLK said that he could not quite agree with all Sir Eyre Crowe had said on the subject. It seemed impossible for the Council to arrive at a resolution, which required a unanimous vote, as he could hardly be expected to join in a formal request to his own government. He would, however, cable to Washington Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal and state that such a resolution was before the Council.

It was decided:

that the American Delegation would cable to Washington the resolution proposed by the British Delegation to the effect that the Supreme Council address a formal request to the United States Government to hand over without delay, to properly appointed agents of the British Government, the passenger vessels illegally detained in United States ports.

6. (The Council had before it the report of the Special Committee (see Appendix G).<sup>5</sup>)

*Report of the Special  
Committee on the Re-  
sumption of Diplomatic  
Relations with Germany*

M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the report. He added that the paragraph on page 5 of the report relating to the credentials of the Ambassador should be modified in accordance with the present attitude of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers toward Germany.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This undated report was presented in accordance with the resolution of the Supreme Council recorded in No. 6, minute 5. The commission recommended that the names of the *Chargés d'Affaires* nominated to represent each one of the Allied and Associated Powers in Berlin should be notified to the German Government through the intermediary of the neutral Power which had during the First World War protected the

MR. POLK stated that the United States was not then in a position to send representatives, but he would make no objection to the report.

It was decided:

to accept the report as presented by the Special Committee, it being understood that the credentials of the Ambassador should be modified to

interests in Germany of the Allied Power in question. 'But it would only be a mere notification, not a request for acceptance. In fact, the Commission unanimously considered that it was not necessary to ask for the acceptance of the nomination of the *Chargés d'Affaires*, on account of the present conditions of our relations with Germany, and of the long interruption of diplomatic relations caused by the war.' The report included a draft letter from an Allied Power to the neutral protecting power and draft credentials for Allied *Chargés d'Affaires* and, when subsequently nominated, Ambassadors. These drafts, and more particularly the latter, were subsequently modified by corrigenda circulated by the Joint Secretariat on November 24, 1919 in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council. (Thus the second paragraph of the draft credentials for an Allied Ambassador at Berlin ran in the original version: 'The qualities distinguishing M. . . . are for me a sure guarantee of the care he will exercise in fulfilling his high functions so as to conciliate your esteem and your confidence and thus obtain the approval of the Government (of the Republic). It is with this conviction that I beg you to receive him with favour and to have absolute faith and trust in all he will say.' This was amended to read: 'The distinguished qualities of M. . . . are a sure guarantee of the zeal with which he will acquit himself of his important duties. With this conviction I request that you will receive him, and will give full credit to everything he may say on my behalf.') The report noted that 'these proposed letters do not follow closely the formulas usually employed; the Commission is of opinion that the terms are sufficiently clothed with the courtesy in use in international relations, and that it would be out of place and inopportune to employ at the present time towards Germany formulas containing assurances of friendship and confidence which are usually employed in credentials'.

The report further stated that 'with a view to assuring as soon as possible the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Governments of Bavaria and Saxony, the Commission suggests the following procedure: the *Chargés d'Affaires* sent to Berlin would be bearers of letters addressed by their respective Ministers for Foreign Affairs to the Ministers-Presidents of Saxony and Bavaria, who also direct Foreign Affairs. These letters would be delivered by a special courier, who might be one of the secretaries belonging to the missions accredited to Berlin, these missions coming to an understanding among themselves as to the choice of this collective courier.

'On the other hand, as the interpretation of the new German Constitution, as regards relations of the Free States with foreign Governments, presents a certain uncertainty, it is proper that we should not expose ourselves to see Bavaria or Saxony refuse to receive diplomats accredited to them. The Commission is of the opinion that the Allied Governments should limit themselves to informing the Ministers for Foreign Affairs for each State in question, that they "propose" to send a Representative to them. . . .

'The [Com]mission finally considered what would be the composition [?] of Missions accredited to Berlin under the transitory régime preceding the arrival of the Ambassadors. . . . There would be no objection to immediately sending to Berlin agents whose mission would be of an economic character, such as commercial attachés. But, on the contrary, it appeared to them that the presence of military and naval attachés was not desirable at the present time. The existence of numerous commissions of control is, in fact, of a nature to diminish the importance of the task of these offices, whose presence might, on the other hand, be inaccurately interpreted as to mean a tribute of confidence toward the German Military authorities. The Military and Naval attachés should, therefore, be sent to Berlin only at the time when the *Chargés d'Affaires* will be replaced by Ambassadors, in which personnel they will naturally find their place.'

agree with the attitude of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers toward Germany.

7. The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee on the question see Appendix H.

*Instructions to General Masterman regarding the disposal by Germany of Aeronautical Material* M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the proposed instructions.

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

to accept the report of the Drafting Committee relative to instructions to be sent to General Masterman on the disposal by Germany of Aeronautical material.)

8.

*Question of Signature by Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Roumania of the financial arrangements of St. Germain*

[Not printed]<sup>2</sup>

9.

*Return of Austrian Prisoners from Serbia*

[Not printed]

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 17, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 24

##### *Note from the French Delegation*

PARIS, November 16, 1919.

##### *Distribution of Enemy Battleships [Warships]*

The question of the distribution of the enemy battleships was several times discussed by the Supreme Council, without a decision being made. It was also the object of various Notes from the British, French and Italian Delegation[s]. At last, the Naval representatives met a short time ago, and in four meetings examined the possible solutions.

It seems that differences which occurred between the Admirals, as well as the different points of view of the Allies, may now be conciliated by the Supreme Council, in order that, by mutual concessions, a definite solution of this controverted question may be reached.

<sup>6</sup> After a short discussion the Supreme Council decided, at the proposal of the Drafting Committee 'appendix I in original', to invite Roumania and Yugoslavia to sign the two financial arrangements of St. Germain (Treaty Series, 1919, Nos. 14 and 15, Cmd. 458 and 459) 'along with the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty'.

A. The first question to be settled is that of the disposition of the ships: if the ships were to be finally broken up, it would have been absolutely useless to discuss their distribution to such a great length. The British Government, in its Note of October,<sup>7</sup> indicated that it deemed that the ships should be broken up, but left to France and Italy the right to dispose of them according to their wishes. The Japanese Government, on this point, as on the others, concurred in the British opinion. The Italian Government declared itself as willing to accept either of the solutions, but desires to be treated, in this matter, the same as on the others, like France. The American Government, although it maintained its point of view, according to which the ships ought to be sunk, gave to understand, in the course of a semi-official conversation by Mr. Polk, that the United States, although having decided to destroy all ships allotted to her, would not contest the right of France and Italy to dispose of them.

B. The second question is that of the basis of distribution of enemy ships. The French Government is willing to accept the British scheme of distribution of the ships, according to the proportion of the losses suffered in surface ships by the Allied and Associated States, this distribution being based upon the attribution of a number of ships equal in each category to the number of lost ships. The French Navy asks that not only the quantity but the quality of the enemy ships delivered, be taken into consideration, and thinks that the British and American Governments will not make any objections to replacing, in the French share, the ships in bad condition out of the salvaged scuttled ships at Scapa Flow, or of the German Fleet, by ships of a higher value, which might be comprised in their own share, since these ships are destined to be demolished. It seems that the British Government, allowing for mistakes, is willing to accept the French proposal combined with its own. Japan and England (?). The American Admiral suggested that the financial effort of each country be taken as a basis: this suggestion was the only one of its kind, because it appears inadmissible that the loss of ships be not taken into account; moreover, the number of millions spent does not represent the whole national effort of a country. The basis suggested by the Italian Admiral seems complicated: the distribution would be made according to the age and number of lost ships, the age being calculated by taking into account the useful tonnage, the real tonnage, maximum duration and the real age of the ship; as the method of calculation of these different values may vary according to the country, such a basis would run the risk of provoking endless discussion.

It is for the Supreme Council to make a decision: it seems that the simpler the method of distribution will be, the more chances it will have of being practical. It is to be noted that the British, Japanese and French proposals, concerning the dreadnoughts, cruisers and destroyers, are almost identical.

The British suggestion, according to which the method of distribution does not attribute any battleships to the smaller Allied Powers, to the New States and neutrals, was unanimously admitted.

C. The third question is that raised by the request of France for a certain number of surplus ships, as a compensation for the abandonment of its naval construction, for the benefit of the armament not only of her troops but of those of her Allies. The suggestion was made to attribute to France, in addition, and for that reason, a certain number of the Allied cruisers demanded from Germany as penalty for the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow.

The French request was not admitted, so far, by the British Admiralty, which

<sup>7</sup> See appendix B below.

deems that the compensation, which it recognizes as legitimate, is represented by the right of disposing of the ships, instead of sinking them. The Italian Admiralty admits the French request for compensation only if she obtains an appreciably equal compensation, which is justified by the same reasons. The American Admiralty did not concur in the French request.

So stands the question of the distribution of enemy battleships. The various delegations seem to have received from their Governments the necessary authority to adjust the matter.

## APPENDIX B TO NO. 24

### *Enemy Surface Warships—Disposal and Distribution*

16th November, 1919.

#### *Historical Summary*

1. The question has not been separately considered by the Supreme Council since 25th April, when the Peace Treaty with Germany was under discussion. No agreement was reached, and it was decided to leave the question open and merely demand the surrender of certain ships from the Germans in the Treaty. The Italian representative was not present at this meeting.

2. On 25th [27th] June, the Admirals agreed on a draft for submission to the Supreme Council in which they stated their opinion that they could do nothing more until answers to certain questions had been given by the Supreme Council. . . .<sup>8</sup>

To these questions no answer has ever been received from the Supreme Council.

3. After the Scapa Flow sinkings, the matter was touched upon by the Council of Four on 24th and 25th June, and it appears from the notes made by Sir Maurice Hankey, which however were not stenographic, that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson implied that they agreed that France was entitled to special consideration on account of her inability to continue her building, due to the pre-occupation of her naval arsenals with the manufacture of munitions for the war on land, and that Great Britain was willing to include the ships sunk at Scapa in her share and waive her rights regarding the ships remaining at Scapa.<sup>9</sup>

4. Since this date there have been interchanges of letters etc. between some of the representatives of the Five Powers.

5. With a view to endeavouring to obtain a settlement, the British representative submitted a memorandum to the Supreme Council on 10th October.

The French submitted an answering memorandum on 15th October. And the Italians did the same on 22nd October.

Summarised the views expressed are:—

*Britain* wishes all ships to be broken up, the proceeds to be divided in the scale of losses of warships. As a concession to the fact that France and Italy have been unable to build during the war, Britain is ready to agree that the share of these two powers may be embodied in their fleets.

<sup>8</sup> The note here recapitulated the questions and opinions advanced in the document printed in Vol. I, No. 21, appendix B, document 1.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Vol. I, No. 23, minute 5.

*Italy* agrees with the British view; but calculating by the military value of the ships lost she considers that the shares proposed should be counted on their military value and not on numbers only as was proposed by the British.

*France* demands:—

1. *Free Disposal* of all enemy craft by beneficiary Powers.
2. Distribution to be effected on the principle of the assignment *of an equal number of ships* of the same category as those of the lost ships.
3. Manner of distribution to take into account not only the quantity, but the quality of the enemy ships surrendered.
4. Assignment to France of an additional number of units, as compensation for having suspended naval construction for the purpose of equipping not only her own troops, but those of her Allies.

6. The U.S.A. and Japan have not submitted any memoranda to the Supreme Council, but have handed an expression of their views to the Naval Advisers. These are:

*U.S.A.* First. All surrendered German and Austrian naval vessels to be sunk.

Second. All surrendered German and Austrian naval vessels to be destroyed by breaking up.

Third. If neither of these policies can be adopted, and distribution of the surrendered German and Austrian naval vessels becomes inevitable, then the United States will demand its share, based on total National Effort in war against Central Powers. The disposition of any such share awarded to the United States to rest with the United States.

*Japan* agrees with the British memorandum; but on condition that it should be accepted by all the other powers represented and with the reservation that in the case of the principle of free disposal, as proposed by the French authorities, being accepted, it should likewise apply to Japan.

7. Since the above memoranda have been submitted, the Naval Advisers have had frequent meetings to consider the matter, but have been unable to arrive at unanimity regarding the disposal of ships, principally by reason of the fact that the Supreme Council have not given their decision on the points raised by the Admirals' Meeting of 25th [27th] June. The British have now drafted a further proposal which it is hoped may bring about an agreement between the extreme views which have been expressed. This has not yet been considered by the Naval Advisers.

#### APPENDIX C TO NO. 24

##### *British Proposal regarding the Distribution of Enemy Surface Warships*

*14th November, 1919.*

In accordance with the preamble to the naval, military and air clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, with the general spirit of that Treaty and of those concluded with the other enemy powers, all surface warships surrendered by enemy powers shall, with the exception of the few noted in paragraphs 5 and 6 below, be broken up under the superintendence of an Inter-Allied Naval Commission.

2. The proceeds accruing from the breaking up of the warships shall be divided amongst the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the following computation of losses of surface warships sustained by these powers during the war:—

Great Britain . . . . .	70%	} Percentage to be amended to include compensation to—
France . . . . .	10%	
Italy . . . . .	10%	
Japan . . . . .	8%	
U.S.A. . . . .	2%	
		Greece who lost 1 T.B.D.
		Roumania „ 1 T.B.
		Portugal „ 1 Gunboat.

3. Enemy tonnage in the above proportions is to be allocated to each country for breaking up purposes by the Inter-Allied Naval Commission. Should any country be unable to break up its share, the Commission is to allocate it as necessary, preference being given to Allied countries.

4. As regards the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow, Great Britain has stated her willingness to bear the loss arising from that incident; but now that it is probable that compensation will be forthcoming from Germany in material which is not warship construction, Great Britain agrees that such compensation should be divided amongst the Allied and Associated Powers in a similar proportion to the proceeds of breaking up the enemy warships (paragraph 2, above).

5. In view of France and Italy being unable to build warships during the war, owing to their pre-occupation with the war on land, it is proposed that they should be granted the following compensation in warships surrendered from the enemy fleets for use with their fleets or any other purpose they may desire:—

France . . . . .	5 Light Cruisers and 10 T.B.D's.
Italy . . . . .	5 Light Cruisers and 10 T.B.D's.

6. It is further proposed that the Inter-Allied Naval Commission shall loan to each of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers:—

- 1 Battleship
- 1 Light Cruiser
- 3 T.B.D's.

The duration of the loan to be one year, during which time these ships may be used for any purpose, except that of being embodied in the fleets of these powers. On the termination of one year after the arrival of these vessels in a port of the power to which they have been loaned, they must either be broken up under the superintendence of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission or sunk in deep water.

#### APPENDIX D TO NO. 24

1. Telegram from Panac to the British Delegation at the Peace Conference (Nov. 15th, 1919).

Following has been received from Admiral Goette No. 1112 of Nov. 14th, begins:—Reference your Wireless Signal 1237 of 28th October, steps are being taken for the delivery of the tank steamers. Ends.

2. Telegram from the British Ministry of Shipping to the British delegation at the Peace Conference (Nov. 15th, 1919).

Message now received by Panac from Goette that steps are being taken for delivery of tank steamers. Unless Supreme Council decides otherwise management

arrangements previously made will be carried out on their arrival at Firth of Forth. So far as Shipping Controller is concerned no compromise in this matter can be considered.

#### APPENDIX F TO No. 24

#### *Detention in the United States of ex-German Passenger Vessels allocated to Great Britain for Management*

##### *Memorandum by British Delegation*

1. The following ex-German steamers were allocated for temporary management to the United States for the repatriation of their army by the Allied Maritime Transport Council at its fifth meeting in February, 1919:—

<i>Name</i>	<i>Gross Tonnage</i>
Imperator	52,117
Kaiserin Augusta Victoria	24,581
Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm	17,082
Mobile (ex Cleveland)	16,960
Zeppelin	15,200
Cap Finisterre	14,503
Pretoria	13,234
Graf Waldersee	13,193

2. When these steamers were first obtained from Germany in March last, Great Britain, recognizing the vital need of the United States to repatriate their army, fully and frankly acquiesced in these steamers being managed and employed by them, though such action delayed seriously the completion of the British repatriation.

3. The U.S. Government, having subsequently intimated that their repatriation work was complete, and that the steamers were available for other purposes, it was unanimously decided at a meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive in London on the 30th July, 1919, that all the above mentioned steamers should be allocated to Great Britain for management. Mr. Anderson, representing the U.S., was present at this meeting.

4. Subsequently the French Government asked to be allowed to use some of these vessels. To meet this claim, an arrangement between the British and French Governments was arrived at, satisfactory to both parties.

5. The allocation of these steamers is only for temporary management, and does not in any way prejudice the final disposal of the steamers under the treaty of peace.

6. Great Britain's need of these vessels is acute. She has to demobilise her army in India before Christmas. Civilians, including business men, cannot go to the East this year owing to the lack of passenger ships. The waiting list of such passengers to all parts is enormous. Over 25,000 South African passengers are awaiting transportation quite apart from British passengers requiring accommodation. The same, if not worse, applies to India and the East, also to Australia and Canada; Great Britain has to repatriate 400,000 soldiers on long distance work.

7. In the month of September British crews were sent to New York to bring back the S.S. *Imperator* and all arrangements were concluded with the U.S. military and naval authorities to move her, but at the last moment the American Shipping Board interfered and refused to allow the vessel to be delivered to the British representatives, stating that their instructions were that the *Imperator* and the seven other vessels had been assigned to them. All arguments failed to induce them to admit that such was not the case.

8. The vessels are, consequently, lying idle, and His Majesty's Government is incurring a cost of hundreds of pounds daily in feeding and housing these British crews, which were sent to America to bring these ships over.

9. Neither the U.S. Shipping Board nor the U.S. Government have the smallest conceivable right to detain these vessels.

10. The most pressing representations have been made by the British Ambassador at Washington to the U.S. State Department on several occasions, and the State Department admit that the ships ought to be handed over, but its efforts have failed to move the American Shipping Board.

11. Early in October, Sir Joseph Maclay, the British Shipping Controller, made a personal appeal to the Chairman of the American Shipping Board to release these vessels, but with no result.

12. A complete deadlock has been reached owing to the unjustified action of the Shipping Board.

13. In these circumstances the British Government requests the Supreme Council to address a formal request to the U.S. Government to hand over the above mentioned vessels to properly appointed agents of the British Government without delay.

*November 14, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX H TO NO. 24

##### *Draft of Instructions to be sent [to] General Masterman*

Note to be handed to German Government:

According to Article 202, last alinea, of the Peace Treaty, Germany agrees to displace no aeronautic material, this material to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers.

Germany, with a view to escaping this agreement, continually operates the displacement, and even the sale and exportation of this material. By attempting to thus render valueless the obligations which she assumed, she compromises the loyal execution of the Treaty signed and rectified [? ratified] by her.

The Allied and Associated Powers remind Germany that the measures thus taken by her cannot be justified, and that, in consequence, the said displaced, sold or exported material must be delivered to them according to the terms of the Peace Treaty, or, in default thereof, its equivalent value, upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

H. D. 95.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 18, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyte Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Captain Madison, U.S.N., Lt.-Commander Koehler, U.S.N., Dr. J. B. Scott, Mr. A. W. Dulles.  
*British Empire*: Mr. A. Leeper, Commandant [*sic*] Dunne, R.N., Captain Fuller, R.N., Commandant [*sic*] Macnamara, R.N., Mr. H. W. Malkin.  
*France*: M. Loucheur, M. Arnavon, Commandant du Chayla.  
*Italy*: Amiral Cagni, M. Vannutelli-Rey, Captain Ruspoli, Commandant Ingianni, M. Pilotti.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

I.

*Report of the Reparation Commission on the Demands presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of the Distribution of Austro-Hungarian Mercantile Tonnage*

[Not printed]<sup>1</sup>

2. M. PICHON observed that this question depended on the decision to be taken on the previous question, which had been adjourned. He proposed likewise to adjourn the discussion of this point to the following meeting.

(This was agreed to.)

3. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that it was necessary to fix a date for signing the Treaty with Bulgaria.  
*Signature of the Austrian Treaty by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation* M. BERTHELOT pointed out that certain questions of detail had still to be settled before the signature could take place. The signature of Serbia was dependent on a prior settlement of the question of distribution of Austro-Hungarian mercantile tonnage. Within eight days

<sup>1</sup> The discussion of this subject (cf. No. 19, note 2, and No. 20, minute 8) 'was adjourned until the following meeting'.

the Council would know whether or not it could count on obtaining the signature of Roumania. Moreover, the Council had decided, upon the request of Switzerland, to insert in the Bulgarian Treaty articles guaranteeing Swiss neutrality. As far as the Bulgarians were concerned, no difficulties would be raised in this connection, but it would still be necessary to inform them of this matter upon the arrival of their delegates in Paris, which would take place the following day. These various considerations made it evident that the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty could not take place before the following Wednesday or Thursday.

(After a short discussion, Thursday, November 27th, was settled upon as the date for the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty.)

4. M. CLEMENCEAU felt inclined simply to reply to M. Venizelos that the Council adhered integrally to the text of the letter it had sent him on November 12th.<sup>3</sup> M. Berthelot could undertake the preparation of this letter.

*Consideration of letters of November 15th and 17th from M. Venizelos relative to the situation in Smyrna. (See Appendices B and C<sup>2</sup>)*

M. DE MARTINO agreed entirely with M. Clemenceau's suggestion. He wished to correct a misleading phrase in M. Venizelos' letter of November 15th (see Appendix B). It was there said (see page 2)<sup>4</sup> that the Commission on Greek Territorial Claims had categorically approved the Greek claims on Smyrna and the neighbouring region. He felt obliged then to point out that the Italian representative on that Commission had always contested the Greek claims.

It was decided:

- (1) that M. Berthelot prepare a letter to be sent to M. Venizelos informing him that the Supreme Council adhered integrally to the point of view set forth in its letter of November 12th;
- (2) that the above letter be signed by the President in the name of the Supreme Council and despatched immediately.

5. (The Council had before it a telegram from Sir George Clerk dated November 16th (see Appendix D).)

*Situation in Hungary*

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented upon this telegram. He pointed out that the information contained therein was less satis-

<sup>2</sup> Appendix C is not printed. In this letter M. Venizelos replied to the Supreme Council's request for information formulated in the penultimate paragraph of its letter to him of November 12 (see No. 20, appendix A). M. Venizelos stated that he had just been informed by the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna that 'in conformity with the proposals of General Milne approved by the Supreme Council, the Greek troops, after having occupied their new positions in the Pergame sector, were obliged to cross the line in the direction of Soma, because of an aggression by Turkish bands, to pursue and disperse the assailants. Having achieved this purpose, they hastened to return to their original position. This action took place by virtue of a new authorization from General Milne by the terms of which Greek troops may, in defending themselves, counter attack and pursue the enemy beyond their line to a distance of three kilometers, under the obligation of returning to their original line after having dispersed the enemy. Mr. Sterghiadis adds that the use made of this authorization was brought to the attention of General Harboursy [Harbord?], representative of General Milne, who formulated no observations nor reserves.'

<sup>3</sup> See No. 20, appendix A.

<sup>4</sup> The penultimate paragraph of the letter.

factory, that arrests of certain political leaders were taking place at Budapest, and that if the situation did not improve, Sir George Clerk might be obliged to carry out the threat which he had already several times made of leaving Hungary.

(Discussion of this question was adjourned pending the receipt of more precise information.)

6. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that as a result of the conversation he had had that morning with the French Naval Expert it had become apparent that the point of view set forth in the latest British proposition was an entirely new one. He found it difficult to reach immediately a decision on such an important point in the absence of the Minister of Marine who was at that moment not in Paris. He felt that the Minister of Marine would not be disinclined to agree with the British proposals. Up to that time his own point of view had been somewhat different, but the new arguments presented to him had rather shaken his convictions and he was quite ready to change his previous point of view in order to arrive at an agreement. Nevertheless he wished time for reflection. He could not indeed pretend that the idea of destroying the vessels would not be very unfavourably received by French public opinion. If a solution of that nature were adopted, at the very least it would be necessary to draw up a statement clearly setting forth the reasons which militated in favour of that solution. Unfortunately the present state of the French navy was so regrettable that French public opinion would not understand why the navy should not use the share of German ships which were allotted to it. At any rate it would be necessary to act with due consideration for French public opinion which was acutely interested in this question.

(The discussion of this question was adjourned.)

7. MR. POLK wished to call attention to the fourth paragraph of the decision relative to German Oil Tank Ships in the Minutes of the preceding meeting (H. D. 94,<sup>5</sup> Minute 2), which did not entirely conform to what he had said. What he had actually said was that he would undertake to transmit to his Government Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal, recommending its adoption, and that in the meantime the 9 oil tank ships of the Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft should be retained without being used.

M. DE PERCIN asked if the remaining tankers could at once be used, as was set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the decision in question.

MR. POLK replied in the affirmative.

It was decided:

that paragraph 4 of the decision relative to German Oil Tank Ships (meeting of November 17th, 1919, H. D. 94,<sup>5</sup> Minute 2), should be modified to read as follows:

'(4) that Mr. Polk would transmit to his Government the foregoing pro-

<sup>5</sup> No. 24.

posals of Sir Eyre Crowe and recommend the adoption thereof, and that in the meantime the 9 oil tank ships claimed by American interests should be retained without being used."

8. M. FROMAGEOT explained that the question of German ships transferred to Dutch Navigation Companies had been brought up by a note of the Council demanding that the Germans retain the 5 vessels in course of construction which they claimed to have legally transferred to Holland in 1915 and 1916. The Dutch Government had protested against this note and maintained that the Dutch Navigation Companies were legal owners of the vessels in question. The Dutch note had been replied to and Germany had replied to the note which had been sent it.<sup>6</sup> The question raised was the validity of a change of flag during the course of a war of a vessel belonging to a belligerent country. That question had not been juridically decided in an identical manner by all the Allied and Associated Powers. In France a very ancient rule was followed which had been laid down at the time of the war of American Independence by an Ordinance of 1778. That ordinance settled that no ship could avail itself of a neutral flag if that neutral flag had been acquired in the course of the war. The French had never ceased to apply that rule. In America and England the system followed was apparently different, and a transfer made in good faith was considered valid in principle; but if account were taken of the jurisprudence of prize courts it would be seen that in practice decisions were in general similar to those arrived at in France. In any case, as it might well be embarrassing to ask their Allies to adopt a course that would not be fully consistent with the juridical principles which they accepted theoretically, he thought, in agreement with his colleagues, that it would be preferable not to reply to the German note until the Treaty had come into force. The Treaty specified (see Part VIII, Annex III, paragraph 7) that Germany must secure for herself the full title to the property in all those ships that were transferred during the war. Basing their position upon that very definite text, the Allied and Associated Powers would be legally justified in demanding from the Germans delivery, pure and simple, of those vessels, without needing to engage in theoretical and obscure discussions upon the validity of the transfers.

(After a short discussion

It was decided:

not to reply before the Treaty came into force to the German note upon the German vessels transferred during the war to Dutch navigation companies.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 18, 1919.*

<sup>6</sup> See Vol. I, No. 74, minute 1, and in the present volume No. 12, minute 6 and No. 13, minute 6.

## APPENDIX B TO NO. 25

GREEK DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONGRESS.

PARIS, *November 15, 1919.*

From: M. E. K. Venizelos

To: M. Clemenceau.

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the letter which Your Excellency was kind enough to send me on November 12, relative to the Commission of Inquiry of Smyrna.<sup>3</sup>

Owing to the spirit of friendly confidence inspiring the answer of the Supreme Council to the written claims and verbal reserves which I had the honour to set forth, I think it my duty not to insist on the errors in the investigation, consequent to the incontestable irregularities committed in the course of the procedure adopted by the Commission.

But it would be a slight on the respectful sincerity of the sentiments which I always expressed to the Supreme Council, to not point out to the benevolent attention of the Council the reflections suggested to me, on two points, by the answer given.

In the first place, the Supreme Council expresses the hope that the dangerous tension, which seems still to exist on the boundaries of the zone of Greek occupation, will be, little by little, reduced by the wisdom and justice of the Greek administration and thanks to the work of delimitation recently terminated by General Milne, Commander of the Allied Forces in Anatolia.

The Supreme Council may entirely rely upon the maintenance of a perfect order in the zone of occupation of the Greek Army. But it would be a misunderstanding of the reality of the facts which provoked this dangerous tension, existing on the boundaries of the zone of occupation, to expect its reduction by the effects of Greek administration. In fact, its vigilance is all exercised within these boundaries while the tension referred to above results from attacks launched from outside. Their authors are not only free to organize them, but they were under the impression of being encouraged to do so by the procedure of the investigation in which they discerned disfavour for the Greek regime. Therefore, they continued their powerless aggressions again and again, as the risks were reduced by the fact that Greek troops had to limit themselves to repulsing them without authority to pursue them.

An objective examination of the facts leads to the conclusion that the good order existing in the zone of Greek occupation will be as well assured beyond its limits as soon as the Turks, deprived of the hope of finding support in instigating trouble, will really become conscious of their defeat. This result will certainly be obtained by the definite decisions of the Peace Conference.

In the second place, the Supreme Council notices that the occupation of Smyrna was only decided for political reasons, and constitutes no new right in the future. May I point out that, whatever be the reasons for the decision to send Greek troops to Smyrna, the Supreme Council could not be mistaken as to the interpretation given it, with good reasons, by the Greek Government and people. The Greek claims on Smyrna and the neighbouring region were not only well-known, but they had been officially formulated to the Conference, defended at length before the Supreme Council, and frankly approved by the Committee on Greek Territorial Claims. In occupying Smyrna, Greece knew that [?if] she was not yet legally, she was at least morally, entitled to it. She did not simply send her troops as

executive instruments to a foreign country, as she had previously done in Russia, but as organs most interested in the success of an international mandate, with a view to maintaining order in an essentially great country. Therefore, although the occupation of Smyrna did not constitute, from a strictly juridical point of view, a new right to the benefit of Greece, in fact, it has created a new situation which should not be disregarded. It does not extend the rights which Greece previously had in Smyrna, and already recognized by the Committee on Greek Affairs, but at least it corroborates them and strengthens the legitimate confidence of the Greek nation in the final decision of the Peace Conference.

I entirely share this sentiment, as I am convinced that the rights of my country in Smyrna are in full accord with the general situation of the world, and with the wishes and interests of the population.

Please accept, etc.

E. K. VENIZELOS

#### APPENDIX D TO NO. 25

*Telegram from Sir G. Clerk, Budapest, to Supreme Council*

*November 16, 1919.*

No. 8.

Order has so far been completely maintained and general life of city is quite normal but there have occurred instances of unauthorized arrests and attempted arrests of prominent socialists and social democrats. These are people who have been in consultation with me and in negotiation with present government in regard to formation of a coalition. I have made strongest possible representations to government who assures me incidents are completely unauthorized acts of individual officers or soldiers. This may be so but instances are all the more significant of lack of authority of government. I have said that I can only regard arrests of political leaders with whom both I and government are in consultation as deliberate insults to Allies and that unless I have formal and definite guarantees that no one will be molested in this way I shall leave Budapest at once.

#### No. 26

H. D. 96.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, November 19, 1919, at 11.00 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire:* Sir Eyt Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France:* M. Clemenceau, M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy:* M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan:* M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire:* Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France:* M. de Percin. *Italy:* M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*U.S.A.*: Dr. I. Bowman, Mr. A. W. Dulles, Lt.-Commander Koehler,  
U.S.N.

*British Empire*: Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. Forbes-Adam.

*France*: General Payot, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Kammerer,  
M. de Montille.

*Italy*: M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1.

[Not printed]<sup>1</sup>

*Treaty between  
Greece and Bulgaria*

2.

[Not printed]<sup>2</sup>

*Signature of  
Minorities Treaty  
with Roumania*

3. (The Council had before it a telegram from the Esthonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated November 12th (see Appendix C).)  
*Request of the Esthonians for the establishment of a neutral zone between the Baltic States and Russia under the control of a third State* M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the telegram. He said that this request tended to replace the local troops in those territories by Allied troops. He thought this would not be an enviable position for the Allies to be in between the Bolsheviks and the Baltic States, and that it would imply a sort of agreement between the Allies and the Bolsheviks.

<sup>1</sup> The Supreme Council considered a report from the Committee on New States, dated November 17, 1919, and an annexed 'draft agreement on Balkan emigration' (appendix A in original). This report and draft agreement are printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 527-34. After some discussion the Supreme Council decided: '(1) to submit to the Bulgarian Delegation the Treaty between Greece and Bulgaria with regard to reciprocal emigration; (see Appendix A [*v. sup.*]); (2) that two days' time be given to the Bulgarian Delegation to consider this text; (3) that the question whether the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign this Treaty would be considered later. It was further decided: that Mr. Polk should refer to Washington the question of the signature of this Treaty by the United States.' (This decision is printed *ibid.*, vol. xiii, pp. 537-8.)

<sup>2</sup> The Supreme Council considered a note on this subject, dated November 18, 1919, from the Committee on New States (appendix B in original). This note is printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, p. 542. After some discussion the Supreme Council decided: '(1) that no answer was called for by the Roumanian note relating to the Minorities Treaty, and that no further action be taken until an answer had been received from the Roumanian Government to the note of November 15th [see No. 23, minute 2]; (2) that if that answer were in the affirmative the Roumanian Delegation should be required immediately to put their observations before the Committee on New States; (3) that the Committee on New States should within twenty-four hours present a report to the Supreme Council on those observations; it being understood that the Minorities Treaty could not be modified in its general principles, but only in respect of such articles, e.g. 10, 11 and 12, as purely concerned Roumania. (See appendix B [*v. sup.*]).' This decision is printed *ibid.*, vol. xiii, p. 543.

M. CLEMENTEAU said that he felt perfectly sure that it was the unanimous opinion of the Council that such a request should not be granted.

It was decided:

not to grant the request of the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs for the establishment of a neutral zone between the Baltic States and Russia under the control of a third State, to be appointed by the Conference. (See Appendix C.)

4. The Council had before it a letter from the Secretary General of the Polish Delegation (see Appendix D.)<sup>3</sup>

*Note from the Polish Delegation, requesting that the Arrangement regarding Galicia be communicated to them*

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the letter. He added that the Council had already decided on November 17th to hear the Polish Delegates without communicating the report to them. He would ask the Polish Delegates to appear before the Council at the following

meeting.

- 3.

*Organization of  
Plebiscite Zones  
in Germany*

[Not printed]<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This letter, dated November 17, 1919, acknowledged receipt of a letter dated November 12, 1919, which M. Dutasta had addressed to the Polish delegation in consequence of the decisions of the Supreme Council of November 11, recorded in No. 19, minute 7. The letter from the Polish delegation stated that 'the Polish Plenipotentiary Delegates, Messrs. Ladislas Grabski and Stanislas Patek have arrived in Paris and are ready to comply with the invitation of the Supreme Council. The Polish Delegates would be pleased to become acquainted with the new draft of statute for Eastern Galicia, before they set forth their observations on the said statute.'

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. In opening the discussion of this matter 'General Le Rond said that the question of transferring the sovereignty over the territories subject to a plebiscite had to be settled between the Commissions of the Allies and the German delegates, who had just arrived. The different plebiscite commissions had been organized since November 10, but they had had great difficulty in getting their personnel: some of the members were still in Rome, others in London, trying to get it together. That was one reason why the discussion with the German delegates had not started. The questions to be discussed with the Germans arose from the application of the Treaty.' General Le Rond outlined these questions of organization and after a brief discussion the Supreme Council decided: '(1) that in the course of negotiations with the German Delegates appointed to sign the protocol the German Government should be asked to appoint to each Government Commission an official who, having been accepted by the Commission, would act as an intermediary between the Central German Government and the Commissions; (2) that financial representatives be appointed by each Power to prepare, together with General Le Rond, a report on the financial questions relative to the organization of plebiscite areas and to the occupation of Dantzic and Memel. (Mr. Polk made the reservation that the United States Government could not be represented on this Commission as the Treaty with Germany had not yet been ratified by the Senate.)'

With reference to the subject of resolution (1) General Le Rond had observed that the appointment of such a German official was particularly desirable in connexion with matters of economic organization. With reference to the subject of resolution (2) the general observed that all expenses were to be charged against local revenues, present and future, but since

6. GENERAL PAYOT said that Marshal Foch's staff had examined the question of transportation of troops and supplies with the representatives of the Allied Armies and had drafted a memorandum which could be transmitted to the German Delegates who would have 48 hours to examine the proposal. If the Germans accepted this, the question would be settled; otherwise the Allied Delegates might see the German Delegates and come to an agreement with them. He pointed out that in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans, the question who would pay those expenses arose and as he had not known what the Council's decision would be, a non-committal formula had been adopted.

SIR EYRE CROWE said there could be no doubt whatsoever that the cost of transportation of troops and of supplies was included in the costs of occupation and therefore should be borne by the States to whom attribution of territories would be made.

GENERAL PAYOT remarked that the cost of the transportation of troops alone would amount to approximately 5,000,000 marks.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, in order not to give the Germans the impression that all costs were being imposed on them, it should be made clear in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans that the costs of transportation were to be borne by the States to whom attribution of said territories would ultimately be made.

It was decided:

- (1) that a memorandum should be submitted to the German Delegates regarding the transportation of troops and supplies in the plebiscite areas;
- (2) that the cost of transportation of troops and supplies in the plebiscite areas should be a charge against the States to whom attribution of these territories would be made and that a phrase to that effect would be put in the memorandum to be submitted to the Germans;
- (3) that a delay of 48 hours be given them for examination.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 19, 1919.*

current local revenues in the plebiscite area would be insufficient to meet the charges it was necessary to consider possible temporary apportionments, as between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Poland, and Germany, of expenses to be met by financial advances; these expenses were of three main kinds: those of administration by local officials, of the maintenance of forces of occupation, and of maintaining the Plebiscite Commissions. 'Sir Eyre Crowe said that it was difficult to solve that question without the advice of financial experts. The argument, however, did not take into account cases like Danzig and Memel. Neither Poland nor Germany were concerned there. The matter would have to be referred to his Government.'

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 26

### PEACE CONFERENCE, PARIS.

Telegram. S.S. Revai 2375 12 126 12 18 42.

I am directed by the Conference of the Delegates of the Balkan [Baltic] States of the Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to inform you that the Conference has decided that in the event of an armistice being possible between the Baltic States and the *de facto* Government of Russia, a neutral zone should be established between the Russian front and the Baltic States under the administration of a third State. Consequently, I have the honour to request the Peace Conference to entrust a State with the organization and control of the Administration in the neutral zone in order that the execution of the clauses of the eventual Treaty may be guaranteed.

ESTHONIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

### No. 27

H. D. 97.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, November 20, 1919, at 10.00 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Henry White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Pichon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Colonel J. A. Logan, Dr. I. Bowman, Captain Madison, U.S.N., Mr. A. W. Dulles.  
*British Empire*: Lieut.-Col. Kisch, Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. MacFadyean, Mr. Carr.  
*France*: M. Laroche, General Le Rond, M. de Montille.  
*Italy*: M. D'Amelio, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. SIR EYRE CROWE called the Council's attention to the importance of definitely settling the conditions of Peace to be submitted to the Hungarians. The latest news from Budapest indicated that a coalition Government was in process of formation. He had just received two telegrams from Sir George Clerk (see Appendices A and B<sup>1</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> Appendix B is not printed. It contained a brief telegram, No. 10, dated from Budapest on November 18, 1919, in which Sir G. Clerk stated: 'In view of the remarkable order and tranquillity which has signalled withdrawal of Roumanians and entry of Hungarian forces, mission of generals and I agree that despatch of further allied officers asked for in my telegram No. 6 [see No. 20, appendix E] is no longer necessary.'

which contained favourable news. A final, definite draft should be ready for submission by the time the Hungarians were in a position to send negotiators to Paris. But to arrive at such a final draft certain questions which were still undecided would have to be settled. The most important one related to the expenses caused by Roumanian occupation of Hungary and the means of meeting the same. If that point were now brought up for discussion it might take months to settle it. He thought it would be well to study the suggestion of the American legal experts that a clause should be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary giving the Reparation Commission power to settle that whole question in view of existing circumstances. The Drafting Committee might be asked to come at once to an agreement with the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission in order to draft such a clause. Another question to be settled related to the cession of Fiume; a formula to that effect would have to be found which could be inserted in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He thought that the Drafting Committee could likewise be charged with that task.

M. BERTHELOT observed that as soon as the two points mentioned by Sir Eyre Crowe had been settled the Hungarian Treaty would be entirely ready for submission to the Hungarian Delegates.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Drafting Committee, in agreement with the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, should prepare a draft article to be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary giving the Reparation Commission full power to settle the questions raised by the expenses of Roumanian occupation of Hungary;
- (2) that the Drafting Committee be charged with the preparation of a draft clause to be inserted in the Treaty with Hungary relating to the cession of Fiume by Hungary.

2.

*Report of the Committee  
on Organization of the  
Reparation Commission  
relating to the demands  
of the Serb-Croat-  
Slovene Delegation on  
the subject of the distri-  
bution of Austro-  
Hungarian mercantile  
tonnage*

[Not printed]<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> M. Loucheur read and commented upon this undated report (appendix C in original). 'He was glad to be able to state that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, at a meeting attended by Italian and Jugo-Slav Representatives, had reached a unanimous decision. The formula agreed upon seemed to him a good one. With respect to vessels of less than 2,000 tons the owners were to be left a free choice of flag in accordance with their nationality. It was understood that further agreement would be reached with respect to vessels of greater tonnage and that Jugo-Slav Delegates would be heard at the moment of reaching such an agreement.' The Supreme Council approved the recommendations of the Committee.

*Report of the Committee  
on Organization of the  
Reparation Commission  
on the provisional distri-  
bution of rolling stock  
between states forming  
part of the former  
Austro-Hungarian  
Monarchy*

[Not printed]<sup>3</sup>

4. The Council had before it a report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the terms of a loan of \$100,000,000. by way of payment for the provisioning of Austria during the next six months 'see Appendix E.' *Report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the terms of a loan of \$100,000,000 by way of payment for the provisioning of Austria during the next six months* M. LOUCHEUR said that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had examined the unanimous report submitted to it by the sub-commission sitting at Vienna. That sub-commission recommended as essential a loan to Austria of \$100,000,000 to cover the supply of food-stuffs and coal of which Austria would have need during the next six months. The action contemplated was of a very important character and evidently necessitated a careful study on the part of the Governments interested. Moreover a loan, however large, would not suffice to smooth away all difficulties. It was not only money that was needed; cars<sup>4</sup> and food were especially necessary. He had recently had a conversation with Mr. Benes. Apparently everything needed in the way of sugar, coal and shoes could be found in Czecho-Slovakia. Czecho-Slovakia had shown a willingness to join the consortium to be created with the object of restoring the economic life of Austria. On the other hand, it was essential to supply Vienna with grain. Grain was already scarce in Vienna and within three weeks it would be completely lacking. The Serbian portion of the Banat alone seemed in a position to furnish the necessary grain. He expected to see M. Trumbitch very soon and, if the Council did not object, to bring some pressure to bear on him to hasten the despatch to Austria of the grain which Jugo-Slavia had contracted to deliver and of which it had not yet delivered half. He himself thought that it became a question of a

<sup>3</sup> M. Loucheur explained the British note of November 13, 1919, on this subject 'appendix D in original: see No. 22, minute 5 and note 5). The Supreme Council decided: '(1) that the question of the nomination of a Commission to sit at Vienna for the distribution of rolling stock between the States forming a part of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy be referred to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission which, if its sub-commission specially charged with Austrian questions should reach a unanimous decision in favour of said nomination, should take the measures necessary to carry such decision into effect; (2) that if the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission or its sub-commission should not reach a unanimous decision, the question should again come before the Council at an early meeting.'

<sup>4</sup> i.e. railway trucks.

direct loan from Serbia to Austria and he would likewise confer with M. Trumbitch on that point. The Allied and Associated Powers in his opinion should only concern themselves with additional loans. Each Government would of course have to determine the extent of the financial aid which it was ready to give to the work of the rebuilding of Austria. He had not yet been able to see the French Minister of Finance on that point. He pointed out that the Government of the United States had several times declared that it could not participate in the loan in question. The United States pointed out that as they had made large advances to the Allies it was incumbent upon the latter to make the financial arrangements which they judged essential with the States of Central Europe.

MR. WHITE observed that the Government of the United States had already several times defined its position on that question. In order to summarize the question without unduly taking up the Council's time, he wished simply to read the following memorandum:

'Paris, November 19, 1919.

'The United States Government understands that this note from the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission must be passed on to the governments or the treasuries of the several Allied and Associated Powers.

'The American Delegation desires to point out that the point of view of the United States was brought to the attention of the O.C.R.C. by a note presented at the Plenary Meeting of Friday, September 17, 1919, and by numerous notes and memoranda presented to the O.C.R.C. and its several sub-committees from time to time since then. All these notes and memoranda have been distributed among the various Delegations.

'It is requested that the various governments or treasuries consider carefully the various American notes and memoranda in reaching a decision.

'The American Delegation refers particularly to the American memoranda presented at the meeting of the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission on November 6, 1919 (17th Meeting) and the Extraordinary-Plenary-Meeting of November 11, 1919.'

M. DE MARTINO said that in short it was a question of making an important loan to Austria. It seemed to him that it was not for the Council, but for the respective Governments, to reach a decision on that question.

M. LOUCHEUR said that it was only a question of the Council submitting a plan for the approval of the respective Governments.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the situation was as follows: the Council had before it a unanimous report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission. He had transmitted the same to his Government. It did not seem to him that M. Loucheur's views corresponded entirely with the plan of action, which was to reach an agreement between the various Governments as soon as possible. He felt obliged to state, moreover, that he had been informed from London that Great Britain could not consent to make a loan if America did not make one. He had received two telegrams

from Vienna which showed the situation to be desperate. The first telegram, dated November 19th, said that within a week flour would be completely lacking at Vienna unless immediate measures were taken, and that snow-falls threatened to interrupt traffic between Vienna and Trieste, which would have disastrous consequences. The Communist Party intended to take advantage of the threatened famine to create disorders, and as the Government was greatly weakened serious consequences were to be expected. A second telegram dated the same day stated that the railroad from Trieste was still open thus permitting the immediate despatch of flour to Vienna. The telegram added that strikes were imminent in Vienna, and also in the Province of Styria. The result of this was that the situation was most alarming and that some action must be taken within a week. He was informed that negotiations had taken place between Great Britain and Italy with a view of sending to Vienna a part of the grain then at Trieste, which would be paid for by the remainder of a loan of \$2,000,000. It seemed to him that the grain could be shipped to Vienna without awaiting a final settlement of the question of credits.

M. DE MARTINO said that he would recommend favourably to his Government Sir Eyre Crowe's suggestion. He wished also [to] point out that Italy had already sent a large quantity of food to Austria.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed fully with Sir Eyre Crowe. He thought it absolutely essential that the grain then at Trieste be immediately sent to Vienna. Moreover, he would see the Minister of Finance. He thought it important to submit immediately to the respective Governments the report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission then before the Council. Modifications, which a closer study of the question might seem to render necessary, could later on be suggested.

M. DE MARTINO called the Council's attention to the first paragraph of the conclusions of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission (see page 3 of the Report,<sup>5</sup> Appendix E). It was there stated that the Austrian Government should forthwith prohibit by law the sale, transfer or disposal, outside of Austria or to other than Austrian nationals, of any assets of the country, either publicly or privately owned. That provision seemed to him unduly restrictive; its effect would be to prohibit all commerce with foreigners. The measures proposed should, he thought, only affect public property, or at the very most, real property belonging to individuals.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the paragraph criticized by M. de Martino would be studied anew; that, however, should not hinder the submission to the various Governments of the report in its present form. He wished to point out that said first paragraph, among other points, was aimed at the question of works of art, which had given rise to certain difficulties.

M. DE MARTINO replied that, in conformity with the Treaty of Saint Germain, his Government was conducting pourparlers on that subject with the Austrian Government.

M. MATSUI feared that the geographic situation of Japan would make it

<sup>5</sup> The first sub-paragraph of the penultimate paragraph of the report.

difficult for his Government to render effective aid in a matter of such great urgency. However, he would not fail to telegraph his Government.

It was decided:

- (1) that the report of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission on the terms of a loan of one hundred million dollars (\$100,000,000) by way of payment for the provisioning of Austria during the next six months (see Appendix E) be submitted by the various Delegations for the examination of their respective Governments;
- (2) that the first paragraph of the conclusions of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, beginning with the words, 'First: Require the Austrian Government forthwith . . .' be examined again by the said Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

5. M. LOUCHEUR, before leaving the room, wished to call the Council's attention to the serious results, from the point of view of the execution of the Treaty, of the delay in the exchange of ratifications. The Germans had to make a series of deliveries the details whereof had to be settled before December 31st. With respect to coal, for instance, under the terms of the Treaty the Germans had to furnish fifteen hundred thousand tons per month; as the Treaty was not yet in force they had furnished only five hundred and ten thousand tons the preceding month and it was probable that their November deliveries would be even smaller. On the other hand, with respect to personal property, the Allied and Associated Powers were unable to consummate any of the necessary arrangements. It would be easy to cite examples showing how serious a matter was the delay in the deposit of ratifications.

M. BERTHELOT said that the date of exchange of ratifications could not be fixed before Germany had made known its intentions with respect to signing the Protocol. Moreover, the organization of the Plebiscite Commissions would have to be completed. Everyone was unanimous in wishing that the Treaty enter into force as soon as possible. But, certain questions had to be settled first. Among them might be mentioned the negotiations between Poland and Germany, whose transfer to Paris had been requested by Poland.

M. LOUCHEUR thought certainly that before the exchange of ratifications the Germans should be made to sign the Protocol relative to violations of Armistice clauses. But it did not seem to him that the question of Germano-Polish negotiations was germane to the putting into force of the Treaty. With respect to the Commissions, he thought that the Allied and Associated Powers could dictate their decisions to the Germans and that long negotiations would consequently be unnecessary. In any event, he wished to insist that the putting into force of the Treaty should not be indefinitely postponed. The Allied and Associated Powers were running the risk of being foreclosed with respect to certain of their demands. The Germans should at once be notified of a date on which the Treaty would be put into force. If they

created difficulties the responsibility for delay would at least lie at their door. Moreover, the Allied and Associated Powers possessed the means of bringing effective pressure to bear upon the Germans. The latter could be prevented from disposing of their foreign securities which they had great need of selling in order to procure foodstuffs.

GENERAL LE ROND called the Council's attention to the difficulties experienced by the Commissions in recruiting the necessary personnel. The British Treasury had not yet given an answer on the question of allowances to members of Commissions. That delay made recruiting very difficult. A Commission had been established to examine into the financial organization of plebiscite zones and it was necessary that an agreement on that point be reached before the negotiations with the German Delegates could advantageously be begun.

M. PICHON proposed to settle upon December 1st as the date of exchange of ratifications.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that the Germans must be notified of that date and told that they would accordingly have to sign the Protocol before December 1st.

It was decided:

- (1) that the first of December be fixed as the date for the deposit of ratifications;
- (2) that the Secretary General of the Conference notify the German Delegation of the foregoing decision, and inform it at the same time that the Protocol relating to the nonfulfilment by Germany of certain Armistice Clauses must be signed by the German Delegates before that date.

6. (At this point M. Patek and M. Grabski entered the room.)

M. PICHON asked the Polish Delegates to be good enough to give the Council their views on the status of Eastern Galicia.

M. PATEK replied that they would be glad if they could first obtain the new draft which had been submitted to the Council.

M. PICHON explained that the Council wished to know their feeling on the general question.

M. PATEK said that M. Paderewski and M. Dmowski had already had occasion to speak to the Council on the status of Galicia. He wished to add several general words on the proposal under discussion, as well as on the impression which its adoption would certainly create in Poland. Until the present time, Eastern Galicia had formed an integral part of Poland. Even during the partition Eastern Galicia had not been separated from the Polish provinces annexed to Austria. At the present time Poland was being offered a mandate for a territory which had never ceased to belong to it. Poland had indeed been told that the terms of this mandate were especially favourable; nevertheless, it meant separating Eastern Galicia from Poland. When Spitz and Orava were under consideration it was a question of territories belonging to Hungary which had not formed a part of the former Kingdom of Poland.

Furthermore, the Poles had had to reach an agreement with the Czechoslovaks. But in Eastern Galicia they had no opponents. In fact, opposition could not be predicated of the Ukraine, which had no real existence, nor of Russia, which had no concern with Eastern Galicia. Therefore, if Eastern Galicia were no longer to be directly attached to Poland, the unanimous impression in his country would be that the Allies were taking away a province which belonged to Poland, and which was claimed by no other Government. Three days from that time Lemberg would celebrate the anniversary of its liberation from the Ukrainian yoke. Was he then to be told that a city in whose defence all classes of the population had freely shed their blood, was no longer on Polish soil? On the very day when celebrations would be held in honour of those who had heroically fallen in the streets of Lemberg, would it be announced in Paris that they had fallen on soil foreign to Poland? The Polish army was at that very time opposing the Bolsheviks. Was it not to be feared that that Army would become demoralized if it suddenly learned that the city for which it had fought, that the territory which it had freed, were no longer to be considered as belonging to Poland? If the Polish troops got the impression that their leaders had deceived them when telling them a year ago that they were fighting in defence of Polish territory, it was to be feared that they would again believe themselves deceived when they were told that the Bolsheviks were the enemy to be fought. The objection indeed was made to the Polish argument that the population of Eastern Galicia was mixed and that hatred existed between Ruthenians and Poles. His reply was that in Eastern Galicia the proportion of mixed marriages was more than 35%. How could one speak of hatred under these conditions? The conclusion was inevitable that selfish intrigues of neighbouring countries and Austrian, and especially German money, which had sown seeds of discord in Eastern Galicia, were responsible for the bloody conflicts of recent times. It had been proven that Ruthenian agitators prior to the war had received money from German sources. That question had been brought up in the Reichstag and in the Parliament at Vienna, and no denial had been made of the specific facts adduced at that time. He recalled that the Germans had played a prominent part in the conflict which ravaged Eastern Galicia, and that, in many cases, Ukrainian troops had been commanded by German officers. At the time when he spoke all conflict had ceased and calm had returned in Eastern Galicia. The representatives of the Western nations found it difficult to appreciate the conditions existing in countries possessing less culture than theirs. The Ukrainian and Polish peasants had fought without being too clear as to the reasons therefor. While he spoke they were once more working shoulder to shoulder and living in perfect harmony. He also wished to present geographical considerations of great weight. Free access to the sea was a necessity for Poland. It did indeed reach the sea at Dantzic but only by a narrow corridor which was constantly threatened by Germany. It was essential for Poland to obtain access to the Black Sea through Roumania, and possession of Eastern Galicia was vital from that point of view. He wished to add a word on the internal situation. The Diet at Warsaw had unanimously

voted that there could be no Poland without Eastern Galicia. It was far from his intention to wish to use Poland's internal situation as a threat but the Allied and Associated Powers must understand that the unanimous opinion of the Polish people had to be considered. M. Paderewski had been obliged to declare in parliament that he would not sign a Treaty which would take Eastern Galicia from Poland. If the solution of a mandate were imposed upon Poland, Paderewski's cabinet would have to resign; the Polish army, ill fed, ill clothed, engaged in a severe struggle against the Bolsheviks, would be threatened with demoralization. The Polish people, finally, would not understand how its Allies could have taken from it Galicia which had always formed part of Poland and which no one was claiming. It was important that the Council should realize the gravity of the situation in Poland; on one side Bolshevism, on the other, German revolution. In the interior a threatened famine. The Polish army was strong and Poland counted on it as an element of order. If the Army became demoralized Poland's situation would become most serious and it would be threatened with extinction. That would be a catastrophe which would certainly have an effect on the situation of the western Powers. The only solution was to allow Eastern Galicia to become an autonomous province of Poland, subject if necessary, to an effective international control. Any other solution would entail consequences for Poland which were greatly to be dreaded.

M. GRABSKI desired to add a few words to what M. Patek had said in order to show the Council the serious economic results for Eastern Galicia of any solution which would not make it an integral part of Poland. The situation in Eastern Galicia was in no way comparable to that of other regions which had suffered damages by the war. By virtue of the Treaty the Allied and Associated Powers were entitled to reparation for damages caused by the war, provided that they had taken part in the struggle on the side of the Entente. The countries which during the whole war had been part of Austro-Hungary, which was the case of Eastern Galicia, had no legal right to any reparation. Eastern Galicia, however, was one of the regions which had suffered the most. It had been devastated successively by the Russians, Austrians and Ukrainians. If to these devastations, estimated at 22,000,000,000 crowns, were added the loss resulting from the depreciation of Austrian currency, the economic situation in Eastern Galicia would be seen to be desperate. Out of 2,500,000 hectares of agricultural land, 2,000,000 hectares were not under cultivation. If left to its own resources Eastern Galicia would be unable to bear the burden placed upon it. It had a vital need of the help of all Poland. Poland had not waited for Eastern Galicia to be given it to come to the help of its inhabitants which it justly considered brothers. Although Poland itself lacked rye and wheat and had had to solicit the help of the United States she had not hesitated to share her meagre resources with Eastern Galicia. If the solution of a Mandate prevailed, separate liabilities would have to be established which Eastern Galicia could not meet. France, which so admirably understood the duty of national solidarity towards its devastated regions, must understand that Galicia could

only exist with the support of the remainder of Poland. Galicia's resources in petroleum would not suffice to amortize the numerous sums which would have to be advanced if its economic rehabilitation were to be made possible. The situation of Eastern Galicia had been compared with that of Austria, but it had been forgotten that there was still large fortunes in Austria and that Austria had not been devastated by the war. Any solution which would paralyse Poland in the work of rehabilitation she had undertaken in Galicia would be disastrous to the economic future of that province.

M. PATEK said that the Poles had been told that there was little difference between a long term mandate given to Poland over Galicia and an annexation pure and simple of that province to Poland. In reality the difference was considerable, especially if account were taken of the fact that four plebiscites had already been imposed upon Poland, which had not failed to have a depressing effect on Polish public opinion. In conclusion he wished to point out that Poland was not asking her Allies to give her anything at all; she was only asking not to be deprived of the territory which she considered belonged to her as of right.

(At this point M. Grabski and M. Patek left the room.)

M. PICHON asked whether any member of the Council thought that the views just expressed by the Polish Delegates necessitated a change in the conclusions already reached by the Council.

M. DE MARTINO was struck by M. Patek's observations on the necessity of a territorial connection between Poland and Roumania through Eastern Galicia. He did not propose, however, to reopen the discussion.

M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the report of the Committee on Polish Affairs dated November 20th (see Appendix F<sup>6</sup>). The Commission had been unanimous on all the articles considered, except on the second paragraph of article 2, where the majority of the Commission had proposed to insert after the words, 'The Council of the League of Nations', the words, 'deciding by a majority of votes'.

M. PICHON pointed out that according to the covenant of the League of Nations the general rule was that a decision should be by unanimous vote, but that when it was a question of the status of certain territories in analogous circumstances—like that of the Sarre—a majority of votes sufficed.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to point out that he had had some difficulty in inducing his Government to make the concessions which had finally rendered a unanimous agreement possible. If the question had to be reopened he could not be responsible for the consequences. That was why he preferred to abide by the text proposed by the British Delegation which, moreover, corresponded to that which had been adopted at a meeting of the Council.

M. LAROCHE said that there might be serious disadvantages if the opposition of a single power could render impossible the adoption of a measure

<sup>6</sup> This appendix is lacking in the original. The text of the report has been supplied from the official record of the proceedings of the Commission on Polish Affairs, and is printed as appendix F.

agreed upon by all the other Powers represented in the Council of the League of Nations.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that as the other Delegations were favourable to a mandate of unspecified duration, he could not see why they should feel the adoption of the principle of a unanimous vote to be dangerous.

M. PICHON remarked that possibly in 25 years Germany would be represented on the Council of the League of Nations. He asked if it would not be dangerous to give Germany the possibility of preventing the unanimous will of the Allied and Associated Powers from taking effect.

SIR EYRE CROWE repeated that he was most reluctant to reopen that question. Moreover he pointed out that an agreement had been reached by the Council on the text presented by the British Delegation. It was on the Commission's own initiative that the question had again come before the Council at a time when it had a right to consider it finally settled.

MR. WHITE said that he could not agree with Sir Eyre Crowe's arguments. He felt that it was after all a question which concerned Poland rather than Great Britain.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired if it was not the American Delegation itself which had insisted that the question of a mandate should receive a permanent rather than a provisional settlement.

MR. WHITE said that he was informed by his experts that this interpretation of the attitude of the American Delegation was not exact.

M. LAROCHE explained that the text referred back to the Commission by the Supreme Council was open to revision. The jurists had brought up the question of the procedure to be followed by the Council of the League of Nations. Moreover, it should be noted that there was a great difference between a mandate of unlimited duration and a mandate perpetually renewed. If the Poles had been offered a mandate of unlimited duration their objections would have probably been much weaker. The attitude of the British Delegation did not seem to him entirely logical. That Delegation had insisted that the mandate be open for revision at the end of 10 years, it should, therefore, not favour a solution which would make any modification in the existing situation very difficult.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the arguments advanced by M. Laroche ran counter to the resolution previously adopted by the Council.

M. PICHON said that he favoured the point of view of the majority of the Commission but in order to arrive at an agreement he was ready to support the text proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe.

MR. WHITE stated that he was obliged to maintain his point of view and he asked M. Pichon to call upon Dr. Bowman who had some additional information to give.

DR. BOWMAN thought that it would be well to define clearly the American Delegation's point of view, which did not seem to have been entirely understood. The statements of the American Delegates on the Commission of Polish Affairs showed that they had desired a mandate of unlimited duration. On the other hand the British Delegation wished the mandate to be open for

revision at the end of 10 years. By way of compromise a term of 25 years was agreed upon, and this had been accepted by the Council. When the question had come back to the Commission a further question had arisen as to the procedure to be followed by the Council of the League of Nations. That was an entirely different question from the previous one, and one on which no agreement had as yet been reached. If a unanimous vote was necessary, a single nation, possibly Germany, could prevent the opinion of all the Allies from taking effect. If what was aimed at was to reserve the possibility of taking Galicia from Poland, in the event of the latter committing abuses, it was necessary to provide for a decision to be reached by a majority vote. That would constitute a sufficient guarantee. On the contrary, if a unanimous vote was required, that would mean practically giving Poland a free hand. The idea of a majority vote was perfectly consistent with the idea previously expressed when asking that the mandate should be of unlimited duration. In both cases it had been desired to ensure to the League of Nations an effective control over the mandatory power. The original proposition of the American representative on the Commission on Polish Affairs was that at any time the Council of the League of Nations, deciding by a majority vote, could revise the mandate.

M. PICHON said that Dr. Bowman's arguments only strengthened the opinion he had already expressed, but in consideration of the attitude of the British Delegation, which had already made numerous concessions, he remained inclined to support Sir Eyre Crowe's proposition.

M. DE MARTINO said that he was likewise disposed to support Sir Eyre Crowe's proposition, always provided that a unanimous agreement could be reached on that very day. Personally he remained convinced that the solution of the majority of the Commission was preferable and he retained his freedom of action if the United States maintained its point of view.

MR. WHITE asked if the question could not again be referred to the Commission, which should try to reach an agreement.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that that would mean reopening the whole question.

M. LAROCHE pointed out that the Commission had already tried in vain to reach an agreement and he did not believe that a further discussion would succeed.

MR. WHITE asked to have until the following day to think the matter over. He felt that the question under discussion involved the very principle of the solution to be reached, and that that principle might become of vital importance. It would have seemed to him more natural for an agreement to be reached in favour of the majority point of view, rather than that the majority should abandon its original point of view to agree with the ideas of a single Delegation. A very dangerous situation would be created if Germany might become a possible arbitrator of the decisions of the Allied and Associated Powers in such a grave question.

M. PICHON said that for practical reasons, in view of the necessity of reaching a conclusion, and of the fact that the attitude of the British Government

did not seem likely to be modified, he hoped that the Council could agree on the following day on the text proposed by the British Delegation.

The discussion of this question was adjourned until the following meeting.)

7. At the request of Mr. White this question was adjourned as well as the question relative to the request of the Polish Delegation that the negotiations between Poland and Germany on questions relative to the execution of the Treaty of Versailles be transferred to Paris.

*Request of the Polish Delegation that the negotiations with regard to the relations between Poland and Danzig be transferred from Warsaw to Paris*

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 20, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 27

*Telegram from Sir George Clerk to the Supreme Council*

BUDAPEST, November 17, 1919.

No. 9.

With reference to my telegram No. 7 of November 13.<sup>7</sup>

A meeting of the Government and the Opposition took place at five o'clock this evening at my house on Friedrich's invitation. I think that he intended that this conference should end in a deadlock and this would have occurred had I not called about forty representative Hungarians to a meeting at my house at 3 p.m. today. This meeting lasted five hours. I began by making a plain-spoken and full statement of the present situation in Hungary as it appeared to me and those present reached the general conclusion that Friedrich must cease to be Prime Minister. The Committee of Ten will meet again at my house tomorrow, but great progress has, in my opinion, been made today.

#### APPENDIX E TO NO. 27

CONFÉRENCE DE LA PAIX

Comité d'Organisation de la Commission des Réparations.

PARIS, le 14 novembre, 1919.

390 C.R.

Sir:

The Supreme Council decided by resolution of October 7, 1919 that a sub-Commission of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission should be constituted at Vienna.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> No. 23, appendix B.

<sup>8</sup> See Vol. I, No. 70, minute 3.

The Sub-Commission has submitted an unanimous report, which has been carefully considered by the Organization Committee.

The main recommendation of the Sub-Commission is in effect the advance to Austria of \$100,000,000.00, to cover the supply of such foodstuffs and coal as will be required by Austria during the next six months. This advance, together with the sum of \$48,000,000.00, advance[d] by the Allies during the last twelve months, would be consolidated into a single loan, to be secured by the total assets and by the present and future revenues, of the Austrian Republic,—the administration of both assets and revenues being entrusted to the Reparations Commission. It would be the duty of the latter during the next six months to formulate and put into operation a programme for the economic and financial reconstruction of Austria.

If attention be confined to the financial aspect of the problem with which the Organization Committee is more particularly concerned, it is clear that the sum of \$100,000,000.00, which is estimated as required as capital, cannot be provided by Austria itself; it follows that the funds must be directly advanced by one or more of the Allied and Associated Powers.

Recommendations of this scope raise questions which it is not within the competence of the Organization Committee to determine. They can, therefore, only submit them for the most immediate consideration and decision by the governments concerned.

It is quite clear that the respective powers themselves must decide whether to grant the loan, and whether the terms of any advances that may be made will permit the Reparations Commission to be entrusted with the responsibility contemplated.

The Organization Committee desires to express it as their opinion that there is no escape from the conclusion that it is only in the institution of a central controlling authority with wide powers over the financial and economic administration of Austria that any hope can be found of the salvation of that country.

If the advances required can be supplied by any one or more of the Allied and Associated Powers, and on terms that will permit, it is the sense of the Organization Committee that the following plan be adopted:

That the Austrian Government be authorized to issue certificates of indebtedness in an amount to be determined by the Sub-Commission at Vienna, convertible into first bonds to be issued pursuant to Article 181 of the Austrian Peace Treaty. A portion of these certificates to be given to the British, French and Italian Governments as security for all loans or credits heretofore made and to be given to the lending governments for all loans and credits hereafter to be made to the Austrian Government, in lieu and instead of the Austrian assets now held or about to be taken as security for loans or credits: such assets to be turned over to the Sub-Commission at Vienna together with all objects of art, the tobacco monopoly and the property of the late Royal and Imperial House, recently declared to be Government property, as well as any other liquid assets of the Austrian Government. All assets so turned over to be held by the Sub-Commission, and so far as available, to be administered by it for the purpose contemplated. The other portion of the certificates to be applied from time to time by the Sub-Commission in such manner as it may deem proper and necessary in the interests of reparation, at the same time assuring to Austria her minimum requirements in food, coal and raw materials, as provided by Article 181 of the Austrian Treaty of Peace.

The Organization Committee further recommends that the foregoing plan be

communicated at once to the Austrian Government, and if the Austrian Government shall request the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, in writing, to exercise immediately like powers to those conferred upon the Reparations Commission, and the Austrian Section thereof, by the Austrian Treaty of Peace, then the Sub-Commission in Vienna shall proceed as follows:

*First:* Require the Austrian Government forthwith to prohibit by law the sale, transfer, or disposal, outside of Austria or to other than Austrian Nationals, of any assets of the country, either publicly or privately owned, without the consent of the Sub-Commission at Vienna, and to declare void any such sales or transfers heretofore made after the signing of the Armistice of November 5, 1918, without the consent of the Austrian Government.

*Second:* To prepare forthwith and put into immediate operation a financial plan along the lines indicated in this report, in order to preserve Austria's assets for reparation, and assure to Austria a minimum supply of food, coal and raw materials.

*Third:* To exercise forthwith such control over the collection and expenditure of all taxes, customs and revenues of the Austrian Government as to the Commission shall appear necessary and desirable.

*Fourth:* To commend [<sup>2</sup> commence] the study forthwith of the economic and financial conditions of Austria, and to prepare comprehensive plans for her rehabilitation, to the end that the reparation contemplated by the Austrian Treaty may be forthcoming.

There is appended for transmission to the Governments concerned a copy of the report of the Sub-Commission at Vienna,<sup>9</sup> above referred to.

I am, etc.

MAUGLÈRE,

President of the

Organization Committee of the  
Reparations Commission.

The President of the Supreme Council  
of the Allied and Associated Powers.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. This report dated November 4, 1919, to which were annexed statistical data illustrating the economic position of Austria, concluded with the following summary of recommendations:

'1. The provision of 30,000 tons of food immediately.' (In this connexion the report had stated: 'The failure of the neighbouring states to deliver foodstuffs contracted for by Austria and the difficulties of obtaining and transporting food supplies within Austria itself have brought Vienna, which constitutes about half the total population, to the brink of starvation. On Wednesday, October 29th, the Austrian Food Controller reported to the Sub-Commission that there were no breadstuffs whatever in hand in Vienna as they had all been distributed as rations for the current week which ended the following Monday, while of fats, meat or any other foodstuffs controlled by the Government they had nothing. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement. At the same time it should be mentioned that on October 29th there were in transit from Trieste breadstuff supplies which, if duly delivered, would ration Vienna to November 11th. The gravity of the position lies in the probable recurrence of these acute shortages and the impossibility of relying upon railway deliveries. Existing food contracts are executed partially or not at all; the contract with the Serbs, already a heavy drain on Austrian finance, is at the moment completely stopped, the Serbs wishing to impose an exportation tax of 40%. Food furnished by contract with the Argentine and *en route* from Rotterdam is momentarily held by the Germans at Mannheim.'))

'2. The provision of an additional 200,000 tons per month of coal.' (In this connexion the report had stated: 'It has been found impossible to provide with any regularity the

*Rapport de la Commission des Affaires polonaises au Conseil Suprême.*

## Document 1

*Statut de la Galicie orientale*

La Commission des Affaires polonaises, d'accord avec le Comité de rédaction, a apporté aux articles déjà adoptés du Statut de la Galicie orientale les changements rendus nécessaires à la suite de la décision du Conseil suprême à la date du 11 novembre.<sup>10</sup>

Les deux Commissions en ont fixé le texte tel qu'il figure ci-après (*voir Annexe*).<sup>11</sup>

Toutefois une divergence de vues s'est produite en ce qui concerne l'article 2.

Les Délégations américaine, française, italienne et japonaise proposent qu'à l'expiration du mandat de 25 années donné à la Pologne sur la Galicie orientale, le Conseil de la Société des Nations ait pleins pouvoirs, *statuant à la majorité*, pour maintenir ou modifier le présent Traité.

La Délégation britannique formule une réserve en ce qui concerne les mots *statuant à la majorité des voix* ajoutés à l'article 2, alinéa 2, du Traité, pour indiquer dans quelles conditions le Conseil de la Société des Nations, à l'expiration de la période de vingt-cinq ans prévue par cet article, pourra maintenir, réviser ou changer le statut de la Galicie orientale. La Délégation britannique fait remarquer que le Conseil suprême, n'ayant pas décidé, quand il a examiné cet article 2, que le Conseil de la Société des Nations statuerait à la majorité des votes, a par là même décidé que ce vote devrait être acquis à l'unanimité. Cette décision est partie intégrante du règlement d'ensemble tel qu'il a été adopté par le Conseil. Dans ces conditions, la Délégation britannique ne s'estime pas autorisée à accepter la modification proposée.

PARIS, 20 novembre, 1919.

meagre ration of 7 kilos—say 15 lbs.—of coal per week for each family in Vienna, where the use of gas and electricity is now far more stringently restricted than it was in London at any time during the war. The consequent suffering, now that the first snow has come, is intense. It is almost inconceivable to think that as the cold becomes more acute the population of Vienna will continue to maintain their present helpless apathy, or that they are likely to exhibit the hardihood necessary to withstand the ordeal of semi-starvation combined with the misery of having no coal for warmth or cooking.')

'3. The Mährisch Ostrau Coal Sub-Commission to be attached as Sub-Commission to Vienna Reparations Sub-Commission.

'4. Credits for fertilisers.

'5. [A] Railway Section to be attached to Vienna Sub-Commission with power to guard and control all railways of late Austro-Hungarian Empire, both state and privately owned.

'6. Inter-Allied Danube Commission to be similarly attached to Vienna Reparations Sub-Commission.

'7. Loan of 100,000,000 dollars for six months to provide food and coal.

'8. Consolidation of existing 48 million dollars loan with the 100,000,000 dollar loan.

'9. Appointment of a special Inter-Allied Commission under the Vienna Reparations Sub-Commission for administering revenues given as security for the Consolidated Loan.

'10. Appointment of Commission of bankers and financial experts to study and devise a plan for the definitive reconstruction of Austrian finance.'

<sup>10</sup> See No. 19; minute 7.

<sup>11</sup> Document 2 below.

## Document 2

### *Annexe au Rapport<sup>12</sup>*

Les États-Unis d'Amérique, l'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie, et le Japon, Principales Puissances alliées et associées, et la Pologne.

Soucieux de mettre fin au conflit malheureux qui, pendant longtemps, a désolé la Galicie orientale, et d'établir dans ce pays un régime qui devra en assurer, autant que possible, l'autonomie et sauvegarder les libertés individuelles, politiques et religieuses de ses habitants:

Considérant que la Pologne est aujourd'hui, de l'avis des Principales Puissances alliées et associées, l'État le mieux qualifié pour restaurer un Gouvernement libre et bien ordonné en Galicie orientale;

Et désirant conclure un Traité à cette fin;

Ont nommé pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

. . . . .<sup>13</sup>

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des stipulations suivantes:

## CHAPITRE I<sup>er</sup>

### STATUT DE LA GALICIE ORIENTALE

#### ARTICLE I<sup>er</sup>

Les Principales Puissances alliées et associées donnent à la Pologne, et la Pologne accepte le mandat d'organiser et de gouverner pendant une période de vingt-cinq ans la partie ci-dessous définie des anciens 'Kronländer' autrichiens de Galicie et de Bukovine, qui constitueront le territoire autonome de Galicie orientale.

#### A. A l'Ouest:

Du point de [?où] l'ancienne frontière entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie rencontre la limite administrative orientale de la commune de Belzec et vers le Sud-Ouest:

cette limite administrative;

puis la limite administrative entre les cercles (*Politische Bezirke*) de Cieszanow à l'Ouest et de Rawa-Ruska à l'Est;

puis vers le Sud-Ouest la limite administrative entre les cercles de Cieszanow et Jawarow, tout en coupant le saillant formé autour du village de Lipowiec par une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain passant à 2 kilomètres environ au Nord de cette localité;

puis vers le Sud la limite administrative entre les cercles de Jaroslau et de Przemyśl à l'Ouest et de Jaworow, Mosciska, Sambor et de Stary-Sambor successivement à l'Est;

puis vers le Sud et jusqu'au saillant à 1 kilomètre au Sud-Est de la cote 519 (Radycz):

la limite administrative entre les cercles de Dobromil et Stary-Sambor;

<sup>12</sup> Note in original: 'Le texte reproduit ne comprend que les parties modifiées; le reste du texte est identique au projet de la page 245': i.e. the draft printed in Vol. I, No. 61, appendix C.

<sup>13</sup> Thus in original.

de là vers le Sud-Ouest et jusqu'au saillant de cette limite administrative à 15 kilomètres environ au Sud-Ouest de Chyrow et à 2 kilomètres environ au Sud-Est de la cote 733:

une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain coupant le chemin de fer Chyrow-Sambor à 2 kilomètres environ à l'Est de Chyrow et puis suivant la ligne de partage des eaux entre les bassins du Strwiaz et du Dniester;

de là vers le Sud et jusqu'au point de rencontre avec la frontière de l'État tchécoslovaque, à 2 kilomètres environ au Sud de la cote 1335 (Kalicz);

la limite administrative entre les cercles de Dobromil et Liska à l'Ouest et de Sary-Sambor et Turka à l'Est. La frontière s'écarte toutefois de ces limites en deux points où le tracé sera à déterminer sur le terrain:

a) lorsque la limite administrative passe à l'Ouest de la route de Chirow à Lutowska de façon à laisser cette route entièrement en territoire polonais;

b) aux environs de la localité de Bobrka, de façon à laisser cette localité en territoire polonais.

#### *B. Au Sud-Ouest:*

Du point ci-dessus défini jusqu'à son point de rencontre avec la limite de Bukovine:

l'ancienne frontière entre la Galicie et la Hongrie.

Le point 1655, qui est le point des Carpathes commun aux bassins des trois rivières Tisza, Visso et Czeremosz, est le point de rencontre des trois frontières de Galicie orientale, du territoire ruthène de l'État tchéco-slovaque et de la Roumanie.

#### *C. Au Sud-Est:*

Du point ci-dessus défini et vers le Nord-Est et jusqu'à son point de rencontre avec la limite entre les cercles de Horodenka et Sniatyn, à 11 kilomètres environ au Sud-Est d'Horodenka:

l'ancienne frontière entre la Galicie et la Bukovine;

de là vers le Nord-Est et jusqu'en un point à choisir sur le cours du Dniester, à 2 kilomètres environ en aval de Zaleszczyki:

une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain passant par les cotes 239, 312 et 317;

de là et jusqu'au point où l'ancienne frontière entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie se détache vers le Nord à environ 3 kilomètres à l'Ouest de Jvanets:

le cours principal du Dniester vers l'aval.

#### *D. A l'Est et au Nord:*

Du point ci-dessus défini sur le Dniester jusqu'au point de rencontre avec la limite administrative orientale de la commune de Belzec:

l'ancienne frontière entre l'Autriche-Hongrie et la Russie.

Une Commission composée de six membres, dont cinq seront nommés par les Principales Puissances alliées et associées et un par la Pologne, sera constituée dans les quinze jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur du présent Traité, pour fixer sur place le tracé des limites ci-dessus prévues à la fixation desquelles il n'avait pas déjà pourvu par ailleurs. Les décisions de la Commission seront prises à la majorité des voix étant entendu que le Président aura droit, en cas de partage de voix, à émettre un second vote; ces décisions seront obligatoires pour les parties intéressées. Les frais en seront prélevés sur les revenus de la Galicie orientale.

## ARTICLE 2

*Texte proposé par les  
Délégations des États-Unis d'Amérique,  
de la France, de l'Italie et du Japon.*

*Texte proposé  
par la Délégation de l'Empire Britannique.*

La Pologne accepte d'accomplir sous le contrôle de la Société des Nations et dans les conditions stipulées au présent Traité le mandat prévu à l'article 1<sup>er</sup>.

A l'expiration de la période de 25 ans, le Conseil de la Société des Nations, *statuant à la majorité des voix*, aura pleins pouvoirs de maintenir, réviser ou changer le statut défini par le présent Traité.

La Pologne accepte d'accomplir sous le contrôle de la Société des Nations et dans les conditions stipulées au présent Traité le mandat prévu à l'article 1<sup>er</sup>.

A l'expiration de la période de 25 ans, le Conseil de la Société des Nations aura pleins pouvoirs de maintenir, réviser ou changer le statut défini par le présent Traité.

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## ARTICLE 12

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10° Questions agraires;

11° Toutes autres matières, pour lesquelles la Diète de Pologne lui aura attribué compétence.

## ARTICLE 13

*(1<sup>er</sup> alinéa sans changement.)*

En ce qui concerne les lois relatives à l'instruction publique dans les établissements d'enseignement secondaire et supérieur, le veto du Gouverneur sera absolu.

Toutefois, si une disposition législative agraire, après avoir été arrêtée par le veto du Gouverneur, est, dans le délai d'un an, votée de nouveau par la Diète à la majorité des deux tiers, la question sera immédiatement soumise par le Gouvernement polonais au Conseil de la Société des Nations. Celui-ci décidera, à la majorité des suffrages, de l'action à poursuivre et des ordres à donner, suivant qu'il estimera utile et convenable en la circonstance.

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## ARTICLE 22

Les affaires ressortissant à la Diète de Galicie orientale conformément à l'article 12, seront dirigées par des Ministres nommés par le Gouverneur et responsables à cet égard devant la Diète. Celle-ci fixera le nombre, les fonctions et le traitement de ces Ministres.

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## ARTICLE 33

*(1<sup>er</sup> alinéa sans changement.)*

Pendant la durée du régime établi par le présent Traité, les biens visés à l'article 32 ne pourront être aliénés, ni grevés de charges dont l'effet dépasserait la durée

du dit régime; dans le cas où un statut nouveau serait établi, conformément à l'article 2, les baux, qui dépasseraient cette durée, cesseront d'être en vigueur trois ans après l'établissement de ce statut, s'ils n'ont pas été expressément confirmés pendant ce délai. Toutefois, cette stipulation n'empêchera en rien, de disposer de ces biens en vue de l'accomplissement de la réforme agraire ou de travaux reconnus d'utilité publique.

*(Dernier alinéa sans changement.)*

#### ARTICLE 34

Les adjonctions aux biens domaniaux ou aux biens affectés à des services publics seront administrées conformément aux dispositions des articles 32 et 33; elles donneront lieu à l'établissement d'un compte à régler dans le cas et au moment où un nouveau statut de la Galicie orientale serait établi, conformément à l'article 2.

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#### ARTICLE 38

La législation sur le service militaire, en vigueur en Pologne, pourra être appliquée par la Pologne en Galicie orientale, sous la réserve que le contingent ainsi recruté formera des unités spéciales qui, en temps de paix, tiendront garnison en Galicie orientale et seront à la disposition du Gouvernement polonais, en temps de guerre, pour la défense du territoire national.

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Le présent Traité, rédigé en français, en anglais et en italien, et dont le texte français fera foi, en cas de divergence, sera ratifié. Il entrera en vigueur en même temps que le Traité de paix avec l'Autriche.

Le dépôt de ratification sera effectué à Paris.

Les Puissances dont le Gouvernement a son siège hors d'Europe auront la faculté de se borner à faire connaître au Gouvernement de la République française, par leur Représentant diplomatique à Paris, que leur ratification a été donnée et, dans ce cas, elles devront en transmettre l'instrument aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Un procès-verbal de dépôt de ratification sera dressé.

Le Gouvernement français remettra à toutes les Puissances signataires une copie conforme du procès-verbal de dépôt de ratification.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires susnommés ont signé le présent Traité.

Fait à Paris, le . . . ,<sup>13</sup> en un seul exemplaire qui restera déposé dans les archives du Gouvernement de la République française et dont les expéditions authentiques seront remises à chacune des Puissances signataires du Traité.

H.D. 98.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 21, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Henry White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Dr. I. Bowman, Mr. A. W. Dulles, Mr. Buckler, Lieut.-Commander L. B. Green, U.S.N.  
*British Empire*: Captain Fuller, R.N., Lieut.-Colonel Kisch, Mr. E. H. Carr, Mr. Forbes-Adam, Mr. H. W. Malkin.  
*France*: M. Laroche, M. Hermitte, M. Serruys, M. Fromageot, M. de Montille.  
*Italy*: M. Galli, M. Stranieri, M. Pilotti, M. Trombetti.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

1. M. CAMBON said that the British and American Delegations would make known their views on the text of Article II of the Eastern Galician Treaty.

MR. WHITE summarized the American point of view (see Appendix A). He added that he had thought it advisable to do so as at the preceding meeting the impression seemed to have been conveyed that the American position on the question was illogical.

SIR EYRE CROWE repeated that he could not change his attitude, and if the Council decided otherwise he would have to refer the question to his Government.

M. CAMBON said it was important to come to a decision on this vital matter and that he hoped the Council would give its decision at that meeting. As the Council had adopted Sir Eyre Crowe's views, he would ask Mr. White whether he could not modify his conclusions.

MR. WHITE then read an alternative text which he suggested be inserted in place of the present second paragraph of Article II of the Eastern Galicia Treaty: 'At the expiration of twenty-five years the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, or the Council of the League of Nations, to whom the Powers may delegate their rights under this Treaty, shall have full power to maintain, revise or change the status of the present Treaty'. He thought this text would meet the objection that the requirement of unanimous decision of the Council of the League of Nations might render impossible a state favourable to Poland through the ultimate opposition of Russia in Eastern

Galicia; and further that a second objection would be made [? met], namely, [?that] which might arise from the provision forcing upon the entire League of Nations the responsibilities of a Treaty concluded by the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

M. CAMBON asked whether this proposed new text met with the approval of the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the modified text still raised debatable questions and that he would have to present it for the approval of his Government. At the end of twenty-five years it still gave to Poland no voice on the final decision of its affairs.

MR. WHITE remarked that he still feared that a Power hostile to Poland might change the status of Eastern Galicia.

M. BERTHELOT said there was a very sharp difference between the two points of view. To effect conciliation he thought that the Council might accept the principle of Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal by leaving it to the League of Nations to decide in twenty-five years the procedure which it would apply.

M. CAMBON said that, in other words, the Council might state at this time that the League of Nations would examine in twenty-five years' time the question of Eastern Galicia, leaving it to the Council of the League of Nations to decide whether it would take its decision by a unanimous or a majority vote.

M. LAROCHE stated that if the procedure to be followed were not specified, it was certain that, taking into account the provisions of the Covenant, the Council would have to decide by a unanimous vote, and yet twenty-five years later the Covenant might have been changed and the procedure applied at that time might be different.

M. CAMBON asked Mr. White whether, taking into account Sir Eyre Crowe's firm stand on the question, he did not feel like accepting the point of view of the majority.

MR. WHITE said he withdrew his objection provided his attitude were recorded in the minutes so that in twenty-five years Poland should not consider America responsible.

It was decided:

(1) to accept the text of the Eastern Galicia Treaty as presented by the Committee on Polish Affairs;

(2) that paragraph 2 of Article II should read as follows:

'At the expiration of the period of Twenty-five years the Council of the League of Nations shall have full powers to maintain, revise, or modify the statute as defined by the present Treaty.'

2.

*Report of the Committee  
on Greek Affairs, regard-  
ing Greek administration  
in Smyrna*

[Not printed]<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Supreme Council considered an undated note from the Commission on Greek Affairs (appendix B in original) arising out of the concluding decision recorded in No. 20,

3. M. BERTHELOT said M. Dutasta and himself had seen on the previous day the two German Delegates Herr von Simson and Baron von Lersner. The interview bore on the note sent to the German Government as well as the protocol annexed thereto.<sup>2</sup> Mr. von Simson spoke practically all the time and Baron von Lersner did not take active part in the conversation. Mr. Berthelot had emphasized to Herr von Simson that he spoke in a personal and not in an official capacity. Herr von Simson first raised the question of participation by America in the Commissions on the execution of the Treaty. He had replied that it had been decided that America would not be represented finally on any of these Commissions until the Senate had ratified the Treaty, and that this decision had been accepted by all the Allies who agreed that the American seats on these Commissions, though they remained vacant, would be reserved.

*Communication by  
M. Berthelot of his and  
M. Dutasta's interview  
with the German Dele-  
gates*

Herr von Simson then raised questions of detail; first, Memel: he wished to know what would be the situation of that city and under what conditions it would be occupied by the Allies. He had replied that this was a subject which only interested the Allies, and that in any case, the situation of Memel would be settled in such a way as not to impose too severe charges on the city, and also the Allies considered that Memel would be incorporated in a new State.

Herr von Simson did not insist and next raised the question of the Sarre. To his questions he had replied, without feeling obliged to give him a full statement. He had told him that President Wilson had agreed to call the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, although the Senate had not yet ratified the Treaty; he had thought it inadvisable to inform him that the Council would settle only the question of delimitation of the Sarre

minute 1. The Commission reported that it had examined the documents thereby referred to it and had heard statements on the subject by General Bunoust and M. Venizelos. The Commission requested authorization from the Supreme Council to send a draft telegram to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople. The Supreme Council approved this draft telegram subject to certain amendments proposed by Sir E. Crowe and Mr. White such that the final text read:

'Reference your telegram 2045. The Supreme Council has entrusted the Commission on Greek Claims to examine those questions relative to the Greek Administration in Smyrna raised by your telegram referred to above.

'In order to study those questions and present its recommendations to the Supreme Council, the Commission would like to know with certainty the concrete facts of every kind which could be considered to have brought about the situation indicated in your telegram, especially in the matters of criminal and civil jurisdiction, customs, postal and press censorship, administration of the port, etc.

'You are consequently requested to collate without delay and in agreement with the Allied High Commissioners the information furnished by your representatives at Smyrna on the concrete facts specified above, and to submit therewith your observations and if necessary your recommendations. You will be good enough to communicate these to Paris as early as possible by means of a telegram drafted in agreement with your colleagues and indicating as far as possible the sources of your information, after having heard the Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople upon the whole question.'

<sup>2</sup> See No. 10, appendices B and C.

and that the question of sovereignty over that territory would remain in abeyance.

Herr von Simson had then referred to the occupation of Allenstein and Marienwerder. He had indicated that articles 95 and 97 of the Treaty did not consider the question in the same manner for the two Provinces; for Marienwerder the question of the possibility of occupation had been raised, which was not the case with Allenstein. That observation had embarrassed him somewhat and he had answered that his personal opinion was that it seemed possible to occupy both territories and that in any event, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers did not intend to impose too heavy a burden on those territories. When the German Delegates met the Allied Commissioners, observations could be made by the Germans and information would be given on those points. Incidentally he had informed him that a general meeting of the Allied and German Delegates would be held the following Monday,<sup>3</sup> and that the Allies considered that only questions of principle should be raised and the discussion be as succinct as possible in the interest of Germany herself. Herr von Simson had agreed on the last point.

Herr von Simson had then raised the question of the Protocol: he said he did not understand the classification adopted by the Allies to distinguish between the Armistice Clauses partially fulfilled, unfulfilled, and violated. He had not understood why the Protocol referred only to the Clauses whose execution was not provided for in the Treaty of Peace. In spite of three successive explanations, Herr von Simson professed not to understand. Mr. Berthelot had assured Herr von Simson that the Protocol specified only certain 'violations, *among others*;' the Allies did not intend to raise the others.

The question of the Baltic Provinces preoccupied greatly the German Delegates: Herr von Simson had asked him whether, if the evacuation was not completed at the time the Treaty came into force, the Allies would continue the blockade. He had replied that the Allies did consider the question with a broad-minded spirit, and that if they had had recourse to a blockade, that was only because satisfaction had not been obtained. In proportion as the Allies recognized loyal and honest efforts on the part of Germany to expedite the evacuation, the blockade, he thought, would be relaxed.

M. Berthelot asked whether in that statement he had properly interpreted the spirit of the Supreme Council.

(The Council agreed that he had.)

M. Berthelot continued that Herr von Simson had discussed the Scapa Flow sinking. M. Dutasta and himself had informed him that they were not qualified to discuss the question, but that a written answer should be made by the Germans. Thereupon Herr von Simson had stated that the attitude of the German Government had been quite correct and that the sinking of the German Fleet was due to a misinterpretation of facts, namely, that Admiral von Reuter had not been notified in due time of the renewal of the Armistice. He had given him to understand that whatever interpretation Admiral von Reuter put upon the incident, the Fleet at Scapa Flow had

<sup>3</sup> November 24, 1919.

represented a German asset. That asset had disappeared and the responsibility of the German Government remained undiminished. As Herr von Simson considered that the responsibility of the Allies was involved, he had informed him that the Allies had examined from the technical and political points of view the question of interning the German Fleet in a neutral port; that the experts had explained that such a solution was impossible, as no neutral port had facilities to receive the German Fleet. On the other hand neutral Governments had been disinclined to have this responsibility placed upon them; no Allied Power had wanted to retain the German Fleet, least of all the British. He had asked whether it was Herr von Simson's wish that he should say to the Supreme Council that the German Government denied responsibility for the Scapa Flow incident. Herr von Simson refused to commit the German Government to that and said that a written explanation would be forthcoming.

After a brief reference to the submarines destroyed in the North Sea and on the Spanish coast, Herr von Simson had raised the vital question, from the German point of view, of the handing over of guilty individuals. He had stated that it was materially and morally impossible for the German Government to comply with that demand. To that statement Mr. Berthelot had replied that he was not qualified to discuss the execution of the Peace Treaty, but that if his personal opinion were asked for, he would say that the whole question had been examined by the Allies with the greatest care and that they had made every effort to see it from the German point of view. He had asked Herr von Simson whether he admitted that crimes had been perpetrated and that the guilty individuals should be punished. Herr von Simson agreed as far as to say that the guilty parties should be brought to judgment, but only before German tribunals; to which he had replied that the situation in that case would be yet more difficult for the German Government. Herr von Simson claimed that America, while admitting the principle that the guilty individuals should be handed over, did not insist on their being actually delivered up. Mr. Berthelot replied that he did not know the correctness of the statement, but that Herr von Simson certainly ought to realize that populations which had suffered directly from the war could not have the same feeling on that question as those that had not. There were crimes which families could not forget and, speaking to him as man to man, he had asked him whether, if the German Government considered its duty in a loyal spirit, it would not find the difficulties less than it had at first believed. The Allies would not be implacable and if they recognized that a sincere effort was being made to hand over the guilty individuals, they might not insist on the extreme fulfilment of this clause; he had asked whether Herr von Simson did not think that there would be found German individuals courageous and patriotic enough to surrender themselves voluntarily. Herr von Simson did not think so and Mr. Berthelot had replied that such would not be the case in the Allied countries.

He had finally explained to Herr von Simson that the Council had fixed the deposit of ratifications for December 1st but this would only be possible

if Germany did not create any difficulty. Germany had had the protocol for the last three weeks and if Germany had observations to make she should do so immediately; the German Government should not forget that the execution of the Treaty would mean the repatriation of her prisoners.

The Council expressed thanks to M. Berthelot for his very valuable summary.

4. MR. WHITE stated that the Labour Conference at Washington which had been unofficial up to that time, wished to know, as it intended *Labour Conference at Washington* to adjourn on November 29th, whether the deposit of ratifications was set for December 1st; in that case the Conference would hold over until the 2nd or 3rd of December to pass official resolutions to confirm the work previously covered unofficially.

M. CAMBON replied that December 1st had been set and that the fact could be officially communicated to the Labour Conference.

5. *Report of the Special Economic Commission regarding the confiscation of Greek Orthodox property in Hungary* [Not printed]

6. *Draft answer to the Danish request regarding the Liquidation of property of Schleswigers residing abroad* [Not printed]<sup>4</sup>

7. (The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee (see Appendix E).)

*Report of the Drafting Committee relative to the Request of the Dutch Government for Permission to Export from Germany certain War Material for its Colonies* M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note. He said it was for the Council to decide whether it should maintain the terms of the Treaty and the legal position already adopted by the Council.

It was decided:

that a letter be sent to the Dutch Minister at Paris advising him that the Supreme Council maintained that no departure could be made from its rule vetoing the export of war material from Germany.

8. *Draft Treaty regarding Spitzbergen* [Not printed]<sup>5</sup>

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 21, 1919.*

<sup>4</sup> French texts of this minute and the accompanying appendix D are printed by A. Tardieu and F. de Jessen, op. cit., pp. 342-4.

<sup>5</sup> M. Laroche 'read and commented' upon a report from the Spitzbergen Commission,

*Summary of American Position Regarding Eastern Galicia*

On June 25th Mr. Lansing introduced into the Council a resolution authorizing the Polish military occupation of Eastern Galicia and the establishment of a civil government 'under a mandate from the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which shall be conditioned to preserve as far as possible the autonomy of the territory and the political, religious and personal liberties of the inhabitants'. His resolution further provided 'that the mandate shall be predicated upon the ultimate self-determination of the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia as to their political allegiance, the time for the exercise of such choice to be hereafter fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or by a body to whom they delegate that power'.<sup>6</sup> This proposition was submitted as a compromise between a proposition of Mr. Balfour for the appointment of a high commissioner under the mandate of the League of Nations and the proposition of Baron Sonnino for the unconditional surrender of East Galicia to Poland.

On the objection of Sir Eyre Crowe to the word 'Mandate' this was stricken from Mr. Lansing's resolution, and the word 'agreement' substituted. With this exception Mr. Lansing's resolution was accepted and served as the basis upon which the Polish Commission drafted its report No. 5<sup>7</sup> embodying a preliminary draft of the Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland establishing an autonomous Eastern Galicia within the Polish State. This draft treaty was drawn up on the general principle that a popular consultation should be held at some period to be determined by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers ten years after the exchange of ratifications of the treaty regarding Eastern Galicia.

Mr. Lansing's resolution was introduced into the Council, and the Polish treaty was largely prepared, at a time when conditions in Eastern Galicia were exceedingly troubled and when civil war between Poles and Ukrainians had hardly ceased.

When the treaty was considered in the Council toward the end of the month of September the situation was quite altered. According to reports of reliable and thorough observers, Polish occupation had resulted in the complete pacification of the country. The American delegation concluded it would be in the interests of peace and quiet to eliminate certain clauses which emphasized the provisional nature of the settlement while maintaining the rights of the Ruthenians and the principle of an eventual revision of the East Galician settlement in case of need. Therefore on September 25th Mr. Polk submitted for the consideration of the Council a memorandum suggesting, in addition to certain minor alterations, that the clauses regarding a popular consultation should be replaced by a stipulation placing the treaty under the guarantee of the League of Nations and providing dated November 17, 1919 (appendix G in original), forwarding a draft for the treaty relative to the Spitzbergen archipelago (appendix F in original); the report dealt mainly with procedural questions which would arise out of approval of the draft, and submitted draft letters regarding adhesion to the treaty (a) from the Supreme Council to the Norwegian Minister in Paris, (b) from the French Foreign Minister to the diplomatic representatives in Paris of the other proposed signatory Powers (United States, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden). 'After a short discussion' the Supreme Council approved the report and the draft treaty, which was signed at Paris on February 9, 1920, as printed in *British and Foreign State Papers (1920)*, vol. cxiii, pp. 789-97.

<sup>6</sup> See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. iv, p. 850.

<sup>7</sup> See Vol. I, No. 61, appendix C.

*'The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and Poland hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification whatsoever of this treaty in whole or in part which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.'*<sup>8</sup>

The French, Italian and Japanese delegations accepted the principle of the American proposition but the British delegation, after reference to its Government, submitted a counter-proposal providing that Poland should be granted a mandate over Eastern Galicia for a definite term of years—ten to fifteen.<sup>9</sup> The French delegation proposed to modify the British proposition to grant Poland a twenty-five year mandate. The American delegation stated that it would accept the French proposition in case unanimity could be reached on this basis, but that otherwise it would revert to its original position that Poland should be granted an indefinite mandate subject to revision by the Council of the League of Nations at any time the settlement proposed should prove unsatisfactory.

The position of the American delegation has been controlled by the following considerations:

The only practicable solution of the immediate problem of administering Eastern Galicia is to entrust this administration to Poland. In the interests of peace it is necessary to create as solid an administration as possible; any administration that is clearly marked as 'temporary' would fail to inspire the confidence and support which is necessary to restore normal conditions in Eastern Galicia and would foster propaganda and intrigue.

It is impossible, however, at the present time to state with accuracy what may be the ideal settlement of the Eastern Galicia problem, and it is therefore necessary to provide for a revision of any settlement in case the situation should demand it, although one cannot indicate whether such a revision should ever be made, or if it should be made, whether at the end of one, five, fifteen or thirty years.

Therefore the most satisfactory solution is to entrust Eastern Galicia to Poland, with the understanding that no change will be made as long as this status proves satisfactory, but to provide very clearly for an immediate revision if and when the solution proves to be no longer a desirable one.

For this reason, in the opinion of the American Delegation, it should not be within the power of a single nation to prevent such readjustment of the situation at the end of twenty-five years, and, therefore, that a decision on this point should be possible by a majority rather than unanimity of the Council of the League of Nations.

*Paris, November 21, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX E TO NO. 28

##### *Note for the Supreme Council relative to the Request of the Netherlands to receive War Material from Germany*

In a letter under date of July 26 last, the Dutch Government requested information on 'the exact interpretation to be given to the words *war material* in Article 170 of the Peace Treaty.' It expressed the wish to be able to get from Germany naval material for the Dutch fleet.

They were informed on October 8 that Articles 170 and 192 of the Treaty stipulated the prohibition of export from Germany of all military and naval material and in consequence thereof the desire expressed by Holland could not receive satisfaction.

<sup>8</sup> See Vol. I, No. 64, appendix K.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. No. 16, minute 3.

Another letter from the Dutch Minister under date of November 6, without disputing the interpretation of the said Articles, appeals to the Supreme Council requesting as an exception the authorization to import from Germany military and naval material which Holland might need for her colonies.

It is not within the competence of the Drafting Committee to appreciate the reply which it is proper to make to the Dutch Government from a political point of view. However, it takes the liberty of recalling to the Council the refusals already made in like cases to Spain and Denmark and, by right, the necessity that such a derogation, if it were accepted, be previously consented to by all the signatory Powers of the Treaty.

For the Drafting Committee,  
HENRI FROMAGEOT

November 19, 1919.

## No. 29

H.D. 99.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, November 24, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Henry White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Rear-Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Colonel Logan, Dr. I. Bowman, Mr. A. W. Dulles, Lieut.-Commander L. B. Green, U.S.N.  
*British Empire*: General Groves, Colonel Percival, Lieut.-Col. Kisch, Major McCrindle, Mr. Carr.  
*France*: Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Hermitte, M. de Montille.  
*Italy*: General Cavallero, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri, M. Manciolì, Commandant Rugiu.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. (The Council had before it two letters from Baron von Lersner to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference dated November 21st and 23rd, 1919 (see Appendices A and B).)

*Negotiations with the German Delegates* M. BERTHELOT read the first letter as well as the draft reply prepared by the French Delegation. (See Appendix C.) He said it was evident that there was no sense in starting a discussion on the return of prisoners of war at a moment when that repatriation was to take place within eight days. Since the draft reply had been prepared they had received

the second letter from Baron von Lersner which the Council had before it. The German attitude was all the more inexplicable since in the interview he had had with M. Dutasta and M. Berthelot, Baron von Lersner had asked him for the date of the first meeting of his Delegates with the Allied Commissioners; von Lersner had put a number of questions to him concerning the procedure to be followed and had expressed a desire to receive on Saturday<sup>1</sup> evening the agenda of that meeting. That agenda had been sent him at the appointed hour. The attitude of Germany seemed to be determined by the delay that had occurred in the American ratification of the Treaty as well as by the Lodge motion tending to the restoration of the state of peace between the United States and Germany;<sup>2</sup> Germany evidently hoped that a misunderstanding would arise between the Allies. M. Berthelot felt that it would be important to acquaint Washington with this tendency. The reply they had given on the question of the handing over of guilty individuals might have also an influence on the German decision. Von Lersner had made him understand that if the Entente maintained its demands, no German could wish to hasten by a single day the ratification of a treaty which, according to him, would plunge Germany in chaos.

M. CAMBON asked whether the draft letter which had just been read by M. Berthelot was approved by the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought it would be advisable to add a few words concerning the departure of the German Commissioners.

M. BERTHELOT agreed. The draft had been prepared before the second letter had been received. A postscript might be added.

SIR EYRE CROWE said it should be stated in that postscript that the departure of the German technical Delegates led one to think that the Berlin Government did not intend to ratify; also that it would be advisable to ask the German Government categorically yes or no, whether it meant to sign the protocol.

M. DE MARTINO said he thought it would be unwise to look as if they had any doubt about the final putting into force of the Treaty.

After further discussion, the text of the postscript was adopted as shown in Appendix D.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that it was important that the note should be sent without delay, and further that it should be published for the sake of the moral effect it would produce on German public opinion.

M. BERTHELOT said they could send the letter as soon as the President—who ought to sign it—returned, that was to say, that night.

MR. WHITE thought that it would be wise in that case to delay the publication for 24 hours.

<sup>1</sup> November 22, 1919.

<sup>2</sup> On November 19, 1919, the Senate of the United States having rejected motions for the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, Senator Lodge had introduced a resolution for a separate declaration of peace between the United States and Germany. This resolution was referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Senate adjourned that night until its next session.

M. CAMBON said the note would then be published the following evening.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve the draft reply to the President of the German Delegation, together with the postscript shown in Appendix D:
- (2) that said reply be transmitted to Baron von Lersner as soon as possible;
- (3) that it be published on the evening of November 25th. (See Appendices C and D.)

2.

*Financial Arrangements  
in the Plebiscite Terri-  
tories and Occupied  
Territories of Danzig  
and Memel*

[Not printed]<sup>3</sup>

3.

*Allowances to Personnel  
of Administrative,  
Government, and Plebis-  
cite Commissions*

[Not printed]

4. SIR EYRE CROWE said Sir George Clerk had telegraphed that he was on the point of leaving Budapest, having fulfilled his mission. Should the Council wish him to remain or have some communication to make to him, it should do so without delay.

*Sir George  
Clerk's Mission*

M. BERTHELOT said Sir George Clerk gave the Council the assurance that

<sup>3</sup> The Supreme Council considered a report on this question, dated November 21, 1919 (appendix E in original), which was presented in accordance with the second resolution of the Supreme Council noted in No. 26, note 4. This report was based upon the premisses previously advanced by General Le Rond in this connexion (ibid.), and recommended as regards: (i) *Upper Silesia*: (a) 'The German Government, during the course of negotiations to be opened, will be asked to agree to supply the public banks of the territory as necessary to meet the normal administration expenses.' (b) As regards additional administration expenses resulting from the interallied régime, 'it seems natural that the Polish Government should be invited to make the necessary advances, the régime instituted having [been] based on her claims on Upper Silesia'. (c) 'Finally, for the military expenses, it seems inevitable that the advance be made by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. . . . The delegates think it advisable to refer the matter to their Government[s].' (ii) *Allenstein and Marienwerder*: The same recommendations as for Upper Silesia except that it was suggested that in this case proposal (a) be extended to cover expenses under (b). 'This extension is justified in regard to Allenstein by the explicit provision of Article 95 [of the Treaty of Versailles] which makes Eastern Prussia responsible for these expenses in case local revenues are insufficient; similarly, it can be proposed for Marienwerder.' (iii) *Danzig and Memel*: 'The British Government accepts to advance upkeep expenses of the administrative official representing the Allied and Associated Powers at Danzig. As to the occupation expenses of Danzig and Memel, it would appear that the question should be solved in the same way as for the various territories above mentioned.'

After discussion the Supreme Council decided: (1) to approve the conclusions of the report; (2) 'that the costs of normal administration of [the] said territories, as well as supplementary costs of administration resulting from the interallied government, should be ultimately placed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers upon the States to whom those territories would be attributed by Treaty'.

Mr. Huszar<sup>4</sup> was not Friedrich's strawman. Sir George Clerk had succeeded fully in his mission. It seemed that the Council could allow him to return. Sir Eyre Crowe might wire him that the Council was not opposed to his return and would be glad to hear his report.

5. (The Council had before it a letter from the Polish Delegation dated November 17th, 1919 (see Appendix H) and a letter from the same Delegation dated November 19, 1919 (see Appendix I).)
- Negotiations between the Polish Government and*  
(a) *the City of Dantzig,*  
(b) *the German Government*
- M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the letters. He added that it would be advantageous to be able to follow the negotiations in Paris itself.

SIR EYRE CROWE said the question was not exactly the same for the negotiations between Poland and the German Governments and between Poland and Dantzig. In the former case there was no difficulty in transferring the negotiations to Paris. In the latter, on the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the local factor played an important part. The Treaty to be concluded would go into all sorts of detail concerning the port, docks, customs, railroads, etc. Would it be wise to transfer to Paris the seat of these negotiations when an account had to be taken of local conditions? The representative of the Allies at Dantzig had a part to play in the negotiations: was it wise to eliminate him?

M. LAROCHE said the Polish Commission had quite definitely thought that because of local passions it would be wiser to withdraw the negotiations from the atmosphere of Dantzig just as it would be to withdraw them from Warsaw. That transfer would not prevent the representative of the Allies at Dantzig from intervening: his advice would be asked for. Indeed in matters of technical details it would be easy to detach to the spot a sub-commission. To take into account the objection formulated by Sir Eyre Crowe, they might decide in principle that the negotiations would take place in Paris although the details should be settled on the spot.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he of course agreed that the decision should be taken at Paris but he considered it difficult to divide the negotiations into two classes. He would rather propose that Dantzig be made the seat of negotiations, it being understood that the scheme worked out at Dantzig be subject to revision in Paris.

M. BERTHELOT said the Council could adopt a formula of that kind.

M. CAMBON suggested that they could say—and in that way indicate that the Allied Representative at Dantzig had to take part in the matter—that the preliminary investigations should take place at Dantzig, that they would be carried out on the spot and that they would be transmitted to Paris for final decision by the Allied Representative who would submit the report.

MR. WHITE asked whether originally it had not been decided that the

<sup>4</sup> On November 22-3, 1919, M. Huszar had formed a new Hungarian Government in which M. Friedrich became Minister of War. Cf. No. 33, appendix A.

negotiations take place in Warsaw, the question interesting Poland in the first place.

M. LAROCHE said the Japanese Delegation had been opposed to that proposal as it did not have a representative at Warsaw who could follow the negotiations.

M. DE MARTINO said his instructions gave him authority to approve the transfer to Paris of all the negotiations in progress, whether in Berlin or Warsaw, between Germany and Poland. He asked whether the negotiations relative to Dantzic fell within that category.

M. CAMBON thought not.

MR. WHITE asked how the Commission would be composed, and why it could not meet at Warsaw.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that it was because Dantzic was the object of the negotiations; the Commission would include representatives of the free city and Poles.

M. LAROCHE said it was understood, then, that the scheme prepared at Dantzic could be modified in Paris. All the questions would be studied anew in Paris under the auspices of the Great Powers and with the cooperation of the Delegates of Dantzic and of Poles.

MR. WHITE said he agreed on the principle, but he wished to read over the text of the resolution once it had been drafted.

It was decided:

- (1) that the negotiations between the Polish Government and the German Government take place in Paris;
- (2) that the negotiations between the Polish Government and the Free City of Dantzic take place in Paris, with the cooperation and under the direction of representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers;
- (3) that, prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preliminary discussions, at which the Allied representative in the Free City of Dantzic is to be a party, should take place at Dantzic. That representative should send to Paris, with a report, the proposals which would have been prepared at Dantzic, and which would serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for in paragraph 2.

(The Council reserves to itself the final approval of the present resolution until a further examination.)

6. (The Council had before it a draft note dated November 24th, 1919 (see *Note to the German Government concerning the Sale of German Aeronautical Material* Appendix J).)

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to adopt the draft note to the President of the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Germany for transmission to the German Government once the Peace Treaty came into force (see Appendix J).)

*Sub-Committee of the  
Committee on Organiza-  
tion of the Reparation  
Commission charged with  
the Improvement of  
Circulation of Rolling  
Stock in the ex-Austro-  
Hungarian Empire*

[Not printed]<sup>5</sup>

8. (The Council had before it the note of the British Delegation dated November 22nd (see Appendix L).)

*German Soldiers  
demobilized in  
the Schleswig  
Plebiscite Area*

(After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to refer to the Drafting Committee for examination and immediate report the note of the British Delegation on demobilization by German authorities of a great number of soldiers in the Schleswig plebiscite area.<sup>6</sup> (See Appendix L).)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 24, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 29

PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION.

PARIS, *November 21, 1919*

From: Baron von Lersner

To: M. Dutasta, Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

Your Excellency having been unable to receive me today, I do not wish to fail to communicate to you in writing the reason for my call.

Yesterday's conversation convinced M. von Simson, Director at the Ministry, that before any future discussion on the coming into force of the Treaty, he should present an oral report to the German Government, all the more so that, for the conventions to be concluded, the approval of the German National Assembly is necessary. M. von Simson will therefore leave tomorrow evening for Berlin.

Furthermore, I feel obliged to inform Your Excellency that I protest most energetically against the fact of again associating the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and interned German civilians with the coming into force of

<sup>5</sup> The Supreme Council approved 'the terms of the draft note of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission concerning the appointment of a sub-committee on rolling-stock in the Ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire [appendix K in original], an appointment which the Council considered as decided in its resolution of November 20' (see No. 27, note 3). The Supreme Council noted a declaration by Signor de Martino that 'it was well understood that the sub-committee would only function until a decision had been taken on the distribution of rolling stock between the several States inheriting territory of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Empire, in accordance with Article 318 of the Treaty of St. Germain'.

<sup>6</sup> A French text of this decision is printed by A. Tardieu and F. de Jessen, op. cit., p. 331.

the Peace Treaty. The declaration of the Allied and Associated Governments<sup>7</sup> separated this question from that of the coming into force of the Treaty. Should this promise now become valueless the promise of the French Government which is now given us again for consideration would meet with no confidence in the public opinion of Germany.

In closing may I not call to your attention the enclosed article published in the *Presse de Paris* of this date,<sup>8</sup> on the question of the handing over of the accused.

Please accept, etc.

#### APPENDIX B TO NO. 29

PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION.

PARIS, November 23, 1919.

No. 447.

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

I have the honour to request that your Excellency kindly postpone the session announced in the letter of the 22nd instant<sup>9</sup> until the return of the Director of the Ministry, von Simson, and the experts accompanying him.

Kindly accept, etc.

#### APPENDIX C TO NO. 29

PARIS, November 22, 1919.

From: President of the Peace Conference.

To: Baron von Lersner, President of the German Peace Delegation.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 21st, which informs me of the departure of Mr. von Simson for Berlin, to confer with the German Government regarding the conditions of the entry into force of the Treaty and, moreover, informing me of the necessity of the approval of the Conventions to be made by the German National Assembly.<sup>10</sup>

This information leads to [?] the question whether the signature of the protocol of ratification of the Treaty (for which the Allied and Associated Governments arranged to be ready on December 1) can take place on this date, and this through the fault of the German Government, which has since November 1 been in possession of the Note of the Allies and of the accompanying protocol.

This delay in the ratification of the Treaty would be the more regrettable as it might arouse doubts concerning the sincerity of Germany's intentions with regard to the execution of the agreements arising from the Armistice, and those contained in the Peace Treaty. Still, it would seem to be in the general interest and, primarily, in the interest of the German people, to ensure that the prompt going into effect of the Treaty bring about Peace and make possible the reconstitution which would thereby ensue to the entire world.

The signature of the protocol of ratification determines in particular the date of the return of the prisoners of war to Germany. On this subject I feel bound to reply to the inaccurate statement, reiterated in your letter of yesterday, that a promise had been made and not fulfilled by the French Government. The truth is

<sup>7</sup> Annexed to the original of this appendix was a copy of this declaration, adopted by the Supreme Council on August 28, 1919, as recorded in Vol. I, No. 45, minute 2, q.v.

<sup>8</sup> Not annexed to the filed original of this appendix.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. minute 1 and note 1 above.

<sup>10</sup> See appendix A above.

quite different: on August 28th, the Supreme Council accepted a draft resolution concerning prisoners of war, to the effect of anticipating the date of the ratification of the Peace Treaty with regard to the repatriation of prisoners and the immediate beginning of the repatriation. This resolution was at once executed, and the repatriation of prisoners of war began. Thus the prisoners made by the British, American and Belgian Armies were returned to Germany, in full accord with the French Government. But the decision added that the continuation of this benevolent policy would depend upon the fulfilment by the German Government and people of all the obligations which are incumbent upon them. The date of the notification of the Allied and Associated Powers proved the patience of the Allies in waiting for the execution of the German agreements, as well as Germany's violations of them on a number of very important points. The consequence of this could only be the discontinuance of the repatriation and the decision to strictly adhere to the clauses of the Peace Treaty, which make the return of the prisoners of war contingent upon the going into force of the Treaty.

The final ratification in eight days and the return of the prisoners to their homes depend on the German Government. It is only necessary that the Allied and German Commissioners agree on the practical conditions of the execution of the clauses concerning Eastern territories, and that the protocol, annexed to the notification of November 1st and providing for the integral execution of the clauses of the Armistice, and for the penalties for violations, be signed without any new questions being raised.

Please accept, etc.

#### APPENDIX D TO No. 29

P.S. November 24, 1919.

Since the drafting of the present letter—the sending of which was only delayed by the absence of the President of the Peace Conference—a new fact was brought to the attention of the Supreme Council by your letter of November 23rd—the departure of the German experts, with Mr. von Simson, who arrived three days before to settle with the Allied Commissions the questions raised by the execution of the Treaty, and concerning the operations of the Plebiscite, Government and Delimitation Commissions.

The Supreme Council was extremely surprised by the departure of the German Delegates, which can only be interpreted as the proof of the determination of Germany to hinder again the preliminary agreements, indispensable for the final exchange of ratifications of the Peace Treaty. This fact raises very regrettable doubts as to the intentions of the German Government.

The Supreme Council desires to be definitely informed on the subject in the shortest time possible, and holds the German Government fully responsible for the delay caused by it in the re-establishment of a state of Peace.

#### APPENDIX H TO No. 29

POLISH DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

PARIS, *November 17, 1919*

To: President Clemenceau.

Considering that, according to Article 104 of the Peace Treaty, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed to negotiate the conventions between Poland and the free city of Dantzic, the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference has the

honour to request the Supreme Council to kindly designate Paris as the seat of these negotiations and to commence same with the least practicable delay.

Accept, etc.,

A. PATEK.

L. GRABSKI.

#### APPENDIX I TO NO. 29

##### GERMAN [POLISH] DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

PARIS, November 19, 1919.

From: MM. Patek and Grabski.

To: M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference.

The Supreme Council has requested the Polish Government, through the French Minister at Warsaw, to send to Paris technical representatives to take part in the negotiations concerning questions relating on the carrying out of the Treaty of Versailles.

The Polish technical representatives, provided with the necessary powers, recently arrived at Paris.

During the negotiations which have been going on in Berlin for some time between the representatives of Poland and Germany and of which the missions of the Principal Powers have been kept constantly informed, questions of supplies and carrying out of the Treaty, and also, among others, problems mentioned in the invitation were discussed.

With a view to the early opening of negotiations at Paris, the Polish Delegation takes the liberty to express the opinion that these negotiations should include not only questions proposed by the Supreme Council, but in general all problems relevant to the carrying out of the Treaty of Versailles by Poland and Germany.

The Delegation hopes that this opinion will be shared by the Supreme Council and that the negotiations which will soon begin will be carried on in conformity with this opinion.

Please accept, etc.

#### APPENDIX J TO NO. 29

##### *Draft of a Note to the President of the Interallied Aeronautic Control Commission (C.A.I.C.) in Germany, for Transmission to the German Government upon the Going into Force of the Peace Treaty*

No reply has been made to the German Note, Wake [Wako] 3639, of October 12,<sup>10</sup> because such a reply would only have been a repetition of Marshal Foch's four telegrams under date of August 2 [?], August 26, September 30, and October 18, communicated to the German Government.<sup>11</sup>

All these telegrams having remained without results, General Masterman, President of the C.A.I.C., was requested to present to the German authorities the note of November . . .,<sup>12</sup> 1919, again calling the attention of the German Government to the character of the measures taken or tolerated by it tending to have Germany avoid her obligations and jeopardizing the loyal execution of the Peace Treaty.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See document 4 in appendix A to No. 8.

<sup>12</sup> Punctuation as in original.

<sup>11</sup> See Vol. I.

<sup>13</sup> See No. 24, appendix H.

Therefore, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers wish to call the attention of the German Government to the lack of foundation for the objections which it had formulated against the just demands addressed to it.

As regards the objections raised in the 2nd alinea of Par. 2, according to which 'Article 169 provides the surrender of material to be destroyed or rendered useless', the Principal Allied and Associated Powers consider this objection as irrelevant as aeronautical material is the particular subject of Article 202 (Section II, Air Clauses), the application of which would not be jeopardized by Article 169 which precedes it. The German Government is aware that by the terms of the said Article 202 all German air material which cannot be [? re]moved without special authorization of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, must be purely and simply delivered to the said Powers in such places as will be selected by the C.A.I.C.

Par. 3 of the German Note is not any better founded. The viewpoint of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as regards the non-military nature of certain airplanes has been repeatedly explained to the German Government and the allegation that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers would not allow the existence of nonmilitary planes is so little justified that on the contrary they have entrusted the C.A.I.C. with determining the military or nonmilitary nature of these planes in conformity with the stipulations of the Treaty.

As to the other objections raised by the German Government in the note above referred to, their discussion would appear to have no further interest after the coming into force of the Treaty.

As a result of the preceding remarks, and in conformity with the Treaty as well as the protocol under date of November . . . ,<sup>12</sup> 1919, the C.A.I.C. is entrusted with requesting the German Government to take immediately the following measures of which they have been already notified:

1st) To furnish the C.A.I.C. a list of all aeronautical material sold or exported:  
2nd) To deliver to the C.A.I.C. at such places as it may select all aircraft and aeronautical material captured by the German forces from the Allied and Associated Powers. Among this material the 500 motors especially referred to in Marshal Foch's telegram under date of August 7<sup>11</sup> must be immediately delivered at. . . .<sup>12</sup>

3rd) To deposit at the places selected by the C.A.I.C. all aeronautical material in Germany (including material removed, loaned, utilized or sold), material which will later be recognized as civil by the C.A.I.C. will be released.

4th) To deposit with the C.A.I.C. before January 31, 1920, and according to the value of [sic] all aeronautical material the delivery of which has been made impossible by Germany.

*November 24, 1919.*

## APPENDIX L TO No. 29

### *Note by the British Delegation*

Information has been received from Copenhagen showing that the German authorities intend to demobilize some of their military and naval forces at Flensburg and to provide them with civilian occupations within the plebiscite area.

In the view of His Britannic Majesty's Government it would be desirable to inform the German Government at once that this proceeding will not be allowed.

H.D. 100.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, November 25, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Henry White; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Barone Russo.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Mr. A. W. Dulles, Capt. H. Pierce.  
*British Empire*: Lt.-Colonel Kisch, Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. E. H. Carr.  
*France*: Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Le Rond, M. Hermitte, M. Kammerer.  
*Italy*: M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. MARSHAL FOCH informed the Council that he had received a telegram from General Niessel, dated November 23rd (see Appendix A).  
*Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces* According to this telegram the Germans were carrying out their evacuation by the Chavli-Tauroggen railroad. The Lithuanians, in spite of instructions received from General Niessel, had crossed that line at several points and attacked the Germans. In order to parry this attack General Niessel had dispatched Allied and German officers and hoped to succeed in checking the Lithuanians. In spite of this, the German Government had ordered troops to cross the frontier in order to protect the railroad, although they had been told not to send any additional troops to that district. One train had already passed through. General Niessel desired the Council to make strong representations to the German Government. He proposed to send a telegram to General Niessel telling him that he had full power to take whatever measures seemed to him fitting and that any action on the part of the Council seemed calculated only to retard a satisfactory solution.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if any news had been received from General Niessel regarding an armistice between the Germans and the Letts. He had received a somewhat obscure telegram from the Admiralty evidently to the effect that there was such an armistice.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It appears probable that the reference was to a transmission of the following telegram of November 24, 1919, from Admiral Sir W. Cowan, British Senior Naval Officer, Baltic, to the Admiralty: 'General Niessel is ordering cessation of hostilities between Letts and Germans. I regard this as madness; instant orders should be sent to cancel. I have sent strongest protest. All his messages are in plain language.' The last sentence of this telegram apparently referred to use by General Niessel of unciphered messages.

GENERAL WEYGAND said he did not think so. The last news received from General Niessel was that he had meant to go to Riga, but felt that his presence was necessary further south, especially as the Letts seemed able to hold their own against the Germans.

It was decided:

to approve the terms of the draft telegram prepared by Marshal Foch to be sent to General Niessel (see Appendix B).

2.

[Nor printed]

*Allowances to personnel  
of Administrative,  
Government, and Plebis-  
cite Commissions*

3. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that the Roumanian answer had not yet actually arrived. General Coanda, who was bringing this answer, was on his way to Paris. According to the Roumanian calculation the time within which their answer was to be delivered only expired at noon of that day. Although, according to the idea of the Council that time had expired on Sunday,<sup>2</sup> it seemed expedient to wait until General Coanda arrived, an event which would take place at any moment. In the meantime, a strong speech from the Roumanian throne had indicated that under no conditions was Roumania willing to permit a rupture between herself and the Allied and Associated Powers. M. Antonescu had confirmed this information.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that a real difficulty existed. He had heard from the British Representative at Bucharest that the Council's note had not been presented by the 22nd of November. The Council in discussing the draft note had changed several words and decided that the Roumanians were to have eight days from the presentation of the note.<sup>3</sup> If then it had not been presented on the 22nd November the time could not be considered to have expired.

M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that he had received a telegram from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest dated November 21st to the effect that the latter had received the first and last parts of the Council's note to the Roumanian Government. An important part was still lacking and was being awaited before the note was presented. M. Misu, however, already knew the substance of the note through General Coanda. The French Chargé d'Affaires had made urgent representations to the Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs as to the gravity of the situation, which permitted of no delay, and had told him that the Roumanian Government must declare itself ready to sign the Minorities Treaty unreservedly in consideration always of the assurance given by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in their note of the 12th October that they would examine certain modifications as to form. M. Misu had replied to the French Chargé d'Affaires that he would

<sup>2</sup> November 23, 1919.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 23, minute 2.

prepare a reply of that tenor and would do his utmost to obtain a favourable consideration of the matter from the King and Council of Ministers.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the Council that the Roumanians had been told that they could not sign the Bulgarian Treaty until they had signed the Austrian Treaty. As they could not sign the Austrian Treaty within the two ensuing days he did not see how they could sign the Bulgarian Treaty on November 27th.

M. BERTHELOT suggested that a protocol could be signed, as had been the case at the time of signing the Austrian Treaty, giving the Roumanians additional time within which to sign the Bulgarian Treaty. That time might be fixed at a week.

M. DE MARTINO agreed that the Council should take no further action towards Roumania until the Roumanian reply had been received.

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that all indications were that the Roumanians were certainly going to sign. The Serb-Croat-Slovene Government was prepared to sign the Treaty with Austria as well as the Minorities Treaty and the financial arrangements. The Drafting Committee had prepared a draft agreement of adhesion to be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government which would be communicated to all the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Saint Germain. With respect to the Roumanians the situation was different. The Minorities Treaty concerning Roumania had not yet been signed by anybody. Some modifications as to form would be made in this Minorities Treaty in order to meet certain views of the Roumanians. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers therefore could not sign this Treaty until the final terms thereof had been settled after consultation with the Roumanian Representatives.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that the Roumanians must give an unequivocal agreement to sign the Minorities Treaty, taking into consideration the fact that certain modifications in their favour might be made therein.

M. CAMBON suggested that after the receipt of the Roumanian reply the Roumanian Delegation be given a week from Nov. 27 within which to sign the Bulgarian Treaty, and that within that week the Minorities Treaty should be put into final form after conference with the Roumanian representatives; that said Treaty, as well as the Treaty of Saint Germain and the agreements related thereto, be signed by Roumania within that week.

M. BERTHELOT read the draft agreement of adhesion, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government (see Appendix C<sup>4</sup>).

It was decided:

- (1) that in connection with the signing of the Treaty with Bulgaria on November 27th a protocol be prepared allowing the interested Powers to sign said Treaty with Bulgaria within one week from November 27th;

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained a draft for the declaration of adhesion which was signed in Paris by Yugoslav representatives on December 5, 1919. This declaration is printed in Treaty Series, 1920, No. 8. Cmd. 638.

(2) that within one week from November 27th Roumania should sign the Treaty with Austria, the Minorities Treaty, and the financial arrangements:

(3) to accept the draft agreement of adhesion, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation;

(4) that the agreement of adhesion when signed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation be communicated to all the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Saint Germain.

4. The Council had before it a note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation regarding the Minorities Treaty (see Appendix D<sup>5</sup>).)

*Note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation regarding the Treaty for the protection of Minorities*

M. KAMMERER commented upon the note from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation and stated that, on the whole, this note was satisfactory. He pointed out that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation had presented its interpretation of the clauses relative to freedom of transit

and equitable treatment of commerce, which were involved in Article 51 of the Treaty of Peace with Austria, and had stated that in the absence of a contrary reply from the Council it would consider that its interpretation was correct. He thought that the Serbian interpretation was, in fact, correct and he therefore proposed that no reply be sent to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation. The question could therefore be considered settled.

It was decided:

that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers were in full agreement with the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation as to the interpretation of the Minorities Treaty, and that said Treaty be at once presented to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation for signature. (See Appendix D<sup>5</sup>).

5. (The Council had before it the Bulgarian reply regarding reciprocal immigration between Greece and Bulgaria, dated November 23rd (see Appendix E<sup>6</sup>).)

*Reply to the Bulgarian Delegation regarding the Treaty on Reciprocal Immigration*

M. KAMMERER commented upon this note from the Bulgarian Delegation and stated that it was entirely satisfactory. The Bulgarian Delegation has asked for

explanations with respect to two points. The Committee on New States agreed with the Bulgarian interpretation of these points. A satisfactory answer consisting of a few lines could be sent to the Bulgarian Delegation. A more serious question was the form of the Treaty. The United States representative had raised some question as to his Government's being able to sign, and the Japanese delegate had thereupon stated that in such an event, his Government might likewise be unable to sign. The Drafting Committee considered that the Treaty between Bulgaria and Greece relative to reciprocal immigration was in no way dependent upon the signature of the Bulgarian Treaty by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. In fact Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Bulgarian Treaty itself, made that point clear.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This note, dated at Paris on November 23, 1919, is printed by D. H. Miller, op. cit., vol. xiii, pp. 543-6.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This note is printed *ibid.*, vol. xiii, pp. 539-40.

In order to meet the difficulty the Drafting Committee proposed the following solution: the Supreme Council should reach a decision which would be inserted in the preamble of the Greco-Bulgarian Treaty; for technical reasons it was preferable that this decision be dated Thursday, November 27th. The wording of the proposed decision was as follows:

'In view of the provisions of Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers deem it fitting that the reciprocal and voluntary immigration of ethnical, religious and linguistic minorities in Greece and Bulgaria should be settled by a convention concluded between these two Powers in the terms decided upon on this date.'

The foregoing solution represented the unanimous opinion of the Committee on New States, with the exception that the Italian representative had made the reservation that M. de Martino would have to give a final opinion on this point.

M. DE MARTINO said that he had already expressed his opinion that for reasons of general interest it was advisable that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should sign this Treaty. The decisions already taken by the Council relative to affairs in the Balkans seemed to him to have created many opportunities for trouble in the future. As a general thing he felt that those Powers who were directly interested in maintaining peace in the Balkans should participate more actively in Balkan affairs. However, as it was of great importance that the present question be settled without further delay, he was willing to withdraw his reservation on that occasion.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Secretary General of the Conference reply to the Bulgarian Delegation that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers were in agreement with the Bulgarian interpretation of the Treaty regarding reciprocal immigration between Greece and Bulgaria;
- (2) to adopt the following resolution, to be dated as of November 27th, 1919, and to be inserted in the preamble of the Treaty between Greece and Bulgaria regarding reciprocal immigration:

'In view of the provisions of Article 56, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers deem it fitting that the reciprocal and voluntary immigration of ethnical, religious and linguistic minorities in Greece and Bulgaria should be settled by a convention concluded between these two Powers in the terms decided upon on this date.'

6. (The Council had before it a draft note, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be sent to the German Government relative to demobilized German soldiers in the Schleswig Plebiscite Areas. (See Appendix F).)

*Report of the Drafting Committee on maintenance of demobilized German Soldiers in the Schleswig Plebiscite Areas*

M. CAMBON read the draft note, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be sent to the German Government relative to demobilized German soldiers in the

Schleswig Plebiscite Areas.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft note, prepared by the Drafting Committee, to be sent to the German Government relative to demobilized German soldiers in the Schleswig Plebiscite Areas. (See Appendix F.)

7. M. CAMBON read the resolution adopted by the Council at its preceding meeting (H.D. 99,<sup>7</sup> Minute 5). The resolution had provided that the Council reserved to itself the final approval thereof until a further examination.

*Resolution regarding the seat of negotiations having to do with the relationship between Poland and the Free City of Dantzig*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he accepted the text as read.

MR. WHITE proposed that paragraph 3 of the resolution be modified to read as follows:

‘that, prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preliminary studies by a special technical committee shall be made at Dantzig. This committee shall be composed of representatives of both Poland and Dantzig with the addition of the Allied representative at Dantzig. These technical studies, which may serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for under paragraph 2, shall be forwarded to Paris by this committee not later than one month after the coming into force of the Treaty.’

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what the object was in the change suggested by Mr. White. He wished to know if the word technical was intended to exclude anyone.

MR. WHITE replied that it was not.

M. CAMBON said that he likewise was unable to understand the proposed change.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if that excluded the preparation of a draft Treaty.

MR. WHITE said that the object of the proposed change was merely to make it clear that only preliminary studies should take place at Dantzig.

MR. DULLES called attention to the fact that preliminary discussions had already taken place at Warsaw. If the resolution provided that preliminary discussions should take place at Dantzig it might imply the removal of the discussions from Warsaw to Dantzig. The Poles and the inhabitants of Dantzig both recognized that technical studies must take place at Dantzig. He also called attention to the fact that in the change proposed by Mr. White a time limit of one month after the coming into force of the Treaty was specified.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that it had been proposed to hold these preliminary discussions at Warsaw. That proposition had been rejected and a request had been made on the previous day that these discussions be transferred to Paris. He had then proposed that the preliminary discussions be held at Dantzig. He further added that the change proposed by the American Delegation contemplated that the Committee engaged in preliminary studies should report direct to the Supreme Council. He felt that this procedure was

not correct and that as a matter of form it was the Allied Representative at Dantzig who should address the Supreme Council. He also felt that one month might prove to be too short a time within which to submit the report in question.

MR. DULLES remarked that discussions had already begun. Therefore by the time the Treaty came into force a further delay of one month might well prove sufficient. He quite agreed that the Representative of the Allies could and should address himself directly to the Supreme Council but he thought that the Committee charged with the preliminary studies should also be able to do so.

M. CAMBON suggested that paragraph 3 be modified to read as follows:

'that prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature and preliminary discussions, to which the Allied Representative in the free city of Dantzig should be a party, take place at Dantzig. Within a maximum delay of two months after the coming into force of the Treaty the said Representative should send to Paris, together with a report, the proposals which would have been prepared at Dantzig and which would serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for in the preceding paragraph.'

MR. WHITE agreed to that modification if it were satisfactory to the Poles.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that under the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Germany that was a matter for the decision of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers only.

M. CAMBON said that the Poles were interested in making preliminary studies and in participating in discussions, but they were not entitled to decide finally the question involved.

MR. WHITE wondered what the result would be if the Poles should refuse to accept the plan proposed.

M. CAMBON inquired whether Mr. White really expected such a refusal on their part. He pointed out that the Poles had asked to have the negotiations transferred to Paris, and their request had been granted. All that was necessary was to tell the Poles that it had been decided to grant their request.

M. BERTHELOT observed that certain questions necessarily had to be studied on the spot. He thought however, that the Council could reach a decision on that day and if necessary communicate it to the Poles. If the Poles had any observations to present, the Council could, he thought, decide on the following day whether or not to take them into account.

MR. WHITE said that Dantzig had been taken away from Germany and made a free city not so much for the good of the inhabitants of Dantzig as for the benefit of the population of Poland.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked Mr. White what action he thought should be taken in case the Poles did not accept the plan proposed. Was it his intention that the Council should yield to the Poles?

MR. WHITE thought that the matter could then be discussed again.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that there was no point in that as the Council alone was charged with the duty of deciding.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that in all probability the Poles would willingly accept this plan.

MR. WHITE felt that he could only accept the resolution proposed after hearing the view of the Poles.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that meant not coming to a decision.

(After some further discussion,

It was decided:

(1) to accept textually the first two paragraphs of the resolution taken at the preceding meeting of the Council (H.D. 99,<sup>7</sup> Minute 5, November 24th, 1919);

(2) that the third paragraph of said resolution be modified to read as follows:

‘that prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature and preliminary discussions, to which the Allied Representative in the free city of Dantzic should be a party, take place at Dantzic. Within a maximum delay of two months after the coming into force of the Treaty the said Representative should send to Paris, together with a report, the proposals which would have been prepared at Dantzic and which would serve as a basis for the negotiations provided for in the preceding paragraph.’

(3) that the entire resolution be communicated on that day to the Polish Delegation, and that if said Delegation had any observations to present the Council would examine them at an early meeting.)

8. (The Council had before it a letter dated November 15th from General Tcherbatcheff regarding Russian war material and supplies left in Roumania. (See Appendix G).)

*Disposal of Russian War Material left in Roumania after Demobilization of the Russian Army*

M. BERTHELOT pointed out that General Tcherbatcheff's note alluded to a joint letter of the Ministers Plenipotentiary of France, England, the United States and Italy, dated March 3rd, 1918. As the text of that joint

letter was not available he had telegraphed to the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest to obtain the same. He thought it would be well to await the receipt of that joint letter and to examine the same before taking any action on General Tcherbatcheff's note.

(This was agreed to.)

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 25, 1919.*

APPENDIX A TO No. 30  
*Telegram from General Niessel to M. Cambon, F. 1*

From: Tilsitt

To the Supreme Council:

Received 11 23 19. 9.00 p.m.

In order to assure free evacuation of the German forces, commanded the establishment of a line of demarkation east of the Tauroggen-Chavli railway. The Lithuanian Government was invited by us to observe this line. Nevertheless, the Lithuanian forces attacked this line in several places on each side of the latter locality.

In order to put a stop to the fights begun, I sent to the spot Allied officers of the Mission, with Colonel Dosse<sup>8</sup> and Admiral Hoppman.<sup>9</sup>

We informed the German Government that we cannot authorize it to transport troops beyond the frontier of East Prussia. However, Noske decided to send contingents to assure the protection of the railway. The first convoy is already past the frontier. The strength of the contingents to be sent has not been communicated to us. The forces at the disposal of General Eberhardt were sufficient to guarantee the security of the Tauroggen-Chavli railway. We think that the officers who were sent there will suffice to restore order.

It would be advisable to exercise, without delay, an energetic pressure on the German Government, in order to prevent the arrival of new troops from rendering more difficult the settlement of an already intricate situation.

APPENDIX B TO No. 30

*November 25, 1919.*

From: M. Foch.

To: General Niessel, President of the Interallied Commissions on Baltic Territories, Tilsitt.

In accordance with the Conference:

I approve all measures taken in order to put a stop to the Lithuanian attacks against the Chavli-Taurogen railway.

Full authority is given to you by the Conference to assure the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the Germans, and consequently, to take in Berlin the action which you might deem proper.

Any intervention of the Conference would only weaken your action, and would run the risk of being too late.

FOCH

APPENDIX F TO No. 30

*Proposed Note to be addressed to Germany*<sup>10</sup>

DRAFTING COMMITTEE OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

PARIS, *November 24, 1919.*

*Re demobilized Germans at Flensburg.*

According to information which has reached the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, German authorities are placing in the Schleswig plebiscite zone men supposed to be demobilized from the German military and naval forces.

<sup>8</sup> Chief of Staff to General Niessel.

<sup>9</sup> The German representative with General Niessel's mission.

<sup>10</sup> The French texts of this note and of M. Cambon's presentation of it in the Supreme Council (see minute 6 above) are printed by A. Tardieu and F. de Jessen, op. cit., p. 331.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers inform the German Government that if, according to Article 109 of the Treaty of Versailles, 'military persons, officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the German army, who are natives of the zone of Schleswig in which the plebiscite is taken, shall be given the opportunity to return to their native place in order to take part in the voting there', it is not the intention of the said Powers to tolerate in the zone in which the plebiscite is taken, supposedly demobilized men who do not come within the category referred to in the Treaty.

#### APPENDIX G TO NO. 30

##### THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES WITH THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND HIGH COMMAND.

PARIS, *November 15, 1919.*

No. 11571.

From: General Tcherbatcheff, Military Representative of the Supreme Chief of Russia with the Allied Governments and High Command.

To: The President of the Council, Minister of War.

I have the honour to call your attention to the fact that, during the demobilization of the Russian Armies on the Roumanian front, I have as Commander-in-Chief of that front, and in accord with the plenipotentiary ministers of the Entente in Roumania, elaborated the order in which the material and war supplies left in Roumania were to be kept and restored afterwards to Russia.

The plenipotentiary ministers of France, England, United States of America and Italy, communicated to me in their joint letter of March 3/16, 1918, copy of two notes addressed by them to the Roumanian President of the Council and in which the plenipotentiary ministers explained their essential point of view on Russian goods, namely: that these goods remain the property of Russia, that the Roumanian Government was to keep them temporarily, and had no right not only to use them, but still [?less], to transport them without previous authorization by the representatives of the Entente Powers which had guaranteed that property. The Roumanian Government consented to those stipulations.

During the German occupation of Roumania the plenipotentiary ministers of the above-mentioned Entente Powers, in a joint letter of July 13/26, 1918, confirmed to the Roumanian Government that they maintained the same point of view with respect to the Russian property which remained in Roumania.

After the organization of Denekin's volunteer army, the question arose of using our material and war supplies which remained in Roumania.

With the assistance of the representatives of the Entente in Roumania, the authorization was obtained from the Roumanian Cabinet (Decision December 14, 1918, No. 1103) to send a small part of this material and supplies to General Denekin's Army.

But, in spite of the entire help of the representatives of the Entente Powers in Roumania, and of the reiterated promises of the representatives of the Roumanian Government, General Denekin's Army only received a very small part of our property.

Furthermore, hindering us by every means from receiving this property which belongs to us, the Roumanian Ministry of War had not only been taking stock of all Russian store houses, but has been appropriating our goods for its own use,

without any control or authorization, thus violating the principles which had been established by four Entente Powers, and to which the Roumanian Government had agreed.

The Military representative of the Russian Armies at Bucarest has employed all possible means in order to obtain the shipment promised. But, in spite of all the steps of the plenipotentiaries of the Entente Powers in Roumania, the Roumanian Government goes no further than making promises.

On account of the foregoing, I deem it indispensable to beg you to kindly place on the calendar the question of the restitution to the Armies of Southern Russia of the Russian material and supplies which remain in Roumania, and to have sent, in the first place, rifles, cartridges and munitions, heavy artillery, and machine guns.

As the Entente Powers consented to protect the property of Hungary, their former enemy, from the exaggerated pretensions of Roumania, they cannot were it only for the sacrifices made by Russia ignore the plundering of Russian property which remained in Roumania, including war material of forty-three infantry divisions of twelve battalions each.

These goods are recognized as our property by the Entente Powers; and were only turned over for temporary safe-keeping to the Roumanian Government, and they are at the present time indispensable to the Russian Armies, which are waging a hard war against the Bolsheviks.

I beg you to kindly inform me of the decisions taken in this matter.

GENERAL TCHERBATCHEFF

### No. 31

H.D. 101.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, November 28, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Poik; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Rear-Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Lieut.-Commander Koehler, U.S.N., Colonel J. A. Logan, Dr. J. B. Scott, Dr. I. Bowman.

*British Empire*: Sir R. Tower, Mr. Palairot, Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. Carr, Captain Fuller, R.N., Commander Macnamara, R.N., Lieut.-Colonel Kisch.

*France*: M. Cambon, General Le Rond, M. Kammerer, M. Leygues, Commandant Le Vasseur.

*Italy*: Admiral Cagni, M. Ricci Busatti, M. Dell'Abbadessa, M. Stranieri, Capt. de Corvette Ruspoli.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU asked M. Georges Leygues to discuss the last British proposal relative to the distribution of enemy surface warships, dated November 14th (see Appendix A<sup>1</sup>).  
*Distribution of Enemy Warships*

M. GEORGES LEYGUES said that for many months the naval experts had discussed the question of distribution of enemy warships without being able to reach an agreement. Great Britain and the United States were of the opinion that those ships should be destroyed. France asked to keep the ships which would be allotted to her, and desired, on the other hand, to obtain an additional share owing to its inability to build warships on account of the war, France having been forced to concentrate all her energies towards the production of war material, not only for herself but also for her Allies.

The British note of November 14th was an effort to bring together the different points of view and to come finally to an agreement. The French Navy was equally very desirous to settle a question which had been under discussion for such a long time, and although the British proposal did not agree on important questions with the French point of view, he felt ready on his part to accept it as a basis for discussion.

He then read and commented upon the different paragraphs of the British proposal.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not understand the purpose of paragraph 6, which allotted to each one of the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers a certain number of ships for the period of one year.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that it had been pointed out that certain Powers were anxious to have ships temporarily allotted, which they might use either for propaganda, or experimental purposes. The British Government did not, however, attach much importance to that proposal, and would not disapprove the omission of the paragraph in question.

M. LEYGUES said those ships might to some extent be considered as trophies. Furthermore, they might be of use from the point of view of instruction, and also for firing practice. He was not averse to accepting the paragraph as proposed by the British Delegation.

MR. POLK said he would have to offer objections on certain points of the British proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that under those circumstances, it would be preferable to discuss the proposal submitted to the Council paragraph by paragraph.

CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 1 of the British proposal.

MR. POLK wished to ask why the question of distribution of surface enemy warships had been treated separately from that of submarines. The American point of view was that the submarines should likewise be destroyed.

CAPTAIN FULLER said those two questions had always been discussed separately and it was to be feared that if they were to mix them up at this time, they would find it impossible to come to an agreement.

MR. POLK asked what advantage there was in discussing those questions separately. Did certain Powers wish to keep enemy submarines?

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained two documents which were respectively identical with No. 24, appendices C and B, q.v.

M. LEYDIER stated that France and Italy desired to keep some. Paragraph 1 was accepted.

CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 2.

MR. POLK said the American Government could not accept the ratio of two percent given to the United States, which it considered as being manifestly insufficient. The United States did not desire to keep those ships, but considered it was a question of principle which affected the national feeling. They had the impression that the basis adopted for the distribution was not fair. The amount of tonnage sunk ought not to be the only factor estimated, and they thought that other factors should be taken into account, such as the effort made by the different navies in the course of hostilities. America had thought that all those ships should be destroyed, and for that reason had not attached great importance to the question of distribution. But it was now different. He had made some mistakes in his life; and one of the mistakes he regretted the most was to have agreed to accept the principle that a reparation was due by the Germans for the sinking of their fleet at Scapa Flow. He did not wish to discuss anew a decision taken by the Supreme Council and which held; he could not but regret, however, that the Council should have thought it necessary to exact from Germany the delivery of a part of her civil material, which resulted in placing the Allies in a better situation than the one they had before the Scapa Flow incident, and which rewarded them to some extent with the crime committed by the Germans. At any rate, he considered that the ratio of two percent attributed to the United States was not fair, and that they should get more.

CAPTAIN FULLER said they had only given round numbers, and for that reason the results indicated in the note were not absolutely final. Those figures, however, should not be greatly changed if the criterion of losses suffered by the different navies was maintained, which criterion had formed the basis for their work.

As far as the British share was concerned, they did not absolutely insist upon having a ratio of seventy percent given them, although that represented the exact percentage of their losses as compared with the losses of the other navies.

MR. POLK asked whether the naval experts could not examine once more those percentages and make the necessary changes.

CAPTAIN FULLER said that in order to accomplish that work successfully, they should know precisely what basis to adopt. It had been suggested on the American side that the national effort of the different Allies should be taken as a basis for distribution. It seemed, however, extremely difficult, if not indeed impossible, to calculate the national effort of a Power, and they had preferred not to embark upon a course which would lead them to making delicate comparisons.

MR. POLK stated his instructions did not allow him to accept the figure of 2%. He admitted that the national effort of the different Powers was indeed difficult to figure out and compare, but he thought that by discussing the question with the naval experts he might succeed in putting together the

foundations of an agreement. He would find it impossible to make a definite proposal on that day, but he hoped to be able to do so the following day. He wished to repeat that as the United States meant to destroy their share of the enemy warships it only entailed as far as they were concerned a question of principle, but that question interested the national American feeling to a very high degree.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that before starting to change the percentage, it was necessary to agree on the general basis to be adopted.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it would be wise to adjourn the discussion of paragraph 2 of the British proposal until the next meeting. One might hope that in that time an agreement would be arrived at between Mr. Polk and the naval experts.

(The discussion of paragraph 2 of the British proposal was adjourned to the following day.)

CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 3.

(The principle of paragraph 3 was adopted.)

CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 4.

MR. POLK said he did not object to accepting that paragraph; he, however, wished to state once more that they considered that a decision of the Council in demanding reparations from the Germans for the scuttling of their fleet at Scapa Flow had been a mistake. It was an entirely questionable principle, that of profiting by the enemy's crimes in order to reward themselves.

(Paragraph 4 was adopted.)

CAPTAIN FULLER then read paragraph 5.

(Paragraph 5 was adopted.)

CAPTAIN FULLER then read the 6th and last paragraph of the British proposal.

MR. POLK said he did not have any fundamental objection to that paragraph, but considered the wording might well be modified. He also made the same remark concerning paragraph 3. He would like to discuss that question of form with Captain Fuller and the naval experts.

CAPTAIN FULLER said there remained a question on which the naval experts wished to have the decision of the Supreme Council. A certain number of small Powers had requested to have enemy warships handed over to them. Some of those Powers had even put forward fairly extravagant claims, either for surface warships or for submarines. In case the Council should decide to refuse those requests, they still had to consider the question whether small patrol boats should be handed over to those Powers to be used for policing purposes.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if they decided to grant the requests made them by the small Powers, they would have to decide whether the ships should be taken from the enemy fleet or ceded by the Allies.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the latter alternative presented certain dis-

advantages. He could not very well imagine, for example, the Italians offering patrol boats to the Yugo-Slavs.

M. DE MARTINO said they should first ascertain whether the Yugo-Slavs had lost any ships. If they had suffered losses in ships of war, that could only have happened naturally in the course of fighting in which they had taken part as Austrians, that is as enemies fighting against the Allies. They, therefore, did not have any right to obtain ships in compensation of losses they had not suffered.

ADMIRAL CAGNI said that that case had already been examined in paragraph 2 of the British proposal under discussion. That paragraph specified which were the small Powers which had suffered losses and which consequently were entitled to compensation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it very difficult to embark on a procedure which would lead to giving the small Powers which had not suffered losses during the war either a share of enemy warships or even small vessels intended to be used for police work. The case of Powers alluded to in paragraph 2 was, of course, reserved.

M. DE MARTINO said that the British memorandum of October 1918 had recognized the principle that none of the small Allied States which had not suffered losses should receive enemy warships. That principle had been adopted by the French and Italian Delegations. Naturally that was all the more applicable to new and to neutral States as paragraph 'C' of the British note for that matter specified.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought that the Council agreed in refusing the request of the small Powers, whether for warships or small patrol boats.

It was decided:

- (1) to adopt paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the British proposal dated November 14, 1919, relative to the distribution of enemy surface warships, paragraphs 3 and 6, however, being subject to modifications of form:
- (2) that Mr. Polk should examine with the naval experts the questions raised by paragraph 2 of the British proposal and that he should make a proposal on that subject at the next meeting of the Council;
- (3) that the Powers, other than those referred to in paragraph 2, should be given neither ships of war nor ships intended for police work. (See Appendix A.)<sup>1</sup>

2. M. CAMBON said that at its meeting of November 25th, the Supreme Council had adopted the following resolution concerning the negotiations between Poland and the City of Dantzig. . . .<sup>3</sup>

*Negotiations between  
Poland and the City of  
Dantzig*

As he had been instructed by the Council, he had communicated the above resolution to M. Patek, who had been satisfied with it on the whole, but had expressed the desire to obtain two modifications relative to paragraph 3 of that resolution.

<sup>2</sup> See paragraph 5 of appendix B to No. 24.

<sup>3</sup> M. Cambon here read out the resolution recorded at the conclusion of No. 30, minute 7.

As indicated in the note which the Council had before it (see Appendix B<sup>4</sup>), M. PATEK desired it should be clearly brought out that only preparatory studies of a purely technical character should take place at Dantzig, and that political negotiations should be held in Paris. In order to avoid all misunderstanding on that point, M. PATEK asked for the suppression, in paragraph 3, of the following words: 'et des pourparlers' (English text: 'and preliminary discussions'). M. PATEK further asked that the period of two months within which the proposals prepared at Dantzig should be transmitted to Paris, be reduced to one month. He contended that the Polish situation was extremely precarious and that she<sup>5</sup> had the greatest interest in being put in a position to profit without delay from all advantages that those negotiations might confer upon her.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the Supreme Council of his warning that if their decisions were continually submitted to the Poles for approval, they would receive a succession of objections. The Polish objection to the word 'pourparlers' only reproduced the objection put forward by the American delegation. He was quite willing to omit the word. But if nothing was put in its place, the result would be to exclude the Poles themselves from the discussions at Dantzig; for 'pourparlers' implied the participation of both parties, whilst 'studies techniques' [*sic*] might be limited to one of the parties. Nor was it possible to admit the exclusion of 'political' questions; in practice no hard-and-fast line could be drawn by questions which were political and questions which were economical. He would propose to adopt the following wording, which he thought would in substance meet all objections:

'3. that, prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature in which representatives of Poland and of the free city of Dantzig participate, under the chairmanship of the Allied Representative at Dantzig, should take place at Dantzig;'

M. CAMBON said he personally was of the opinion that Sir Eyre Crowe's proposed modification should be accepted; it defined happily the situation, whilst satisfying the Polish request.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that on the second point raised by the Poles, he would remark that the period of two months, which he himself had proposed, was far from being extravagant, considering that the negotiations were to take place between Poland and the city of Dantzig and that the latter had first of all to be constituted by the League of Nations. As a matter of fact, the period of two months was a maximum and there was nothing to prevent the negotiations being ended before that period expired.

M. CLEMENCEAU was of the opinion that they should stand by the original period of two months.

It was decided:

(1) to change the text of the first sentence of paragraph 3 of the resolution

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This note from M. Patek, dated at Paris on November 26, 1919, was as summarized by M. Cambon.

<sup>5</sup> i.e. Poland.

of November 24th. concerning the negotiations between Poland and the free city of Dantzig, as follows:

(3) that, prior to the opening of negotiations as provided for in the last paragraph, preparatory studies of a technical nature in which representatives of Poland and of the free city of Dantzig participate, under the chairmanship of the Allied Representative at Dantzig, should take place at Dantzig;

(2) to maintain without modification the second sentence of paragraph 3 of the above mentioned resolution.

3.

[Not printed]

*Exequaturs of Foreign  
Consuls at Dantzig prior  
to the definite establish-  
ment of the free city*

4.

[Not printed]

*Communication of  
Article 435 of the Treaty  
of Versailles to Spain  
and to Sweden*

5. M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon a letter from the President of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission relative to the question (see Appendix E<sup>7</sup>).

*Request of the Austrian  
Delegation for the inser-  
tion of an Article in the  
Hungarian Treaty to  
Guarantee Food Supplies  
from Hungary to Austria*

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to refer to the Economic Commission the letter of the President of the Committee on Organization of the

Reparation Commission dated November 21st, relative to the request of the Austrian Delegation for the insertion of an article in the Hungarian Treaty to guarantee food supplies from Hungary to Austria. (See Appendix E.<sup>7</sup>)

<sup>6</sup> 'After a short discussion' the Supreme Council decided to adopt a note from the French Delegation, dated November 27, 1919 (appendix D in original), proposing that the French Government should now invite Spain and Sweden to adhere to the provisions of article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. In this letter M. Loucheur transmitted certain observations by Baron Eichhoff to the effect that 'before the dismemberment of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Vienna and the Alpine countries, which constitute the present territory of the Republic, received their supplies of flour, meat, fat and dairy products from Hungary as they procured coal from the regions which today form part of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. As regards coal, Art. 224 of the Peace Treaty with Austria formally guaranteed exportation from Czecho-Slovak and Polish mines to Austria. M. Eichhoff asks that in the future Treaty with Hungary an article be inserted similar to the article mentioned treating with the exportation of Hungarian foodstuffs to Austria. Of course, in compensation, this article would also contain a provision guaranteeing the Hungarian State rights corresponding to the demands stipulated in favour of Austria; effectively, this provision would guarantee to Hungary such industrial products and especially agricultural implements which Austria usually furnishes her. M. Eichhoff thinks that such an arrangement would contribute to

6. SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had received from the British Chargé d'Affaires at Bucharest a telegram indicating that the Allied note to the Roumanian Government had been delivered on November 24th. The Roumanians had professed to be at the height of a cabinet crisis, and that the new cabinet would need a few days to examine the note. Their argument seemed somehow to have impressed the Allied representatives at Bucharest. The British Chargé d'Affaires suggested that an additional period of two days be granted to the Roumanians. The Italian Minister, more generous, proposed to give them twenty days. It seemed to him that the Allied representatives at Bucharest did not quite realize the situation. The additional Protocol to the Treaty with Bulgaria gave Roumania a supplementary period of eight days in which to sign that diplomatic document. It was therefore absolutely necessary that the Roumanian answer arrive before the expiry of the period fixed by the Protocol. He thought it would be important to inform the Allied representatives at Bucharest of that situation.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the Council would agree to reckoning the period only from the day when the note had been handed to the Roumanian Government, that is to say, November 24th. Accepting that starting point, the period would expire on the following Tuesday, December 2nd, at midday. They ought to consider that, in his opinion, the Roumanians had not exceeded that period, provided their reply had left Bucharest before the 2nd of December at midday. The slowness of communications ought to be kept in mind and their reply might take 48 hours to arrive at Paris. In that case it would coincide almost exactly with the period fixed in the protocol and expiring on Friday, the 5th of December, at midday. They could make known to the Roumanians by their representatives at Bucharest that if the Supreme Council were not in possession by the 5th of December at midday of a satisfactory reply from the Roumanians the measures announced in the last note of the Allies would be put into effect. He had had a visit that morning from M. Antonescu. The latter had led him to understand that if he might let it be known at Bucharest, as his personal impression and without committing the Council in any way, that the Allies would be disposed to grant certain concessions in the Minorities Treaty,<sup>8</sup> the acceptance of that Treaty by Roumania would be greatly facilitated. The points to which Roumania attached the greatest importance were:

First, the omission in the preamble of the following passage:

'Considering that, in the Treaty of Berlin, the independence of the Kingdom of Roumania had only been recognized conditionally;

'Considering further, that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers wished to recognize the independence of the Kingdom of Roumania unconditionally, in its former and new territories.'

bringing back to work the agricultural populations in Hungary and the industrial in Austria, and in case the Peace Conference should care to approve it, he would be at the disposition of the latter to determine the drafting of a text corresponding to his suggestion.'

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Vol. I, No. 29, minute 8 and note 14.

Second, the insertion in the preamble of a formula affirming that the Treaty had been accepted by Roumania only after discussion and agreement, in order to prevent Roumanian opinion from considering the Treaty as having been purely and simply imposed upon Roumania. That modification, like the previous one, seemed to him personally quite acceptable.

Third, the Roumanian Minister had asked finally—and this was more serious—for the omission of the two articles numbered 10 and 11 relative to the situation of the Jews. He also asked that the Allies consent to the insertion in the preamble of a sentence by which the Allied and Associated Powers would recognize the 'decret loi' of May 22, 1919, concerning the status of Jews in Roumania.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered it quite possible to omit the two articles concerning Jews which had latterly been criticized as going into too much detail, all the more so as the Jews themselves did not seem to be particularly anxious to have those articles retained. On the other hand he saw great objection to inserting in the protocol a reference to the 'decret loi' of May 22, 1919. That 'decret loi' was, as a matter of fact, far from satisfying the Jews, and by making special reference to it, the Powers would seem to acknowledge that it was a sufficient concession on the part of the Roumanians. For that reason he did not think it possible to accept M. Antonescu's suggestion but he would not object to the omission, pure and simple, of the two articles in the Treaty concerning Jews, the more so as general guarantees applying to all Minorities remained in force in the Treaty with Roumania and would constitute sufficient protection for the Jews.

M. BERTHELOT said that the French Delegation had accepted the two articles on the Jews so as not to differ from the majority of the Commission, but it was of the opinion that those articles were unnecessary, especially with regard to the recognition of the Sabbath as a legal holiday.

M. DE MARTINO said that on the New States Commission, of which he had been a member, he had thought that in the interest of the Jews themselves it would be a mistake to ask special privileges for them. Such a way of acting could only end in deepening further the gulf which separated them from the rest of the population, with which on the contrary they should make an effort to identify themselves. In Jewish circles opinion was, for that matter, divided upon the expediency of such privileges; the more uncompromising Jews demanded them, but those of more liberal tendency did not wish even to hear about them. He, therefore, identified himself very willingly with the proposal to omit articles 10 and 11 dealing with the Jews.

MR. POLK said that he saw no difficulty as far as concerned the preamble, but could they not, for the Jews, adopt a text similar to that which occurred in the Greek Minorities Treaty?

M. BERTHELOT said that in the Treaty with Greece articles specially referring to the Jews no longer appeared.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Mr. Polk alluded to a text which had really figured in the draft Treaty with Greece, but which, for reasons unknown to him, had disappeared from the final text. In his opinion, it would be best

that the New States Commission should meet that afternoon and try to agree on a text which would be submitted to the Council at its next meeting.

M. KAMMERER said he thought he should point out that the omission in the Treaty with Roumania of articles concerning Jews might have its effect on the Treaty with Poland. Poland would not fail indeed to ask the omission of the guarantees she had granted to the Jewish element if it appeared that similar guarantees were not asked of Roumania.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the situation of the Jews in Poland was exceptionally unfavourable and that the regulations in favour of the Jews imposed upon Poland justified themselves.

He wished to return to the question of the time limit. Were they to grant an extension of two days to the Roumanians when the latter had not asked them for anything? That would seem to him extremely difficult. He would rather suggest that the Roumanians be informed through the Allied representatives at Bucharest that they could not modify the terms of their ultimatum which had been adopted only after ripe reflection, and that the Roumanian answer should be handed to the Allied representatives at Bucharest before December 2nd at midday. They ought to say in addition, for the sake of their representatives, that, the time limit laid down by the protocol expiring on December 5th at midday, the Roumanian answer should reach Paris before that date. They would further have to consider whether it would not be advisable, in the event of the situation not improving at Bucharest, to publish the last note of the Allies to Roumania. That was a question which they might well discuss at the next meeting.

It was decided:

- (1) to instruct the Allied representatives at Bucharest to inform the Roumanian Government that its answer should be delivered to them before December 2nd at midday;
- (2) to inform the Allied representatives at Bucharest that the Roumanian answer should be telegraphed without delay to Paris so as to reach the Council before December 5th at midday, on which date expires the time limit laid down in the additional protocol to the Treaty with Bulgaria for the signature of said Treaty by Roumania;
- (3) to refer to the New States Commission, which shall submit a report to the Council at its next meeting, the examination of changes requested by the Roumanian Delegation in the preamble and in the terms of the Minorities Treaty with Roumania.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 28, 1919.*

H.D. 102.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, November 29, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. POLK; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Hawthorn.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Northam.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Durosoy, M. Desclaux, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombadori.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. G. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Perdon. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for the items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Rear-Admiral McGilly, U.S.N., Colonel J. A. Logan, Lieutenant-Commander Koehler, U.S.N., Mr. A. W. Dulles, Capt. H. Pierce.  
*British Empire*: Captain Fuller, R.N., Commander Macnamara, R.N., Mr. Coles, Mr. E. H. Carr, Colonel Beadon, Lieut.-Colonel Nisch.  
*France*: M. Georges Leygues, M. Cambon, General Weygand, M. Laroche, Commandant Le Vavasseur, M. Kammerer.  
*Italy*: Admiral Cagni, M. Manciola, M. Stranieri, Capt. de Corvette Ruspoli.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. MR. POLK stated that he had been unable to come to an agreement with the naval experts as to the questions raised by paragraph 2 of the British proposal (see H.D. 101, Appendix A<sup>1</sup>); he would therefore have to refer the matter to Washington.

*Distribution of Enemy Surface Warships* SIR EYRE CROWE asked if this meant referring the whole question.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that the points raised in paragraph 2 of the British proposal were alone meant.

MR. POLK agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to know what the United States' proposal was.

MR. POLK explained that they had been unable to come to an agreement as to figures. The amount of national effort, as a basis of distribution, which had been proposed in committee by the American representatives, had now been abandoned. Captain Fuller had proposed certain figures which were arbitrary, inasmuch as they were not based on exact data, and which the American representatives could not accept without referring the question to Washington.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to know what basis of distribution was desired. If the United States had abandoned the idea of having national effort the basis of distribution, what other basis could be adopted except the clear one of losses? He wished to know if the United States desired a still different basis. He did not see how the principle of distribution according to per-

<sup>1</sup> See No. 31, note 1 and No. 24, appendix C.

centage of losses sustained in the war could be combined with another principle, for example, that of national effort.

MR. POLK pointed out that the basis proposed was a distribution of 70% to Great Britain, 10% to France, 10% to Italy, 8% to Japan and 2% to the United States. He felt that the effort of the United States had been larger than was reflected in such a distribution. The United States had had eight super-dreadnoughts with the Grand Fleet and, he thought, more destroyers than any other Power. The United States did not desire to keep the ships in question but considered it was a question of principle which affected the national feeling. The question was one of satisfying public opinion. The United States might have over-estimated the effort it had made, but did not feel that a 2% distribution correctly estimated or reflected its effort. He wished, further, to point out that the basis of loss suffered took into account ships which had been lost not necessarily in action; a great many had been lost in harbour and it was not sure whether or not they had been lost as a result of enemy action. For instance, some of the losses might have been the result of boiler explosions and similar accidents.

ADMIRAL CAGNI stated that the large Italian ships which had been lost in harbour had clearly been destroyed by enemy action, and that this was susceptible of proof by documents in his possession.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that his sole desire was to arrive at clearness. The discussion still left obscure the position as regards the principal issue. He would like to know if the United States wished to eliminate from the basis of losses suffered, ships not sunk at sea by enemy action.

MR. POLK said that this was not what he had in mind. The figures then under discussion of losses suffered were arbitrary. No hard and fast rule had been adopted for determining these losses; for instance, it seemed to him that the 10% of losses as given for France and Italy did not correspond exactly with the losses suffered. He wished again to point out that some of the ships lost might or might not have been lost as a result of enemy action.

M. DE MARTINO said he wished to disagree formally with that last point of Mr. Polk's. Italian losses had not been arbitrarily calculated. The vessels lost in port had been lost as a result of enemy machinations. The result was just the same if a ship were lost in this way as if it had been sunk at sea. He therefore maintained his point of view that ships lost in that manner must enter into the calculations of losses suffered.

MR. POLK thought that M. de Martino was putting up a man of straw to be knocked down. He, himself, was not questioning the right to include such losses in the calculation of losses suffered, nor was he questioning the fact that some Italian ships might have been sunk in port by enemy action. If it could be proved that such was the case, then there could be no question as to its being proper to include such losses in the calculation of losses suffered. All he had said was that, as a general matter, some of the ships included in the calculations of losses might well not have been lost as a result of enemy action.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he unfortunately had a passion for clearness but he still remained confused. He would like again to ask what the standard

was. He appreciated Mr. Polk's different relative to American public opinion but it seemed to him that the correct way to develop public opinion in every country was to state a clear principle of distribution and nothing could be clearer than actual losses suffered. If it was decided to give a certain percentage of enemy ships to certain countries without such distribution being based on a clear and logical principle, it would be necessary to explain to the satisfaction of public opinion in all countries why different nations were given an arbitrary percentage of ships. A distribution of 2% to the United States was not unfair for he thought that the United States losses had been so small as not to reach in fact the percentage figure of 2%.

MR. POLK agreed that the losses had indeed been small. He agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe's point of view but the difficulty he felt was that the proposed percentage of distribution was arbitrary. It was true of course that no United States ships had been lost in port but he still felt that it was arbitrary to include all ships lost in port irrespective of the cause.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the calculation was not arbitrary and was based on the principle of losses suffered.

MR. POLK reiterated that he thought the figures of 70-10-and 10 percent must be arbitrary. He thought it inconceivable that the French and Italian losses were exactly the same. In any event he had certain instructions and at the present stage of the discussion he would have to refer the matter to his Government.

CAPTAIN FULLER stated that by actual calculations the French and Italian losses were almost identical: 10.70% for the French and 11.45% for the Italians.

SIR EYRE CROWE proposed the following solution: to accept as the standard the percentage of warships sunk by definitely proved action of the enemy whether at sea or in port.

ADMIRAL CAGNI pointed out that in the event of such a solution being adopted it would be necessary to institute an inquiry for each ship lost. In many cases losses were due to collisions resulting from war navigating conditions. Such losses were as fully entitled to be included as losses resulting more directly from enemy action. Certainly the most long drawn out inquiries in each case would have to be expected.

M. CLEMENCEAU declared that he was ready to accept Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal.

MR. POLK again pointed out that he would have to get instructions from his Government.

M. DE MARTINO inquired whether Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal would eliminate such collisions as those mentioned by Admiral Cagni and also losses resulting from mines?

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that to meet M. de Martino's suggestion he would propose that the standard of distribution might be all ships sunk at open sea and all ships sunk elsewhere through definitely proved enemy action.

MR. POLK said that he would cable his Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU approved this new proposal in principle.

ADMIRAL CAGNI thought it would be well to definitely approve the other points raised by the British proposal.

MR. POLK said that he had accepted those points in principle subject to changes of phraseology to be arrived at between Admiral McCully and Captain Fuller. He had no objection to France and Italy receiving the ships specified in paragraph 5 of the British proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE understood that it had been decided that Greece, Roumania and Portugal should each receive as compensation a ship corresponding to the one lost by each of these Powers, as specified in paragraph 2 of the British proposal.

(This was agreed to.)

ADMIRAL McCULLY suggested that in the final clause of paragraph 1 it be provided that the surface warships surrendered by the enemy Powers should be either sunk or broken up. It might well be more expensive at times to break up the ships than to sink them.

M. CLEMENCEAU took it as understood that the Power receiving the enemy warships would have the option of sinking or breaking them up.

(This was agreed to.)

ADMIRAL McCULLY in discussing paragraph 3 of the British proposal relative to the allocation of enemy tonnage to be broken up by the Inter-Allied Naval Commission proposed that the breaking up or sinking be begun immediately and be completed within one year and furthermore that none of the sunken vessels and no parts or portions of them were to be incorporated in the naval forces of any Power.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was utterly unable to agree with this proposal. It seemed to him an impossible procedure.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would put an extreme case which would test the proposed principle; was it meant that if a vessel had been broken up, none of the steel from such vessels should ever find a place in another ship?

M. CLEMENCEAU felt that each Power should be enabled to sink or break up the vessels allocated to it in such manner as it should see fit.

MR. POLK pointed out that it would then be possible for all the necessary parts, such as engines, guns, etc., to be taken off an enemy warship and put onto a ship belonging to the Power to which such vessel had been allocated.

M. CLEMENCEAU felt that the proposal in question implied a mutual distrust, and he considered such a condition would be almost humiliating.

M. LEYGUES thought that a condition of this kind was one which could only logically be proposed by the Germans. If such a solution were adopted it would be equivalent to the Allies imposing upon themselves conditions which were more difficult than those they were imposing upon the enemy.

MR. POLK said that he would like to know frankly what was intended. If it were intended to use this material in the manner which had just been suggested, he thought it would be better to say so clearly. His idea was that the principle had already been accepted that the enemy warships were to be

destroyed. If it were now intended to save certain parts thereof he felt that that was an extreme departure from the principle of destruction.

M. LEVEQUE pointed out that as a result of the enormous losses suffered by certain nations, public opinion in these nations would simply not be able to comprehend why boilers and other similar useful parts of enemy warships could not be used.

MR. POLK replied that that was exactly what he meant. If it were not intended to destroy the ship completely, he thought it should be repaired. He merely wanted to know what the intentions were.

SIR EYRE CROWE said it had been agreed to destroy them as ships but not to demolish them.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not understand the proposal advanced by Admiral McCully. He did not see why it was necessary to pulverize the enemy warships. To his mind, destruction meant the destruction of enemy warships but not the destruction of their component parts. When artillery material had been taken from the Germans there had been no objection to using the same. England was at the present time building a warship costing several millions of pounds; this showed that there was no contemplation of adopting the principle of total disarmament. The idea of building ships out of enemy material had been made a matter of reproach. For his part, he could not see any harm in taking for instance a boiler from an enemy warship and putting it into a warship to be built two years later. France had reduced her armies to the minimum and might have done so too soon. England had not demobilized her navy, and certainly he was far from reproaching her therewith. It should not be forgotten that France's financial situation made it impossible for her to build up a powerful navy, and consequently there was nothing to fear from her in that respect.

MR. POLK repeated that it was merely a question of so saying unequivocally if it was desired to use material from the enemy warships in the manner which had just been discussed; the original idea had been to destroy all enemy warships.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that the words 'breaking up' had always been used instead of the word 'destroying'. Consequently, it had been contemplated that parts of these enemy warships were to be put to some use. He instanced the operations of breaking up of ships: when a ship was no longer useful they did not pulverize it but broke it up and made use of the parts. If it had been contemplated that the ships were to be completely demolished there would have been no use calculating their distribution so carefully.

MR. POLK said that he did not wish to hold the matter up, but he must go on record as saying that the United States Government did not consider that the procedure proposed carried out the principle that had been decided upon. He felt that when the enemy ships were taken to the yards the greater part of them would doubtless be devoted to war purposes.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if the words actually used were 'breaking up' or 'destroying'.

CAPTAIN FULLER replied that 'breaking up' was the actual text.

MR. POLK said that the American idea had always been that the enemy warships would be destroyed so that there would be that much less naval war material in the world.

M. LEYGUES replied that Admiral Benson had repeatedly expressed this view, but that the French and Italian representatives had never agreed thereto and that the question had never been formally voted upon.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the question of the time within which enemy warships were to be sunk or broken up should be settled. The British suggestion had been two years and the United States had thought one year sufficient.

MR. POLK said he would not make any difficulties on this point.

M. LEYGUES thought the delay should be even greater. The breaking up of ships was a long and costly operation as the English had discovered in their inquiry relative to Scapa Flow. It might be almost impossible to get the necessary workmen or appliances within a shorter period.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested a three year period.

MR. POLK wished to go on record as considering this entirely too long a delay. However, he did not intend to prevent a decision being reached.

It was decided:

- (1) that any Power receiving enemy warships not to be incorporated for use with its fleet, should have the choice of sinking or breaking up said enemy warships;
- (2) that any Power receiving enemy warships to be sunk or broken up should effect said breaking up or sinking within a period of three years after the arrival of said vessels in one of its own ports;
- (3) that Greece, Roumania and Portugal each receive as compensation one enemy warship corresponding to the warship lost by each of these Powers, for use with its fleet or any other purpose that it might desire;
- (4) that Mr. Polk should refer to his Government the question of the percentage of distribution among the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of enemy warships and of the proceeds accruing from the breaking up thereof;
- (5) that except as modified by the foregoing paragraphs, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the British proposal (see Appendix A, H.D. 101<sup>1</sup>) be adopted unchanged.

2. CAPTAIN FULLER read a summary on the situation relative to the surrendered enemy submarines, dated November 28th (see *Distribution of Enemy Submarines* Appendix A). The question now was what view France took.

M. LEYGUES stated that France had always been opposed to breaking up the surrendered enemy submarines inasmuch as she had always felt that this question was tied up with the question of future submarine warfare. If, however, the question of prohibiting future submarine warfare were now brought up, he would be prepared to discuss it.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the Council that this question had been put within the competence of the League of Nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that submarine warfare did consequently not now be discussed. The question remained whether enemy submarines were all to be destroyed or to be submitted to the same treatment as enemy surface warships. He then read to the Council a French proposal relative to the distribution of enemy submarines (see Appendix B), and a statement relative to the number of submarines in each navy (see Appendix C). He asked if the former might be accepted as a basis of discussion.

M. MATSUI pointed out that when the question of the distribution of submarine motors had arisen a different proportion had been adopted than was then proposed. Japan desired that the two should be similar.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that this French proposal was merely to serve as a basis of discussion and that therefore M. Matsui's objection was not immediately involved.

MR. POLK took it as understood that in discussing this proposal the question of principle as to whether or not the submarines were to be destroyed, was still before the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out, with reference to the first paragraph of the French proposal, that France had hitherto opposed the destruction of submarines. In the proposal then submitted by her she had made a large concession which should influence the other members of the Council in reaching a decision.

MR. POLK announced that he agreed with the first paragraph of this proposal, with the exception that he would like an eventual explanation as to the small number of submarines therein referred to.

M. MATSUI said that he could not give any decision on the matter until the following Monday,<sup>2</sup> as he had just received this proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that the discussion be continued without necessarily reaching a decision on that date.

MR. POLK, with reference to the second paragraph, said that although he had no present objection to the figures in question, he wished to inquire if the distribution was to be made for the purpose of eventually breaking up the submarines.

M. LEYGUES replied that that was so. With reference to the third paragraph of the French proposal, he read and commented upon the figures presented in Appendix C. He pointed out the heavy losses suffered by France and the fact that she alone had not been able to indulge in any naval construction, all the resources of her shipyards having been devoted to production of land war material for herself and her Allies.

M. DE MARTINO agreed with M. Leygues in what he had said with respect to the French situation. Although Italy was not in exactly a similar position, she occupied a position intermediate between that of England and of France. Italy had likewise been greatly handicapped by having to stop her naval construction on account of having to devote such resources to the production

<sup>2</sup> December 1, 1919.

of land war material. If France, by way of compensation for such a situation, was to receive a certain number of submarines, Italy likewise should have some. He did not have exact figures at hand, but would refer to Admiral Cagni for such figures; he thought that this matter might be further examined into.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was quite ready, as far as France was concerned, to agree to the same principle with respect to submarines as had been determined upon with respect to surface ships. His Government would be glad if the ten submarines to be allotted to the French might be selected from among such as had not disgraced the flag. His Government would be glad of this for sentimental reasons.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired if there were ten such submarines available.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that there were more than ten in French ports.

M. LEYGUES agreed with the British proposition, provided that ten submarines of that kind could be found available for delivery to France. If they could not, the French would have to fill up their quota from other enemy submarines.

SIR EYRE CROWE accepted M. Leygues' reservation. He did not feel quite sure that M. de Martino was entirely correct in saying that Italy occupied a position intermediate between that of France and England. He was of course not entirely familiar with the figures that had just been furnished but they seemed to show that in Italy new construction had been relatively greater and losses relatively less than in other countries, and he felt that from that point of view it was really England that was in the intermediate position.

MR. POLK felt that in this respect France occupied a unique situation. He would recommend the acceptance of the French proposal to his Government, but with respect to the proportions suggested for distribution of enemy submarines he would likewise have to refer the question to his Government. President Wilson when in France had taken a strong position with respect to total destruction of enemy submarines.

M. MATSUI said that he would make the same recommendation to his Government as did Mr. Polk.

ADMIRAL CAGNI remarked that the French figures (Appendix C) did not give an exact idea of the situation as far as Italy was concerned. It was true that Italy had constructed submarines during the war but the majority of them were very small submarines for work in the northern Adriatic and could scarcely be used for any other purpose. The Italian Admiralty was quite ready to recognize the special situation of the French Navy to which it extended its sympathy.

(Further discussion of this question was provisionally adjourned).

3. M. KAMMERER informed the Council that the Committee of New States  
*Modification of* had been unanimous in agreeing to expunge from the  
*Roumanian Minorities* preamble of the proposed Minorities Treaty with Rou-  
*Treaty* mania all reference to Roumanian independence (para-  
graphs 2 and 3 of the preamble to the proposed Minorities Treaty).<sup>3</sup> The

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Vol. I, No. 29, minute 8 and note 14.

United States alone had not been in favour of expunging the last paragraph of the preamble and of eliminating all reference to the Treaty of Berlin. The majority felt that as the text in question favoured Roumania it might well be eliminated upon the request of Roumania. The United States Delegation had proposed to substitute for the last three lines, the following: 'recognize that Roumania is definitely discharged from the obligations undertaken by article 44 of the Treaty of Berlin.' As the other Delegations had not agreed to this the American Delegation had reserved its judgment giving as its reason the fact that no written observations had been received from the Roumanian Delegation which would show whether or not its request was well founded. Roumania had desired a clause inserted showing that the terms of the Treaty were finally agreed upon after consultation with the Roumanians. It had been unanimously decided that there was no objection to the insertion, as a new paragraph in the preamble, of the following clause: 'And after discussion and agreement with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.' The Committee had then discussed the request of the Roumanians for the suppression of articles 10 and 11 granting special protection to the Jews. The majority were in favour of the elimination of both articles; the American Delegation alone reserved judgment on this point, again stating that since the Roumanians had submitted no formal observations the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should not be put in the position of prejudicing the question of the protection of the Jews as a result only of informal conversation with M. Antonescu—this question of the protection of Jews having been insisted upon in the case of Poland. Since the majority of the Committee had been in favour of the suppression of these articles, and since it had been necessary to reach some conclusion which could be presented to the Supreme Council on the following day, it had been decided to present the views both of the majority and of the minority and to leave it to the Supreme Council to settle the question. On this understanding it had been proposed that the following paragraph should be inserted in the preamble as a new paragraph, the American Delegation accepting this proposition only in case its view was overruled by the Supreme Council and the two Jewish clauses were eliminated: 'Whereas Roumania has declared its intention of recognizing as Roumanian nationals *ipso facto* and without the requirement of any formality the Jews inhabiting all the territories of Roumania'.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that further discussion of this question be adjourned until the receipt of the Roumanian answer. The nature of that answer might well change his opinion.

MR. POLK said that that was the point that he had always been trying to make.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was ready to make concessions if the Roumanian signature could certainly be obtained thereby but otherwise there was no point in making such concessions.

SIR EYRE CROWE was entirely of the President's opinion provided the Roumanians gave proof immediately of deserving the concessions proposed.

It was decided:

that further discussion on this subject be adjourned until the receipt of the answer to the last note sent by the Council to the Roumanian Government.<sup>4</sup>

4. M. CLEMENCEAU informed the Council that the King of Roumania had addressed a letter to President Poincaré. This letter was *Letter from the King of Roumania* certainly a most unfortunate one, and was evidently prepared under the influence of M. Bratiano. It was in substance one long series of complaints. It appealed to President Poincaré to intervene with the Supreme Council, and this could certainly not be tolerated.

M. BERTHELOT read the letter from the King of Roumania to President Poincaré. (See Appendix D.)

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that this constituted a good commentary on General Coanda's activities.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had not yet seen President Poincaré. He suggested that a joint answer be prepared by France, England and Italy. He understood that the letter had not been sent to President Wilson or to the Emperor of Japan. This constituted a most serious act of discourtesy.

SIR EYRE CROWE informed the Council that he had also had bad news from the British representative at Bucharest. M. Maniu<sup>5</sup> had stated that the Roumanians did not intend to retire away from the Theiss prior to the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary. He felt that the time had come to publish the last note of the Council to the Roumanian Government. Perfect ignorance still existed in Roumania with respect to the attitude of the Supreme Council.

MR. POLK agreed that the Roumanian press was full of misstatements relative to the attitude of the Allies.

M. DE MARTINO agreed with M. Clemenceau's suggestion as to a joint answer. He thought that it was a matter to be arranged between the Governments concerned.

It was decided:

to publish in the morning press of Sunday, November 30th, the text of the last note of the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government.<sup>4</sup>

5. (The Council had before it the draft of an additional protocol to the Treaty concluded at Versailles between the Principal Allied *Treaty regarding Eastern Frontiers of Poland* and Associated Powers and Poland, June 28th, 1919 (see Appendix E).)

M. CAMBON in commenting upon this draft protocol pointed out that in the absence of a regularly constituted Russian Government it had hitherto seemed impossible to assign definite eastern frontiers to Poland. Nevertheless it had been recognized that in order to enable Poland to administer the territory occupied by her it was necessary to establish at least

<sup>4</sup> See No. 21, appendix F and No. 23, minute 2.

<sup>5</sup> President of the Directing Council of Transylvania and leader of the National Party in Transylvania.

a provisional eastern frontier comprising territories which were indisputably Polish. By a decision of the Supreme Council, 12.2.17, the Drafting Committee had been charged with examining the formulation of such an agreement and it had been unanimous in presenting the present protocol. The frontier line having already been laid down by the Council the labours of the Drafting Committee were limited to matters of form.

MR. POLK pointed out that in the first article the full and complete sovereignty of Poland was formally recognized by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. He wondered whether this did not constitute a final gift on the part of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and whether it did not mean shutting the door to any future negotiations with Russia.

M. CAMBON explained that all the territories in question were incontestably Polish. When part of the Russian Empire they had been described as forming a part of the Kingdom of Poland.

MR. POLK said his only doubt was whether it were wise to give this recognition in so formal a way as by signing a protocol of this nature. He thought it possible that Poland might receive this communication in some other form.

M. LAROCHE pointed out that the protocol only bound the signatories thereto.

MR. POLK said that nothing, however, could more formally bind the five Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that this question had come up previously and that it had been agreed that the Drafting Committee should determine the necessary formula.<sup>6</sup> The Council would recall the famous declaration of Kerensky relative to all territories *bona fide* inhabited by Poles.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore this was not in contradiction with the Council's note to Admiral Koltchak.

MR. POLK observed that the Drafting Committee had been asked to find a formula for communicating to Poland the Council's decision relative to Poland's eastern frontiers. It seemed to him that this was more than a communication. He was prepared to cable his Government but under his present instructions he could not sign such a protocol.

M. CAMBON thought the question was covered by previous decisions of the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked if it were necessary to retain the word 'Polish' in the first paragraph of Article 1. He thought that if this word was omitted the substance would be retained and only a cause of irritation removed.

MR. POLK said that he would get instructions from his Government.

(Further discussion on this question was adjourned until an early meeting of the Council.)

<sup>6</sup> Vol. I, No. 64 (minute 10.).

<sup>7</sup> On March 29, 1917, the Provisional Russian Government, of which M. Kerensky was a prominent member, had issued a manifesto to the Polish people declaring that the creation of an independent Polish state, consisting of all territory where the Polish people constituted a majority of the population, was a guarantee of durable peace in the remodelled Europe of the future. M. Kerensky was a leading exponent of this policy of recognition of Polish national aspirations.

6. (The Council had before it two notes relative to the expenses occasioned by the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war and refugees in Germany (see Appendices F and G<sup>8</sup>).)

*Russian prisoners of war and refugees in Germany.* GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon these two notes. He called attention to the unanimous conclusions of the Financial Sub-Commission (see page 6, Appendix F<sup>9</sup>).

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the Italian representative had made a reservation with respect to the expenses concerning refugees from Kiev (see page 2, Appendix F<sup>10</sup>), and wished to associate himself with that reservation. The German Government had stated that the Allied and Associated Powers had assumed the responsibility for the maintenance of these refugees, but no evidence had been adduced to show that the German Government was telling the truth. The Inter-Allied Commission at Berlin had apparently not gone into that question. He thought that it should be further examined and that the Commission at Berlin should be charged with the duty of verifying the truth of the statement of the German Government.

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed. He had thought that as General Malcolm had presented the matter in that manner, the question had already been examined. He called attention to the proposed resolution contained in the second note (see Appendix G<sup>8</sup>). It was his personal opinion that that point had already been settled by the Council's decision of November 11th.<sup>11</sup> General Malcolm might be informed to that effect, but certainly the German Government knew that already. A further question remained to be examined. He had been informed that the expenses of the Commission at Berlin amounted to twenty thousand marks per month. He further pointed out that the Germans had said that their delegate would not be named until the Allies had indicated that they were willing to cooperate in the sense of assuming their share of the expenses. He thought that the Germans could now be notified that they were to assume all the expenses connected with the maintenance of those Russian prisoners and refugees.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether it was contemplated that the Allied and Associated Powers should pay the twenty thousand marks referred to or that the Germans should do so.

GENERAL WEYGAND thought that the Allied and Associated Powers were to pay it.

<sup>8</sup> Appendix G is not printed. In this brief undated note to the Supreme Council the members of the Special Commission in Paris entrusted with the question of the Russian prisoners of war in Germany unanimously requested that, in connexion with correspondence with the German Government arising out of the Supreme Council's decision of October 11, 1919 (see Vol. I, No. 72, minute 4) the following two points be made in reply to German representations: '1st. The Allied and Associated Powers have decided to incur no more expenses for the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, except those necessary for the upkeep of their representative to the International Commission in Berlin; 2nd. The International Commission in Berlin will be a control commission only.'

<sup>9</sup> Last paragraph of appendix F.

<sup>10</sup> Third paragraph of appendix F.

<sup>11</sup> Apparently in error for October 11. See Vol. I, No. 72, minute 4.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the Allied and Associated Powers had washed their hands of these prisoners and refugees. It was not to their interest to maintain that Commission. If the Germans were told that they had to assume all the expenses they would wish to eliminate that Commission, and for his part, he was willing that this Commission be abolished. There could be no objection to having an officer on the spot exercise some control, but he considered the continuation of that Commission unnecessary.

GENERAL WEYGAND thought that humanitarian, as well as political, reasons made it advisable that the Allied and Associated Powers should continue to interest themselves in the lot of these prisoners. He proposed to prepare a draft letter to General Malcolm.

MR. POLK pointed out that the position of the United States was that it had no money for that Commission. As the United States Government had already contributed over half the expenses of this work in Germany, it considered that it was in no way obligated to participate in the payment of outstanding indebtedness, nor was it directly interested in the method adopted for the payment of those outstanding bills. He thought that even if General Malcolm recommended it, his Government was in doubt as to whether any basis of right existed for creating or maintaining a Commission not provided for in the Treaty. His Government considered rather that this was a suitable time to withdraw.

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed that the coming into force of the Treaty offered a good chance to withdraw if this were considered advisable; but the question was whether political considerations with respect to Russia would not render it expedient to continue this work.

MR. POLK observed that the Commission would be without power or money. They might take decisions, but would have no way of enforcing them. He thought that that meant putting the officers on that Commission in a most difficult situation.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Germans should be told that they must meet the expenses of the Commission. The Germans would then refuse and the Commission would cease to exist.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that the Italian representative had made an additional reservation with respect to the basis of distribution of the expenses of maintenance of the Russian prisoners (see page 2, Appendix F<sup>12</sup>); he wished to maintain that reservation.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the German Government be informed that it would have to meet all expenses until such time as the Treaty went into force.

MR. POLK said that he felt most strongly that after the Treaty came into force such a Commission had no place in Germany.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that it be decided that when the Treaty went into effect the Commission would cease to exist.

M. DE MARTINO agreed.

MR. POLK agreed also, but wished to put on record the remarks he had

<sup>12</sup> First paragraph after the quotation in appendix F headed: *Russian, Serbian and Roumanian prisoners in Germany.*

previously made as to the attitude of the American Delegation in view of the discussion which had taken place.

It was decided:

- (1) that the International Commission at Berlin be charged with the duty of verifying the statement of the German Government that the Allied and Associated Powers had assumed the responsibility for maintaining the refugees from Kiev;
- (2) that General Weygand prepare a draft letter to General Malcolm, for submission to the Council, taking into account the views expressed at that meeting.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, November 29, 1919.*

## APPENDIX A TO No. 32

### *Surrendered Enemy Submarines*

#### *Summary of situation, November 28, 1919.*

1. At a meeting of the Admirals on 27th June 1919, all except the French were in favour of the destruction of all surrendered enemy submarines.<sup>13</sup>

2. After the surrender of the submarines, it was agreed that a certain number should be broken up, but when fifty-four had been sold for breaking-up, it was agreed by the Supreme Council that no more should be broken up pending a decision on the whole question of the disposal of the enemy fleets. The proceeds of the fifty-four which have been broken up are being held in trust for the Allies in the same way as the submarines themselves.

3. A certain number of submarines have been supplied to France, Italy, U.S.A., Japan and Belgium for propaganda purposes, viz.:

Great Britain	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5
France	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	15
Italy	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	10
U.S.A.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	6
Japan	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	7
Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	<u>43</u>

and Belgium has been loaned one for a few weeks.

4. The present situation of enemy submarines including those for propaganda purposes is as follows:<sup>13</sup>

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number</i>
Great Britain (49, and 54 sold for breaking up)	103
France	46
Italy (18 completed Austrian and 10 German)	28
U.S.A.	6
Japan	7
Total	<u>190</u> *

<sup>13</sup> See Vol. I, No. 21, appendix B.

5. The losses of the Allies in submarines during the war are as follows:

Country	Number	Agreed percentage of total submarine losses sustained by Allies		
		Submarine losses sustained by Allies		
Great Britain	55	.	.	70
France	14	.	.	18
Italy	8	.	.	10
U.S.A.	1	.	.	2
Total	78	.	.	100

#### APPENDIX B TO No. 32

##### *French Proposals concerning Enemy Submarines*

All the submarines turned over by the enemy powers, with the exception of the small number indicated in Part 2 below, shall be demolished under the supervision of an Interallied Naval Commission.

2nd The distribution of the submarines between the Allied and Associated Powers shall be operated proportionally to the losses suffered by them in submarines percentage already established concerning the distribution of their motors already turned over by their owners.

	Per cent.
Great Britain	70
France	18
Italy	10
United States	2

3rd France, alone among all the Allied Navies as not having constructed submarines during the war, shall receive 10 German submarines in good condition as a compensation.

#### APPENDIX C TO No. 32

##### *Number of Submarines in Each Navy*

	Existing in 1914	Vessels entering service during the war	Lost	Remaining at the end of the war
England	60	127	55	132
America	31	60 (77 in shipyards)	1	167
France	45	21 (of which the latest were finished in 1912)	14	52
Italy	19	51 10	8	72

#### APPENDIX D TO No. 32

BUCAREST, November 24, 1919

To: His Excellency, President of the French Republic.

During the long trials undergone by my people and myself, the manifestations of friendship which I received from Your Excellency, as well as the words, never to be forgotten by Roumania, which you uttered at the opening of the Conference,

lead me to think that it is not necessary to again set forth the nature of the Roumanian actions during the war, and to insist on the loyalty, devotion and efficacy of the assistance lent by Roumania to her great Allies, at the cost of the most bloody and heavy sacrifices.

In spite of the fact that, from the beginning of the operations of the Conference, the Council of Four alone made all the decisions, Roumania, in order to prove her fidelity and solidarity, has, however, submitted to the stipulations which were decided upon, unknown to her and against her interests, until she was put in such a position that she could only sign at the cost of her dignity and independence. However, the Supreme Council which proved, and is still proving, such great magnanimity in the questions not yet settled, or the solution of which seems difficult to obtain, treats Roumania with a violence inconsistent with our friendly relations and the principles of justice.

This policy of the Allied Governments, in contradiction with our actions and feelings, can but have the worst consequences on the role of order and peace which Roumania should have in this part of Europe.

It is believed that I am creating difficulties, while I only defend a just cause, and the fact that my appeals are not listened to is indirectly favouring the danger which threatens every nation, for the encouragement given to the elements of disorder by the attitude of the Supreme Council has a tendency to lessen the authority of my Government, who are only guilty of defending the order, honour and independence of their country.

However, it would be natural that the great Allies, whose responsibilities are in proportion with their power, support what represents the best guarantee of order against invading anarchy, as was recently proved in Hungary and on the Dniester.

In the name of these principles, I deem it my duty to appeal to you in order to bring the Government of the Republic to a more friendly and just attitude toward us.

I apply, for the same purpose, to His Majesty, the King of England, and His Majesty, the King of Italy.

FERDINAND

#### APPENDIX E TO No. 32

##### *Additional Protocol to the Treaty Concluded at Versailles between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, June 28, 1919.*

The United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and Poland,

Recognizing, by common agreement, that it is important as soon as possible to put a stop to the existing conditions of political uncertainty in which the Polish nation is placed and to make it possible for the Polish Government to proceed, according to the conditions previously provided by the Treaty with Poland of June 28, 1919, to organize a regular administration of the territories so far regarded as Polish,

The undersigned duly authorized by their respective Governments have agreed to the following provisions.

#### Article 1.

Without prejudging the provisions which must in the future define the eastern frontiers of Poland, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers hereby declare that they recognize the full and complete sovereignty of Poland over the Polish

territories of the former Russian Empire situated to the West of the line described below. . . .<sup>24</sup>

The rights that Poland may be able to establish over the territories situated to the East of the said line are expressly reserved.

#### Article 2.

The proportion and nature of the financial or other charges of the former Empire of Russia which Poland will have to bear by reason of the placing of the territories of this former Empire under her sovereignty shall be fixed in conformity with the stipulations of Article 21 of the Treaty concluded with Poland on June 28, 1919.

Future conventions shall regulate all other questions which may arise from the recognition of the sovereignty of Poland over the territories described in Article 1.

Done at Paris, the . . . . .<sup>25</sup> 1919 in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic; and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the Signatory Powers.

### APPENDIX F TO NO. 32

#### *Note to the Supreme Council*

The Special Paris Commission which is entrusted with the questions concerning the Russian prisoners of war in Germany examined the following points communicated by the Supreme Council:

[1st] Reimbursement of the flour advanced by the German Government until August 23rd, 1919.

[2nd] Liquidation of the liabilities of the Inter-Allied Commission, namely, 400,000 marks.

[3rd] Reimbursement to the German Government of the expenses incurred for the Kiev refugees.

[4th] Employment of the Russian money which remained in the hands of the German Government (20 million roubles).

According to the reports emanating from the International Commission in Berlin, the following obligations will be incumbent upon the Allied and Associated Governments:

#### *Due [to] the German Government:*

	marks
For provisioning of the Kiev refugees . . . . .	2,000,000
Value c.i.f. (?) German ports (?) 2,400 tons of wheat flour or of 2,700 tons of rye flour, supplied to the Russian prisoners of war, and the reimbursement of which is requested in kind . . . . .	7,680,000

#### *Due [to] the British Red Cross:*

Advances made by the British Red Cross, to be reimbursed in francs or in pounds sterling . . . . .	400,000
	<hr/> 10,080,000

<sup>24</sup> There followed the description of this line as subsequently embodied in the declaration of December 8, 1919, relative to the provisional eastern frontiers of Poland, printed in *British and Foreign State Papers (1919)*, vol. cxii, pp. 971-2: see No. 34, minute 7 and note 6.

<sup>25</sup> Thus in original.

After having examined the data given by the International Commission in Berlin, the Paris Commission expressed the opinion that the above account only deals with correct and legitimate expenses, and that the principle of their settlement can be admitted. The Italian Delegate, however, makes reservation with respect to the views of his Government concerning the provisioning of the Kiev refugees for two million marks, until an investigation has been conducted on the conditions under which the corresponding agreement was made.

In the sharing of the liabilities in question, between the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, the Commission took as a basis the following decision of the Supreme Council of supplies [*sic*], under date of February 1st, 1919.

*Russian, Serbian and Roumanian prisoners in Germany*

'The Council approves the decision made by the permanent committee in its meeting of January 28th.

'The French Government is entrusted, in the name of the four Associated Governments, with the provisioning of the Russian, Serbian and Roumanian prisoners in Germany.

'The distribution and the supervision of this provisioning in Germany will be exercised by the Inter-Allied Military Committee at Berlin, under the presidency of General Dupont, in co-operation with the Red Cross organizations of the various nations. The sums necessary will be temporarily advanced by France. The distribution of the expenses between the four Associated Governments is to be ulteriorly regulated.'

This basis of distribution being admitted, with the reservation made by the Italian Delegate with respect to the approval of his Government, each Delegate gave the elements of the following account which totals the supplies so far furnished by their respective Governments.

	<i>Amount</i>	<i>Approximate value in marks<sup>16</sup></i>
France . . .	11,000,000 Francs (100 mks. = 38.25 fcs)	28,710,000
Great Britain . . .	80,000,000 pounds (1 pound = 88.50 mks)	7,080,000 (obvious error)
United States . . .	2,500,800 dollars (1 dollar = 20 mks)	50,016,000

This amount comprises 1,727,800 dollars representing the supplies furnished by the American Red Cross, by virtue of a special agreement with the Government of the United States.

Italy . . .	Account	
	Total . . .	<u>85,806,000</u>

In order to determine the share of each of the four Powers and the total cost of the upkeep of the Russian prisoners of war, and of the Kiev refugees, it was decided that the present amount of the debt to be paid would be added to the cost of the

<sup>16</sup> Note in original: 'The Commission, having no data on the dates on which the supplies mentioned above were made, took as a basis, for the conversion into marks, the rate of exchange of August 25. Therefore, the above figures should be examined before being definitely admitted. In fact, each Delegate has expressly reserved for his Government the right to modify the total of the sums representing its contribution to the provisioning if, ulteriorly, other items of expense were to be comprised in it.'

supplies previously furnished, and that this general total be divided into four, the quotient representing the share of each Power.

Present debt . . . . .	200,000,000
Amount of previous expenses . . . . .	65,800,000
Total . . . . .	<u>265,800,000</u>
Share of each of the four Powers: . . . . .	26,575,000 (100 marks)

From the above data, it appears that France and the United States have given more than their share to this common operation of the Allies. On the other hand, Italy and Great Britain did not assume their share of the liabilities. Consequently, it is incumbent upon them to assume the present debt, according to the following distribution:

Great Britain . . . . .	1,500,000
Italy . . . . .	6,580,000
	<u>10,080,000</u>

The Commission suggested that, in this distribution, the Government of Great Britain should assume, as a contribution to the total reimbursement to be effected, the 400,000 marks advanced by the British Red Cross; the balance of the English debt, and the total amount due by Italy shall, if the Supreme Council approves this proposal, and through the intermediary of the Reparations Commission, and under reserve of approval by the Italian Government, be applied to the credit of Germany, through the debit of the reparations account of Great Britain and Italy.

The French and American Delegates declared that, if these proposals were adopted by the various Allied and Associated Governments, they think that their respective Governments, except in case their parliaments should not approve, would very likely not insist that the surplus of their share in this common operation be reimbursed to them.

With respect to the proposal that a part of the twenty million roubles temporarily in the hands of the German Government should be used for the regulation of the pending accounts, the Commission is of the opinion that this sum should not be deducted in any way, on account of the important questions mixed up with the disposition of the funds in question.

Concerning the request that the cereals supplied by Germany should be reimbursed in kind, the Commission thinks that, as Germany did not comply with the demand made by the Supreme Council to withdraw the German troops from the Baltic provinces, it is neither advisable, nor necessary, at the present time, to effect a reimbursement in kind, but that sufficient satisfaction would be given to Germany, by crediting her with a sum representing the reparations account. The especial situation of the American Delegate is pointed out to the Supreme Council. In fact, he is instructed to make officially known that the American Government is obliged to refuse all financial assistance, which would aim to continue the provisioning of the Russian prisoners of war, or of the Kiev refugees, at present in Germany. That is why the American Delegate informed the Commission that it must be understood that no representative or agent of the Government of the United States has the authority to make any financial agreement in the name of his Government, with respect to the affair in question, and declared that the figures given in the present note, relative to the debts to be paid, represent the exact balance at present payable.

The British, French, Italian and Japanese Delegates declared that, although

they have no instructions to make any official statement in the name of their Governments, however, they are of the opinion that their treasuries would consider the matter from the same point of view as the American treasury; consequently, the Commission asks that the International Commission in Berlin be informed that according to the decision of principle already made by the Supreme Council, it has no authority to make any financial agreement in the name of the Five Powers collectively.

Therefore, if the above proposals are approved by the Supreme Council, the points submitted to the Special Commission in Paris would be settled as follows:

The 400,000 marks due [to] the British Red Cross (Question No. 2) will be reimbursed to the latter by the British Government;

The flour advanced by the German Government (Question No. 1) will be reimbursed, not in kind, but in currency, that is to say, 7,680,000 marks; this amount will be added to the 2,000,000 marks due for the upkeep of the Kiev refugees (Question No. 3) and the payment of the sum of 9,680,000 marks would be effected by applying an equal sum to the credit of Germany, in the reparations account; 1,100,000 marks being charged to the English account and 8,580,000 marks to the Italian account. The employment of the 200,000,000 [sic] Russian roubles retained by the German Government (Question No. 4) will be postponed until the settlement of similar questions of a larger extent.

### No. 33

H. D. 103.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, December 1, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARIES, Mr. H. Norman, Sir George Clerk.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Arnavon, M. de Percin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: General Bliss, Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Mr. E. L. Dresel, Dr. J. B. Scott, Lieut.-Commander Koehler, U.S.N., Mr. A. W. Dulles, Captain H. Pierce.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Captain Fuller, R.N., Lieut.-Colonel Black, Sir P. Loraine, Mr. E. H. Carr, Mr. H. W. Malkin.

*France*: Marshal Foch, M. Cambon, General Weygand, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Fromageot.

*Italy*: General Cavallero, Admiral Grassi, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Vanutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri, Commander Fea.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

1. The Council had before it a report from Sir George Clerk to the President of the Conference, dated November 29th, 1918; see Appendix A.

SIR GEORGE CLERK summarized the report sent by him to the Council and brought out the following additional points. In his report he had mentioned the respective positions of M. Friedrich and M. Huszar and had shown how difficult it was to obtain the collaboration in the same Government of the leaders of the National Christian Party and the National Democratic and Jew leaders. Personal differences had furthermore added complications to party questions. He wished to draw the Council's attention to the unique situation in the country occupied by Archduke Joseph. It was true that he was a Hapsburg but he had always lived in Budapest; he had formerly been Palatine of Hungary and he was considered a true Hungarian. Moreover, he had been opposed to the Hapsburgs at Vienna. Archduke Joseph had taken an important part in making M. Friedrich understand the real situation. He Sir George Clerk had likewise pointed out in his report how greatly his mission had been helped by the position which the Allied and Associated Generals and Admiral Troubridge had acquired at Budapest. The Generals and the Admiral enjoyed in Hungary a reputation for impartiality which gave special weight to their opinions. In case the Council considered that the Mission of the Generals had now come to an end, and if it decided to recall them, it would be well to leave there some officers who had been on that Mission. It should not be forgotten that the Generals had collected a mass of documents, relating especially to the conditions under which the Roumanian requisitions were effected and to the requisitions themselves. These documents might be of great use in the future. In any event, he thought that if the Generals left Budapest the Allied and Associated Powers should replace them by High Commissioners and that some officers who had been on duty with that Mission should be placed under them. These Commissioners should be charged with the duty, and that would give the Hungarians a high opinion of the Allies' sense of justice, of establishing the events which had happened in the regions occupied by the troops of states bordering on Hungary. He had acquired the conviction at Budapest that the Hungarians were prepared to accede to the Council's demand that peace be signed. But there were two points to which they seemed to attach great importance, and which they would like the Council to examine before the terms of the Treaty were settled. In the first place, his attention had been called to the work accomplished by the hydrographic service of the old regime. If Hungary did not constitute a unit from the ethnographical point of view, it undoubtedly did constitute one from geographical and economic points of view. The remarkable work accomplished throughout all Hungary by the hydrographic service had been carried out on a unique plan. It was greatly to be feared that if the maintenance of this work were left to the new states receiving parts of former Hungarian territory the whole system would soon be broken down. He thought it important that a permanent regime be organized which should be charged with ensuring the upkeep and develop-

ment of the work accomplished in that line by the former Government. The second question raised was as to the Presidency of the Hungarian Delegation which would be sent to conclude a Treaty of Peace. For the reasons indicated in his report the Hungarians would like the Delegation to be headed by Count Apponyi who had played a great part in the recent negotiations. Unfortunately, however, Count Apponyi had a bad reputation in western Europe, and he himself was well aware of it. Nevertheless it was true that he and Count Andrassy were perhaps the only Hungarians possessing a true knowledge of the general European situation. If he were to accept the Presidency of the Hungarian Delegation, Apponyi would be obeying his sense of duty alone. He would be guided by no personal ambition. The economic situation of Hungary, like that of Austria, was desperate, unless the Allies could see their way to giving it financial aid. The territory which remained Hungarian could furnish no indispensable raw materials and the situation was all the more serious since there was scarcely any more Hungarian rolling stock in existence. It was essential to send immediately to Hungary at least the material necessary for the reparation of locomotives and cars which still remained. Finally he did not wish to fail to point out to the Council that all Hungarian public opinion was extremely eager for the return of the Hungarian and Austrian prisoners in Siberia, as to whose fate there was great anxiety. To sum up, he brought back from Budapest the impression that the Hungarians were inspired in general with a desire to collaborate with the Allies. They were beginning to realize the error they had committed, the responsibility for which, moreover, they were now placing on Austrian policy. They hoped that the Allies would help them and give them a chance to prove their good will, otherwise, following Austria, they would have to lean towards Germany.

MR. POLK asked Sir George Clerk if the Serbs were still occupying the Pecs mines.<sup>1</sup>

SIR GEORGE CLERK answered that they were.

MR. POLK thought it important that the Council reach a decision in that matter, requesting the Serbs to retire.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the question had last been referred to the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that the Commission be asked to submit a report the following day.

MR. POLK asked if Sir George Clerk had thought it necessary that General Bandholtz should remain at Budapest until the arrival of the civilian Allied High Commissioners or would it suffice to keep a field officer there who might not be a General?

SIR GEORGE CLERK said he only meant that it was necessary for someone to remain; he personally would recommend retaining at Budapest a field officer and several subaltern officers of each nation, so that the latter could be sent on missions throughout the country.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Sir George Clerk had not indicated in his report

<sup>1</sup> Cf. No. 4, note 3.

what procedure he advised for entering into negotiations with Hungary. He wished to know whether it was possible to ask the Hungarian Government to send its representatives.

SIR GEORGE CLERK replied that the Hungarians were ready and were awaiting the invitation of the Council.

M. DE MARTINO observed that they could be asked to come immediately.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was merely necessary to send them a letter inviting them to come on a given date to a given place. Sir George Clerk had spoken a little while before of Count Apponyi. Personally he was not one of his admirers but it seemed to him very difficult to prevent his coming. The Council had never told enemy States how their Delegations should be composed and moreover he was not sure that any right existed to tell them to send such or such a person.

SIR GEORGE CLERK observed that Count Apponyi did not wish to come if his presence would be distasteful to the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the Hungarians were entitled to do what they thought best for their cause.

M. BERTHELOT observed that Count Apponyi could be reproached with always having been a rabid Germanophile and an ardent advocate of the oppression of small nationalities; evidently these facts did not recommend him to the Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that that was true, but that he did not feel sure of the tendencies of the other persons who might be sent.

MR. POLK thought that if Count Apponyi was allowed to come it would be the surest way of destroying his popularity in Hungary.

M. DE MARTINO agreed with Sir George Clerk's suggestion.

SIR GEORGE CLERK remarked that, as M. Clemenceau had said, it was a question for the Hungarians to decide.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he saw some objections to Apponyi just as M. Berthelot had done, but after all he thought that this question concerned the Hungarians alone.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council then had nothing to say to the Hungarians except that they should send their Delegation. In the event of their consulting Sir George Clerk as to the effect which might be produced if Count Apponyi or any other individual should head their Delegation he thought that Sir George Clerk should reply that he was not competent to answer. He asked what date should be set for summoning the Hungarians.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought it was not necessary to specify a date.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was true and that it would suffice to ask them to come as soon as possible.

M. BERTHELOT read a draft telegram to be sent to Hungary in clear over the American wire (see Appendix B).

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was then agreed that the Hungarians should be asked to come to the Château de Madrid at Neuilly. He added that the Council thanked Sir George Clerk for his report and for the manner in which he had accomplished his Mission.

MR. POLK said that in view of the remarkable way in which Sir George Clerk had accomplished his Mission he thought the Council would doubtless see fit to formally put on record its especial thanks.

(This was agreed to.)

It was decided:

to send to the Hungarian Government a telegram (see Appendix B) notifying it to send to Neuilly as soon as possible its representatives to receive the conditions of Peace.

2. (The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Conference dated November 27th, 1919. (See Appendix C).)

*Letter from Marshal Foch on the Military Situation in Germany*

M. CLEMENCEAU summarized Marshal Foch's letter.

GENERAL WEYGAND read a draft note which the Marshal proposed to send to the German Government.

MR. POLK said he had no objections to make, but that in view of the present attitude of the German Government, he wondered if it were wise to send it any more notes. He felt, however, that that was a question to be decided by the British and French Governments.

M. CLEMENCEAU admitted that the attitude of the German Government was not good, but felt that that was no reason why it should not be warned that the Council was not deceived as to what was going on. They could not do more for the moment but he felt that they should not do less.

SIR EYRE CROWE approved the draft note which had just been read.

M. DE MARTINO also felt that it was fitting to recall the Germans to their duty. However, it should not be forgotten that the internal situation of Germany was a difficult one. There was a party which seized all pretexts for retarding the putting into force of the Treaty; care should be taken not to play into its hands.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that nothing was being done except to keep an account of German shortcomings with respect to the Armistice and the Treaty. He thought that such an account was necessary.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft note to the German Government prepared by Marshal Foch (see Appendix D).

3. (The Council had before it a letter from Marshal Foch to the President of the Conference, dated November 28th, 1919 (see Appendix E).)

*Relations between the Esthonian Government and General Yudenitch*

MARSHAL FOCH read and commented upon that letter.

He added that he had just received a telegram from General Yudenitch setting forth his difficulties and asking, in case it was not desired to let him remain in Esthonia, that he be transported elsewhere with his troops, for instance, to the territories under General Denikin's control. In view of the rapid march of events, he (Marshal Foch) thought that it would be well, without further delay, to inform the Esthonian Government

that General Niessel was directed by the Council to intervene in the matter and that from now on the Conference invited the Esthonian Government to hold in abeyance all measures relative to the disarmament of General Yudenitch's army. To sum up, he proposed: first, that General Niessel, as soon as he should have settled matters in Courland—which apparently would be on or about December 15th—should be sent to Esthonia to negotiate an agreement between the Esthonian Government and General Yudenitch; secondly, that in the meantime the Esthonian Government be invited by General Niessel's representative on the spot to hold in abeyance all hasty measures which it might take against General Yudenitch, until the Conference, which was considering the question, should intervene.

MR. POLK had no objections with respect to the second proposal. As to the first, he felt that he could not accept it without referring it to his Government, since it was tantamount to giving General Niessel a political mission, whereas it had formerly been stipulated that the General should not have any mission of that nature.

SIR EYRE CROWE, although he had no personal objections to the proposed procedure, felt himself to be in a similar situation. He would have to refer the matter to his Government, which had formerly demanded that it be clearly understood that General Niessel's Mission should have nothing to do with the Russian side of the Baltic problem.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, he thought that it would be well to ask the Esthonian Government immediately to hold in abeyance all hasty measures.

M. DE MARTINO had no objections to the Marshal's proposals.

M. MATSUI associated himself with the opinion expressed by Sir Eyre Crowe.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the Council was therefore agreed to approve in principle Marshal Foch's second proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that that was so, but that it was to be clearly understood that the Esthonian Government would not be told that the Niessel Mission was to settle the question.

It was decided:

to request the Esthonian Government to hold in abeyance, until further notice, all hasty measures against General Yudenitch and his army, and to inform it that the Council had taken the question under consideration. (See Appendix E.)

4. The Council had before it a draft form of organization of the Inter-Organization of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Bulgaria, prepared by the military, naval and air representatives at Versailles, dated November 24th, 1919 (see Appendix F).<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 7, minute 3.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This draft form of organization followed very closely, *mutatis mutandis*, the model of the approved organization of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control for Austria: see Vol. I, No. 72, appendix F. The more important differences between the organization for Bulgaria and that for Austria were: (i) The Military, Naval, and Aeronautical Commissions of Control for Bulgaria were to be respectively presided over by a French general, a French admiral or senior officer, and a British general or senior officer.

(After a short discussion it was decided:

to approve the draft form of organization of Inter-Allied Commissions of Control, provided for in Articles 94 to 100 of the Bulgarian Treaty of Peace, prepared by the military, naval and air representatives at Versailles (see Appendix F)<sup>3</sup>.)

5. (The Council had before it a note from the German Delegation dated November 27th, 1919. (See Appendix G).)

*Reply to the German  
Note on the Scapa  
Flow Incident*

M. BERTHELOT said that a draft reply had been prepared but that upon examination, in agreement with the legal experts, it had seemed that this draft did not exactly meet the situation. It had especially made no allusion to a phrase in the German note of September 3rd, which established the general responsibility of the German Government in that affair. He proposed that the Drafting Committee be charged with preparing a new note, which, moreover, could be very brief.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that the Drafting Committee could confer with the naval experts.

It was decided:

that the Drafting Committee, in agreement with the naval experts, should prepare and submit to the Council at its next meeting a draft note to the German Government in reply to the German note of November 27th, 1919, concerning the Scapa Flow incident.

6. (The Council had before it a note from the German Delegation, dated November 27th, 1919 (see Appendix H), and a draft reply to that note. (See Appendix I).)

*Reply to the German  
Note regarding Prisoners  
of War*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council had before it the draft reply which had been prepared, but before any discussion thereof he wished to make a preliminary statement. The French Government in no wise desired to hold the German prisoners, who required 40,000 men to guard them, and whose presence was becoming objectionable to the inhabitants of the devastated regions. But he felt that it was not possible under existing circumstances to repatriate those prisoners in contravention of the terms of the Treaty.

(ii) The first sentence of article 10, identical with that in the form of organization for Austria, was followed by an additional second sentence reading: 'The amount of the allowances thus granted shall be revised every three months, consideration being taken of the economic conditions prevailing in Bulgaria.' (iii) At the end of the second paragraph of article 10 of the draft for Bulgaria the phrase 'by the President of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control' was substituted for the phrase 'by the Staff of General Diaz' in the text for Austria. (iv) The subcommission of the Military Control Commission (sitting at Sofia) for munitions, armaments, material, and fortifications was to be 'represented by Officers at Philippopolis, Jamboli, Varna, and other places which may be considered necessary'; the subcommission for establishments, recruiting, and military training was to be similarly represented at Philippopolis, Plevna, and Šumla (articles 14-15). (v) Article 16 of the draft for Bulgaria fixed the following proportions: France 6/20, Great Britain 5/20, Italy 5/20, U.S.A. 3/20, Japan 1/20. (vi) Article 17 established a main Naval Control Commission with no subcommission.

MR. POLK remarked that he had not had time to acquaint himself with the draft reply. He had no doubt that it would be satisfactory and he would send his reply to the Secretary General during the course of the afternoon.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as soon as Mr. Polk's acceptance was received he thought that it would be advantageous to publish the note.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft reply to the German note of November 27th, 1919, concerning prisoners of war and to publish it, with the reservation that Mr. Polk in the course of the afternoon would notify the Secretary General of the Conference of his decision.

7. The Council had before it a letter from General Tcherbatcheff to Marshal Foch, dated November 17th, 1919, see Appendix J, and *Letter from General Tcherbatcheff relative to Stocks of Russian Cartridges in Germany* transmitted by a letter of Marshal Foch to the President of the Conference. See Appendix K.<sup>4</sup>

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the letter of General Tcherbatcheff. He observed that the question was not a new one: General Dupont had formerly pointed out that the Germans to whom these cartridges had been sold were proceeding to destroy them. On November 1st Marshal Foch had warned the German Government that it should not authorize the destruction of these cartridges. Moreover, on November 10th the Council had forbidden the manufacture in Germany of material destined for General Denikin's army.<sup>5</sup> At the present moment, following upon that decision, General Tcherbatcheff was asking for authority to buy Russian cartridges from the individuals who were withholding them. Marshal Foch thought it impossible to authorize the sale by Germans to Russians of material which, according to the terms of the Treaty, belonged to the latter.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that what General Weygand had just said became true from the date of the entry into force of the Treaty. It should not be forgotten that that material had been ceded to Germany by virtue of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. That Treaty, it was true, was to be annulled by the Treaty of Versailles, but it would only be annulled after the entrance into force of the latter.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that Sir Eyre Crowe was evidently right from a legal point of view, but it seemed to him difficult to authorize the Germans to sell material which in a week perhaps might become Russian property. Moreover, it was undoubtedly true that General Denikin needed ammunition, but the assembling of that ammunition, dispersed in Germany, would be a long process; consequently, it could not prove an immediate help to General Denikin. By refusing General Tcherbatcheff's request General Denikin would not be directly harmed. The day the Treaty came into force it would become the duty of the Military Commission of Control to recover this ammunition and give it the destination provided by the Treaty.

<sup>4</sup> This short covering letter, dated November 21, 1919, is not printed.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 18, minute 5.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was evident that if General Denikin did not immediately need those cartridges, his request might be refused. If, on the contrary, he needed them at once it seemed to him that a reply might be sent to General Tcherbatcheff saying that he was free to buy, but that he should also remember that as soon as the Treaty came into force those cartridges had to be delivered to him. He was afraid that a categorical refusal might be badly interpreted by General Denikin.

MR. POLK said that if there was any way of working out this matter it should be done.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that it was therefore proper to write General Tcherbatcheff showing him the difficulties raised by his request and giving him a free choice in the matter.

It was decided:

that Marshal Foch should inform General Tcherbatcheff of the difficulties raised by his request, at the same time advising him that the Allied and Associated Governments did not oppose the purchase for the account of General Denikin from the Germans, who were withholding them, of Russian cartridges which General Denikin might urgently need.

8. M. CAMBON said that at the last meeting of the Council the American Delegate had made reservations relative to the draft protocol submitted to the Council.<sup>6</sup> He wished to point out that on September 25th, the Council approved Report No. 6 of the Commission on Polish Affairs.<sup>7</sup> That report contained a description of the eastern frontiers of Poland. He thought that it would be rather difficult for the Council to now reconsider the decision then taken.

MR. POLK pointed out that there was a slight misunderstanding. He had never objected to the decision of September 25th; he had merely asked if it was necessary to notify the Polish Government of that decision in the solemn form of a protocol.

M. CAMBON said that he believed, indeed, that a protocol was not necessary and that a decision of the Council would suffice.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that M. Cambon come to an agreement with the Drafting Committee and submit a draft to the Council at its next meeting.

It was decided:

that the Drafting Committee, in agreement with the Committee on Polish Affairs, should submit to the Council at its next meeting a draft form of notification to the Polish Government of the decisions of the Council concerning the eastern frontiers of Poland.

9. (The Council had before it a letter from M. Plamenatz<sup>8</sup> to the President of the Conference, dated November 26th, 1919. (See Appendix L).)

<sup>6</sup> See No. 32, minute 5.

<sup>7</sup> See Vol. I, No. 64, minute 10.

<sup>8</sup> M. J. S. Plamenatz was Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Montenegrin Government in exile.

M. BERTHELOT thought that the best course would be to simply ignore the letter which the Council had before it.

*Note from Montenegro  
relative to the possible  
Signature of a Separate  
Peace with Germany,  
Austria and Bulgaria*

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed.

M. DE MARTINO agreed, but wished to know if the Council intended to take up the examination of the Montenegrin question which had to be settled some day.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that was another question. If the Italian Government wished to bring up that problem it should make some proposal on the subject.

It was decided:

that no reply should be sent to the letter from M. Plamenatz threatening the Allied and Associated Powers with a separate peace between Montenegro and Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria.

10. MR. POLK said that as the Drafting Committee was present, it might perhaps give some information to the Council as to the points in the Hungarian Treaty upon which no decision had yet been reached.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that the Treaty was ready except the reparation and financial clauses as to which, in spite of repeated attempts, he had been unable to receive any definite reply from the Commissions concerned. Moreover, his Committee had prepared Article 207, similar to Article 224 of the Austrian Treaty, but that article had still to be approved by the Council. Finally, pursuant to the task given it of preparing for the Hungarian Treaty an article which would not prejudice the final solution of the Fiume problem,<sup>9</sup> his Committee had drafted an article which it was prepared to submit to the Council, and with reference to which the members of the Drafting Committee were in agreement on all save very minor points.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the Council could consider all those questions at its next session.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Reparation Commission should be asked to present its report on the following day.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Council should examine at an early meeting the articles of the Hungarian Treaty on which no decision had yet been reached;
- (2) that the competent Commissions which had not yet done so should immediately submit their reports to the Council.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, December 1, 1919.*

<sup>9</sup> See No. 27, minute 1.

29 November 1919.

Monsieur le Président du Conseil,

In pursuance of the instructions of the Supreme Council I arrived in Budapest on October 23 last, in order to put before the Government of M. Friedrich the conditions under which the Supreme Council would be prepared to treat with the Hungarian Government.

The main condition was that such a Government must include representatives of the different political parties in Hungary. It also must be such as to satisfy the Supreme Council that it was able to maintain law and order, to hold elections based on universal suffrage, in a free, impartial and democratic manner, and be prepared to send delegates to Paris to negotiate the peace with the Allies.

It is unnecessary for me to give a long account of the tedious and difficult negotiations which were necessary before this result could be achieved, but it may be desirable to explain briefly the reasons why the negotiations were long and difficult.

Over four years of unsuccessful war, and the collapse of the whole administrative machine under the revolutionary Government of Michael Karolyi, followed by a communist regime, which again was immediately succeeded by the Roumanian occupation, had reduced the Hungarian spirit to a condition of apathy and depression which it required pressure from outside to rouse to action. On the other hand the Communist Regime, of which the most prominent leaders were Jews, and its association with certain members of the Social-Democratic Party, had produced an inevitable reaction. Feeling throughout the country was excited to the highest pitch and very little would have led to an outburst of wild fanaticism. Moreover, M. Friedrich, the titular Minister-President, had become in the minds of the vast majority of the Hungarian people the symbol of this reaction against Jewish and Communist influence and anything that had the appearance of attacking or weakening his position was liable to be misinterpreted and to arouse an outburst of unreflecting, but none the less dangerous, chauvinism.

Another element in the situation, which had to be taken seriously into account, was the attitude of M. Friedrich, as expressed in the course of an interview which I had with him immediately on my arrival in Budapest. M. Friedrich asserted that during the three months for which his Government retained office, the whole country had rallied almost unanimously to his banner; the different Christian parties had fused together into a solid block which stood behind him. Personally he was ready to do his best to meet the desires of the Entente, but he was no longer a free agent, as he had been when he assumed power, but merely the trusted spokesman of the Christian National Block. He had already gone as far as possible in broadening the basis of his Government, but any attempt, even if made by himself, to introduce a Social-Democrat or a Jew, or any individual even remotely connected in the popular mind with the Communist regime was foredoomed to failure. His followers simply would not hear of it, and his action must be guided by their will. If amalgamation with the Extreme Left were contemplated, then he preferred to hand over the Government of the country to the Allied and Associated Powers, failing which he would go into opposition to any Government which might take office, and the whole Christian National Block would follow him. Lastly: M. Friedrich sought to impress upon me the magnitude of the service which he had

<sup>10</sup> Excerpts from the following report are printed by F. Deák, *op. cit.*, pp. 531-8.

rendered to the Entente by refusing repeated and tempting offers of direct negotiation with Roumania and hinted that any other Government but his was likely to succumb to them.

It was, therefore, necessary to move carefully and to work so that the country gradually awoke to the fact that the wishes of the Entente were not directed against the feelings of the Hungarian people, but were solely intended that those sections of the Hungarian people who were classed together as enemies of the State should not suffer injustice when the elections came to be held.

But it was immediately clear to me that nothing effective could be done so long as the dead-weight of the Roumanian occupation lay upon the country. One after the other, leading Hungarians of independent views, said the same thing to me—that it was useless to try to modify or reconstruct the Friedrich Government while the Roumanian occupation continued. To do so would inevitably involve disturbance and possibly worse, while, if a new Government resulted, which was in itself doubtful, that Government would lose its authority in a day, once it were seen that the Roumanians still remained. Moreover, it was obviously impossible to hold proper elections in any district still occupied by foreign troops. I had, therefore, no hesitation from the outset in urging the earliest possible withdrawal of the Roumanian troops upon the Roumanian authorities in Budapest. It was true that this involved a certain risk. In the unoccupied provinces, and to some extent in Budapest itself, there was much wild talk about the fate in store for the Communists and Jews, and in the capital the Jewish and Social-Democratic sections of the people looked forward with great anxiety to the day when the Roumanians would leave and Horthy's 'White' army come in. On the other hand the organization of the gendarmerie and the police was under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals, who were sufficiently confident of the behaviour of these forces to confirm my intention to take the risk. There remained Horthy's army. Admiral Horthy came to see me at my request from his headquarters and in the course of a long conversation, I became convinced of his sincerity and patriotism, and above all of his complete recognition of the fact that it would be fatal for Hungary if disorders or abuses followed on the arrival of his troops in Budapest.

In taking this decision, I realized that I was throwing away the best lever with which to secure the withdrawal of M. Friedrich, for I could have used the departure of the Roumanians as a bargain and I could have easily brought about a change of Government. But I felt the gravest objections to putting the Roumanians in any way into a position which would enable them to say that their stay in Hungary was undertaken or prolonged at the request of the Allies. It would have been fatal to put the Allies under any obligation to Roumania. I, therefore, steadily pressed for their immediate evacuation.

Meanwhile, as it became clearer that the Roumanians were really going, the attitude of M. Friedrich and his immediate supporters stiffened. More than once I received assurances that once the departure of the Roumanians was definite he would be prepared to meet the wishes of the Allies in every way, and resign his office. But with that departure there came an instantaneous change which, with the experience that I had acquired of M. Friedrich's character and political tactics, caused me no surprise. There was now, according to M. Friedrich, no reason why he should not remain in office, as desired by practically the whole country, and although the Allies certainly wanted peace, Hungary could quite well get along without it. Fortunately there were in Hungary people of wider political experience

and M. Friedrich was gradually forced to see that he must make an attempt to meet the wishes of the Allies. I cannot say that the attempt was undertaken very whole-heartedly. It ended with an invitation to the actual party leaders, sent on by M. Friedrich without my knowledge, to meet at my house in a conference, which was so arranged as to lead inevitably to a deadlock. M. Friedrich would then have been able to turn to me and say that I myself was a witness of how his best efforts were useless and that the only chance for the country was to retain a Government which represented 80 or 90 per cent of the population. This Conference was to meet at 5 p.m. on Nov. 18th. To checkmate this manoeuvre, I invited about 40 of the leading Hungarians to meet me informally at 3 p.m. on the same day, in order that I might put before them the situation in Hungary as I saw it. The Friedrich Party came to this meeting with the definite decision that M. Friedrich must remain Minister-President, or the whole Christian National Block would go into opposition. I spoke very plainly, and at least made the Friedrich party see that Hungary must have peace. I then left those present to discuss the position amongst themselves. The discussion lasted till late in the evening and swallowed up the proposed inter-party conference which M. Friedrich had called together. The position that evening was that Count Apponyi, nominated by the Extreme Left Social-Democratic Wing, was generally accepted by all parties outside the Christian National Block as the man who should form a Coalition Government corresponding to the wishes of the Allies. Even in the Christian National Block a large number of leading men were prepared to accept Count Apponyi, but the party as a whole insisted that if it was really impossible to keep M. Friedrich as their leader, the new Minister-President must at least come from the party. The Conference was resumed at my house next day and resulted in the agreement of all parties to accept M. Huszar, Minister of Education in the Friedrich Government, as Minister-President, provided that he could form a Government of all parties which would be acceptable to the country and agreeable to the Allies.

The hope and expectation of M. Friedrich and his immediate adherents was that the task would prove impossible, and would break M. Huszar's political neck, for he was by far M. Friedrich's most dangerous competitor for leadership. His rivals counted, soundly enough, on the fact that the Social-Democrats, who would have come in almost without terms under Count Apponyi, would exact so high a price from M. Huszar that the Christian National Party would be bound to refuse to pay it. Moreover the five parties of the Left had formed themselves into a block and announced their intention of standing or falling as a whole.

However, in the end M. Huszar succeeded, although his negotiations were almost ruined at the last moment. The Social Democrats insisted that the portfolio of Justice must be given to M. Barczy, a former Burgomaster of Budapest, a leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, and a representative of M. Vaszonyi, the Jewish leader, who had left the country. Such a nomination aroused a storm in the Christian National Block—indeed a week earlier it would have been unthinkable—and the whole fabric threatened to collapse. M. Huszar came to me in despair and I at once gave him a letter congratulating him on his success in bringing all parties together, and especially on the appointment of a member of the Democratic Party as Minister of Justice. No better guarantee could be given to the Allies of the genuine intentions of M. Huszar to meet their wishes. I added a warning to the Democratic Party that their integrity and impartiality would be measured in the eyes of the world by their administration of this high office, whose

function it was to try those who had robbed and murdered in the times of the Communist Government. Armed with this letter M. Huszar brought his party to heel at once and was able to bring home to the parties of the Left the serious responsibility that lay upon them to see that the Ministry of Justice was administered with absolute impartiality. Even this concession, however, did not completely satisfy the Social Democratic Party, which bluffed up to the last moment and only withdrew its exorbitant demands when informed by M. Huszar that I had set a time limit for the formation of the concentration Government. Both parties were likewise aware that I should not have hesitated to make it known both to the Supreme Council and to public opinion where the responsibility lay if the negotiations had broken down.

M. Kari Huszar is still young, barely 40, I think, the son of very poor parents, and himself a village school teacher. He entered Hungarian political life as early as he could and has consistently upheld Democratic views and fought for the betterment of the working classes. His personal honesty is above suspicion and he enjoys respect among all political parties. He has great energy and force of character and is well fitted to lead Hungary through this troubled stage of its existence.

I think I should also place on record the fact that the final assent of all Hungarians to a Coalition Government was due more than anything else to the wisdom and influence of two men whose names would rather suggest reaction—Count Apponyi and Admiral Horthy.

Count Apponyi, who had withdrawn altogether from the political arena and was living in retirement on his estate near Pressburg, came to Budapest at my request. His arrival was the signal for a remarkable demonstration in the whole Hungarian press, which voiced the general feeling which was noticeable everywhere that, now that Count Apponyi had come, the solution would be found. By the irony of circumstances, Count Apponyi, who has never yet been Minister-President of Hungary, was proposed for this office on this occasion by his consistent and most bitter opponents, the Social-Democrats—a striking testimony to their belief in his honesty and patriotism—and rejected by the Christian National Block, of whose policy he had been the accepted life-long exponent. Working solely for what he believed to be the interests of his country, Count Apponyi banished all personal feeling and it was his influence used on every party that more than anything else enabled M. Huszar to amalgamate the various resisting elements.

Admiral Horthy not only in every particular carried out the assurances that he gave me on the occasion of my first interview with him, but ever since his arrival with his troops in Budapest on the day the Roumanians left he showed himself the leader of an army which is really national and a servant of the State, and used his full influence, at the moment greater than that of any man in the country, to make all Hungarians see that the only possible course for Hungary is to meet the wishes of the Allies. The extraordinary smoothness and absence of disorder which marked the departure of the Roumanians and the entrance of the Hungarians was due very largely to the arrangements carefully worked out by the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals and Admiral Troubridge with Admiral Horthy's staff, but most of all to the complete hold which Admiral Horthy had over the forces under his command.

Two days before the Roumanian departure some of the Social-Democratic and Jewish leaders came to me, to announce that they themselves intended to leave the city, as they would certainly be arrested when the 'White' troops came in, and

they told me that the feeling in the Jewish and working-class section of the population was one of the greatest anxiety. I pointed out that for them to go at such a moment would be a grave political error from their point of view; I said that I personally had the fullest confidence in Admiral Horthy's sincerity and in his power over his troops and thus persuaded these gentlemen to remain. I myself spent the whole of the afternoon of the transitional period in the Jewish quarter and I cannot imagine anything more normal or more peaceful, or more evident of confidence. It is true that there were one or two arrests of prominent people, but these were carried out by subordinates without orders from, or the knowledge of, the Government; and, immediately on my representation, and in some cases before, the victims were released.

The Government as now constituted is really representative of Hungarian opinion—in fact the left wing is proportionately more strongly represented in the Cabinet than its power in the country justifies—but the complete realisation of the necessity for peace and the preliminary necessity to meet the wishes of the Allies has made possible the fusion, temporary though it be, of political opposites, the thought of which six weeks ago would have aroused utter incredulity in the minds of nearly every Hungarian.

I should like to testify to the extraordinary respect and attention which was paid to me personally by all the Hungarians, as well as by their Press. Even those who were hardest to convince and most profoundly disagreed with the object for which I was sent to Budapest, were agreed that my Mission served no personal end but was simply carrying out its duty as impartially as it could, and I received the most loyal assistance from nearly everyone.

I am also much indebted to the support and assistance of Admiral Troubridge and of the Inter-Allied Mission of Generals. I not only have to thank them for their great and ready help in all personal and departmental difficulties, but also for the fact that their influence was directed throughout to support my mission and to convince the Hungarians that the Allies were completely in unison.

But the real reason why my mission achieved its object was because the Hungarians themselves wished it to do so. During the time I spent at Budapest I heard the views of Hungarians of every shade of opinion, stated, I must admit, with great moderation. They realise that though they can claim, with justice, to be a great and civilised race, they allowed their foreign policy to be controlled in another, and to them a foreign, capital, and largely by reason of that now find themselves deprived of large territories where, whatever their political behaviour towards their non-Magyar fellow nationals, they had built up a culture and a civilisation which, it is difficult to deny, stands far higher than that of the neighbouring States, whose conduct has been in many respects deplorable.

They recognise, I think, the broad justice of the inclusion of peoples of one common stock in one State, but they feel that the Allies have, inevitably perhaps but unfortunately for Hungary, only heard one side of the case and have, in doubtful instances, naturally given the benefit to those who fought on their side. Moreover the Hungarians plead for consideration of geographical and economic, as well as of purely national, factors.

The Allies certainly intend to be as just to their late enemies as to themselves, and to see that the small States, aggrandised through the war, do not, by abuse and oppression, cause the world to feel that the result of the war has after all only been to substitute one unrighteous system for another and to sow the seeds of inevitable future conflicts. It is because my experience in Hungary makes me feel

that there is a serious danger of this occurring and being aggravated by a rupture of old economic ties and commercial relations, which affects the private citizen far more intimately than great political changes, that I venture to close my report with some observations on what is happening on the borders of Hungary and on the position of that country in general.

It is impossible to see a higher civilisation hopelessly mishandled by those who are still learners in the art of Government, without some sympathy for the victims and without some compunction for one's own share in what is happening. For instance, it seems unnecessary and uncivilised, and, I think, illegal, for the Roumanians to call for an oath of allegiance from university professors whose town and University have not yet been definitely handed over to them. But this is what the Roumanians did in the University of Kolosvar in May last. The professors very rightly said that they were still Hungarian subjects and could not consider themselves released from their duties as such until the Peace Treaty had definitely allocated Kolosvar to Roumania. The Roumanian answer was to turn the professors out of their posts, out of their houses, and to force them to work as labourers, to keep body and soul together. One distinguished Professor of Geography, who has a world-wide reputation, was forced to hoe potatoes for a living and he gave his lectures to four pupils who hoed the rows on each side of him. He was then arrested, put in prison and made to clean the latrines. He was finally allowed to leave with his family in a cattle truck, but at the sacrifice of his personal possessions and of the fruits of his whole scientific life.

Another distinguished professor, over 70 years of age and an invalid, was arrested on an unfounded charge of Bolshevism, beaten, and put in prison, where he still remains.

Officers of the Hungarian army have been carried off in numbers for enquiry as to their behaviour during the Communist regime, and are confined in filthy barracks, doing manual work, under-fed, unpaid, with no clothes save those they have on, cut off from all outside communication. And so it goes on.

It is difficult to believe that the cause of Roumania is helped by this sort of thing.

In the territories occupied by the Serb-Croat-Slovene troops abuses of all sorts are committed and it is credibly reported that the country is being stripped bare where it is being evacuated. I have already reported the instance of the unfortunate land-owner who was shot dead with his small child and whose wife was seriously injured, simply because they happened to live in a house the contents of which appealed to the covetousness of the Serbian soldiers. In justice to the Serbians it must be added that the complaints about such abuses are directed far less against the authorities and forces of the old kingdom than against the new and imperfectly disciplined levies from the Serb, Croat and Slovene population of the absorbed territories.

In the district in the occupation of the Czechs there is a home of the Archduke Joseph. It is true that he is an Archduke and a Habsburg, but he can not help either of these things, and he paid for this home 24 years ago out of his private funds and has spent the greater part of his life there. The Czechs continue to take away his private property in the house and are now proposing to sell by auction the wedding dress of his wife—a gift from the Empress Elizabeth whose wedding dress it had also been—and all her private family letters. The Church lands of the Archbishopric of Esztergom, now in Czecho-Slovakia, have been taken from the Hungarian ecclesiastical authorities, and the educational and humanitarian institutions which existed on the revenues of those properties have been ruined.

This form of ignoble persecution is unfortunately all too typical of the Allies whom we have made independent States.

It is for these and similar reasons that I have urged that Inter-Allied Commissions should be sent to see what is really happening in these lands which may eventually fall definitely to the lot of Roumania, Serbia, or Czecho-Slovakia, but are now suffering the fate of a village in debatable ground in Macedonia. It might be argued that the Allies cannot insist on sending a Commission into regions which have been definitely assigned to those countries, but I venture to observe that where there is evidence that the authorities of those countries are anticipating and abusing the rights which the final Treaty of Peace may give them, the Allies owe it to themselves to see that their good name is not brought into disrepute. The danger of this is, unfortunately, serious and growing. In fact in my humble opinion there should be a Central High Commission for all these countries with real powers of inspection, and full authority to check abuses and outrage.

Hungary is dying for lack of coal and wood—the latter both for fuel and for pit props. About September 24th General Serbescu, on behalf of the Roumanian military authorities, made a formal agreement with the Hungarian Government whereby all locomotives and wagons that were taken from Hungary after 8 a.m. on September 26th were to be returned at once. The number of wagons still owing under this formal agreement is about 11,000. Budapest is faced with complete disaster unless it can get coal to run the trams, lighting, gas works, mills, hospitals, and municipal administration, and heating of all private houses. The Czecho-Slovak Government have agreed to allow Hungary 60 wagons of coal a day, if Hungary will lend them 3,000 wagons for a year. The Hungarians have not got these wagons and asked the Roumanians to let them have 5,000 out of the 11,000 which they admittedly owe. Nothing is done and there is no machinery which can effect the urgent and direct action which alone can save the situation. Again there is a definite agreement in operation between the Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak Governments by which the latter have undertaken the continuous supply of wood for fuel and pit props. Quite suddenly, without reason given, the Czecho-Slovaks have cut off the provision of this wood with the result that even the Budapest bakeries will have to cease work, owing to lack of fuel. Here again there is nobody that can enforce the maintenance of formal obligations. It would be easy to multiply instances of the selfish and callous policy pursued by these newly created States, but what I wish to bring out is that the final result will inevitably be that the Great Powers, not only for humanity, but in order to prevent a recurrence of chaos in Europe, will be obliged to provide remedies out of their own resources at an infinitely greater cost and when bitter experience has so driven home to those who have suffered the futility of trust and confidence in the Allies that no amount of eleventh hour charity will restore that political balance which can alone be a guarantee for the peace of Europe.

Perhaps the best instance, and one where there is still time to act, of the desirability of strong Allied action lies in the duty of finding a successor to carry on the water control system of the Hungarian plain. A glance at the map will show that the whole of Hungary, ringed round by the Carpathians, is one geographical unit. The Hungarians have worked out a scientific, efficient, and elaborate control of their water-ways—their knowledge of this subject is probably the highest in Europe—but if each of the new States is to be left to follow its own sweet will in the territories which it has acquired, great economic harm will result, not only to the whole geographic system, but to the individual State. I venture to think that as

soon as possible some international body should be instituted which, basing itself on the labours of the Hungarian Government, should provide a permanent and impartial control of all this water system, directed to the interests of all the countries concerned.

In conclusion I venture to submit, on the direct experience that I have now been privileged to have of Hungary and to some extent of Austria, that any idea of immediate payments on account of reparation from those countries must be abandoned. On the contrary, if we are not to condemn millions of human beings to misery and starvation, if we are not to be responsible for a catastrophe almost as great, and in its ultimate consequences possibly even greater, than the war itself, so far from exacting reparation, we have to find funds to keep Austria and Hungary alive. I should be the last to deny that this can be exaggerated. There is a feeling of helplessness in both countries which leads them to expect everything and to feel incapable of doing anything for themselves. But their financial situation and their losses through the war are such that unless they get some measure of immediate help they will inevitably collapse into utter ruin and despair. It is one more instance of the creditors of a bankrupt having to decide whether they should cut their losses or take over control themselves and put in more money in order to recover, in time, what they have originally risked.

Moreover, if the two countries feel that they have been able, through the help of the Allies, to avert the complete breakdown of their material and economic existence and to gain a foothold on the arduous path of reconstruction much will be done to diminish the likelihood of Austria seeking union with Germany as her one remaining chance of salvation, and to strengthen the Hungarians in their resolve to abjure for ever the German connection against which they have fretted for so many generations and from which they hope that they have now been finally released.

I can only say that both Austria and Hungary long for strict Allied control, so long as it is designed to help them to live, and that the neighbouring States, our present Allies, need firm supervision and guidance to make them fit to enjoy the inheritance which has fallen to them through our sacrifice and effort.

I have the honour, etc.

GEORGE R. CLERK.

## APPENDIX B TO No. 33<sup>11</sup>

*December 1, 1919.*

General Bandholtz, Budapest.

*Rush.*

Please deliver following message, textually, from M. Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference, to Mr. Huszar, President of the Council of Ministers of Hungary. Quote.

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, after information received from Sir George Clerk, its Delegate at Budapest, decided to invite the Hungarian Government to send Delegates to Neuilly (Château de Madrid) supplied with the necessary powers to conclude peace with the Allied and Associated Powers.

<sup>11</sup> A text of the telegram in this appendix is printed in *The Hungarian Peace Negotiations* (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Budapest, 1921), vol. i, p. vii.

Consequently, the Hungarian Government is requested to despatch its delegates to Neuilly without further delay. G. Clemenceau. Unquote.

POLK, Ammission.

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 33

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.

General Staff. 5505.

*G.H.Q., November 27, 1919.*

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President Clemenceau.

From information sent from Berlin by Generals Nollet and Dupont or collected in the neutral zone by General Degoutte, it appears that the military situation of Germany at the present time is as follows:

Germany has organized two armies:

(A) One comprising:

The Reichswehr, about	.	.	.	.	.	320,000 men
The remnants of the former army, about	.	.	.	.	.	80,000 „
The volunteer Corps, about	.	.	.	.	.	30,000 „
Making a total of about	.	.	.	.	.	430,000 men

These formations are under the Minister of War. Their existence is admitted by the German Government which intimates that it will disband the remnants of the former army and the volunteer corps and gradually reduce the Reichswehr to the effectives provided for by the Peace Treaty.

That is the official army.

Besides this official army, there is also in preparation a veritable reserve constituted by the Zeitfreiwillige (voluntary time enlistments) of which a census is taken, who are subject to call and to military training, having their own arms and ammunition depots.

These men are carefully recruited from among those having Monarchist or pan-German tendencies. Their effectives are rapidly increasing. To each formation of Reichswehr corresponds a Zeitfreiwillige formation.

(B) The other, comprising:

Police Detachments (Sicherheitspolizei)	{	Permanent formations of from 600 to 1,200 men distributed among the important localities. Recruited from among the former officers or non-commissioned officers who may pass in or out of the Reichswehr and who are provided with all the engines of war (guns, airplanes, machine guns, grenades).
The Einwohnerwehr		A kind of national guard. A census is taken of the men; they are drilled periodically, and have their depots of arms and munitions.

These formations, whose effectives are unknown, but continue to increase, are commanded and administered by a staff composed of officers and non-commissioned

officers of the former army and having an organization similar to that of an army corps, division or regiment.

They are under the orders of the *Ministry of the Interior*.

That is the unofficial army, the dissimulated army.

The German Government admits its existence but pretends that it is only a matter of measures taken for the maintenance of order.

It may be clearly seen from the above that Germany has begun to form a military organization absolutely contrary to the military clauses of the Treaty. General Degoutte having pointed out to me the existence in neutral zone Frankfurt, Hanau, Hamburg, of certain staffs and depots of arms and munitions not provided for by the clauses of the Armistice, I directed him to demand from the German Command the immediate withdrawal of these staffs or depots. But it is not possible before the coming into force of the Treaty to impose upon the German Government the suppression of the military organization which it is forming.

However, it seems necessary to keep the Supreme Council informed of the situation above set forth and to advise the German Government that all the military provisions which it has taken, contrary to the clauses of the Treaty, must be revoked *without delay* upon the coming into force of the Treaty.

F. FOCH.

#### APPENDIX D TO NO. 33

##### *Proposed Note to the German Government*

According to corroborative information received up to the present time, the German Government has been preparing and has realized considerable development in its military forces for some time back.

Apart from the Reichswehr, it has organized permanent forces which are designated as Sicherheitspolizei and which have all the characteristics and value of chosen troops.

These forces are commanded and administered by Staffs constituted from a military personnel. These formations, although attached to the Ministry of the Interior, have characteristics which deny their avowed purpose as police forces, and their development is in contradiction with Article 162 of the Treaty.

Furthermore, under the name of Zeitfreiwillige and Einwohnerwehr, Germany is forming a reserve force, subject to call and military drill, having at their disposition munitions and arms depots. These organizations are contrary to the military clauses in general and, in particular, to Article 178 of the Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Governments point out at this time that these provisions, adopted in contradiction with the spirit and terms of the Treaty, might be interpreted as an intention on the part of the German Government to not comply with the Treaty. Consequently, they invite the German Government to annul the above indicated measures at once or, in any event, that upon the entry into force of the Treaty:

- all forces, so-called police, be carried in the effectives provided for by the Treaty, and in a constitution in conformity with their character of local or municipal police;
- the staffs, aside from those provided for by the Treaty, be dissolved;
- all reserve organizations be discontinued.

## APPENDIX E TO No. 33

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.

General Staff, 3rd Section. No. 5514.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, *November 28, '19.*

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President of Council.

According to reports from General Etiévant, the Russian Northwest Army, after the failure of its attempt against Petrograd, was repulsed in direction of Esthonia.

Youdenitch wants to reorganize it.

But the Esthonian Government seems unwilling to receive it, and wants to disarm it, and enlist the volunteers in its own army and dissolve the rest.

This situation requires an immediate solution, as it can cause conflicts between Russians and Esthonians at any moment.

General Etiévant suggests, to this end, that the Entente intervene in order that the Esthonian Government receive the Youdenitch Army on its territory, and respect its autonomy, so as to enable this army to reorganize and reinforce itself with the Russian elements of the Bermont Army, which General Niessel can send to it, to receive the war material intended for it and, thus, to be put in a position to resume its operations against the 'Red' army.

These suggestions seem acceptable, for it seems that the Entente cannot permit the nucleus of the Youdenitch Army [?] to be disbanded, without renouncing its principle [*sic*] instrument in Northern Russia against the Bolsheviks.

But the measures to be taken can only be determined on the spot. They imply the conclusion of agreements with the Baltic States—in particular with Esthonia—which a representative of the Entente, only, can successfully negotiate, as a compensation for the assistance lent to these states to liberate them from the Bolsheviks and the Germans.

General Niessel, on account of his present situation, seems to be the right man to be entrusted with this mission, when he has regulated the evacuation of the German troops.

It is sufficient to give him the necessary instructions.

If you share this point of view, I have the honour to ask you to kindly submit to the Supreme Council the following resolution:

'The Allied and Associated Powers, with a view to continuing, as far as possible, to help the anti-Bolshevist forces, at present under the orders of General Youdenitch, and to facilitate the reorganization of these forces, direct General Niessel to intervene, in their name, with the Esthonian Government and with General Youdenitch, to the end of bringing about and facilitating the conclusion of the necessary agreements for the establishment in Esthonia and the reorganization of the Russian Northwest Armies.'

FOCH.

APPENDIX G TO No. 33

Document 1

PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION.

No. 53.

PARIS, November 27, 1918.

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: His Excellency, M. Clemenceau.

I have the honour to forward to you herewith a memorandum from the German Government concerning the Scapa Flow affair.

Please accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER.

Document 2

*Memorandum concerning the scuttling of the German Battleships at Scapa Flow*

In a note of November 1, the Allied and Associated Governments made the establishment of the first Protocol of deposit of ratification and, consequently, the going into force of the Peace Treaty, dependent upon the signature of a special Protocol regulating the execution of the clauses of the Armistice not yet fulfilled by the Germans. They inclosed in their note a draft of Protocol containing the enumeration of the clauses of the Armistice, which they consider as not yet executed.<sup>12</sup> As was already affirmed by Germany, in the conversation which incidentally took place on the subject, the German Government does not intend to oppose the establishment of such a Protocol, although it is bound to affirm with all its energy that if some conditions of the Armistice are not entirely executed, Germany is not responsible for it. The German Government also admits that the Protocol enumerates the obligations which remain to be fulfilled by Germany. Verbal negotiations will be necessary to specify to what extent the enumeration contained in the Protocol conforms to the truth and to settle the question of juridical consequences which would eventually result from the non-execution of the obligations which have not yet been fulfilled. On the other hand, in conformity with the agreement made in the course of the conversation which took place on the subject, it is necessary to set forth, from now on, the point of view of the German Government on one of the questions contained in the Protocol and, in particular, on the question of the scuttling of the German battleships at Scapa Flow: in fact, it is considered on the German side that this question cannot be dealt with from the point of view of the non-execution of the clauses of the Armistice; therefore, a special discussion on this subject is necessary at first.

In a note of June 25th the Allied and Associated Governments mentioned the scuttling of the German ships at Scapa Flow as a violation of Article[s] 23 and 31 of the Armistice, for which the German Government should be made responsible. At the same time, referring to Articles 40 and 41 of the Hague regulations on the laws of war on land, they reserve the right to require a reparation for the damage suffered by them. The German Government, in answer to this note, refrained from setting forth its juridical point of view, because the accurate information on this incident promised to the German Armistice Commission by the British

<sup>12</sup> See No. 10, appendices B and C.

Admiralty had not yet reached it, and because sufficient information was lacking on the accuracy of these facts. Consequently, the German reply of June 28th was limited to establishing that the scuttling of the ships had been executed by Admiral von Reuter and by his subordinates unknown to all German civilian and military authorities. In its subsequent note of September 3rd, the German Government also abstained from judging the incident from a juridical point of view; this note, in fact, aimed to obtain the liberation of the crews of the ships held as prisoners of war. Now, the Allied and Associated Governments, again referring to Articles 23 and 31 of the Armistice Convention, in reality, pretend to obtain a reparation for the damage, which is supposed to have been caused by the scuttling; they require that Germany comply with demands of an extraordinary importance. On account of these conditions, it is necessary to make the following remarks: with regard to Article 31 of the Armistice Convention, the German Government thinks that this provision, which forbids the destruction of ships or material before the evacuation, delivery or restoration, does not cover the case considered. The note of November 1st discovers in Article 23 of the Armistice Convention the obligation for Germany to maintain, in good condition, the ships conducted to the Allied ports, on the ground that these ships were destined to be subsequently surrendered. This interpretation of Article 23 cannot be admitted. The Armistice Convention contains no provision concerning the fate of the ships. The fact that the latter were preferably (or originally, in *German: in erster Linie*) to be held in neutral ports and that the German crews were to remain on board, rather proves that the fate of the ships was not intended to be regulated by the Armistice Convention. From the German point of view, the internment should not be considered as the preliminary of a definite surrender. The First Lord of the British Admiralty himself, Long, several times distinguished very plainly between internment and surrender, according to the meaning of this word in the Armistice Convention. Consequently, the German Government had fulfilled the obligations resulting from Article 23, since it had sent its ships to the Firth of Forth within a period of seven days. Thus, the aim of Article 22, which was to render impossible the resumption of hostilities by the German Navy during the Armistice, was attained.

Therefore, in the opinion of the German Government, the question of the interpretation of Article 3123 [*sic*] of the Armistice Convention, as well as the questions as to whether the scuttling of the ships is in contradiction with any stipulation of the Armistice Convention, does not need to be discussed. Similarly, the German Government is of the opinion that the point is not whether the scuttling caused a damage, or not, to the Allied and Associated Powers. The decisive element in the appreciation of this incident is the fact that the scuttling of the ships must not be put down to the attitude of the German Government but to the attitude of the Allied and Associated Governments. In fact, in contradiction with the provisions of Article 23 of the Armistice Convention, the Allied and Associated Governments interned the German battleships not in a neutral port but in an enemy port. According to the inquiries made on the German side, they did not even try to intern the said ships in the neutral ports which were qualified to be chosen, in particular in Dutch or Scandinavian ports. During the negotiations for the prolongation of the Armistice, at Trèves, on January 15, the Germans already protested against this fact. This protest, although several times repeated, remained without an answer. But, as the internment took place in a British Port, the Allied and Associated Governments should have at least organized it in such a way as to correspond to the internment in a neutral port. Instead of that, the crews, in spite

of reiterated protests, were treated like prisoners of war. Wireless relations with their country were forbidden them; they were even forbidden to use, although they requested it, their wireless receiver, in order to listen to the radiograms of the press; they only received mail once a week. Censure was so strict that three weeks, at least, elapsed before news could reach them. At the time of the scuttling, the last mail steamer had arrived a week previous; the mail B 98 only arrived [after the scuttling]. Now, the interruption of relations between the crews and their country resulted in that, in those unfortunate days, Admiral von Reuter was led to suppose that the Armistice expired on June 21st at 12.00. The details of the facts were already set forth in the German note of September 3rd, according to authentic declarations of the Admiral which reached Germany on that date. According to the terms of these declarations, the supposition made by the Admiral was caused by the news published by the English papers, to which he had recourse for his information. A copy will be found in the Annex of the news published in the Times of June 16th and 17th<sup>13</sup>; the first of these advices reached Admiral von Reuter the day before the scuttling, the second reached him on the day of the scuttling itself. It appears from these facts that the Admiral did not know that the remittance of the ultimatum of the Allied and Associated Powers had been delayed from June 16th, 12.00 o'clock, to June 16th, 7.00 p.m. Therefore, it is established that Admiral von Reuter, during the stay of his ships at Scapa Flow, was beyond the jurisdiction of the German Government; for this reason, any responsibility of the German Government for the actions of the Admiral is, at first sight, out of the question. The responsibility of the State for the action of its agents implies, in fact, that the said agents obey the orders of the State. The Fatherland is not responsible for the orders given by a military chief, prisoner of war, neither towards the State in which he is residing, nor towards any third person. On the other hand, it is ascertained that the treatment inflicted upon the Admiral by the British authorities and, particularly, the interruption of the communications between him and the Fatherland (as circumstances which ought to be considered as the real cause of the scuttling) were contrary to the stipulations of the Armistice Convention. A State is not qualified to ask another State for a reparation for a damage due to the violation of a Treaty by the applicant State, and which the other State was not in the position to prevent, for the very reason that the Treaty had been violated.

Therefore, as such an agreement would not be justified, the German Government is obliged to refuse to agree in any way to execute obligations which might be imposed on it on account of the scuttling of the German battleships. However, in case the Allied and Associated Governments should not admit this point of view, and in order not to delay by a debate of this kind the going into force of the Treaty, which it also earnestly desires, the German Government proposes to submit this affair to the permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. The Court of Arbitration should decide first, whether the German Government is responsible for the scuttling of the ships; in case this question should be affirmatively settled, the Court of Arbitration would have to appraise the damage which resulted to the Allied and Associated Powers from the scuttling itself, and to say how Germany can repair it.

<sup>13</sup> Not included in original of this appendix.

APPENDIX H TO No. 33

PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION.

No. 54.

PARIS, *November 27, 1919.*

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: President Clemenceau.

Replying to your note dated November 15, which reached me on November 21, relative to the repatriation of the German war prisoners in France, I have the honour, by order of my Government, to communicate the following to your Excellency:

(1st) The French Government affirms that it has never promised anything further than the execution of the clauses of the Peace Treaty.

Doubtless the French Government has forgotten the official declaration which was published by the Havas Agency on August 29, 1919. That declaration was drawn up as follows:<sup>14</sup>

'With a view to diminishing the sufferings, caused by the war, as rapidly as possible, the Allied and Associated Powers have decided to ignore the ratification date of the Peace Treaty with Germany when treating the repatriation of German prisoners.

'The repatriation operations will commence immediately, and will be conducted under the auspices of an Interallied Commission, to which will be added a German representative upon the entry into force of the Treaty. The Allied and Associated Powers desire it to be fully understood that the continuation of this policy of favour, offering such great advantages to the German soldiers, will depend upon the accomplishment, by the German Government and the German people, of all the obligations incumbent upon them.'

[?(2nd)] The French Government does not affirm that this promise was withdrawn because the German Government and the German people have not accomplished the obligations incumbent upon them. Such a withdrawal should at least have been communicated to the German Government.

The French Government simply denies having made any promise whatever. This contradictory attitude is the more incomprehensible in that the statement of August 29 was not a spontaneous concession made from reasons of humanity, but more the counterpart of concessions to which the French Government had influenced the German Government by promising a favourable attitude in treating the question of the prisoners of war.

The questions at issue at that time were, on one hand, the delivery of coal, and on the other, the case of Sgt. Mannheim:<sup>15</sup>

(1st) At the time of the Paris negotiations concerning the deliveries of coal to France, a statement was made to the German representative on August 22, intimating that Germany could not expect the fulfilment of her desires in the question of war prisoners except upon the commencement of coal deliveries: on the contrary, as soon as deliveries of coal would have been commenced the Entente would accord a generous treatment of the question;

(2nd) Relative to the case of Sgt. Mannheim, the German Government had refused to pay the fine of about a million francs imposed upon the city of Berlin

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Vol. I, No. 45, minute 2.

<sup>15</sup> On July 11, 1919, Sgt. Mannheim of the French Army had been attacked and killed in the streets of Berlin. The French Government demanded exemplary reparation for this incident.

under threat of military penalties. From an authorized French source the German Government was informed that the question might be settled in a friendly manner: in that case, Marshal Foch would use his influence to effect as prompt a repatriation as possible of the German war prisoners.

At Paris, as well, the Mannheim case was at the same time treated in conjunction with the war prisoners question. When, on August 26th, the German representative, after having promised an immediate commencement of coal deliveries, expressed a desire to base the early repatriation of the war prisoners upon the promise which had been made during negotiations, satisfactory assurances were given him, and it was added that the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, would write to him on this matter within a short time. But, at the same time, the French representative requested an intervention for the payment of the fine of a million francs imposed concerning the Mannheim case, stating that the settlement of that matter was an important item with the President of the Council.

At that time it was agreed in Berlin to place one million francs at the disposal of the French Government for the Red Cross, in order that, within one week after the payment of this sum, the Commission, provided for by Article 215 of the Peace Treaty to regulate the repatriation of war prisoners, might convene, and that proper announcement might be made by the Havas Agency.

As the installation of the Commission progressed slowly, and as the German representatives in Paris insisted upon the keeping of the promise, he [*sic*] was informed, on September 28, that the war prisoner question had been regulated: henceforth transportations destined for Germany were to continue without interruption. In the first place, all the prisoners detained in England would be repatriated, then those in America, and lastly those who were detained in France. In the opinion of the President of the Council, M. Clemenceau, the Franco-German negotiations concerning these transportations were useless.

The French Government, therefore, cannot deny that Germany, several months ago, by agreeing to important sacrifices, obtained a formal promise that the repatriation of the war prisoners would not be delayed until a time fixed by the Peace Treaty, and that, on the contrary, this repatriation would begin without delay.

In the Government's note dated November 15th, not only is the obligation of the French Government to repatriate the war prisoners without delay contested, but the note exposes in detail the reasons for which the French Government is not inclined to willingly commence this repatriation before the entry into force of the Treaty.

This exposé contains a list of all the grievances that the French Government formulates against the German Government, and it is on these prisoners of war that the French Government causes these grievances to fall. In contradiction with the principles of generosity and humanity continually affirmed by the French Government, it is the innocent who are forced to pay for the pretended discrepancies of the German Government; as it is the innocent who are retained as hostages in order that the desire of the French Government may receive satisfaction.

Such a policy should be the more severely condemned in that the information claiming that the German prisoners in France are well treated from both a material and moral point of view is unfortunately far from the truth. As in the past, they are submitted to the laws of war, applied with a pitiless severity. In many respects their clothing and nourishment are insufficient for the cold season, and the war prisoners are, in majority, still cut off from all communication with the mother country.

On account of the situation so clearly established by the promise of the French

Government, it appears superfluous to insist further concerning that part of the note. However, in order to dissipate any false impression, the German Government considers it proper to proffer the following remarks:

(1st) The German Government did not refuse, as the note inclines to establish, to comply with the consequences involving from the fact that it affixed its signature to the Peace Treaty, which provides for the delivery of persons accused of having violated the laws of war. Fully recognizing the obligation resulting from the Treaty, the German Government called attention rather to the difficulties which oppose the execution of these clauses and, without submitting a formal proposal, requested the Allied and Associated Governments to study on their side how it would be possible to reach, by some other means, the end which they are pursuing.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the German Government made this effort before the note of the Allied and Associated Governments of the month of November had been received by it.

(2nd) The note asks what the inhabitants of the devastated regions might think if the prisoners of war who are employed in the much needed cleaning up operations cease their labours before the period fixed by the Peace Treaty and are authorized to leave France.

The German Government does not believe that it can reply to that question in the sense intimated by the note. On the contrary, it is convinced that the French population has a great deal of sympathy for the war prisoners and, despite their own sufferings, would prefer to see the prisoners recover their liberty, rather than see them atone for acts for which they are in no wise responsible by performing the labour of slaves.

(3rd) From an authorized French source, it has been solemnly affirmed several times since July 11 that the question of war prisoners was not to be confounded with the question of restoring the devastated regions. If no definite agreement has yet been reached upon the employment of German civil manual labour, the German Government is not responsible for it. Upon the signing of the Peace Treaty, the German Government declared itself ready to furnish German manual labour for reconstruction operations, and in the course of the negotiations which were carried on on this subject it made careful proposals concerning the employment of this manual labour. At the same time, in the interior of Germany the preparations which had commenced before the signing of the Treaty regarding the sending of this manual labour were pushed with the greatest celerity. The French Government was fully aware of all this. The German Government regrets that, despite its repeated requests, it has not yet been possible to have the French Government make a definite statement concerning the German proposals, and to designate the sectors in which the reconstruction operations are to be accomplished by German workmen.

(4th) It is impossible to understand the reproach made toward the German Government pretending that it refused to take the necessary temporary measures to facilitate the execution of the Peace Conditions in Schleswig and Upper Silesia. The preparations for executing the stipulations of the Treaty in the Schleswig plebiscite zone were fully facilitated by the German Government. Studied negotiations took place between the Government and the International Commission, which, during the plebiscite, is to take over the administration of the territory. In the course of these negotiations an agreement was reached on all essential points. Representatives of the Commission are already functioning, with the approval of the German Government, in the plebiscite zone.

<sup>16</sup> See Vol. I, No. 25, appendix A.

Concerning Upper Silesia, the German Government declares itself ready to comply with the desire expressed by the Allied and Associated Governments relative to the despatch of a Military Inquiry Commission. It is also well known that, according to the observations made by that Commission, the responsibility for the troubles which occurred in the month of August and, consequently, the responsibility for the sufferings endured by the population as a result, are in no wise incumbent on the German Government.

(5th) The German Government rejects the accusation of having systematically delayed the execution of the clauses of the Armistice Convention. Germany has done everything in her power to fulfil the extremely heavy obligations imposed by that Convention. The German Government, furthermore, has no intention of discussing the numerous violations of Armistice, the numerous and serious abuses, as well as the excesses by which its adversaries violated the said convention, at this time. The Government knows that at this time its voice would be unheeded. A time will come, more equitable, when it will be known which of the two parties has the greatest right to raise complaint.

(6th) Concerning the scuttling of the warships at Scapa Flow, that question will be treated in detail in another document.

The question of the evacuation of the Baltic provinces is, furthermore, not open to discussion at this time since it has been submitted to examination by an Inter-allied Commission presided over by General Neissel, the results of which examination are being awaited.

(7th) Concerning the reproach addressed to Germany in the note 'of having retained an equivocal article in the Constitution up to the present time,' a question which was settled long ago, and concerning which the German Government complied with all the claims of the Allied and Associated Governments, is again presented.

(8th) Finally, the note affirms that the German Government pursues a tireless propaganda, backed by important resources, against the Allies throughout the entire world.

The German Government can only express its astonishment that such absurd falsehoods find credence and are considered as worthy of chronicle in an official document. The German Government hopes that the Allied and Associated Governments will not allow their attention to be detracted by this from the question of war prisoners, which is becoming daily more serious and urgent, and concerning which Germany believes she is entitled to the sympathy of all civilized peoples.

Accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 33

##### *Note from Supreme Council to German Delegation*

PARIS, December 1, 1919.

To: Baron von Lersner.

On November 27th last, you addressed a letter to me relative to German prisoners of war, which contained a series of statements whose incisive tone cannot mask their inaccuracy.

In a general way, in the prisoner of war question, Germany had but one right formulated by the Peace Treaty which she has signed: repatriation to begin on the day of the coming into force of the Treaty following the definite exchange of

ratifications. Any modification of these stipulations, which are law for the parties, is a favour. The statement that the prisoners are innocent persons without responsibility in the war does not bear examination.

Your note states that the French Government has taken in the first place, on August 29th, 1919, and later, either on the delivery of coal by Germany or the payment of a million to the Red Cross as expiation for the assassination of Sergeant Mannheim at Berlin, definite obligations for the anticipated repatriation of German prisoners of war. This triple statement is absolutely without foundation. The French Government has never assumed any obligation in the matter which was within the jurisdiction of all the Allies.

The declaration of August 29 which, for reasons of humanity and not as a counterpart of concessions made by the Germans, announced the decision of the Allies to anticipate the date of the coming into force of the Peace Treaty as regards the repatriation of prisoners, is posterior to conversations relative to coal and Sergeant Mannheim. This declaration is not made between the French Government and the German Government under the form of a promise resulting from a negotiation. It is a humanitarian declaration by all the Allies relative to all German prisoners captured by them. The declaration reads: 1st:—the immediate commencement of repatriation; 2nd:—the possible interruption of this benevolent policy in case the German Government and people did not fulfil all the obligations incumbent upon them by the Armistice, which binds them until the definite ratification of the Treaty.

In conformity with this unilateral decision of the Allies, repatriation immediately began and continued for several months by the return of German prisoners from England, America and Belgium.

Again in conformity with the declaration of August 29th, the repatriation of prisoners has been suspended because of violations, non-execution and incomplete execution of the Armistice clauses by the German Government.

The promise and the threat, freely made by the ensemble of the Allies, has thus strictly been executed. In the note of November 1, the German Government was advised of its non-execution of obligations assumed by the Armistice of November 11, 1918, one year previously. It was advised of the measures and penalties provided for assuring the integral execution of the Armistice clauses not renewed in the Peace Treaty.

The French Government follows no policy based on the non-repatriation of prisoners of war, and does not make use of it as a means of pressure. It adheres to the Articles of the Treaty and if the benevolent measure inaugurated August last has not been followed to the end, it is solely because of the non-execution by the German Government of its own obligations.

The responsibility of Germany for the delay in the return of German prisoners is directly engaged in the most precise manner by the fact that she has not yet replied to the note of the Allies under date of November 1, and that after having sent her Commissioners to Paris to arrange for the functioning of Commissions on the Execution of the Treaty, she sent them back to Berlin two days after their arrival, although the date and the conditions for the examination of questions asked had been fixed in accord with her delegates.

It is the German Government which is seeking to make use of the prisoner of war question to excite German public opinion against the Allies, and especially against France; the proof may be seen in the fact that the Conference, determined that the ratification and the coming into force of the Peace Treaty should take place on

December 1st, fixing thereby the date for the early return of the prisoners; instead of agreeing to the last negotiations under consideration, the German Government has taken a dilatory attitude and begun a discussion in an unjustifiable tone relative to the repatriation of prisoners, whose return at the end of last month, that is to say, a few days later depended on itself. The dilatory character of such a proceeding and the delay in the ratification, caused by Germany, makes her entirely responsible for the upkeep of her prisoners in France where, moreover, they have been treated not only in a humane way, but also with kindness.

Without going into detailed explanation outlined relative to Schleswig and Upper Silesia, or in the matter of the Baltic Provinces (where Germany decided to partially fulfil her obligations only when constrained and forced to do so., or Article 61 of the Constitution, which has not been suppressed up to the present time (the German Government always delaying till the last moment, and until morally and physically constrained to execute her obligations), I will only consider the discussion concerning the handing over of the accused.

The Germans themselves do not deny that numerous crimes have been committed and that universal morality would be seriously injured if these crimes, whose authors are known, should remain unpunished. Any human being going through the northern regions of France, as well as into Belgium, and who sees with his own eyes these provinces systematically ravaged, with all industrial establishments levelled to the ground, dwellings reduced to dust by savage methods, all the fruit trees sawed within a meter of the ground, mines blown up and filled with water, human work of entire centuries spitefully annihilated, cannot understand Germany's hesitation to consent to the reparation for her crimes. If the same impartial observer then heard from the mouths of the inhabitants the tale of the treatment to which they had been subjected for four years, the violences and the abominable constraints imposed on young girls, brutally separated from their families, he would be unable to restrain his indignation in face of the attitude of Germany and the arrogant tone of your letters.

As to the Allies, they are profoundly surprised to see that German public opinion, even at the present time, is so unconscious of its responsibilities as not to ask, itself, for the just punishment of crimes committed, and that among the criminals there seem to be neither sufficient courage, nor patriotism, to come forward for trial as they have deserved, to defend their conduct, and to facilitate, for their country, the fulfilment of its obligations. Until the German conscience understands, like that of the whole world, that wrong must be righted, and criminals punished, Germany must not expect to enter the communion of Nations, nor obtain from the Allies forgetfulness of her crimes or attenuation of just peace conditions.

#### APPENDIX J TO No. 33

PARIS, *November 17, 1919.*

No. 3—1103.

From: General Tcherbatcheff, Military Representative of the Supreme Chief of Russia, with the Allied Government and High Command.

To: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

I have the honour to call your attention to the fact that the Russian Armies, which are fighting against the Bolchevists, are almost deprived of cartridges (*cartouches de 3 lignes*) for the Russian rifles.

All the stocks of Russian cartridges which were possessed by the Russian Armies

and the Entente are already exhausted. Nevertheless, two big stocks of those cartridges still exist, one in Roumania, of which I had the honour to inform you by letter on November 15th, No. 11570,<sup>17</sup> and another in Germany.

According to the information of the Russian Delegation on matters pertaining to prisoners of war in Berlin, there are in Germany about 150,000,000 Russian cartridges. This number is not exaggerated.

However, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs affirms, according to the communiqué of the Russian Delegation, that the German Government does not possess any Russian cartridges.

It may be inferred therefrom that the Government sold those cartridges to private individuals. The latter have two alternatives; either to clandestinely pass those cartridges to the Bolchevists, which they have certainly been doing, or to sell them directly to the anti-Bolchevist Armies, which is not in accord with the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, according to which the war material is to be gratuitously restored to the Russian Government.

Owing to the bad faith of the German authorities, no blockade is capable of stopping the sale of cartridges to the Bolchevists. On the other hand, it would be very difficult to force the German Government to restore these cartridges to Russia. In any case, even if it were possible to discover the stocks of the latter, the search would be so long that the individuals interested would have time to pass the cartridges to the Bolchevists.

I think that the only means of receiving the cartridges in the shortest time possible is to authorize the Russian authorities to start negotiations with all the persons who possessed them, for the purchase of cartridges, and, then, to charge this purchase expense to the account of the German Government, if this is not contrary to the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

On account of the great necessity for the Russian Armies to have these cartridges, in order to energetically continue the fight against the Bolchevists, I beg you to kindly give the necessary orders so that the possibility of resuming possession of those cartridges be studied as soon as possible, apart from the general question of the delivery of Russian war material.

I am sending in the same mail a letter on the same subject to the President of Council, Minister of War.

I earnestly beg you to kindly inform me of the decision made.

GENERAL TCHERBATCHEFF.

#### APPENDIX L TO NO. 33

NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE, *November 26, 1919.*

ROYAL MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR MONTENEGRO

No. 1086.

From: F[J]. S. Plamenatz<sup>8</sup>

To: President Clemenceau.

It is in vain that the Royal Government of Montenegro referred up to the present time to Montenegro's incontestable rights in her demands to be represented at the Peace Conference. The latter has disregarded all these justified claims. It has persistently refused to take into account the fact that Montenegro voluntarily entered the war and that according to the very avowals of the Serbian Government

<sup>17</sup> Cf. General Tcherbatcheff's note No. 11571 in appendix G to No. 30.

which is hostile to Montenegro ('Military efforts of the Serbs-Croats-Slovenes during the war of 1914-1918', p. 16), Montenegro has lost 20,000 soldiers killed and a third of her population. The Peace Treaties with Germany and Austria have been signed without the presence of Montenegro although she has been at war with them from the very first day. Within a few days will be signed the Peace Treaty with the third Enemy State, Bulgaria, and again without the participation of Montenegro.

Such an attitude by the Peace Conference might lead us to suppose—which the Royal Government of Montenegro refuses to believe—an aid designed to favour Serbia in the perpetration of her crime against Montenegro, a crime surpassing in horror that committed by William II against Belgium in 1914. The attitude adopted by the Conference is not only contrary to the solemn obligations taken by the Governments of the Great Powers in respect of Montenegro, but is also contrary to the decision of the Supreme Council, a decision which, moreover, is unjust and disadvantageous for Montenegro.

On behalf of the Royal Government, I have the honour to renew my protest against the injustice of the Peace Conference with regard to Montenegro, and I beg it to respect their rights and to convoke our Delegate as soon as possible with a view to the subsequent signing of the Peace Treaties with Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that should the contrary be the case, that if within a short time no reply to our justified request reaches us from the Peace Conference the Royal Government of Montenegro will do what duty and right impose upon it, and what any other Government would long since have done. It will address the Governments of Germany, Austria and Bulgaria with a request to conclude a peace treaty, Montenegro not caring to remain in a state of war with these countries.

The responsibility for these steps will not rest upon Montenegro, but upon the Peace Conference.

At the same time, I have the honour to call your Excellency's attention to the fact that the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Neuilly do not prohibit the Governments of Germany, Austria and Bulgaria to conclude a peace Treaty with Montenegro.

Please accept, etc.

F[J]. S. PLAMENATZ.

### No. 34

H.D. 104.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, December 2, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*U.S.A.*: Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Mr. E. L. Dresel, Dr. James Brown Scott, Colonel Logan, Mr. A. W. Dulles, Lieut.-Commander Kochler, U.S.N.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Captain Fuller, R.N., Commander Macnamara, Mr. H. W. Malkin, General Mance, Lieut.-Colonel Kisch, Colonel Beadon.

*France*: M. Leygues, M. Cambon, M. Laroche, Commandant Le Vavasseur, M. Fromageot.

*Italy*: General Cavallero, Rear-Admiral Grassi, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri, Commander Fea.

1. (The Council had before it an account of an interview which had taken place on December 1st, 1919, between M. Dutasta, Secretary General of the Conference, and Baron von Lersner. (See Appendix A).)

*Interview between  
M. Dutasta and  
Baron von Lersner*

M. DUTASTA said that the Council had before it a correct account of the conversation which had taken place the preceding day between Baron von Lersner and himself. M. Arnavon had been present at that meeting and had taken notes of the interview. At the close of Baron von Lersner's statements, he, M. Dutasta, had asked Baron von Lersner to read over the notes which had been approved by the German Delegate.

M. Dutasta wished to point out: first, that Baron von Lersner had referred to a conversation which had taken place between them on October 14th, 1919; his contention then was that the possible nonratification by the American Senate of the Treaty with Germany would lead to a new situation, and that a new agreement would have to be entered into between the Powers which had ratified the Treaty and Germany; he, Lersner, now maintained that M. Dutasta had accepted his contention: this was absolutely false. M. Dutasta had only taken good note of what Baron von Lersner had said on that day without binding himself in any way. He had always pointed out to Baron von Lersner that he, M. Dutasta, spoke only as an Inter-Allied representative and that he could not express any personal opinion which would commit him.

Secondly, Baron von Lersner had referred to a contradiction between the note of November 22nd<sup>1</sup> (last paragraph), which stipulated that the protocol of November 1st should be signed unconditionally by Germany, and a conversation which he and Herr von Simson had had with M. Berthelot and M. Dutasta, according to which they had understood that they were invited to hold negotiations, both verbal and in writing. He, M. Dutasta, wished to point out that they had never held that language.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that as von Lersner's declaration brought up several difficult and important questions, he thought it very advisable to adjourn the discussion to the next meeting.

(The discussion was adjourned until the following day).

<sup>1</sup> See No. 29, appendix C.

2. (The Council had before it a note of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, dated December 1st, 1919. (See Appendix B<sup>2</sup>).)

*Exploitation of  
the Pecs Mines*

M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the report. He added that he strongly advised the Council to submit that question to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, as the latter chiefly was concerned in solving the problem of coal distribution in Central Europe.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed, but wished to point out that the solution should be offered in a very short time so as to be included in the Hungarian Treaty.

MR. POLK asked M. Laroche whether the proposition as made in his report provided for the evacuation of the Pecs district by the Serbs.

M. LAROCHE said that that was understood.

It was decided: to refer back the question for immediate examination and report to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, recommending the adoption of the following paragraph to be inserted in the Hungarian Treaty: 'Hungary shall furthermore give to the Allied and Associated Powers an option, as reparation in part for the annual delivery during the five years which follow the coming into force of the Treaty, of a quantity of steam coal from the Pecs mines, which shall be fixed periodically by the Reparation Commission, and which the latter will dispose of in favour of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State under conditions determined by the Commission.'

3. (The Council had before it a draft reply to the German note of November 27, 1919 on Scapa Flow.<sup>3</sup> (See Appendix C).)

*Answer to the German  
note of November 27th  
on Scapa Flow*

SIR EYRE CROWE thought it would be inadvisable to separate the question of Scapa Flow from the question of the general German attitude, which would be dealt with on the following day. He wished to add that he considered the draft reply a very satisfactory document.

MR. POLK said he would be ready to discuss the question at the next meeting.

(It was agreed to adjourn the discussion until the following meeting.)

4. (The Council had before it a draft article concerning Fiume, to be inserted in the Hungarian Treaty. (See Appendix D).)

*Report of the Drafting  
Committee on the Hun-  
garian Treaty*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the draft article. He added that the Council should decide whether the second paragraph should be drafted as in the first alternative or the second.

M. SCIALOJA stated he agreed on the first part of the draft: that was a formula which had already been used in the Treaty with Austria. He thought

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This note observed that 'it is impossible to separate this question from the general question of the situation in Central Europe relative to the coal supply', and proposed the measure adopted by the Supreme Council, as recorded below.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 33, appendix G.

it was useless to draft the second paragraph according to the second alternative, for that would entail great difficulties for the future. He felt that Hungary should obligate itself to recognize the Council's decisions and should not have any kind of supervision thereon. If the second alternative were accepted, Hungary could object that because of disagreement between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State it could not recognize the solution. A distinction was being made between Italy and the Principal Powers. Why should this be so? There was no reason why Italy should be distinguished from the other Principal Powers and put on a standing with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. If that draft were accepted, it would mean adding another difficulty to those which were already involved in the Fiume question.

MR. POLK said that a reply could be made to one of M. Scialoja's objections by deleting the word 'Italy', and the sentence should read: 'The Principal Allied and Associated Powers in agreement with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. . . .'

M. SCIALOJA said he wished to point out that the second alternative would create a departure from the system which had prevailed until then; this was a Treaty with Hungary and not a Treaty with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. It would simply mean a complication of the question which seemed quite useless.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it advisable not to mention either Italy or Jugo-Slavia in the paragraph. He could not be accused of partiality against the Jugo-Slavs, but he felt that he could not let Jugo-Slavia have a control over decisions which the Conference took as a sovereign body. It would be sufficient in the second alternative, if the Jugo-Slavs were to refuse to accept the decision of the Conference, for the whole question to be reopened once more by Hungary.

M. SCIALOJA pointed out the analogy with the Dalmatian question. It had been stated in the Austrian Treaty that Austria accepted the decisions of the Conference regarding Dalmatia. Why should Hungary be treated differently?

SIR EYRE CROWE said his views were entirely covered by the precedents adopted by the Conference. In many other cases a cession of territory and abandonment of sovereignty rights had been decided upon, but a stipulation such as the one proposed in the second alternative had never been, and could not now be made.

MR. POLK thought it might be a little difficult to settle that question according to precedents alone. This was the first case where a party was a claimant and also a judge; Italy, he thought, would be both in this case.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that was not absolutely accurate.

M. SCIALOJA said that Italy had already held that position in the Trentino question.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the Dalmatian question could be cited as analogous with the case under discussion.

MR. POLK said that was the type of question which might provoke war and he did not think they were doing justice to the Serbs.

M. SCIALOJA thought the risk of war would be greater if six Powers instead of five had to agree.

MR. POLK stated the United States had always felt that Jugo-Slavia should be consulted on the questions which involved the security of peace in Central Europe: he did not wish to obstruct the Treaty but wanted only to put on record his reservation on the subject.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Mr. Polk on his declaration that the Jugo-Slavs should be consulted, but it was precisely for that reason that the question of an agreement with Jugo-Slavia should not be mentioned in a Treaty with Hungary.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that he himself had not wished to have it understood that the Jugo-Slavs were not to be consulted. He thought the Serbs should be heard in the same way as the Poles.

MR. POLK repeated that in this case two litigants were at swords' point on the question, in which one sat as judge and party at the same time, and the other one outside, but he did not wish to insist.

It was decided:

to insert the following article in the Hungarian Treaty. (Part III. Political Clauses, Section 5—Fiume):

'Hungary renounces all rights and title on Fiume and the adjacent territories belonging to the former Kingdom of Hungary, [a]n[d] included within the boundaries which shall be fixed at a later date.

'Hungary agrees to recognize the stipulations concerning those territories, especially on the nationality of the inhabitants, which shall be included in the Treaties intended to settle the present questions.'

5.

[Not printed]<sup>4</sup>

*Appointment of a Committee to distribute the rolling-stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy*

6.

[Not printed]<sup>5</sup>

*Report of the Drafting Committee regarding claims of inheriting States for rolling-stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy*

<sup>4</sup> At the request of Signor Scialoja the discussion of this subject was adjourned until the following meeting: see No. 35, note 3.

<sup>5</sup> After a short discussion the Supreme Council approved a report by the Drafting Committee concerning claims to this rolling-stock advanced by Yugoslavia, Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (appendix F in original). The main conclusion of this report was that 'the inventory provided for by Article 318 [of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye] should be established under the date of the Armistice, and should not comprise material the fate of which was already regulated at that date, either as a result of legally valid war actions, or as a result of the Armistice itself'.

7. (The Council had before it a proposed declaration submitted by the Drafting Committee. (See Appendix G<sup>6</sup>).)

*Approval of declaration  
submitted by the Draft-  
ing Committee relating to  
the provisional Eastern  
frontiers of Poland*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the proposed declaration. He added that taking into account the objection which had been raised at the preceding meeting he had prepared a document which took the form of a simple declaration to be signed by the President of the Conference.

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to approve the declaration as submitted by the Drafting Committee relating to the provisional Eastern frontiers of Poland. (See Appendix G<sup>6</sup>.)

8. M. FROMAGEOT stated that the rights of Poland on the former German and Russian territories had been recognized; Eastern Galicia was about to have a special status, but no disposition had been made of the southwestern part of Poland (Western Galicia) and the boundaries between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia had not yet been determined. It should, therefore, be necessary to recognize the sovereignty of Poland in Western Galicia on the one hand, and on the other, the rights of Czecho-Slovakia on the territories which belonged to it should be recognized. He recommended that a Treaty be drafted, which would transfer the rights and title on the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Government belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers by virtue of the Peace Treaties, to both Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Furthermore, the sovereignty rights of Poland on the territories bordering Czecho-Slovakia should be recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand, and by Czecho-Slovakia on the other. Lastly, the sovereignty rights of Czecho-Slovakia on the territories which were attributed to it should be recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers, and it was also of great importance that the boundaries of Czecho-Slovakia should be determined by a single document, which had not yet been done. He summed up by suggesting to the Council that a draft Treaty be prepared which would solve only questions of sovereignty rights as well as determine the frontiers.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council would charge the Drafting Committee with the preparation of such a Treaty.

It was decided:

that the Drafting Committee should prepare a draft Treaty which would:

- (1) attribute Western Galicia to Poland, and fix its boundaries;
- (2) determine the frontiers of the Czecho-Slovak State, recognizing the sovereignty of that State over the territories comprised within said boundaries.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained the previously discussed draft protocol (see No. 32, minute 5 and appendix E) recast in the form of a declaration. The French text of this declaration, dated December 8, 1919, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers* (1919), vol. cxii, pp. 971-2.

9. (The Council had before it the French proposal concerning Enemy Submarines. (See Appendix B to H.D. 102<sup>7</sup>.)  
*Distribution of* M. LEYGUES said that on November 29th, 1919 the Council  
*Enemy Submarines* had adopted the principle of the French proposal. He asked the Council to vote upon the same.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the American Delegation had made certain reservations on the second paragraph of the proposal.

MR. POLK said he had no objection to offer with regard to the first and third paragraphs. As for the second paragraph, he could not accept the proportion given therein, but he expected to receive instructions from his Government at any time. He had proposed to his Government that it would be better to accept nothing on account of the unfair ratio attributed to the United States.

M. MATSUI said that his instructions allowed him to accept paragraphs 1 and 3 of the French proposal. He wished however to make a reservation on paragraph 2: a certain number of submarines had already been distributed between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, i.e., 43 submarines; Japan had received seven, which Japanese crews had taken from England to Japan at a great cost, and the Japanese Government envisaged great material difficulty in bringing those submarines back to Europe. He proposed that the submarines which had been attributed for propaganda purposes should definitely belong to the Power to which they had been attributed: it being understood that those submarines should be broken up and the material taken therefrom should belong to the Power to which attribution had been made. He added that the same principle had been adopted for surface vessels.

M. LEYGUES said he accepted the Japanese proposal.

SIR EYRE CROWE also accepted it, but wished to state that the breaking up of those submarines should be made under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Commission. He asked whether it would not be advisable to omit the sentence beginning with the words, 'percentage already established . . . etc.' of the second paragraph.

(This was agreed to.)

MR. POLK said he understood the Japanese reservation applied to all Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the American Delegation made its reservation on the whole of the second paragraph or only on the figures showing the percentage each Allied and Associated Power should receive.

MR. POLK said the American Delegation wished to reserve the whole paragraph.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that the time limit within which submarines should be destroyed had not been mentioned in the French proposal, and he suggested one year.

M. LEYGUES said he accepted that time limit.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the American decision would arrive before Mr. Polk's departure.<sup>8</sup>

MR. POLK said he was sorry he could not give a definite reply to Sir Eyre Crowe's question.

M. LEYGUES said the French Delegation had accepted the British declaration according to which the 10 submarines attributed to France as a special compensation should be selected from those which had not participated in the submarine warfare. It had done this, provided that 10 such submarines could be found available for delivery to France. If such were not available, he had understood that the French Government could take those submarines wherever they happened to be.

M. Leygues said that he had just received a telegram to the effect that two of the German docks at Hamburg had been sold to Holland and had already been removed to that country. He wished to bring the attention of the Council to the dangerous situation in which the Allies would find themselves if they were to find German ports empty of all material.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that question should be referred to the naval experts for examination and report.

It was decided:

- (1) that all the submarines turned over by the enemy Powers, with the exception of the small number indicated in paragraph 4 below, should be demolished under the supervision of a Naval Inter-Allied Commission;
- (2) that the submarines already distributed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for propaganda purposes should not be made the subject of a further attribution, but that said attribution should be final. Those submarines should be demolished by said Powers under the supervision of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission;
- (3) that the principle and percentage of distribution of enemy submarines be provisionally reserved;
- (4) that France, for the reason that she is the only Power not having constructed submarines during the war, should receive ten German submarines in good condition, as compensation; the latter to be selected preferably amongst those which had not taken part in submarine warfare, wherever they stood;
- (5) that the period granted to each of the Allied and Associated Powers for the destruction of submarines to be broken up should be one year; (see Appendix B to H.D. 102).<sup>7</sup>

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, December 2, 1919.*

<sup>8</sup> Mr. Polk was preparing to return shortly from Paris to the United States. (Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. xi, p. 656f.)

*December 1, 1919.*

Mr. von Lersner, President of the German Delegation, requested to be received by the Secretary General of the Conference, to whom he made the following statements which have been collected almost textually:

'I am directed to inform you verbally of my Government's reply to the Supreme Council's note of November 22 and 24.<sup>9</sup>

'Should you desire a written reply, I could hand it to you later, but this reply is yet in Berlin and will require time.

'I must set forth that the President's doubts relative to our intentions as to the fulfilment of the Treaty are, in our opinion, absolutely deprived of all foundation. We reject the reproach made us of being responsible for the delay of the coming into force of the Treaty. We ratified on July 16, and we have since then awaited the coming into force, that is to say, the first protocol of exchange of ratifications. Since the day following your ratification, I have had full powers to sign the procès-verbal.

'It was not until November 2 that we were informed of the ratification by three of the Great Powers. Nevertheless, the Powers did not declare themselves ready for the coming into force of the Treaty as was provided at the end of the Versailles document. This coming into force was made subject to new conditions which were very severe and which refer to the Treaty itself. The German Government today, as before, is ready: it desires a prompt reestablishment of peace by the coming into force of the Treaty.

'A large number of stipulations of the Treaty provides [for] the participation of America. You recall, Mr. Ambassador, that on October 14 we were agreed that an accord would be concluded on this subject between the Ratifying Powers and Germany. We now consider that this accord should not limit itself only to the territorial questions of the East. We are quite willing to do our share, but as you know all Germany considers the participation of America as an important guarantee. We will give our assent to the coming into force despite the absence of America; but, for us, it will be a sacrifice, and, in compensation, we expect that you will favour our requests relative to the extradition of the guilty and prisoners of war.

'The German Government opposes a refusal to the demand contained in the Note of November 22<sup>1</sup> (last paragraph) stipulating that the protocol of November 1 must be signed unconditionally. This demand is in contradiction with your declarations and those of M. Berthelot made to M. von Simson and myself when you invited us to oral and written negotiations.

'I again wish to touch on the objections which we raised against the protocol. For us, the Baltic question has been settled. On questions of lesser importance, agreement will be easy (on rolling stock, for instance); but what we absolutely refuse is: (1st) the demands presented as compensation for the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow; (2nd) the eventual military measures provided for in the last paragraph. For us, they are unacceptable.

'We trust with confidence that you will adopt our viewpoint.

'We ask that a provision be inserted in the protocol stipulating that the repatriation of prisoners of war will not be allowed to be subjected to any condition whatsoever, unless to that provided for in Article 221 (return of French prisoners of war retained in Germany).

<sup>9</sup> See No. 29, appendices C and D.

'As regards the promises which we declare were made us relative to the repatriation of our prisoners of war, the German Government reserves the right to reply later.'

Upon leaving, M. von Lersner stated that the German Government had approved the departure of M. von Simson.

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 34

### Scapa Flow Affair

*Proposed answer to the German Note of November 27, 1919<sup>3</sup>*

*December 2, 1919.*

To: Baron von Lersner.

On November 27th last, you were kind enough to forward me a memorandum in which the German Government rejected the reparations demanded by the Allied and Associated Powers in their note of November 1 for the destruction on June 22, 1919, of the German fleet anchored at Scapa Flow, and proposed to submit this affair to arbitration.

The German Government, to which the Allied and Associated point of view was communicated on June 28, 1919, and which, on June 28 and September 3, 1919, made it the subject of its communications, today claims that this destruction in no way constitutes a violation of Germany's obligation,—that the destroyed warships were not, at the time of their destruction, destined to be handed over to the Allies,—and more than that, that the destruction should be imputed to the Allied and Associated Powers themselves which, 'in contradiction with the provisions of Article 23 of the Armistice had interned the warships not in a neutral port, but in an enemy port.'

The Allied and Associated Powers can only see in the German memorandum an attempt, difficult to explain, to voluntarily delay the coming into force of the treaty and the definite re-establishment of peace.

In its note of September 3 last, addressed to the Allied and Associated Governments, after having noted the authentic statements of the Admiral commanding the destroyed German fleet, the German Government, far from disregarding the obligations incumbent upon it, in this respect toward the Allies, had, on the contrary, set forth that the Admiral had in no way had 'the intention of violating the obligations that the German Government had assumed'.

The German Government itself also recognized that in destroying the German fleet the Admiral commanding had acted according to a general order; it added that the Admiral was aware that the German proposals themselves concerning the peace conditions provided that the fleet be credited to reparations.

It is precisely the destruction according to the orders of the German Government of what Germany thus should have handed over to the Allied and Associated Powers which, whatsoever the personal responsibility of Admiral von Reuter and his subordinates, constitutes a violation of the Armistice as well as an act tending to annul obligations already agreed to and on the point of being definitely signed.

Finally, it is hardly necessary to recall that the choice of roads at Scapa Flow for lack of proper neutral port is, in every way, in conformity with the letter as well as the spirit of the text of Article 23 of the Armistice.

Under these conditions, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers consider that the German Government cannot repudiate today the responsibility in-

cumbent upon it or seek, through arbitration, a solution for acts of war the settlement of which belongs to the said Powers.

Consequently, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers invite the German Government, in conformity with their note of November 1 last, to sign without further delay the protocol, thereby allowing the exchange of ratifications and the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, and thus by the return to normal life appease the sufferings of the people.

Please accept, etc.

APPENDIX D TO NO. 34  
HUNGARIAN TREATY  
PART III. POLITICAL CLAUSES

Section V. *Fiume*. Article 53 (Proposed)

Hungary renounces all rights and titles over Fiume and adjacent territories, belonging to the former Kingdom of Hungary and comprised in the boundaries which will be fixed later.

*1st alternative*: Hungary agrees to recognize the stipulations which are to be drawn up relative to these territories, notably concerning the nationality of the inhabitants, in the Treaties destined to regulate the present affairs.

*2nd alternative*: Hungary agrees to recognize the stipulations elaborated by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in conjunction with Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State relative to these territories, notably concerning the nationality of the inhabitants.

No. 35

H.D. 105.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, December 3, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Mr. E. L. Dresel, Rear-Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Colonel J. A. Logan, Lieut.-Commander Koehler, U.S.N., Mr. A. W. Dulles.

*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, General Mance, Captain Fuller, R.N., Mr. Palairot, Mr. A. Leeper.

*France*: General Le Rond, Commandant Le Vavasseur, M. Maucière, M. Kammerer.

*Italy*: General Cavallero, M. Vannutelli-Rey, Commandant Fea.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

*Personnel for the German  
Mine-Sweeping Service*

2. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated December 1, 1919, relative to German activities in Schleswig. *German Activities in Schleswig* (See Appendix B.))

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that, as was shown by the note before the Council, reports from Copenhagen indicated that the Germans were persisting in their schemes for getting around certain of the terms of the

<sup>1</sup> This item, the seventh on the agenda, was taken first since M. Clemenceau was unable to attend the meeting before eleven o'clock. After discussion the Supreme Council decided:

(i) 'To approve in principle the report of the naval experts relative to the personnel of the German Mine-Sweeping Service.' This report, dated November 25, 1919 (appendix A in original), referred to notes from the German Delegation, dated October 20 and November 4, 1919, requesting additional crews for this service in excess of the German naval establishment laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. The Allied Naval Advisers expressed the view that 'the Allied and Associated Powers have the right to require that the Mine Clearance Personnel should be included in the 15,000 officers and men of which the German Navy is, in the future, to consist. . . . It is considered that the number of men asked for by Germany is excessive. The following is a comparison of the British and German numbers employed:

	<i>Vessels</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Average per Vessel</i>
'British . . .	1,000	900	15,000	16
'German . . .	328	755	14,535	47'

After severally rebutting the principal reasons upon which Germany based her demand (*a.* the permitted naval strength of 15,000 was required to man remaining German warships; *b.* crews must be specialists; *c.* article 183 implies obligation to retain crews in commission; *d.* need of minesweeping personnel only temporary), the report concluded: 'During the winter months, minesweeping in the Baltic is largely impracticable. In consequence practically half the mine clearance personnel will not be employed, and opportunity can then be taken to make the necessary changes. In view however, of the importance to the general interests of commerce that the minesweeping should be completed as early as possible, and as its rapidity depends not only on the number of vessels, but also on the personnel, the following concession is proposed: "The German Navy may include, for a maximum period of eight months from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, in addition to the personnel prescribed in Article 183, a number of men who shall be exclusively employed in the mine-sweeping provided for in Article 193. This additional number of men shall at no time exceed 10,000 and shall be progressively reduced from time to time in such manner as the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control shall determine, so that at the end of the period of eight months above referred to, the personnel of the German Navy shall not exceed the figure stipulated in Article 183."'

(ii) 'Not to communicate that decision to Germany prior to a further discussion by the Council, which at that time should likewise determine whether that point should not be incorporated in the protocol to be signed by Germany.' In this connexion Sir E. Crowe had previously stated that he 'saw no objection to adopting the unanimous report of the naval experts, but he wished to observe that a concession was thereby being made to the Germans. . . . He felt that this was not a very opportune moment to let the Germans know that such a concession was being made. Consequently, he thought it might be well to adopt the report in principle but not to communicate the decision to the Germans before it was known what line of action should be taken with regard to their attitude.'

Treaty relating to the Schleswig plebiscite; thus it was that the German Colonel commanding the German troops in Schleswig had been given employment in that city and that troops under his command had been disguised as his employees. That was a barefaced subterfuge which could not be tolerated. However, he had not suggested any decision because he felt that nothing could be done until the coming into force of the Treaty. When the Treaty came into force it would be easy to send troops to Schleswig to drive out those disguised soldiers, but for the moment it seemed difficult to make any demand upon Germany on that point. He pointed out that the British report strongly urged that a third battalion be sent to the plebiscite zone. He had confined himself to bringing this request to the Council's attention.

M. CAMBON said that the Council took note of Sir Eyre Crowe's statements, as well as of the request made by Sir Charles Marling. After the Treaty came into force the Council could then decide what should be done.<sup>2</sup>

(This was agreed to.)

3. (Upon the request of M. Scialoja that question was adjourned.)

*Plans of the Turkish  
Government relative to  
the Reconstruction of  
Constantinople*

(At this point M. Clemenceau entered the meeting.)

4.

*Creation of a Provisional  
Commission to Organize  
the Circulation of Roll-  
ing-Stock in the States  
containing territories  
which were part of the  
former Austro-Hungarian  
Monarchy*

[Not printed]<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Sir C. Marling was H.M. Minister at Copenhagen and Chairman of the Schleswig Plebiscite Commission. (For a French text of the above minute see A. Tardieu and F. de Jessen, op. cit., p. 329.)

<sup>3</sup> M. Maucière outlined the antecedent circumstances in this matter (see No. 22, minute 5; No. 27, note 3 and appendix E; No. 29, note 5) and referred to 'a new note' from the British Delegation, dated December 1, 1919 (appendix E to No. 34 in original: not printed), which questioned the previous decision of the Supreme Council (No. 29, note 5). 'The British Delegation, in fact,' said M. Maucière, 'wished the proposed new Commission to be fully independent of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.' This committee 'had considered that note and had decided, with the exception of the British Delegate who maintained his point of view, that there was no reason to modify the draft decision of the Supreme Council'. In reply Sir E. Crowe stated that 'the British Delegation thought that under present conditions the intervention of the Reparation Commission was in no wise justified, and its information led it to believe that the proposed procedure would not be accepted by Poland, Czecho-Slovakia or any of the new Allied States which were in no way subject to that Commission. The Reparation Commission in fact was a body which had been created to act in the interests of the Allies against the enemy Powers. It, therefore, was not qualified to intervene in the relations between the Allied and Associated Powers and Allied States. Moreover there was in existence a Commission charged with the distribution of Austro-Hungarian rolling-stock. That Commission acted on principles entirely different

5. M. BERTHELOT informed the Council that M. Vesnitch had given him a letter from the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation showing that the Jugo-Slav Government had been prepared to sign the Austrian and Minorities Treaties when, on November 21st, it had been informed that it was also to sign the two financial arrangements signed at Saint Germain, September 10th. One of those arrangements had greatly disturbed the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government by its provisions for a set-off between the sum due to Jugo-Slavia by way of reparation and those which it would have to pay out as its contribution to the expenses of the liberation of the territories acquired by it. The Serb-Croat-Slovenes maintained that such a provision would prevent their receiving anything from the reparation fund within 10 years, and would place them in an impossible economic situation as a result of the serious losses which the years of occupation by the troops of the Central Empires had inflicted upon them. The Jugo-Slav Delegation was convinced that if it could discuss that question directly with the former [*sic*] Reparation Commission an agreement could be reached prior to the following Friday, which was the expiration of the time limit granted it for signing the two Treaties and the two Financial Arrangements. Advantage might be taken of the presence in Paris of the Prince Regent, who had Technical Delegates with him, and the former Reparation Commission might be charged with preparing a report to be submitted the following Friday after having conferred upon this question with the Jugo-Slav Delegation.

It was decided:

- (1) that the former Reparation Commission submit to the Council on Friday, December 5th, a report relative to the request of the Jugo-Slav Delegation seeking to obtain a modification in one of the financial arrangements signed at Saint Germain, September 10th, 1919;
- (2) that the said Commission, before preparing its report, should hear the Jugo-Slav Delegates on that subject.

from a juridical point of view from those actuating the Reparation Commission. Indeed it only acted in the general interest and not exclusively in the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers.' M. Maucière replied that 'there was no question of imposing the control of the proposed Sub-commission upon the New States. It was merely desired to obtain from the good-will of the interested States their acceptance, without any obligation on their part, of the intervention of that Commission which was charged only with ensuring the normal exchange of rolling-stock. . . . As the Reparation Commission constituted the only body of any permanency provided for the execution of the Treaty in that respect, there was a natural tendency to attach to it the temporary bodies which were also studying means to reestablish in Central Europe a normal economic regime which alone would allow enemy States to fulfil the obligations assumed by the Treaties. In a general way, therefore, it could be said that the question of reparations dominated the whole problem.' After further discussion M. Clemenceau said that he 'agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe's opinion that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had a tendency to progressively enlarge its functions and he realized that it might be dangerous not to counteract that tendency but as M. Loucheur was then absent and was expected to return the following day he thought it would be difficult to reach a decision without consulting him. Consequently he felt it would be preferable to adjourn the rest of the discussion of this subject to a meeting at the end of the week.' This was agreed to.

6. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation summarizing the contents of a telegram from the French Chargé d’Affaires giving the point of view of the British, French and Italian representatives at Bucharest. (See Appendix C).)

*Roumanian reply*  
M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the note of the French Delegation. He observed that the name of the American representative was not mentioned, although it was not said that he had adopted an attitude differing from that of his colleagues.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if the new Roumanian Ministry had been formed.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Roumanian Government was quite capable of having deliberately brought about a Ministerial crisis in order to have a pretext for not replying to the note of the Allied and Associated Powers.

M. BERTHELOT said that the French representative at Bucharest had, moreover, telegraphed that Vaiva[Vaida]-Voevod had been elected President of the Chamber. He was opposed to a policy of resistance, and upon assuming the Presidential chair had made a speech in which he had insisted upon the necessity of Roumania’s not weakening the ties binding her to the Allies. Apparently the general impression of the last few days was more satisfactory, although surprises were of course always possible. The British chargé d’affaires had made representations to the Queen and emphasized the dangers which Roumania would incur by refusing to sign. Roumania would find herself entirely isolated from a diplomatic point of view, and she would be obliged to maintain large forces under arms; the result would be a general discontent which might endanger the dynasty itself. The Queen had seemed impressed with that argument and has promised to use her influence over King Ferdinand to induce him to give a favourable reply to the Allies. The question now was whether or not the Council would grant the Roumanians the delay they requested on the ground that their Ministerial crisis did not permit them to reach an immediate decision. It was to be feared that an open break would be badly received at that moment by public opinion, and in any event, it could not be denied that the decision now being deliberated would have most serious consequences.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that the Roumanians had deliberately provoked a ministerial crisis in order to gain time. Nevertheless, in order to run no risk of antagonizing public opinion, he was inclined to grant the Roumanians a final short delay, six days for instance. But it should be clearly indicated that that delay would not be prolonged under any circumstances.

SIR EYRE CROWE admitted that he felt a great hesitancy in giving his final opinion; there were many arguments in favour of both conclusions. On the one hand the Council had already sent a very succinct ultimatum to the Roumanians and it might be most disadvantageous to grant a prolongation of the time limit. He felt that the attitude of the various diplomatic representatives at Bucharest had not been at all satisfactory. They had not obeyed their instructions and they had led the Roumanians to hope that the Council’s decisions were not final. Quite possibly the Roumanian reply

might have been more satisfactory if the attitude of the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers had been more firm. His impression was that whatever the Council did the Roumanians were determined not to sign. The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers seemed to think that if the Council granted a further delay to the Roumanian Government the latter would emancipate itself from M. Bratiano's influence and would at last see where its true interests lay. He was far from being convinced thereof. M. Bratiano was no longer in power and his party no longer had a majority in Parliament; but he remained very powerful. His counsels had certainly prevailed once more, and if the Council now seemed to hesitate his influence could not but be increased. As to Vaiva[Vaida]-Voevod, he thought that he was quite unreliable: he was, in fact, nothing more than M. Bratiano's puppet. It was true that the decision was a serious one, but he pointed out that that decision had already been taken eight days before when the ultimatum had been sent. The foregoing considerations seemed to him of great weight, but, on the other hand, he was aware that in view of the difficulties raised by the situation in America and the arrogant attitude which Germany seemed to wish to assume it was necessary to move cautiously, and that it might not be advantageous to have an open break with Roumania.

MR. POLK remarked that he had telegraphed the American Minister at Bucharest that he was not satisfied with his attitude and that in any event, in case of a severance of relations, he should leave Bucharest with his colleagues.

M. SCIALOJA said that he had given the Italian representative at Bucharest very clear instructions directing him to remain in complete agreement with his colleagues and to model his attitude upon theirs. He had been ordered to urge the Roumanian Government to conform to the decisions of the Council. With respect to the general question, he felt that the Roumanians could not well be refused a short and final delay. It was quite possible that the Ministerial crisis was only a subterfuge; nevertheless, it was necessary that there should be a Government at Bucharest in order that a valid decision could be reached there. At a time when the enemies of the Allied and Associated Powers seemed to be again lifting their heads, it would be very serious if a breach were made in the ranks of the Allies. If, as he felt sure, Roumania finally decided to sign, the prestige of the Conference would be greatly increased. For these reasons he was in favour of M. Clemenceau's proposal to grant the Roumanians a final extension of six days.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed fully with all Sir Eyre Crowe had said, especially concerning the perfidy of M. Bratiano and the intrigues of the Roumanian Government. It was nevertheless true that an open break would be very serious, especially at that time when the situation in America imposed added caution. The regrettable attitude of the diplomatic representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers made it possible to excuse, to a certain extent, the Roumanian attitude. However, to make assurance doubly sure and to be well within its rights, he thought that the Council had better grant Roumania the extension of six days. He did not agree with Sir Eyre Crowe

as to the Roumanian Government definitely refusing to sign. The Queen of Roumania, who was a very sensible and clever woman, seemed to have been impressed by the representations of the British representative at Bucharest. Her influence might be decisive; furthermore, he knew that influential politicians were bringing pressure to bear on King Ferdinand in order to induce him to yield. But if this extension were granted it should be clearly set forth that no consideration of any nature could induce the Council to grant a further extension.

SIR EYRE CROWE recognized that there was a great deal of truth in what the President of the Conference had just said, and he was ready to agree in principle with his point of view, but he felt that the Council should calculate very carefully the date the extension would expire so as to give Roumania the time necessary to make her reply. Account should be taken of the extraordinary delays always encountered by telegrams sent to Bucharest, and the Council should carefully determine the conditions under which its communication to the Roumanian Government was to be sent and delivered. A further question was that of the publication of the notes of the Council. It seemed to him that now was the time to have recourse to publication. The Council should not fail to avail itself of the means at its disposal for acting upon Roumanian public opinion which still remained ignorant of the true situation.

M. BERTHELOT did not think that it would be advisable at that time to publish the notes addressed to the Roumanian Government. What was above all desired was to obtain the Roumanian signature. That would not be facilitated by a publication which might wound the national pride so excessive in Balkan countries. On the other hand, there would be no disadvantage in publishing the notes of the Council if the severance of diplomatic relations became a *fait accompli*.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to again insist upon one point, to wit the extreme importance of the Roumanians having no knowledge of the deliberations of the Council or of the differences of views which might have arisen on that serious question.

M. BERTHELOT thought that a special note might be published summarizing the last exchanges of notes with Roumania and setting forth the reasons why the Council had felt obliged to grant a last extension of time to the Roumanian Government. That would be a way of enlightening public opinion without wounding any sensibilities.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that M. Berthelot might prepare a draft of that nature which should be submitted during the course of the day to all the heads of delegations and, if approved by them, should be published in the press of the following day.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in view of the uncertain communications between Paris and Bucharest, the Council at the same time that it sent a telegram, might ask a member of the Roumanian Delegation, M. Antonescu for instance, to go to Roumania. He would personally carry the Council's message and could exert his influence at Bucharest towards obtaining an

agreement. The telegram to be prepared by M. Berthelot should specify that it bound all the Powers and that none of the representatives at Bucharest of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should await special instructions.

It was decided:

- (1) that M. Berthelot should prepare, and submit on that day to the Heads of Delegations, a telegram informing the Roumanian Government that the delay granted it to submit its reply was extended for six days, that is to say, until noon on Monday, December 8th; that the said telegram should be sent directly to Bucharest and a copy delivered to M. Antonescu requesting him to deliver it personally to the Roumanian Government;
- (2) that the question of detail concerning the sending and delivery of the communication to the Roumanian Government should be examined by M. Berthelot and his conclusions submitted during the day to the Heads of Delegations;
- (3) that M. Berthelot should prepare a note for publication in the press explaining the attitude of the Allied and Associated Powers towards Roumania,<sup>4</sup> and that said note should be submitted during the afternoon to the Heads of Delegations.

7.

*Exequatur of Foreign  
Consuls at Dantzig  
prior to the Definite  
Establishment of the  
Free City*

[Not printed]

(The meeting was then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,  
Paris, December 3, 1919.*

## APPENDIX B TO No. 35

### *Memorandum for the Supreme Council*

Information has been received by His Majesty's Government from Copenhagen to the effect that Doctor Koester, the German 'Kommissar' for Slesvig-Holstein, who resides in the town of Slesvig, has taken an office in the town of Flensburg and has stated that he intends to remain in the plebiscite area during its occupation by the international commission.

It is further reported that Colonel Frumme, who was previously in command of the German troops in Flensburg, has been given an appointment,<sup>5</sup> nominally under the Ministry of Labour, and has already taken an office in one of the barracks of the town, where he has a staff of some 200 non-commissioned officers and men. It is reported on reliable authority that these persons are still inscribed in the official military accounts and are still drawing pay as members of the German army.

<sup>4</sup> An announcement of this nature was published in the British press on December 4, 1919.

<sup>5</sup> Note in original: 'It is not clear from the telegram what is the nature of this appointment.'

Sir Charles Marling,<sup>2</sup> who has telegraphed from London his comments on these reports, observes that it is impossible to permit a measure which is nothing but a retention of troops under the thinnest disguise, or to recognise an authority set up at the last moment without the consent of the international commission. He adds that the proposed residence of Dr. Loester [?Koester] at Flensburg would appear at first sight to be an attempt to evade the provision of the treaty by which German civilian officials are to leave the plebiscite area.

He strongly urges that a third battalion of allied troops should be placed at the disposal of the commission in view of the intention of the German Government—unmistakably shown by the above-mentioned information—to influence in their favour the voting in the plebiscite area.

December 1st 1919.

## APPENDIX C TO No. 35

### *Note from the French Delegation*

December 2, 1919.

The French representative at Bucharest telegraphs that the Roumanian reply has been delivered to the Legations. This reply commences with a justification of the Roumanian policy since the beginning of the war, and recalls the sacrifices suffered by Roumania. It indicates that the Ministry, besides not being parliamentary, has resigned and cannot make a decision involving so gravely the future of the country. It begs a delay of sufficient length to enable a Ministry created by the Parliament to declare itself validly.

The British, French and Italian representatives are of the opinion that the request for a delay is one of the most justified under the existing circumstances. They are moreover under the impression that the new Government, which will be supported by a majority constituted outside of the liberal party, will be better disposed than the resigning government.

It is to be feared that in refusing a prolongation of the delay the campaign of the liberal party, which is attempting to swing the other parties in line with its intransigence, would not [*sic*] be facilitated. The British and Italian representatives insist also upon the danger which might arise from any weakening of the authority of the state, direct or indirect, which might be favourable to the bolshevist movement.

## No. 36

H.D. 107.<sup>1</sup>] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, December 5, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

British Empire: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

<sup>1</sup> H.D. 106 is not printed. This document recorded a meeting of the Supreme Council in M. Pichon's room on December 4, 1919, at 10.30 a.m. At this short meeting the Supreme Council considered two questions: (i) '*Question of Ex-Austro-Hungarian ships at Cattaro*'. M. Leygues said that he was in receipt of a number of telegrams from the French Naval Officer in charge of the ex-Austro-Hungarian warships at Cattaro, which referred to a state of excitement prevailing amongst Hungarians and Jugo-Slavs at that place. He thought that the situation of the enemy warships in that port was rather precarious. The enemy

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: *U.S.A.*: Capt. G. A. Gordon. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Camerlynck.

fleet there was composed of approximately 40 units of which 6 or 8 were important. He felt that an incident similar to that of Scapa Flow should not be repeated in any event.' After discussion the Supreme Council decided to adopt the French proposal that these warships 'should be convoyed to a French port, preferably Bizerte'. (ii) '*Distribution of Enemy Warships to Powers with limited interests.*' M. Leygues said that the Polish Delegation had asked 'that enemy warships be allotted to Poland. That request brought up once more a recent decision of the Council to the effect that no enemy warships would be attributed to small Powers. He thought it advisable for the Council to examine their decision anew. As a matter of fact, Belgium had in her possession from ten to fifteen enemy warships' which she asked to be allowed to keep. After discussion the Supreme Council decided: '(1) to allow Belgium to keep the small enemy warships held in her ports provided such ships be used only for police work; (2) to give a certain number of small enemy warships, selected from amongst those to be broken up by the Allied and Associated Powers, to all the Allied States with limited interests making a request for such vessels, provided such ships be used solely for police work; (3) to refer to the naval experts for examination and report the questions raised by the above paragraph 2.' The record of this meeting concluded as follows: 'The meeting then adjourned. The Heads of Delegations held a conference *in camera*.' Sir E. Crowe, in his telegram No. 1655 of December 4 to Lord Curzon, reported of the adjournment of the first meeting: 'Mr. Clemenceau asked the secretaries and experts present to leave the room during the discussion, in consultation with Marshal Foch and General Weygand, of the situation created by the present attitude of Germany. After about an hour the two officers also left the Council and the discussion was continued by the five plenipotentiaries. This question forms the subject of a separate telegram.' In his immediately following telegram, No. 1656 of December 4, Sir E. Crowe reported:

'The five Plenipotentiaries and Marshal Foch sitting alone and without Secretaries discussed this morning German situation with special reference to recent communication from German Delegation in which they refuse to sign Protocol and wish to make exchange of ratifications of Treaty of Peace dependent on elimination of clause respecting handing over of war criminals.

'Marshal Foch explained that anything which deferred establishment of peace and continued régime of armistice aided Germany in strengthening her military powers. This therefore (? point)ed to importance of getting Germany to bring peace into operation as soon as possible. On the other hand he developed (? at some) length theoretical aspect of a possible termination of armistice which as he explained would bring us back absolutely to state of war and should therefore be preceded by concerted action of Allied plans for conducting such (? war) and also by recreation of Allied Armies which were fast disappearing under process of general demobilization.

'If Alliance were to decide on some military operation on a limited scale (? with) definite object of inducing Germany by this means to accept our conditions Marshal Foch mentioned as possible alternative plans:

'1. Occupation of Frankfurt.

'2. Occupation of basin of Ruhr including Essen. Of these alternatives he described first as easier but less decisive, second as requiring a considerably greater effort but more effective.

'After Marshal Foch's withdrawal there was general agreement amongst five Plenipotentiaries that there was no occasion at present to contemplate an imminent termination of armistice or resumption of hostilities, there being every indication that Germany on her

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*U.S.A.*: Mr. E. L. Dresel, Rear-Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Dr. James Brown Scott, Lieut.-Commander Koehler, Mr. A. W. Dulles, Mr. M. Nielson, M. Hodge.

*British Empire*: Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. H. W. Maiksin, Captain Fuller, R.N.

*France*: M. Maucière, M. Serruys, M. Laroche, General Le Rond, M. Fromageot.

*Italy*: Admiral Grassi, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Dell'Abbadessa, M. Stranieri, Commandant Fea, M. Pilotti.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

I.

*Signature of the  
Financial Arrangements  
of Saint Germain by the  
Serb-Croat-Slovene  
Government*

[Not printed]<sup>2</sup>

part was in no way prepared for such an eventuality. On the other hand it was agreed that it was essential to insist on Germany's acceptance of our terms as any yielding on our part or readiness to bargain for her consent would inevitably lead to fresh demands because of indication of an inability on the part of Alliance to enforce their terms.

'It was decided not to enter into any discussion with Germany on the question of how Treaty on certain of its provisions might be affected by non-ratification of America. Ratification by United States was still an open question and it would be better to give no indication that we doubted its being ultimately effected.

'American delegate was at first in favour of dropping demands for Scapa (? reparations) suggest(ing to) let the fulfilment of those demands be (? made) depends [*sic*] on an ultimate decision of Reparation Committee, but Monsieur Clemenceau strongly supported me in negating this proposal. He thought we must maintain our demands but that we might offer to agree hereafter to consider any representations that German Government might make for the purpose of proving that handing over of particular docks or harbour equipment would cripple their means of maintaining effectively their fluvial and canal navigation. I undertook to recommend such a solution to my Government and my Naval Adviser is telegraphing direct to Admiralty on the subject.

'On point of surrender of criminals no concession is considered possible.

'As regards repatriation of German prisoners from France answer will be that matter is definitely settled by Treaty itself and that Germany has only to proceed with exchange of ratifications to obtain satisfaction. Monsieur Clemenceau repeated declaration that he had more than once recently made, that French Government have no interest in keeping these prisoners except as a means of pressure to obtain peace and that immediately peace becomes operative repatriation will commence.

'It was finally agreed that Monsieur Clemenceau should submit if possible tomorrow a draft note to be addressed to German delegate conciliatory in tone but firm in maintaining our demands subject to assurance to be given as to Scapa reparation. Note would end with a warning conveyed in courteous but clear tones that should German Government (? maintain) their refusal to fulfil conditions necessary to establish peace, Allied and Associated Governments would be compelled to consider what measures they might have to take in order to enforce their demands.

'I shall of course submit text of proposed note to Your Lordship before assenting to it.'

<sup>2</sup> M. Maucière referred to the Yugoslav objection to certain provisions of the agreement concerning contributions to the cost of liberation of territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Treaty Series, 1919, No. 14, Cmd. 458. Cf. No. 35, minute 5). In accordance with the previous decision of the Supreme Council, the Reparation Commission

2. M. CLEMENCEAU thought that it would be well to adjourn until the following day the examination of that draft reply<sup>3</sup> as well as of the general note which was to be sent to Germany.<sup>4</sup> The draft of that latter note did not fully satisfy him.

*Draft Reply to the  
German Note concerning  
Scapa Flow*

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed, but wished to make a remark on the subject of the note relative to Scapa Flow. The British Admiralty had just published some documents which showed in an incontrovertible manner that the German Government gave instructions to sink the fleet.<sup>5</sup> He thought the [that] these documents had been communicated to the Drafting Committee. In his opinion the answer should [?have] taken them into account.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that his Committee had in fact regretted having had no other knowledge of these documents than through the press; however, his Committee would receive them that afternoon.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to make another observation concerning the passage in the draft of the general note relating to Scapa Flow and to the compensation which was being demanded. He proposed that the Council's answer on this point should read as follows: 'A reply, annexed hereto, to the German note of November 24th on Scapa Flow establishes the legal point of view. The Allied and Associated Powers examined the question before making their demands, and they do not share the fears expressed by had on the preceding day met the Yugoslav representatives and agreed upon a solution whereby articles 4 and 5 of the aforesaid agreement should be eliminated and replaced by a new article 4 (appendix A in original: not printed: for the text see Treaty Series, 1920, No. 7. Cmd. 637.) M. Maucière explained that the new article 'in no way changed the situation of the States affected by the former Article 4. Its only effect was to place in the same situation as the latter, the States affected by the former Article 5. The debt due by these latter States would likewise be represented by bonds issued under the same conditions as those provided for by former Article 4. As those bonds matured the Reparation Commission would withhold from the sums due to the States in question by way of reparation such sums as became necessary for interest payments and amortization. Serbia, therefore, preserved all its rights to immediate reparation. The Italian Delegation adhered to that condition on the condition that the Special Arrangement concluded with respect to Italy [Treaty Series, 1919, No. 15. Cmd. 459] should be modified in a similar manner. At the last minute and after the meeting ended the Serbian Delegate presented a new demand with a view to securing for his country treatment similar to that accorded to Belgium and to have granted to it a priority of 2,000,000,000 francs on the reparation account. He (M. Maucière) had replied that the Commission was not competent to pass upon that demand. He pointed out moreover that that was the first time that the Serbs had raised the question and they in no wise made it a condition precedent to their signing the financial arrangement. . . . M. Berthelot added that the question was all the more delicate as the Serbs had to sign the Bulgarian Treaty before noon of that very day.' After discussion the Supreme Council decided: (i) to accept the solution proposed by the Reparation Commission; (ii) that the Drafting Committee should similarly modify the agreement with Italy; (iii) 'that the Drafting Committee be charged with determining the procedure to be followed so that the modification of the said Financial Arrangements thus rendered necessary should not prevent the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government from adhering to the Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty, and from signing the Bulgarian Treaty, within the time limit provided.'

<sup>3</sup> See No. 34, appendix C.

<sup>4</sup> See note 1 above.

<sup>5</sup> A statement on this subject, quoting relevant documents, was issued by the British Admiralty on December 3, 1919, and was published on the following day in the British press.

the German Government regarding the disastrous effect on the economic life of German ports. The term[s] of the protocol must stand. On receipt of a complete list of all the floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, which is demanded by the protocol, the Allied and Associated Powers will make known their selection, keeping in view the general economic situation of the German ports. Should thereafter the German Government think that it is able to prove that some particular demand is of a kind gravely to affect Germany's legitimate requirements in respect to the maintenance of her fluvial navigation, or similar vital economic interests, the German Government may present its claim to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers who will be prepared to consider them in a spirit of equity after consultation with their naval advisers and after hearing the Reparation Commission.'

M. CLEMENCEAU said that that text satisfied him fully.

MR. POLK asked who would examine the German claims. There would no longer be a Supreme Council and the Ambassadorial Council would not be competent to pass upon them.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that there had not been any decision as to what body would succeed the Supreme Council, but it was certain that some competent authority would exist.

MR. POLK doubted it. He pointed out that there already existed a Reparation Commission which was competent to determine that matter.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the question could not be determined by the Reparation Commission alone. It also affected the naval authorities.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that the Reparation Commission was not competent to reach a decision which had to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers.

MR. POLK said that the real question, however, was whether the Germans could fulfil their obligations if they were deprived of the material essential to the existence of their ports and their fluvial navigation. He was afraid that the only idea of the naval experts was to seize that material.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the naval experts would be heard and also the Reparation Commission. After that the Governments would decide.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that that reply would satisfy Mr. Polk.

MR. POLK said that he was sorry that essentially commercial material was being taken by way of compensation for war material. He reiterated that the only question was whether Germany needed that material in order to furnish the reparation owed by her. The Reparation Commission was the body which could answer that question.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether Mr. Polk would be willing to refer to the Reparation Commission the question of the German ships held in American ports. It should not be forgotten that the Scapa Flow affair came under the Armistice.

MR. POLK replied that he would not object if the Reparation Commission would decide to give back the *Imperator*. Aside from that, in the case under consideration, he wished to know who would have power to pass judgment if it were not the Reparation Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that it would be the Five Governments; they had settled all the questions concerning the Armistice.

M. BERTHELOT wished to make two observations: first of all, he did not think that the documents published by the British Admiralty, which Sir Eyre Crowe had just referred to, were as convincing as the latter seemed to think. He, M. Berthelot, had informed M. Fromageot of their substance and the latter had thought that it would not be advisable to engage in a long discussion with the German Government on that subject, but that it would be better to utilize the avowals made by the Germans in their notes.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that it would be well, nevertheless, to take into account the Admiralty's documents.<sup>6</sup>

M. BERTHELOT added that, on the other hand, it seemed to him desirable that the Drafting Committee should point out in the note that military action did not necessarily imply a resumption of a state of war. There were many precedents for that view.

(The discussion of that subject was then adjourned.)

3. (The Council had before it a draft Treaty prepared by the Drafting Committee (Appendix B) and a modification of the last part of Article 2 of that draft (see Appendix C).<sup>7</sup>)

*Treaty between the  
Principal Allied and  
Associated Powers,  
Poland and the Czecho-  
Slovak State*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon these two documents.

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

- (1) to accept the draft Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State, prepared by the Drafting Committee;
- (2) that the last part of Article II of that Treaty be drafted as indicated in Appendix C.<sup>7</sup>

4.

[Not printed]<sup>8</sup>

*Expenses of the  
International Teschen  
Commission*

<sup>6</sup> The following sentence was accordingly added to the end of the fifth paragraph of the draft note in appendix C to No. 34: 'Did not the Head of the German Admiralty write privately to Admiral von Reuter at Scapa Flow as early as May 9, 1919: "Whatever may be the fate of these vessels under the pressure of political events, this fate will not be decided without us; it will be accomplished by ourselves, and the surrender of the vessels to the enemy is out of the question"?' With this addition the draft in No. 34, appendix C, was, subject to verbal variation, the text of the final note of December 8.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. See note 12 below.

<sup>8</sup> The Supreme Council considered a short note from the 'International Commission at Teschen', dated December 3, 1919 (appendix D in original), which stated in part that this Commission 'on account of the short duration of its mandate, should assume no part of the administration of the country; consequently, it shall have no local revenue to collect, and the totality of its expenses shall be advanced by the Allied Governments'. In commenting

5. SIR EYRE CROWE informed the Council that according to a telegram which he had received from Bucharest the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had agreed with the Roumanian Government on a formula which the latter would accept and which would be satisfactory to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. That formula was reported to have been already telegraphed to Paris.

M. CLEMENCEAU observed that on the preceding day he had seen General Coanda who had spoken in a most satisfactory manner. He knew nothing, however, of the formula that Sir Eyre Crowe mentioned.

M. BERTHELOT said that a telegram had indeed arrived but it was still in an incomplete condition; the part which had been deciphered seemed satisfactory. As soon as complete text was available it would be sent to the various Delegations.

6. (The Council had before it a draft of the Financial Clauses dated December 1st, 1919 (see Appendix E,<sup>9</sup> and the *Financial, Economic and Reparation Clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary* Economic and Reparation Clauses (Appendix F),<sup>10</sup> M. SERRUYS read and commented upon the proposed measures relative to the economic and reparation clauses. He pointed out that all members of the Economic

Commission were in agreement and that that Commission was likewise in agreement with the Reparation Commission. The principal provisions concerned the supply of coal from the mines at Pecs by Hungary to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. That supply would be controlled by the Reparation Commission. In a like manner the Economic Commission had thought that the Treaty should provide for the supply by Austria to Hungary of foodstuffs within limits to be fixed by the Reparation Commission if a direct agreement were not reached between the interested parties. Finally the Commission had decided on the proposal of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation, to add two paragraphs to the article corresponding to article 264<sup>11</sup> of the Treaty of Saint Germain in such a manner as to adapt it to Hungarian special legislation. On the other hand it had rejected a Serbian demand which sought a revision of the principle, already many times affirmed, which prohibited liquidation of enemy property in transferred territories.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that all that remained to be done was to refer these texts to the Drafting Committee for insertion in the Treaty.

upon this note General Le Rond stated that 'it seemed that the best solution would be to have the joint expenses common to the whole Commission, which, moreover, would certainly not exceed 50,000 francs per month, provisionally covered by advances of equal sums by the various Powers represented on the Commission. The Presidency of the Commission in fact belonged to the United States and it was only provisionally being held by France.' The Supreme Council decided to adopt the solution proposed by General Le Rond.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. This draft text of Part IX (articles 180-99) of the Treaty of Trianon is printed in *The Hungarian Peace Negotiations*, vol. i, pp. 598-605.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained drafts submitted by the Economic Commission for: (i) the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 of annex V to Part VIII of the Treaty of Trianon; (ii) article 207 of the treaty; (iii) article 208; (iv) the last three paragraphs of article 249.

<sup>11</sup> Apparently a mistake for article 266.

MR. POLK said he would have to make a reservation with respect to the solution given to the question of the Pecs Mines.

It was decided:

to accept the Financial, Economic and Reparations clauses of the Treaty with Hungary and to refer the same to the Drafting Committee for final drafting; with the reservation that Mr. Polk should inform the Secretary General of the Conference whether he accepted the provisions relative to the coal of the Pecs Mines.

7. M. CLEMENCEAU informed the Council that the President of the Austrian Delegation had just handed him a request of Chancellor Renner that he be permitted to come to Paris to consult with the Council on the economic situation of Austria. He (M. Clemenceau) felt that both from a political point of view and for humanitarian reasons it would be well to accede to that request and to reply that the Council would be glad to have M. Renner come to Paris.

M. DUTASTA remarked that it was only that morning at 10 o'clock that he had seen M. Eichoff. The latter would certainly appreciate the promptness with which the Council had given an answer.

It was decided:

that the Secretary General of the Conference should immediately inform the Austrian Delegation that, far from being opposed to Chancellor Renner's coming to Paris, the Council would be glad to have him come.

8. MR. POLK said that the decision reached at the meeting of the Council on the preceding day relative to the former Austro-Hungarian warships at Cattaro under guard of the French navy<sup>4</sup> had not covered the case of the warships at Spalato under guard of the American navy. The Council, however, had recognized that the American navy had a right to convoy these warships to another port.

It was decided:

that the two former Austrian warships now at Spalato under guard of the American Navy might, if the American Naval authorities so desire, be convoyed from Spalato to a port to be designated by the American Naval authorities, in accordance with the principle decided upon by the Council at its last meeting with respect to former Austro-Hungarian warships under guard of the French Navy at Cattaro (See H.D. 106, Minute 1).<sup>4</sup>

(The meeting then adjourned.)

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, December 5th, 1919.*

#### APPENDIX B TO No. 36

##### *Poland and Czecho-Slovakia*

The United States of America, The British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Poland, and the Czecho-Slovak State,

Desiring to assure the sovereignty of Poland and the Czecho-Slovak State over the territories recognized as belonging to them respectively,

The undersigned, after exchanging their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

#### ARTICLE I

Subject to the special provisions of the Treaties and Decisions concluded for the purpose of completing the present settlement, the High Contracting Parties recognize the sovereignty of Poland over the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy lying to the north of the frontier line hereafter described:

From a point on the course of the Oder immediately south of the Ratibor-Oderberg railway—south-eastwards to the point of meeting of the three old boundaries between Galicia, Hungary and the Duchy of Teschen,

a line to be defined subsequently in accordance with the Decision of September 27, 1919;

thence to the point where it is met by the western boundary of the political district of Nameszto,

the old boundary between Galicia and Hungary;

thence eastwards to the point where this old boundary is met by the southern boundary of the political district of Trsztena,

a line to be defined subsequently in accordance with the Decision of September 27, 1919,

thence to point 2508 of the Magas Tatra,

the old boundary between Galicia and Hungary;

thence to point 1052 about 13 kilometres north-west of Olublo,

a line to be defined subsequently in accordance with the Decision of September 27, 1919,

thence eastwards, then east-south-eastwards to a point about 2 kilometres south of point 1335 (Halicz) where it meets the administrative boundary between the districts of Lisko on the west and of Turka on the east,

the old boundary between Galicia and Hungary.

This is the point common to the three frontiers of Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Eastern Galicia.

The Boundary Commission provided for in the seventh paragraph of Article 83 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany concluded on June 28, 1919, will have to trace on the spot the frontier line described above. . . .<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> The remainder of this draft treaty comprised: (i) Article 2, delimiting the territories of Czechoslovakia. This article was, apart from minor verbal variation, the same as article II, paragraphs 1-4, of the treaty relative to the frontiers of Poland, Roumania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, concluded at Sèvres on August 10, 1920 (Treaty Series, 1921, No. 20. Cmd. 1548); (ii) a concluding formula providing, among other things, that the treaty 'will come into force at the same time as the Treaties of Peace with Austria and with Hungary. The deposit of ratifications will be effected at Paris at the same time as the deposit of ratifications of the said Treaties.' This concluding formula was, however, replaced by the alternative draft contained in appendix C in the original and approved by the Supreme Council. This approved draft was, *mutatis mutandis*, the same as the concluding formula (beginning: 'The present Treaty, in French, in English and in Italian . . .') in the aforesaid treaty signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920.

H.D. 108.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, December 6, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Arnavon, M. De Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Rear-Admiral McCully, U.S.N., Mr. Ellis L. Dresel, Colonel J. A. Logan, Lieut.-Commander Koehler, U.S.N.  
*British Empire*: General Sackville-West, Captain Fuller, R.N., Lieut.-Commander Dunne, Mr. A. Leeper, Mr. Ibbetson-James.  
*France*: M. Loucheur, M. Cambon, M. Laroche, M. Mauclère, M. Seydoux, M. Kammerer, M. Sonnolet, M. Cheysson.  
*Italy*: Rear-Admiral Grassi, M. Dell'Abbadessa, Commandant Fea, Commandant Inganni.

1. (The Council had before it 5 resolutions passed at meetings of the Supreme Economic Council in Rome.<sup>1</sup> (See Appendix A).)

*Resolutions passed at the session of the Supreme Economic Council in Rome: (a) Austria, (b) Danger of non-ratification, (c) Armenia, (d) Russia, (e) Oil Tankers*

M. LOUCHEUR read and commented upon the resolutions. He added with regard to the question of [? the] provisioning of Austria the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had examined at a meeting held on the preceding day the question of provisioning Austria and they were waiting for a reply from the Italian

Government with reference to the sending of 12,000 tons of cereals to Vienna from Trieste following an agreement made between Italy and Austria. He had also seen Mr. Austen Chamberlain<sup>2</sup> in London; the British and French Governments were willing to do their utmost to help until the credit opened for the provisioning of Austria had been exhausted. With regard to the situation of the Armenian refugees in the Caucasus, the Supreme Economic Council wished to bring the attention of the Supreme Council to the great importance of providing for the provisioning of those refugees and he understood that the Armenians had applied to the American Delegation direct. He wished to ask Mr. Polk what could be done in the matter.

COLONEL LOGAN stated that a telegram from Mr. Hoover had been received

<sup>1</sup> The thirty-first session of the Supreme Economic Council had been held in Rome on November 21-3, 1919: cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. X, pp. 613-74.

<sup>2</sup> Chancellor of the Exchequer.

to the effect that an arrangement had been entered into with the Grain Corporation to supply 35,000 tons of cereals on credit to Armenia, to be distributed under Colonel Haskell's supervision. Furthermore, the American Red Cross had given 1,700,000 dollars for relief purposes.

M. LOUCHEUR said that with regard to the Russian question, he was of the opinion that it would be advisable to await a solution of the Russian problem before taking any action in the matter.

MR. POLK said that he had just received a proposal from the American Government on the question of the tank ships which Mr. Dresel would submit to the French and British Delegations. He wished to put on record that the United States were not now represented on the Supreme Economic Council.

(The Council took note of the resolutions passed by the Supreme Economic Council at Rome and of M. Loucheur's declarations on the subject.)

2. (The Council had before it a letter from the President of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission to the President of the Peace Conference, dated November 27th, 1919, to which were attached a memorandum by the American Delegation, two notes from the French Delegation, and a list of products prohibited from importation into Germany, for which the French Government asked that free entry into Germany be allowed. (See Appendix B).)

*Note from the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission regarding (a) Customs paid on Franco-German and Germano-Belgian frontiers; (b) payment of German customs duties on a Gold Basis*

COLONEL LOGAN read and commented upon the memorandum presented by the American Delegation to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, dated November 27th [?8th], 1919.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the German Delegation had proposed that the German Government be allowed to establish the customs duties in gold marks, more exactly in paper marks, taking the rate of exchange into account. He was of the opinion that at the present time no reply should be made to Germany before the exchange of deposit of ratifications and the signing of the Protocol. On the other hand, a very important question came up in which France and Great Britain were especially interested: Germany had edicted a series of import prohibitions; it could not be contested that that was her right, but she should not be allowed to evade the provisions of the Treaty in order to treat the Allies in different ways. He therefore suggested that a solution be adjourned until Germany had signed the Protocol and the deposit of ratifications had taken place. In the second place, the right of prohibiting imports should be connected with the whole question of the payment of customs duties.

MR. POLK said that, with reference to the memorandum of the American representative on the Reparation Commission, the difficulty was that for some time past Germany had been applying two principles in the payment of German customs duties: in ports she had applied a gold basis, but on her

land frontiers payment was being made in paper. That was a discrimination in favour of the countries which were importing by land as against those importing by sea.

COLONEL LOGAN said that France and Belgium were paying one-ninth of the import duties that Great Britain and America paid on a gold basis.

M. LOUCHEUR remarked that such a fact had never been brought to his attention nor, as far as he was aware, to the notice of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

MR. POLK said that Sir John Bradbury<sup>3</sup> and Mr. Rathbone had both raised the question.

M. LOUCHEUR said everybody agreed that there should be no different treatment between the Allies and that payment of customs duties should be made in gold. He insisted on what he had said before, that no answer should be made to Germany at the present time and that the question of import prohibitions should be settled at the same time.

MR. POLK suggested that the questions be referred back to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission for consideration. The questions were covered by Article 269 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

M. LOUCHEUR said he did not agree: the provisions of the Treaty were that customs duties should not be changed during a certain lapse of time, but payment on a gold basis would entail an increase of customs duties.

M. SCIALOJA thought that it would be advisable to consult the Economic Commission, as the questions were not entirely within the province of the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

M. LOUCHEUR remarked that there no longer was an Economic Commission and that on the other hand the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had consulted the economic experts.

M. MATSUI agreed with M. Scialoja, and said that he had some time ago, when the Treaty with Germany was being prepared, proposed a clause which would have prevented Germany from prohibiting any importations. Such a clause had not been accepted, but nevertheless he was of the opinion that the economic experts should be heard.

M. LOUCHEUR said that up to that time they had never referred to Commissions which were charged with the preparation of the Treaty, questions of execution of the Treaty; he proposed that representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers on the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission should study the questions in accord with economic experts, and Japan would have an opportunity to be heard.

MR. POLK wished to propose the following resolution: that the questions be referred back to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission with instructions to take the necessary action without delay and further to decide itself such questions in the future.

M. LOUCHEUR thought that the question was important and should be

<sup>3</sup> Joint Permanent Secretary to the British Treasury and subsequently the principal British representative on the Reparation Commission.

referred back to the Supreme Council by the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

MR. POLK asked why this question should come back to the Supreme Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it was a question involving other matters of political importance and that although he agreed in principle with Mr. Polk's proposition, he was of the opinion that the questions should still be referred back to the Supreme Council without delay, and that at any rate no action should be taken before the Germans had signed the protocol and the deposit of ratifications had taken place.

It was decided:

- (1) to refer back to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission in accord with economic experts both the question of payment of German customs duties on a gold mark basis, and the import prohibition by Germany;
- (2) that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission submit immediately a report to the Council;
- (3) that no reply be given to Germany until she had signed the protocol and the Treaty of Peace had come into force.

3. M. BERTHELOT said they had received a letter from Bucharest dated November 30th which related to an incident which had taken place in the past, but which was of a certain importance. Before withdrawing, the Government of M. Misu and General Vaitoianu had tried to put a negative answer before the Powers: but the Allied representatives had evaded such a manoeuvre on the part of the Liberal party.

Telegrams sent from Bucharest between December 2nd and 4th gave the following information: M. Vaida-Voevod, before seeing the King of Roumania, had had a conference with the Allied representatives, the result of which was that as regards requisitions in Hungary Vaida-Voevod would be ready to accept the appointment of an Inter-Allied mixed Commission as proposed but maintained that it would be impossible that such a Commission should have the power to inflict penalties; on the other hand, the Roumanian army would withdraw to the boundaries fixed by the Peace Conference. He would take note of the assurances given by the Supreme Council, and expressed his conviction that the Council would be able to find a solution satisfactory to Roumania. It had been feared for some time that the King would call to power M. Maniu, but in the morning of December 3rd M. Maniu had refused, and M. Vaida-Voevod had been asked to form a cabinet. Thereupon M. Vaida-Voevod had consulted all the political leaders with the exception of the Liberals, and had concluded from his consultation that they would be in favour of the signature by Roumania; he had authorised the Allied representatives at Bucharest to telegraph to Paris that the majority of the parties was in favour of Roumania's signature and promised to sign if the King accepted the Cabinet.

M. Antonescu, furthermore, was about to arrive in Bucharest; under those

conditions one could well hope that a satisfactory telegram would be received from Roumania within the time limit laid down by the Council.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

(The Heads of Delegations then held a conference *in camera*.)<sup>4</sup>

*Hôtel de Crillon,*

*Paris, December 6, 1919.*

<sup>4</sup> In telegram No. 1667 of December 6 to Lord Curzon (received December 7), Sir E. Crowe reported of this meeting: 'At the request of Monsieur Clemenceau, the secretaries and experts then left the room and the five plenipotentiaries discussed the situation produced by the attitude of Germany, with the assistance of Mr. Dresel, a member of the United States Delegation, who had had an interview with M. von Lersner.' In telegram No. 1662 of even date (received 9.25 p.m., December 6) Sir E. Crowe reported:

'Supreme Council settled to-day text of proposed note to German Delegation [v. inf.]; it is on lines which I have already foreshadowed. It makes concessions respecting Scapa reparation in a form of words accepted as entirely satisfactory by Americans. It also meets German objection as regards reservation of right to resort to military action, which had formed part of Protocol.

'On this and on all other points five plenipotentiaries were unanimous. Further evidence was produced to show that there is every reason to expect that German Delegation will sign. The Americans have had a further interview with Lersner in which they categorically told him that in regard to these matters America and Allies were solid. Both M. Clemenceau and Italian Delegate had independent information that Germans will accept.

'In the circumstances M. Clemenceau strongly urged, and both American and Italian agreed, that it was absolutely necessary not to show any weakness in wording of our reply as this alone might make Germans hesitate. The note accordingly terminates with following passage which I translate literally from the French (Begins).

'“Until Treaty of Peace comes into operation the denunciation of Armistice suffices to leave Allied armies every latitude as regards such military measures as they might consider necessary. If German Government continues to defer signature of Protocol and thereby definitely ratify [*sic*] Treaty Supreme Council are determined without further delay to place Germany in face of a rupture of Armistice with all the consequences which would follow therefrom (Ends).”

'All my colleagues expressed greatest anxiety to get this note off to Germans at once. They are convinced that delay can only encourage Germany to believe Allies are not united. I promised to do my best to obtain by telephone your and Prime Minister's authority to sign note if possible to-day or at least not later than to-morrow.

'Monsieur Clemenceau repeated message which he sent through Lord Derby yesterday that if, contrary to expectation, German answer to this note should be unsatisfactory he would at once proceed to London to consult Prime Minister but both he and Mr. Polk made earnest personal appeal to me to do what I could to obtain immediate assent to despatch of note.

'I trust in the circumstances that it may be possible for Your Lordship to obtain Prime Minister's consent and to let me have necessary authority if possible in course of the day.

'I shall send by bag to-night actual text of draft note. It differs only in small particulars from original draft [not printed: cf. No. 36, minute 2] sent yesterday except that concluding paragraph which I have (? quoted) takes place of original concluding paragraph.'

The draft of December 6 read as follows:

'Monsieur le Président,

'1. Le Conseil Suprême a pris connaissance de la communication verbale que vous avez faite, le 1<sup>er</sup> décembre, au nom du Gouvernement allemand.

'2. Les notes des 1<sup>er</sup> et 22 novembre ont défini la responsabilité du Gouvernement allemand dans le retard de la ratification du Traité, et leurs conclusions demeurent.

'3. La suggestion concernant un prétendu droit pour l'Allemagne de demander (en

compensation de l'absence des délégués américains dans les Commissions jusqu'à la ratification du Traité par les États-Unis, une modification des clauses du traité concernant les livraisons des coupables et le retour des prisonniers de guerre, n'est pas fondée. Aux termes des clauses finales du Traité, celui doit entrer en vigueur dès que l'Allemagne et trois des Principales Puissances Alliées et Associées l'ont ratifié; ce serait en vain que l'Allemagne chercherait à subordonner cette mise en vigueur à une nouvelle condition, la présence des délégués américains dans les Commissions.

'4. Il est inexact que le point de vue allemand ait été admis à cet égard le 14 octobre.

'5. Il est également inexact que MM. von Simson et von Lersner aient été invités le 20 novembre à des négociations orales et écrites au sujet du Protocole du 1<sup>er</sup> novembre. Il leur a été dit simplement que, saisi d'une note écrite, le Gouvernement allemand devait répondre par écrit aux seules stipulations qui y étaient formulées.

'6. Le Conseil Suprême estime que l'article 22: du Traité de paix (relatif au retour des prisonniers de guerre) est parfaitement explicite et n'a nul besoin d'être complété. La France a déjà déclaré à plusieurs reprises qu'elle libérerait les prisonniers dès la mise en vigueur du Traité: elle n'a aucune raison de le répéter à nouveau.

'7. Le Conseil ne s'arrête qu'aux objections présentées à la demande des compensations pour la destruction de la flotte allemande à Scapa Flow, et à la prévision des mesures éventuelles de coercition militaire formulée par la note des alliés le 1<sup>er</sup> novembre.

'8. Une réponse séparée et ci-jointe est donnée à la note allemande du 24 novembre sur Scapa Flow [see No. 34, appendix C and No. 35, note 6]. Avant de faire leur demande, les Puissances Alliées et Associées ont examiné cette question. Elles ne partagent pas les appréhensions du Gouvernement allemand, en ce qui concerne les effets d'ordre économique qui en résulteraient pour les ports allemands. Elles maintiennent le protocole tel qu'il est rédigé. Après avoir reçu l'état complet de tous les docks flottants, grues flottantes, remorqueurs et dragues demandé par le protocole, les Puissances Alliées et Associées feront connaître leur choix, tenant compte de la situation économique générale des ports allemands. Si ensuite le Gouvernement allemand croit pouvoir démontrer qu'une des dites demandes est de nature à porter une grave atteinte à la capacité de l'Allemagne de satisfaire à ses besoins légitimes pour ce qui regarde le maintien de la navigation fluviale ou à d'autres intérêts vitaux d'ordre économique du même genre, le Gouvernement allemand pourra présenter ses revendications aux Principales Puissances Alliées et Associées qui, de leur côté, seront prêtes à les examiner dans un esprit d'équité, après audition de la Commission des Réparations.

'9. En ce qui concerne le dernier paragraphe du Protocole du 1<sup>er</sup> novembre, le Conseil Suprême estime que la signature du dit Protocole et le dépôt des ratifications détermineront la mise en vigueur du Traité et par conséquent l'état de paix. Dès lors, l'exécution des clauses du protocole, condition de la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, sera garantie par les stipulations générales de ce Traité, ainsi que par les méthodes ordinaires reconnues par le droit des gens.

'10. Jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix, une dénonciation de l'armistice suffit pour donner aux armées alliées toute latitude en vue des mesures militaires qu'elles jugeraient nécessaires. Si le Gouvernement allemand continue à différer la signature du protocole du 1<sup>er</sup> novembre et par là la ratification définitive du Traité, le Conseil Suprême est décidé à mettre, sans plus de retard, l'Allemagne en face d'une rupture de l'armistice avec toutes les conséquences qui en résultent.

'11. Veuillez agréer, etc.'

Lord Curzon, in his telegram No. 1451 of midnight, December 6, informed Sir E. Crowe:

'A meeting of the Cabinet was held tonight to consider Note as amended. Grave misgiving was felt as to form of final paragraph which threatens Germany with definite rupture of armistice. We are uncertain both as to wisdom of such a threat, and as to effect that may be produced upon German Government. We suggest the following amended version which we earnestly trust that all your colleagues will be willing to accept.

'Begins: "The Allies must insist therefore that there should be no further delay in the signature of the Protocol and the conclusion of Peace." Ends.

'Kerr is coming over to give full explanations, should these be required, and will be in Paris tomorrow (Sunday) morning.

'Please reserve room.'

Sir E. Crowe, in his telegram No. 1670 of December 7, reported to Lord Curzon: 'Mr. Kerr and I saw M. Clemenceau to-night on his return from country. He agrees to omission of second sentence of concluding paragraph of note. The first sentence of that paragraph really forms part of argument in preceding paragraph 9, which contains withdrawal from position we had taken up in protocol. The protocol had explicitly reserved right of Allies in case of non-fulfilment of its conditions to resort to such military measures as might be required to enforce their demands. To this Germans objected that as signature of Protocol is to coincide with coming into force we should at once come under conditions of peace which would not admit of one party proceeding to reopen hostilities without a fresh declaration of war. We have recognized force of this argument and conceded German point by saying that once peace is re-established by coming into force of treaty or deposit of ratifications, the treaty itself will afford necessary guarantees for enforcement of stipulations of Protocol and that ordinary rules of law of nations, i.e. no hostilities prior to declaration of war, will apply. But we add . . . [text uncertain] in first sentence of concluding paragraph, until treaty of peace does become operative, the Allies retain power to resort to military measures by simply terminating armistice.

'This is a statement of fact. It is moreover merely a restatement of what was already said to Germans in note in which we invited them to sign Protocol. To withdraw this warning altogether in face of Germany having recalled her delegates in answer to request to sign protocol seems to M. Clemenceau to go too far. He is however willing to attenuate sentence by making it quite clear that, whilst conceding German view of true position as regards resort to military measures, we recall warning already given that such resort though not compatible with a state of peace would always remain open to Allies under régime of a prolonged armistice.

'M. Clemenceau would accordingly accept following wording for concluding paragraph—I translate literally from French:

'“Until treaty comes into force we remind Germany once more (*une dernière fois*) that a denunciation of the armistice suffices to leave Allied armies every latitude as regards such military measures as they may consider necessary. This being the situation (literally: *dans cet esprit*) we await signature of the Protocol and deposit of ratifications without further delay.”

'M. Clemenceau reiterates his firm conviction that even in this revised form the note would undoubtedly lead to Germany's prompt acceptance of our demands.

'We said that of course we had no authority to accept this wording but we agreed to refer it to His Majesty's Government. He was emphatic as to his inability to go any further in his concessions to British view and earnestly requested our acceptance. He repeated what he had already declared at Supreme Council, that French Government did not in any case contemplate military operations at present juncture.

'M. Clemenceau cordially agreed to come over to London on Wednesday or Thursday provided that this question was decided and out of the way. . . .'

Lord Curzon, in his telegram No. 1452 of 12.45 p.m. on December 8, instructed Sir E. Crowe: 'His Majesty's Government authorize you to accept form of final paragraph as now proposed and to sign to-day. Prime Minister and I look forward with pleasure to promised visit of Monsieur Clemenceau, and we think you should come over at same time to advise as to future conduct of affairs.'

The draft text of December 6 thus became the final text of December 8 subject to the amendment of the last paragraph. The final text was published in the British press on December 9.

*Resolutions of the Supreme Economic Council*

The Supreme Economic Council having taken knowledge of the decision H. D. 94/1[2]<sup>5</sup> of the Supreme Council, and particularly of Pars. 2 and 5, esteems that, considering the general coal and production situation throughout the entire world, it is necessary that the German tankers be utilized; it requests that immediate measures be adopted covering the utilization of these vessels for the transportation of mineral oils which may be used to supply the needs of countries suffering from coal shortage.

The Supreme Economic Council having taken note of the affirmations of Lord Curzon relative to the critical situation actually existing in Armenia,<sup>6</sup> desirous [desires] to show its sympathy for the Armenians and to express its regret that it has no available resources to offer assistance to Armenia.

The Supreme Economic Council esteems that the assistance necessitated by the Armenians in distress, as well as the assistance necessitated by Austria, concerns not only the Powers represented on the Supreme Economic Council, but all the civilized peoples of the world.

The Supreme Economic Council deems it opportune to indicate to the Presidency of the Conference in Paris the increasing danger to which the economic life of all the Allied countries is exposed by the delay in the exchange of the Peace Treaty ratifications.

The Supreme Economic Council has taken note of the decision of the Supreme Council of November 15th,<sup>7</sup> charging the C.O.G.R.<sup>8</sup> with the duty of studying the problems concerning the provisioning of Austria.

The Supreme Economic Council which was previously able partly to relieve Austria's distress thanks to credits granted by England, France, Italy and with the assistance of America, finds itself at the present moment without the power and necessary resources to render efficacious assistance, and it can only in the most pressing manner draw the attention of the Supreme Council to the extreme urgency of finding a solution capable of remedying a tragic situation which cannot continue without imperilling the security and the honour of the civilized nations of the entire world, who will have to bear the responsibility for it.

<sup>5</sup> No. 24, minute 2.

<sup>6</sup> A letter of November 15, 1919, from Mr. Spicer, Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Office, to the British Secretary of the Supreme Economic Council had stated in part: 'While Lord Curzon understands that the relief funds at the disposal of the Supreme Economic Council, which could properly be applied to purposes of Armenian relief, are exhausted, His Lordship considers it in the highest degree desirable that the urgent necessity of doing something to succour the Armenians in the Caucasus, of whom there are understood to be 300,000 refugees from Asia Minor alone in addition to the Armenian inhabitants, should be brought to the attention of the Supreme Economic Council.'

'Lord Curzon would point out that the destitute condition of these unfortunate people is to a large extent the consequence of the regrettable though unavoidable delay in the conclusion of peace with Turkey, which prevents the re-establishment of settled conditions throughout Anatolia, which on humanitarian grounds cannot be exaggerated, and the responsibility for which must to some extent be borne by the Allies themselves.'

<sup>7</sup> See No. 23, minute 5.

<sup>8</sup> Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission.

The Supreme Economic Council has also taken note of the declarations of the English, French and Italian treasuries, attesting the impossibility of increasing the financial charges of countries whose resources have suffered so seriously from the war.

The Council finds that in any case the financial resources required should be furnished not only by the Governments participating in the Supreme Economic Council, but by all the other nations and it recommends the examination of the possibility of an international action of this kind.

The Supreme Economic Council, wishing at the earliest possible moment to place the surplus stocks of food of South Russia (as compared to the local needs of this region) at the disposal of general revictualling, draws the attention of the Council of Five to the necessity of considering, in anticipation of the time when Moscow and Petrograd become accessible, to [?the] supplying of food to the population of these cities.

## APPENDIX B TO No. 37

### Document 1

ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE OF THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION.

*November 27, 1919.*

Secretariat. C.R. No. 442

From: President of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.  
To: President of the Peace Conference.

I have the honour to forward you herewith copy of a note delivered to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission by the American Delegate.<sup>9</sup>

This note raises the two following questions:

1st) The necessity for the immediate creation, by the German Government, of a customs control along the Franco-German and Belgo-German frontiers.

The Organization Committee recognizes that it is to the interest of the Allied and Associated Powers to see a customs control established which would increase Germany's capacity of paying the debt incumbent upon her under the head of reparations. Besides, it appears from the most recent information that this customs control has recently been established.

2nd) The possibility of Germany exacting the payment of this duty on the basis of the value of the mark gold, insofar as such duty would not be in contradiction with the stipulations of Article 269 of the Peace Treaty.

The Organization Committee believes that it should recall that this question was discussed during the course of a conference with the German Delegates, at Versailles, on October 10.

That Conference, while not unfavourable to the payment of duties in gold, took advantage of it as an instrument to be used in exerting pressure on Germany and laid down the condition that Germany would have to furnish guarantees that the customs system (without Allied supervision) of granting importation licences for Germany would not in any way conflict with the application of Articles 264-5 and -6 of the Treaty.

Under these conditions, the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission renounced, for the time being, exacting the immediate payment of duties

<sup>9</sup> Document 2 in this appendix.

in gold, in spite of the interest of this measure from a point of view of reparations, in order to not deprive the Supreme Council of an instrument of pressure in its relations with Germany.

As this has been shown as unsatisfactory up to the present time, and the German reply concerning importation licences, copy of which is hereto annexed<sup>10</sup> being very ambiguous, the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission decided, in the course of its session of November 14, 1919, to indicate to the Supreme Council the important interest there would be from a reparations point of view to have a solution made which would permit Germany to make collections, without delay, of duties on a basis of the value of the mark gold.

Kindly accept, etc.

LOUCHEUR.

## Document 2

*Note: Necessity of the immediate creation by the German Government of a Customs Control on the French-German and Belgian-German Frontiers*

B-172.

8 November, 1919.

The American Government instructed its Delegation to call the attention of the C.O.C.R.<sup>8</sup> to the fact that it constantly receives reports mentioning that, on account of the absence of the customs control on the French-German and Belgian-German frontiers, important quantities of various kinds of products were and are, every day, imported to the occupied German territory.

The American Government cannot be indifferent to the existence of such a state of things, which deprives Germany of an important source of revenue and, consequently, has direct influence on its capacity to pay the debt which is incumbent upon her, under the reparations item.

The American Delegation is aware that, in order to assure its own protection, the German Government established on the right bank of the Rhine a customs control on the frontier of the territories occupied by the Allies.

After the ratification of the Peace Treaty, Germany will have the right to establish a customs control on the French, German and Belgian frontiers, but the gravity of the situation seems to justify immediate measures. Therefore, we propose that the Organization Committee should suggest to the Supreme Council to give the German Government an official notification of the authorization granted to it to institute this customs control under the date of November 20; and add that, according to the provisions of Article 269 of the Peace Treaty with Germany, the Allied and Associated Governments allow that the payment of the duties imposed be effected on the basis of the value of the gold mark, as far as these duties are not in contradiction with the stipulations of the said article.

## Document 3

*Memorandum submitted by the German Delegation on the Importation Policy*

To: The Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, Paris.

Referring to the interview which took place on October 11 with Mr. Maucière, I take the liberty to forward to you herewith a memorandum concerning the appli-

<sup>10</sup> Documents 3 and 4 in this appendix.

cation of the prohibitions to importations to Germany.<sup>11</sup> This memorandum explains the point of view of the German Government such as it is, according to the opinion of the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Bergmann, of Mr. von Le Suire, and of myself.

In conformity with the discussion which took place, I again remarked that it is very urgent and important for us to immediately re-establish the German customs houses, all along the frontier, for the application of the customs regulations and of the prohibitions of imports and exports. Therefore, I earnestly reiterate the request to cancel the instructions contrary thereto, which were given to the occupying authorities. Besides, I beg you to kindly inform me as soon as possible when the discussions will start, concerning the imports from Alsace-Lorraine, and during which it would be advisable to deal with the question of the imports from France in general.

DR. SCHMITT.

#### Document 4

##### *Memorandum concerning the Application of the Prohibition to Import to Germany*

In the meeting of October 10 of this year, the Allied and Associated Governments raised the question as to whether it would not be necessary to guarantee the uniform application of the German prohibitions to import, with respect to all countries, by determining certain quotas for the various goods to be imported and distributing these quotas in an equal manner. It seems that such a method cannot be realized. There is a fundamental difference between the application of prohibitions to import by the Allied and Associated Governments and by Germany. This difference is caused by the diversity of the situation. It is possible to determine quotas in the Allied and Associated countries for the importation of various goods, because the Allied and Associated Governments have so many items at their disposal that they can pay for the importation of goods in way of quotas. On the contrary, in Germany it is not possible to determine any quotas because Germany has no items at all, or very little, at her disposal. Therefore, in Germany it will be necessary to proceed otherwise. In general and in principle, Germany should prohibit all importations, and only make exceptions in certain cases, by an especial authorization.

Thus, there is in Germany a general prohibition to import. This prohibition concerns all goods. It was cancelled for certain goods; for a certain category of other goods, the customs houses were authorized in general to allow the importation of the goods in question to Germany, without special authorization. A list will be made and sent to you of the goods for which the prohibition to import was cancelled, as well as a list of the authorizations given to the customs houses. Besides, exceptions will be made to this prohibition to import, as above mentioned, in certain cases, by special authorization. These authorizations will be granted by a central service in Berlin. They should mention, in a precise manner, the names of the sender and of the recipient, as well as the kind and the quantity of the goods. They will be granted when the central service thinks that the importation of those goods does not prejudice the aims of the prohibition to import; therefore, it will be when the necessary items for the payment of the goods will be available, or when credits will be granted on these goods, for a period long enough and under favourable conditions, or when the exportation of German goods will compensate the im-

<sup>11</sup> Document 4 in this appendix.

portation of the goods in question, either as a result of a special exchange, or of an agreement between two different states. It is not possible to establish detailed principles with regard to the question in which cases especial authorization can be granted, on account of the diversity of relations and of the difficult situation in which Germany finds itself. In particular, it is impossible to determine in general the conditions of credit.

The German prohibition to import constitutes a temporary measure intended to surmount the consequences of the war and should be cancelled when the situation again becomes normal. At present, however, it is absolutely impossible to do without it, or else, the German rate of exchange could not again become normal. In future, the prohibitions to import could only exist as far as the various nations will agree on them; for instance, for hygienic reasons, for reasons of public security, for measures taken by the League of Nations, pursuant to hostile manifestations, for the application of monopolies and similar institutions, and for the execution of a national economic policy. On the other hand, it is out of the question to apply the German prohibition to import in such a manner that the goods of the various countries would be treated in different ways. This cannot be, on account of the very spirit of this prohibition. On the contrary, the German prohibition to export will be applied in a uniform manner by the Allied and Associated Powers [*sic*] (Article 264, alinea 2, Peace Conditions). As to the goods coming from the producing countries, if the items are available in order to effect the payment of the goods, if the necessary credits are granted, or exchange questions, either for each different case, or subsequent to agreements between the states, do not prejudice the German rate of exchange [*sic*]. In case it should happen that goods are offered by various countries to the Allied and Associated Governments for importation and under the same conditions, it should be considered, in fact, whether contingents can be fixed to the various countries in question. However, in the present state of affairs, it seems absolutely unlikely that this case might happen.

## Document 5<sup>12</sup>

### *Note for the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference*

#### *German Commercial Régime. Proposal of the French Delegation.*

1. In a meeting which took place on October 10th last with the German Delegation, the Allied representatives asked how the German Government intended to apply Articles 265 and 266 of the Peace Treaty, in regard to the German imports and exports.

The German Delegation only replied that the prohibition to import constitutes a measure without which it is impossible to do at the present time.

2. The prohibition to import which affect[s] nearly all the goods upon their importation to Germany, and the control existing on these imports, enables Germany to make differences to the detriment of the trade of any of the Allied and Associated States; consequently, it is contrary to the stipulations of Article 265 of the Peace Treaty.

3. The same difference is made for the exports which are subjected to a very strict control, as different prices are established or determined, according to the import countries.

These provisions are contrary to Article 266 of the Peace Treaty.

<sup>12</sup> Documents 5 and 6 are transposed in the original.

4. Now, the German Government requests the right to require the payment of the customs duties on the basis of the gold mark, on the French and Belgian frontiers, as is already done on its maritime frontiers; the French Delegation considers that, from the reparations point of view, it is advisable to give this authorization to the German Government; but it thinks that it is also advisable to examine from the same point of view the question of the measures taken by this Government, in order to reduce the freedom of imports and exports.

5. Although the economic recovery of Germany is necessary to enable her to repair the damages which she made, notably in France, it is no less necessary that the trade of the Allied and Associated Countries, and in particular that of France, be not directly prejudiced by this recovery.

6. That is why the French Government, after having closely studied the measures taken by the German Government, in order to regulate the import and export of goods, declares that its adhesion to the payment in gold of the customs duties on the German frontier is subordinated to the following conditions:

(a) Germany will restore full freedom of import for the products, a list of which is hereto annexed.<sup>13</sup>

(b) In case it should not, from the Reparations point of view, appear possible to lift the embargo on all those products, quotas will be established and distributed between the export countries, according to the average of the last three pre-war years, provided the share of France may not be under the average of her imports during the last three years, the calculation being made in weight.

(c) Germany will authorize, without restriction, the export of all spare parts for machines and rolling stock of all kinds exported from Germany. Besides, as Germany forbids the export of certain products which do not appear on the prohibition list, but for the reasons that they are provided for, either for deliveries to be made, or because they are used as substitutes, no prohibition of this kind will be made or maintained without the approval of the Reparations Commission.

7. The Articles which do not appear on the present prohibition list of imports and exports should freely go in and out, and this freedom should not be restricted, directly or indirectly.

#### Document 6<sup>12</sup>

##### *List of Products appearing on the German List of Prohibitions to Import and of which the French Government requests the Free Entry to Germany*

1. Wines of all kinds, including aperitive and medical wines.
2. Cognacs and brandies, and other products made from natural alcohol of wine, of fruit or fruit seeds.
3. Bonded liquors.
4. Flowers, plants and foliage for ornamental purposes.
5. Seeds.
6. Abrasives.
7. Graphite, plumbago, and stove-blackening.
8. Soaps of all kinds and in all forms.
9. Resins, gums, lacs and varnishes.
10. Animal and vegetable wax.
11. Slaughter-house waste of all kinds.

<sup>13</sup> Document 6 in this appendix.

12. Phosphates, superphosphates and dephosphoration dross.
13. Tartar, tartaric acid and tartrates of all kinds.
14. Rock salt and sea salt.
15. Tanning and tinctorial woods and their extracts.
16. Chrome, nickel, cobalt, antimony, and their ores and alloys.
17. Turpentine.
18. Miscellaneous perfumes.
19. Glues and gelatines.
20. Medicines and patent medicines.
21. Silks and miscellaneous silk goods, natural or artificial.
22. Woven stuffs and pure or mixed woollen stuffs, carpets, blankets and similar articles.
23. Cotton threads and cloths of all kinds, pure or adulterated.
24. Men's, women's or children's garments of all kinds.
25. Hats and hat trimmings.
26. Finished leathers and skins.
27. Baskets and basket work.
28. Exotic woods, in the rough or finished.
29. Corks and cork articles.
30. Porcelain and china articles.
31. Glasses and optic articles.
32. Mirrors and crystal, cast or blown.
33. Iron and iron alloys.
34. Plates or copper threads; all kinds of articles made of pure or alloyed copper.
35. Motor vehicles for passengers or goods; spare parts.
36. Spare parts for bicycles and motorcycles.

## No. 38

H.D. 109.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, December 7, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: *U.S.A.*: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyte Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: *U.S.A.*: Capt. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*U.S.A.*: Rear Admiral McCully, Mr. L. Dresel, Dr. I. Bowman.

*British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke, Lt. Col. Kisch.

*France*: M. Laroche, M. Kammerer, M. Cheysson.

*Italy*: Gen. Cavallero, Col. Castoldi.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

*Cost of Administration  
of Western Thrace*

2. The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation (see Appendix B<sup>2</sup>). On M. Clemenceau's proposal:

*Belgo-German Convention relative to the Reimbursement of German Marks held by Belgium*

It was decided:

to refer that question to the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission, for examination and report (see Appendix B<sup>2</sup>).

3. The Council had before it a note from the Polish Delegation (see Appendix C).

*Rights of Poland to Reparation*

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon that document.

After a short discussion, it was decided:

to refer to the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission the examination of questions relative to the rights of Poland to reparation, brought up by the note from the Polish Delegation (see Appendix C).

<sup>1</sup> The Supreme Council considered a letter from General Franchet d'Esperey to M. Clemenceau, dated November 15, 1919 (appendix A in original), in which it was stated that 'owing to the almost complete abstention of Italy and England, France remains the only large power taking part in this occupation [of Western Thrace] with rather important forces and, consequently, obliged to shoulder considerable expense. To my mind, these expenses cannot be borne by us.' General Franchet d'Esperey explained that in order to safeguard the interests of the French Treasury he had instituted an 'absolute separation' of (i) Military expenditure: 'As France is operating in Thrace as the mandatory of the Allied and Associated Powers, the expenses occasioned by this occupation should be paid, either by being distributed among all the Powers, or else by the State to which Thrace will finally be attributed.' (ii) Civil expenditure: 'Expenses of a civilian character will be entirely charged to the Thracian budget. According to the instructions of the Conference, the local authorities have been maintained, and under the control of officers of the Occupation Corps, persons of the country have been chosen to take the place of high Bulgarian functionaries whom it was impossible to maintain. A rough draft of the budget shows 6,000,000 expenditures and 8,000,000 assets—the boni making it possible to reimburse, gradually, the military expenses. In order to enable the Government of Western Thrace to function from the beginning, I am having a credit of 1,500,000 francs awarded to it.'

In the course of discussion 'Sir Eyre Crowe said he wished to remark that from the document before them it was only a question of meeting the costs of present military occupation, as the civilian costs were entirely covered by the local budget. General Franchet d'Esperey pointed out that the proposed budget for the territories in question foresaw an excess of receipts of two millions. That circumstance seemed to him a means of evading the present difficulty. Such an excess might allow for the reimbursement, little by little, of advances made for the military occupation.' In reply 'M. Laroche said that estimation only referred to a budget which was not yet working. General Franchet d'Esperey had even had to accord to the government of Western Thrace an advance of 1,500,000 francs to enable it to function until such time when a regular financial regime should be established.' In conclusion the Supreme Council decided to refer the question back, for examination and report, to 'the Financial Commission, in accord with the Central Territorial Committee'.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

4. The Council had before it a list of outstanding questions to be settled, drawn up by the Secretariat General (see Appendix D).  
*Recapitulation of Questions still remaining to be settled* M. BERTHELOT read that document. He said it would be interesting to have Mr. Polk point out to the Council before his impending departure those questions upon which he had received instructions and those he was not ready to discuss.

MR. POLK said that he had received a reply from Washington on the first question concerning the reorganization of the Supreme War Council of Versailles. He would take the liberty to speak about it with Mr. Clemenceau after the meeting.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would be happy to have a conversation with Mr. Polk on the subject. Then the question could be submitted at its next meeting.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he had not yet received a final reply from his Government, but he thought that their military experts favoured the adoption of the proposal which had been submitted them.

MR. POLK said that with regard to the extradition of the Kaiser he did not see why the question should come up again before the Council.

M. BERTHELOT asked whether there did not still remain the question of defining under what conditions the request for extradition should be drawn.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the text of the note to be addressed to the Dutch Government asking for the extradition of Wilhelm II had been settled a long time ago.

MR. POLK said that he thought the Togo-Cameroun Question was a question for the Council of the League of Nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU did not agree. He said there had been decisions of the Conference on that question, and that he had conferred about it, especially with Mr. Lloyd George.

MR. POLK said there had also been conversations on the subject in London between Mr. Lloyd George and Colonel House. The question had not come up before the Council during the time he had been present.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated the question would be examined by the Council at its next meeting, and the minutes of the Council relating to that subject might be consulted.

M. BERTHELOT said that with regard to the designation of the authorities to whom should be remitted the sums mentioned in Article 259 of the Treaty of Versailles, they were confronted by an Italian request. The question of substance had already been settled; it was merely a matter of designating the competent authorities.

MR. POLK said he did not remember that the question had been discussed in his presence.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that question might be put on the agenda of the next day's meeting.

M. BERTHELOT said the Italian Delegation had also brought up a request regarding the attribution to Italy, in the former German Colonies, of coaling stations for transatlantic navigation.

MR. POLK said he could not take any position on that point without instructions from his Government.

M. DE MARTINO said he did not insist to have that question put on the following day's agenda.

M. BERTHELOT said that the question raised by the creation of a committee for the distribution of rolling stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire had already come up many times before the Council,<sup>3</sup> and could be discussed the following day in the presence of Mr. Loucheur. On the other hand, he did not think that there was any need of putting on the agenda the question of the attribution of Western Thrace.

MR. POLK said that it would certainly be impossible for him to give on the following day a final reply on that question.

M. BERTHELOT said that amongst the questions which concerned all the Allies, there remained to be settled the general distribution of enemy merchant shipping, as well as that of oil tank steamers.

MR. POLK said that with regard to the question of oil tank steamers Mr. Dresel, who would remain in Paris, would continue the negotiations with Sir Eyre Crowe and Mr. Henry Berenger.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the question of the distribution of merchant tonnage did not concern exclusively the Reparation Commission.

M. BERTHELOT said he would submit a note to the Council at its next meeting. They would then have certain objections to put forward, notably on private agreements which had taken place between some of the interested countries.

He thought it would also be necessary to settle the question of the cost of the armies of occupation. Differences in points of view had taken place on the subject, and Mr. Polk had proposed that only a fraction of those costs should enjoy a priority right with regard to reparations to be made by Germany.<sup>4</sup>

MR. POLK said he had made a suggestion of that kind, but from a personal point of view, without binding his Government. Now the American Treasury did not agree with the views he had expressed at that time. He thought the question might be referred to the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission which might, after examination of same, submit a report to the Council of Ambassadors.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that that question concerned the military experts rather than the Reparations Commission. He thought, furthermore, that an agreement had already been made.

M. BERTHELOT said he would look up the texts and see where the matter stood: the question might come up the following day before the Council.

MR. POLK said that he would, as a matter of fact, be enabled to give a decision at the next meeting on the subject.

M. BERTHELOT said that the great questions of general policy could not, evidently, be settled on the following day. There would, therefore, remain only the question of distribution of costs for the Chambéry-Turin Railroad.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that was a question of improvements which had

<sup>3</sup> See No. 35, note 3.

<sup>4</sup> See Vol. I, No. 68, minute 1.

been made on the Modane Railway during the war. They had been decided upon by the Supreme Military Council of Versailles and had for principal object to improve, in the common interest of the Allies, the conditions of military transportation between France and Italy. It had been decided, in principle, to distribute the costs between Great Britain, America, France and Italy. It still remained to determine the total cost of the work and the conditions under which the distribution should take place. That question had already been examined at different times by the Supreme War Council at Versailles and by other Commissions. A final solution, however, had not yet been obtained.

M. DE MARTINO said that the Italian Delegation had sent to the Secretariat General, at its request, a list of the questions it believed should be taken up by the Supreme Council. He noticed that a certain number of those questions did not figure on the list submitted to them by the Secretariat General. He was quite ready to discuss the opportunity of putting on the list such or such a question, but he would have liked to have been enabled to point out the reasons for which the Italian Delegation thought it advisable that those questions should be discussed, and also to hear the arguments of the other side. He thought it would be opportune for the Secretaries of the various Delegations, assisted, if need be, by technical experts, to agree between themselves to put on or leave off such and such a question.

M. DE ST. QUENTIN said that it was easy to take up, point by point the enumeration which figured on the list prepared by the Italian Delegation. There was first a proposal for the appointment of a commission for the execution of colonial clauses provided for in the Treaty of Versailles. They had been of the opinion that the approaching coming into force of the Treaty made it unnecessary to organize such a commission, whose powers would necessarily expire as soon as the Treaty was put into force. The questions which that commission would have to examine would belong, after the Treaty came into force, to the Council of Ambassadors.

M. DE MARTINO said that the technical experts of the Italian Delegation were of the opinion that the creation of that commission would still offer certain advantages.

M. DE ST. QUENTIN said that their technical experts did not see the use of creating such a commission on account of the short time which separated them from the coming into force of the Treaty.

M. DE MARTINO said there also was the question which concerned the district of Radkersburg, about which the Austrian Delegation had offered a number of objections.

M. DE ST. QUENTIN said that indeed there had been various Austrian objections in that matter, but that, as long as the Serbs had not signed the Treaty of St. Germain, it was difficult to reproach them with regard to the execution of clauses of that Treaty.

M. DE MARTINO said that there was also a question relative to the military clauses of the Treaty with Hungary.

M. DE ST. QUENTIN replied that the French Delegation had formulated a

reservation on the total forces provided for the Hungarian Army under the conditions of peace.<sup>5</sup> That reservation, however, had been withdrawn, and a unanimous decision had been taken so that the question no longer existed.

M. DE MARTINO said that M. de St. Quentin was too familiar with all those questions to enable him to pursue such a discussion with him. Their list, however, contained other questions, and he contended it would be advisable to have an agreement on the subject between the different secretaries.

[5] M. BERTHELOT said they had received a telegram from Bucharest dated December 6th, 7 p.m., of which only the first part had been deciphered; it was a telegram emanating from the four Allied representatives at Bucharest. M. Vaida Voevod, who was the chief of the new cabinet, had renewed to the Allied representatives the assurance that Roumania was disposed to sign the Treaty with Austria, which involved the acceptance in principle of the Minorities Treaty. They did not yet have the rest of the telegram, but the beginning thereof was certainly encouraging.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he also had received a telegram from Bucharest which did not give the text of Mr. Vaida Voevod's declaration; it only stated that the text thereof was satisfactory *on the whole*.

[6] The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch on the question, dated December 5, 1919 (see Appendix E<sup>6</sup>).

*Purchase of Russian munitions of war in Germany for account of General Tcherbatcheff* COLONEL GEORGES commented upon that note. He said that General Tcherbatcheff had taken up with them the request to buy a part of the stock of Russian cartridges remaining in Germany and of which Denikin's army was in urgent need. The German Government had conceded a great part of the 150 million Russian cartridges existing in Germany to private parties, and had demolished others so as to get the metal they contained. The question raised by General Tcherbatcheff's request was a delicate one for the reason that Article 116 of the Treaty of Versailles expressly reserved to Russia the right to get back those cartridges, and because Article 169 of the same Treaty imposed upon Germany the obligation to restore to the Allies (and, consequently, to Russia) the war material belonging to them and still remaining in her possession. Russia might therefore in principle recover possession of that war material, once the Treaty came into force. To authorise the acquisition for money of that material might therefore seem

<sup>5</sup> See Vol. I, No. 38, minute 5.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained (i) a covering note dated December 5, 1919, from Marshal Foch to M. Clemenceau via the General Secretariat of the Conference enclosing: (ii) a copy of the letter dated December 1, 1919, sent by Marshal Foch to General Tcherbatcheff in execution of the decision of the Supreme Council of that date (see No. 33, minute 7); (iii) the reply of General Tcherbatcheff, dated December 3, 1919, in which he stated that his representative in Berlin informed him 'of the growing decrease of the cartridges (there are, at the time being, only 75 million instead of 150 million)'; this correspondence was as summarized by Colonel Georges; (iv) a draft resolution as adopted below by the Supreme Council.

contrary to the provisions of the Treaty. On the other hand it was difficult to reject the request presented by General Tcherbatcheff, taking into account the urgent needs of General Denikin's army in cartridges for small arms.

The Supreme Council, the question having been brought up before it by Marshal Foch, had recently decided to let General Tcherbatcheff choose himself between the two systems which might be envisaged. General Tcherbatcheff had just informed Marshal Foch by a letter, dated December 3, that on account of the lack of supplies from which the Denikin Army suffered, he reiterated his request tending to obtain an authorization to purchase Russian cartridges in Germany. Under those conditions Marshal Foch submitted to the Council a draft resolution which specified the special reasons why such a purchase was authorized as an exceptional measure, so as to prevent the creation of a precedent. Colonel Georges then read a draft resolution, which was adopted. (See Appendix E, Document IV<sup>6</sup>.)

It was decided to accept the draft resolution presented by Marshal Foch as follows:

'Owing to the urgent need of the Russian Armies, the Allied and Associated Powers will not oppose the purchase by the representative of General Tcherbatcheff of cartridges for Russian rifles which the German Government is actually supposed to hold, or which it may have disposed of to individuals.

This decision, motivated by the exceptional situation of the Russian Armies, is strictly limited to cartridges for portative arms intended for these armies.

It does not imply in any way whatsoever that the Allied and Associated Powers recognize the validity of the transfers which the German Government may have made to individuals of a material which it should return to the Allied and Associated Powers in execution of Article 169 of the Treaty and which should go to Russia in execution of Article 116.

II. The above resolution shall be sent to General Tcherbatcheff and the German Government by Marshal Foch.

III. The notification to General Tcherbatcheff shall be completed by the following addition:

While raising no opposition regarding the purchase of these cartridges and while reserving, in regard to Germany, the rights conferred on Russia by virtue of Article 116 of the Treaty of Peace, the Allied and Associated Powers desire to confirm hereby the fact that General Tcherbatcheff has been informed, in advance, that the purchase of the cartridges existing in Germany must be effected by the Russian authorities at their own risk and peril, without guarantee or intervention by the Allied and Associated Powers.'

7. The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch on the subject, dated December 5. (See Appendix F<sup>7</sup>).

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained a note dated December 5, 1919, from Marshal Foch to M. Clemenceau, concerning the matter indicated below. Marshal Foch expressed the opinion 'that the Allied and Associated Powers should, in principle, forbid these contracts which are in contradiction with the spirit of the Treaty of Peace. The draft resolution

COLONEL GEORGES read and commented upon that document.

*Purchase of Russian  
munitions of war in  
Germany for account of  
Finland*

After a short discussion it was decided not to authorize the execution of the order for Russian cartridges effected in Germany by the director of a Finnish munition factory.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 38

The President of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission informed the Polish Delegate, in an interview with him, that Poland's rights to reparations for damages of war by Germany and her Allies, in execution of the Treaty of Peace, would be contested in the Reparations Commission.

It is this Commission, to which the Polish Delegate will only be called to set forth the rights of his country, that has the final word. A detailed memorandum will be sent it on the subject, in which the justification of the Polish claims will be set forth from a legal point of view.

But there is also a political side which the Commission might not consider but to which the Polish Government believes it important to draw the French Government's attention.

A decision which would deprive Poland from all claims to reparations would produce a profound disillusion, it would alarm public Polish opinion in the extreme, and it might be interpreted by the public as a change of Allied policy in regard to Poland. For it would not understand why Russia, whose territory has suffered only slightly as a result of the war, should benefit by a right to reparations (Paragraph 116 of the Peace Treaty) while Poland is deprived of them, particularly as Poland has been almost exclusively the battleground of military operations in the East, and has been subject to devastation not less than Belgium or Serbia, and who finally, has agreed to assume part of the Russian debt.

According to the Treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain, Poland is to contribute to the mutual reparations fund considerable amounts to the credit of Germany and Austria. If the Polish claims are recognized, if only in part, the liabilities which Poland assumes in this way would be balanced. If the contrary should take place, not only would Poland be deprived of all reparations, but would be obliged to contribute to those of the others.

The need of reconstituting the industrial and agricultural life of the devastated countries, as well as the precarious condition of Polish finances, so harmed by the war, a war defensive in the East against the Bolshevist danger which is threatening all Europe, make it absolutely impossible for the Polish Government to assume any new charges.

PARIS, December 5, 1919

enclosed with my letter No. 5585 of December 5 [see note 6 above] provides for an exception to this rule only as far as the Russian Armies are concerned, their military situation being exceptionally serious and their needs urgent.'

## APPENDIX D TO NO. 38

### *List of Questions to be Settled*

#### I. SPECIAL QUESTIONS

##### A. *Execution of the Treaty with Germany.*

Reorganization of the Superior War Council of Versailles to centralize the executive measures for the military clauses of the Peace Treaty in Germany and in the different occupied territories.

Extradition and trial of the Kaiser.

Togo and Cameroun. Using contingents for defending metropolitan and colonial territory.

Choice of the authorities to whom should be turned in the sums of money referred to by Article 259 of the Treaty with Germany. Transfer, within a delay of one month dating from the entry into force, of the sum in gold which was to have been deposited in the Reichsbank in the name of the Council of Administration of the Public Ottoman Debt to guarantee the first issue of paper money of the Turkish Government.)

Attributing to Italy coal deposits for transoceanic navigation.

##### B. *Execution of the Treaty with Austria.*

Commission for the distribution of rolling stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

##### C. *Execution of the Treaty with Bulgaria.*

Attribution of Western Thrace. Administration of Western Thrace.

#### II. QUESTIONS TO BE TREATED JOINTLY

##### A. *Distribution of enemy merchant ships.*

(a) General distribution of merchant tonnage to the interested parties.

(b) Question of tank ships.

##### B. *Cost of the Armies of Occupation.*

#### III. GENERAL POLITICAL QUESTIONS

##### A. *The Adriatic Question.*<sup>8</sup>

##### B. *Russian and Baltic Questions.*<sup>9</sup>

Aaland Islands,

Bessarabia,

The rights of the Danube Commission in Bessarabia.

##### C. *Treaty with Turkey.*

##### D. *Treaty with Belgium and Holland for the Revision of the Treaties of 1839.*

#### IV. DIVERS

Distribution of expenses of the Chambéry-Turin Railroad.

<sup>8</sup> See chap. ii.

<sup>9</sup> See Vol. III of this series.

H.D. 110.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, December 9, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. F. L. Polk; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Arnavon, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. Hinchley-Cooke. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Rear-Admiral McCully, Mr. Ellis L. Dresel, Dr. J. B. Scott, Dr. Bowman, Mr. A. W. Dulles, Capt. Madison, U.S.N., Lt.-Cdt. Koehler, U.S.N., Colonel J. A. Logan.  
*British Empire*: Capt. Fuller, Cdt. [sic] Macnamara, Cdt. Dunne, Gen. Sackville-West, Gen. Mance, Mr. Leeper, Mr. Carr, Sir J. Bradbury, Mr. Malkin.  
*France*: M. Leygues, M. Loucheur, M. Cambon, M. Henry Simon, Gen. Le Rond, M. Laroche, Cdt. Le Vavasseur, M. Kammerer, M. Fromageot.  
*Italy*: M. Bertolini, Gen. Cavallero, Admiral Grassi, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Dell'Abbadessa, M. Manciola, Col. Bassetto, Cmdt. Fea, Col. Castoldi, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri, Cmdt. Ingianni, M. Antonucci.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

1. (The Council had before it a modified text dated December 9th [9th] of the British proposal of November 14th (see Appendix A), as well as draft orders for the Inter-Allied Naval Commission dated December 9th (see Appendix B).)

M. LEYGUES stated that the Naval Experts had asked the Council to define various resolutions taken by the Conference at its last meetings. Paragraph 1 of the resolution of November 29th (H.D. 102,<sup>1</sup> minute 1) should have the following words added thereto: 'Under the superintendence of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission.' The following paragraph should be substituted for paragraph 2 of the resolution of December 2nd (H.D. 104,<sup>2</sup> minute 6<sup>3</sup>): 'that the submarines already distributed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for propaganda purposes should not be made the subject of further attribution and should be allowed to remain in charge of those Powers now holding them but that those submarines should be demolished by the said Powers in the same way as the

<sup>1</sup> No. 32.

<sup>3</sup> In error for minute 9.

<sup>2</sup> No. 34.

other submarines, under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission.'

M. MARSH said that the new text did not correspond exactly to the proposal he had made. He would, however, if all the Powers agreed to adopt the same, recommend its acceptance by his Government. For the time being he could only accept it whilst making that reservation.

M. LEYGUES said that in the first paragraph of the resolution of December 4th (H.D. 106, minute 2<sup>d</sup>), it would be advisable to delete the last part of the sentence: 'such ships . . . for police work.' Belgium might therefore use in any way she saw fit the ships in question. Paragraph 2 of the same resolution should be modified as follows: 'to allocate a certain number of small enemy warships, chosen from amongst those which would otherwise be broken up by the Allied and Associated Powers, to Poland and to Yugo-Slavia, those vessels to be used for police purposes only.'

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether it would not be advisable to give the same privilege to Portugal which had suffered losses during the war. Portugal, as a matter of fact, had already made repeated efforts to that effect.

M. LEYGUES said that Portugal, like Greece and Roumania, had already received a warship in compensation of her losses at sea.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Portugal had suffered losses at sea, which was not the case with Roumania. It therefore had good reason to ask for more.

M. LEYGUES said that if they granted the request of Portugal, Greece and Roumania would also ask for something, and it would be difficult not to give them satisfaction.

MR. POLK asked whether a share could not be allocated to Brazil.

M. DE MARTINO said that 22 Powers had asked for the attribution of warships.

M. LEYGUES said it was understood that those ships should be employed for the policing of the coast and that they should be delivered without armament. On the other hand some modifications had been made to the British proposal of November 14th<sup>5</sup> which the Council had accepted in principle on November 29th.<sup>1</sup> The British note proposed a distribution of the proceeds of the sale of material accruing from the breaking up of enemy warships. It was now agreed that the material itself should be distributed. On the other hand, new time limits had been accepted for the breaking up of surface warships allocated for propaganda purposes. The time limit for the breaking up had been lengthened to 5 years, but at the end of 18 months those ships should already be out of commission. The naval experts had decided upon 6 units as the number of ships to be allocated to Poland and Yugo-Slavia for naval policing; that figure was perhaps too small.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the proposal provided that the allocation should be open to reconsideration by the Powers: was it at that time necessary to fix final figures?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would be too late to do so once these ships were broken up. A decision should be taken immediately.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 36, note 1.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 24, appendix C.

M. LEYGUES said that he proposed to allocate 12 small vessels to Yugoslavia and 6 to Poland. Brazil, Portugal, Greece and Roumania would also receive 6 vessels.

It was decided:

- (1) to accept the British proposal modified as contained in Appendix A, it being understood that the American reservation concerning paragraph 2 thereof remains; and to adopt Appendix B proposal;
- (2) that paragraph one of the resolution of November 9, 1919 (H.D. 102,<sup>1</sup> minute 1) should be completed as follows: 'Under the superintendence of the Interallied Naval Commission;' and paragraph 2 should be modified as follows: 'That every Power receiving enemy warships to be sunk or broken up should sink them or dismantle them within a period of 18 months and every such Power should complete the breaking up of such ships within a period of 5 years after their arrival in one of its home ports.'
- (3) that paragraph 2 of the resolution of December 2nd (H.D. 104,<sup>2</sup> minute 6<sup>3</sup>) should be modified as follows, with the reservation of Mr. Matsui's acceptance: 'That the submarines already distributed to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for propaganda purposes should not be made the subject of further attribution, but should be allowed to remain in charge of those Powers now holding them. But that these submarines should be demolished by the said Powers in the same way as the other submarines, under the supervision of the Interallied Naval Commission.'
- (4) that paragraph one of the resolutions of December 4, 1919 (H.D. 106, minute 24) be modified as follows: 'To authorize Belgium to keep the small enemy warships which are in her ports.'
- (5) that paragraph 2 of the same resolution should read as follows: 'To allocate a certain number of enemy warships, chosen from amongst those which would otherwise be broken up by the Allied and Associated Powers, to certain other Powers; those vessels to be used for police purposes only;'

that allocation should be made as follows:

Poland . . . . .	6 enemy torpedo boats
Serb-Croat-Slovene State . . . . .	12 enemy torpedo boats.

'The following States: Brazil, Greece, Portugal, Roumania should, if they should so desire, receive 6 similar enemy torpedo boats each;'

that no other enemy warship be allocated to another State with the exception of those above mentioned and those figuring in Appendices A and B.

2. M. BERTHELOT said that, from the telegrams they had received from Bucharest, M. Vaida Voevod had given instructions to the Roumanian Delegation to sign the Treaty with Austria and the Treaty with Bulgaria. On the other hand General Coanda had shown him the text of the telegram which he had received from the Roumanian Government in which he was asked to obtain a delay for the signature of the

*Treaty between the  
Principal Powers and  
Roumania for the Pro-  
tection of Minorities*

Minorities Treaty until the arrival of new Delegates. He (M. Bertheiot) had pointed out to General Coanda that such a thing was impossible and that the Roumanian Delegation would have to sign the three Treaties at the same time. General Coanda had admitted that he had instructions to do so. It was, nevertheless, true that their representatives at Bucharest thought that the Treaty should be modified and that the Council was to take without delay a final position in the matter.

M. KAMMERER said he had the honour of explaining to the Council the changes proposed by the Commission which had prepared the Minorities Treaty.<sup>6</sup> In the first place, the Commission was unanimous in proposing the omission in the preamble of all reference to the independence of Roumania. It was, however, of the opinion, with the exception of the American Delegation, that it would be necessary to omit in the same preamble any reference to the Treaty of Berlin. Lastly, it had been decided to insert in the preamble a sentence to the effect that Roumania had discussed the Treaty. That sentence was as follows: '... had, after a common examination, come to an agreement in order to execute the present Treaty.' The Drafting Committee had already given final form to that preamble. The essential question remained, that is the Jewish question. With the exception of the American Delegates the members of the Commission were in favour of the omission of Articles 10 and 11 concerning the Jews: those were the Articles which had raised in Roumania the most violent protests.

MR. POLK asked whether it would not be sufficient to adopt for Articles 10 and 11, the text figuring in the Treaty with Greece.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it was certain that the articles in question of the Roumanian Treaty entered into a great deal of detail especially on the Sabbath, when as a matter of fact the general principle, which alone was of importance, was recognized by the general clauses of the Treaty.

M. KAMMERER said that another reason militated in favour of the omission of the articles concerning the Jews. The Commission had examined the 'décret loi' which had been published in May last by the Roumanian Government. It was quite true, however, that that document was not entirely satisfactory. The fact, nevertheless, remained that they had given the Jews the option of nationality without condition, and what was more important to the Roumanian Jews was that they should not be treated as aliens. The American Delegation had not thought that it could adopt the opinion of the majority: it argued amongst other reasons that the Roumanians had not formulated any definite request on the subject.

MR. POLK said that at the present time Mr. Paderewski's Government was confronted in Poland by very great difficulties. The opposition reproached him especially with having granted too much to the Allies. If at this time they were to give the Roumanians more favourable conditions on the Jewish question than those which had been imposed upon Poland, Mr. Paderewski's position would be made more difficult. He proposed that Articles 10 and 11 be omitted and replaced by Article 10 of the Greek Treaty.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. No. 32, minute 3.

M. KAMMERER said that it was concerning Article 11 that the Roumanians were raising the strongest protest.

M. BERTHELOT said that the question was raised in quite different terms in Roumania and in Poland. The Poles held pogroms: the Roumanians merely refused to grant the Jews the rights of citizenship and the Roumanian Jews were protesting against that situation. He had received a call from the Grand Rabbin and from Mr. Edmund de Rothschild on the subject. Both had declared expressly to him what he had just told the Council. They had even added that the majority of the Roumanian Jews would prefer the omission of Articles 10 and 11 which, although they seemed to confer upon them a special status, seemed to place them outside the body of the nation.

MR. POLK said he admitted that the situation of the Jews was not the same in Roumania as in Poland: but what troubled him most were the effects of their decision of [on] the political situation of the Polish Government. He recognized, however, that a number of criticisms could well be formulated concerning the articles in question.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the British Jews would also prefer that no mention be made in the Treaty of the Sabbath.

M. DE MARTINO said that he had received similar indications. As, however, it was the pogroms which were especially to be feared in Poland, he asked whether there was in the Polish Treaty provisions which secured the Polish Jews from those dangers.

M. KAMMERER said that for all those reasons the majority of the Commission had deemed it preferable to omit articles 10 and 11 and to insert in the considerations the following paragraph: 'Lastly, considering that Roumania has declared her intention of recognizing as Roumanian subjects, with full rights and without any formality, Jews inhabiting all the territories of Roumania, and unable to claim other nationality'.

MR. POLK asked if it would not be possible to turn that paragraph of the preamble into a special article of the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that it seemed to him that it would indeed not be difficult to insert in the Treaty an article by which Roumania would declare that she recognized the Jews as Roumanian subjects.

It was decided:

- (1) to omit in the preamble in the Treaty with Roumania for the protection of minorities, all reference to the independence of Roumania, as well as to the Treaty of Berlin.
- (2) to insert in that preamble a sentence indicating that the Treaty has been prepared after agreement with Roumania.
- (3) to omit articles 10 and 11 concerning the status of Roumanian Jews, and to replace same by a new article in which Roumania should declare that she recognizes as Roumanian citizens, with full rights, all Jews inhabiting the Roumanian territories and unable to establish citizenship of another nationality.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU said they should adjourn the discussion of that question until Mr. Polk had been able to examine it with his Government and to communicate its opinion thereon. He, however, took the liberty of insisting that Mr. Polk be good enough to give an answer to the Council as soon as possible.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that as far as he was concerned he had already shown that he thought that their military authorities were favourable to the proposal, but he had not yet received the formal authority to accept it.

MR. POLK said that the recommendations he had made on the subject to Washington had not been approved, but that as soon as he knew that the Allied Governments were in agreement, he would insist once more with his Government and would communicate its decision without delay.

(This discussion was adjourned.)

4.

[Not printed]<sup>7</sup>

*Execution of Article  
259 of the Treaty  
of Versailles*

5. (The Council had before it a report of the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs dated December 9, 1919. (See Appendix D).)

*Frontiers between  
Hungary and Croatia*

M. LOUCHEUR read and commented upon the report.

M. DE MARTINO said he did not wish to break the unanimous feeling of the Council and that he would agree with the opinion of the majority. He wished, however, to point out that the new delimitation which was proposed to them would be extremely sinuous.

It was decided:

- (1) that the frontier of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, from the railroad one kilometre southwest of the station of Gykenyes until a point 9 kilometres approximately east of Miholjac-Dolni, should follow the former administrative line between Hungary and Croatia;
- (2) that the frontier should be modified in such a way as to leave the Gykenyes Barcs railroad entirely in Hungarian territory, including the station of Gola;
- (3) that the station of Gola should receive a mixed organization, allowing it to serve the locality of Gola;
- (4) that the Article prepared by the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs in

<sup>7</sup> After a brief discussion the Supreme Council decided: '(1) that Germany should be requested to transfer to Paris, under the same conditions as the Russian gold, by virtue of Article 19 of the Armistice Conventions of November 11, 1918, the gold deposited with the Reichsbank by the public Ottoman debt, referred to in Article 259 of the Treaty of Versailles; (2) that the gold when transferred to Paris under the provisions of Article 259 should be delivered to whosoever would be entitled to it as soon as the decision had been taken on the subject by the Allied and Associated Powers.'

its report No. 2 of April 6, 1919, adopted by the Supreme Council, and which places the railroad from Kotor to Barcs under international superintendence, should be inserted in the conditions of peace with Hungary;

- (5) that the Drafting Committee be charged, after having consulted, if deemed necessary, the Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways, with conforming the text of the Conditions of Peace with the above decisions.

6. M. HENRY SIMON said that the question which he desired to submit to the Council had already been brought up on January 30th at a time when the future of German colonies had been discussed.<sup>8</sup> Two theses were then confronting each other: on the one hand that of France and the Dominion Government[s]; on the other hand that of Great Britain and America. They had then agreed upon an intermediate text which had become article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations. It was stated in that article, that certain territories (Togo and Camerouns were amongst them) that [*sic*] no military instructions should be given to natives, 'except for purposes of police and the defence of the territory'. M. Clemenceau, at the meeting of January 30th, as expressed in the official minutes (i. c. 128)<sup>8</sup> had requested that the latter formula should be, if not modified, at least interpreted in such a way as to allow for the employment of those native contingents for the defence of the metropolitan territories as well as the colonial. President Wilson and M. Lloyd George had agreed with M. Clemenceau, and at the Commission on Mandates the Delegates, with the exception of the French Delegates, had wished to limit the employment of troops raised under those conditions to the defence of the Colony. The French Delegation insisted that the first interpretation be maintained.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the French Government had proven that it knew how to manage native populations. They had been able, while the war was in full swing, to raise 75,000 native troops without the least difficulty when it had been predicted that it would be impossible to raise over 30,000 without shedding blood. At the time of discussion in the month of January he had understood President Wilson to have some difficulty in granting to France what she asked for the reason that he feared to create a precedent which would oblige him to grant the same rights to other Powers but while he insisted upon keeping that text he had very clearly expressed, and the minutes proved this, that he accepted the interpretation accepted by France to the text under discussion. They could evidently not admit that they should have the right to raise soldiers in their former colonies and that such a right should be refused any of the others. The natives would think, and their prestige would suffer by it, that the Powers were holding them in guardianship. He did not ask that the text be modified, but wished to ask

<sup>8</sup> See *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iii, p. 803 f.

that the text whilst remaining as it was, they might be, however, able to raise troops without restriction.

M. BERTHELOT inquired whether the Council would allow him to read an extract of the meeting of January 30th:

[Extract from H. D. meeting A. C. 128, 3 January 30, 1919.]

Mr. Lloyd George said that there was nothing in the clause under review to prevent that. The words used there were: "for other than police purposes and the defence of territory". He really thought that those words would cover the case of France. There was nothing in the document which would prevent their doing exactly the same thing as they had done before. What it did prevent was the kind of thing the Germans were likely to do, namely, organize great black armies in Africa, which they could use for the purpose of clearing everybody else out of that country. That was their proclaimed policy and if that was encouraged amongst the other nations even though they might not have wars in Europe, they would have the sort of thing that happened in the 17th and 18th centuries in India when France and Great Britain were at war in India whilst they were fairly good friends in Europe. Then they were always raising great native armies against each other. That must now be stopped. There was nothing in this document which prevented France doing what she did before. The defence of territory was provided for.

M. Clemenceau said that if he could raise troops, that was all he wanted.

Mr. Lloyd George replied that he had exactly the same power as previously. It only prevented any country drilling the natives and raising great armies.

M. Clemenceau said that he did not want to do that. All that he wished was that the matter should be made quite plain, and he did not want anybody to come and tell him afterwards that he had broken the agreement. If this clause meant that he had a right to raise troops in case of general war, he was satisfied.

Mr. Lloyd George said that so long as M. Clemenceau did not train big nigger armies for the purposes of aggression, which was all the clause was intended to guard against, he was free to raise troops.

M. Clemenceau said that he did not want to do that. He therefore understood that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was adopted.

President Wilson said that Mr. Lloyd George's interpretation was consistent with the phraseology.

M. Clemenceau said that he was quite satisfied.'

SIR EYRE CROWE said that under these conditions he wondered why the question should be raised anew.

M. HENRY SIMON said it was raised because the Commission on Mandates whilst establishing the text of the 'B' Mandates, that is to say the African Mandates, had disagreed on the subject of article 2 of those Mandates which provided for the employment of native troops: while the majority wished to limit the employment of those troops to the defence of the colony the French

Delegation asked that it be specified that they might also be employed for the defence of the metropolitan territory.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they might maintain the text as it appeared in Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he accepted on condition that it be understood that for the interpretation of that text, they would refer to the Minutes of the Supreme Council meeting of January 30th. (I. C. 128).<sup>9</sup>

SIR EYRE CROWE said he thought he remembered that in the conversations which had taken place in June and July on that question, Mr. Balfour had said that probably the word 'territory' was a little equivocal, but that it gave France all she wanted. The best would be as a matter of fact to maintain that text and to interpret it in the spirit of the discussion which *had taken place* on January 30th.

MR. POLK said that that question had been discussed in London<sup>9</sup> and he could not take a decision. He would recommend that solution to his Government and he felt pretty certain that it would not make any objection to it.

M. MATSUI said that as they were discussing the question of Mandates, he wished to repeat that the Japanese Delegation on the Commission of Mandates had formulated a reservation on the subject of the 'C' Mandates. They might discuss that point another day but it was well understood that their reservation of the 'C' Mandates remained at the present time.

It was decided:

that under reserve of the American Government's approval, the words, 'defence of the territory' in Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations, and in the text of the 'B' Mandates, should be interpreted in conformity with the discussion which had taken place on January 30th, 1919 (I. C. 128)<sup>8</sup> before the Supreme Council.

7. M. FROMAGEOT said that a certain number of questions relative to the *Treaty with Hungary* Treaty with Hungary were still in suspense. The Drafting Committee would like to get a decision from the Supreme Council thereon. He would first wish to know whether the Council, as the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation had requested, meant to give to the Yugo-Slav State a priority concerning reparations.<sup>10</sup>

M. CLEMENCEAU said that was a grave question which he could not solve immediately. He proposed that it should be referred back to the Reparation Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that the Commission should make haste.

M. FROMAGEOT said that, in the second place, they had been charged with the insertion, with regard to Labour, of the same articles as in the other Treaties. Those articles had reference to a Conference at Washington, which as a matter of fact had already taken place, but which certainly were [*sic*] not official as no Treaty of Peace was then in force. They asked to be authorized to say in the articles of the Treaty with Hungary that the first session of the

<sup>9</sup> The Commission on Mandates had met in London in July 1919.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. No. 36, note 2.

Labour Conference would take place at a date to be fixed later. Lastly, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation in a letter of December 3rd had asked different modifications in the articles concerning Canals and Waterways. It would be advisable to bring this up before the competent Commission.

It was decided:

- (1) to refer back to the Reparation Commission for immediate examination and report the request presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation concerning the attribution to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State of a right of priority with regard to reparations;
- (2) that the Drafting Committee insert in the Treaty with Hungary an article stipulating that the first session of the Labour Conference should take place at a date to be fixed later;
- (3) to refer back to the Ports, Waterways and Railways Commission, for immediate examination and report, the observations presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation on the subject of the clauses of the Treaty with Hungary concerning canals and ways of communication.

8. M. LOUCHEUR said that the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had met that morning to settle the question of the payment in gold of customs duties. They had agreed substantially that they ought not to commit themselves to a definite future policy. The solution they proposed was as follows:

*Collection by Germany, of  
customs duties in gold  
marks*

The Allied and Associated Powers agree that Germany be immediately authorized to increase the amount of specific pre-war customs duties expressed in marks in such a measure as the Reparation Commission should deem it to be a just equivalent of the depreciation of German currency;

The necessary negotiations with various Powers on the question of import prohibitions into Germany, as well as the question of exports, should be opened or continued;

If such negotiations had not resulted within a period of three months in a conclusion which should be deemed satisfactory by the said Powers, the question should be entirely examined anew.

M. MATSUI said that as no Japanese expert had been present at the meeting held that morning he could not accept that text immediately.

It was decided:

under the reservation of Mr. Matsui's acceptance:

- (1) that Germany be immediately authorized to majorate the amount of specified pre-war customs duties expressed in marks in such a measure as the Reparation Commission should deem it to be a just equivalent of the depreciation of German currency;
- (2) that the necessary negotiations with various Powers on the question of import prohibitions into Germany, as well as on the question of exports, should be opened or continued;
- (3) that if such negotiations had not come within a period of three months to a conclusion which should be deemed satisfactory by the said Powers, the question should be entirely examined anew.

9. M. LOUCHEUR said that a sub-committee had been appointed to make an estimation of the cost of the Armies of Occupation during the Armistice. That sub-committee had very nearly finished its work but the question of principle still remained. Could each of the armies of occupation claim the complete reimbursement of its expenses, when as a matter of fact the cost of maintenance of the American soldier was nearly double that of the French soldier? Under those conditions they could only request Mr. Polk to examine anew with his Government the suggestion which he himself had proposed and which at a later time the American Delegation had withdrawn.

MR. POLK said that he held little hope of success.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that his Government also was not disposed to accept another solution.

M. LOUCHEUR said that under these circumstances he felt he must say that the solution which would be taken would cause in France great astonishment.

MR. POLK asked whether the question had not been solved by raising the rate of allowance granted to French officers and soldiers.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed that was so for the future: but the future counted for little in that question for the army of occupation would not be very large. It was only a question of the past and the brutal fact was that France, which had maintained an army double that of the British and of the Americans together, would not get a larger amount.

MR. POLK said that he proposed that Mr. Rathbone and the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission examine the question anew. Mr. Rathbone would then make a proposal to the American Government.

M. DE MARTINO said he was in accord with that proposal but in principle he associated himself with the observations presented by the French Delegation.

(The question was referred to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission for further examination.)

10. M. LOUCHEUR said that since he had conferred with General Mance he had acquired the conviction that there existed a complete misunderstanding on the attributions of that Commission between the British and French Delegations.<sup>11</sup> From the explanations given by General Mance the Commission would be organized voluntarily by the interested States, that is to say, by the States inheriting the former Monarchy to settle between themselves the movements of the rolling stock. Those States, so as to facilitate the discussions, were hoping to have as Chairman an independent personality who would not be a party to the question. Under these circumstances it was clear that the Reparation Commission did not have to interfere but the question of choosing the President was a delicate one inasmuch as Sir Francis Dent was too occupied at the present time to be able to assume that function. He had suggested to General Mance that France and Great Britain might agree on the choice.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. No. 35, note 3.

M. DE MARTINO said that he wished to be allowed to participate in that choice.

GENERAL MANCE said that it was a question of the choice of a person, and that the Powers did not interfere.

M. DE MARTINO agreed but asked to participate in the choice under these circumstances.

M. LOUCHEUR said he had no objection.

It was decided: to accept the principle of the British proposal concerning the meeting at Vienna of a commission composed of delegates from the States acquiring territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in order to regulate the exchange of cars between those states, on condition that the French, British and Italian delegates agree on the choice of a president who shall not belong to any of the interested States.

11. (The Council had before it a telegram from the Military Interallied Mission dated December 3rd, 1919 (see Appendix E<sup>12</sup>), and  
*Hungarian Peace* a telegram of the Hungarian Government dated December 4th,  
*Delegation* 1919 (see Appendix F).)

M. BERTHELOT read the two telegrams and added that the Hungarian Government seemed to attempt a sort of blackmail upon the Council by asking for the freedom of Souab [*sic*] and Magyar agitators. He did not think that the Allies ought to be drawn into the controversy, which the Hungarians were trying to draw them [*sic*].

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was clear that they could not ask the Roumanians to set at liberty people, the reasons for their arrest, which they were ignorant of [*sic*]. He proposed that they reply that it was none of their business.

It was decided:

to reply to the Hungarian Government to the effect that the Supreme Council did not have to intervene to obtain the freedom of agitators whom Roumanian authorities might have deemed it necessary to arrest.

12. M. CLEMENCEAU said that before adjourning the meeting he wished, in  
*Departure of Mr. Polk* the name of the Council, to express to Mr. Polk all the  
sincere regrets caused by his departure<sup>13</sup> and at the same  
time the hope that they would always have in him, better than an Ally, he  
meant, a friend.

(Approval).

(The meeting then adjourned).

*Paris, France,*

*December 10, 1919.*

<sup>12</sup> Not printed. This telegram contained an advance résumé of the request made by the Hungarian Government in the telegram of the following day contained in appendix F.

<sup>13</sup> Mr. Polk and accompanying staff of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace left Paris for the United States later that day.

*Proposal regarding the Distribution of Enemy Surface Warships*

8th December, 1919.

All changes from the British Proposal of 11/11/19 are underlined<sup>15</sup> in the following text.

In accordance with the preamble to the naval, military and air clauses of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, with the general spirit of that Treaty and of those concluded with the other enemy powers, all surface warships surrendered by enemy powers shall, with the exception of the few noted in paragraphs 2 (b), 5 and 6 below, *also paragraph (5) (II) and (5) (III) of Draft orders to I.N.C.* be broken up or sunk under the superintendence of an Interallied Naval Commission.

2. (a) *Enemy Tonnage of Surface Warships* shall be divided up between the Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with the following computation of losses of surface warships sustained by these powers during the war:—

The U.S.A. reserve	Great Britain	.	.	.	70%
the portion of this	France	.	.	.	10%
paragraph between	Italy	.	.	.	10%
the brackets shown <sup>16</sup>	Japan	.	.	.	8%
	U.S.A.	.	.	.	2%

(b) *Other Allied Powers which lost surface warships during the war shall have these losses replaced by an enemy ship of a type similar to that lost. These ships may be used for any purpose to which these powers may desire to put them. The distribution under this head shall be as follows:*

Greece	.	.	.	.	1 T.B.D.
Roumania	.	.	.	.	1 T.B.
Portugal	.	.	.	.	1 Gunboat

3. (a) Enemy tonnage in the above proportions is to be allocated to each country for breaking up or sinking, *under the superintendence of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission.* Should any country be unable to break up its share, *it may place it in another country for breaking up, subject to conditions detailed below, preference being given to Allied countries.*

(b) *The ships are to be sunk or rendered incapable of any further service as Naval War vessels, in the judgment of the Inter-Allied Naval Commission, within a period of 18 months and to be completely broken up within 5 years from the date when they arrive in a port of the power to whom they are allocated.*

4. As regards the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow Great Britain has stated her willingness to bear the loss arising from that incident; but now that it is probable that compensation will be forthcoming from Germany in material which is not naval construction, Great Britain agrees that such compensation should be divided in a similar proportion *to that adopted for the enemy surface warships* (Para. 2 (a) above).

<sup>14</sup> This appendix was preceded in the original by a note of the textual emendations to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Council on this subject proposed by a mission of the Allied Naval Advisers on December 8: see M. Leygues' statement in minute 1 above.

<sup>15</sup> Here italicized.

<sup>16</sup> No brackets shown in original. Cf. No. 32, minute 1.

5. In view of France and Italy being unable to build surface warships during the war, owing to their preoccupation with the war on land, it is proposed that they should be granted the following compensation in warships surrendered from the enemy fleets for use in their fleets or for any other purpose they may desire.

France	.	.	.	.	5 light cruisers & 10 T.B.D.
Italy	.	.	.	.	" " " " "

6. It is further proposed that the Naval Inter-Allied Commission shall loan to each of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers:—

1 Battleship  
1 light cruiser  
3 T.B.D.

This loan will be for one year and during this time these ships may be used for any purpose whatsoever provided that they are not incorporated into the navies of these Powers. At the end of a year after these ships have arrived in a port to the power to which they have been allotted they shall be broken up under the supervision of the I.N.C. or sunk in deep water, under conditions identical to those which were set forth in paragraph 3 (b) above.

*The material from the breaking up of these ships will belong to the Powers to which they were allotted.*

#### APPENDIX B TO No. 39

*Draft Orders for Inter-Allied Naval Commission for Superintending the Disposal of Enemy Warships. (Supreme Council. H. D. 102<sup>1</sup> (1))*

9/12/19.

1. (a) The Inter-Allied Naval Commission for superintending the disposal of enemy warships will be referred to as the I.N.C. and will consist of a British Flag Officer as President and a flag officer or captain from the U.S., France, Italy and Japan.

(b) Technical Advisers will be attached to the Commission as each member may desire.

(c) The I.N.C. may delegate such of its duties as it may consider desirable to the Naval Attaché in any of the countries concerned.

(d) Any of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which may not have ratified the Treaty of Peace with Germany when the I.N.C. first meet, may, pending ratification of the Treaty of such power, have a representative at the meetings, who may take part in the discussions, but will not be empowered to vote on decisions.

2. The I.N.C. is to assemble in London at as early a date as practicable without necessarily waiting for the Treaties of Peace to come into force.

3. The pay of the officers as allowed by their Governments, also their actual and necessary expenses, will be paid by each Government concerned. The general expenses of the I.N.C. will be shared by the various Governments concerned in the same proportion as the percentages decided on for the division of the enemy surface warships.

#### 4. *Surrendered Enemy Warships.*

(a) The Inter-Allied Naval Commission of Control (A.N.A.C.) will supervise the transfer of ships from German to Allied Ports, where they will be held in trust for the I.N.C. by the Powers in whose ports they are until they are definitely allocated to the Powers concerned.

(b) The I.N.C. will make agreements with the Naval Authorities of the countries concerned to have the ships sunk or rendered incapable of any further service as Naval War vessels, in the judgment of the I.N.C., within a period of 18 months, and to be completely broken up within 5 years from the date they are handed over to the said authorities in their ports.

(c) The I.N.C. will arrange with the interested Naval Authorities as to their visiting the yards where the breaking up of the enemy vessels is in progress.

(d) The I.N.C. are to render half-yearly reports to the Allied and Associated Powers as to the progress of demolition of the Enemy warships.

#### 5. *Ex-Enemy Warships and submarines which need not be broken up.*

Ex-enemy ships are allotted to the following Powers and are exempted from being broken up or sunk:—

(i) Vessels to be employed as the Government to which they are allotted may desire:—

France: 5 light cruisers, 10 destroyers, 10 submarines.

Italy: 5 light cruisers, 10 destroyers.

Greece: 1 Destroyer, 6 T.B.

Portugal: 1 Gunboat, 6 T.B.

Roumania: 1 Torpedo Boat, 6 T.B.

Brazil: 6 T.B.

(ii) To be disarmed with the exception of one gun to be used for police duties:

Poland: 6 torpedo boats.

Serb-Croat-Slovene: 12 torpedo boats (These vessels will not be employed until the maritime frontier[s] of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State are defined.)

(iii) The following States to have the option of receiving similar vessels if they desire them: Greece 6 T.B., Portugal 6 T.B., Roumania 6 T.B., Brazil 6 T.B.

#### 6. *Surrendered German ships.*

(a) With a view to facilitating the selection of the ships for the French and Italian Navies, vide paragraph 5, the 13 light cruisers and also 20 destroyers to be surrendered by Germany will proceed to a French port in the first instance, the French Government being responsible for these ships until the final allocation concerning them has been made.

(b) With regard to the remaining German ships, those allotted to the United States and Japan will proceed in the first instance to a British port and those for France and Italy to a French port. The United States, Italy and Japan should take over their responsibilities regarding the ships allotted to them, as soon as such ships arrive in a British or French port.

7. The following ex-enemy ships are to be loaned to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for the purpose of propaganda and experiments, in accordance with H. D. 102<sup>1</sup> (1).

### *Capital Ships:*

*Great Britain* Baden.

*United States* Oldenburg Class one vessel or Hindenburg if U.S. desires to salve her.<sup>17</sup>

*France* Baden, Goeben, or Oldenburg Class one vessel.

*Japan* Oldenburg Class one vessel.

*Italy* Tegetthoff.

### *Light Cruisers:*

*Great Britain* Nürnberg.

*United States* Frankfurt or one of the latest type L.C.s which may be available after the 10 L.C.s referred to in par. 5 (i) have been allocated.

*France* Emden.

*Italy* Sankt Georg.

*Japan* Strassburg or one of the latest type L.C.s which may be available after the 10 L.C.s referred to in par. 5 (i) have been allocated.

T.B.D.s. The U.S.A., Great Britain and Japan are entitled to choose 3 T.B.D.s each from those saved at Scapa Flow.

The allocation of the remaining T.B.D.s is deferred until the T.B.D.s referred to in par. 5 (i) have been selected.

In connection with the above the following vessels are provisionally selected:—

*Great Britain* V. 46, G. 102, S. 137.

*United States* V. 100 (1 1,300 ton 1916-17 class), 1 1,000 ton 1916-17 class, 1 750 ton 1916-17 class.

*France*

*Italy*

*Japan* (1 1,300 ton 1916-17 class), 1 1,000 ton 1916-17 class, 1 750 ton 1916-17 class.

8. (a) All ex-enemy submarines will be dealt with in accordance with H. D. 104<sup>2</sup> (VI),<sup>3</sup> of 2nd December and the general principles denoted above.

(b) The I.N.C. will select the 10 submarines referred to in H. D. 104<sup>2</sup> (VI)<sup>3</sup> par. 4.

9. The I.N.C. is charged with taking all [?measures] necessary for carrying out the decision of the Supreme Council in accordance with the following provisions<sup>18</sup> to which the Council have given their approval.

## APPENDIX D TO NO. 39

### *Report of the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs to the Supreme Council*

PARIS, December 9, 1919

#### *I. Claims advanced by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation*

Article 27 of the Conditions of Peace with Hungary determine that the frontier between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State shall follow the course of the Drave from the point where this river joins the Mur to a point situated about 9 kilometers east of Miholjac-Dolnji.

<sup>17</sup> The battle-cruiser *Hindenburg* was one of the German warships sunk at Scapa Flow.

<sup>18</sup> Not annexed to filed original.

By a letter dated November 27th 1919 the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State asked the Conference to maintain, in this section, the former administrative boundary between Croatia and Hungary. This boundary which corresponds to a former bed of the Drave, passes, sometimes North, sometimes South of the present bed but does not differ essentially from it except in the region of Gola where it attaches to Croatia a population of about 5,000 people living North of the river.

## II. *Opinion of the Commission*

The Commission of Roumanian and Yugo-Slav affairs examined the Serb-Croat-Slovene claim in its sittings of December 1st and 8th.

### *Opinion of the American, British and French Delegations:*

(a) That there is a definite advantage in maintaining an administrative frontier which has existed for several centuries and which is rigorously determined.

(b) That the Drave, not being embanked in this section, the frontier would be continually displaced from one point to another, and if, to do away with this obstacle, the present course were staked out, the line thus traced would soon cease to correspond to the bed of the river.

(c) The disadvantages, from an economic point of view, of the administrative boundary which cuts and again cuts across the windings of the river would be equal for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and for Hungary; the two States, to whom the Internationalization of the waterway of the Upper Danube guarantees the free navigation of the Drave, would be obliged to come to a direct understanding to carry out the necessary works.

(d) The administrative frontier, making the Hungarian railway from Gykenes to Barcs pass under Serb-Croat-Slovene control for a few kilometers only, would create a difficult situation; nevertheless, measures must be taken to ensure that the Hungarian railroad station of Gola continues to supply the Croatian village of the same name.

The American, British and French Delegations have, therefore, the honour to propose to the Supreme Council. . . .<sup>19</sup>

## III. *Opinion of the Italian Delegation*

A. The Italian Delegation, while appreciating the value of the geographical and economic arguments advanced by the other Delegations, finds: (a) That the administrative frontier between Hungary and Croatia, who were part of the same State, no longer corresponds to the conditions which should be met by a political boundary between Hungary and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

(b) That there is every reason for a political frontier to follow geographical lines, and from a military point of view especially, the course of the Drave, constituting the only important natural obstacle in this region, gives, for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State as well as for Hungary, the best frontier possible.

B. Desirous, however, of not breaking the unanimity of the Commission, it agrees to the propositions of the other delegations as far as the Gola region is concerned, from the bridge of the railroad at Gykenes to Belavar.

(c) As for that part of the frontier which is included between the last point of Miholjac-Dolni it declares that it has not received instructions and reserves the opinion of the Italian representative on the Supreme Council.

<sup>19</sup> There followed the five-point proposal which was adopted by the Supreme Council: see minute 5 above.

APPENDIX F TO NO. 39

*Telegram transmitted by the American Delegation<sup>20</sup>*

Monsieur Georges Clemenceau,  
President of the Peace Conference,  
Paris.

BUDAPEST, December 4, 1919.

No. 225.

The Hungarian Government has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the telegram dated December 1 by which the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers have had the kindness to invite it to send delegates to conclude peace.<sup>21</sup> The Hungarian Government will make every effort to act on this invitation within the shortest time possible. It desires, however, to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to a note previously sent to the Interallied Military Mission at Budapest, in which it sets forth that a certain number of people intended to form part of the Peace Delegation must be set free and furnished with the necessary passports to go to Budapest.

These persons are, particularly, M. Emil Grandpierre, Commissary of the Government of the Comitatus Kolozs at Kolozsvár, M. Louis Servatius, sub-prefect of the Comitatus Brassó at Brassó and of M. Gaspard Muth, at Fog[ar]as. Of these, the two first are imprisoned and the last mentioned, M. Muth, interned.

The Hungarian Government takes the liberty of asking the Supreme Council to have the Roumanians guarantee the security of the families and property of the above-mentioned delegates.

HUSZAR,  
BANDHOLTZ.

<sup>20</sup> A slightly variant text of this telegram, dated December 3, 1919, is printed in *The Hungarian Peace Negotiations*, vol. I, pp. vii-viii.

<sup>21</sup> See No. 33, appendix B.

No. 40

H.D. III.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held at M. Clemenceau's Residence, Paris, on Tuesday, December 16, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*France*: M. Loucheur, M. de Percin.  
*Italy*: M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Dell'Abbadessa.

1. M. BERTHELOT said that according to a note which General Weygand had just submitted, the British Government would not be in a position to send troops into the plebiscite regions before January 15th. Because of delays which had taken place in the coming into force of the Treaty that Government would have as a matter of fact to send into those territories not the troops then under arms, but troops of the regular army. Those contingents would not be ready to set out before January 15th; until that time only small detachments could be sent to the spot.

2. MR. WALLACE<sup>1</sup> stated that he wished to make a declaration to the Council to the effect that his Government had delegated him only to observe, and that he was not qualified to participate in the discussions. He was only to communicate to Washington what was going on. When decisions had to be taken he would have to refer to Washington and would communicate to the Council the answers of his Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council took note of Mr. Wallace's declaration. He would like to know whether Mr. Wallace had powers to sign the protocol with Germany and to approve the text of the reply which the Council would have to make to the German Delegation.

MR. WALLACE replied that he had powers to sign the Treaty with Hungary but had not powers to sign anything whatever with Germany.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would make this observation to Mr. Wallace—and it was a point which might well be intimated to the Government at Washington—that the signature of the protocol did not commit the American Government any further than did the signing of the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU felt that a remark should also be made that Mr. Polk had approved all the correspondence which the Council had sent to the German Delegation concerning the protocol.

MR. WALLACE said he would refer the question immediately by cable to Washington.

3. (The Council had before it, first, a note from the German Delegation dated December 14, 1919 (see Appendix A), second, a note from the German Delegation (see Appendix B)<sup>2</sup> third, a note from the Secretary General of the Peace Conference reporting the declarations made by M. von Lersner dated December 15, 1919 (see Appendix C).)

M. BERTHELOT gave a résumé of the German note of the 14th December drawing the Council's attention to the following essen-

<sup>1</sup> Ambassador of the United States at Paris.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In this short note dated December 15, 1919, Baron von Lersner informed M. Dutasta of the composition of the technical commission to discuss reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow, which had been proposed in the preceding German note (see Appendix A) and was expected to 'arrive tomorrow'. The composition was given as: 'Dr. Seeliger, Privy Legation Adviser, Mr. von Gager, Navy Commander, Mr. Schreiber, Privy Admiralty Adviser, Mr. Loewer, Naval Construction Adviser, Mr. Eich, Privy

tials: the first paragraph was important. The Germans declared in effect that they would not raise any difficulty on account of the absence of American Delegates on the Commissions. There were means, he believed, for calling attention to this declaration in suitable form: he had asked M. Fromageot and the Drafting Committee to be good enough to consider the point. The second paragraph raised a delicate question: M. von Lersner said that his Government took account of the interpretation given by the Supreme Council to the last paragraph of the protocol of the 1st November but in doing so M. von Lersner went a little further than the Council had done. To go by the German note it would appear that the Council had declared that its right 'to have recourse to measures of coercion, military or other, would obtain no longer than the moment of the reestablishment of the state of Peace by the coming into force of the Treaty'. That text would seem to say that after the Treaty came into force the Allied and Associated Powers could no longer have recourse to any military measures without actually making a declaration of war. It seemed advisable in his opinion, while noting that the German Government withdrew the objections it had formulated, to indicate that measures of coercion remained possible from the legal point of view even after the coming into force of the Treaty. He had asked the legal experts to prepare a formula in that sense.

M. CLEMENCEAU considered that they ought to make only a general formula and that it was very inopportune to speak of measures of military coercion.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that that was his opinion also.

M. BERTHELOT said that was precisely what he had wished to say. It was all the more necessary not to leave that phrase unanswered since the German note said expressly 'measures of coercion, military or other'. The only point in the remainder of the Allied note to which the German Government raised objections was the Scapa Flow incident. While accepting total reparation for the destruction of the fleet it had announced for that purpose that new proposals would be made by the experts coming from Berlin. The German Delegation had asked that a meeting be held that afternoon at 4 o'clock. The French Delegation on its part had no objection. The meeting would take place at 3 rue François I<sup>er</sup>. After that conversation the Reparation Commission could meet to estimate the value of the reparations that Germany offered. The German note made no allusion to the handing over of light cruisers. They would, therefore, conclude that the Germans accepted the point, but it would be well to throw light upon this point. As to repatriation of the crews interned as a result of the Scapa Flow affair, that was a question which concerned the British Government and upon which they could not make a reply until they had been told by the British Government of its point of view.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he would submit the question to London but there was another point upon which he would very much like to be enlightened.

Adviser, Mr. Blohm, Certified Engineer, Mr. Pretzer, Director, Mr. Muller, Labour Representative.'

The Council had decided that pourparlers of a technical nature should take place with the Germans before the coming into force of the Treaty in order to settle the procedure to be adopted. Had the German technical delegates returned?

M. BERTHELOT said that it was obvious that the Germans must be asked to send their technical delegates without delay, but he thought there would be no difficulty on that point. Von Simson had anticipated none and had even declared that agreement upon those questions could be arrived at in the course of two or three days.

(The Council noted M. Berthelot's statements: the meeting of Naval Experts and of members of the Reparation Commission with the German experts would take place that afternoon at 4 o'clock at 3 Rue François I<sup>er</sup>.)

4. (The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation dated December 12th, 1919, on the question of the Vorarlberg (see *Question of the Vorarlberg* Appendix D) and a note from the same Delegation concerning 'dangers of breaking up of Austria'. (See Appendix E).)

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had received a call from Chancellor Renner who in his conversation had shown the most conciliatory dispositions and had protested the good will of Austria with respect to the execution of the Treaty of Saint Germain. The Chancellor had appeared to be to him a simple and well meaning man. There was no doubt that his Government was confronted by very serious difficulties, and its situation would be compromised if he did not leave Paris with satisfactory promises on the subject of the provisioning of Vienna. He had deemed it advisable to assure him that at that time the Council was considering the Austrian question in a spirit of good will.

M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the notes which the Council had before it. He added that it was quite clear that separatist activities could not be tolerated without the consent of the League of Nations. Article 88 of the Treaty of Saint Germain was emphatic on that question. Under these circumstances it might well be opportune to transmit to Chancellor Renner a declaration which might be worded thus:

'The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, anxious to ensure the integrity of Austria within the frontiers assigned to it, and agreed to have the provisions of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye observed, declare that they will oppose every effort which tends to endanger the integrity of Austrian territory, or which, contrary to the provisions of Article 88 of the said Treaty, would result in compromising in whatever manner, directly or indirectly, the political and economic independence of Austria.'

Such a declaration would have as corollary the measures which the Powers would take in favour of the provisioning of Austria.

M. DE MARTINO said it was certain that from a geographical standpoint the Vorarlberg occupied an eccentric position in Austria and from that point of view the union might be grounds for long discussions. But the Council was confronted by a political question of the highest importance. If a separatist movement got a footing in the Vorarlberg there was no doubt that it would

spread to Styria, Carinthia and to the Tyrol. It would, therefore, be wise to stop immediately a movement of that nature. That was the reason why he entirely approved of the proposed declaration which was then before them.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he also approved.

M. MATSUI said that he agreed.

It was decided:

That the following declaration be submitted to Chancellor Renner in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers:

'that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, anxious to ensure the integrity of Austria within the frontiers assigned to it, and agreed to have the provisions of the Treaty of Saint Germain-en-Laye observed, declare that they will oppose every effort which tends to endanger the integrity of Austrian territory, or which, contrary to the provisions of article 88 of the said Treaty, would result in compromising in whatever manner, directly or indirectly, the political and economic independence of Austria.'

The American Ambassador undertook to refer the text of this declaration to his Government.

5. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that before hearing Chancellor Renner it would be advisable to ask M. Loucheur to communicate to the *Provisioning of Austria* Council the proposals of the Reparation Commission.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission had considered during a number of meetings the situation in Austria. It had taken the following decisions:

(1) An arrangement had been concluded with Italy in view of sending immediately from Trieste to Vienna 30,000 tons of wheat. That wheat would be paid for out of the balance of the credit of 48,000,000 of dollars which had been opened for the provisioning of Austria, and would insure Austria's existence until February 20.

(2) The Reparation Commission requested France and Great Britain to open a credit in favour of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State on condition that such a credit be used for the provisioning of Austria. France was ready to open immediately to that effect a credit of 50,000,000 francs; the British Government was studying the possibility of opening a similar credit, which would only be done if the Serb-Croat-Slovene State actually furnished the amount of food stuffs it was to deliver. It was certain that it had not done so in the past. They were considering the sending of a commission on the spot which would supervise the regularity of deliveries. That credit of 100,000,000 of francs would enable Austria to live from February 20 to the end of April. The difficulty was to insure the provisioning of Austria from the end of April until the end of September; the O. C. of the R. C. had agreed on the necessity of opening a total credit of 100,000,000 of dollars; it was, however, necessary in order to do this, first, that guarantees should be had, and in the second place that dollars should be obtained. Neither Great Britain nor France had any, and there could be no doubt on the subject, nothing was

possible without America's participation. If an agreement did not take place between America, Great Britain, France and Italy, there would be famine in Austria from the first of May: there was no means in the world of preventing that fact.

MR. WALLACE asked whether Mr. Loucheur was speaking in the name of the Reparations Commission: in that case Mr. Rathbone might be heard.

M. LOUCHEUR stated that the Commission was of the unanimous opinion that a credit of 100,000,000 dollars was necessary.

MR. WALLACE stated that if that question was to be discussed in substance he would ask that Mr. Rathbone be heard by the Council.

M. LOUCHEUR said that it was not a question at this time of discussing the point in substance. He was making a summary statement which the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission had asked him to make; but it was certain that they would have, either the next day or the day after, to discuss that grave problem with the participation of the members of the Reparation Commission. His duty was to tell the Council that famine was threatening.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council would hear the Reparation Commission at its next meeting.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the Austrian Delegates had on the other hand told them that the Vienna Government had received an offer from a Dutch group which was ready to advance 30,000,000 florins to Austria against the promise that, if at a later time the Austrian Government was to grant to an industrial company the monopoly of tobacco, it would enjoy a priority right for the concession of that monopoly. Mr. Rathbone had alluded to that fact in saying that they were eating the artichoke leaf by leaf; that was quite exact; but they had no other solution. The Organization Commission of the Reparation Commission therefore proposed to approve the contract between the Austrian Government and the Dutch group on condition that [? if] within two or three months, the Reparation Commission was able to work out, in order to float Austria financially, a possible scheme, it would be able to reimburse the Dutch group. From the information in their hands, that group would accept such a scheme. To summarize briefly, they proposed that the Council should reply to Chancellor Renner by giving him immediately relief and by informing him that they were going on with the study of a reorganization of the Austrian finances.

Chancellor Renner then entered the room.

6. M. CLEMENCEAU asked Chancellor Renner to speak.

CHANCELLOR RENNER then read the declaration contained  
*Hearing of* in Appendix F.  
*Chancellor Renner*

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would ask M. Loucheur to inform the Chancellor of the decision taken by the Supreme Council and the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission, following declarations made by Chancellor Renner and by the

members of the Austrian Delegation, had taken a certain number of measures involving immediate application:

1. Through the good will of the Italian Government and that of Great Britain, and with the aid of France, 30,000 tons of wheat would be sent from Trieste into Austria: that measure was already being executed.

2. France and Great Britain were studying the opening of a credit in favour of Serbia against the latter's delivery to Austria of the wheat it had promised her. The credit would only be opened in the measure where wheat would be delivered to Austria; an Allied mission would supervise on the spot those deliveries.

3. The Austrian Government had requested the release of a certain number of foreign securities which it had loaned when the first credit of forty-eight millions of dollars had been opened. They were now studying that proposal, and would be able to reply to it within eight days. They should, however, remark at once that they did not think that the securities in question constituted for Austria a means of finding within a short time the resources which she needed. Lastly, with regard to the loan for a first mortgage of the sum of thirty millions of florins, the Reparation Commission agreed to authorize the signing of the contract in question, with certain reservations which would be communicated that evening to Chancellor Renner, but which were not of a nature to prevent the execution of the proposed loan.

They had thus insured the immediate future of Austria. As far as a much more important programme was concerned, which had been submitted to them by Chancellor Renner, the Powers would examine it and would communicate their opinion within a very short time, but they found it impossible to give an answer on that day concerning the general question.

CHANCELLOR RENNER said that he first wished to thank the Council and the Reparation Commission for the speed with which the requests presented by them had been examined, and also for the replies which had just been made known to them. With regard to the first point, the assurances which were given them that 30,000 tons of wheat would be sent immediately had caused them great relief; they did not know a few days before whether there would be bread in Vienna for Christmas. He took the liberty of insisting before the Italian representative, so that the sending of that wheat should not suffer any delay: they would thus have flour for the holidays.

M. DE MARTINO said that he believed that the first trains were already on the way; if they were not, they would be leaving right away.

M. LOUCHEUR said that M. Bertolini, the Italian representative on the Reparation Commission, had given them the day before the most reassuring information on the subject.

CHANCELLOR RENNER said that with regard to the opening of a credit to Serbia, he thought he should point out that they had once before made a formal contract for foodstuffs with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State: under the provisions of that contract, and notwithstanding the great difficulties which they had had in obtaining them, they had deposited with the Serbian

Government 140 millions of Serbian crowns, and up to this time they had received nothing, or practically nothing.

M. LOUCHEUR said it was certain that Jugo-Slavia had not kept its promises. For that reason he was to meet the Serbian ministers the next day in order to take in accord with them the necessary measures.

CHANCELLOR RENNER stated that a few days before he left Vienna they had signed with Serbia a new agreement. Notwithstanding the great lack of rolling stock in their yards, they were lending her fifty engines so as to insure the transportation of that wheat. Unfortunately, however, on account of the late season which made it difficult to navigate the Danube, he believed it would be difficult to obtain it. He therefore feared that the happy solution found by the Allied and Associated Powers would not be sufficient to furnish them with the necessary foodstuffs. He hoped, however, that the mission which M. Loucheur announced was to be sent might achieve the execution of the contracts.

On the other hand, they were well aware that the foreign securities which they were asking the Council to release would not suffice to get them out of trouble. It was only an expedient. They were, however, forced to have recourse to it as practically Austria did not dispose of any more foreign securities.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the British and Italian representatives were awaiting the reply of their respective governments to the proposals of the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission. They hoped that in four or five days they would be enabled to communicate their decision to the Chancellor.

CHANCELLOR RENNER said that with regard to the monopoly of tobacco he was hopeful that the discussion which would take place that afternoon before the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission would have favourable results for them.

Lastly, he was happy to hear that a prompt answer would be made to the general proposals which they had presented. Already the concessions which had been made to them guaranteed that they would be able to live during the next few weeks. At that they would be receiving mostly wheat, and they lacked everything. The fact should not be lost sight of, however, that if they did not succeed in getting up a programme on the whole question which would carry them until the next crop, Austria would go from bad to worse; they would remain condemned to live from day to day. When they had left Vienna, their provisioning was only insured for three days! It did not need much effort to understand that such a situation embittered individuals, exasperated passions; and in order to establish a normal situation little by little, one should see clearly a few months ahead. He therefore took the liberty of insisting before the Supreme Council and the Reparation Commission in order that a methodical organization might be got under way which would last for ten months. If that result were obtained, he could guarantee that Austria and Vienna would work. People came to Vienna from all Eastern countries to obtain goods. As soon as they were enabled to

work they would have no difficulty in exporting their products and would thus be capable of earning their bread and paying their debts.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he would reply to Chancellor Renner that they were studying the programme which he had submitted to them; they were quite aware that the measures which had already been decided upon would only suffice for two or three months. He wished, however, to point out that the possible loan of thirty million florins would enable Austria to acquire other things besides wheat.

CHANCELLOR RENNER wished, before leaving, to thank the Council and the Powers represented thereon for the assistance which had been given them. He hoped that the message which they could bring back to Vienna before Christmas would be a consolation for the populations. But in any event he wished to state that immediately after the holidays they would make efforts to better their relations with Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia: they wished to forget the past and work together on the foundations laid by the Treaty of St. Germain.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Council thanked Chancellor Renner for the assurances of good will which he had just given. On their side they wished to express the firm hope that the promises made on both sides would be held.

Chancellor Renner then withdrew.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 40

##### *Note from the German Peace Delegation to the Supreme Council<sup>3</sup>*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS,  
ESH BULLETIN No. 14,

*December 15, 1919.*

THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION.

No. 58.

(Presented in French, by M. von Lersner).

PARIS, *December 14, 1919.*

Monsieur le Président:

In reply to the note of December 8,<sup>4</sup> I have the honour, at the order of my Government, to inform your Excellency of the following:

The German Government wishes to do away with the misunderstanding which creates the impression that in compensation for the absence, for the time being, of the Delegates of the United States in the Commissions provided for by the Treaty, Germany requests the *right* to have the terms of the Treaty modified in regard to the extradition of persons accused of infractions against the laws of war, and the repatriation of prisoners of war. The repatriation of prisoners of war has not been mentioned in this connection. In regard to the extradition, the German Government, before receiving the Allies' note of November 1,<sup>5</sup> stated the reasons which would seem to make it necessary to attenuate the terms of the execution of the

<sup>3</sup> The main part of this note was published with verbal variation in the British press on December 16, 1919.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 37, note 4.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 10, appendices B and C.

Treaty. These reasons still deserve, to the same extent, the most serious consideration by the Allied and Associated Powers. But the German Government has never made its consent to the going into force of the Treaty dependent on previous agreement on this question.

The German Government takes note of the fact that according to the intention of the Supreme Council, the right, as reserved in the last paragraph of the Protocol of November 1,<sup>5</sup> to have recourse to measures of coercion, military or otherwise, will only be effective until the state of peace shall have been established by the coming into force of the Treaty, and that the fulfilling of obligations, provided for by the Protocol, will not, from that time on, be guaranteed by stipulation other than the general stipulations of the Peace Treaty and the methods generally recognized by the law of nations. Under those conditions, the German Government does not maintain the objections made so far regarding the last paragraph of the Protocol.

The German Government also takes note of the declaration according to which it is the intention of the Allies to repatriate, from the time of the deposit of ratifications, the prisoners of war whose liberation, after the conclusion of peace, can no longer be subordinated to any but the conditions referred to by Article 221—conditions which have already been fulfilled.

Aside from the terms of the Protocol of November 1st regarding the destruction of the German warships at Scapa Flow, and in view of the relative unimportance of the undertakings in question, and in the expectation that the deliveries effected in the meantime will unquestionably be taken into account, the German Government will raise no objections to the contents of the Protocol. The German Government only wishes to record the fact that the delays and the infractions of the Armistice, which, according to the Allies, have taken place, are not to be ascribed to it.

As for the affair of Scapa Flow, the German Government renounces replying in a detailed fashion to the separate note which the Allies submitted on the subject. It limits itself to the following observations:

The so-called contradiction[s] between the memorandum of November 27th and the notes of June 28th and September 3rd do not exist in reality. These notes do not discuss the legal aspect of the question. The memorandum only examines the legal side of the affair, and sets forth the arguments that a court of arbitration should take into consideration.

Through an inaccurate translation, the sense of the passage of the letter of May 9th, from Admiral von Trotha, which was cited, is completely altered. From the original text, as well as from the passages preceding and following it, it appears that it refers to instructions given to the Naval Delegates for the negotiations at Versailles, and not, as the Allied note supposes, to an order given Admiral von Reuter.

In the order sent by Admiral von Reuter, June 17th, to the commanders of the warships, and which has just been published by the British admiralty,<sup>6</sup> it is stated that the Admiral should not destroy the ships unless the enemy attempted to take them over, without the assent of the German Government, but that the ships should, on the contrary, be surrendered to the enemy if the German Government accepted the Peace terms. This order proves, once more, that it is only the mistaken impression that the Armistice had ceased and that a state of War again existed which impelled Admiral von Reuter to act as he did. He thought it his duty to act, under those circumstances, according to the general order which,

<sup>6</sup> See No. 36, minute 2 and note 5.

case of war, imposes on every naval officer the duty of not allowing his ship to fall into the hands of the enemy. A similar order exists, besides, in the British and French navies.

The German Government maintains its opinion that the best way to arrive at a just solution of the dispute would have been to submit it to the International Court of Arbitrage at the Hague. This measure would in no wise have delayed the going into force of the Treaty nor the signature of the Protocol, modified accordingly.

The German Government can only regret that the Allies, on the contrary, should have taken the standpoint that it is a question of acts of war, the settlement of which rests with the victor. Desirous, nevertheless, of doing everything within its power to do away with all obstacles which may oppose a prompt reestablishment of peace, the German Government declares its willingness to make good the damage caused to the Allied and Associated Governments by the destruction of the ships. It cannot, however, carry out this reparation in the manner provided for by the Protocol of November 1st, as a careful examination of the matter has shown that the demands formulated in the protocol would compromise in an irreparable way the economic life of Germany and would end by excluding all possibility of fulfilling the other enormous obligations which the Treaty imposes on Germany. It cannot be that the Allies wish to demand that the German Government assume such a new obligation. According to the note of December 8th they are, themselves, disposed to avoid causing such a fatal injury to the vital interests of German economic life. They have declared themselves ready to examine the question as soon as the German port material has been surrendered to them. The German Government desires, immediately, to submit its data to the Allies and the other necessary data which will show to what an extent the fulfilment of these demands will harm the economic capacity of Germany. It has entrusted a commission of experts with the task of placing these data before the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers and to furnish them will [? with] all desired explanations. It will formulate at the same time definite and detailed propositions on a mode of reparation which, while creating a new and heavy load for Germany in her present position, will not be incompatible with her vital interests.

After having, in this way, declared itself ready in principle to afford reparation for the destruction of the ships in question, the German Government believes it may expect that the crews held until now on board will be repatriated without delay.

The German Government hopes in this way that it will be possible to proceed with the signature of the Protocol immediately, and to effect the coming into force of the Treaty, and the return of peace, so ardently desired by the German people and the entire world.

Please accept, etc.

BARON VON LERSNER.

#### APPENDIX C TO No. 40

##### *Note from the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference*

*December 15, 1919.*

In transmitting the German reply to the Secretary General of the Conference, M. von Lersner stated that he had been instructed with making the following point

clear: the German Government never considered it was its right to obtain a modification of the Treaty on the ground that the United States have not yet ratified and consequently will not be represented in the Commissions for the time being. The German Government adheres to Article 440, which stipulates that the Treaty will go into effect immediately upon the ratification by three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Regarding the matter of Scapa Flow M. von Lersner stated that a delegation of German technicians would arrive in the morning. The Delegates would be supplied with all the necessary documents. The German Government was desirous of having this Commission meet, if possible as soon as to-morrow afternoon, a Commission of Allied technicians. M. von Lersner assured that in this event the Allies by to-morrow evening would be convinced of the absolute impossibility for Germany to satisfy the demands of the Allies concerning the 400,000 tons requested.

M. von Lersner again insisted on Germany's very great and sincere desire for the re-establishment of a state of peace. But he added, begging that the Secretary General should not misinterpret his words, that if the Allies insisted on the actual surrender of the material described in the Protocol, the German Government would find it impossible to sign. But immediately thereafter he referred to the fact that not only would the experts enlighten the Allies but would propose compensation very acceptable to them. M. von Lersner brought out the point that the German Government, in this matter, has set all questions of pride completely aside since it agrees to reparation for acts for which it continues to assert it is not responsible.

#### APPENDIX D TO No. 40<sup>7</sup>

##### *Vorarlberg Question*

*December 12th, 1918*

From: French Delegation.

To: Secretariat General of the Delegation of the United States of America.

From reports which reached the French Government, the Government of Vienna and public opinion in Austria are very much concerned about the separatist movement which is to be observed in Vorarlberg.

The Landtag of this region discussed, on December 6, the question of its union with Switzerland. On this subject, it has taken the four following decisions:

(1) It asks the Central Government to recognise the right of self-determination for Vorarlberg, and to refer this question to the Supreme Council at Paris (League of Nations).

(2) These authorities are invited, in case of necessity, to proclaim themselves the right of self-determination of the country.

(3) The communes are invited to prepare the electoral lists, with a view to eventual plebiscite.

(4) The provincial authorities are invited to take the necessary measures, case they should have to exercise the right of self-determination.

These decisions have been communicated by the Landtag to the Chancellery of the State of Vienna, which has answered by the following telegram:

"The Government will close no legal way to Vorarlberg, if the Landtag presents to the Government in Vienna a proposition authorising the negotiations

<sup>7</sup> This appendix is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz: *The Treaty of St. Germain* (California and London, 1935), pp. 331-2.

Vorarlberg concerning its union with Switzerland; the proposition will be forwarded to Paris; but the Government will, at the same time, reserve the right to make the necessary declarations in the interests of Austria. Vice-Chancellor Fink's proposition, presented Tuesday, will therefore be accepted by the Government. The Government will, of course, be obliged to oppose, by every means in its power, any action directed against the Peace Treaties or the existing laws. It advises legal methods.'

The Allied and Associated Powers cannot remain indifferent to this question. It is certain, as the Austrian Delegation says, in its letter of December 2, that the separation of Vorarlberg from Austria, would 'lead sooner or later to a complete disintegration of Austria'. The demonstrations of the Vorarlberg people and of their Landtag have stimulated the ferments of dissolution throughout the Republic. It is reported that the province of Salzburg demands its reunion with Bavaria, and that a similar movement is growing in Northern Tyrol. The agents of the Government of Budapest are circulating through the comitats of western Hungary, which were attributed to Austria, organising an agitation in favour of a plebiscite. It may be remarked, on this subject, that the Austrian Government now realises the danger of the solution it had the imprudence to request in its counter-propositions.<sup>8</sup>

The decisions of the Peace Conference concerning the frontiers of Austria, determined in the interest of Europe, which inspired it with the desire to facilitate in every way the existence of this State, should influence it to give the Austrian Government official support in the question of Vorarlberg.

The Supreme Council might take advantage of Chancellor Renner's presence in Paris to transmit to him a declaration in which the Allied and Associated Powers state that they adhere, and will adhere, as far as concerns the territory of the Austrian Republic, to the frontiers which have been fixed by the Treaty of St. Germain.

The Chancellor might be authorised to publish the declaration of the Supreme Council. This demonstration would strengthen the authority of the Austrian Government in all the regions where separatist tendencies exist. Concerning Vorarlberg in particular, it would contribute to wipe out the movement which is gaining hold in certain Swiss classes for the incorporation of Vorarlberg with the Confederation. The partisans of the incorporation invoke the danger for Switzerland if Vorarlberg were attached to Germany. Now, this eventuality would be excluded, if the Allied and Associated Powers would affirm their desire to see the integrity of the Austrian Republic maintained.

## APPENDIX E TO No. 40<sup>9</sup>

### *Dangers of the Disintegration of Austria*

The deplorable situation now existing in Austria from an economic point of view favours all efforts towards disintegration instigated in the country by the pan-Germans who thus hope to annex the new State piece by piece by evading the provisions of the St. Germain and Versailles Treaties which prohibit the attachment of Austria to Germany.

<sup>8</sup> At the time of the preparation of the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye the Austrian Government had requested that a plebiscite be held in that part of western Hungary which it was proposed to attribute to Austria: see Vol. I, No. 36, minute 7.

<sup>9</sup> This appendix is printed by N. Almond and R. H. Lutz, op. cit., pp. 332-4.

The Vorarlberg Landtag decided, on December 6, to request the Government at Vienna to recognize a right of self-determination to the province, and to submit the question to the Supreme Council at Paris and to the League of Nations. Preparatory measures for an eventual plebiscite were taken, as well as provisions with a view to the separation from Austria.

In Switzerland public opinion is considerably stirred up, but is divided.

In certain circles, especially in the Germanic districts, a propaganda for the annexation of Vorarlberg to Switzerland is being conducted, while another current of opinion is hostile to such annexation through fear of seeing the religious or linguistic proportion displaced in the Confederation.

However, the Swiss Government has taken the following position, viz., that it will not favour the annexation of Vorarlberg to Switzerland as long as the integrity of Austria is maintained. It is only in the event that Austria would become disintegrated and the annexation of Vorarlberg to Germany a possibility, that Switzerland would support the independence of Vorarlberg and even consider its annexation, to prevent such an eventuality.

It is also agreed in Switzerland to submit the question to the League of Nations if need be.

On the other hand, an annexationist movement is being manifested in the Limburg [? Salzburg] district favouring Bavaria, and a similar movement is also evident in the Tyrol where it has assumed the form of a request for economic annexation with Germany.

Finally, the Hungarians announce that they will claim a plebiscite for the districts of Western Hungary, which were annexed to Austria by the St. Germain Treaty. The Government at Vienna, greatly alarmed, appeals to the Powers to obtain the solemn assurance that they will not permit a like destruction of the work of the St. Germain Treaty.

Article 88 of this Treaty is formal, and is drawn up as follows:

'The independence of Austria is inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Consequently Austria undertakes in the absence of the consent of the said Council to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly or by any means whatever compromise her independence, particularly, and until her admission to membership of the League of Nations, by participation in the affairs of another Power.'

These provisions were taken with a view to protecting European interests which exist more than ever and which should create a desire to favour the Austrian State by every means.

It is therefore proposed to accord the Austrian Government public support in the form of a declaration which might be drawn up as follows and delivered to Chancellor Renner:

'The Allied and Associated Powers, desirous of assuring the existence of Austria within the frontiers as assigned, and determined to have the provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye respected, declare that they will oppose every effort of a nature to infringe upon the integrity of Austrian territory or which, contrary to the stipulations of Article 88 of the said Treaty, would result in compromising in any manner, whether directly or indirectly, the political or economic independence of Austria.'

It is understood that in order to give full force to this public declaration, the Supreme Council should offer at the same time full security to Austria relative to her provisioning, and also take all measures necessary to insure her economic life.

Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Supreme Council:

In a moment of most distressful plight the people of Austria, in behalf of which we appear before you, in [?] taking refuge with the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers. We are well aware of the fact that here in Paris not only the political fate of countries but also the economic existence of nations are decided on. Our Mission is not a political one. In St. Germain our political future has been settled and our people, represented by the National Assembly, a body elected in general suffrage, has accepted with a majority of five-sixths of all men and women in Austria the terms of the St. Germain Treaty as a basis for their political existence and future, and thus adopted with confidence the system established in St. Germain.

Since that time our people have come into a desperate situation; seven millions of people are literally on the point of perishing by hunger and cold. In the name of humanity we implore the powers ruling the world to put an end to these atrocious sufferances unworthy of modern civilization; to put an end to this destruction of all working power, to the fearful mortality of children, to the physical and moral infirmity of the future generation!

May I be spared to picture to you the present state of our country and the suffering of our people. I know that the exhaustive and conscientious reports of the Missions did not leave the Governments of the Great Powers in doubt as to our present situation. The daily rations, which hard-working people have contented themselves to line [live] on, are so small that the more fortunate nations of the west could hardly conceive how a household could be kept on them. Today we are not able to deal out but a portion of said rations, and even that not to all of our people.

In Vienna we could only distribute 100 gr. of bread and flour a day and head, these last few weeks; at some other places outside of Vienna there was no bread at all. Nevertheless our people maintained peace and order up to the last moment. There is hardly a foreigner who did not admire them for [?t]his heroism. For this patience has been shown by our people now for years. With painful regret I have to confess that acts of violence and pillage have occurred these last few days. We condemn and punish such deeds, but the judges' verdict is influenced by pity. Unspeakable care has brought us here; we fear that we do not possess the strength to leave this place if this care is not taken from us.

For even these small and irregularly dealt out rations could only last till about the middle of January, at which time we will be left without any food. The Austrian Government could not remain in office up to the very moment when the last kg. of flour, the last deka of fat has been given out, and the six million people are facing complete exhaustion of all their supplies. The Government bears before its own country and the entire world the responsibility that mankind shall not be surprised by such a catastrophe, which is bound to deal a heavy blow on the conscience of the civilized world.

I hardly need to cite the reasons, which have brought matters so far. There are chiefly two reasons: our own country in its present shape was only able to produce even in good times of peace a third or fourth of the year's demand in breadstuffs. Therefore self-aid is of no avail to us. The second reason is that the agriculture of the neighbouring countries and of Eastern Europe is run down to such an extent that it yields only a small or no surplus at all. Our next neighbours are

mostly showing the best intentions, but we could convince ourselves that partly their soil, partly their railroads are giving out. The Austrian Government has in conformity with its duty and with the aid of the Great Powers made all efforts to assure our demand through agreements, but to our great distress we had to convince ourselves during these last few weeks, that it is impossible to build up our provision-system on an exchange of goods with our neighbours, and that *the East cıykd* [*? could*] *at the best supply additional contributions only*. This disappointment prompted us to look towards the West, and this was the source of our second more fateful embarrassment.

Even in case a credit for the purchase of foodstuffs should be granted in the West to the Austrian Government, the provisions could only then be started moving and therefore could not arrive in time, but at the best in two months.

Through our disappointment in the East turned towards the West, we see to our own great dismay, that *the time is too short*. We cannot wait until the provisions are shipped across the Atlantic Ocean. Our first prayer therefore is, that the quantities needed for the taking care of the minimal rations for the next two months be advanced us out of the stocks available in Europe.

The breakdown of our currency system, an event which has not its equal and could not be foreseen in its actual extent by any one, makes it impossible for us to pay in our own money. We therefore must pray that the food supplies conceded out of the European Stocks be credited to us 'in natura', and that we obtain at the same time a credit, which would enable us to buy immediately, that is to say in this very hour, in countries across the Ocean, in order that the grain shipped from over there not only could replenish the said stocks, but also reach our country as soon as possible, to be distributed there. Not until then can a regular provisioning-service be taken up.

This, however, requires on the other part that our people are placed in a position to have continuous work. We must work in order that we ourselves may provide for our living and meet the obligations imposed on us by the Treaty of St. Germain. In our country employers and employés have after months of deep depression following the catastrophe of war shown the best intentions to resume work, but lack of food and above all of coal rendered it impossible to revive industrial activity. For unfortunately nature has denied to the territory awarded to us by the Treaty of St. Germain any coal-field worth while mentioning. We can only obtain the necessary minimum of food and raw materials, if the leading Allied Powers grant us a credit sufficient for said purpose. The Austrian Republic as created by the Peace of St. Germain does not possess at present foreign currency, contains incoherent parts of the whole productive machinery of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and requires a transition period in order that its people could rearrange their activity in conformity with the changed conditions.

Such credits are provided for in the peace terms. The provisions contain moreover all guarantees which Austria has to offer and all means of control to which Austria has to submit itself in order to assure repayment of said credits and reparation. We realize that it will require a length of time until a complete plan for the execution of these peace terms is worked out and carried into effect. The Austrian Government and people therefore appreciated it greatly that the Sub-Committee of the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission was sent to Vienna several weeks ago, where its members devoted themselves with great zeal and pain to their difficult task. But I want to call the attention of the Supreme Council to the fact that this aid may come too late, if we are left in this uncertain state of

affairs for months to come and are prevented from resuming activity, living through all this time from hand to mouth. Under the present circumstances no conscientious man could remain in a responsible public position knowing that it is impossible for him to help, so that without the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers our country would be delivered to full anarchy. The existence and social order of our population being in greatest danger we have full confidence that our appeal will be favourably understood and be followed by an *immediate* intervention. Our life after being assured by your assistance we [sic] shall make all efforts to help us ourselves as far as our strengths go.

It would be our greatest satisfaction to reach the point where we do not have to come for help anymore as every state has to overcome its difficulties by itself.

The Austrian Government is fully conscious of the responsibility which it carries for the existence of the Austrian people and the maintenance of order in their own country. And—to be sure—we are pleading here above all the cause of the people. But we have the frankness to declare that we do not carry this responsibility alone, but that we are standing under higher duty while we are taking care of our people's welfare. Europe is still far from a state of political steadiness of organized economic affairs and of social security, which state to attain must be the aim of all fair-minded people. We have the feeling that our country is the centre of the actual economic depression and the spot where the social suffering has reached its highest point. Our breakdown is bound to affect the whole system of the new states created by the Treaty of St. Germain and of entire Central Europe; it is bound to shake up the economic conditions of the entire world, so that no country, no part on our earth could get away from it. Therefore we comprise all we need in this one prayer:

Give kindly to our state, which in full confidence adopted the system established by the Great Powers, by your support a chance to save itself in order that it may fulfil its duty at its proper post and in the same time in the service of the entire world.

## No. 41

H.D. 112.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, December 17, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*U.S.A.*: Colonel J. A. Logan, Mr. Rathbone.

*British Empire*: Mr. Leeper, Cdt. [sic] MacDonald, Cdt. [sic] Macnamara.

*France*: M. Loucheur, M. Leygues, Gen. Le Rond, Amiral Le Vavas seur,  
M. Hermitte, M. Massigli.

*Italy*: M. Bertolini, C. Amiral Grassi, Cdt. Fea.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu.

1. M. LOUCHEUR said that the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission had examined at its preceding meeting the general economic situation of Austria. He had had the honour of explaining the day before to the Supreme Council the measures proposed for providing Austria with foodstuffs for from two to two months and a half. There still remained to be examined measures of a more general order which would insure the economic uplift of Austria for a longer period. From information received that morning the negotiations concerning the loan of 30,000,000 florins which Austria was trying to conclude with a Dutch group were proceeding and it could be hoped that the pourparlers would succeed.

The Organization Committee had received from the Austrian Chancellor and from the Food Minister a memorandum which gave an estimate of the measures which would be necessary each month to insure the provisioning of Austria; that estimate gave the following figures:

<i>Monthly:</i>	\$
50,000 tons of wheat, i.e. . . . .	5,500,000.00
1,600 tons of meat, i.e. . . . .	1,000,000.00
3,400 tons of fats, i.e. . . . .	2,700,000.00
30,000 boxes condensed milk, i.e. . . . .	300,000.00
making a total of . . . . .	\$9,500,000.00 each month.

They would therefore, so as to take care during seven months of Austria's needs, require a sum of seventy million dollars as a minimum. The figure asked by the Austrian Delegation for the same period amounted to one hundred million dollars. The financial effort to be accomplished was therefore included between those two figures.

The Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission could only refer to the letter which it had sent on the 14th November last to the President of the Conference.<sup>1</sup> It had pointed out in that letter that it was not for it to decide on the principle of the loan to be granted to the Austrian Republic. That question was not within its competence and concerned exclusively the different Allied governments. The Organization Committee would therefore limit itself, in case the principle of a loan was adopted, to suggesting certain measures of protection, such as the establishment of a certain control over the finances of Austria. The Austrian Government should furthermore promise to have certain financial laws voted so as to give the Powers all

<sup>1</sup> See No. 27, minute 4 and appendix E.

desirable guarantees. Before examining those questions in detail, it was, however, advisable to solve the question of principle and to know whether they intended or not to grant Austria an important loan which might vary between seventy and one hundred millions of dollars; that was a question which the Organization Committee now asked the Conference to settle.

M. CAMBON said it was important to settle before anything else the question of principle, and he would ask the representative of the United States of America to give his opinion on the matter.

MR. WALLACE said that he would refer the question to his government that very day, and hoped to obtain a reply within two or three days.

M. CAMBON said it seemed to him extremely important, as well as to the French Government, to come as promptly as possible to Austria's help, so as to avoid throwing into absolute want the population of the small Austrian State which the Allies had just created.

MR. WALLACE said that M. Cambon had not been present at the preceding meeting where he had very clearly stated his position. His principal duty consisted in following the meetings of the Council as an observer and in forwarding immediately to his government all questions of a nature to be submitted to its decision. He did not have the necessary powers to express before the Council opinions which would be binding upon the American Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question had already come up before the Council and it had been decided that it concerned the governments alone.<sup>1</sup> The British Government, as a matter of fact, was ready to bear its share of the expenses involved in the economic reestablishment of Austria, but only on the formal condition that America should also stand its share. That consideration was all the stronger as in the actual state of the financial market nothing of any value could be done without the help of the United States. It was not pounds or francs that they needed, but dollars, which they could only obtain from the United States. His Government had made every effort to arrive at an agreement on the subject with the Government at Washington. It had telegraphed many times, but no decision seemed to have been yet taken at Washington. They still hoped that a favourable decision might be taken in the United States, and if so, he could assure the Council that his Government would act in the most sympathetic spirit towards the Austrian Republic.

M. DE MARTINO said that they had the strongest reasons, as well from a humanitarian as from a political point of view, for coming quickly to Austria's help, whose actual situation appeared extremely serious. They had, however, as Sir Eyre Crowe recalled, decided that it belonged to the governments alone to take decision on the loan which should be granted to the government at Vienna. The Italian Government had not yet taken a decision, and it was natural that it should await, before doing so, the result of the negotiations taking place between London and Washington. It was indeed a question of obtaining dollars, which the United States alone were able to supply.

M. MATSUI said that he had also referred that question to his Government and had not yet received a reply. He was therefore not able to state precisely what attitude would be adopted by the Japanese Government; but he hoped that it would be able to participate in the common task.

M. CAMBON said that under those conditions he did not see that they could do anything more on that day, and he proposed to adjourn the discussion until such time as the interested governments would have made known their decisions.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished to ask how far they had got on the question of wheat, which the Serbian Government was to deliver to Austria. Numerous difficulties had come up on the subject, and he hoped M. Loucheur had been able to obtain from the Serbian Delegates the promise that they would fulfil their contract.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he was going to see that very afternoon Mr. Trumbitch as well as the Serbian Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Lascovitch. As he had informed the Council on the preceding day, he intended to propose that an interallied commission be sent which would be charged with the verification on the spot of the conditions under which the food stuffs were sent, and which would insure the satisfactory settlement of all questions concerning the performance of the contract made between Austria and the Jugo-Slav Government.

(The discussion on that question was adjourned to a later date.)

2. M. LOUCHEUR read and commented on a note of the Organization Committee on the subject. (See Appendix A.)<sup>2</sup> He said that the difference of interpretation which had taken place in the Committee of Organization concerning the resolutions adopted by the Council on the 6th and 9th of December seemed to be of merely academic interest. As a matter of fact, Germany having sent delegates to Paris with a view to signing the protocol, and the latter appearing on the whole to be in a conciliatory spirit, it might be hoped that the exchange of ratifications might take place within a very few days and that the Treaty might then come into force. He did not,

*Collection by Germany  
of customs duties in gold  
marks*

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This note, dated December 15, 1919, reported that the British and American representatives on the committee considered that the resolution on this subject adopted by the Supreme Council on December 9 (No. 39, minute 8) 'included the suppression' of paragraph 3 of the resolution adopted on December 6 (No. 37, minute 2): whereas the Belgian, French and Italian representatives considered that the decision of December 9 was 'subject to the reservation' of paragraph 3 of the decision of December 6. The American, British and Italian representatives advised the Supreme Council of their opinion that 'in the interest of Reparations, No. 3 of the decision of December 6 should be modified and the proposition adopted by the Committee should immediately be communicated to Germany. . . . Placing themselves on the standpoint of "Reparations", the French and Belgian Delegates were of the opinion that the payment of customs duties on a gold basis should be authorized. But, from the same point of view, and in the superior interest of Reparations, those two delegates were also of the opinion that all measures for exerting pressure which may bring about the rapid ratification of the Treaty, should be maintained, and, consequently, the annulment of No. 3 of the Resolution of the Supreme Council of December 6th, should not be requested.'

however, see any objection to addressing at this time a letter to the Germans telling them what it had done at its meeting of December 9th (H.D. 110).<sup>3</sup> If the Council so decided the Organization Committee would immediately prepare a draft letter which would be submitted to the Council.

It was decided:

that the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission should submit to the Council a draft letter to the German Delegation informing it of the decisions taken by the Council at its meeting of December 9 (H.D. 110)<sup>3</sup> concerning the question of collection by Germany of the customs duties in gold marks.

3. M. LOUCHEUR said that the members of the Reparation Commission had held a meeting on the previous day with the naval experts and those sent by Germany at which it had been discussed the questions [*sic*] relative to the reparations claimed for the Scapa Flow affair. They knew that by the last German note Germany declared itself unable to surrender the 400,000 tons of naval material which had been claimed from her. They thought, however, that the

*Report of the conference  
between the Allied and  
German delegates on the  
subject of reparations  
claimed by the Supreme  
Council for the Scapa  
Flow sinking*

Germans were going to propose compensations of another order. Indeed, the German note stated that 'the German Government has charged a commission of experts to put these data before the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, and to give them the necessary explanations; it will formulate at the same time precise and definite proposals for a mode of reparations which, although it would mean a new and heavy burden for Germany in its present situation, would not be contrary to its vital interests';<sup>4</sup> that sentence seemed to indicate on the part of the Germans an intention to offer compensation to the Allied Powers for that part of the claimed naval material which they declared they were unable to surrender.

The Germans, however, had not made any proposal of that kind. They had been satisfied with giving a list of material actually existing in their ports, which they estimated approximately at 700,000 tons, of which 500,000 tons were docks and the remainder dredges, tugs, etc. The figures given by the Germans did not agree with those furnished by the Allies' own experts. The difference was approximately one of 85,000 to 90,000 tons. As a matter of fact a meeting between their naval experts and those of the Germans had been held on the previous evening. The figures given by the two parties had been compared, but he did not yet know the results obtained at that meeting.

Supposing, however, that the figures as given by the Germans were correct, the Germans offered to deliver to the Allies 192,000 tons out of the 700,000 which they claimed to have. He made no difficulty in admitting that, if the Germans only possessed 700,000 tons of port material, they could not surrender 400,000 thereof. But the important point was that the Germans up to this time offered no compensation whatsoever for the 208,000 tons which they declared they were unable to surrender.

<sup>3</sup> No. 39, minute 8.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 40, appendix A.

Under those conditions a first question came up on which they needed a decision of the Supreme Council. Should their Committee limit itself to examining whether the Germans were offering them a sufficient proportion of their available port material? Should they, on the contrary, examine what compensations the Germans could give them? From a purely personal point of view it seemed to him that they might request the Germans that they promise to build within a time limit of from three to five years a quantity of docks corresponding to the 208,000 tons which they refused to surrender.

Contrary to their expectations, the Germans had also raised the question of the five light cruisers which, according to the provisions of the protocol, were to be delivered to the Allies. The Germans insisted on keeping those five cruisers, maintaining that their ports and coastline would remain without proper defence if those ships were taken away from them. They offered in exchange to surrender to the Allies five other cruisers actually under construction. They, however, had been unable to furnish any precise time when the building of those cruisers would be completed. The Germans were to get information from Berlin on the subject, and the experts might probably know where they stood on the following day. Before examining that question, however, it was important that the Council take a decision as to whether the Organization Committee should or should not be asked to examine what compensations the Germans could furnish for that part of the material which had been claimed and which they declared it was impossible for them to surrender.

M. LEYGUES said that before seeking for a compensation, it would be necessary first to confirm the exactness of the figures given by the Germans. The figures which had been arrived at by their experts after a conscientious and thorough search, coincided in fact with the data furnished in 1916 by a special German review, the *Germanischer Lloyd*. As they had naval experts on the spot, they might ask them to verify rapidly in the German ports the correctness of the figures which had been given them. If they found out that those figures were exact, they might look for compensation in another direction. But the difference was too important, approaching at least 85,000 tons, for them to accept without any verification whatsoever the figures given by the Germans.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he quite realized the importance of verifying the German figures. But such an investigation might necessarily take a certain time, and it was important before all not to delay the signature of the protocol, and consequently the coming into force of the Treaty. They might proceed at once with the signature of the protocol, accepting the German figures under reserve of later verification which might be made quite rapidly. If the figures given by the Germans were found to be wrong, the Allied and Associated Powers would thus be enabled to increase their claims. He did not think that the Germans would object to such a procedure for they had informed them on the preceding day that their data were exact to within five percent. It belonged, however, to the Council to reply to the question which he had put a few minutes ago. Should the Organization Committee

of the Reparations Commission be charged with finding another form of compensation?

MR. WALLACE asked whether the Organization Committee could not give an opinion to the Council on the question of principle raised.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he did not think that the Organization Committee would be in a position to do so. It was, as a matter of fact, a political question in the first place. Should the Allies maintain the point of view they had expressed to Germany in the shape of an ultimatum? From the special point of view which interested the Reparation Commission the question was a secondary one. It was indeed quite clear that they would not be able to make the Germans pay twice, and that what they would pay on the one hand they would not pay on the other.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he fully agreed with Mr. Loucheur that it was an essentially political question, and for that reason he was not in a position to take an immediate decision. He had telegraphed to his Government on the previous evening explaining the general lines of the situation as it appeared to him. They should not forget that their last note demanded from Germany the signature of the protocol as it stood. It was only after that signature that the Powers were to examine whether certain concessions could be made to Germany. The first question before them, therefore, was to know whether they ought to abandon the principle which they had formally laid down. It should indeed not be lost sight of that the Germans were trying to bring them round to a procedure which was just the opposite. They wished to bargain first and sign afterwards. He had drawn the attention of the British Government to the fact that the German Government had been satisfied with offering them half of what they had demanded from it, without giving detailed explanations on that reduction.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he must admit that the Germans had handed to them a very long and rather complete memorandum on the subject. He thought, however, that it was quite certain that a complete acceptance of their demands would throw German navigation into very deep trouble, especially on account of the lack of tugs.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was whether the Organization Committee was in a position to judge on the German claims from the indications furnished by that memorandum, without having recourse to an investigation on the spot. He would add that his own experts had told him that the explanations given in the German memorandum were very vague and were confined to ideas of a very general character. He would, however, refer that question also to his Government.

M. LOUCHEUR said that in the next conversation he would have with the Germans he would ask them for more precisions and would make every effort to force them to put their cards on the table.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the third point which had attracted his attention was the remarkable discrepancy in the figures of the port material then in Germany. For example: in the list drawn up by the Allies figured two floating docks of very large dimensions at Dantzig. According to the Ger-

mans there were no docks at Dantzig. As it happened they had in Paris certain of their Allied experts who, he was assured, had seen those docks at Dantzig with their own eyes. When the Germans told them that those docks did not exist it might well be that they simply meant that they had been sold. That would be a fact which would be easy to verify as they had people at Dantzig. An answer could be had in two or three days.

To sum up, he would say that he could not express an opinion on the procedure to be followed towards the Germans, for the reason that the question of procedure was closely allied to that of principle. Four questions were raised:

1. Could they abandon the principle they had sustained until now towards the Germans, namely that they, the Germans, should sign the protocol before any discussion, and that it would only be then that the Council would examine concessions they might eventually make?

2. Were there grounds for verifying on the spot the data furnished by the Germans?

3. Were they ready to make concessions in the amount of material claimed by them, and, if so, how far should those concessions go?

4. Lastly, should they look for a compensation for that part of the tonnage which the Germans said they were incapable of handing over?

On the other hand, he was very much struck by the views expressed by Mr. Loucheur on the necessity of arriving at an agreement as soon as possible so as not to delay once more the coming into force of the Treaty.

M. DE MARTINO said that there was no doubt that the pourparlers which were going on concealed the Germans' desire to bargain and to obtain some advantages before the signature. They certainly had great interest in preventing that little game. They should not, however, lose sight of the fact that, of all the aims they had before them, the most important of all was to reach, as quickly as possible, the coming into force of the Treaty which alone would allow the Reparation Commission to function. They should, according to him, subordinate all other considerations to that fundamental aim. The question of reparations to be exacted for the Scapa Flow incident presented itself under a double aspect; a political and a technical one. From the technical point of view, his experts informed him that it was not impossible that certain mistakes might have been made, such as, for instance, that docks might have been counted twice. He was not competent in those matters, but it seemed to him that they should take into account a certain possibility of errors. An investigation on the spot might of course be advantageous, but such a procedure would take time and delay the coming into force of the Treaty. From a political point of view they should not hide from themselves the danger there would be in delaying the Treaty's coming into force, on account of the interior situation of Germany, which was evidently unstable. They should avoid giving the Imperialist Party, which might not perhaps be numerous but which was energetic, and troublesome, an occasion to resume its agitation against the Government.

He did not make any proposition, but wished to point out the interest there

would be in putting the Treaty into force as rapidly as possible. They should, according to the expression used on the preceding day by M. Clemenceau, avoid giving the Germans the possibility of rebounding and of creating new difficulties for the Allies.

M. MATSUI said that they all seemed agreed on the necessity of a prompt coming into force of the Treaty. M. Loucheur's proposal tending to sign the protocol without delay, with the reservation of an ulterior verification of the figures furnished by the Germans, seemed to him opportune. It did not, however, seem absolutely necessary to him that a decision should be arrived at on that day, and there would be no inconvenience in waiting a day or two, which would perhaps allow for certain verifications.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he was to see the German experts at three o'clock. He would then make them define the reasons for the reduction they proposed. He would, furthermore, ask them once more whether they offered any compensation whatsoever for the missing tonnage.

MR. WALLACE said that his opinion was that it would be preferable to await, before taking a decision, the instructions of their respective governments.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had seen M. Clemenceau that same morning and that he had explained the situation to him. He, of course, was not qualified to speak for the President before the Council, but he thought he could give it his impressions simply for their information. M. Clemenceau was of the opinion that a reply should be made to the last German note: 1, in order to take note of the German declaration that no difficulty would be raised on account of the absence of the American or other delegates on the Commissions; 2, to define the sense to be given to that part of the note concerning measures of coercion. He had prepared, in accord with M. Fromageot, two draft texts on the subject, which had been approved by the President of the Council and might be discussed when the whole of the reply to be made to Germany came up for examination. M. Fromageot had observed to him that amongst German precedents alone might be found seven or eight cases of measures of military coercion taken without a declaration of war, such as those of Haiti or Zanzibar.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand it was necessary to request the Germans to send delegates immediately to take up practical questions relative to the functioning of plebiscite and other commissions. If negotiations on the subject were not immediately opened, the coming into force of the Treaty ran the risk of being materially delayed.

He would not speak for the moment of the question of the light cruisers which would be taken up by the Minister of Marine.

On the question of substance which had been submitted by M. Loucheur,

<sup>5</sup> In 1904 the German warship *Panther* had been ordered to Port au Prince in order to act in concert with a French warship in exacting reparation for an attack by Haitian soldiers upon the German and French diplomatic representatives in Haiti. In 1885 a squadron of German warships had made a demonstration off Zanzibar and compelled the Sultan of Zanzibar to accept certain German demands.

M. Clemenceau was of the opinion that the 192,000 tons offered by the Germans should be accepted, and that a compensation should be found for the lacking tonnage. On account of the necessity of arriving at a quick solution, they might immediately proceed to sign with the reservation of a later verification of the figures which had been furnished. Should those figures be found incorrect, the Allies would be entitled to claim a greater portion of the German port material.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether it would not be advisable to ask the Germans to send delegates at once to take up the questions relative to the practical organization of the commissions provided for by the Treaty, without awaiting the drafting of the note addressed to the Germans.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Dutasta observed that the procedure proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe would have the inconvenience of giving the Germans the impression that they were ready to yield on the question of reparations to be furnished by them for the Scapa Flow incident. It would be wiser to await the result of the next meeting with the German delegates which would take place that very afternoon. The German delegates sent from Berlin to examine the question of organization of the Commissions should have instructions to sign within 48 hours.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he would report to the Council at its next meeting the result of the interview which he would have that afternoon with the German representatives.

M. LEYGUES said that, concerning the question of the light cruisers, he wished to state that he was not of the opinion that the German proposal should be considered before the exchange of ratifications. They were not, as a matter of fact, in a position in the short time which separated them from that exchange, to appreciate the exactness of the information given by the Germans. The latter offered them, in exchange for the five cruisers which they were to surrender, five ships which were still on the ways, and they ignored the progress of their construction. As that was an important question, especially for the French Navy, he would ask to be allowed to examine it at leisure, and this would not be possible until after the signature of the protocol, for investigations would have to be made which would take from fifteen days to three weeks at the minimum.

M. BERTHELOT said that it might perhaps be possible to tell the Germans that they maintained their claims on the question of the cruisers with the possibility of examining after the coming into force of the Treaty whether certain substitutions might prove acceptable.

M. CAMBON said that if they told the Germans that they would examine the question after the coming into force of the Treaty, they would either think that the Allies intended to deceive them with a view to obtaining their signature, or consider that reply as a tacit agreement to give them satisfaction, at least in part. It therefore seemed to him that, as M. Leygues had objections to put forward against the Germans' claim, it would be best to reply by a pure and simple refusal which would not, however, prevent their eventually examining the question anew, should there be need to do so.

M. LEYGUES said he entirely agreed with the views of the Chairman.

M. BERTHELOT said that the ships under construction which the Germans offered to exchange for those they claimed should be demolished under the provisions of the Treaty. Their claim was, therefore, contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty.

M. CAMBON said that the latter consideration seemed to him final and, in his opinion, should lead the Council to refuse the Germans' demand purely and simply.

MR. WALLACE said that it seemed a very reasonable conclusion to reach.

ADMIRAL GRASSI stated that before denying purely and simply the Germans' claim, it would be wise to remark that if things remained as they were Germany would find itself in the following year with five light cruisers which would be twenty years old. Under those conditions she would be entitled, according to the terms of the Treaty, to rebuild new ships in place of those old units. A net loss would result in the way of labour and construction material. What was the need of obliging Germany to destroy warships which she had in her ways, if she was to rebuild new ones six months later?

M. MATSUI said that he thought it preferable to maintain their demand as it stood.

MR. WALLACE said that he wished to point out that the opinion which he had expressed was purely personal: in that question as in all others he was not qualified to bind his Government, unless he had received explicit and precise instructions to that effect.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would observe that Mr. Polk having already signed the protocol, it did not seem that new instructions should be necessary when it was merely a question, as was the case for the question of the cruisers, of maintaining the text of that protocol.

M. LEYGUES said that as a matter of fact the Council had reached, on the question of the cruisers, a unanimous decision. The discussion which had taken place with regard to the new request of the Germans did not bear in any manner whatsoever on the principle of that decision, but merely on the forms of its execution. Under those conditions and without, of course, wishing to exercise any pressure of [on] the representative of the United States, it seemed to him that new instructions were not necessary. He would point out that this was a question which interested France primarily and which only offered for America and Great Britain interest of a secondary nature. He would, however, simply mention that the principle had been adopted unanimously by the Conference.

MR. WALLACE stated that he felt obliged to repeat that everything he might say before the Council was unofficial, except in cases where he had received explicit instructions from his Government. He hoped it would not always be necessary to repeat that all that he said here had an unofficial character.

M. CAMBON said that the question was whether they maintained prior decisions of the Conference or whether they accepted the new request formulated by the Germans with regard to the cruisers. It seemed to him that

instructions would only be necessary in the second case. If another procedure were adopted by the Council the Germans would have it in their hands to suspend the execution of the Treaty by making new requests. He personally would be of the opinion that they maintain the text already arrived at and that they should answer the Germans by a pure and simple refusal.

M. LEYGUES said that the question was quite different for the cruisers and for the docks and port material.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that was not quite certain. They had made a proposal to the Germans. The Germans now made a counter-proposal. It was for them to examine it and to decide whether they would strictly adhere to the text of the protocol, or whether they would envisage certain modifications on that point.

M. CAMBON said that to consent to changes on that question would be to open the door to a whole series of German claims.

M. LEYGUES said that the Council had decided to demand from the Germans five cruisers which had been designated by name. The Germans now asked to keep those ships and offered in exchange warships which were still under way. The Germans did not therefore contest the principle of their demand; they only discussed the forms thereof. But as they lacked precisions on the progress of construction of those ships, it would be better for them to stand by their former demand which would also offer the advantage of not risking, by starting a new discussion, to delay the date of the signature of the protocol and the coming into force of the Treaty.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they were evidently entitled to maintain the original text of the protocol, and, as far as he was concerned, he did not see any objection thereto.

It was decided:

to maintain, with regard to the question of the five light cruisers to be delivered by Germany, the text of the protocol such as it had been fixed on November 1, by the Supreme Council.

(The discussion was adjourned to a later date.)

4. SIR EYRE CROWE said that the Drafting Committee was engaged upon two questions for which a solution was necessary in view of the final preparation of the Treaty with Hungary.

*Right of priority claimed  
by Serbia for reparations*

The first concerned the request of Serbia to obtain a right of priority on reparations to be furnished by Hungary and Austria. The Serbian request had been referred to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.<sup>6</sup> The latter, however, had not yet communicated its views on the subject.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that the delay came from a confusion which had taken place between the former reparations commission and the Commission presided over by M. Loucheur. The misunderstanding, however, had now been cleared up and the Organization Committee was to furnish a report on the question the following day.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 39, minute 7.

*Protection of Allied and  
Associated nationalities  
leaves of bank notes  
issued by the Bolshevik  
Government of Hungary*

[Not printed.]

The meeting then adjourned.

<sup>7</sup> This question, the second raised by Sir L. Crowe, was referred back to the Financial Commission: cf. No. 65, minute 3.

## No. 42

H.D. 113.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held at M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Thursday, December 18, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARIAT, Mr. L. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
*France*: M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARIAT, M. Trombetti.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARIAT, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Capt. Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

U.S.A.: Mr. Rathbone, Capt. Madison, U.S.N.  
*British Empire*: Mr. Leeper, Mr. Carr, Lt.-Col. Kisch, Capt. Fuller, R.N., Cdt. [sic] MacDonald, R.N., Sir John Bradbury.  
*France*: M. Leygues, M. Loucheur, Marshal Foch, Gen. Weygand, Gen. Le Rond, M. Laroche, C. Amiral Le Vavas seur, M. Hermitte, M. de Montille.  
*Italy*: M. Bertolini, C. Amiral Grassi, M. Stranieri, Cdt. Fea.

1. The Council had before it a note from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated December 14, 1919. (See Appendix A.)  
*Situation in the Baltic Provinces* MARSHAL FOCH summarized and commented upon the note of December 14th.

He added that it seemed difficult to disarm completely the anti-Bolshevist force represented by what was left of the Yudenitch Army. If the Esthonian Government, provisionally at least, did not wish to confer with the Bolsheviks, it should utilize that force. But the possibility of utilizing it later and of agreement between Esthonia and Yudenitch presented a series of local questions which were difficult to judge from that distance. It was for that reason that he proposed to send General Niessel to examine on the spot

whether it would be possible to arrange for an agreement between General Yudenitch and the Esthonians.

MR. WALLACE said that he could not give any opinion before he had received instructions from his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the Council remembered that when the instructions for General Niessel had been drafted, the British Government had clearly indicated that Russian questions of a political nature would not be in the province of the mission.<sup>1</sup> He was still bound by that reservation, all the more so as the situation in the Baltic provinces was more obscure, and he did not know what were the intentions of his Government. Under those circumstances he could not then agree to give General Niessel an interallied mission of a political character. That would be contrary to the principle which they had previously adopted. General Niessel, however, was a French officer, and he could not object in any way to his being sent to Esthonia in that capacity.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he did not conceal the fact that he was indeed raising a new question, also that the mission under discussion was entirely independent of that which had been previously entrusted to the General. But he wished to call the attention of the Conference to the fact that, if the Allied and Associated Powers wished to act, there was not a moment to lose. If they delayed any longer, it would mean the complete dissolution of the Yudenitch Army and the development of a new centre of anarchy. He also felt convinced that an interallied mission could alone have a chance to succeed: General Niessel could only be sent there in that quality. He repeated that there were in Esthonia remnants of forces which could still be utilized in the pursuit of a policy; but it was quite true that they should first decide upon that policy. They should especially foresee that the Esthonian Government, before listening to their advice, would begin by asking them to recognize it. At any rate, and if they did not wish to be faced once more by ruin, it was important to define their policy without delay.

M. CAMBON asked whether Sir Eyre Crowe could not telegraph his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would do so; at the moment he did not know how far the decisions which had been taken in London<sup>2</sup> might have modified the situation.

M. DE MARTINO said that he gathered, from all that had been said by Marshal Foch, first, that it was urgent to take certain measures, and on the other hand, that the mission which he proposed to have sent, should have an interallied character. He could not give a final opinion before knowing that of his colleagues; but he approved in principle the proposal which was submitted. He would like to take advantage of this occasion to ask the Marshal what was the exact situation of the Yudenitch Army at the present time.

GENERAL WEYGAND said it was difficult to give exact figures: one might say approximately that the Army was made up of from 20,000 to 30,000 men,

<sup>1</sup> See No. 7, minute 3.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 62.

a part of which had been treated by the Esthonians as civilian refugees who were now dispersed, while there still remained under arms from 5,000 to 15,000 men. A telegram addressed to Marshal Foch by their representative with that army, depicted the situation as being very critical. The French officer telegraphed on the 16th of December that the Yudenitch army could still fight for seven days against the Bolsheviks, but that if, after that period, relations between it and the Esthonian Government had not improved, it meant a conflict with Esthonia. They already had been informed that Russian officers had been murdered at Narva.

M. MATSUI said that if the other Powers were agreed to send an interallied mission, he would not be opposed to it. He would, however, remark that the Japanese officer who belonged to the Niessel mission was on the point of receiving another appointment; it would therefore be impossible for him to accompany the mission if it were sent into Esthonia.

M. CAMBON said that they could apparently not think of taking any decision if they did not know the opinion of the British Government. He would urge Sir Eyre Crowe to make every effort to obtain a reply in as short a time as possible, and he hoped it would be a favourable one.

(The rest of the discussion was adjourned.)

## 2. The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation. (See Appendix B.)<sup>3</sup>

*Notification to Roumania  
and Poland of the frontier  
between Roumania and  
Eastern Galicia in  
Bukovina*

M. LAROCHE read and commented upon the note of the French Delegation, and added that the frontier adopted on August 1st by the Supreme Council practically gave the whole of Bukovina to the Roumanians, as it only excluded from Roumanian territory a narrow strip which was crossed by the railway connecting two Galician towns. It was true, however, that the Roumanians were making unofficial efforts to have the original administrative frontier maintained as it stood. Now that the Roumanians had signed the Treaties of St. Germain and Neuilly it seemed opportune to notify them the decision taken on August 1st, the more so as the proposed frontier already figured in the treaty relative to Eastern Galicia.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did not object to that proposal in principle; he wished, however, to know what exactly, at that time, their relations with Roumania were; what treaties General Coanda had signed, and whether a reply to their ultimatum<sup>4</sup> had been received.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that the Roumanian Delegation had signed the

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This note recalled the decision in this matter adopted by the Supreme Council on August 1, 1919: see Vol. I, No. 25, minute 9. The note continued: 'The condition set by the Supreme Council having been fulfilled, the French Delegation has the honour to ask that the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference be invited to inform the Roumanian and Polish Delegations of the frontier described above which interests Roumania and Eastern Galicia.'

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 35, minute 6.

Minorities Treaty, had agreed to the Austrian Treaty and the Financial Arrangements, as well as to the Bulgarian Treaty. Roumania was, therefore, so far as her signature was concerned, on the same footing at that time as the other Allies. But so far as he knew, no reply had been made to the other questions raised in the note of the Supreme Council.

M. LAROCHE said there was no doubt that Roumania was in the throes of an internal crisis; the cabinet crisis was not, properly speaking, at an end. He was, however, of the opinion that the Council should not confuse Hungarian affairs with the question of Bukovina. One of the interested parties already knew the line of the new frontier; they ought to finish that question. It was quite true that Roumania had not yet entirely acceded to their demands, but on the other hand, her claims had not received entire satisfaction in Bukovina.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he was of the same opinion, and he thought they should strengthen the government of Mr. Vaida Voevod. On the other hand, he would urge that they insist upon a reply to their ultimatum from Roumania, and also that she conform to the injunctions she had received from the Supreme Council concerning the Hungarian affairs, further, that question could not be separated from that of the blockade of Roumania. They had already decided upon certain restrictive measures in regard to trade with that country.<sup>5</sup> His Government considered that it would be well to suppress these measures; they were troublesome and served no purpose, for, according to information in their hands, goods were passing pretty freely across the land frontier, and maritime trade alone was held up. They did not think, however, notwithstanding the drawbacks for them of such a blockade, that it would be possible to suppress it entirely as long as the Government at Bucharest had not replied definitely to their demands. It would be necessary, he thought, to let the Roumanian Government know under the existing circumstances that the blockade could not be raised so long as it had not itself replied.

M. CAMBON said that they might take a decision concerning the frontier of Bukovina, and ask M. Berthelot at the same time to use his influence with the Roumanian Delegation in order to hasten its reply.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that they should tell the Roumanians that they were ready to raise the blockade, but that Roumania must first accept the demands which had been formulated by the Council.

M. DE MARTINO said that he approved the two decisions which were then proposed.

It was decided:

- (1) that the line of the Roumanian frontier in Bukovina, already approved by the Supreme Council on August 1st, should be notified to the Roumanian and Polish Delegations;
- (2) that the Roumanian Government should be requested to reply in as short a time as possible to the last note of the Supreme Council, and that it should at the same time be informed that, failing a satisfac-

<sup>5</sup> See Vol. I, No. 42, minute 3.

tory reply to the said note, it was impossible for the Allied and Associated Powers to raise the blockade measures which had been taken towards Roumania on August 23, 1919.<sup>5</sup>

3. The Council had before it a telegram from Colonel Haskell, dated December 1, 1919, transmitted by the American Delegation. See Appendix C.

*Line of demarcation  
between the Government  
of General Denikin and  
the state of the  
Caucasus*

M. CAMBON asked whether the American Delegation supported Colonel Haskell's proposal.

MR. WALLACE replied that it did not, but was contented with transmitting it: Colonel Haskell, he would add, had acted in this matter as an Interallied representative.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he feared that if Colonel Haskell's proposal were adopted, it would create serious difficulties. The zone assigned to General Denikin had been fixed a long time ago: he thought that if the line then fixed were changed, they would be raising a wasps' nest. The present situation was very confused; they had no authority over General Denikin. How could they tell him that he must retire beyond a new line which would be fixed by them? If he refused to obey, how could the Council enforce its decisions? The whole problem of the Caucasus was involved, and of that they knew very little and exercised over it no control. His opinion was very clear: they should leave things as they were; though of course, he was quite ready to draw the attention of his Government to that proposal.

M. DE MARTINO said that the Haskell proposal had made an extremely favourable impression on him. It was calculated to protect from troubles and disorders of all kinds a region most important for them, economically speaking. They knew what guerilla warfare meant as practised in those countries, and what ruins it accumulated. It would be to the advantage of those territories to fix a limit to the advance of the Denikin Army. Sir Eyre Crowe thought that a decision in that question was of considerable political importance; he agreed, but asked whether it would not be possible to say that the fixing of the new line of demarcation would not prejudice the final settlement of the problem.

M. MATSUI said that he was not informed on the subject; he was, however, very much struck by Sir Eyre Crowe's argument.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in his opinion the difficulties were greater than M. de Martino seemed to think. General Denikin actually occupied the territories in question; they would therefore have to drive him out.

M. STRANIERI said that, according to information in their hands, Denikin had occupied the northern slopes of the Caucasus, 'The Republic of the Mountaineers', but had not occupied the Daghestan.

M. CAMBON said that it seemed to him very difficult to take a decision in such a state of uncertainty.

M. DE MARTINO admitted that they should first make out exactly what the situation was and that the examination of the question might be then taken up.

M. CAMBON said they would therefore adjourn the discussion until such time as they should have more complete information.

(The discussion was then adjourned.)

4-

*Repatriation of Bulgarian Prisoners of War*

[Not printed.]<sup>6</sup>

5. M. MATSUI said that he was happy to inform the Council that he was authorized by his Government to withdraw the reservation which he had formulated on December 9th, concerning the distribution of enemy submarines.<sup>7</sup>

*Distribution of enemy submarines*

6. The Council had before it a note from the French Delegation on the conditions under which the German warships should be delivered to the Allies. (See Appendix E.)

*Conditions under which the Germans warships should be delivered*

M. LEYGUES read and commented upon the note of the French Government.

MR. WALLACE stated that he could not give any opinion on the matter without the instructions of his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if he understood the French proposal correctly, it meant requesting the Germans to surrender, into the same ports as the warships, the armament material instead of destroying it.

M. LEYGUES agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE feared that such a proposal would raise difficulties, for it seemed to him that it was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty; a modification of the Treaty would be necessary, for which they would have to obtain the approval of all the signatory Powers. The same difficulty, however, did not exist for the five light cruisers whose surrender was demanded in the protocol of November 11: it was not impossible, as a matter of fact, to modify the protocol which had not yet been signed.

ADMIRAL GRASSI said that he shared the opinion just expressed by M. Leygues. It was not a question of modifying the Treaty, but only of interpreting Article 192. That article stipulated as follows:

'The warships in commission of the German fleet must have on board or in reserve only the allowance of arms, munitions and war material fixed by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.'

The allowances of material in excess were to be surrendered to the Governments of such Powers at the places to be indicated by them. In that way, the surrender would take place in two periods: first the ships would be surrendered, then the material disembarked from them. Article 192 did not evidently apply to the material of warships which were to be, or which

<sup>6</sup> This question was raised by the British delegation. The Supreme Council decided '(1) that there was no objection to the repatriation of Bulgarian prisoners of war; (2) that such prisoners of war belonging to territories formerly Bulgarian and now situated outside the frontiers of Bulgaria should have the option of declaring whether they preferred to be sent back to Bulgaria or to their country of origin.'

<sup>7</sup> See No. 39, minute 1.

already had been. surrendered to the Allies. It only applied to the material of warships which remained German.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that Article 186 was however explicit: it stipulated that the ships which were to be surrendered to the Allies should be surrendered in a state of disarmament. Article 182, on the other hand, declared that the material remaining in Germany would be destroyed. He proposed that the question be referred back to the legal experts for examination.

M. LEYGUES said that two cases should be distinguished: first, that of warships whose surrender was provided for in the protocol of November 1st. It was natural that the material belonging to those ships should be surrendered at the same time as the ships themselves. The second case was that of warships whose surrender was provided for in the Treaty of Peace. He admitted that there was a question of interpretation of the Treaty; which might be submitted to the legal experts.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they should, however, observe, concerning the first point, that they had communicated to the Germans a draft protocol and that they would be proposing its modification. Would the Germans accept that modification? The Council should envisage the possibility of a refusal.

M. LEYGUES said that they did not ask for any modification of the protocol. They insisted, on the contrary, that it be signed as it stood. The protocol did not in any place state that they would not receive the armament material of the warships whose surrender they demanded.

M. CAMBON said that the first question was, therefore, solved as M. Leygues had requested; the second was referred back to the legal experts for examination.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Interallied Naval Commission of Control should take the steps necessary in order that the material belonging to the five light cruisers to be delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers under the provisions of the draft protocol of November 1st should not be destroyed, but surrendered in the same places as the ships from which such material had been disembarked;
- (2) that the Drafting Committee be requested to examine whether, under the terms of Articles 185 and 192 of the Treaty of Versailles, the material disembarked from the warships referred to in Article 185, in execution of the clauses of the Armistice, should be necessarily destroyed after it had been surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers.

7. M. LOUCHEUR said that they had met the German delegates on the preceding afternoon. It had been impossible to reach an agreement on the tonnage of the docks then in Germany. The Germans continued to insist with the greatest energy that there did not exist at Dantzig docks of 50,000 tons, and that the dock of 80,000 tons which figures on the Allied list was really a second entry of two docks—one of 43,000 tons and one of 37,000 tons, both of which also figured therein.

*Report of the conference  
between the Allied and  
German Delegates con-  
cerning the reparation  
demanded for the Scapa  
Flow affair*

They had therefore reserved the right of verifying those figures and the German delegates had agreed. There remained, therefore, a difference of 85,000 tons between their figures and those of the German delegation. Before submitting the rest of the discussion, he wished to state that if the Reparation Commission had been consulted at the time the protocol had been drafted, certain of its members would have been opposed to demanding from Germany a compensation for the Scapa Flow incident which would reduce its capacity of payment. They had asked the German delegates whether, outside of the 192,000 tons which they were ready to grant, they had some compensation to offer. After much hesitation they had declared that they could offer 50,000 tons of new docks to be built within a period of one and one-half years. They had taken note of that proposal, and the German delegation had withdrawn.

He had then put the following questions to his colleagues:

(1) Did they consider as sufficient, for the time being, the immediate surrender of 192,000 tons, taking into account the economic situation in Germany?

(2) In the affirmative, were they of the opinion that it was advisable, notwithstanding, to demand a supplementary compensation to be furnished later?

The American delegate had answered the first question in the affirmative. He considered that the second raised a political problem, upon which he had no opinion to express. From the point of view of reparations he considered it was not advisable to make other demands of Germany.

The British Naval delegate had repeated the reservation made that morning by Sir Eyre Crowe. He was not convinced by the German explanations. As for Sir John Bradbury, the British representative on the Reparation Commission, he reserved his opinion: he considered especially that the Germans might compensate the loss of their floating docks by using for their merchant fleet the dry-docks of their naval arsenals. He thought that the question of reparations was for the Supreme Council to decide.

The Italian delegate had replied in the affirmative to the first point; and considered on the other hand, as M. Loucheur did, that it would be advisable to request the Germans to build 80,000 tons of new docks for the Allies.

The Japanese delegate deemed insufficient the German proposals. In his opinion, a compensation was necessary.

The Belgian delegate had adopted the opinion of the French delegate. From the standpoint of reparations, he believed that they should ask Germany as little as possible in the way of supplementary compensation.

The French delegates were divided; the naval representative had maintained that it would be wise to claim 400,000 tons. He, personally, was of the opinion that they could be satisfied with the immediate surrender of 192,000 tons, but that from the political point of view, a compensation was necessary. If the German figures were correct, their original demands should naturally be reduced from 400,000 to 315,000 tons. The deficit was therefore reduced to 123,000 tons. He observed that the Germans would be furnishing them

with new docks, built according to their indications and specifications, which had a certain advantage. Fifty thousand tons was an insufficient figure, but 80,000 tons of new docks might be considered as the equivalent of 120,000 tons of used docks. He therefore concluded that they should accept the German proposal and that they should ask, in the way of supplementary compensation, for the building of 80,000 tons of new docks.

They should, at any rate, not lose sight of two different considerations: they should remember that from the political point of view, they had decided upon a definite figure, and they could not, under penalty of losing prestige in the opinion of the world, renounce purely and simply their demands. But at the same time they should not forget that they had the greatest interest not to weaken the Germans' capacity for payment and if they wished to receive something they should raise that capacity to its maximum.

M. LEYGUES said that a misunderstanding existed between the Naval experts and the members of the Reparation Commission which it was important to clear up. They had asked Germany for 400,000 tons of docks on account of the scuttling at Scapa Flow of 430,000 tons out of 510,000 tons which were there interned. Thus had disappeared the pawn which the Allies had in their hands. It was in the way of a reparation and of a penalty that the Council had decided on October 24th to demand the surrender of port material. When the protocol of November 1st had been drawn up, that material had been estimated at 400,000 tons. There was a decision of the Conference, which should be carried out. It would be serious to give way, for the moral question was as important as the material one: if they yielded, Germany would be encouraged in starting once more. They should beware: and they had good reasons for doing so. The Allies themselves were acting in good faith; they would reduce their demands if it were proved that they were exaggerated. It would be a mistake to make a concession right away. They would be the first to yield if they had proof that their claims could not be satisfied without paralysing the economic life of Germany and endangering her capacity for payment; but he pointed out that Germany possessed a great many dry-docks in her naval ports; and as she had no more warships she might therefore employ those dry-docks in the repair of her commercial fleet. As a matter of fact, under the provisions of the Treaty, she did not possess ships of over 1,600 tons. They should therefore decide that the terms of the protocol be maintained, with the reservation that if, at a later time, it was proved that they had committed an error in their figures, such an error would be taken into account.

M. LOUCHEUR said it was clear that no one thought of accepting with closed eyes the figures furnished by the Germans. He should, however, add that he did not share M. Leygues' opinion. He could not approve of a policy which consisted in imposing penalties which militated against their reparations in money.

SIR EYRE CROWE believed that, as they must all reserve the opinion of their Governments, the discussion might well be adjourned. Meanwhile, however, what would happen to the conversations with the Germans? He

admitted he was in no wise convinced by the German arguments. A telegram he had before him affirmed that four weeks ago there was at Dantzig a dock of 40,000 tons if not of 50,000. Somebody was therefore lying.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the German delegates had categorically told them on the preceding day that there did not exist large docks at Dantzig. They had asked them whether those docks had not been sold. The Germans had replied that all sold docks figured on the lists furnished to the Allies.

M. CAMBON said that before the discussion was resumed by the Council, it would be wise for each Government to investigate the veracity of the documents furnished by the Germans.

M. LEYGUES said that the Armistice Commission had already been asked to shed light upon the question of the Dantzig docks.

M. LOUCHEUR said that under those conditions all conversations between the Germans and themselves would actually be useless. The negotiations could only be resumed when they knew the opinion of the various Governments, and when the information asked of the Armistice Commission had been received.

(The discussion was then adjourned.)

(The meeting adjourned.)

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 42

##### *Note from Marshal Foch to the Supreme Council on the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces*

A.G.H.Q., December 14, 1919.

General Staff. 3rd Section.

No. 5680.

From information sent by General Niessel inclusive of December 11th, it appears that the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by the German troops may be considered as almost completed.

At this date there were, in the Baltic States, only light contingents marching towards the German frontier and at about a day's march from this frontier, as follows:

5,000 men of the German Legion marching towards Tilsitt,

6,000 men of the Iron Division marching towards Memel.

All were to have crossed the boundary by December 15th according to the agreements made by General Eberhardt.

The German Delegation to the Baltic Commission has, besides, asserted that all the German detachments or isolated men remaining in Latvia or Lithuania after this date would be considered as outlaws and thereby abandoned to the Letts and the Lithuanians.

Once the evacuation is over, it remains for General Niessel to:

Make the Germans deliver, according to the decision of the Supreme Council, the rolling-stock necessary for the functioning of the Latvian and Lithuanian railroads.

Make sure that the Germans have strictly observed their agreements regarding the surrender of war material to Lithuania, as ransom for their free passage.

As for the penalties to be taken and the reparations due on account of exactions of the German troops in occupied territory, it has been telegraphed to General Niessel that he was not empowered to negotiate in regard to them without special instructions from the Supreme Council.

It may therefore be considered that General Niessel's mission is almost completed, as far as the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces is concerned.

## II.

The Baltic Provinces thus being freed from *German aggression*, it is in the Entente's interest to maintain the solid rampart which they formed against *Bolshevism*.

From this standpoint, it is urgent to settle, as soon as possible, the disagreement between Youdenitch's Army and the Estonian Government,<sup>1</sup> a disagreement which seriously compromises the military situation on the North Eastern front and which the Bolsheviks are cleverly taking advantage of by vigorous offensive actions.

Now the steps taken by the Allied Representatives, either on their own initiative or according to the decision of the Supreme Council of December 3,<sup>2</sup> to obtain from the Estonian Government the measures necessary for the upkeep of Youdenitch's army, as an organized Russian force, have not been successful.

The Estonian Government, so far, has given only dilatory replies; it has continually delayed the date of its reply to the communication from the Supreme Council.

Detachments of the North Western Army penetrating on Estonian territory therefore continue to be disarmed, dispersed, and the irremediable disintegration of this army will soon be completed.

The time seems therefore to have come to act in a more efficacious manner; to act, to try to find and to establish, between the Estonian Government and Youdenitch's Army, a community of views and means which are indispensable for the continuation of their joint action against Bolshevism.

But the Allied and Associated Governments will not be able to carry out such an understanding, practically, except by the intermediary of qualified representative, who can judge the situation on the spot, who can bring about the necessary 'rapprochements', and equipped with powers which will enable him to negotiate directly with the Estonian Government and General Youdenitch according to the general sense of the instructions already sent by the Supreme Council.

General Niessel, whose qualities of force and decision have asserted themselves in the settling of a delicate question, will soon be in a position to fulfil this new mission.

## APPENDIX C TO No. 42

### *Telegram received from Colonel Haskell, December 1, 1919*

An agreement has been signed between the Armenians and Tartars by Premiers Khatissian (Armenia) and Ussebbekoff (Azerbaijan).

The Agreement provides:

(1) The Governments pledge themselves to stop the present hostilities and not to resort again to force of arms,

(2) They agree to open roads into Zangazour to peaceful traffic,

(3) All controversies, including borders, are to be settled by peaceful agree-

<sup>1</sup> See No. 33, minute 3 and appendix E.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently in error for December 1: see No. 33, minute 3.

ment, or, failing this, are to be left to a neutral party as arbitrator, said party to be the High Commissioner.

(4) An International Conference was called to discuss all questions causing dispute or friction, the delegates being given full authority to settle same by agreement or arbitration.

(5) Agreements effective as of dates on which they are signed.

In view of above developments believe peace can be kept in the Caucasus if the menace of military operations against Transcaucasia by volunteer army<sup>10</sup> is removed.

Denikin has recalled his Missions from both Georgia and Azerbaidjan. The possibility of his attacking Azerbaidjan through Daghestan virtually forces Azerbaidjan to seek Turkish aid. It is recommended, if it is believed advisable, after considering this matter from other standpoints, that the Peace Conference define the boundaries of Denikin's activities with reference to the Caucasus, at least until the final decision of the Caucasus question is reached. The limits recommended to such activities should follow those previously described by the British, namely: from the Caspian Sea five miles south of Petrovsk, west to the border of Daghestan thence following the boundaries of the former Russian Governments Terek-Kouban and Mekadir River to the Black Sea at Gagri Gate Logate [sic].

HASKELL.

#### APPENDIX E TO NO. 42

*Memorandum from the General Secretariat on the conditions under which the German warships must be delivered to the Allies*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN NO. 4.

December 13, 1919.

1. Article 185 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany prescribes that within a delay of two months from the coming into force of the Treaty, 8 battleships, 8 light cruisers, 42 destroyers and 50 torpedo-boats shall be surrendered to the Allied and Associated Powers in the Allied ports to be indicated by the said Powers.

These warships shall be disarmed as prescribed in Article XXIII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, and they must have all their guns on board.

2. The Interallied Naval Commission determined, December 4, 1918, the conditions of disarming to be the following:

All the essential parts of the artillery and the 'appareils de réglage de tir', munitions and explosives, war material and spare parts, torpedoes, wireless apparatus, &c., shall be landed.

3. The above measures, taken with regard to the warships brought to Scapa Flow and to those remaining in German ports, were *measures of precaution*.

They have been maintained in regard to the warships figuring in Article 185 of the Treaty, and in regard to the 5 light cruisers which are to be surrendered according to the Protocol of November 1, 1919, because these ships are to be brought to Allied ports by German crews.

4. In order to leave Germany only the material and munitions necessary for arming the number of battleships determined by the Treaty, Article 192 prescribes

<sup>10</sup> The army of General Denikin.

that all the material in excess of these quantities shall be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and is to be *broken up or rendered useless*.

In this material, therefore, might be included that taken off the ships as *measures of precaution* and now deposited in the arsenals. Such a measure is inexplicable, granted the decisions taken recently by the Supreme Council on November 28th and 29th authorizing each Power to dispose as it sees fit of the material and ships which it is to break up.<sup>11</sup>

Still less justifiable is this measure in regard to the light cruisers and destroyers allotted to France and Italy which they may incorporate in their fleets. If deprived of the material described above, these ships are useless from a military point of view.

5. For this reason it is proposed:

a. that the material landed from the ships surrendered or to be surrendered by Germany be delivered in the same place as the ships from which it was taken:

b. that this material be selected at the request of the interested Powers, by the Interallied Naval Commission of Control:

c. that only such arms, munitions and war material as remain within the hands of the German Government, in excess, after delivery of the material indicated under 'a' and 'b' be broken up or rendered useless.

<sup>11</sup> See No. 31, minute 1 and No. 32, minute 1.

### No. 43

H.D. 114.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held at M. Pichon's Room, Saturday, December 20, 1919, at 3 p.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARIAT, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARIAT, Mr. H. Norman.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIAT, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARIAT, M. Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARIAT, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain B. Winthrop. *British Empire*: Captain Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned.

U.S.A.: Mr. Rathbone.

*Great Britain*: Captain Fuller, Cdt. [sic] Macnamara, Mr. Malkin.

*France*: M. Leygues, Admiral Le Vavas seur, M. Fromageot, M. Cheysson, M. Laroche, M. de Montille, M. Escoffier.

*Italy*: M. Ricci-Busatti, C. Admiral Grassi, Cdt. Fea, M. Bianchi.

*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka, Cdt. Osumi.

I. SIR EYRE CROWE said that, with regard to the Scapa Flow question, he had not yet received general instructions from his Government. In fact, he had only received instructions on two special points: 1, they were ready to repatriate prisoners from Scapa Flow as soon as the Germans had signed the protocol; 2, on the other hand, his Government was opposed to any modification whatsoever of the protocol

*Compensation claimed by the Supreme Council from the German Government for the Scapa Flow affair*

with regard to the surrender of the five light cruisers. To agree to the German claim would, as a matter of fact, be contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty, and they were of opinion that no modification could be made to the Treaty without the assent of all the signatory Powers, a course which obviously would carry them too far. He was still waiting, as he had already mentioned, for the instructions of his Government regarding the other questions. They had, on the other hand, received a note from the French Delegation on the question of the five light cruisers, which they had not yet had time to examine but which would entail a modification of the protocol.

M. LEYGUES said that the French Delegation had indeed envisaged a different solution from that which had been originally proposed. It would be advantageous to accept in part the Germans' request under the following conditions: they would begin by taking delivery of the five light cruisers of the *Grauden* type which they had demanded from the Germans according to the terms of the protocol. They would, however, exchange those cruisers for new cruisers under construction as they were completed. That would involve no change in the principle laid down in the protocol. But they would get material advantages in this way, that if they only left to the Germans old cruisers which would very shortly be twenty years old, Germany would be free, according to the terms of the Treaty, to build new ones as soon as the 20-year period had been reached. With the solution they proposed, on the contrary, the Germans would not be able to build new warships for eleven years and their naval forces would be diminished accordingly. They were, therefore, of the opinion that their proposal was advantageous, not only for France and Italy, but in a general way for all the Allies.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he fully admitted the force of the arguments made by the Minister of Marine, but the fact remained that his solution implied a modification of the Treaty, which the British Government would not deem possible except with the assent of all the signatories.

M. LEYGUES replied that Sir Eyre Crowe's remark was quite correct, but they should not conceal the fact that the situation created by the Treaty was abnormal and illogical. They were obliging the Germans to destroy their existing ships, and inside of a year they still might build new ones, certainly a paradoxical situation.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, but said that they were confronted by the Treaty, and the British Government was opposed to any modification of the Treaty. It therefore seemed to him necessary to await, in order to discuss the Scapa Flow question in its entirety, until Sir Eyre Crowe received from London the general instructions he was expecting.

(The discussion was adjourned.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that they were not ready to draft a reply to the German Note until they had agreed on the questions which were still pending, such as the Scapa Flow affair. He therefore proposed to adjourn the discussion.

MR. WALLACE then stated that at the meeting of the Council last Tuesday

*Reply to the German Note  
of December 14*

he had been asked by the President whether he would sign the protocol on behalf of the United States.<sup>1</sup> He undertook to obtain the views of his Government in the matter, and he had now to say that he had received instructions that the United States could not be a signatory to the protocol.

He said it would be recalled that at the same meeting of the Council a draft of a declaration to Chancellor Renner was presented and approved by his colleagues. At the same time he informed the Council of his instructions and made it quite clear that he would refer such matters to his Government. The declaration in question was communicated to Chancellor Renner the day following the meeting, that was to say, last Wednesday, and he informed his Government to that effect. In reply, he had been informed that in view of the existing circumstances the Government of the United States was not in a position to take any action whatever, on account of the fact that the Austrian Treaty had not been presented to the United States Senate.

He said that, in this connection, and in order to make his position quite clear, he had been instructed to state that in view of the fact that his participation in the deliberations of the Council was merely one of an observer, it could not be presumed that the United States was a party to any action, declaration, or resolution of the Council unless the Government of the United States expressly declared its consent thereto.

M. BERTHELOT remarked that the situation did not present itself in the same manner in the two cases referred to by Mr. Wallace. As a matter of fact, the protocol had been signed by Mr. Polk on November 1st. No American signature was any longer necessary if the text of the protocol was not modified, and the signature of the Germans was the only one required.

MR. WALLACE said that M. Clemenceau had asked him on the preceding Tuesday whether he would be in a position to sign the protocol. He therefore assumed that the protocol would be modified, and consequently that new signatures would be necessary; and that is why he had asked for the instructions, the sense of which he had just communicated to the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that no member of the Council had yet signed the protocol. What had been signed was the note submitting to the Germans the draft protocol. He did not believe that that would do away with the signing [? of] the protocol itself, even in the case where no modifications were adopted.

M. FROMAGEOT said that it did not seem necessary that the protocol should bear the signatures of the Allied Representatives. If they referred to precedents they found that the declaration relative to the non-application of Article 61 of the German Constitution had only been signed by the German Representative. The delegates of the Allied Powers had simply witnessed the fact of the German signature. There was only in the protocol the question of a unilateral agreement which Germany should undertake. Therefore Germany's signature was the only one required. The Allied Representatives, or some of them, might, however, witness the fact that the signature had been given.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 40, minute 2.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the protocol presented itself in such a form that the procedure suggested by M. Fromageot would be applicable.

M. FROMAGEOT said that it certainly did. It would only be necessary to omit the word 'protocol' and to replace it by the term 'declaration', or some analogous expression.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as far as the declaration made to Chancellor Renner was concerned, Mr. Wallace was not authorized by his Government to subscribe to it at this time. On the other hand he did not believe that they should foresee any difficulty on the part of Austria, who had no interest in raising doubts on the validity of their declaration. As a matter of fact, the American Government had only declared war on Austria very late. They all understood the present difficulties of the situation in America<sup>2</sup> and they naturally did not wish to do anything which might increase those difficulties. On the other hand, however, they had brought to a satisfactory conclusion the important questions which had been submitted to them. They could therefore only take note of the American Ambassador's declaration and carry on the discussion in order to arrive either at a general signature, for it was likely that the situation might change in America, or to another solution which they would have to envisage at the proper time.

MR. WALLACE said he would be glad to act as soon as he received instructions allowing him to do so, and he hoped that it would not be long before he received satisfactory instructions.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that as a matter of fact the declaration made to Mr. Renner did not necessitate the signatures of all the delegates; it had sufficed that he, as President of the Conference, sign the note by which that declaration had been communicated to the Chancellor.

3. M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the note of the Drafting Committee as shown in Appendix A.

*Conditions under which  
the German warships  
should be surrendered*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had listened with much pleasure to the ingenious and subtle arguments of M. Fromageot. It had, however, seemed to him that the latter must admit that those arguments were more ingenious than convincing. Besides, their enemies could themselves also show ingenuity, and he considered it would be dangerous for them to start a controversy, the result of which would be doubtful. If they were to tell the Germans that Article 192 did not apply to the material disembarked in execution of the Armistice they would be giving them a pretext which they would not fail to grasp to avoid proceeding with the destruction of that material. The literal sense of Articles 185 and 192 seemed to him to be that the material which was disembarked should be destroyed under the same conditions as all the war material remaining in Germany. While he did not object to the grounds underlying M. Fromageot's argument, he yet did not wish to do anything which implied a modification of the Treaty. Even sup-

<sup>2</sup> Strong opposition to the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles had developed in the Senate of the United States.

posing that M. Fromageot's argument could triumph, it would not be for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to make good a lacuna in the Treaty. It would be necessary to get the consent of all the signatory Powers. Therefore, he thought it wiser to adhere to the most natural interpretation of the Treaty, notwithstanding the slight inconveniences which might be attached thereto and not to set out upon a course that was dangerous and full of pitfalls. He would add that the arguments which he had just put forward did not apply to the case of the five cruisers referred to in the protocol. As a matter of fact, the Treaty was not involved in that case and it would be sufficient to change a few words in the protocol in order to obtain the desired result.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they should be careful not to touch the protocol; the discussion which had just taken place should incline them to great prudence in that respect.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether certain changes would not be indispensable in any event, considering they had already decided that they would grant certain concessions to the Germans. If they did not modify the protocol it would be necessary, at the very least, to have it followed by an interpretative note.

M. DE MARTINO admitted that it would be dangerous to modify the Treaty in any fashion whatsoever. But as it was only a question of interpretation, could they not sound the Germans to find out if they would not consent to surrender that material, a course which would avoid them the trouble and expense of destroying it? As soon as the exchange of ratifications had taken place, the Commission of Control might be asked to give the Germans their interpretation of Articles 185 and 192.

M. CLEMENCEAU remarked that in any case they were entitled to demand that the breeches of guns be put back in place as the Treaty provided that the warships to be delivered should have their complete artillery on board.

ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR said that it would likewise be important to have the material other than artillery, especially in the case of the destroyers, torpedoes and torpedo tubes.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, but remarked that they were confronted by the Treaty; they could not run counter to its stipulations. He thought, however, that they might propose to the Germans the interpretation suggested by M. Fromageot without, however, insisting if the Germans should refuse to accept it.

SIR EYRE CROWE said if they proposed that interpretation, it was to be feared that the Germans would immediately accept it, and that they would avail themselves of it so as not to destroy any of the material which had been disembarked. If they were to give the Germans the example of interpreting the terms of the Treaty in a way not strictly impartial, they would be exposed to endless chicane on the part of the Germans.

M. FROMAGEOT said that they might ask the Germans to surrender the torpedoes and torpedo tubes without furnishing any explanation. They could always wait and see whether the Germans accepted their demand.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired whether the term 'complete artillery' did not also imply the surrender of munitions.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the English text had the word 'guns' which did not seem to admit of such a broad interpretation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they might anyhow try to obtain the accessory material, such as torpedoes, etc. If they met with a refusal there would always be time to take counsel.

MR. WALLACE inquired whether a verbal communication would be made, or a written note.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that a verbal communication would suffice.

It was decided:

- (1) that the Germans would be asked verbally to deliver the warships which they were to surrender according to the terms of the Treaty and which were not meant to be destroyed, not only with all their artillery, but also with their munitions and accessory material, such as torpedoes, torpedo tubes, etc.
- (2) that that demand, however, should not be made a condition *sine qua non* of the exchange of ratifications.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

4. M. FROMAGEOT read and commented upon the report of the Organization Commission of Mixed Tribunals and also the reply of the Drafting Committee to certain questions put by that Commission (the two papers contained in Appendix B).  
*List of guilty Germans, presented by the Polish Delegation*

He added that the question submitted to the Drafting Committee had some rather difficult aspects because acts involving violations of the laws of war could hardly have been committed on Polish territory in the course of hostilities, taking into account the fact that there had then been no organized and recognized Polish Army, and that Poland had not yet existed as a State. It would, however, seem unjust to reply to Poland's request by an absolute refusal. It seemed that there might be grounds for giving different solutions according to the cases presented, and that the question was above all one of concrete fact.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that his legal experts had told him that that question presented certain difficulties which were technical but of considerable importance. On the British side, the question had been more especially examined by Sir Ernest Pollock.<sup>3</sup> As the French and Belgian representatives on the Organization Commission of Mixed Tribunals, that is to say, M. Ignace and M. Rolin-Jacquemyns, were going to London, where they would meet Sir Ernest Pollock, he proposed to adjourn the discussion on that subject until they knew the results of the interviews that would have taken place.

It was decided:

To adjourn the discussion of questions raised by the Polish request relative to German subjects guilty of violating the laws and customs of

<sup>3</sup> Solicitor-General.

war until they know the results of the interviews which Sir Ernest P. Dill, M. Ignace and M. Rolin-Jacquemyns were to have in London on the subject.

5.

[Not printed]

*Rights of Allied and  
Associated Nationals,  
holders of bank notes  
issued by the Sovietist  
Hungarian Government*

6.

[Not printed]\*

*Insertion in the Hun-  
garian Treaty of Clauses  
relative to certain rail-  
roads of common interest  
to Hungary and (a)  
Serb-Croat-Slovene State  
(b) Roumania*

7. M. BERTHELOT read and commented upon the note of the French Delegation as shown in Appendix F.

*Diplomatic Represen-  
tation of Germany at  
Vienna*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he quite agreed that something should be done to prevent Germany from having a predominant diplomatic situation at Vienna; he thought it inadvisable, however, for the Allies to address themselves directly to Germany, all the more so as Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles did not seem to offer very strong grounds for action. He would prefer to use the second method suggested by the note before them, and to approach the Austrian Chancellor on the matter. If they considered the very favourable frame of mind actually evinced by him for the Allies, it was hardly likely that they would meet with a refusal.

MR. WALLACE said that he would refer that question to his Government and would advise it of the resolution which seemed to be preferred by the Council; he would ask his Government to concur therein.

It was decided:

That the Chancellor of the Austrian Republic be advised that the Allied and Associated Governments would not view with approbation the sending by Germany to Vienna of a diplomatic representative having the rank of ambassador.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for instructions of his Government.

8. M. BERTHELOT said that he had had an interview with General Weygand on the questions raised by the transportation of the Allied troops charged with the occupation of the plebiscite regions in Germany. Certain material difficulties might arise by reason of the holiday period which was

*Transportation of troops  
in the Plebiscite Zones  
of Germany*

\* The Supreme Council adopted drafts for the third paragraph of article 302, and article 303 of the Treaty of Trianon.

before them. General Weygand thought that in case the ratifications were exchanged on the following Tuesday or Wednesday,<sup>5</sup> there would be grounds to specify that the measures of execution would only begin on January 5th. Such a solution would allow them to reach the time when the British troops could themselves be transported; that, according to the information in their hands, would not take place before approximately January 15.

M. DE MARTINO inquired whether the transportation of British troops would be completed shortly after January 15th.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that the difficulty arose from the fact that they could not send the troops raised by conscription who would have to be relieved practically at once. They would have to have recourse to forces made up of volunteers, and these would not be ready for transportation until about January 15th. They might perhaps be able nevertheless to send off their advance guards a little sooner. It would be sufficient for the British contingents to be transported amongst the last.

The meeting then adjourned.

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 43

##### *Note from the Drafting Committee to the Supreme Council on the Conditions for the Surrender of German Warships*

1. The text of article 185 seems to provide that the ships shall be delivered in a state of disarmament, according to Article XXIII of the Armistice, with exception of the guns which must all be on board.

It was in this state that they were first supposed to be *sunk*, a provision which was afterwards replaced by *surrender*. Nothing was then said, and nothing has since been said, concerning the material which has been disembarked.

2. All the material, besides the artillery, disembarked from the ships to be surrendered, appears as being part of the material referred to in Article 192 as material 'actually in the hands of the German Government' and in this respect to be surrendered to be broken up.

3. Nevertheless, in case that the Allied and Associated Powers should agree with Germany that, besides the ships to be surrendered in a state of disarmament, according to Article 185, the material which was aboard should also be surrendered, such a special agreement might be considered.

Certain members of the Drafting Committee are of the opinion that such an agreement would be facilitated by the following arguments: Article 185 in speaking of material in the hands of Germany, to be surrendered for breaking up, does not refer to the material disembarked according to the provisions of the Armistice, remaining under the supervision of the Allied and Associated Powers as provided by Article XXIII of the Armistice. The text provides nothing in regard to this material and there is, therefore, an omission which, by mutual agreement, it is desirable to complete.

*December 19, 1919.*

<sup>5</sup> December 23 or 24, 1919.

APPENDIX B-VI No. 43

Document 1

*List of Germans accused of Crimes contrary to Laws of War—Submitted by the Polish Delegation*

AMERICAN EXHIBIT, PARIS

ISH BULLETIN 11, 34

December 22, 1919.

ORGANIZATION COMMISSION OF MIXED TRIBUNALS (and of Revision of Lists)

December 17, 1919.

The list of German nationals demanded by Poland includes 381 names.<sup>6</sup>

The Polish Government asks to bring before its tribunals, and eventually before mixed tribunals, German nationals guilty of violations of the laws and customs of war, these violations having been committed since the time that the territory which was to become Polish was the theatre of atrocities and exactions (August 1914, until a time later than the Armistice (sometime in 1919).

The Polish Delegation remarks that the cases maintained by it refer only to acts committed on territory formerly Polish-Russian, excluding violations committed on the territories formerly Polish-Austrian or Polish-German.

From what date on is the Polish Government entitled to claim German nationals for prosecution before its military tribunals?

The Organization Commission of Mixed Tribunals (and of revision of lists) did not consider itself able to determine this date and has the honour of asking the Supreme Council to take a decision in this respect.

The Polish Army was recognized as belligerent by the great Powers in September-October, 1918. (Recognition by France, September 28, 1918; by England, October 11, 1918; by Italy, October 12, 1918; by the United States of America, November 1, 1918).

If this date of September-October were maintained, Poland would, in reality, be able to claim very few Germans.

She would have still less if the date when Poland was recognized as an autonomous state were considered. In spite of the participation of Polish Delegates at the Peace Conference, it remains nevertheless that Germany only recognized Poland by the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, and the Allies can only oppose to Germany the date of ratification of the above Treaty (July 10, 1919) if Germany does not contend that the Treaty is not yet in effect.

On the other hand, the Organization Commission of Mixed Tribunals is of the opinion that the Supreme Council could act in accordance with the spirit of the drafting of Articles 228 and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles. The object which is proposed by this Treaty is to punish crimes committed in violation of laws and customs of war.

The doctrine of the Commission may be summarized as follows:

'The basis of the Allies' action is the prosecution of crimes which are not excusable because of demands of a military nature. Whatever is true in this regard of belligerent countries is equally true in regard to countries which,

<sup>6</sup> Note in original: 'The Polish Delegation states that this list has been reduced 50%.'

although they may not have been in war, have been the victims of atrocities committed by Germans. The horrors that took place in Poland wounds [*sic*] every human sentiment, and, from the standpoint of penalties to be imposed, these cases should be considered as having been committed in the course of a period of war.'

It may also be advanced that at the time when these crimes were committed the accused were subject to the decisions of the German, Austrian and Russian military tribunals because of the nationality of the victims and of the territory where they were committed.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that the case of Poles in Germany will be the same as that of Czecho-Slovaks in Austria, Roumanians in Hungary, Yugo-Slavs in Austria-Hungary.

As memorandum and for reference, certain dates are given below, which in regard to Poland, may eventually be taken as a starting point for the incriminations:

(1) Decree (French) creating an autonomous Polish Army in France on the date of June 4, 1919 [*sic*];

(2) Recognition of the Polish National Committee. (By France, June 20, 1917; by England, October 15, 1917; by Italy, October 30, 1917; by the United States of America, December 1, 1917.)

(3) Decree (French) organizing the military justice of the Polish Army.

(4) Recognition of the Polish Army as autonomous Allied and belligerent Army, September–October, 1918.

## Document 2

### *Reply of the Drafting Committee*

*December 18, 1919.*

To the question asked by the Organization Commission of the Mixed Tribunals, i.e. 'From what date on is the Polish Government justified in claiming, for judgment by its own military tribunals, German nationals?' the Drafting Committee makes the following reply:

From August 2, 1914, on condition that it is a question of violations of the laws and customs of war which injures a person classed as a Polish national according to the Treaty.

The question as to whether the charges constitute a violation of the laws and customs of war or not, is a question to be decided according to the circumstances of the matter and from the standpoint of the law of nations.

## APPENDIX F TO NO. 43.

From: French Delegation—regarding Diplomatic Representation of Germany at Vienna.

To: The Supreme Council.

The Allied and Associated Powers have shown their intention of being represented at Vienna by agents having the rank and quality of ministers plenipotentiary. The new Austrian State has not the importance which would justify the sending of ambassadors, which would be, besides, discourteous to the new Allied States who are all much more populated than Austria.

According to concurring information, the German Government had decided to send an Ambassador to Vienna. Its representative would, therefore, have a preponderant influence, and the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers would, in a way, be relegated to a rank incompatible to the dignity of their Governments.

The object which the German Government has in view, is evident. We are in the presence of a manoeuvre which is contrary to the object of Article 10 of the Treaty of Versailles, which is only in appearance respected by Germany but which is violated in spirit. To admit that the representatives of Germany at Vienna should be in a special position above all would be to give a tacit assent to the annexationist propaganda and to favour a characterized tentative against Austria's independence. The Allied and Associated Powers are, therefore, justified in opposing the realization of this plan.

In order to arrive at this, two procedures may be employed at the same time: First, a note should be sent to the German Delegation at the Conference to inform it that the Allied and Associated Governments have been advised of the German Government's intention to maintain an embassy at Vienna. That they feel bound to inform it that they will only have legations, and that under those conditions the presence of an embassy from Germany would be interpreted as being contrary to the spirit of Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles, and of a nature to create difficulties in the relations between Germany and the Allied and Associated Powers: that the latter, consequently, would wish to receive from the German Government the assurance that it would be represented at Vienna by an agent who would not have rank superior to minister plenipotentiary and who should be accredited as such.

Second, Chancellor Renner should be advised by a note transmitted to the Austrian Delegation of the communication sent to the German Government. He should also be told that the Allied and Associated Governments will not send any ministers to Vienna if the German Government is represented by an ambassador. The Austrian Government could, in this way, fall back on this conception to refuse to recognize a German ambassador.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Appended to this note in the original was the text of article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles.

## No. 44

H.D. 115.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, December 22, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire:* Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.

*France:* M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Arnavon, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy:* M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan:* M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Winthrop. *Great Britain:* Captain Lothian Small. *France:* M. Massigli. *Italy:* M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*U.S.A.*: Mr. Rathbone.

*Great Britain*: Capt. Fuller, R.N., Cdt. [sic] Macnamara, R.N.,  
Mr. Malkin, General Mance.

*France*: M. Leygues, M. Loucheur, M. Cambon, Gen'l Le Rond,  
C. Amiral Le Va[va]sseur, M. Fromageot.

*Italy*: M. Ricci-Busatti, C. Amiral Grassi, Cdt. Fea.

*Japan*: M. Nagaoka, M. Osumi.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that before dealing with the agenda he would like to raise a question which he hoped would not cause any difficulty. The Council had decided some weeks previously to give a 25-years mandate to Poland for the administration of Eastern Galicia.<sup>1</sup> That decision had occasioned lively protest in Poland, and the Polish representatives had insisted that the question should be examined anew. According to them a resolution of that nature would have a very favourable effect on public opinion, and to some extent, keep their army free from Bolshevik propaganda. On his visit to London he had interviewed Mr. Lloyd George on the question;<sup>2</sup> later he had asked Sir Eyre Crowe to request Mr. Lloyd George to be good enough to put before them a text which they could adopt; the English Prime Minister had proposed that very day the following formula: 'The decision recently taken at Paris, granting to Poland a mandate of 25 years over Eastern Galicia, ought to remain in suspense and be the subject of a new examination to be conducted later.'

M. DE MARTINO approved the text, all the more for the reasons adduced by the Polish Delegation which seemed to him not without foundation.

M. MATSUI also approved of the proposal.

It was decided:

That the execution of the recent resolution which accorded to Poland a 25-years mandate for Eastern Galicia should be suspended and that the question should be re-examined later.

2. SIR EYRE CROWE informed the Council that his Government was pressing for the Council to take a definite decision upon the mandates for former German colonies. The mandates were ready for South-East and South-West Africa, as also for the Pacific Islands; they could also be ready for Togoland and the Cameroons since the only litigious question had been settled, namely, the employment of native troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that that last question had not been completely settled, for Mr. Polk had stated that he must make a reservation on behalf of his Government and he (M. Clemenceau) anticipated no difficulty on the point, but agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe that the question ought to be put upon the agenda for an early meeting.

<sup>1</sup> See No. 28, minute 1.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 55, minute 11.

3. SIR EYRE CROWE was glad to be in a position that day to acquaint the Council of the opinion of his Government. In conformity with the view of the majority of the Council, the British Government considered it preferable not to modify the protocol but thought that it would be well, nevertheless, to settle some procedure for acquainting the Germans that concessions were possible. It had, for example, already been established that in the Allies' calculations there was an error of 80,000 tons. Under those circumstances the British Government believed that there were grounds for reducing the Allied demands from 400,000 tons to 300,000 tons, the Allied experts having to agree among themselves the nature of the material to be handed over and the conditions of its delivery. The protocol would then be signed by the Germans alone and in its present form; at the same time the latter would be informed that the Allies were ready to make such concessions as were recognized by their experts to be legitimate.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Sir EYRE Crowe meant discussion between Allied experts alone or between those and the German experts.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that he meant between Allied experts.

M. LEYGUES said that in those circumstances he accepted the British proposition: the protocol to be signed as it stood but no note would be taken in the application of admitted errors.

M. LOUCHEUR asked whether the British Government meant to accept the immediate delivery of the 300,000 tons or did it agree that a part only of that material ought to be handed over, the remainder to be delivered later?

SIR EYRE CROWE explained his Government was of the opinion that they should ask for immediate delivery. The second procedure, that namely which had in view the handing over of new docks constructed specially, presented, as a matter of fact, numerous disadvantages even from the point of view of reparations. It was preferable that the Germans should give at once what they could and afterwards set themselves to work in their own interest as well as in that of the Allies to supply the remainder. If the Allied demands were excessive it was for the Germans to furnish the proof; if that proof were forthcoming they could [?would] have to take action correspondingly. The case was for that matter anticipated in a perfectly unambiguous phrase of the protocol.

M. LEYGUES considered it certainly probable that a mistake in calculation had been made; but it was the more necessary to have proof of it, since the Allied estimates had been founded upon German figures.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked to have matters made still clearer. Was he to write to the Germans that they maintained in principle the stipulations of the protocol but that the Council was ready to take into account any error that they might have made and reduce its demands in consequence?

SIR EYRE CROWE considered that a question of procedure. In principle he did not think it necessary that the declaration be made in writing; but it was important that the Germans should know that in the event of their

supplying proof of mistake in calculations the extent of their demands would be immediately diminished.

M. LOUCHEUR thought it necessary to be still more precise. The Germans claimed that there was a miscalculation of 160,000 tons in the Allies' figures—over the Dantzig docks, and that other of 80,000 tons which, according to the Allied contention, existed at Hamburg and which was identical with that already appearing on the Allied statement as two docks—one of 37,000 tons and another of 43,000 tons. But the German experts pointed out further the existence of 60,000 to 80,000 tons of docks which did not appear upon the Allied estimates, the result being that the difference between the German and the Allied calculations made a total of 80,000 tons. Should they then say to the Germans that they would agree to a reduction of 160,000 tons, or only 80,000 tons, and admitting that they would reduce the demands by 100,000 tons, were they going to specify that they already agreed to the reduction of 100,000 tons under reserve of verification of figures? Again, was Sir Eyre Crowe prepared to go further still? Apparently, the Germans were going to stick [stick] to the 192,000 tons which they had proposed. Were they agreed to go beyond that and demand 300,000 tons, or would they, on the contrary, agree to make ultimately a new concession upon that last figure?

M. CLEMENCEAU, looking at the matter from the point of view of procedure, preferred the method proposed by Sir Eyre Crowe. According to his information the Germans were ready to sign, were indeed troubled at the delay that had intervened. He thought, therefore, that for the moment it would suffice to stick to Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal to maintain their demand, indicating to the Germans that they would be prepared ultimately to reduce them if error in their calculations were proved. If, in these conditions, the Germans did not agree to sign they could fall back upon the proposition of M. Loucheur and discuss figures, but he felt that there would be no real controversy, especially if at the time of handing over the note M. Dutasta made a verbal communication also.

M. DE MARTINO believed, as he had indeed pointed out at a previous meeting, that at the actual moment they must before all else have the treaty come into force. To attain that essential end the means were comparatively unimportant. In those circumstances he associated himself with the proposition which the President had just formulated.

M. MATSUI likewise gave his approval to the proposition.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that in the verbal communication to be made to Baron von Lersner, M. Dutasta could perfectly well indicate that if an error of 80,000 tons in the calculations were definitely established the Allied demands would be reduced by the 100,000 tons. In that way the Germans would have complete reason for giving their signature.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the question of the immediate handing over of tonnage remained. Would they start by taking the 192,000 tons which the Germans offered, or would they await, before taking anything whatever, the definite establishment of the figures?

SIR EYRE CROWE thought they might well commence by taking delivery of what had been actually offered.

M. LOUCHEUR suggested that there would, therefore, be grounds for saying in the verbal communication: Let the Germans sign the protocol as it stands; they stated, it was true, that in the Allied calculations there was an error of 80,000 tons; they would verify; if the German information were exact their demands would be reduced by 100,000 tons. Let the Germans then start at once the delivery of the 192,000 tons they had offered. If they showed that the Allied demands were excessive the Allies would reduce them to the degree considered necessary.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that such an affirmation was, for that matter, already in their last note, but there were grounds for inserting in their reply a paragraph maintaining that they did not recognize any sales that Germany had made. They undertook not to paralyse German economic life but that undertaking had another side, namely that Germany did not get rid of the docks she possesses.

M. LOUCHEUR said he would go further: they ought to prohibit the Germans for a period of one or two years from selling any dock whatever; the concessions they were able to make now were not for the purpose of allowing the Germans to sell any part of the material.

M. LEYGUES thought that it was not necessary to insist too much in the verbal or written communication upon the possibility of further concessions. The Germans would take advantage of it; indeed, it was important to be on their guard against figures the Germans supplied. He would remind the Council that the Commissions of Control had discovered in German ports 30 submarines more than they had declared.

M. CLEMENCEAU summarized. They were agreed upon the general lines of the reply and he thought the Council was unanimous in considering that they should be sent with the least possible delay. He would be unable himself to be present at a meeting of the Council the following day: in these circumstances he proposed that the Heads of Delegations meet that evening at 7 o'clock in his cabinet to decide upon the terms of the note.

(That proposition was adopted.)

SIR EYRE CROWE added that the reply ought to take account of the position of the prisoners of Scapa Flow, as also of the question of the five cruisers. On the matter of the prisoners his Government made no difficulty about handing them over, it being understood that it should retain those who were guilty of a crime.

M. LOUCHEUR asked whether the destruction of the vessels would be considered a crime.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that obviously it would not. As for the cruisers, it was a case of maintaining purely and simply the demand formulated in the protocol.

M. LEYGUES said that in order not to delay agreement he would not insist upon the proposition formulated by the French Delegation. He would, however, take the liberty of indicating that their proposition satisfied France

and Italy and in general all the Allies. By 1920, if they adhered to the protocol and the terms of the Treaty, the Germans would have three cruisers that had reached the age limit and which, consequently, they would be entitled to replace. In 1923 they would have three more. The Allies were then going to oblige them to demolish at once ships which they had under construction and to let them build others immediately afterwards, since they were entitled to replace those cruisers which were left to them as soon as those had attained the age limit. That was a situation that seemed really to have very little justification. The other system would have been more satisfactory. The Germans would have handed over five cruisers. Just as the ships which were actually on the slips had been completed they would have handed over these to the Allies who could have given back to them in exchange the cruisers already surrendered. Now those last ships, by the terms of the Treaty, could only be replaced in eleven years.

SIR EYRE CROWE perfectly recognized the force of the arguments developed by M. Leygues. It was none the less true that the adoption of his proposition would render a modification of the Treaty necessary—a very grave matter. Further, nothing obliged the Germans to replace immediately ships that had reached the age limit; they might very well wait some time before doing that.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that it was unnecessary to deal with that point in their reply since the German note made no mention of cruisers.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed but pointed out that the Germans had affirmed that their reply had been misinterpreted and that their intention from the beginning had been to ask for the non-surrender of the cruisers; that was the reason for specifying in its letter that it refused this concession.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that it would be a good plan for the naval experts and the Drafting Committee to consult.

M. CLEMENCEAU summed up that it was understood that a meeting would take place at 4 o'clock to prepare the text and that that text would be presented at the 7 o'clock meeting of the Heads of Delegations that night.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. 1736 of December 23, 1919, to Lord Curzon, Sir E. Crowe reported briefly of this latter meeting: 'At meeting last night of Plenipotentiaries draft was approved of note to be addressed to German delegates by Monsieur Clemenceau in name of Supreme Council, and of heads of verbal statements to be made by Secretary General of Conference in handing them note.' In despatch No. 2316 of even date Sir E. Crowe transmitted copies of these two documents to Lord Curzon. The English text of the Allied note of December 22, 1919, read as follows:

'1. The Allied and Associated Powers have examined your letter of December 14th. They have noted with satisfaction that the German Government shares their views regarding the full application of all the provisions of the Treaty from the moment when it comes into force, in accordance with its final clauses, whether or not it has been ratified by the Government of the United States. They take note of the admission by the German Government of the principle that they cannot any more than any of the other High-Contracting Parties, invoke the non-participation of the United States in the first deposit of ratifications as a ground for calling in question any stipulation of the Treaty. Any claim or reservation in this respect would, in fact, be contrary to the clearly expressed intentions of the Treaty itself.

'2. As regards the measures of coercion (*moyens de garantie*), to which the Allied and Associated Powers hope not to be obliged to have recourse, they are pleased to note that

4. M. LOUCHEUR explained that when the Serbian Delegation had acquainted him with their demand he had replied that the question could only be examined by the Reparation Commission when that had been constituted, namely, after the coming into force of the Treaty: the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission was not qualified to grant their request.

*Demand of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation for priority of treatment in the matter of reparations*

the German Government are duly warned that whilst as soon as peace is finally re-established an end will have been put to the employment of means proper to a state of war, the special measures contemplated by the Treaty will, on the other hand, be strictly applied as well as such other methods as are recognised by international law.

'3. With regard to that portion of the Protocol which deals with compensation for the sinking of the German warships at Scapa Flow the Allied and Associated Powers, after deliberation, judge that they must insist on the signature of the Protocol as it stands.

'4. The procedure for safeguarding the vital economic interests of Germany is explained in the note of the Allied and Associated Powers dated December 8th, 1919, in which it is made clear that the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to reduce their demand of 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers in the event of just cause for such reductions being established.

'5. The Allied and Associated Powers have had it brought to their notice that sale of certain German floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers may have recently taken place. They point out that, in view of the economic situation, as described by the German delegation, no such sales will be recognised by the Allied and Associated Powers between 3rd November, 1919, the date on which the contents of the Protocol were originally notified to the German Government, and the date on which the compensation by Germany for the Scapa Flow incident, shall have been completed.

'6. The German delegates have made a verbal request not to surrender the 5 Light Cruisers detailed in the Protocol; and have proposed to complete and hand over 5 of the Light Cruisers now under construction in German dockyards, as and when each of them is completed. The German note of December 14th, 1919, does not include this demand. Moreover the terms of the Protocol must be adhered to just as they are since any modifications would be contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

'As soon as the Protocol is signed, the Allied and Associated Powers are prepared to release the German officers and men interned in connexion with the Scapa Flow incident, with the exception of any who may be required to answer charges for war crimes.'

The agreed heads for the verbal communication to be made by M. Dutasta to Baron von Lersner were as follows:

'1. M. Dutasta presents to the German Delegates the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers regarding the German Memoranda on the subject of compensation for the German action of sinking their warships at Scapa Flow.

'2. The Allied and Associated Powers are unable to accept any alteration to the Protocol of November 1st and the note of December 8th.

'3. The protocol must be signed as it stands.

'4. At the same time M. Dutasta has been authorised by the Supreme Council to assure the German Delegation that the assurances contained in the note of December 8th, as regards the safeguarding of the vital economic interests of Germany, will be most carefully adhered to by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control and the Reparation Commission.

'5. The experts of the Allied and Associated Powers are disposed to think that part of their information, on which they based their demand for 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredgers, may have been incorrect in some particulars.

'In particular they think that they may have erred as regards the 80,000-ton floating dock at Hamburg.

'If investigation by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control shows that this was indeed

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether, in those circumstances, they had to change anything whatever in the Hungarian Treaty, what mattered most at the moment being contained therein.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that they had not. The Serbian demand concerned the Treaty with Germany and bore upon sums to be collected from Germany, for the Serbian Delegates considered that there would be very little to collect from Hungary. In the matter of Hungary, the Serbian demands concerned only the mines of Pecs.

M. FROMAGEOT: The Drafting Committee had been under the impression that the demand of the Serbian Delegation had in view the Treaty with Hungary, but he must acknowledge that they had never received a copy of any note on the subject.

M. DE MARTINO, for his part, understood that it was a request for priority in regard to reparations due by Germany, and he felt obliged to say at once that the Italian representatives considered the demand to have slight justification.

SIR EYRE CROWE concluded that there was, therefore, nothing to prevent the Drafting Committee giving the Treaty with Hungary definite form.

M. LOUCHEUR added that the question of the mines of Pecs remained and that its text would be drafted within 24 to 48 hours.

5. The Council had before it two draft letters prepared by the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission. (See Appendices A and B.<sup>4</sup>)
- Draft letters to the German Delegation on the subject of collection by Germany of custom duties in gold marks*
- M. LOUCHEUR said that the drafts were unanimously approved by the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission.

an error, the Allied and Associated Powers will be prepared to reduce their demands by a corresponding ratio, say roughly to 300,000 tons, or even still further if convincing evidence is produced for the necessity of reduction. But, the fullest facilities must be given to the competent representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers to make all investigation necessary for checking the German statements, before any reduction from the original demands of the protocol can be definitely admitted by the Allied and Associated Powers.

'6. With reference to the ultimate paragraph of the Memorandum containing the reply of the Allied and Associated Governments it is not considered that the sole act of the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow constitutes a war crime for which the punishment of individuals is demanded in accordance with Article No. 228 of the Peace Treaty.'

On the proposal of M. Clemenceau it was further agreed that M. Dutasta should not remit this latter document to Baron von Lersner, but that he should not refuse to approve and, if requested, initial a minute of his verbal communication if Baron von Lersner should have made one during the conversation.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. Appendix A contained a draft letter to Baron von Lersner prepared in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council on December 17, 1919: see No. 41, minute 2. This letter was in three paragraphs and communicated with only verbal variation the three resolutions upon the matter adopted by the Supreme Council on December 9: see No. 39, minute 8. Appendix B contained a covering note from the Organizing Committee of the Reparation Commission, dated December 20, 1919, enclosing a supplementary draft letter to Baron von Lersner which drew attention to the expression 'in such a proportion as the Reparation Commission shall deem it to be a just equivalent to the depreciation of German currency': cf. resolution (1) of December 9. The supplementary draft observed

After a short discussion it was decided to adopt the draft letters prepared by the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission to be sent to the German Delegation concerning the collection of custom duties in gold marks.

6. SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he had already indicated the very strong desire of the British Government to see raised the blockade measures which had been adopted towards Roumania: it felt, however, unable to do so until Roumania had replied to the ultimatum of the Supreme Council.<sup>5</sup>

*Restrictions upon commerce with Roumania*

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that, in consideration of a decision taken at a previous meeting of the Supreme Council, M. Berthelot had called General Coanda and indicated to him the importance that the Powers attached to receiving a prompt reply from the Roumanian Government; the Allied representative at Bucharest had been acquainted with this step to enable him on his side to act to the same end.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, for his part, he must admit having thought, perhaps wrongly, that after the signatures of the Treaties by Roumania the resumption of commercial relations presented no difficulties and so far as France was concerned, he had authorized that resumption. Naturally, he would have no objection whatever to the British Government doing the same. From the legal point of view he recognized that Sir Eyre Crowe was perfectly right.

M. DE MARTINO asked whether the President, therefore, was of the opinion that all Powers could resume commercial relations with Roumania.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that that was his opinion.

It was decided:

To authorize the resumption of commercial relations with Roumania;

That whatever has been the formula adopted, Mr. Wallace would refer the resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

7.

*Letter to Roumanian  
Delegation on the subject  
of an inventory of the  
rolling stock on the  
Roumanian Railways*

[Not printed]<sup>6</sup>

(The meeting then adjourned).

that 'it therefore becomes the duty of the Reparation Commission to establish the rules according to which this equivalence is to be calculated. Provisionally, and until the Reparation Commission informs you of what these rules are to be, Germany must take the steps necessary to ensure that the customs duties which she imposes are not superior to pre-war customs duties, expressed in marks, calculated at the rate of exchange on the dollar, the date of collection'.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 42, minute 2.

<sup>6</sup> After a brief discussion the Supreme Council decided to address to the Roumanian delegation in Paris the draft letter on this subject (appendix D in original) submitted by the British delegation at the instance of Sir F. Dent, Chairman of the Commission for the distribution of rolling-stock belonging to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In

a covering note from the British delegation, dated December 13, 1919 (appendix C in original), Mr. Norman explained that 'this step has become necessary owing to the fact that so far no representative of Roumania has been present at the meetings of the Commission, although at my request the Roumanian Government was invited, about a month ago, to choose this representative at once'. The letter to the Roumanian delegation stated in part: 'In order to facilitate the re-establishment of normal conditions in Central Europe, the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council have requested the countries of Central Europe, through its liaison officers, to have made an inventory of all their railroads belonging to the state or to private persons. This request, to which was joined a request for complementary details, was simultaneously communicated to the representatives at the Commission for the Distribution of Rolling Stock of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but owing to the absence of the Roumanian Delegate it could not be brought to the attention of the Roumanian Government in this way. The proposed inventory was to take place Sunday, January 4, 1920, and the following Sundays every four weeks, these being the dates on which inventories should take place in France and Belgium. All the other countries have agreed to proceed with this inventory.

'The French representative of the Communications Section, however, has been advised by his Liaison Officer in Roumania that the Director of the Roumanian Railways did not believe he could proceed with this inventory without the authorization of his Government.

'Owing to the early date of the inventory, the Supreme Council begs the Roumanian Delegation at the Peace Conference to kindly telegraph its Government, dwelling on the advantages of the proposed inventory, the facilities which will thereby accompany exchanges at the frontier, and the repercussion on economic conditions of Central Europe, and requesting it to authorize this inventory.'

## No. 45

H.D. 116.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, December 24, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.

Great Britain: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. Norman.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. de Saint Quentin.

Italy: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: *British Empire*: Capt. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

Great Britain: Capt. Fuller, R.N., Cdt. [sic] Macnamara, R.N.

France: M. Leygues, M. H. Simon, M. de Perotti, G.al Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Hermitte.

Italy: M. Dell'Abbadessa, M. Catastini.

Japan: M. Shigemitsu.

1. SIR EYRE CROWE recalled that the Supreme Council had recently decided upon the allocation to Poland of a certain number of German ships for police purposes.<sup>1</sup> The British Government asked whether that decision might not lead to certain difficulties between Germany and Poland, the more especially as it was a case of giving to that latter Power German vessels actually stationed at Dantzic. It was worth while considering in those circumstances whether it were not preferable to give to Poland an equivalent number of Austrian ships.

It was decided:

To refer to the Naval experts the question whether it were practicable to substitute for the German ships destined to be sent to Poland for policing her coasts an equivalent number of Austrian ships.

2. SIR EYRE CROWE stated his opinion that the resolution on the conditions of surrender of German warships was not exactly in accord with the decision taken by the Council at its meeting of 18th December. It was necessary to distinguish between the case of the vessels referred to in the Peace Treaty and the case of the vessels dealt with in the protocol. As the Council had decided to make no modification in the protocol it appeared to him that they ought to confine themselves in that matter to purely unofficial dealings with the Germans. The resolution, as actually formulated, maintained, on the contrary, that the Interallied Naval Commission of Control was to take the steps necessary for having the material of the five light cruisers, referred to in the protocol, delivered to the Allied and Associated Powers in the same places as the vessels themselves from which it had been stripped. He thought that the resolution ought to be amended so as to indicate that an unofficial advance should be made to the Germans either through the Naval Commission or through the Secretariat General.

M. LEYGUES had no objection to the Germans being approached unofficially provided the desired result were obtained; that was merely a question of form to which he attached no importance.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he was equally of opinion that an unofficial step was preferable for the principal Powers had no right to act merely on their own account in the name of all the Powers who were signatories of the Treaty. He would ask Sir Eyre Crowe to be good enough to bring to the following meeting of the Council the text in writing of the modification that he proposed.

3. The Council had before it the account of two conversations that had taken place on the 23rd December between M. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner. (See Appendix A.)

*Note of 22nd December to the German Delegation*<sup>3</sup>

M. CLEMENCEAU said that when M. Dutasta had put before the Baron von Lersner the Council's last note, the German Delegate had at first appeared very disagreeably impressed. He had declared that he

<sup>1</sup> See No. 39, minute 1 and appendix B.

<sup>2</sup> No. 42, minute 6.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 44, note 3.

would set out for Berlin that very day, accompanied by all the German experts. But in the afternoon he had come round and told M. Dutasta that he had changed his mind, that he would remain in Paris and content himself by sending to Germany only some of the experts from the German Delegation. Baron von Lersner had likewise declared that he would advise his Government to institute immediately an inquiry into the tonnage actually existing in Germany. But if Baron von Lersner had in mind an inquiry made by the German Government alone, he did not think that the Council ought to agree to the procedure but that it must insist that the inquiry could only have value if it were made in co-operation with the Allied Naval representatives.

M. DUTASTA pointed out that von Lersner meant it in the latter sense.

M. DE MARTINO emphasized that the Germans must be made to consent to the inquiry taking place only after signing.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that according to the opinion of his Naval experts a serious inquiry into the number of docks existing in Germany would require weeks to carry out. If they did not wish to delay indefinitely the coming into force of the Treaty, it would indeed be necessary to require the Germans to give their signature before any inquiry.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they ought to await the reply which the German Government would make to their last communication. When the Council had received that reply, they could let the German Government know that [? what] they demanded of them, the first demand of all being that they should sign the protocol, the inquiry having to be made later. He would be inclined not to publish their last note, the substance of which was already known to the public; publication of the exact text would run the risk of creating in Germany a disagreeable impression and consequently of delaying the signature.

MR. WALLACE asked whether the German experts had all departed for Berlin.

M. DUTASTA explained that a certain number of them had gone but that some remained in Paris. He felt that he ought to explain further that von Lersner had declared that Germany could not in any case sign the protocol before agreement had been arrived at on the quantity of tonnage to be demanded of her.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that that would involve a delay of a month.

M. DUTASTA said that Baron von Lersner had told him that [in] his opinion they could on the same day sign the agreement regarding tonnage, the protocol and the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications. To hasten communication between the German Delegation and Berlin, he had thought it right to make representations to the P. T. T.<sup>4</sup> in order to have telegraphic wires with Germany which had been damaged by the storm<sup>5</sup> immediately restored.

<sup>4</sup> Abbreviation for *Postes, Télégraphes, et Téléphones*, the French postal administration.

<sup>5</sup> An Atlantic gale had been raging during the previous week.

M. LEYGUES suggested that the Interallied Naval Commission at London ought to be asked to hold itself in readiness to leave at any moment for Germany in order to verify the figures supplied by the Germans.

M. CLEMENCEAU felt that there was no purpose in the Naval Commission leaving in a body. The presence of an English Admiral seemed to him quite sufficient.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that he regretted having to leave the Council shortly as he had a meeting in the Chamber from which he could not be absent. Had Mr. Wallace any communication to make on the subject of the Convocation by the President of the United States of the first Council of the League of Nations?

*Convocation of the first  
Council of the League  
of Nations*

MR. WALLACE said he would like to ask at what time President Wilson ought to convoke the first Council of the League of Nations. Without doubt that question depended upon the moment of signing the protocol. But he would like to know what interval after the date of the exchange of the ratifications should elapse before the Council should be convoked.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that it had been decided that the Council of the League of Nations would be convoked on the first or second day after the exchange of ratifications.

M. MANTOUX recalled that there had even been a document drafted which was to be sent in advance to the members of the League who were to take part in the Council.<sup>6</sup>

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether that notification had been sent.

MR. WALLACE thought that it had not.

M. DUTASTA explained that it was the Drafting Committee that had been entrusted with preparing the document; he would discover whether it had been sent out or not.

M. Clemenceau, having handed over the Presidency to M. Jules Cambon, left the Council.

5. The Council had before it drafts of conventions relative to mandates to be attributed:

*Draft of Conventions  
relative to certain man-  
dates*

A. To the British Empire for part of German East Africa. (Appendix B.)

B. To Belgium for part of German East Africa.

(Appendix C.)<sup>7</sup>

C. To the British Empire (Union of South Africa) for German South West Africa. (Appendix D.)<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See No. 18, appendix D.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed. This draft mandate was, *mutatis mutandis*, the same as that in appendix B. In particular the drafts for articles 9 and 10 of this mandate were identical with those of the mandate conferred upon the British Empire, and thus differed from the final text of articles 9 and 10 of the mandate conferred upon Belgium under date of July 20, 1922. This mandate is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers* (1923), vol. cxviii, pp. 879-83.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed. The preamble of this draft mandate was, *mutatis mutandis*, the same as that in appendix B. Articles 1 and 2 of this draft read as follows: '(1) The Principal Allied and

- D. To the British Empire for the Island of Nauru. (Appendix E.)<sup>9</sup>
- E. To the British Empire (New Zealand) for German Samoa. (Appendix F.)<sup>10</sup>
- F. To the British Empire (Australia) for the German possessions in the Pacific, south of the equator other than Nauru and Samoa. (Appendix G.)<sup>11</sup>
- G. To Japan for German possessions in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator. (Appendix H.)<sup>12</sup>

M. CAMBON stated that the drafts before them were simply the resolutions arrived at by the Mandates Commission in London in execution of a decision of the Supreme Council dated 7th May, 1919, put into treaty form.

SIR EYRE CROWE made the comment that the pact of the League of Nations had provided for three different forms of Mandate. In execution of those provisions the Mandates Commission had drawn up three types of mandates—A, B, and C. The form of mandate A had not been decided upon in London but texts had been drafted for types B and C. Those texts had been sent to the Legal Advisers who had not modified the substance but had only put them in Treaty form. Those were the texts revised by the Legal experts which were actually submitted to the Council. They did not differ therefore, except in certain formal and unimportant modifications, from the texts adopted by the Mandates Commission in conformity with Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations. He thought therefore that the Council would have no difficulty in adopting those texts. The question of Togo-Cameroon was not actually before the Council, no definite understanding having been

Associated Powers confer upon His Britannic Majesty a mandate to be exercised on His behalf by His Government of the Union of South Africa, in conformity with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, to administer the former German Protectorate of South-West Africa. (2) His Britannic Majesty, for and on behalf of the Government of His Union of South Africa (hereinafter called the Mandatory Power), accepts the mandate thus conferred upon Him, and will execute the same on behalf of the League of Nations, and in accordance with the following provisions.' Articles 3-8 of this draft mandate were, subject to verbal variation, the same as articles 2-7 respectively of the final text, dated December 17, 1920, which is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers* (1920), vol. cxiii, pp. 1109-10.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed. This draft mandate was, *mutatis mutandis*, in the same form as the preceding (see note 8 above). The final text of this mandate, dated December 17, 1920, is printed op. cit., vol. cxiii, pp. 1111-12.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed. This draft mandate was, *mutatis mutandis*, in the same form as the preceding except that it contained an additional article (3) as follows: 'In case of any dispute arising as to whether any island is or is not included in the above mandate, the question shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.' This draft article was omitted from the final text, dated December 17, 1920, which is printed op. cit., vol. cxiii, pp. 1107-8.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed. This draft mandate was, *mutatis mutandis*, in the same form as the preceding (see note 10 above). The final text of this mandate, dated December 17, 1920, is printed op. cit., vol. cxiii, pp. 1113-15.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed. This draft mandate was, *mutatis mutandis*, in the same form as the preceding. The final text of this mandate, dated December 17, 1920, is printed in *British and Foreign State Papers* (1922), vol. cxvi, pp. 806-7.

yet arrived at, but he thought it would be easy to come to an agreement and that the question could come before the Council very soon.

They were, on the other hand, confronted by a Japanese reservation applying to Mandate C, dealing with the ex-German possessions in the Pacific. Japan desired evidently the insertion in the C type of mandate certain clauses relative to equality of treatment in economic matters—clauses which were embodied in the B type. He could very well understand Japan's interest in that modification but it appeared to him contrary to the Treaty. The difference indeed between the B and the C mandates was precisely that in the C type the territory with which the mandates dealt formed an integral part of the territory of the mandatory states and entered consequently into the revenue and administrative system of that state. There was a much closer connection between the mandatory power and the territory over which it exercised its mandate in the C type than in the B type. He therefore considered that they could not satisfy the demand made by the Japanese Delegation without modifying the explicit terms of Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations and consequently of the Treaties already signed.

M. HENRY SIMON stated that so far as concerned the two first drafts of conventions submitted to the Council, those namely relative to German East Africa, he did not think that they could raise any difficulty, the Mandates conferred upon the British Empire on the one hand and on Belgium on the other being both of the B type.

M. CAMBON asked whether then the Council adopted in principle the drafts of conventions dealing with the Mandates to be given over ex-German East Africa to the British Empire and to Belgium. They could then pass to the discussion of the drafts conferring upon the British Empire (Union of South Africa), mandate over German South-West Africa.

M. MATSUI stated that although Japan had no direct interest in that region, he felt obliged to make a reservation upon the point, the type of mandate involved being the C type, the same, that was to say, as that of the territories in the Pacific. He had circulated a note indicating the point of view of the Japanese Government upon the C type of mandate and the modifications that would have to be introduced to conform with his view. (See Appendix I.)

The matter was for Japan at once a political question and one of principle. From the point of view of principle they considered that all states, members of the League of Nations, ought to enjoy 'equal opportunity' in the same degree and that consequently the principle of equality of treatment in the economic sphere must be understood among the guarantees provided for in paragraph 5 of the same Article 22, in the interests of the native population. When the discussion of that general question had come before the Supreme Council two definitely opposed theories were discussed—that of annexation and that of mandates. An intermediate solution had been found at the end of several days' discussion at which he had been present. There was no question at the moment of any discrimination whatever between the members of the League of Nations. They ought not to lose sight of this, that the

League of Nations was founded upon the principle of absolute equality between its various members. His Government maintained that Article 22 of the Pact of the League of Nations ought to be interpreted in the sense that the conditions of equality in matters of currency and commerce alluded to in paragraph 5 were part of the guarantees implied in paragraph 6 at the end.

Independently of that question of interpretation, the matter presented itself for Japan in its political aspect. They had entered the war in 1914. It was the Japanese fleet that had driven the German cruisers from the Pacific and from the Indian Ocean. Now in the Pacific Isles which belonged to Germany before the war, natives of Japan had enjoyed complete equality of treatment with the natives of other Powers, including Germany. Japan now required the assurance that that situation would not be modified in such of the German possessions as were coming under the mandate of the United Kingdom or its Dominions. If that were not so, Japanese nationals would find themselves, after the war in which they had participated as victors side by side with their Allies, in a situation inferior to that they had enjoyed before the war. Their public opinion would be totally incapable of understanding and of accepting such a paradoxical consequence and could not endure Japanese nationals being on a footing different from those of other nations. It was in virtue of these considerations that the Japanese Delegate on the Mandates Commission had made a formal reservation upon the text adopted for the C type of mandate. The Japanese Parliament was actually on the point of assembling: he thought indeed that its first session was taking place that very day. They ran the risk of finding themselves in an extremely awkward situation unless they received the assurance that the rights of Japanese nationals in the ex-German possessions on the Pacific, which were coming under England or its Dominions, were respected. Japanese public opinion would experience serious disillusion and would be fully justified in so feeling. His Government asked therefore that article 5 of the draft of the B type of mandate, as it appears in the text worked out in London, should be inserted in the draft of the C type. He had communicated to his Government the drafts of mandates drawn up in London and had received in reply the instructions, the substance of which he had just communicated to the Council. He had not yet received instructions about the texts which were at the moment put before them and which he had telegraphed to Tokio, but as they [? there] were between those various documents only differences of form, he had ground for thinking that the instructions he had received would not be modified. In any case he was for the moment bound by the instructions he had received and he hoped that his colleagues would find it possible to satisfy the legitimate demands of the Japanese Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that article 5 of the draft of mandate B, to which Mr. Matsui had referred, bore in the text which he had before him and which the Legal Advisers had revised the number 8. But it was the same text.

He could not very well see how the modification to the C type of mandate demanded by the Japanese Government could be made without going directly against Article 22 of the Treaty which Japan had accepted since it

had signed and ratified it. Paragraph 6 of Article 22 deliberately omitted the words which appeared at the end of paragraph 3 and which tended to ensure to members of the League of Nations equality of conditions in currency and commerce. If that difference had been formulated between the mandates B and C, it was done intentionally, since the territories under mandate C were an integral part of the territory of the mandatory Power, a state of affairs involving as a consequence equality of treatment between all the members of the League of Nations on the territory of the mandatory power itself. It seemed to him that by the very fact that it had signed the Treaty, the Japanese Government had already accepted the general principle of discrimination between the mandate B and mandate C, a principle the suppression of which it was that Japan was then demanding.

M. DE MARTINO explained that in the question of mandates in general Italy had no special interests. He recognized nevertheless all the importance of the arguments which the Japanese Delegate had just expounded, alike from the point of view of the general principle of the liberty of traffic which they ought naturally to try and safeguard to the fullest possible extent and because of the fact that Japanese nationals ran the risk of finding themselves in a situation worse than that they had enjoyed before the war. But since, for that matter, he recognized that serious interests were involved from the point of view of Great Britain towards which country he would by no means adopt an unfavourable attitude, he would simply adhere to whatever decision would be taken by the majority.

He had said that Italy was not specially interested in the question of mandates. Their disinterestedness was due to the fact that Italy had been excluded from participation in the mandates over the former German colonies in Africa. He repeated to the Council what he had already had occasion to say elsewhere, that that exclusion seemed to him to be a mistake. The Council ought rather to have created upon the African continent, the future of which did not appear in a very reassuring light, a solid united interest of all the Powers. He did not mean however to raise the question anew and he made his remarks in a purely platonic spirit.

M. HENRY SIMON explained that at London the French had supported the British interpretation of Article 22 and could not but adhere to their former point of view.

M. MATSUI said that he had expounded the point of view of the Japanese Government and that he saw nothing to add to his former explanations. His instructions did not permit him to accept the draft submitted to them for the C type of mandate.

M. CAMBON said that he considered with Sir Eyre Crowe that the Japanese Government, by the mere fact that it had signed the Treaty, had accepted the distinction between the B and C mandates, which was clearly formulated in Article 22 and the Mandates Commission had merely executed the provisions of that article.

M. MATSUI said that a difference in interpretation existed between them; the Japanese Government considered in fact that the guarantees provided

for in Paragraph 6 of Article 22 included similarly conditions of equality of treatment discussed at the end of Paragraph 5. It was in giving it that interpretation that the Japanese Government had accepted Article 22.

M. CAMBON did not consider that it was possible to interpret the concluding provision of paragraph 6 in so wide a sense.

It was not indeed only the guarantees provided in the interests of the population.

M. MATSUI claimed that equality of treatment too was as much in the interests of the native population as in that of foreign nationals.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the interpretation given to Article 22 by the Japanese Delegation did not seem compatible with the text. The guarantees understood in Article 6 meant only the prohibition of the abuses discussed in paragraph 5, such, for example, as were mentioned in the Treaty, the treatment of slaves, traffic in arms and in alcohol, etc. It could not be maintained that equality of treatment in the economic sphere fell within the same category. No subtlety of interpretation could avail against the fact that the passage relative to equality of treatment which had appeared in paragraph 5 had been deliberately omitted from paragraph 6. As he understood it the Japanese Government was bound by its acceptance of Article 22 and obliged consequently to recognize the fundamental difference that separated mandate B from mandate C, and which it then desired to have suppressed. He hoped that a more careful examination of the question would enable the Japanese Government to become convinced that the interpretation it was proposing was diametrically opposed to the letter and the spirit of Article 22.

He would like to offer one further observation arising out of a remark just made by the Italian Delegate. The question involved—and under discussion at that moment—was not one as between British and Japanese interests. The three classes of mandates had been determined according to geographical considerations and the clauses of the C type of mandate engaging their attention then applied equally to all the former possessions of Germany in the Pacific which were coming within the mandatory power of Great Britain, its dominions or Japan. The same treatment would therefore be applicable to all territories in the Pacific for which a mandate was envisaged. The differences existing between the B and the C types of mandate resulted therefore directly and solely from the provisions of Article 22.

M. MATSUI felt that he could only repeat that he was bound by the instructions received from his Government which considered its proposal in conformity with the principle of equality of treatment which served as the basis of the pact of the League of Nations and which was furthermore justified by the political considerations which he had adduced.

M. CAMBON asked whether M. Matsui could not accept the draft before the Council under the reserve of gaining the approval of the Japanese Government. The other members of the Council appeared indeed unanimous for the adoption of the British interpretation of Article 22.

M. MATSUI maintained that as he had already said he had asked for instructions when he sent to Tokio the drafts of the mandates prepared in

London. He had so far received no instructions regarding the texts before them, but it was very unlikely that he would receive different instructions since between the former and the new texts there appeared to be mere unimportant differences of form.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that Mr. Matsui might not perhaps consider it necessary to maintain the reservation he had formulated in so far as concerned the mandate of the Union of South Africa over German South West Africa. He had himself said, indeed, that Japan had no direct interests in that zone. If Mr. Matsui would agree to confine his reservation to the territories of the Pacific, the Council would be in a position at the very least to settle that day the question of South West Africa.

He would also very earnestly urge the Japanese Delegate to make known to Tokio that the interpretation given by the Japanese Government did not appear to any of the other Delegations compatible with the text of the Treaty. He hoped that Mr. Matsui would gain acceptance for the arguments that had been put forward by the Council and would be good enough to recommend to his Government the adoption of the drafts they were discussing.

M. CAMBON emphasized that they ought not to forget the need there was of arriving at a solution. Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal seemed to him acceptable so far as concerned German South West Africa and he would be glad if M. Matsui would kindly let his Government know that in the opinion of the other Powers represented on the Supreme Council Japan was already committed on that question by the fact that it had signed the Treaty.

M. MATSUI said he would send to Tokio an account of that discussion and would ask for new instructions. For the moment he was bound by the instructions he had received already. He would further like the Council to consider how important for Japan was the question of principle involved therein. Japanese public opinion would be quite unable to understand why their nationals should be in a more unfavourable situation after, than they had been in before the war, the more so as Japanese Squadrons had driven the German fleets from the waters of the Pacific.

As to the suggestion made by Sir Eyre Crowe and supported by M. Cambon on the subject of German South West Africa he regretted that he could not associate himself with it. German South West Africa fell as a matter of fact under the type of mandate C and he was consequently unable to withdraw a reservation bearing upon the very principle of that type of mandate.

SIR EYRE CROWE wished in no way to deny the force of Mr. Matsui's argument, but he could only repeat that in his belief Japan had already accepted the provisions which it was then actually asking to have modified.

M. MATSUI said that their acceptance ought to be understood in the sense that equality of treatment was for them part of the guarantees provided for in paragraph 6 of Article 22.

SIR EYRE CROWE maintained that that paragraph concerned only guarantees provided in the interests of the native population, namely, liberty of conscience and of religion, prohibition of commerce in arms and in alcohol and other provisions of the same nature.

M. MATSUI pointed out that his Government believed that the principle of the Open Door was also in the interest of the native population.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that on referring to the minutes of the meetings of the Mandates Commission one might easily see that the provision dealing with equality of treatment inserted in paragraph 5 had been omitted deliberately and of design from paragraph 6. The Japanese line of argument consisted, on the contrary, in maintaining that the principle of the Open Door was understood in paragraph 6. That appeared to him in complete contradiction, not merely with the text of the paragraphs in question, but also with the efforts of the Commission.

M. MATSUI maintained that the principle of equality of treatment upon which they were basing their arguments constituted the very basis of the pact of the League of Nations. It was clearly set forth in explicit manner by Article 23, paragraph (e) of the pact.

SIR EYRE CROWE repeated that he appreciated the force of the Japanese argument, but those arguments ought to have been adduced at the time of the discussion of the B and C types of mandate. It did not seem to him possible at that time to reopen the question without going against Article 22.

M. CAMBON thought it necessary to suspend the discussion until M. Matsui should have received instructions from his Government.

MR. WALLACE said that in the event of his having to sign the drafts then before them, he would, in order to save time, ask instructions from Washington immediately.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that the United States being a party to those acts, the signature of the American Delegate was indispensable.

M. MATSUI added that Sir Eyre Crowe had just said that the drafts before them had been revised by the Drafting Committee. There must be some mistake for the Japanese Delegate on that Committee, Mr. Nagaoka, had no knowledge of those texts.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he believed that those texts had been submitted to the Drafting Committee, but he might have been mistaken.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN explained that the text could not indeed have been prepared by the Drafting Committee for they had come to them in English, and communications from the Drafting Committee were generally prepared in French.

M. CAMBON held that in those circumstances they might refer all those drafts of conventions to the Drafting Committee, it being understood that the drafts A and B relative to German East Africa were approved in principle by the Council.

It was decided:

To instruct the Drafting Committee to revise the texts of the drafts of conventions submitted to the Council relative to the attribution of mandates, it being understood that the drafts A and B dealing with German East Africa (British and Belgian mandates) were approved in principle by the Council. On the other drafts of conventions, discussion would be

resumed once the Japanese Delegate had received instructions from his Government.

Mr. Wallace would refer that resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

The meeting adjourned.

## APPENDIX A TO No. 45

### Document 1

#### *Note*

M. Dutasta, Secretary General of the Conference received Baron von Lersner, President of the German Delegation, at ten-thirty this morning, December 23rd. He gave him the letter from the Supreme Council of December 22nd,<sup>2</sup> and asked him to read it.

He then verbally informed the President of the German Delegation, as directed, of the message from the Supreme Council. Baron von Lersner seemed much impressed. He asserted that the German Government, could not, in any case, sign the Protocol before an agreement had been reached as to the deliveries to be made by Germany. He added that owing to the importance of the matter, he was obliged to leave for Berlin this evening, accompanied by all the experts, military, naval and others.

He asked the Secretary General of the Conference not to interpret this general departure as a rupture. He will leave a representative at Avenue de la Bourdonnais whose name will be given later.

M. von Lersner expressed the desire to put down, in writing, a résumé of M. Dutasta's declaration. He did not ask the latter to initial it.

### Document 2

#### *Note*

At 2.45 M. von Lersner asked to be received immediately by M. Dutasta, Secretary-General of the Conference, who received him at 3.30.

M. von Lersner informed the Secretary General of the Conference that, contrary to his decision of this morning, he as well as M. von Simson had decided to remain at Paris unless he received contrary instructions from his Government.

M. von Lersner said that, after the communications of this morning, the German Delegation had the impression that the Allies were not in a hurry to put the Treaty into force. M. Dutasta declared that on the contrary, the Supreme Council unanimously desired the going into force of the Treaty, provided Germany gave all the satisfactions asked for.

Before leaving M. von Lersner said to M. Dutasta that he would advise the Berlin Cabinet to have made immediately, by the Interallied Commission, the investigations provided for in the note of December 22.

## APPENDIX B TO NO. 45

### *Convention relating to the Mandate for the Part of German East Africa assigned to Great Britain*

Whereas by Article 119 of Part IV (German Rights and Interests outside Germany) of the Treaty of Peace, Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her overseas possessions, including therein German East Africa; and

Whereas, in accordance with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the said Treaty, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers are desirous of conferring a mandate upon His Britannic Majesty to administer part of German East Africa, and have decided to conclude a convention for this purpose; the High Contracting Parties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say—

The President of the United States of America:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

The President of the French Republic:

His Majesty the King of Italy:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

1. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers confer upon His Britannic Majesty a mandate to be exercised in conformity with Article 22 of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at Versailles on the 28th June, 1919, to administer the former German Protectorate of German East Africa, excepting the following portions:—

(a) The area situated at the mouth of the Rovuma River and to the south of that river;

(b) The area situated to the west of the following line. . . .<sup>13</sup>

## APPENDIX I TO NO. 45

I. The Commission on the Mandates Regime adopted two kinds of Mandates, respectively called Mandates B and C, and destined to be applied to the territories

<sup>13</sup> The remainder of this draft mandate (beginning: 'From the point where the frontier between the Uganda Protectorate and German East Africa . . .') was, apart from verbal variation, the same as the final text of July 20, 1922 (printed in *British and Foreign State Papers* 1922, vol. cxvi, pp. 832-6) with the following exceptions: (i) The last paragraph of article 1 was not included in the draft. (ii) Draft article 3 was omitted from the final text. This article read: 'His Britannic Majesty, hereafter called the Mandatory Power, accepts the mandate thus conferred upon him, and will execute the same on behalf of the League of Nations and in accordance with the following provisions.' (iii) The fourth paragraph of article 7 of the final text was not included in the draft. (iv) The second part of the first sentence of article 8 of the final text began in the draft as follows: 'Missionaries of all such religions shall be free to enter . . . etc.' (v) Draft article 12 was omitted from the final text. This article read: 'The Mandatory Power shall extend his diplomatic protection to the natives of the territory when in foreign lands, under the same conditions as to his own nationals.'

referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. However, the conclusions of this Commission did not express the unanimous opinion of the Commission, on account of the reservations made by certain Delegations.

As far as the Japanese Delegation is concerned, the Japanese Delegate proposed to the Commission to insert in the clause of Mandate C the stipulations of Article 5 of Mandate B on the principle of 'equal opportunity', 'the benefit of which is enjoyed by the nationals of States members of the League of Nations, on territory administered by the Mandatories.

This proposal not having been accepted by the Mandates Commission, the Japanese Delegate was obliged to make reservations concerning the draft of Mandate C, such as it was approved by the other members of the Commission.

II. It seems to us that no differences can be accepted between Mandate B and Mandate C, especially with respect to the advantages of the open-door policy, which the States members of the League of Nations should enjoy on an equal footing.

According to paragraph 6 of Article 22, the territories of Mandate C shall be administered under the laws of the Mandatory, as integral portions of this territory, as distinguished from territories of Mandate B. This paragraph, thus drafted, however, gives the Mandatory no right to go against the elementary principles of the League of Nations, which are the expression of justice and equity.

III. Concerning the Southern Pacific Islands, which are to be administered according to the provisions of Mandate C, Japan has special interests, as considerable capital is invested in these islands and the natural resources of the country were improved thanks to the continual efforts of Japanese nationals.

If the Japanese Government makes a point of formulating the preceding proposition this is because it has in mind the situation of its nationals in Australia subjected to a regime different to that of other foreigners.

In this connection, if the same conditions were to spread to the territories of the Mandate, which may be feared owing to the present policy of the Australian Government in the islands which it occupies, it would be contrary to the spirit of the League of Nations. It would be a real injustice, equivalent to barring Japanese nationals from all kinds of trade and be prejudicial to their rights.

IV. It will be remembered that, before the war, the Japanese were treated by the German authorities as on an equal footing with nationals of other countries, from a point of view of commerce, navigation, establishment and acquisition of property.

Japan's participation in the war against Germany, the assistance which she lent to her Allies, to enable them to apply the Mandate regime to those territories, would lead, if the principle of 'equal opportunity' were not admitted, to depriving Japanese nationals of the advantages which they formerly enjoyed and would place them in a situation inferior to that which they held when those territories were in the hands of the enemy.

Japanese public opinion could not possibly admit such a paradoxical consequence, and could not understand such a result crowning the efforts made by the country. The Japanese Government would be unable to justify the situation and assume responsibility in face of public opinion.

<sup>14</sup> The text of this draft article was appended to the original. It corresponded to article 7 of the final text of the mandate for German East Africa, omitting the fourth paragraph: cf. note 13 above.

V. For these reasons the Japanese Government is unable to accept Mandate C such as it has been drawn up by the majority of Mandates Commission. Therefore, the Japanese Government proposes that stipulations similar to those in Article 5 of Mandate B relative to equal opportunities, be inserted in the Clause of Mandate C.

## No. 46

H.D. 117.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held at M. Clemenceau's Residence, Paris, on Saturday, December 27, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.  
Great Britain: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. H. Norman.  
France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Arnavon, M. de Saint Quentin.  
Italy: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.  
Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
JOINT SECRETARIAT: Great Britain: Capt. Lothian Small. France: M. Massigli. Italy: M. Zanchi.  
INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

Great Britain: Capt. Fuller, R.N., Cdt. [sic] Macnamara, R.N., Mr. Malkin.  
France: M. Leygues, Gen. Weygand, Gen. Le Rond, Contre-Amiral Le Vasseur, M. Laroche, M. Hermite, M. Fromageot.  
Italy: C.-Amiral Grassi, Cdt. Fea, M. Pilotti.  
Japan: M. Nagaoka.

1. M. DUTASTA informed the Council that Baron von Lersner had visited him on the previous day. The Chairman of the German  
*Reply of the German Government to the Note of December 22* Delegation had come to discuss two kinds of questions with him: he had first stated that the German Government was prepared to receive the Allied Naval experts responsible for determining the exact number of floating docks existing in Germany. Baron von Lersner had even added that his Government would like the experts to start as soon as possible. He had also come to ask whether the Allied Powers were prepared to allow their technical delegates to negotiate with the German experts of whom M. von Simson was the head. Otherwise M. von Simson and his colleagues would leave again for Berlin. M. Clemenceau, to whom he had reported this request, was of opinion that the opening of negotiations as soon as possible between the experts of both sides could not but be beneficial. He had informed Sir Eyre Crowe of this opinion.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that he had already telegraphed to London as a result of the communication made to him on the previous day, pointing out that in his opinion their experts should leave as soon as possible for the

German ports. He believed, moreover, that the inquiry which they were about to make would last some time—the exports even suggested several weeks. However that might be, they were in rather a difficult position. They had verbally informed the Germans that they were prepared to make them concessions: the Germans asked them to define those concessions in a sort of agreement to be signed before or at the same time as the Protocol. Such a procedure would necessarily involve an alteration in the text of the Protocol. He was uncertain whether it would not be better, instead of so doing, to indicate, if possible, in the Protocol in its present form that the figures claimed was [*sic*] the maximum. This solution would certainly involve a slight alteration of the Protocol and it would consequently be necessary to obtain the consent of the American Government to this alteration: but he thought it unlikely that this consent would be refused, since from the outset the American Delegation had been of opinion that their conditions were too hard and since Mr. Polk had insisted that the Reparation Commission should be consulted: Mr. Wallace might sound his Government on that particular and point out to it that the proposed change would be in conformity with the American views and that the Germans alone would have to sign the new document in the presence of the Allied delegates.

M. CLEMENCEAU personally thought it would be better, if possible, not to alter the Protocol. They might merely note the concessions they had decided to grant Germany in a letter to Baron von Lersner. The German delegation was already aware of them from the verbal communication for which M. Dutasta was responsible.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out that this procedure had the drawback of causing discrepancy between the Protocol and the letter.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that for his part he was ready to accept this proposal if the Germans could be persuaded to agree to it.

MR. WALLACE stated that if the Council so desired he was in a position to explain the views of his Government on this question. The American Government had repeatedly declared that the question of reparation to be demanded of Germany must be considered from a purely economic point of view. Germany's power to make reparation depended on her power to produce and export. It was thus closely connected with the economic conditions of the world at a time when a large part of it was in a critical economic position. The American Government could not, therefore, accept any claim for reparation seriously affecting Germany's power of payment. It had realized that by claiming the surrender of docks, dredgers and harbour material they had committed a great mistake. President Wilson had always thought that German ships surrendered to the Allies as reparation should be destroyed. The fact that the German crews had destroyed them themselves did not therefore cause such heavy loss to the Allies that they were justified in renouncing that principle of reparation which he had just recalled. As to the acceptance of the original Protocol by Mr. Polk, the Council would recall the fact that the American delegate had afterwards regretted it. The American Government therefore accepted the delivery of the 192,000 tons

which Germany declared her readiness to supply, but it was definitely opposed to any supplementary cession of harbour material as reparation for the Scapa Flow incident.

M. CLEMENCEAU begged to point out that Mr. Polk had formally accepted the Protocol providing for the surrender by Germany of 400,000 tons of floating docks. He made the following proposal: the Protocol should not be altered, and, in his capacity as President of the Conference, he would write to Baron von Lersner specifying the concessions they were prepared to make. But they could obviously decide nothing without the consent of the British Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE hoped to obtain that consent but they must not ignore the fact that if their action had not the desired effect their position would be rendered more difficult.

Would it not be sufficient for the moment to have another conversation with the German delegates and to tell them that their claims were satisfied on the whole? They could then be asked whether they wished these promises to be noted in writing and if they would then be satisfied. If the German reply was in the negative they would have the advantage of not having compromised themselves.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this suggestion excellent: M. Dutasta might see Baron von Lersner that very day and ask him what satisfaction he desired. It was, moreover, possible that Baron von Lersner would reply that he wished for an alteration of the Protocol. They would then see what could be done.

M. DUTASTA said that his interview with Baron von Lersner had given him the impression (which was, however, a purely personal one) that if the Supreme Council were to confirm in writing the verbal communication made in its name and definitely stated that after the immediate supply of the 192,000 tons proposed by the Germans themselves time would be granted for the delivery of the material still to be supplied, it would be possible to come to an arrangement. The German experts were most alarmed at the demand for immediate delivery of all the material claimed.

M. BERTHELOT supposed that under those conditions the Protocol would not be altered.

SIR EYRE CROWE feared that they could not really avoid altering the Protocol in this way.

M. DE MARTINO agreed with the last speaker. The American representative should at once ask for the consent of his Government to a possible alteration of the Protocol.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought it might be enough to add a few words to the Protocol stating that they only claimed a quantity of docks, dredgers, floating cranes not exceeding 400,000 tons. Such a formula would allow of all necessary arrangements with Germany without involving more serious alteration of the Protocol.

He indeed thought it difficult to sign the Protocol without altering it, since they had not stated elsewhere in writing that they would not demand 400,000 tons.

M. BERTHELOT saw no real difficulty: a 'contre-lettre' would be sufficient.

M. DUTASTA thought this all the more possible as they had already expressly stated in the Note accompanying the Protocol that their claims might be reduced in order to take into account the economic difficulties facing Germany.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether there was any objection to a conversation between M. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner with a view to inducing the latter definitely to state his point of view.

SIR EYRE CROWE would prefer that the Secretary General should in no case state that they would if necessary accept the delivery of new material specially constructed for them.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought M. Dutasta might make the following statement. The inquiry which they were about to make was two-fold: first there was the verification of figures, which might be fairly quickly done; then there was also the investigation of the possible effects of the execution of the Protocol on German economic life. This was a much more delicate problem, the solution of which might take much time: he thought it would be difficult to pledge themselves on the second point. On the other hand, it would be easy to reduce their demands if they had made a mistake in the facts concerning the docks of Hamburg or of Dantzig.

M. DUTASTA also pointed out that, if they were prepared to grant a delay in delivery, the German objection based on the eventual paralysis of the economic life of the country fell through to a great extent.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that as a preliminary M. Dutasta might state that they had requested of London that the experts might be sent speedily.

(M. Clemenceau withdrew and M. Cambon took the chair.)

2. A note, dated 26th December, 1919, from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies was laid before the Council. (Annex A.<sup>2</sup>)

*Transport of Allied  
troops in plebiscite terri-  
tories*

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented on Marshal Foch's note. He added that there were points in the reply of the German experts to our memorandum which could be accepted and others which did not admit of discussion. For instance, it was certain that whatever were the arrangements made between the Germans and the Poles for the evacuation of territories ceded to Poland,

<sup>1</sup> A diplomatic instrument, usually secret, modifying or annulling a provision in a previously authenticated instrument.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This note began as follows: 'On December 20 the German Delegation replied to the Memorandum, presenting the proposals of the General Staff of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, relative to the transportation of the Governmental Commissions and troops of occupation across Germany to the territories of Eastern Germany, which was received by the Delegation on November 20. The German reply presents important modifications in the proposals of the Marshal's Staff. The reply was examined during an Interallied Conference on December 22nd.' The note proceeded to discuss the questions raised by General Weygand in the Supreme Council, and in conclusion submitted the substance of the three recommendations which were adopted by the Council as resolutions 1 (a-c).

there was no need to await the 26th day after the coming into force of the Treaty in order to let our troop trains through; before that date at least two trains per day could run through Western Prussia. Other questions were of a more difficult nature. If they were satisfied with the four trains per day offered by the Germans, a period of twenty days would be necessary for the transport of troops for Upper Silesia and the occupation of other territories would not be completed for 40 days. He asked the Council whether such a state of affairs would not have drawbacks; for his part, he thought it would.

On the other hand, if they managed to run six trains per day, transports for Upper Silesia would be completed in 15 days and, at the end of twenty-five days, the northern territories would have received the contingents allocated to them. Should the Council consider it necessary that the occupation troops should all be on the spot within a period of 15 days from the coming into force of the Treaty, a larger number of trains would obviously be required. However, in view of the fact that they had claimed 10 trains per day and that the Germans offered them four, he thought they might easily demand 6.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if, at the rate of 6 trains per day, the transport of troops was effected within a period of 25 days, that was a solution which could be accepted. He would not say the same if the transports would not be completed for 40 days.

M. DE MARTINO refused to give an opinion in the absence of his military expert, but was ready to agree with the opinion of the majority.

GENERAL WEYGAND said his opinion was that of all the military delegates who had examined the German Note together.

M. DE MARTINO withdrew his reservation in these circumstances.

M. CAMBON said the Council therefore invited General Weygand to demand 6 trains per day.

GENERAL WEYGAND passed on to another point: if transport began immediately on the coming into force of the Treaty and if this coming into force was close at hand, they would be obliged to mark time, owing to the special position of the British contingents which could not leave the Rhine before about January 20. Such interruption might have a bad effect on the Germans and he therefore thought it best that transport should take place without interruption. That would be possible if it began on January 8 at the rate of 4 trains per day or January 13 at the rate of 6 trains per day.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought General Weygand's scruple probably useless as it was doubtful whether the procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications would be signed before January 13.

GENERAL WEYGAND asked, however, that trains might be fixed to run on January 13 if the Treaty came into force before that date. As he required 5 days to settle the final details, he also asked to be informed 5 days before the coming into force of the Treaty.

M. CAMBON assured General Weygand that he would be informed in good time by the Secretariat-General.

GENERAL WEYGAND said there remained the question of wagons and that

of the cost of transport. The Germans declared that they could supply no wagons. The French lines could supply a certain number of trucks and of flat wagons, but no passenger wagons: the men must, however, travel in heated wagons. He would add that it was morally essential that the Allied soldiers should be as well treated as the German prisoners, for whom heated passenger wagons perfectly fitted were provided. With the consent of the Council, he would therefore demand passenger wagons of the Germans.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that, if necessary, the German prisoners might wait a few days.

M. CAMBON noted that the Council approved of this proposal.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that, with regard to the cost of transport, the Germans claimed payment at the general rates in force for goods and passenger transport.<sup>3</sup> He thought this claim incredible.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered it quite inadmissible.

M. CAMBON agreed that this claim could not be accepted and that no discussion of the point by the Germans could be allowed.

It was decided that, with a view to the transport to plebiscite territories of Interallied contingents, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies should:—

1. (a) Require the German Government to run a minimum of six trains per day;
- (b) Require the German Government to supply all the passenger wagons required;
- (c) Refuse to allow these transports to be effected at the rate generally in force in Germany and demand the application of the military rate.

It was also decided that if the transport was effected at the rate of six trains per day, these trains should not begin to run before January 13, in order that it might continue uninterruptedly until the completion of the transport.

2. That the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies should be informed five days beforehand of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty.

3. A note dated December 26, from the Naval experts was laid before the Council. (Annex B.<sup>4</sup>)

*Enemy ships allocated to Poland for policing and guarding the coast* After a short discussion it was decided that the Interallied Naval Commission should come to a final decision regarding the transfer to Poland of ex-Austrian torpedo-boats, taking into consideration the views developed in Annex B.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> The note before the Supreme Council explained that: 'We requested that the military tariff in use in Germany to November 1, 1919, be admitted similar to its application [*sic*] during the transportation of the Haller Army. The Germans offer the "*general tariff in use concerning travellers and merchandise*." An estimation already made relative to the liquidation of the cost of transporting the Haller Army indicated that the two tariffs would have been (at the time of the execution of the Haller transportation) in the relation of 1 to 4.'

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This note stated in part that there existed 25 former Austrian sea-going torpedo-boats completed since 1913-14. 'From a naval point of view, the difficulty of transferring the Austrian torpedo-boats to Dantzic still exists. There is no reason why this difficulty should be insurmountable, although the transfer should be carried out in a

4. A Note dated December 26, 1919, from the French and Italian naval experts was laid before the Council. (Annex C.<sup>5</sup>)  
*Conditions of delivery of German warships* M. LEYGUES read and commented on the Note from the French and Italian experts.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought they were all agreed in wishing to grant the request of the French and Italian navies if possible. But the question was whether that request was in conformity with the Treaty. It had been recognized at a previous meeting that it was not and that they must content themselves with semi-official overtures to the Germans. The Joint Secretariat had formulated the Council's decision inaccurately. Under those conditions the naval experts had met again but the French navy had preferred to begin the discussion afresh. They were faced by a difficulty which they all desired to settle and he was quite prepared to consent to refer the matter once more to the legal experts, unless M. Fromageot who was present, could give their definite opinion at once.

M. DE MARTINO said that the Note explained by M. Leygues had been drawn up in agreement with the Italian experts. He therefore agreed with this argument.

M. MATSUI thought that in common sense the claim made by the Minister of Marine seemed well founded, but Sir Eyre Crowe had rightly pointed out that the terms of the Treaty and the Protocol were so definite that a claim seemed hardly possible. He thought the question should be referred to the legal experts.

M. LEYGUES asked M. Fromageot for his opinion.

M. FROMAGEOT stated that Article 185, which, moreover, in its original form provided for the destruction of the ships, referred to Clause 23 of the Armistice Convention, which stipulated that vessels must be disarmed. Article 185 nevertheless added that the artillery must be completely re-embarked.

VICE-ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR pointed out that only the breeches had been re-embarked.

M. FROMAGEOT said that disembarked material was at present in the hands of the German Government. It therefore belonged to the categories referred to in Article 192 of the Treaty. As for the five cruisers the delivery of which was provided for in the Protocol, that document certainly made no mention of Article 192 and there was no question of any destruction. It only referred

favourable season. The cost of the journey should be charged to the Polish Government.' In conclusion the note recommended the proposal adopted by the Supreme Council.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This note referred to Sir E. Crowe's intervention on December 24, 1919, in favour of an unofficial approach to the German authorities in this matter (see No. 45, minute 2), and argued that 'any attempts of this nature appear to be destined to be unsuccessful unless we offer an advantage of some kind in exchange. Such steps are not necessary.' The note proceeded to renew and develop the arguments previously advanced by M. Leygues concerning the interpretation of articles 185 and 192 of the Treaty of Versailles (see No. 42, minute 6 and appendix E). In conclusion the note submitted three proposals which were in main substance, though not in form, the same as those advanced in paragraph 5 of the previous French note of December 13 (see No. 42, appendix E).

to Article 185, i.e. it specified that the ships should be handed over disarmed with their artillery. The destruction of the material was doubtless not provided and the Treaty did not come into play, but if they wished to obtain the delivery of all that material, it was nevertheless necessary to alter the terms of the Protocol.

M. LEYGUES thought M. Fromageot confused two ideas when he declared that material disembarked under Article 185 came under the categories referred to in Article 192. In reality, they must distinguish between three kinds of boats: 1. boats referred to in Article 185. It was not stated that material disembarked from them belonged to the German Government and would not be handed over to the Allies. Indeed, this material had only been disembarked because they mistrusted the German crews responsible for handing over the vessels. 2. Article 190, on the other hand, specified that a certain number of ships should be left at the disposal of Germany. Article 192 concerning the destruction of excess material only referred to material disembarked from the vessels mentioned in Article 190. He thought it impossible to combine Article 185 with Article 190. Still less could they adduce Article 192 in relation to the third category of vessels, i.e. the cruisers the delivery of which was claimed by the Protocol of November 1. He would go further and would ask whether it was possible in international law to hold that a vessel should not be surrendered with all its material, unless it was expressly stated that before delivery such material should be disembarked for purposes of destruction.

M. FROMAGEOT regretted that he could not accept the point of view of the Minister of Marine. It was indeed true that, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, a vessel must be surrendered with all its material and appliances, but Article 185 referred to by the Protocol definitely provided for the disarmament of ships to be surrendered. Article 192 seemed to have a general bearing. Nevertheless, it might be argued (he was not very convinced of the value of the argument) that the material disembarked from the vessels referred to in Article 185 was not in the hands of the German Government, since it was placed under Allied control; consequently, it would not come under the scope of Article 192.

M. LEYGUES thought the meaning of Article 192 perfectly clear; the word 'in excess' contained therein clearly indicated that it applied to arms and material of all kinds disembarked from the vessels referred to in Article 190. He was quite prepared to accept a formula which would give the result he was seeking in any way whatever, but how could they prove to public opinion or a parliament that while they left Germany armed cruisers, they allowed her to surrender disarmed boats? He thought it rather dangerous to count on verbal communications and German good will in order to attain their object. He was afraid Germany would not lose such a good opportunity to be unpleasant. He must, moreover, point out that in reality the cruisers concerned had not been disarmed.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered that all this should have been thought of when the Protocol was drafted.

M. DE MARTINO thought it would be best if the naval experts and the drafting committee examined the question together once more.

SIR EYRE CROWE said they were faced by a purely legal problem, that of the interpretation of the Treaty. Discussion at that meeting had produced no fresh arguments; he was afraid the fresh examination by the legal experts would lead to no better results.

M. FROMAGEOT said they would be pleased to reconsider the question, but was afraid they could reach no other solution.

SIR EYRE CROWE returned to his original suggestion. Could not M. Dutasta discuss the matter with Baron von Lersner since it was of no importance to the German Government, as the material would not be left to it in any case?

M. LEYGUES thought such action would have serious drawbacks: what would be their position if the Germans refused their request, even unofficially?

SIR EYRE CROWE said the same question might be raised with regard to the Protocol. They did not pledge themselves to anything. It was merely a matter of an inquiry.

M. CAMBON asked whether the Minister of Marine agreed that the Germans should be asked this question by M. Dutasta.

M. LEYGUES said he did not agree, and asked again what their position would be in the event of a German refusal.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that if they insisted on settling the question they must then alter the protocol.

M. CAMBON said he was struck by M. Leygues' argument. He was indeed afraid that unless M. Dutasta was successful, they would be in a worse position. They had the choice of two solutions: either a fresh examination of the question by the legal experts, or a conversation between M. Dutasta and Baron von Lersner.

M. DE MARTINO thought a conference between the naval and legal experts might be very helpful: hitherto they had deliberated separately.

M. MATSUI agreed with this opinion.

SIR EYRE CROWE was not opposed to referring the matter to the legal experts.

It was decided that the Drafting Committee and the naval experts should examine together the conditions of surrender of German warships destined for delivery to the Allies.

5. An aide-mémoire from the Swiss Legation in France was laid before the Council, to which was annexed the Federal Decree of November 21, 1919, concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations, (Annex [Appendix] D) together with a note from the Drafting Committee, concerning the aide-mémoire. (Annex [Appendix] E.)

*Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations*

M. FROMAGEOT read and commented on the note of the Drafting Committee.

M. DE MARTINO asked whether the Swiss aide-memoire had been transmitted to the French Government or to the Peace Conference.

M. FROMAGEOT replied that it had been transmitted to the French Government.

M. CAMBON asked whether there was any need to answer it.

M. FROMAGEOT thought there were drawbacks to leaving the Swiss arguments unanswered.

M. CAMBON thought it better that the reply should be drafted and sent on behalf of the Conference. He proposed that the Drafting Committee should submit a draft to them.

It was decided to accept the principles developed in the Drafting Committee's note with regard to the Swiss aide-memoire concerning the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations.

It was also decided to instruct the Drafting Committee to prepare a draft reply to that aide-memoire.

The meeting was adjourned.

#### APPENDIX D TO No. 46

##### Document 1

[*Translation*]

#### SWISS LEGATION IN FRANCE.

Although the deposit of ratifications of the Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919, has not yet taken place and, consequently, the Swiss Federal Council has not been officially invited to declare that Switzerland will accede to the League of Nations, in conformity with the terms of Article I of the Covenant of April 28, 1919, the Swiss Federal Council has the honour to inform the Government of the French Republic that the Swiss Federal Assembly decided, on November 21, 1919, in favour of Switzerland's entry in the League of Nations, text of which decision is annexed hereto.<sup>6</sup>

The Federal Council will make a formal declaration of the accession of Switzerland, to the Secretariat General of the League, at the proper time. However, in compliance with a desire expressed by the Commission of the Swiss National Council, the Federal Council begs to indicate at this time that, in its opinion, the vote of the people and the Swiss cantons on the Federal Bill of November 21, which will be promulgated as soon as circumstances permit, should not, necessarily, have to be operated within the time stipulated in Article I of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It would be absolutely contrary to the constitutional customs of Switzerland to submit a proposed bill to the people before its juridical bases had been established, as the realization of the League of Nations is dependent on the accession of all the States to whom the Covenant accords, in relation to their special political importance, permanent representation on the Council of the League.

The Federal Council is convinced that a notification of the decision of the Swiss Federal Assembly, made within two months after the entry into force of the Peace

<sup>6</sup> Document 2 below.

Treaty, will assure Switzerland, without anticipating the decision of the people and of the cantons, all the rights due [to] a State invited to accede to the League of Nations in the capacity of original member. Switzerland is the only country in which the principle of popular vote in the question of accession to the League of Nations is a constitutional necessity, but as this principle is in entire conformity with the conception of the international regime which is the object of the League of Nations, the Federal Council is firmly convinced that Switzerland will not be placed at a disadvantage by reason of the democratic character of her constitutional law.

## Document 2

[Translation]

The Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation,

After having taken note of a message from the Federal Council, dated August 4, 1919:

Whereas the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, recognized in particular by the Act of November 20, 1815, is considered, according to Article 435 of the Peace Treaty concluded on June 28, 1919, between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, as an International agreement for the maintenance of peace; and whereas the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, according to Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, may be considered as inconsistent with none of the provisions of the said Covenant:

Hoping that the present League of Nations will extend, in the near future, so as to become universal,

*decrees that:*

I. Switzerland adheres to the Covenant of the League of Nations agreed upon on April 28, 1919, by the Peace Conference, assembled in Paris.

The provisions of the Federal Constitution concerning the promulgation of the Federal laws shall apply to the ratification of the amendments made in the said Covenant, and to the approval of all conventions pertaining to the League of Nations.

The decisions relative to the violation of the Covenant or exclusion from the League of Nations, shall be submitted to a plebiscite.

Article 121 of the Federal Constitution, concerning popular expression, is also applicable to the decisions relative to a violation of the Covenant or to exclusion from the League.<sup>7</sup>

II. The present Federal decision shall be submitted to the vote of the people, as soon as the five Great Powers shall have adhered to the Covenant.

III. The Federal Council is charged with the execution of the present decision.

<sup>7</sup> A more exact English translation of the two preceding paragraphs, as supplied by the Swiss Government, is as follows:

'The decisions concerning denunciation of the Covenant or concerning withdrawal from the League of Nations must be submitted to the vote of the people and cantons.

'Article 121 of the Federal Constitution, concerning popular initiative, is also applicable to the decisions relative to the denunciation of the Covenant, and to withdrawal from the League of Nations.'

## APPENDIX E TO No. 16

### *Notes of the Swiss Note of December 14, 1919, concerning the Adherence of Switzerland to the League of Nations*

1. It is evident that the Swiss Note does not authorize Switzerland's adherence to the League of Nations, as is, moreover, recognized by Switzerland herself, as she referred to an ulterior formal declaration.

2. According to Article 1 of the Covenant, the declaration of adherence must be made without reservations. Consequently, Switzerland cannot, expressly or implicitly, subordinate her adherence to a referendum, which she contends is compulsory by her constitutional law. Questions of Swiss Constitutional law, such as the necessity of a referendum, concern Switzerland only and are not of interest to the other Powers.

3. It can be sustained that the date for the commencement of the two month period, allowed the Powers in which to make their declaration, is not necessarily connected with the ratification of the German Treaty, since the Covenant, of which the Powers can take advantage, is also incorporated in the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties, and that the entry into force of those two Treaties will doubtless be subsequent to that of the German Treaty. It is known that China, which is neither among the signatory Powers of the German Treaty nor the invited Powers, is, nevertheless, a signatory of the Covenant, by the fact that she has signed the Austrian Treaty.

In the event that Switzerland would allow the two months following the entry into force of the German Treaty to lapse, she could still demand the delay provided for by the Covenant in the Austrian or Bulgarian Treaties, and adherence to this Covenant within the period of two months which will follow the entry into force of these Treaties.

If the non-adherence of Switzerland at the time of the entry into force of the German Treaty cannot prevent the constitution of the League of Nations and the commencement of its functions, it can, on the other hand, seriously interfere with the establishment of the League at Geneva.

4. The Swiss Note quotes April 28, 1919, as the date upon which the Covenant was adopted.

It should be noted that the only official text is that which was signed, that is to say the text of the Treaties, and first of all, that of the German Treaty of June 28, 1919.

5. The theses of the Swiss Note, according to which the realization of the League of Nations is dependent on the ratification of the five Principal Powers, cannot be accepted.

On this point, it is clearly stipulated in the final clauses of the Treaty, and is, further, agreed at this time that the Treaty, in all its parts, inclusive of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations) will enter into force for all the Powers which will have ratified at that time, upon ratification by three of the Principal Powers and Germany.

6. The decision of the Federal Council, [? text] of which was annexed to the Note from the Swiss Government, contains various considerations in its preamble concerning the relation between the adherence of the Helvetic Confederation to the League of Nations and the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, as well as between Articles 21 and 435 of the Treaty.

Regarding this question, which was the object of certain developments in the Message of the Supreme Council<sup>8</sup> of August 4, 1919, it would be advisable to not appear to silently acquiesce purely and simply in the views of the Federal Council, but to hold the entire question for examination and whatever solution it may be deemed proper to adopt.

<sup>8</sup> This should apparently read: Federal Council.

## No. 47

H. D. 118.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Monday, December 29, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.

Great Britain: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. Norman.

France: M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

Italy: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: Great Britain: Captain Lothian Small. France: M. de Percin. Italy: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

Great Britain: Capt. Fuller, R.N., Cdt. [sic] Macnamara, R.N., Mr. Malkin.

France: M. Leygues, M. Loucheur, Marshal Foch, Gen. Weygand, Adl. Le Vasseur, M. Laroche, M. Fromageot.

Italy: Gen. Cavallero, C. Adl. Grassi, M. Dell'Abbadessa, M. Pilotti.

Japan: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka, Cdt. Osumi.

1. M. DUTASTA said that in accordance with the Council's instructions he had had a conversation on Saturday<sup>1</sup> evening with M. von Lersner. He had taken great pain not to commit the Council in anything whatever and to give to his conversation a purely unofficial and personal character. M. von Lersner after hearing his exposition had told him that without committing his Government he was himself of opinion that an immediate agreement was possible upon the basis outlined. He had also said that he would telegraph to Berlin immediately, and that he would visit him that evening. It was probable therefore that they would know immediately exactly where they stood.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what exactly were the suggestions made by M. Dutasta to which M. von Lersner had agreed.

M. DUTASTA answered that he had said the Conference was ready to confirm in writing the declarations made verbally to the Head of the German Delegation in the course of the previous conversation; that he had added

<sup>1</sup> December 27, 1919.

that the Allies would be satisfied provisionally with the 192,000 tons offered by the Germans allowing them the additional time required for handing over the remainder of the material. In that way they were answering the objection raised by the Germans to the effect that the immediate handing over of all the material claimed would imperil their economic existence. As he had said, M. von Lersner had shown himself satisfied on the whole with those proposals. The only objection M. von Lersner had made, one which, in his opinion, might easily be taken into consideration, was that the date of signing the Protocol ought to coincide with that of the coming into force of the Treaty. The Germans seemed to attach great importance to the point since that affected intimately the burning question of prisoners of war. He had considered that he might tell von Lersner that he did not anticipate any difficulty on that subject.

He had further drawn M. von Lersner's attention to the fact that the negotiations which were proceeding might be disturbed if the German Government were to send the Council a note refusing to sign the Protocol as it stood. M. von Lersner had answered that he did not know whether a note to that effect were not already on the way; if it were so it was probable that the German Press would publish it, but in any case he would not submit such a note to the President of the Conference, and he hoped that no notice would be taken of anything that might appear in the German Press.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that M. Dutasta's report was on the whole satisfactory. Concerning the question of sending naval experts to Germany, he had, at M. Clemenceau's request, telegraphed to London. He had received a telegram from the British Admiralty, saying that the experts who had been appointed would not be ready to start before the following day.

M. DE MARTINO thought that there need be no difficulty in granting the German request to have the date of signing the Protocol coincide with that of the coming into force of the Treaty.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they need only fix the date in such a way as to render possible the military arrangements required by the occupation of the plebiscite areas.

GENERAL WEYGAND added that certain political questions which were then being discussed by General Le Rond and the German experts, relating to the conditions under which the transfer of authority would take place in the plebiscite zone, must be taken into consideration.

M. DE MARTINO considered that it would be well to advise those commissions to conclude their work as quickly as possible.

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the negotiations were commencing that very day.

M. CAMBON thought if M. Dutasta's impressions were correct they might well expect the signing of the Protocol by the Germans within four or five days.

GENERAL WEYGAND was afraid that the negotiations between General Le Rond and the German experts were perhaps already finished [*sic*]. The General Staff of the Army itself required four or five days to prepare the transportation of troops. On the other hand, as he had already indicated to

the Council there was something to be said, if a sort of hiatus between the departure of the French and the Italian troops on the one hand and of the British troops on the other were to be avoided, for postponing the transport until about the 12th or 13th January.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered it unnecessary to start the transportation of troops on the very day of the Treaty's coming into force; there was, of course, a decision of the Supreme Council to that effect, but it was for the Council itself to modify the decision if it thought it necessary.

GENERAL WEYGAND pointed out that there was nothing to prevent them really from delaying the transport until perhaps 10 days after the Treaty's coming into force. If that were to take place on the 3rd January, for instance, the troops might start moving on the 13th.

SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the General's proposal was the best procedure to adopt.

M. DUTASTA explained further that M. von Lersner had anticipated no objections on Germany's part to the handing over of the five light cruisers.

2. M. DE MARTINO asked if he might draw the Council's attention for a moment to a question that did not appear on the agenda. The Italian Delegation had just received from Klagenfurt communications of very disquieting nature. The inhabitants were dreading a *coup de main* by the Jugo-Slavs in that zone; [?] a] certain number of them had even asked that a part of the Italian detachments in the neighbourhood might be dispatched to Klagenfurt. It was certain that the decisions of the Conference ought to be respected and that a military operation by the Jugo-Slavs would take away all value from the proposed plebiscite. Steps ought obviously to be taken at once, therefore, if the Council did not wish to find itself confronted with a *fait accompli*. He would add that they had an Italian officer on the spot who confirmed those local reports of which he had just spoken.

SIR EYRE CROWE added that the other allied governments also had officers on the spot.

M. CAMBON said that before taking any decision whatsoever it would be necessary to have fuller information. They had to deal with a nervous and divided population and it was very probable that while certain of the inhabitants complained to the Italian authorities about the activities of the Jugo-Slavs, others were addressing to Belgrade complaints of the exactly opposite nature.

M. DE MARTINO asked how they were to set about making the proposed inquiries and suggested that the President of the Conference might address the Austrian or the Jugo-Slav Government.

M. CAMBON suggested that it would be much better to ask first of all the allied officers who were on the spot their opinion on the situation.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that certain difficulties had already occurred owing to the fact that the officers whom the Allies had there seemed to consider themselves as forming an Interallied Commission; that was not at all

the case. They had been sent at a moment when an armistice between the Serbs and the Carinthians had to be negotiated; it was important not to allow those officers to retain the impression that they constituted a commission invested with powers by the Supreme Council.

M. CAMBON suggested that in order to obviate the difficulty pointed out by Sir Eyre Crowe, it might be sufficient that each Government consult individually the officer it had on the spot.

M. DE MARTINO insisted that the Council ought not to forget how urgent the question was and that unless they acted quickly they ran the risk of finding themselves in the presence of a *fait accompli*.

M. CAMBON suggested that it was very important that in their fear of finding themselves before a *fait accompli*, they should not act in the very way in which to create one.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether they might not very well address themselves directly to M. Troumbitch and ask him frankly what truth there was in the reports. It was certain that the Serbs had no right whatever to go to Klagenfurt, but he felt that he must say frankly that he did not give implicit faith to the reports that seemed so to disquiet their Italian colleague.

M. DE MARTINO said that farther the Serbs were making restrictions upon traffic which could not be prolonged indefinitely.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that all the interested parties stopped traffic in turn. Similar complaints were raised against the Italians.

M. DE MARTINO could not believe that report was accurate. It was the Italians who were victims in the situation.

It was decided:

1. that the Allied and Associated Governments address separately their officers on the spot a request for information about the situation in the Klagenfurt Basin, and especially about the possibility of a *coup de main* by the Jugo-Slavs.
2. that an inquiry be addressed to M. Troumbitch asking him for an explanation of the situation at Klagenfurt and of certain reports alleging that the Jugo-Slav Government intended, contrary to the decisions of the Conference, to send troops to Klagenfurt.

3. M. LOUCHEUR explained that para. 2 of appendix 4 of part 8 of the Treaty dealing with reparations distinguished between two kinds of substitutes for the materials destroyed or removed by the Germans, the one by equivalents—Para. 2(a)—and the other by direct supply—Para. 2(b).  
*The time period provided for in Annex 4 of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles*

In para. 3 it was provided that the lists dealing with the articles mentioned in para. 2(a) were to be supplied within the 60 days following the coming into force of the Treaty. So far there was no difficulty, but the lists dealing with Articles mentioned in Para. 2(b) were there required to be supplied to the Reparation Commission by the Allied and Associated Powers on the 31st December 1919 at the latest. At the same time when that had been drafted, it had been considered that the Treaty would be in force at the latest in the month of August, and that the Reparation

Commission would have had several months before it to procure those lists. It was obvious that in the existing state of things the lists could not be supplied at the time indicated as the Treaty was not yet in force and the Reparation Commission was not yet functioning. A modification was therefore necessary: but no arrangement to that effect was necessary perhaps with Germany, since it was stated in the paragraph concerned that the lists had to be supplied to the Reparation Commission. Germany might claim, it was true, that if those lists did not arrive to the Reparation Commission until a date later than the 31st December 1919, its own situation was modified adversely. Personally he considered that the Reparation Commission need not consult Germany at all in order to extend the period provided for in para. 3, and that the question was entirely a matter for the Allied Powers. They might however, take advantage of the negotiations actually going on with the Germans regarding the signing of the Protocol to ask from them a declaration that they would not raise objection to the change from the period provided for in para. 3. That way of looking at it had the advantage of cutting short all later discussion. They had then alternative solutions: it was for the Council to decide between them.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that they might combine the two solutions. On the one hand they might themselves decide to prolong the period expiring on the 31st December and, on the other, communicate that decision to M. von Lersner. He thought they need not anticipate difficulty on that point.

M. DE MARTINO pointed out the Treaty of St. Germain contained the stipulation identical with that of which M. Loucheur had just spoken. The last date—31st December 1919—appeared there also. It would be necessary therefore to extend to the Treaty of St. Germain the same resolution that they were going to introduce in the Treaty of Versailles.

It was decided:

- (1) that the final date—31st December, 1919—provided for in line 2, para. 3 of Appendix IV of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles for the Allied and Associated Powers to deposit with the Reparation Commission the lists dealing with the articles mentioned in para. 2 (b) of the aforesaid Appendix shall not in law prevent the Allied and Associated Powers from presenting those lists at a later date.
- (2) that a communication shall be made to M. von Lersner to inform him of the decision taken by the Council.
- (3) that the decision appearing in the 1st paragraph of the present resolution shall apply equally to the final date—31st December, 1919—provided for in section 2 of para. 3, Appendix IV, of Part VIII of the Treaty of St. Germain.
- (4) That a communication shall be made to the Austrian Delegation informing it of this decision taken by the Council (para. 3 of the present resolution).

(Mr. Wallace will refer this resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.)

4. M. LAROCHE said that they had just received a telegram addressed to

M. Clemenceau from their Ambassador at Washington from which it appeared that the President of the U.S.A. was ready to convene the Council of the League of Nations on the first or second day after that of the coming into force of the Treaty.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that it had also been decided that preparatory measures should be taken by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to acquaint the Governments concerned unofficially of the date arranged for the first convocation of the Council of the League of Nations in order that no delay should occur.

M. DE MARTINO thought that they must also come to an understanding as to the agenda. Certain questions were of supreme interest for Italy, that especially of reciprocal emigration in the Balkan Peninsula. It would be well that that question be placed on the agenda as the Council of the League of Nations had to nominate a commission for dealing with the application of the convention arrived at upon that subject.

SIR EYRE CROWE recalled that the agenda of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations included only two questions, that of the Sarre and that of the confirmation of Powers of the existing secretariat of the League of Nations. He would also remind the Council that his Government had agreed upon the first meeting being held in Paris on the explicit condition that the agenda be limited to those questions.<sup>2</sup>

MR. WALLACE asked whether the Council wished that President Wilson fix the meeting for the day after that of the coming into force of the Treaty or for the day following that. He would like to be able to give Washington a definite indication on that point.

M. CAMBON thought it would be necessary to examine that question anew in the presence of M. Clemenceau.

M. DE MARTINO suggested that it would be well for them to ask whether it was really necessary to limit the agenda of the first meeting so strictly.

M. MANTOUX explained that the Secretariat of the League of Nations had examined the question of the time of its convocation. If the existing agenda were maintained there would be no objection to the first meeting being held on the first or second day after the Treaty's coming into force. But if the agenda were to be extended, it would become necessary to consider a more distant date.

M. LAROCHE explained that in submitting M. Jusserand's telegram to the Council, they had not intended to open a debate the more especially as M. Clemenceau did not yet know of the telegram.

M. CAMBON believed that it would indeed be necessary to resume the discussion of that question at a later date—(further discussion was, therefore, postponed).

5. M. FROMAGEOT explained the conditions under which this question had been referred for examination to the Drafting Committee and the Naval

<sup>2</sup> Cf. No. 3, minute 6, and No. 14, minute 2.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that it would be all the easier for the Secretary General of the Conference to broach the question with M. von Lersner in that the latter had said that Germany would probably make no difficulty about the surrender of the five light cruisers demanded by the protocol.

M. LEYGUES said that he supported Sir Eyre Crowe's proposal if it were understood that the question of principle regarding the interpretation of Articles 185 and 192 of the Treaty of Versailles remained intact and was not decided in one sense or another by the Supreme Council. It might be raised again in the event of the unofficial pourparlers with the Germans not arriving at a solution satisfactory to the French and Italian navies [navies].

It was decided:

1. That, without prejudice to the general question of the interpretation of Article 185 and 192 of the Treaty of Versailles, M. Dutasta should negotiate unofficially with M. von Lersner with a view to obtaining agreement that the five light cruisers to be surrendered under the protocol should be handed over with their munitions and armament complete.
2. That M. Dutasta be authorized, should he consider it absolutely necessary, to let von Lersner know that if that request were admitted by the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers were disposed in exchange to authorize Germany to retain in addition to the total number of seamen provided for by the Treaty, a certain number of crews for her mine-sweeper service.
3. That in the event of the pourparlers undertaken by M. Dutasta not arriving at a satisfactory result, the whole question would come before the Council again.
4. That the present resolution annul the resolutions upon the same subject agreed upon at the meetings of the 18th and 20th December.<sup>4</sup>

(Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.)

6. The Council had before it a Note by Marshal Foch dated 25th December (Appendix C).

*The proposed Mission  
of General Niessel to  
Reval*

MARSHAL FOCH told the Council that General Niessel, who had been sent by the Council to the Baltic Provinces to ensure the evacuation of those provinces by the German troops, had step by step fulfilled his Mission. Meanwhile the fate of the army of General Yudenitch who had been thrown back upon the Esthonian territory was becoming tragic on account of the difficulties which had cropped up between General Yudenitch and the Esthonian Government. In a note of the 28th November,<sup>5</sup> he had asked the Supreme Council whether it were not expedient to adopt in Esthonia a policy analogous to that which had produced such excellent results in Courland. It was a matter of re-establishing good relations between the Esthonians and Yudenitch's troops in order to set up in those regions which were most particularly threatened

<sup>4</sup> See No. 42, minute 6, and No. 43, minute 3.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 33, minute 3 and appendix E.

by the stress of revolution, a barrier against the Bolshevik forces. On the 1st December the Council had replied to his communication that the Mission entrusted to General Niessel was purely military and that there could, therefore, be no question of giving it a political nature.<sup>5</sup>

Since the date of that reply of the Supreme Council the question of Courland had been settled to their entire satisfaction. He had proposed anew in a Note of 14th December<sup>6</sup> that General Niessel should be sent to Rerval to try and establish an understanding between the Estonian Government and General Yudenitch. The question was all the more pressing since the army of Yudenitch was daily going more and more quickly to pieces. The moment for action seemed favourable seeing that the negotiations between the Estonian Government and the Soviets had just been broken off as a result of the extravagant claims of the Bolsheviks.<sup>7</sup> The hour seemed to have come for taking steps if the Council were to remain faithful to the policy it [?] that had been already formulated, that, namely, which consisted in establishing in the Baltic Provinces a barrier against the Bolsheviks. In order to realize that policy, it was important to constitute a group in which the Lithuanians and the Letts would take part, as well as the Estonians whose situation was more particularly threatened. General Niessel, having completed his mission, was on his way back. He had telegraphed to the General to await new instructions at Berlin; it appeared to him that General Niessel was indicated as the agent of the policy he had just defined. In his opinion it was essential to send to the spot representatives of the powers who could arrest the steady decomposition of the Yudenitch Army and make some use of the debris. It was urgent to come to a decision on the matter because of the disquieting situation in Estonia, and also in order to take advantage of General Niessel's stay in Berlin, as he could easily be sent from Germany into Estonia.

MR. WALLACE said that he would transmit Marshal Foch's proposals to his Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that on that question he did not have full powers and must ask for instructions from his Government. The Russian question was indeed a very delicate one.

M. DE MARTINO stated that he also would consult his Government.

M. MATSUI said that he would do likewise.

M. CAMBON said that he would do likewise.

M. Cambon summed up saying that Marshal Foch had rightly shown how urgent it was to come to a decision. He hoped that the Governments consulted would let their answers be known by telegram and as soon as possible.

MARSHAL FOCH said that if they were not empowered to take active steps at once in Estonia, it was nevertheless necessary to have on the spot an intelligence agent, and General Niessel was obviously fitted to fulfil that role.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that he could not agree to the proposal even in that form without first having instructions. They had, for that matter, British agents in Estonia.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 42, appendix A.

<sup>7</sup> For these negotiations cf. Vol. III of this series.

M. CAMBON insisted that under those circumstances the answers of the several Governments ought to be obtained quickly.

MARSHAL FOCH said that he intended telegraphing to General Niessel to return to Paris, wh[?ere] he could be sent into the Baltic Provinces if the Council were to decide later that that were necessary. He felt that he ought to draw the Council's attention to the particularly happy way that General Niessel had acquitted himself in the Mission it had entrusted to him. He thought that the Conference might like to express to him its satisfaction.

SIR EYRE CROWE said he wished to support what the Marshal had just said; he did it all the more gladly since the task entrusted to General Niessel had been particularly delicate and since many of them at the moment of the General's departure had believed his Mission doomed to failure.

M. DE MARTINO associated himself heartily with the words of Marshal Foch and Sir Eyre Crowe.

It was decided:

To entrust the Secretary General of the Conference to communicate [*sic*] to General Niessel the following resolution of the Supreme Council:

'The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers expresses to General Niessel its complete satisfaction with the remarkable way in which he acquitted himself in the particularly difficult and delicate Mission which was entrusted to him in the Baltic Provinces as well as with the entirely successful results which he obtained.'

7. M. FROMAGEOT commented upon a Note of the Drafting Committee on that question (Appendix D).

*The rank of German  
Diplomatic Agents in  
Neutral Countries*

M. CAMBON stated that as concerned the question raised by the special situation of the German Minister at Caracas, he thought that they would all agree in considering that that diplomat ought not to be recognized by their diplomatic agents until he had offered new letters of credence. It would be well to ask the Allied representatives to take the matter up with the Government of Venezuela. They could telegraph to their representatives asking them to take united action with the Government of Caracas.

M. LAROCHE suggested that they should send a telegram saying that the Supreme Council had examined the question raised by the irregular situation of the German Minister at Caracas and instructing their representatives to abstain, so long as that situation remained unchanged, from taking part in any meeting of the diplomatic corps at which the German Minister was present. Other Delegations ought to ensure that similar instructions be sent to Caracas at the earliest possible moment. There was no time to lose; it was already the 29th December, and it was desirable that those instructions arrive before the diplomatic reception on the 1st January.

M. CAMBON said that upon the second point which the Drafting Committee had examined he agreed entirely with the opinion that it had expressed. However disagreeable it might be for them to see a German representative occupy the rank of Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, they could not well go against the rule established by international custom.

M. DE MARTINO said that that was also his opinion.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that he too was in agreement with the President.

It was decided:

1. That each Delegation ask its Government to send instructions to its representative at Caracas instructing him to point out to the Venezuelan Government the irregular situation of the German Minister at Caracas, inasmuch as his letters of credence were granted by the old Imperial Government, and instructing the representatives to abstain, so long as the German Minister had not received new and regular letters of credence, from taking part in any meeting of the Diplomatic Corps at which the German Minister was present.
2. To raise no objection to the rank already reached by German Diplomatic Agents in neutral countries.

Mr. Wallace would refer the above resolution [to] Washington for instructions of his Government.

The meeting was adjourned.

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 47

#### *Note from the Drafting Committee relative to the conditions covering the delivery of German ships*

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN NO. 68

December 31, 1919.

It is evident primarily that Germany, aside from the material left to her, must deliver all material whether it belongs or not to the cruisers to be handed over; that is, whether it belongs to cruisers to be delivered in execution of the Treaty as [?] or] those to be delivered in execution of the Protocol.

The question arises as to whether, after the delivery of the material, Germany is justified in demanding its destruction.

According to certain members of the Committee, any demands on the part of Germany would in this case be without foundation for the following reasons:

1. In the first place, it may be argued that upon complete delivery of the material, Article 192 becomes annulled as far as Germany is concerned, and its destruction is a measure which concerns the Principal Powers exclusively and is no affair of Germany's. On this basis, a German [?] demand] would be inadmissible.

2. Even admitting that Article 192 intended to establish Germany's right to demand destruction, it could be held that Article 185, 1—by stipulating that this or that ship is to be 'delivered', provides for the delivery of the ships and all their armament, that is, their material. Article 183 [sic], 2—by stipulating that these ships are to be in a state of disarmament does not impose any restriction in the obligation to deliver but only indicates in what condition the ships should be delivered, and does not imply any reduction in the armament or material to be delivered.

If it were otherwise, it would be difficult to see why, referring to the ships now interned in neutral ports, Article 184 should provide for their delivery inclusive of material. The solution to the question should be the same for both cases. Conse-

quently, the material referred to here does not come under the provision for destruction as provided in Article 192, and any claims made by Germany under this head would be unjustified.

Certain members of the Committee, on the contrary, believe that the texts of the Treaty and the Protocol (which refers to the Treaty) the arguments [*sic*] above referred to would not be sufficiently strong to reply successfully to an objection on the part of Germany. On the other hand, concerning the five cruisers to be delivered in execution of the Protocol, the difficulty could be solved by means of an interpretative note of the said Protocol.

For the Drafting Committee.  
HENRI FROMAGEOT.

December 27, 1919.

## APPENDIX B TO NO. 47

### *Note as to the Material taken from German Warships*

PARIS, December 29, 1919.

It appears from the exchange of opinions which took place before the Council as well as from the Drafting Committee's note of December 27th, that:

(1) It is possible to consider as not being part of the material referred to in Article 192 of the Treaty, which was to be broken up, the material disembarked from ships the delivery of which is prescribed by the Treaty of Peace as well as by the Protocol of November 1st.

(2) This is possible without changing the texts and without asking the Germans, in advance, whether they consent to this material not being destroyed.

(3) As any written or oral request on the part of the Allies would certainly meet with a refusal, on the part of the Germans, it is better to refrain from taking any steps in this direction.

These considerations would allow each of the five Great Powers to bring to their ports the material and the munitions of the ships attributed to them. In view of the fact that the preceding propositions refer only to the light cruisers and destroyers which were not to be broken up, it is proposed that the resolutions of December 18th and 20th<sup>4</sup> be modified as follows:

'The Interallied Naval Mission of Control will take the necessary measures to ensure that the material belonging to the light cruisers and destroyers which were not to be broken up, be delivered in full and not destroyed.'

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 47

(*Translation*)

GENERAL ALLIED HEADQUARTERS,

Dec. 25, 1919.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.

General Staff, 1 Section.

From: Marshal Foch, To: M. Clemenceau.

After the interview I had with you on Dec. 24, I received a telegram informing me that General Niessel has probably left Riga on Dec. 22, for Berlin.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The text of this telegram (not printed), dated from Stockholm on December 22, 1919, was annexed to the original of this appendix.

Consequently, I am sending to General Nisael in Berlin a confirmation of the telegram which I sent him on the 23rd to Riga, to order him to limit his intervention concerning the reparations claimed from the German Government, or the Lithuanian and Lettish Governments.

Moreover, I invite him to wait in Berlin, instead of in Riga, for any ulterior instructions which might eventually order him to Riga, in case the Supreme Council should deem it necessary to entrust him with negotiations with the Lithuanian Government, for the settlement of the question of the "Vendettian Army".

#### APPENDIX D TO No. 47

##### *Note from Drafting Committee to Supreme Council relative [sic] German Diplomatic Representatives in Neutral Countries*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN NO. 50.

December 27, 1919.

The Supreme Council decided, July 25, 1919, to invite Germany to "furnish new credentials to those of her diplomatic agents, accredited abroad by the former Imperial Government, at present in function".<sup>1</sup>

1. The Minister of France at Caracas advises that the German Minister at Venezuela is an agent accredited by the former Imperial Government in whose favour he is continuing his propaganda, and he has never presented any credentials from the new German Government.

Regarding this point, it is evident that the German Minister, representing a fallen sovereign, cannot legally be considered the German representative to Venezuela. An observation to the effect to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Venezuela would legally be justified.

2. The question has arisen as to whether German diplomatic agents, accredited by the former Imperial Government but having presented credentials from the new government, can take advantage of the seniority acquired by means of their former credentials. This point is of interest in the recognition of the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps.

Hitherto, according to diplomatic rules and practices, new credentials, of the same rank, have been recognized as not modifying the seniority acquired by the priority of the first reception.

The instructions of the Secretary of State of the United States of May 27, 1886 (IV, Moore's Digest, p. 734) are to this effect, and authors on the subject express the same opinion.

After the Russian Revolution, new credentials were presented by the Russian Ambassador in Paris who still holds the rank acquired in seniority.

The thesis that Germany of today is different from the former Russian Empire, would be dangerous, owing to the consequences that could be deducted [sic] from it.

Under those conditions, the Drafting Committee is unanimously of the opinion that a protest from the Allied and Associated Powers regarding the rank, acquired by seniority, of German diplomatic agents, in neutral capitals, would not be opportune.

For the Drafting Committee  
HENRI FROMAGEOT.

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. I, No. 17, minute 17 and appendix M.

H. D. 119.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, December 30, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.  
*British Empire*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. Norman.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Arnavon, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: *British Empire*: Captain Lothian Small. *France*: M. Massigli. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*British Empire*: Capt. Fuller, R.N., Cdt. [sic] Macnamara, R.N., Mr. Malkin.  
*France*: M. Loucheur, M. Cambon, Marshal Foch, Gen. Weygand, Gen. Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Serruys, M. Fromageot, Capt. Roper.  
*Italy*: Gen. Cavallero, C. Adl. Grassi, M. Pilotti.  
*Japan*: M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

1. M. DUTASTA told the Council that in company with M. Loucheur he had had a visit on the previous day from M. von Lersner. From statements made to him by the President of the German Delegation it appeared that the Germans were ready to sign the protocol as it stood; the signature would coincide with the exchange of ratifications. Those instruments once signed, the Supreme Council would submit to M. von Lersner a letter declaring the undertaking given by the German Delegation to surrender without delay 192,000 tons of docks, and agreeing, for the surrender of the remainder, to a period of from two to three years. M. von Lersner had tried to bargain about the handing over the five cruisers required by the protocol. Confronted by the categorical statements made by M. Loucheur and himself on the utter impossibility for the Allies of allowing any discussion of that subject, the President of the German Delegation had not insisted. He had, on the other hand, asked for certain precision[s] on the method of calculating the tonnage still to be surrendered. On that point, a certain ambiguity seemed to remain in his mind, and then M. Loucheur took part in the discussion in order to remove it.

M. LOUCHEUR explained that in M. von Lersner's telegram to his Government, the text of which he had communicated to M. Dutasta and himself, he had said in effect that if it were shown that there actually existed at Hamburg and at Dantzig a deficit of 180,000 tons as compared with the figure appearing on the lists of the Allied experts, the Allied demands would be reduced by that amount of tonnage. Such a formula might well have been a source of misunderstanding. As a matter of fact, while it was possible that

Allied experts were mistaken to the extent of 190,000 tons. they had on the other hand established in conformity with the figures submitted by the German Delegates the existence of 80,000 tons about which, apart from those figures, they had been ignorant. He had thought it well, therefore, to make clear the position taken by the Allies: the demand for 190,000 tons by the Allies had been based upon an inventory established by them according to which Germany possessed on the 1st November a total tonnage of 9 tons. Then German experts had furnished a statement which are still to be verified and which represented a lower figure—3 tons. From the 190,000 tons claimed by the Allies they would deduct the difference 187 or more exactly the difference really established after verification.

M. DUTASTA stated that as a result of their conversation they had drafted a letter which after the exchange of signatures would be addressed to the President of the German Delegation and of which he would of course have previous acquaintance. The draft was as follows. M. Dutasta then read the draft letter which appears as Appendix A.

SIR EYRE CROWE saw some disadvantage in saying that there would be granted to the German Government for the surrender of the required tonnage a period of from two to three years: it would be better he thought to be a little more precise.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed and said that the text he proposed was as follows:

There will be granted to the German Government for the delivery of the sum total tonnage a period not to exceed two years.

SIR EYRE CROWE accepted that text and suggested that it would be well not to leave the task of determining the tonnage to be surrendered to the Reparation Commission alone; would it not be well to specify that the Naval experts should be heard?

M. LOUCHEUR thought indeed that the matter could be decided between these (and on the following day the Reparation Commission would be notified). But there would be no advantage whatever in stating that specifically in the letter to be addressed to M. von Lersner.

SIR EYRE CROWE concluded that the conversation just reported to the Council had had a result even more favourable than they had hoped for.

It was decided:

- (1) That after the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles and the signing by the Representatives of the German Government of the protocol of the 1st November, the President of the Peace Conference shall address to the President of the German Delegation in the name of the Allied and Associated Powers the letter the draft of which appears in Appendix B.<sup>1</sup>
- (2) That the Reparation Commission in fixing the tonnage of floating docks &c. to be handed over by the German Government as reparation for the Scapa Flow incident, and in fixing also the 192,000 tons

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This draft was the same as that in appendix A apart from certain modifications of form and the alteration of the last paragraph in accordance with M. Loucheur's proposal. (The draft was subsequently revised further: see No. 51, appendix A.)

of which the German Government proposed delivery, shall take the opinion of the Naval Experts of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

2. The Council had before it a Note from the British Delegation on the jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission within the area occupied by American troops. (Appendix C.)

*The Jurisdiction of the  
Inter-Allied Rhineland  
High Commission*

SIR EYRE CROWE read and commented upon the British Note.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it quite impossible that the territories occupied by American troops should be without the jurisdiction of the High Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered it probable that the American command would accept an arrangement by which it recognized the jurisdiction of the Commission, it being understood that America would have an unofficial place on that body.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in fact there were only two possible hypotheses: either the American troops were on the Rhine as a conquering army or they were there as a result of an Inter-Allied agreement and because America had its place in the concert of the Allies. It was obviously the second hypothesis which was the true one.

MARSHAL FOCH said that a question of principle dominated the whole situation. So long as the armistice regime lasted, the whole of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine were placed under common jurisdiction. The day the peace treaty came into force and on which therefore the armistice regime ended that common jurisdiction disappeared, but that was only in order to give place to another jurisdiction which extended equally over the territories of the left bank.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that they ought to come to a decision. If their decision gave rise to objection on the part of the American Government, that Government would communicate their decision.

It was decided:

That on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Germany the jurisdiction of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission will extend over all the territories on the left bank including those at present occupied by the American troops.

(Mr. Wallace will refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government).

3. GENERAL WEYGAND told the Council that on a previous day he had had a long meeting with the German Delegates in order to arrange the conditions of the transport of Allied troops in the territories submitted to plebiscite. At a previous

*Allied contingents in the  
Plebiscite Areas*

meeting, the Council had indicated to him on what points concessions were possible and upon what others he ought to make none. On the matter of the number of trains that should be run each day he had, conforming to the

Council's instructions, demanded six. The German Delegates had declared that in principle they were willing to grant that number; they required, however, approval from Berlin. On the matter of transport in Western Prussia, the German Delegation had likewise declared itself ready to examine their demands and he thought that it would agree to them. It had nevertheless pointed out that from the 17th day and as a result of special arrangements come to between Germany and Poland, the Poles would have taken possession of Western Prussia. The German Delegation considered therefore that the Polish Government ought to take its share in supplying the transports and stores necessary. There was obviously a complication since it would be necessary to appeal to the Polish experts, but that was a difficulty in detail which they could easily overcome. In the third place, Germany agreed to supply the passenger carriages necessary for the transport under the reserve that the Allies furnish part of the remainder of the material; they had come to an agreement about that condition. The German Delegation however had asked it to be recorded on the procès-verbal that they formulated reservations on the possibility of Germany's furnishing the number of carriages demanded. There remained the question of the payment for the transport. On that point, he had not received a sufficiently satisfactory result, and the German Delegates had appeared to be decided not to yield; they alleged that a law of the Empire stipulated that in time of peace the military tariff could be applied only to the transport of German troops; a new law would therefore be necessary. He had replied that they had only to pass such a law. The Germans refused to say [? pay] anything whatever on the transport of troops going to Dantzic and Memel, territories purely and simply taken away from them. As for plebiscite areas they were ready to advance the cost of transport if the plebiscite were favourable to Germany; the question would be by that very fact decided; if not, the administration of the German railways would demand from the beneficiary states repayment at full tariff of the cost of transport.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether they could calculate approximately the difference between those two tariffs.

GENERAL WEYGAND gave the information that the proportion was as 4 or 5 to 1. On that point he required definite instructions from the Council. Should he adhere to his position or leave the matter over in favour of the Reparation Commission?

SIR EYRE CROWE doubted whether the Reparation Commission was competent; further the question affected rather Poland and Denmark.

GENERAL WEYGAND agreed; it was obvious (and that was what annoyed him) that they were playing with the finances of Denmark and Poland.

MARSHAL FOCH considered that they might lay it down as a principle that Allied troops would be transported on the same terms as German troops since they were crossing Germany after agreement with the German Government.

SIR EYRE CROWE believed that the Marshal was right. No bargaining was possible on that point.

GENERAL WEYGAND considered that in those circumstances he would

maintain his original demands, avoiding naturally anything which might embitter the discussion; he would give an account of the results obtained.

In the course of the discussion with the President of the German Delegation, Counsellor of Embassy Göppert had asked what were the exact numbers of troops to be sent into the Plebiscite areas. He had said (and that indeed had determined the reply) that M. Berthelot in the previous conversation had not felt that he ought to give that information. The General had therefore not satisfied his curiosity. Ought he to do it?

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the General himself saw any objection to doing so.

MARSHAL FOCH felt it all the easier to give the information since the Germans knew the number of trains required of them, and consequently they would not find it difficult to calculate the numbers of the occupying troops.

GENERAL WEYGAND concluded that M. Göppert had raised finally a question of principle on the subject of the occupation of the territories of Allenstein: he had emphasized that the Treaty had not provided for sending Allied contingents into that zone and added that the German Government was in a position to assure the maintenance of order; his would [*sic*] not object, however, to a Government force of one battalion being sent there to ensure the safety of the Allied Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked how many battalions they had anticipated sending for the occupation of Allenstein.

GENERAL WEYGAND answered that four battalions had been intended.

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that it was hardly permissible to allow the German Government to maintain troops in an area subject to plebiscite, and thought that the Council should adhere to its previous decisions.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that he was of the same opinion.

It was decided:

- (1) that, in his negotiations with the German technical experts, the Field-Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, shall maintain his demand that the transport of Allied troops to plebiscite areas, as also to Dantzic and Memel, be on the conditions laid down in the German military tariff;
- (2) that the Field-Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, is authorized to make known to the German delegates, the number of troops provided for the occupation of plebiscite areas;
- (3) that he will notify those delegates the decision of the Allied and Associated Powers to have the Allenstein territory occupied by interallied contingents.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU made the proposal to the Council to fix then the date of the coming into force of the Treaty; for his part, he thought of the 7th or 8th of January.

*Date of the coming into  
force of the Treaty of  
Versailles*

GENERAL WEYGAND remarked that, in any case, the transports would commence only on the 13th.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the President had in mind sending an ultimatum to Germany about the date.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that he had not. M. Dutasta could propose to M. von Lersner the 8th of January for the exchange of ratifications: that having been agreed to, he would tell the German Delegation, officially, the date chosen.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in those circumstances the earlier date should be chosen; they might as well decide on the 7th as on the 8th.

M. DE MARTINO was of that opinion and said that it was understood that the treaty came into force on the day of the deposit of ratifications.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed and said that there was no objection to the date of the 5th being decided upon. If that was too early the 7th might be selected.

It was decided that the Secretary General of the Peace Conference should inquire of the President of the German Delegation whether he was prepared to sign the Minutes of the deposition of ratifications on the 5th of January.

In case that date were too early the depositions of ratifications would take place on the 7th, or, at the latest, on the 8th of January.

At this point M. Clemenceau retired and M. Cambon took the chair.

5. SIR EYRE CROWE said that this question had been adjourned on the previous day owing to the absence of the President. As *Summing up the first meeting of the League of Nations* Monsieur Clemenceau had just left it seemed to him again difficult to discuss it then. Nevertheless he wished to state that he had inquired of his Government regarding the agenda of the first meeting of the Council. The opinion in London was that only the nomination of the Delimitation Commission of the Saar should appear on the agenda but perhaps the views of his Government had since changed in view of the imminent visit of British Cabinet Ministers to Paris.

M. BERTHELOT believed that Sir Eric Drummond<sup>2</sup> would prefer that the first meeting of the Council should not take place on the day after the entry into force of the Treaty. Sir Eric Drummond in fact wished to give this meeting a solemn character and desired that the Council should not meet until eight or ten days after the entry into force of the Treaty so that he might make due preparation.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether such delay would be in any way inconvenient.

M. BERTHELOT replied that this delay would not be inconvenient if the only item on the agenda were to be the Delimitation Commission of the Saar though he regretted that it was not possible to nominate immediately the Government Commission.

SIR EYRE CROWE observed that, in any case, if the Treaty were to come into force on the 5th of January no time was to be lost and this question would have to be settled on the following day.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary General designate of the League of Nations.

6. The Council had before it a Note of the German Delegation dated October 16, 1919, (Annex [Appendix] D) and a note of the Drafting Committee dated December 24, 1919 (Annex D).<sup>3</sup>

*Voting rights in  
Schleswig*

M. BERTHELOT commented on the note of the German Delegation and on that of the Drafting Committee. He added that the Drafting Committee were unanimous in their opinion that the interpretation given to Article 109 of the Treaty of Peace by the Belgian General commanding the Fourth Zone, General Michel, was erroneous.

SIR EYRE CROWE concurred in the opinion of the Drafting Committee, and thought that it should be communicated to the military authorities concerned.

M. CAMBON said that the necessary instructions would be given.

It was decided that the Allied Authorities of the Territories of the left bank of the Rhine should be informed that persons born in Schleswig and domiciled outside the zone of the plebiscite could, according to the Treaty, claim a right to vote.

MR. WALLACE would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

7. The Council had before it draft instructions for dispatch to General Mastermann, President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control at Berlin, dated December 24, 1919. (Appendix E.)<sup>4</sup>

*Instructions to the  
President of the Inter-  
allied Aeronautical Com-  
mission of Control in  
Berlin*

After a short discussion it was decided to approve the draft instructions to be sent to the President of the Interallied Aeronautical Commission of Control in Berlin. (Appendix F.)

8. The Council had before it a letter of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to the President of the Peace Conference dated December 12, 1919 (Annex [Appendix] G) and of [*sic*] a letter of the Secretary General of the Economic Commission to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference dated December 24, 1919. (Annex [Appendix] H.)

*Modifications in the  
Economic Clauses of the  
Treaty with Hungary  
requested by the Serbo-  
Croat-Slovene Delegation*

M. SERRUYS read out and commented on the note of the Economic Commission. He added that since the note of December 27 now before the Council had been drafted, the Italian Delegation had withdrawn its adhesion to the conclusions in this note and had brought forward

<sup>3</sup> In error for annex E, not printed. The French text of this note (which was as indicated by M. Berthelot), and of appendix D and the decision of the Supreme Council in the matter, is printed by A. Tardieu and F. de Jessen, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-3.

<sup>4</sup> In error for appendix F, not printed. This appendix contained a short covering letter from General Duval to M. Dutasta enclosing the draft instructions, which read as follows: 'I remind you that the air material referred to in Art. 27 and 28 of the Armistice Convention of Nov. 11, 1918, has been the subject of an inventory, as far as the material existing at the beginning of 1919 is concerned, in the naval bases recognized by the German authorities, according to the telegram from Admiral Goette, dated March 27, 1919, as bases for the collection and storage of material. Therefore, it will be incumbent upon you, as soon as the Peace Treaty goes into force, to require the delivery of this material, a list of which appears in the report of the Air Section of the Interallied Naval Armistice Commission. (ANAC).'

a serious objection thereto. The Italian Delegation drew attention to the fact that if the Articles in the Hungarian Treaty corresponding respectively to Article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles and to Article 111 of the Treaty of St. Germain were to be modified, the Hungarian State might have to bear a heavy burden inasmuch as the repurchases of the entails majordoms would apply equally to the territories ceded to Roumania. In those circumstances the Italian representatives thought that the question chiefly concerned the Reparation Commission because the solution proposed would be tantamount to granting to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State a real priority in the matter of reparations. The Economic Commission therefore thought that it ought to propose to the Supreme Council that the whole matter including the Commission's own suggestions should be referred to the Reparation Commission for examination.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether the proposals of the Economic Commission would have the effect of modifying in any way the Treaty with Germany or the Treaty with Austria.

M. SERRUYS replied in the negative.

M. DE MARTINO said that if the matter were simply one of referring the whole question to the Reparation Commission, he was quite agreeable. But if it were necessary for him to express an opinion, he would have to reserve it on account of the absence of his technical advisers.

M. CAMBON observed that there was no need to express any opinion.

It was decided to refer to the Reparation Commission for examination and immediate report, the note of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation, dated December 12, concerning the liquidation of Hungarian properties situated in the territory transferred to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, together with the proposals of the Economic Commission contained in its note of December 27, 1919, to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

9. SIR EYRE CROWE thought that the question of the repayment of the cost of transport and maintenance of Russian prisoners of war in Germany should be brought before the Council at an early opportunity. The matter had been held over.

M. CAMBON replied that the question would be put on the agenda for tomorrow.

SIR EYRE CROWE also desired to draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the British Delegation had been requested to circulate a Note concerning the general methods of reparation to be applied to Hungary. His Government had suggested the adoption of a new system in the case of Hungary; but it had subsequently recognized that this proposal involved serious difficulties and he was now instructed to withdraw it.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN pointed out that, according to a report of the Economic Commission, the British Government had obtained what they wished as regards one point: the arrangements already made forbade for a period of five years the establishment of customs barriers by the neighbouring States who had acquired territory formerly Hungarian.

M. DE MARTINO observed that the Council had decided on October 2 to send an Interallied Commission of Officers to the Comitadjis of Western Hungary ceded to Austria by the Treaty of St. Germain.<sup>5</sup> But, as a matter of fact, that Commission had never proceeded to the spot. In view of the declaration recently communicated to the Chancellor Renner in the name of the Supreme Council, it would be advisable that effect should be given to the decision of October 2.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN said that the French Delegation had had a meeting with the Italian Delegation and had just drafted a note on the subject which would be circulated to the members of the Council.

M. CAMBON said that this question would be placed on the agenda for the following day.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 48

##### *Draft Letter to the Germans regarding the Signature of the Protocol*

PARIS.

To: Baron von Lersner.

Now that ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles have been exchanged and the Protocol of November 1st signed by the qualified representative of the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers wish to assure the German Government again that in demanding reparations for the scuttling of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, their object was not to injure Germany's vital economic interests. By the present letter they confirm the declarations which the Secretary General of the Peace Conference was directed to make, verbally, on this point, December 23rd, to the President of the German Delegation. These declarations were as follows:

1. The Secretary General was authorized by the Supreme Council to assure the German Delegation that the Interallied Commissions of Control and the Reparation Commission would act scrupulously in conformity with the assurances contained in the note of December 8,<sup>6</sup> concerning the safeguard of Germany's vital economic interests.

2. As the experts of the Allied and Associated Powers are inclined to believe that part of the data upon which they based their demand for 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges may have been inaccurate in certain minor details, they think a mistake may have been made as to the 80,000 tons of floating docks in Hamburg. If the investigation to be conducted by the Interallied Commission of Control proves that an error has really been made, the Allied and Associated Powers will be disposed to reduce their claim proportionately, so as to bring the quantity down to 300,000 tons, in round figures, or even lower, if convincing arguments prove that this is necessary. But absolute facilities must be granted authorized representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers to make all necessary investigations, in view of verifying the German assertions, before any reduction of the original demands of the Protocol can be made by the Allied and Associated Powers.

<sup>5</sup> See Vol. I, No. 69, minute 8.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 37, note 4.

3. The Allied and Associated Governments, referring to the last paragraph of the memorandum containing their reply, do not consider that the scuttling of the German ships at Scapa Flow constitutes a crime of war for which individual penalties should be demanded according to Article 228 of the Peace Treaty.

The Allied and Associated Powers, always actuated by the desire to consider Germany's vital economic interests, have presented a claim for 400,000 tons, based on an inventory made by them, according to which Germany was supposed to have had on November 1st a total tonnage of . . . . .<sup>7</sup> tons. The German experts made a statement, to be verified, which sets forth an inferior amount of tonnage . . . . .<sup>7</sup> tons. Consequently, from the 400,000 tons claimed by the Allies will be deducted eventually the difference between the first figures and the second, or rather that actually found upon investigation.

The Allied and Associated Powers add that the 192,000 tons proposed by the German Government must be delivered immediately. As for the remainder of the tonnage, as determined by the experts, the German Government will be given a delay of from two to three years for delivery.

#### APPENDIX C TO No. 42

##### *Note to be submitted to the Supreme Council by the British Delegation*

The question has been raised whether [? upon] the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and the Rhineland Agreement, the jurisdiction of the Rhineland High Commission will extend to that portion of the occupied territory which is in occupation by the United States troops.

In the opinion of the British Government the answer must be in the affirmative. There is nothing in the Rhineland Agreement about the different zones of occupation, which have been established by an internal arrangement between the Allied and Associated Powers concerned. As the Agreement comes into force in the same way as the Treaty of Peace and as the view of the Allied and Associated Powers is that the rights of those Powers under the Treaty are not affected by the fact that it has not at the moment been ratified by the United States, it follows that the Rhineland Agreement will come into force for the whole of the occupied territory, although the United States will not be in a position to avail themselves of the provisions of the Agreement until they have ratified. It will result that the High Commission, though officially without an American Representative, will, on the coming into force of the Agreement, enjoy the jurisdiction conferred by it over the whole of the occupied territory. Arrangements will no doubt be necessary between the Allied and Associated Powers, on the assumption that the U.S. troops will remain in occupation, for the practical working of the situation thus created; as against the Germans it would appear that the rights of the U.S. troops to remain in occupation can only be derived from the terms of the Armistice, but so far as the jurisdiction over the whole of the occupied territory is concerned, the Armistice will be superseded by the Rhineland Agreement as soon as the latter comes into force.

If the above view commends itself to the Supreme Council, the British Government would suggest that the Council should pronounce a decision to this effect.

<sup>7</sup> Thus in original.

## APPENDIX D TO No. 48

PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

PARIS, *Oct. 16, 1919.*

No. 23

From: The German Delegation

To: The President of the Conference

Subject: Passports for Inhabitants of Schleswig residing in occupied territory.

The German passport section in occupied Rhineland territory asked, by a note dated September 29, the High Command of the 4th Zone, at Mayence, that persons in the occupied territory, residents of Schleswig, be granted facilities to leave in order to take part in the plebiscite.

The High Command replied to this note by referring to Article 109 of the Treaty of Peace:

'Only the inhabitants of Schleswig who were born in the zone where the plebiscite is taken, or have been domiciled there since a date before January 1, 1900, or were expelled by the German authorities without having a domicile there' are allowed the right to vote. I consider, under those circumstances, that your request should be regarded as not having been made. The Lt. General Commanding: Michel.

## APPENDIX G TO No. 48

DELEGATION OF THE SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE  
KINGDOM TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

4, rue de Presbourg.

PARIS, *Dec. 12, 1919.*

From: Pachitch

To: Clemenceau.

In my note of November 27th last, and in the Memorandum annexed thereto, (Annex D),<sup>8</sup> I had the honour to insist that the question concerning the properties, rights and interests of the Hungarian nationals located on transferred territories, be settled in the Peace Treaty with Hungary on a basis of the same principles admitted in the Peace Treaty with Germany; principles which to a certain extent are common law in such matters.

The importance which this question presents for us obliges me to again take the matter up by submitting certain considerations which were not sufficiently set forth in our preceding memorandum. These points are of a nature to exercise an important influence in the adoption of a solution relative to the measures which should be applied concerning the properties of Hungarian nationals who will remain within the boundaries of our State.

During the occupation of Serbia which, as is known, lasted more than three years, the Budapest Government maintained the high hand in the administration of our State, which was considered, according to the ideas reigning at that time in the relations between Vienna and Budapest, as being within its sphere of influence.

The Hungarian Government has never failed to use this exceptional 'de facto'

<sup>8</sup> Not annexed to filed original of this appendix.

situation in obtaining an advantageous regulation of the conditions of the economic laws existing between her nationals and Serbia, especially in the light of the declaration of war.

Although, at the time of the invasion of the country, there existed a law in Serbia proroguing all matured paper, the Austro-Hungarian General Government at Belgrade, immediately after its installation, caused the repeal of these legal provisions, in violation of the Convention of the Hague, and replaced them by a decree declaring all Austro-Hungarian credits in Serbia redemptible at once. A special organization was created at once by the General Government and the effect of all these credits instituted, without regard for absent mortgage claims. Naturally, there was no hesitation in applying a forced execution to these measures with the result that the property of Serbian debtors was sold at an extremely low price by public auction. Of course, the sequester placed on the possessions of Austro-Hungarian nationals in Serbia was immediately raised and they were reinstated in all their rights.

Consequent to that condition of affairs, the situation in Serbia in 1919, in relation to Hungary, relative to property, rights and interests, is as follows:

Relation has collected all her credits from the Serbian nationals, and her own subjects have been reinstated and are in possession of all their seized property. There are scarcely any Hungarian structures in Serbia. We are, therefore, in our relations with Hungary, relative to domestic law, in a very unfavourable position. We are deprived of a pledge which the Allies qualified as "essential" (Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Remarks of the German Delegation, page 51) for the recovery of their credits from the enemy, and for the payment of the indemnities due [to] Allied nationals, as a result of the application of exceptional war measures and provisions concerning the possessions, rights and interests of our nationals in Hungary.

The only way left by which we may reestablish the situation and repair the detrimental consequences of the arbitrary measures of the Hungarian Government in Serbia can only be realized by the insertion of provisions relative to the possessions, rights and interests of nationals in the Peace Treaty with Hungary similar to those which were inserted in the Peace Treaty with Germany. This measure would not constitute a privilege in our favour, and we do not ask for any advantage other than those recognized to our Allies in their relations with Germany. What we claim is simply the application of common law, and the maintenance of the same principles which were admitted in settling the same question in the Peace Treaty with Germany.

The derogation admitted, to the advantage of Austria, in Article 267 of the Peace Treaty of Saint-Germain, has already caused us considerable injury. But we understood the gravity of the motives which provoked the adoption of that exceptional measures [*sic*] by our Allies and we kept silent in face of the superior interests to which our pledge was sacrificed. However, it is unnecessary to extend that measure in favour of Hungary, that is: to have it apply in a case concerning which the motives invoked for Austria have no application. Such a provision would be absolutely unjustified, and would cause us an extremely prejudicable [*sic*] injury in every respect.

With confidence in the high spirit of justice of our Allies, we feel certain that they will protect our interests and we are firmly convinced, after examination of the reasons above presented, our claim will be accorded favourable consideration.

Please accept, etc.

## APPENDIX H TO No. 48

FRENCH REPUBLIC

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY, POSTAL AND TELEGRAPHIC SERVICE

Cabinet of the Minister. No. 334.

PARIS, *Dec. 27, 1919*

From: The Secretary General of the Economic Commission.

To: The Ambassador of France, Secretary Gen'l of the Peace Conference.

The Economic Commission has examined, in detail, the Serbian note under date of December 12, treating the interdiction to liquidate Hungarian property in the territories transferred to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

The Commission esteems that, by the application of the Articles of Part X of the Peace Treaty, especially those having reference to the prejudices caused by decisions rendered in cases of property, rights and interests, without the party concerned having an opportunity to offer any defence, the cases indicated by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, treating the actions of the Hungarian authorities relative to the recovery of Hungarian credits during the occupation of Serbia, justify the Serbian Government in demanding an indemnity from the Hungarian Government.

The Economic Commission was uncertain as to whether, in order to permit the Serbian Government to reimburse its nationals for the damages caused by the above-mentioned acts, it would be advisable to authorize a liquidation of Hungarian property in new Serbia. The Commission recognized, however, that even if this authorization were accorded to the Serbian Government, the Government might be unable to employ the proceeds of the liquidation as a reparation of the damages in question, since by the terms of Article 297 of the Treaty with Germany (249 of the Treaty with Austria) the proceeds of the liquidation can be levied upon only for indemnities relative to the properties or credits of Serbians in Hungary.

However, the Economic Commission esteemed that, by a slight revision of Article 260 of the Treaty with Germany (211 of the Treaty with Austria) it would be possible to meet the serious objection presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, without infringing on the general system which rules in the Treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria concerning enemy property in transferred territory.

The Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation specified, in demanding the liquidation of Hungarian property in the transferred Hungarian territories, that an interdiction to permit the liquidation would maintain, within the territories which the former Empire recognized as of Hungarian influence, the economic superiority of Hungary as beneficiary, not only of the most of the public concessions (transportation means, canals, lighting, etc.) but also of the majorats which afford certain Hungarian subjects with an important economic influence over vast domains and seigneurial rights, which might entail difficulties of an administrative or political nature.

The Economic Commission esteemed that it was impossible to not recognize the argument presented by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, and is of the opinion that satisfaction might be accorded Serbia by a sufficiently extensive application of Article 260 of the Treaty of Versailles (211 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain), which provides that, in the transferred territories, the Reparation Commission may, within a period of one year after the entry into force of the Treaty,

demand that the enemy State acquire full rights or interests for its nationals in all enterprises of public utility, or in all concessions. With special reference to the question of majorats, the Economic Commission is of the opinion that mention of the majorats be inserted in the Article above referred to in the Treaty with Hungary, under the form 'demand that Hungary acquire full rights or interests for her nationals in all enterprises of public utility, or in all concessions, as well as in all majorats, etc.'

In order that, on one hand, the regime adopted concerning immovable property situated in transferred territory be not infringed on, and on the other hand, equitable guarantees be assured the Serb-Croat-Slovene State against a rupture which cannot be disregarded, it will be advisable after having introduced the revision proposed by the Economic Commission in Article 265 of the Treaty of Versailles, and of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, that the Supreme Council indicate to the Reparation Commission that an extended application of this Article is to be anticipated regarding the Hungarian territories transferred to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

D. SERRUYS.

## No. 49

H. D. 120.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Four Great Powers, held in M. Picot's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Wednesday, December 31, 1919, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.

*Great Britain:* Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. Norman.

*France:* M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy:* M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan:* M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: *Great Britain:* Captain Lothian Small. *France:* M. de Percin. *Italy:* M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*Great Britain:* Captain Fuller, R.N., Cmdr. Macnamara, R.N., Mr. Malkin, Mr. Carr, Lt.-Col. Beadon.

*France:* Gen. Weygand, Gen. Le Rond, Adl. Le Vavas seur, M. Serruys, M. Fromageot, M. Tannery, M. Hermitte, M. de Montille.

*Italy:* Gen. Cavallero, M. Piloti.

*Japan:* M. Shigemitsu, M. Nagaoka.

1. M. DUTASTA told the Council that at five o'clock on the previous day he had had an interview with M. von Lersner and had communicated to him the draft letter that was to be addressed to the German Delegation by the President of the Conference. The only thing left blank was the space for the figures relative to tonnage as estimated by the Allies on one hand and by the Germans on the other. M. von Lersner appeared on the whole satisfied with the letter. His only hesitation had been about the period of two years granted to the Germans for supplying the additional port material:

*Negotiations relative to the signing of the Protocol*

he thought that period too short. He had told M. von Lersner that in his own opinion it might be possible to have the time extended to thirty months. M. von Lersner had gone away satisfied, and it was agreed between them that the afternoon of January 6th might be taken as the date for signing the Protocol which would take place at the Quai d'Orsay, and would coincide with the coming into force of the Treaty.

Since that interview Captain Fuller had submitted the figures to be inserted in the blank spaces left in the draft letter. The estimate of the Allies was 624,275 tons and that of the Germans, 527,380 tons. These figures referred to the docks exclusively, and to [*sic*] the difference between the two figures would, after verification, be deducted from the 400,000 tons originally claimed. He had then had the completed text presented to M. von Lersner by M. de St. Quentin. In acknowledging the document M. von Lersner told M. de St. Quentin that M. Loucheur had given, as the Allied figure, 700,000 tons and claimed that the situation was considerably modified if the estimate of the Allies was only 624,000 tons. Under the circumstances M. von Lersner said that he would be obliged to telegraph Berlin for instructions. What had occurred in reality was that M. Loucheur had suggested the estimate of 700,000 from memory and, no doubt, as an example for the sake of argument. The Germans were not justified in basing an argument on that estimate which was indicated merely in the course of conversation. And it ought further to be borne in mind that the figures submitted by Captain Fuller and which appear in the draft letter were more favourable to the Germans than those established by the French Admiralty, namely 612,000 tons.

M. DE ST. QUENTIN stated that M. von Lersner had claimed in his presence that the figure of 700,000 tons had been given in the course of the discussion that took place between the Allied and the German Experts. But, as a matter of fact, no trace of that figure having been given could be found in the procès-verbaux, and their Experts could not recall having heard it quoted. There was every ground for thinking that M. von Lersner's affirmation was inexact.

M. DUTASTA mentioned that, as he had already said, the figures referred to the floating docks alone. No statistics had been supplied on the number of tugs, cranes, etc., in the possession of Germany.

He did not think that the opposition thus created *in extremis* was very serious. If the Germans had given exact figures there was the assurance of their having 100,000 tons at least to hand over. M. von Lersner had on several occasions confided to him that the German Government was prepared by way of compromise to hand over a total of 260,000 tons. In any case putting the situation at its worst from the German point of view they would not demand from them more than 300,000 tons. He did not think that the Germans intended to withhold their signature for a difference not exceeding 50,000 tons at the most.

In the course of the interview M. von Lersner told him the anxiety caused to the German Government by the question of the actual handing over of the

vessels that were to be delivered to the Allies. In a similar way he had led him to understand that the German Government did not expect freedom in the officers and crews on board these vessels. He was not at all that of these ships had to leave for Allied ports with the crews on board. He had said that they ran the risk of their being scuttled either at the port of destination or during the voyage. He had told M. von Lersner that such a risk was not at all extraordinary serious. M. von Lersner had agreed and added that the German Government acknowledged how serious the consequences might be, but precisely for that reason and being himself powerless in the matter that he wished to draw the attention of the Allied and Associated Powers to the situation. He had suggested that the German Government might assemble all the ships in question in one port, and take off the crews, and that the Allies might send their own crews to take possession of the ships and man them into their own ports. He had confined himself to telling M. von Lersner that he would report his statements to the Council.

M. CAMBON summarized, saying that in M. Dutasta's explanation of the Council was confronted with two distinct questions. Would they discuss first of all the question of the figures given by the Allies on the one hand and of the Germans on the other?

SIR EYRE CROWE felt that there could be no question about changing their figures which were based upon statements of facts. The estimate of 71,000 tons was only a maximum figure.

M. DE MARTINO did not think the difficulty serious and thought that the Allies had merely to maintain the figures they had already decided upon.

M. DUTASTA said that they would therefore stand by the terms of their note and await the German reply.

M. CAMBON said that the second question was rather important: he thought that they ought first of all to send it to the Naval Experts for examination.

ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR recalled that he had already suggested that this question would come up when he had said that the Germans had professed that probably they would be unable to sail their boats into Allied ports. If it were not German crews who manned the vessels that were to be handed over in our ports, the precautionary measures they had taken, such as disarmament, became purposeless.

It was decided:

1. To extend to thirty months the period granted to Germany for handing over the tonnage in excess of the 192,000 tons whose immediate delivery the German Government proposed.
2. To refer to the Naval Experts for examination the measures to be taken in order to obviate the possibility of the ships that were to be surrendered to the Allies by Germany being scuttled by the German crews.

Mr. Wallace would refer the first paragraph of this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government.

2. GENERAL LE ROND told the Council that the negotiations with the German Delegation presided over by M. von Simson concerning the application of

the clauses of the Treaty to Plebiscite Areas had opened on the preceding day. The German Delegation had from the outset shown itself disinclined to accept any of the articles and inclined, rather, on several points to refer to the Government at Berlin on the grounds that it had not itself full powers to decide.

*Negotiations relative to the transfer of powers in Plebiscite Areas*

The German Delegation advanced certain inadmissible claims such as maintaining the power of German Courts of Appeal or Supreme Courts outside of the Plebiscite areas, over the inhabitants of those territories in spite of the fact that the latter had been placed under Interallied Government. It had explicitly stated that it considered the inhabitants of those territories as remaining under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court at Leipzig before which they might be tried for high treason against the German Government.

The President von Simson had alluded in a threatening way to the possibility of German officials leaving the Plebiscite areas *en masse*. In a general way the Delegation had seemed inclined from the beginning to dispute the ground step by step and to take no personal responsibility for the decisions. Count Lerchenfeld had even declared that certain decisions could not be taken without reference to the Reichstag.

In the course of the Conference the attitude of the German Delegation became gradually more conciliatory when confronted by the firmness of the Allied position, and because it was made clear to it on several points that the rights conferred by the Treaty upon the Commissions were wider than those they meant to exercise in the beginning of their administration.

It remained certain, nevertheless, that the German Delegation would, on certain important points, refuse to take decisions and would refer to Berlin, a fact which pointed to a slowing up of negotiations the more especially since telegraphic communication with Berlin was at the moment very unsatisfactory.

He felt obliged to tell the Council his very definite impression that the policy of the German Delegation was to have the Protocol signed as soon as possible and consequently the Treaty come into force, in order that they might reject after its coming into force the conclusion of negotiations regarding the Plebiscite areas. In that way the Germans reckoned to have greater opportunity of rejecting the Allied demands. The more M. von Lersner seemed anxious to bring matters to a close, the more M. von Simson seemed trying to drag the negotiations out. The negotiations would be resumed on the following day and one meeting would probably suffice to expound the Allied demands relative to the administration of Plebiscite areas. All the delays that might occur would be owing to the fact that the Germans would not have full power of decision.

He would remark however that on certain points the statements of the German Delegation had seemed to him worthy of attention. For example, M. von Simson had pointed out that Memel, which was to be definitely separated from Germany, was actually being administered by German officials, and that some understanding must be reached to give their ad-

ministration security until a new one took over from them. That decision ought to be examined for it was obvious that they could not leave that territory indefinitely under the direction of one single Allied officer surrounded by a purely German administration, the more especially as these officials were perfectly free to withdraw if they liked.

M. CAMBON felt that the idea at the back of the German mind could be clearly seen from General Le Rond's account. He was convinced that, peace once established, the Germans would reject all the demands relative to these territories. They ought, he considered, to indicate clearly to the Germans that the negotiations then taking place must be completed before the signing of the Protocol. Monsieur Dutasta might be charged with making that declaration to M. von Lersner at their forthcoming interview. The methods adopted by the German Delegation to lengthen the negotiations made the Germans themselves responsible for any disadvantage accruing from the delay.

SIR EYRE CROWE suggested that they ought even to advise the Germans that it would be impossible for the Allies to adhere to the date of January 6th agreed upon for signing the Protocol if as a result of the obstructionist methods of the German Delegation the negotiations relative to the transfer of powers in the Plebiscite areas had not previously been concluded.

GENERAL LE ROND wished to add that the draft financial arrangements discussed on the previous day had so far not been met with any objections on the part of the Germans. There were grounds therefore for thinking that the occupation of Allenstein and Marie[n]werde[r] would not impose on the Allies any final expense.

As for Upper Silesia, the question had already been settled with the Polish Government which was going to advance the necessary sums.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the question of the occupation of Allenstein had been raised.

GENERAL LE ROND said that it had not.

GENERAL WEYGAND stated that in agreement with the decision taken by the Council at its previous meeting he was communicating to the Germans on that day the Allied decision to occupy Allenstein.

M. CAMBON thought that they would all be agreed upon making the communication to the Germans that Sir Eyre Crowe had suggested.

M. DE MARTINO agreed and said that they ought to demand from the Germans the undertaking that as the negotiations relative to Plebiscite areas had to be completed before the Treaty came into force, the measures of execution only be decided afterwards and step by step.

It was decided:

To entrust M. Dutasta with making it known verbally to M. von Lersner that the signing of the Protocol and the coming into force of the Treaty could not take place until after a satisfactory arrangement of the question relative to Plebiscite areas, questions which were the subject of [?at] that moment of negotiations between the Commission presided over by General Le Rond and the German Delegation presided over by M. von Simson.

3. GENERAL LE ROND suggested that considering the indefensible claims put forward by the Germans it seemed absolutely necessary to fix the conditions under which protection of nationals of the Plebiscite areas would be assured.

*Protection of Nationals  
of Plebiscite Areas*

GENERAL LE ROND then read the note which appears as Appendix A.<sup>1</sup>

After a short discussion,  
it was decided:

1. That the nationals of the different Plebiscite areas be [?as] defined in the Treaty of Versailles, being entitled to vote in the Plebiscite, shall be placed for this purpose while outside of the said territory, under the protection of the Diplomatic and Consular agents of the allied power holding the presidency of the Commission in said territory and in all other respects shall receive that protection.
2. That foreign consular agents actually carrying out their duties shall be recognized by the Inter-Allied Commission; that foreign consular agents who shall be appointed during the period of the Commission's administration shall be required to receive that recognition in advance; that the consular agents of the Principal Powers shall be considered to have full right to this recognition; that the present decision shall be made known to the interested powers.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

4. SIR EYRE CROWE said that the British Delegation had had a note circulated (Appendix B<sup>2</sup>) explaining the point of view of His Majesty's Government, namely, that the Allied forces occupying Plebiscite areas and Danzig and Memel ought to be considered troops of occupation within the meaning of Article 249 of the Treaty of Peace. The British Government considered that each of the states taking part in the occupation of Plebiscite areas ought, as was the case in the occupation of the Rhine, to make the necessary advances for the maintenance of its own troops. As for recovering the costs, that ought to be asked from the beneficiary states in proportions corresponding to the attribution of territories by the Plebiscite.

*Conditions of the  
Advance of funds to  
meet the expenses of  
Allied troops in the  
Plebiscite Areas*

GENERAL CAVALLERO considered that the explanation made by Sir Eyre Crowe did not coincide entirely in its latter part with the text of the British note to which he referred. That note said in effect that repayment of the expenses was to be a priority charge against Germany.<sup>3</sup> If he had understood Sir Eyre Crowe it was his opinion that the beneficiary states were to make this repayment in proportion corresponding to the territories attributed to them. The French accepted Sir Eyre Crowe's point of view; they could not,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This note of December 30, 1919, submitted the two proposals adopted by the Supreme Council, the second being less full in form than the text adopted.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This note of December 24, 1919, was as indicated in the remarks of Sir E. Crowe and General Cavallero.

<sup>3</sup> The note proposed that the cost of the allied forces occupying plebiscite areas 'should be recoverable as the first charge on Germany'.

on the other hand, take the point of view set forth in the British note. As already explained in a note of the Italian Delegation dated 27th December, Article 240 applied in fact only to German territories and that was not the case with Danzig and Memel, which were no longer part of Germany. Now Article 87 [288] of the Treaty relative to Upper Silesia said that the expenses of occupation were to be borne from local revenues. Since any might anticipate that part at least of the territories under consideration would return to Poland it would be going against the spirit of the Treaty to lay [lay] the whole of the cost upon Germany alone.

SIR EYRE CROWE accepted the point of view maintained by General Cavallero.

GENERAL LE ROND considered it well to be quite clear on the point that this was only a question of advances for the costs had to be reimbursed ultimately by the beneficiary states. They accepted the British proposal that each power advance the costs of maintenance of its own troops.

GENERAL CAVALLERO said that there remained one point to make clear. They had told the Germans that they still wished to occupy Allenstein. But that occupation was not provided for in the Treaty. Reimbursement of costs was provided for in the Treaty only in the case of Upper Silesia.

GENERAL LE ROND considered that it was easy to anticipate in the case of Allenstein and Marienwerder repayment of the costs by the states to which those territories would be attributed. The question on the other hand remained open in the case of Danzig since in that case there was no attribution of territories.

SIR EYRE CROWE explained that they had had in view in the case of Danzig only the establishment of a base; later if the Allied High Commissioner required it the troops entrusted with guarding that base could be employed for the maintenance of order in Danzig and the surrounding district.

M. DE MARTINO said that he would let his Government know the decision that had been taken but he would have to reserve his decision since in financial matters he could not act without instructions.

Under reserve of the Italian Government's approval it was decided:

1. that each state taking part in the occupation of territories submitted to Plebiscite shall make the advances of funds necessary for the maintenance of its own troops.
2. that the reimbursement of those advances shall be made for all the Plebiscite areas by the beneficiary states in proportions corresponding to the territories attributed to them.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

5. M. FROMAGEOT said that the Supreme Council having been good enough to approve at the meeting before last the conclusions of the note presented to it by the Drafting Committee on the subject of the Swiss Note of the 18th

+ Appendix C in original, not printed.

December 1919, concerning the accession of the Swiss Confederation to the League of Nations,<sup>5</sup> they had prepared a draft letter to the Federal Government in the sense of that note which they had then presented (Appendix D).

*Draft reply to the Swiss note of 18th December 1919 concerning Switzerland's accession to the League of Nations*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he approved the note submitted to the Council. But they had decided that the reply to the Swiss Government ought to be made in the name of the Supreme Council and not only in the name of the French Government.

M. FROMAGEOT explained that the Drafting Committee had prepared the reply in that way because it had not known whether the other powers had been sent similar communications by the Swiss Government. But it would be easy to effect in the text the changes necessary to make it in accordance with the decision recalled by Sir Eyre Crowe.

It was decided:

1. To adopt in principle the note prepared by the Drafting Committee, (Appendix D).
2. That the changes necessary be introduced in the text so that the reply be made not in the name of the French Government but in that of the Supreme Council to which the question had been referred by the French Government.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this decision to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

6. The Council had before it a note from Marshal Foch to the President of the Peace Conference, dated 1st December (Appendix E) and a note of the Paris Inter-Allied Commission of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany dated 6th December (Appendix F<sup>6</sup>).

*Winding up of the Inter-Allied Commission of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany*

GENERAL WEYGAND commented upon Marshal Foch's note. He added that the agreement arrived at within the Commission on Prisoners of War had been unanimous but for a reservation made by the Italian Delegate on the basis of the distribution of the costs of maintenance of Russian Prisoners of War in Germany.

M. TANNERY explained that for the winding up of the Berlin Commission

<sup>5</sup> See No. 46, minute 5 and appendices D & E (one meeting earlier than that indicated by M. Fromageot).

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This covering note, signed by M. Tannery, forwarded to M. Dutasta a note which, apart from minor variation, was the same as that in appendix F to No. 32 subject to: (i) the insertion after the third paragraph of the earlier draft (beginning: 'After having examined the data . . .') of a new paragraph reading: 'The British Delegate requests that the reimbursement of these two millions be delayed until proof is presented showing that the refugees were sheltered in Germany at the request of the Allies.' (ii) The omission of the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and part of the twelfth paragraph of the earlier draft (beginning: 'The Commission suggested that . . .' and ending: 'sum representing the reparations account.'). In his covering note M. Tannery stated that the revised draft 'was approved by all the Allied Delegates, with the exception of the Italian Delegate, from whom, despite repeated requests, I have been unable to obtain any response'.

it had been agreed that the expenses would be divided into four between the four Great Powers there represented. But the share of the U.S.A. and of France already considerably exceeded a quarter. The remainder was therefore to be defrayed by Great Britain and Italy. The Italian Delegate had always made a reservation for the approval of his Government.

M. DE MARTINO said that he must maintain the Italian Delegate's reservation until his Government had given its decision.

GENERAL WEYGAND wished to point out that the question of the maintenance of refugees from Kiev had been reserved until further information could be obtained.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in accordance with instructions from his Government he wished to raise a question which, although not exactly the same as that under discussion, was related to it. If he understood the matter rightly there existed at the moment no commission for Russian prisoners of war in Germany other than the Berlin one, and it was the Council's intention to bring that one to an end without replacing it in any way whatever.

Now his Government had just been in negotiation at Copenhagen with a representative of the Soviets over the question of the liberation of English prisoners in Russia. There were in Russia many British prisoners whose repatriation was extremely desirable. The other Powers doubtless were in the same situation. The Soviet representative in the Copenhagen negotiations had put forward one condition as a *sine qua non* for the continuation of those negotiations. He demanded that the Soviets be represented in the Berlin Commission charged with controlling the repatriation of Russian prisoners in Germany. General Malcolm, consulted on the subject by the British Government, had answered that he could see no difficulty in the way of granting the demand formulated by the representative of the Bolshevik Government, the more especially as the Commission did not exist any longer. Apparently therefore the creation of a new commission was being considered and that was what he could not understand, since if he had rightly interpreted the previous discussion the Council had wished to wind up the existing commission and not to replace it by any other at all. He would ask therefore, did there exist such a commission, different from the Berlin one, or was it proposed to create a new one?

GENERAL WEYGAND explained that the difficulty was due to a subtlety of interpretation. The Inter-Allied Commission of Russian prisoners in Germany had recently been transformed into an international commission by the addition of a German delegate. That transformation had taken place at the moment when it had been decided to assume no further financial responsibility for the fate of Russian prisoners in Germany and to leave to the Commission only measures of control. But the German Government had considered that, the Allies rendering no more financial aid, the existence of that Commission interested them no longer, and abstained from nominating a delegate and in those circumstances the Commission had not sat. It was in that sense that one might say with General Malcolm that the new Commission never having sat, did not in fact exist.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether at the moment when they had decided upon the suppression of the Inter-Allied Commission they had really intended to substitute for it an international commission or to recognize the existence of one. If he rightly remembered the last state of the question they had decided upon the suppression pure and simple of the commission which therefore was to dissolve as soon as certain questions still pending had been settled.

COLONEL BEADON said that it had been decided that they would stop sending money and that the Commission on which the Germans would be represented would have powers of control only, but because of the attitude of the Germans the plan could not be realized.<sup>7</sup>

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that anyhow his Government proposed that the Soviets should be represented on the Berlin International Commission. If this were the only means of releasing our prisoners, it would appear that this proposal should be seriously considered. One of Koltshak's representatives was, it transpired, already on the commission, and yet the Bolsheviks stated that their interests were not represented, and they had asked to be put on the Commission. His Government saw no reason why this demand of the Soviets should not be agreed to, provided it would facilitate the repatriation of allied prisoners.

M. CAMBON stated that the proposal of the British Government was such as to render consultation with the other Governments necessary.

SIR EYRE CROWE insisted that the question was an urgent one.

If the negotiations with Copenhagen dragged on, they ran a great risk of achieving no results. Besides, it was now winter, and the sufferings of our prisoners in Russia were increasing from day to day.

GENERAL WEYGAND thought that the first question to be settled was establishing the Commission, which had been unable to get to work on account of the negative attitude of the Germans. It seemed difficult to reopen the discussion with them on the eve of the coming into force of the Treaty. The Germans had stated that if the Berlin Commission no longer controlled financial means, it was useless and that they preferred to deal with the question themselves. It must also be admitted that in this the Germans had right on their side.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that it was the Italian reservation on the distribution of expenses which had delayed our reply to the Germans.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that if it were decided that the Berlin International Commission had no longer any reason to exist, we should have found a graceful way out of the situation created by the Bolshevik request. It was obviously impossible to form part of a Commission which had ceased to exist.

M. CAMBON asked each member of the Council to approach his Government with regard to the question raised by Sir Eyre Crowe.

The remainder of the discussion was put off until a later date.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. No. 32, minute 6.

7. The Council had before it:

1. Two Notes from General Niessel to the President of the Council, dated the 11th and 13th December 1919. Annexes [Appendices] G and H.  
*Violent Treatment of the Officers on the Niessel Mission*

2. A draft telegram from Marshal Foch to General Nudant giving instructions from the Supreme Council to the German Government. Annex [Appendix] I.

GENERAL WEYGAND commented on the proposed telegram from Marshal Foch [Annex I]. He added that instead of sending a telegram to the German Government, which, on the eve of the coming into force of the Treaty might run the risk of starting general discussion, he proposed, if Marshal Foch were in agreement, that this question should be dealt with in a verbal note which could be delivered to the German Delegation by the Secretary-General of the Conference.

After a short discussion it was decided to entrust to M. Dutasta the drawing up of a verbal note to be delivered to M. von Lersner, which would draw the attention of the German Government to the violent treatment of the officers belonging to General Niessel's Mission.

8. GENERAL WEYGAND commented on a note dated the 30th December addressed by Marshal Foch to the President of the Conference regarding the military measures adopted by the Germans in Upper Silesia. Annex [Appendix] J.  
*German military measures in Upper Silesia*

After a short discussion it was decided to ask M. Dutasta to submit to M. von Lersner a verbal note on the lines of the note attached to the report by Marshal Foch dated December 30th (See Annex J).

[That *sic*] Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

9. M. DE ST. QUENTIN commented on a note from the French Delegation on this subject. Annex [Appendix] K.

*Position of the Comitadjas in Western Hungary*

It was decided to ask the Allied Generals in Budapest to send with the least possible delay to the Comitadjas ceded to Austria by Hungary the Mission, the constitution of which had been agreed to by resolution of the Supreme Council on the 2nd October.<sup>8</sup>

10. M. SERRUYS commented on a note from the Economic Commission on this question dated December 26th (Annex [Appendix] L).

*Report of the Economic Commission on the amendments to the economic clauses of the Treaty with Hungary proposed by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation*

After a short discussion it was agreed:

1. To refer to the European Coal Commission the request of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation that in the case of the inserting of an article in the Hungarian Treaty of Peace similar to Article 224 of the Treaty of St. Germain, the Czecho-Slovak Republic should not be cited as one of the States who would undertake to supply Hungary with coal.

<sup>8</sup> See Vol. I, No. 69, minute 8.

2. To adopt the recommendations of the Economic Commission rejecting the request put forward by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation for the deletion in the Peace Treaty with Hungary of Article 287<sup>9</sup> of the Treaty of St. Germain and to the corresponding modification on [?] in the Treaty with Hungary of Article 249 of the Treaty with Austria.

11. M. DE MARTINO said that recently the question of putting the case of the Aaland Islands on the agenda had come forward. A  
*The question of the Aaland Islands* Plebiscite had been held there as a result of which 90% of the inhabitants had declared themselves in favour of Sweden. This question, therefore, would not appear to present any great difficulties and it could be agreed before the breaking up of the Conference.

SIR EYRE CROWE was against raising this question *in extremis*. It appeared to be more the concern of the League of Nations.

M. DE ST. QUENTIN stated that it had indeed been proposed to leave this question to the League of Nations. At that time it was believed that the Supreme Council would not have been so long-lived as it actually had been, and since then the proposal to bring this question up at the Council had been again considered.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that this might mean dragging on their work indefinitely. A commission would have to be formed which, of course, would not be able to reach an agreement and for which therefore, the Council would have to arbitrate. That could not be done immediately.

M. DE MARTINO said that to him the question seemed quite clear and that the forming of a Commission was not a necessity.

SIR EYRE CROWE reminded the Council that the fate of the Aaland Islands was of interest to Finland and was related to the Russian question. It was rather a delicate matter.

M. CAMBON was of the opinion that this matter should not at the moment be entered on the agenda. It would be time enough to add it when the necessity arose.

M. DE MARTINO stated that he would not press the matter.

The meeting then adjourned.

#### APPENDIX D TO No. 49

##### *Draft of Reply to the Swiss Note of December 18, 1919, relative to Adherence of Switzerland to the League of Nations*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS

ESH BULLETIN NO. 70

Jan. 2, 1919 [1920]

PARIS, December 29, 1919

In a memorandum dated December 18, 1919, the Swiss Legation, in referring to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the date of which is set by the Legation as of April 28, 1919, informed the Government of the French Republic that the

<sup>9</sup> In error for 267.

Swiss Federal Assembly, on November 21, 1919, decided in favour of the entry of Switzerland into the League of Nations, text of this decision being annexed to the memorandum.

The Swiss Government adds that a formal declaration of adherence will be forwarded in proper time, under reservation of the result of the popular vote, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations. This popular vote is provided for by the Helvetic Constitution and it ought not, according to the Swiss Government, necessarily to take place within the period of two months referred to in Article I of the Covenant, for the reason that the realization of the League of Nations depends upon the adherence of all the States to whom a permanent representation in the Council of the League is accorded by the Covenant.

In short, in the opinion of the Swiss Government, a notification of the decision of the Federal Assembly presented within a period of two months after the entry into force of the Treaty should assure to Switzerland all the rights of a State invited to adhere as an original member, and at the same time it would not anticipate the final decision expressed by the Swiss people in the referendum required by the Helvetic Constitution.

In thanking the Swiss Legation for its memorandum, which is moreover recognized by the Swiss Government, could not in any sense be considered as a declaration of adherence, the Government of the French Republic has the honour to present the following remarks:

1. According to Article I of the Covenant, the declaration of adherence must be made without reservations, and within two months after the entry into force of the Covenant. A declaration of adherence which would be subject to the result of the referendum could not be considered as an adherence without reservations. Furthermore, the measures which are required by the Swiss Constitution in like matter concern Switzerland only. As far as the other interested Powers are concerned a declaration of adherence made only in conformity with the terms of the Treaty can be taken into consideration.

2. The Swiss Note refers to the date upon which the Covenant was adopted as April 28, 1919.

It is important to recall that the only official text is that which was signed by the Powers, and concerning which the date of April 28, 1919, does not apply.

3. The basis of the Swiss Note, according to which the realization of the League of Nations depends upon ratification by the five Principal Powers, is not in conformity with the final clauses of the Treaty, as by these clauses, the Treaty, in all its parts, that is, inclusive of Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations, is applicable *erga [erga] omnes* in everything concerning the computation of delays, and will enter into force for all the Powers which will have ratified up to that time, upon the deposit of the ratifications of three of the Principal Powers and Germany.

4. Finally, the measure of the Federal Council, copy of which was attached to the memorandum of the Swiss Government, contains several considerations in its preamble relative to the relation between the adherence of the Helvetic Confederation to the League of Nations and the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland, as well as between Article[s] 21 and 435 of the Treaty.

The Government of the Republic will hold this question for subsequent examination.

*Draft of Resolution**December 1st, 1919.*

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, after having taken note of the report of the special commission in Paris, entrusted with the questions concerning the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, made, in its meeting of December . . . 1919, the following resolution, with respect to the questions pending since the dissolution of the Interallied Commission in Berlin:

1st. *Liquidation of the liabilities of the Interallied Commission.*

The 400,000 marks due to the British Red Cross will be reimbursed to the latter by the British Government.

2nd. *Reimbursement of the flour advanced by the German Government.*

The flour advanced by the German Government will be reimbursed, not in kind, but in currency, that is to say, 7,680,000 marks.

The payment of this reimbursement will be effected by applying an equal sum to the credit of Germany in the reparations account; 100,000 mark[s] being charged to the English account, and 7,580,000 marks to the Italian account.<sup>11</sup>

3rd. The employment of the 200,000,000 [sic] Russian roubles detained by the German Government, is postponed until a settlement is made of the financial questions connected with the employment of this sum.

4th. As to the question of reimbursement to the German Government of the 2,000,000 marks representing the upkeep expenses of the Kiev refugees, its solution is postponed until the results of an investigation as to the conditions under which the representatives of the Entente made agreements in this matter, are known.

*Draft of Resolution*

The Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers, after having taken cognizance of the note of the German Government of November 6th, 1919 (5010 II/19 Wako), and of the proposals of the special commission on the Russian P.W., decided to address the following answer to the German Government:

'The Allied and Associated Powers confirm their resolution to incur no more expenses for the Russian prisoners of war in Germany, except those necessary for the upkeep of their representatives to the International Commission on Russian P.W. in Berlin.

<sup>10</sup> The original of this appendix also contained a covering note of even date from Marshal Foch to M. Clemenceau (see minute 6 above), forwarding the two draft resolutions and proposing that, if adopted, the first be telegraphed to General Malcolm and the second communicated to the German Government and to General Malcolm.

<sup>11</sup> Note in original: 'The share of each power in the upkeep of the Russian P.W. is as [?] so] far as follows:

For France	.	.	.	.	.	28,710,000 marks
For Great Britain	.	.	.	.	.	7,080,000 „
For America	.	.	.	.	.	50,015,100 „
For Italy	.	.	.	.	.	0 „

The above provision is calculated to increase the shares of Great Britain and Italy to 7,580,000 marks.'

'On the other hand, as this Commission—whose role is only to supervise the material situation of the Russian P.W. and to eventually lend its assistance to the German Government for the repatriation of these prisoners—is not provided for by the Peace Treaty with Germany it will cease operating as soon as the Treaty gets into force.'

## APPENDIX G TO No. 49

### Document 1

INTERALLIED COMMISSION IN THE BALTIC STATES.

TILSITT, Dec. 11, 1919.

292 S/P

From: General Niessel, President of the Interallied Commission in the Baltic States.

To: M. Clemenceau, Paris.

During the numerous, difficult, and delicate missions fulfilled by the Allied officers with courage and coolness, a great many incidents took place.

Such officers were frequently insulted and attacked, sometimes even ill-treated and struck at, and usually under the indifferent and sarcastic eyes of the very German officers, who had been instructed, officially, to facilitate their task and to look after their security.

Whenever such an attack occurred penalties were claimed verbally and in writing, from Admiral Hopman, Chief of the German Delegation. The German Government has again been officially informed of these facts by a note, which set them forth in detail, remitted to Minister Noske himself, by Colonel Dosse, on Dec. 6, at Berlin.

Today again, another cowardly attack has just been committed, this time by a group of German officers, on an isolated French soldier see report annexed.<sup>12</sup>

No satisfaction having yet been granted, in regard to the numerous and earnest claims for penalties made by the Commission, I have the honour to ask the Supreme Council to kindly strengthen, through direct action in Berlin, the claims to reparations to which our officers and soldiers are entitled.

I am transmitting this report to the President of the German Delegation immediately.

The culprits are easy to find. Their brutal cowardice demands immediate punishment.

I request that excuses be made to my soldier. I take his case to heart, more than that of the officers, because he was alone, defenceless; no pretext can be invoked for the brutality to which he has been submitted.

The President of the Interallied Commission.  
NIESEL.

### Document 2

INTERALLIED COMMISSION, TILSITT BRANCH.

TILSITT, Dec. 12, 1919.

### Report

No. 290 S/P

On Dec. 11, at 4 o'clock p.m., I entered the restaurant of the 'Preussischerhof Hotel', where I live, to give my key before beginning my duty. Some German

<sup>12</sup> Document 2 in this appendix.

officers who were in the restaurant got up and pounced on me, forcing me to leave the restaurant and the hotel, kicking and striking me into the street.

Having been able to make them understand that I lived in the hotel, two officers came out to fetch me and took me inside, where an officer calling himself a Captain apologized and asked me to shake hands with him, which I absolutely refused to do. I was again brutalized and thrown into the street, amidst blows and kicks, and under the threat of revolvers, which they held in their hands.

Three times I was knocked down.

The Captain spoke French very well, and I believe he lives in the hotel.

The hotel-keeper tried to protect me, but was also knocked about.

R. MONNIER.

Seen and transmitted by the Chief of the Tilsitt Branch. DU CHOUCHE.

Seen and transmitted: It will not be difficult to find the culprits this time; a severe penalty is indispensable. The General Commanding the Mission of Control.

VINCENT.

### Document 3

#### *Statement of the Attacks made by the German Troops in the Baltic Provinces on the persons of Officers of the Interallied Commission of Control*

<i>Date and Place</i>	<i>Designation of the Allied Officers</i>	<i>Designation of the Military Germans responsible</i>	<i>Statement of the incidents</i>
11/23 Prekuln Station	Captain Bot	Soldiers of the Plehwe Branch Captain Plehwe	Daily threats and insults against officers of Control.
11/25 Station of Poschervny	Captain Lewinson (French) of the Control of Poschervny	German military authorities of the station of Poschervny, on duty 11/25, Lt. Bidefeld, officer of the Station Control	At midnight a grenade is thrown into the window of the lodgings occupied by the Control Officers. No measure was taken by the German authorities to safe- guard these officers.
11/25 Station of Kurchany	Major Leveque	Captain Iordann, Chief of the Iordann Company	Window panes of the Con- trol Officers' car, broken by stones and apples. Captain Iordann refuses to intervene.
11/26 Station of Bayoren	Captain Chipponi	Captain Shock, Commanding a bat- talion of the Plehwe Corps. A Feld- webel <sup>13</sup> of his bat- talion	At 6.30 p.m. a detachment of the Plehwe Corps arrived at the station to embark. The men spread over the station, shouting and threatening. The officers take refuge in the Control office, where they are im-

<sup>13</sup> Sergeant.

<i>Date and Place</i>	<i>Designation of the Allied Officers</i>	<i>Designation of the Military Germans responsible</i>	<i>Statement of the incidents</i>
11/26 Station of Eydekrug	Captain Henry	Captain Plehwe Lieut. Mausch of the Plehwe Corps	<p>mediately surrounded and threatened with rifles and grenades. Shock excites his men and insults the German station officers, who try in vain to keep order. A Feldwebel threatens our officers with his revolver.</p> <p>The men of train 8496 coming from Memel storm the office of the Control Officers, singing and howling. The manifestations clearly organized by Lieut. Mausch lasts [12] half an hour.</p>
11/28 Memel	Major Loustalot Captain Chipponi Captain Vink Lieut. Guarensan	Captain Plehwe. A soldier of the battalion of Shock	<p>Manifestations against our officers in a room of the Hotel Victoria. The soldiers of Shock battalion say: 'We are going for reinforcements, and tonight we will get rid of all those foreigners.' The German Colonel, Thauvenay, having declared that he is powerless to assure the security of the Allied officers at Memel, as long as Shock's battalion remains there, the Allied officers, under the Command of Major U. S. Loustalot, go on board the French ships, in the Memel harbour.</p>
11/29 Station of Tilsitt	Lieut. Valadon Lieut. Mannaz	Lt. Arnold, Control officer of Tilsitt Station. Captain Platnen, Chief of the Squadron of Lt. Cavalry, No. 18 of the Diebitch Corps	<p>At 16.45, German troops threaten our troops from a train, with blows and grenades. Shots are fired. Captain Platnen urges on his men. The German officer accompanying Col. von Luck, intervening, encourages the soldiers with a smile.</p>
12/1 Station of Schavli	Major Giraud	Lt. Schepper of the Voluntary Corps Petersdorf	<p>Major Giraud, while proceeding to the Control Bureau, is attacked by 30 German soldiers, commanded by an officer; he is surrounded by</p>

<i>Date and Place</i>	<i>Designation of the Allied Officers</i>	<i>Designation of the Military Germans responsible</i>	<i>Statement of the incidents</i>
12/2 Station of Schavli	Colonel Dosse Major Jocard Major Coriou Major Giraud Major Vanlande Major Keenen (A.B.) Capt. Jozan Lt. Messik (U.S.) Lt. Forster (A.B.) Lt. Martin-Prevel	Gen. von Eberhardt Major von Tritsch [? Fritsch]	soldiers and menaced with fixed bayonets. Pushed about, and kicked, and thrown into the Kommandantur Bureau, amid howling and threats of death. He is received by a young officer who listens to his declarations sneering. Capt. von Gordon, after trying in vain to calm the soldiers and Lt. Schepper, finally brings Major Giraud to his own residence.  Nothing serious is done by Gen. von Eberhardt to assure the security of the Delegation. In the evening, the Delegation's train is fired upon by machine-guns.
12/2 Station of Schavli	Major Coriou Major Pouvreau Major Giraud Capt. Chirossel Lt. Janvier Lt. Gladien	Lt. Hertmann Control Assistant	On detached service with the Allied Officers, deserted his post. Has never done anything to assure the protection of the Allied officers, constantly menaced.
12/2 Station of Schavli	Gen. Jukovski Col. Dosse Major Keenen (A.B.) Major Jocard Major Giraud Major Coriou Major Vanlande Capt. Chirossel Capt. Jozan Lt. Forster (A.B.) Lt. Martin-Prevel	Escadrille 34 Lt. Kredel	Gen. Jukovski and several Allied officers, having approached the train containing the material of the Escadrille 34, are immediately menaced by rifles and machine-guns. The control of the material thus being rendered impossible, Admiral Hopmann suggests that the train should be conveyed by an Allied officer. The Commanding Officer of the Escadrille warned him that this officer would certainly be killed. The train started in spite of the orders given by the Control Officers.

<i>Date and Place</i>	<i>Designation of the Allied Officers</i>	<i>Designation of the Military Germans responsible</i>	<i>Statement of the incidents</i>
12/3 Station at Tilsitt	Lt. Lloyd-Wilson	Escadrille 34 Lt. Kredel	<p>Lt. Lloyd-Wilson having approached the train, transporting the Escadrille, is coarsely insulted by Lt. Kredel, who orders him away. Lt. Lloyd-Wilson goes to fetch the German Control Officer, and is followed by Lt. K[redel] and his men, who insult him. K[redel] seizes Lt. Lloyd-Wilson by the shoulders, tries to expel him and spits on him . . .<sup>14</sup> he places the machine-guns in position.</p> <p>Lt. Lloyd-Wilson having ord[ered] Kredel, in the [pre]sence of a German Control Officer to abandon the machine-guns because they are [? not] included in the [re]gulation issue of the Escadrille[? is] again insulted and Kredel ref[?uses].</p>
12/3 Station of Schilany	English Lt. Sandels, of Kovno Mission	German soldiers	<p>Passing through the station of Schilany, Lt. Sandels received a grenade, within a range of 15 meters, thrown by German soldiers, who cannot be identified.</p>
12/3 Station of Schavli	Colonel Dosse Major Keenen Major Jocard Major Giraud Major Jozan Lt. Forster (A.B.) Lt. Martin-Prevel Lt. Messik (U.S.)	General von Eberhardt Major von Tritsch [?Fritsch]	<p>Before the departure of the Delegation's train for Tilsitt, some German soldiers arrived with grenades, and are seen prowling around the train. General von Eberhardt, having taken no police measures, the officers of the Delegation organized their own defence by means of arms which the German Delegation [? which] is accompanying them, had ordered to be transmitted to them. These measures of security prevented incidents from occurring at the departure.</p>

<sup>14</sup> The text here is uncertain.

<i>Date and Place</i>	<i>Designation of the Allied Officers</i>	<i>Designation of the Military Germans responsible</i>	<i>Statement of the incidents</i>
12/4 Station of Schavli	Major Coriou Major Leveque Capt. Chirossel Capt. Buisson Lt. Gigonguilheme Lt. Gladien Lt. Janvier	General von Eberhardt Major von Tritsch [?Fritsch]	General von Eberhardt had agreed in writing to protect the Control Officers of Schavli. The car occupied by these officers had been attached to the Eberhardt train. About one o'clock in the morning, this car is detached, taken six hundred meters away from the Eberhardt train, and attacked by several soldiers, with grenades. Most of the windows are broken, and it is only through luck that the grenades do not burst in the cars. Major Coriou having gone to protest and ask for protection, an officer on duty answers him that the General and his Chief of Staff (Major von Tritsch [? Fritsch]) are sleeping and that it is impossible to wake them up. On the insistence of the German Delegation, the posts of Control of Schavli and Kurchany were withdrawn.
12/6 Station of Insterburg	French Captain Angelli 2nd Lt. Jacquemet of the Control Bureau of Insterburg	Capt. Killac Lt. Schumann of the Kommandantur	About 9 o'clock p.m. a train of troops entered the station; the soldiers gather in front of the rooms of the Control Offices. They threaten the latter with their arms. As the German officers of the Kommandantur do not intervene to calm the soldiers, the Control Officers are obliged to leave the station of Insterburg.

## APPENDIX H TO No. 49

### Document 1

INTERALLIED COMMISSION TO THE BALTIC STATES  
203 s/e

TILSITT, *Dec. 13, 1919.*

From: General Niessel.

To: President of the Supreme Council

I have the honour to enclose herewith translated copy of a letter which was addressed to me by a Delegation of Lithuanians of the territory of Memel.

These documents indicate the terror felt by the unhappy Lithuanian population as a result of the troops of the Baltic districts being maintained at Memel contrary to promises made officially. The German military authorities have done everything possible to prevent any knowledge of the atrocities committed in Lithuania and Latvia becoming public. In the meantime the Lithuanians of Memel are becoming daily more aware of what they must expect from troops who are accustomed to live by looting and to spread terror in their path. For that matter, the soldiers themselves declare that they prefer not to return to Prussia as 'the life there is much less agreeable'.

The justified alarm of the Lithuanian inhabitants is easily explained by the arrival of troops whose hatred has become still more intense over the fury they feel for having been obliged to evacuate Lithuanian territory.

The Lithuanians of Memel who drafted the letter referred to are Messrs. Jokub Stiklorus, Jonas Griga, Kristus Lemszas, and Giorgis Jagomastas, who were obliged to avoid giving their names through fear of reprisals. They informed me verbally that they are desirous of sending a Delegation to Paris if the Supreme Council would deign to receive them.

In the event it is decided that one alone should have a hearing, it would be advisable to designate Mr. Jokub Stiklorus for the mission.

NIESEL.

### Document 2

INTERALLIED COMMISSION TO THE BALTIC STATES

TILSITT, *Dec. 13, 1919.*

Excellency:

In the name of the Delegation of the Lithuanian territory of Memel, I take the liberty to express our warmest thanks for your intervention which resulted in the evacuation of the Baltic countries by the German troops, and the liberation of Greater Lithuania which is at last being accomplished.

These Legions, as was recognized by Minister of War Noske, are made up of very dangerous elements who, for years, have been practising extortions in Lithuania.

Instead of sending these troops back to their homes in Germany, they are allowed to occupy the territory on [? of] Memel. (Which they will inevitably put to sack as they did greater Lithuania.)

For a long period already we have been awaiting in anguish for the time when the territory of Memel would be occupied by the Entente, thus putting an end to the German terror, but instead of this emancipation so long looked forward to we are now the victims of undisciplined hords [hordes]. We are subjected to the

regime of a state of siege, and every movement in favour of our legitimate liberation is violently suppressed either by imprisonment or threats of death. (Doctor Guigelat.)

In our distress we appeal to your Excellency, as Representative of the Entente, with the following supplication:

‘Do the needful to cause an immediate evacuation of Smaller Lithuania by the Baltic troops, in order that we may not be abolished through terror and helplessness.’

II. May we be allowed to recall to Your Excellency that we are forced to remain Prussian Lithuanians against our wishes (we are nevertheless grateful that a small portion of our country to the north of Memel is at last officially liberated) because by far the greater part of the former territory of Lithuania, to the south of Memel, remains separated from us. In fact, not only the region to the north of Memel, but all the country included between Kurisches Haff, the Deime and the Pregel, with Darkemen, Goldap, Komenten, are a part of the former territory of Lithuania. The names of all the villages, cities, streams and lakes, as well as the mountains and hills, forests and districts are Lithuanian, and testify that they were a part of antique Lithuania, and consequently should in all justice be returned to Lithuania as Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France.

Not only is it to the interest of Lithuania, but also to the entire Entente and the peace of the whole world, that Eastern Prussia, as ‘head’ of the monstrous ‘Prussian Militarism’, be sliced and cut to pieces in such a way that the Ermeland and Mazuria may go to Poland, and all the territory of former Lithuania to Lithuania, and that the remaining territory around Königsberg be placed under the administration of the Entente.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 49

*Note from the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies relative to action of Germans toward Officers of Allied Mission of Control*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN, NO. 62.

*December 30, 1919.*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.

Headquarters. 3rd Section.

From: Marshal Foch.

To: General Nudant, President, I.P.A.C., Cologne.

Please transmit to the German Government the following communication from the Supreme Council:

‘Frequently, officers and soldiers of the Interallied Commission, presided over by General Niessel, while exercising their mission of control, have been insulted and even attacked by German officers and soldiers.

‘These outrages have been viewed with indifference and have sometimes even been committed in complicity with certain German authorities, to whom the task of assuring the security of the Allied personnel of control had been confided.

‘Although they have already been the subject of verbal and written complaints addressed by General Niessel to Vice-Admiral Hopman, and although the German

Government has been officially informed by a joint note, remitted December 6, to the Minister Noske, Berlin, by Colonel Dosse, Chief of Staff of General Niessel, they have, nevertheless, remained unpunished to this day.

'The German Government which might claim itself powerless in regard to undisciplined troops in the Baltic outside its frontiers, cannot, at a time when these troops are in its own territory, argue its powerlessness to cover impardonable acts [*sic*] for which it is responsible.

'Consequently, the Allied and Associated Powers demand that it impose without delay the necessary penalties on the culprits, and inform the Interallied Commission of Control, of the execution of the measures prescribed on this subject.'

## APPENDIX J TO No. 49

### Document I

GENERAL ALLIED HEADQUARTERS,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES.

*Dec. 30, 1919.*

General Staff, No. 5848

From: Marshal Foch.

To: M. Clemenceau.

Concording reports emanating from the French Military Mission in Berlin, and from various sources, point out, in Upper Silesia, a most disquieting situation created by the doings of the military party, with the toleration, if not under the secret protection, of the German Government.

This situation, looked at from a military point of view, may be characterized as follows:

#### 1. *Concentrating in Upper Silesia of regular, important and efficient military forces.*

The effective of these forces<sup>15</sup> largely exceeds the needs of the military situation and of the interior police.

Their spirit, which is most ardent, is resolutely inclined towards resistance to the execution of the Treaty, by active propaganda in which Ludendorf himself seems to participate. Certain unities [*sic*], such as the Marine Brigade, are particularly feared by the populations, on account of their sentiments of hatred and violence.

These forces, already too numerous, would be joined later by elements coming from the 'Baltikum' and whose bad character and want of discipline are well known.<sup>16</sup>

#### 2. *Abnormal development of the Police Forces.*

Besides these regular troops, the Germans extend the organization of their 'police forces' in a proportion which is in no way justified by the interior situation of the country.

In fact, these police formations, becoming more numerous under different denominations (Sicherheitswehr, Bürgerwehr, Reichswehrpolizei, etc.),<sup>17</sup> are

<sup>15</sup> Note in original: 'This effective, estimated by certain information at 200,000 men, is not inferior, according to the most moderate calculations, to 80,000 men (effective provided for the Allied troops of Occupation: 12,000 men).'

<sup>16</sup> Note in original: 'It is to be noted that, according to the promises of the German Government, these elements were to be sent to Central Germany.'

<sup>17</sup> Note in original: 'Not less than twelve different organizations are mentioned.'

recruited among the demobilized soldiers, and can constitute, at the first sign, *real unities of reinforcement* of regular troops.

3. *Influx of demobilized men from the 'Baltikum'.*

Lastly, numerous demobilized men from the 'Baltikum', particularly from the Iron Division—and not natives of Upper Silesia, are reported in the country, where they increase every day the ranks of the agitators.

This situation calls for the attention of the Allied and Associated Governments.

The concentration of such important forces, the presence of such active elements of agitation, the exalted sentiments by which they are agitated, may be the cause, at any moment, of serious incidents.

In particular, it is to be feared that violence be exercised against the inhabitants during the evacuation pursuant to the going into force of the Treaty, that armed conflicts burst out with the Allied troops of occupation, and that the International Commission be thus, from the very beginning, placed before inextricable difficulties.

In consequence, I deem it advisable to take this situation into account, as it involves the responsibility of Germany, and to invite the German Government to reduce without delay the force of their regular troops in Upper Silesia, as far as is consistent with the maintenance of interior order.

If you share this point of view, the Ambassador, Secretary General of the Peace Conference, might be directed to make to M. von Lersner, Chief of the German Delegation, a communication on this subject, based on the annexed Note.

## Document 2

### *Note concerning the Situation in Upper Silesia*

The Allied and Associated Powers carefully observed the continual reinforcement of the regular forces of the so-called 'police forces' in Upper Silesia.

The importance of those forces is justified neither by the needs of the military situation nor by the maintenance of order.

Such a situation is inconsistent with the desire expressed by the German Government to loyally execute the clauses of the Treaty of Peace.

On the other hand, the difficulties which occurred in Courland give reasons to fear that the German Government will be again powerless to control the events in Upper Silesia, after having permitted the elements of disorder to accumulate there.

Consequently, the Allied and Associated Governments take note of the situation created in Upper Silesia, and wish to make clear to the German Government the responsibilities which are incumbent upon it, on that account.

They deem that the following measures should be taken without delay in order to remedy this situation:

1. Reduce the strength of the regular troops and police forces, at present in Upper Silesia, within the strict limit consistent with the maintenance of order and the safeguard of public and private property.

2. Eliminate from the regular troops and police forces all the elements having been part of the 'Baltikum' forces in 1919.

3. Include, within the troops to be evacuated from Upper Silesia before the going into force of the Treaty, the Marine Brigade, the attitude of which is contrary to the pacification of the country.

4. Take all necessary measures to put a stop to the appeals to resistance addressed to the troops of occupation by certain parties.

5. Oppose the influx, in Upper Silesia, of the demobilized men not native[s] of this country.

The above various measures should be carried out as soon as possible, so that they may become fully effective *as soon as the Peace Treaty is put into force.*

#### APPENDIX K TO No. 49

*Note from the French Delegation on the situation in the Comitats of Western Hungary*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN, NO. 64.

*December 30, 1919.*

. . . According<sup>18</sup> to information received from the French representative at Vienna, and despite the fact that the Allied Generals at Budapest were notified of the resolution of the Supreme Council, the Mission whose formation was decided upon has never been constituted, and the Magyar authorities have continued to exercise uncontrolled authority in the Comitats attributed to Austria by the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

A continuation of this situation may entail serious drawbacks, as it favours the spreading of false news in the Hungarian Press tending to pretend that the Entente has not made a final decision in the matter. This situation also encourages the development of a propaganda in Hungary in favour of maintaining these Comitats under Magyar sovereignty, and it has been announced in Budapest that a 'League of Western Hungary' to organize this propaganda has been formed. There are even reasons to indicate that the Hungarian Delegation may attempt to present a proposal to the Peace Conference asking for a revision of the Saint-Germain Treaty. If, on the contrary, the Interallied Military Mission were sent to the territories in question it would show that the Allied and Associated Powers do not intend to have the provisions of a Treaty, signed scarcely three months, brought up again for discussion.

Under these circumstances, it would be desirable to invite the Allied Generals at Budapest to immediately send the Military Mission, decided upon on October 2, to the Comitats attributed to Austria.

#### APPENDIX L TO No. 49

##### Document 1

PARIS, *Dec. 26, 1919.*

From: The Secretary General of the Economic Commission.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

The Czecho-Slovakian Delegation has sent directly to the President of the Economic Commission, the two proposals, copies of which are hereto annexed.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The first paragraph of this note recapitulated the decision taken in this matter by the Supreme Council on October 2, 1919: see Vol. I, No. 69, minute 8.

<sup>19</sup> The first of these proposals is printed as document 2 in this appendix; the second, described below, is not printed.

On account of the technical difficulties raised by those two proposals, the Commission was of the opinion that the first, concerning the exportation of Czecho-Slovakian coal to Austria, should be submitted to the Commission dealing with this supply.

The second suggests that, 'in the Treaty of Peace with Hungary, the same advantages should be recognized to Czecho-Slovakia as to the other Allied and Associated Powers, participating in the reparations, as far as concerns the proceeds of the liquidations of enemy properties in the new States'. For this purpose, the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation proposes the suppression, in the Treaty with Hungary, of Article 267 of the Treaty of St. Germain, and the corresponding modification of Article 249. The Economic Commission is of the opinion that the attention of the Czecho-Slovakian Delegation should be called to the fact that, even if the modifications requested were granted, Czecho-Slovakia would not be, for this reason, entitled to utilize the proceeds of the liquidation, for the settlement of its reparations, as these proceeds can only be charged with indemnities pertaining to Czecho-Slovakian property and credits in Hungary.

*The Secretary Gen'l of the Economic Commission to the Peace Conference:*

D. SERRUYS.

## Document 2

### PART X. SECTION I, COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

#### Chapter I. *Regulation[s], Taxes, and Customs Restrictions*

##### *Consideration*

Article 224 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain pledges Czecho-Slovakia and Poland to maintain, during a certain period, a favourable duty regime for the exportation of coal to Austria, and even, until such times as a permanent settlement is reached, to take positive measures with a view to the provisioning of Austria with coal.

As it appears that the Treaty with Hungary is to be, in general, drawn up according to the same principles as were applied in the drafting of the Saint-Germain Treaty, it seems probable that the Supreme Council will insert an analogous article in the Peace Conditions with Hungary.

Now, the Czecho-Slovak Delegation wishes to call the following facts, pertaining to this question, to the attention of the Peace Conference:

The coal consumption throughout all Hungary, before the war, amounted to about 15 million tons per year. The Hungarian mines furnished 10,200,000 tons towards this consumption; 2,800[? 000] tons were imported from Germany, especially from Upper Silesia, and about 1,500,000 was received from the Ostrau-Karvin Basin. A considerable proportion, at least 3,500,000 tons, of the total consumption, was destined for the needs of the former Hungarian territories, which now form part of the Czecho-Slovak Republic. More than 50% of the coal imported from Germany, and 75% of the importations from the Ostrau-Karvin Basin remained in Slovakia. The lignite required by this region was received at the rate of about 480,000 tons from Salgo-Tarjan, and 300,000 tons from Handlova.

Under the present circumstances there only remains the Handlova mines in the territory of the Czecho-Slovak Republic, as the Salgo-Tarjan mines are included in the Hungarian territory. Now, these latter mines furnished about 480,000 tons of lignite per year to Slovakia, while the Ostrau-Karvin Basin exported only about 200,000 tons of coal out of Czecho-Slovakia as it is now bounded. By considering

the difference in the caloric value of these two kinds of coal it is shown that, judging by the pre-war figures, the territories of former Hungary located outside of Czecho-Slovakia were at a considerable advantage in comparison with the latter. This exposé shows clearly that Czecho-Slovakia should not be expected to furnish the coal provision for Hungary.

For these reasons the Czecho-Slovak Delegation takes the liberty of presenting the following

*Proposal:*

In the event that the insertion of an Article in the Peace Treaty with Hungary analogous with Article 224 in the Treaty of Saint-Germain would be provided for, the Czecho-Slovak Republic should not be included in the States that are to adopt measures with a view to facilitating the provisioning of Hungary with coal.

**No. 50**

H. D. 121.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room at the Quai d'Orsay, Saturday, January 3, 1920, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.

Great Britain: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. Norman.

France: M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: Great Britain: Capt. Lothian Small. France: M. Massigli. Italy: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

Great Britain: Cdt. [sic] Macnamara, R.N., Mr. Malkin.

France: General Weygand, General Le Rond, Admiral Le Vasseur, Colonel Requin, M. Hermitte, M. Kammerer, M. Alphand, M. de Montille, M. Fromageot.

Italy: C. Amiral Grassi, M. Stranieri, Cdt. Gabetti, M. Pilotti.

1. The Council had before it a Note dated January 1, 1920, from the Chairman of the German Delegation to the Secretary General of the Peace Conference (Appendix A).

*Negotiations with the German Delegation concerning the Protocol*

VICE-ADMIRAL LE VASSEUR wished to draw the Council's attention to one passage of the letter from Baron von Lersner. The Chairman of the German Delegation said that 'the Allies, as M. Loucheur had recalled, must have reckoned on the existence in Germany of more than 700,000 tons of floating docks when drawing up their list'. This was a gratuitous suggestion on the part of Baron von Lersner. In the Allied negotiations with the Germans, no inclusive figure had ever been mentioned: the Germans had therefore no reason for saying that one had been fixed. When the naval experts decided to claim 400,000 tons of material of all kinds to be handed over by Germany as reparation for the Scapa Flow

incident, the information at their disposal as to the material existing in German ports gave the approximate figure of 620,000 tons, and their claim was based on this figure. The difference between their calculation and those of the Germans was therefore due to the difference between 620,000 and 520,000 and not between 700,000 and 520,000. He repeated that no maximum figure was ever given during negotiations.

M. CAMBON agreed that the Allies must therefore maintain their figures. Baron von Lersner was ill: in order that blame for the delays in bringing the Treaty into force, for which the Germans were really to blame, might not be imputed to the Allies, M. Dutasta was prepared to go and visit him with M. Loucheur and would inform him that the Allies maintained their figures. It was important that the ensuing conversation should be carefully noted.

M. DUTASTA suggested leaving a memorandum with Baron von Lersner.

VICE-ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR said Commander Macnamara had drafted a note which might serve as a basis for drafting the memorandum. Its essential points were as follows:

1. Baron von Lersner's letter was inexact as far as floating dock tonnage was concerned.

2. No figure from the inventories prepared by the Allied naval experts was communicated to the Germans during the conversations between them and the Allied naval experts.

3. The chief subjects of discussion had been the 80,000-ton dock at Hamburg and the two 50,000-ton docks reported at Danzig; these were, indeed, the two most remarkable cases of disagreement between the inventories supplied by the Allied experts and the German documents; but it was never said that the Allies adopted as their own other information communicated by the German delegates. Finally, the figure of 700,000 tons mentioned by M. Loucheur was given only by way of example and for comparison with the figure of 600,000 tons which also the Germans had given by way of example: neither figure was exact.

M. CAMBON thought that a document to this effect should be read to Baron von Lersner who would be asked to take note of it.

It was decided:

that in reply to the letter of January 1, 1920, from the Chairman of the German Delegation, the Secretary General of the Peace Conference should inform Baron von Lersner (who would be requested to take note of the fact) that, the Allies had never based their calculations upon the existence in Germany of 700,000 tons of floating docks, and that they maintained the figure of 624,000 tons.

2. The Council had before it a note dated January 2, 1920, (Appendix B).

*Negotiations with the German Delegation concerning the putting into force of the Treaty*

GENERAL LE ROND reported that during recent conversations the attitude of the German delegates had obviously changed: they seemed to have understood that the Allies did not intend to make extravagant claims, but that, on the contrary, they keenly desired to disturb as little as possible

the life of those regions that were going to pass temporarily under their control. Nevertheless, the situation had hardly changed: the German Delegates had not full powers; they had to refer constantly to Berlin and could only express personal opinions. Fresh experts had been summoned to settle questions concerning the Allenstein and Marienwerder territories, and to deal with questions of a military nature arising out of the relief of German troops by Allied contingents. M. von Simson had also pointed out that a series of problems remained to be settled concerning Memel and Danzig as well as the working of boundary commissions, and that it was also necessary to conclude the German-Polish negotiations begun in Berlin; finally, he had drawn the attention of the Allies to the Slesvig questions. M. von Simson had also asked what procedure the Allies had in mind for the several Commissions taking over their functions—he meant the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, the Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions, and the Reparation Commission; did they intend merely to notify Germany that the authority of these Commissions had come into force or to negotiate with her on the matter? He must say that the German delegates seemed merely to expect notification on the part of the Allies.

With regard to the organization of boundary commissions, he thought it would be sufficient to give M. von Simson the text of the instructions and note already approved by the Supreme Council.<sup>1</sup> With the Council's permission he would do this. The Chairman of the German Delegation had also asked him whether the Allies intended to summon the German members of these Commissions to Paris. That was a question which had still to be decided. As far as the settlement of Slesvig questions was concerned, there was a Commission on the spot to take all the necessary steps. M. von Simson was, however, not aware whether the German representatives had ratified the agreement prepared by it. In this connection he would point out to the Council that the Danish Minister had been very much disturbed by the news published in the press that the cost of upkeep of troops of occupation in plebiscite zones would be charged to the States to whom the territory was attributed. He pointed out that, as far as Slesvig was concerned, the Treaty expressly provided for the division of these expenses between Germany and Denmark. Obviously, a decision of the Supreme Council could not be carried out in contradiction of an article of the Treaty, and, moreover, the decision in question referred only to the plebiscite territories of eastern Germany.

With regard to Memel, M. von Simson pointed out that Germany would be justified in withdrawing her officials. This was true and might certainly cause an awkward state of affairs. He therefore thought it would be well to conclude an arrangement prepared on the Allied side by a special commission working on the following bases: (a) temporary retention of office by German officials with all their existing guarantees; (b) retention of the existing and creation of a higher jurisdiction; (c) retention of German legislation; (d) delivery to the Allies of property belonging to the Reich or to Prussia; (e) provisional retention of the economic and financial *status quo*.

<sup>1</sup> See Vol. I, No. 74, note 6.

Similarly, it would be well to make arrangements concerning German officials and services in Danzig.

M. von Simson did not object in principle to the provisions making the German Government responsible for the upkeep of offices responsible for disbursement of public monies in plebiscite territories. The German delegates even seemed ready to advance the necessary funds for the troops of occupation.

He would be grateful if the Council would kindly give him instructions on the points still in dispute. He recalled the fact that, as far as Upper Silesia and the Allenstein and Marienwerder territories were concerned, negotiations were proceeding (replies from Berlin were awaited) and that the German-Polish negotiations were beginning that very day.

MR. WALLACE asked whether the questions enumerated by General Le Rond must be settled before the signature of the Protocol.

GENERAL LE ROND replied that they must be settled but that could be done in a very few days.

M. CAMBON asked General Le Rond to be good enough to enumerate each of the questions still remaining to be settled: so that the Council might come to decisions upon them one by one.

GENERAL LE ROND said the first question was as follows: ought they merely to notify the German Government of the assumption of office of the Inter-allied Rhineland High Commission, the Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions and the Reparation Commission, or should they enter into negotiations on the subject?

GENERAL WEYGAND reminded the Council that this point had already been settled. Germany had already been informed that the Control Commissions would act officially from the coming into force of the Treaty and that from that time the delegations which those Commissions already had in Berlin would have power to act on behalf of the Commissions.

M. CAMBON stated that in the opinion of the Council there was no need to enter into negotiations with the Germans concerning the assumption of office by the Commissions just enumerated; notification would be sufficient.

GENERAL LE ROND said that the second point was the transfer of sovereignty in Memel; should a special commission prepare a separate arrangement on this subject?

M. CAMBON thought that the commission might at the same time prepare an arrangement for Danzig. He asked whether a special commission must be constituted.

M. SCIALOJA proposed that the task should be entrusted to the Commission on Polish Affairs.

GENERAL LE ROND agreed on condition that the Commission might co-opt any experts whose opinion it considered necessary.

M. CAMBON accepted this solution on behalf of the Council.

As for arrangements which the Slesvig Commission might have made with the German authorities, there was nothing for them to decide; it was merely a matter of asking Copenhagen for information.

GENERAL LE ROND, referring to the organization of boundary commissions, believed he was right in thinking that the Council had no objection to his transmitting a copy of the instructions approved on October 15<sup>1</sup> to M. von Simson; but ought they to summon the German members of those commissions to Paris?

SIR EYRE CROWE asked what was the object of holding the meeting in Paris. To him the question seemed essentially a technical one.

GENERAL LE ROND replied that it was a question of coming to an understanding as to working methods. It was for this reason and because the same methods must be universally applied that they had not granted the claim made by the Belgian Government that the members of the German-Belgian Boundary Commission should meet at Brussels.

M. SCIALOJA was of opinion that the German representatives should be summoned.

SIR EYRE CROWE agreed that this would be better.

GENERAL LE ROND suggested alternative solutions; either the Allies should come to an agreement and when this was done, appoint a meeting place with the Germans, or they should summon the Germans to Paris.

M. CAMBON offered a third solution: the Allies could come to an agreement at Paris and, once that was done, summon the Germans. It was most essential that they should be in agreement before the Germans took part in their discussions.

(The Council accepted this proposal.)

GENERAL LE ROND said there remained the Saar question; Colonel Requin would lay it before the Council.

COLONEL REQUIN recalled the fact that, in a letter dated December 28, Baron von Lersner had raised the question of the regime to be applied during the transition period preceding the formation of the Government Commission for the Saar. The German delegation thus admitted that there would be a transition period; but it was of opinion that the armistice regime could not be retained during that period. On this point they were in perfect agreement with the Germans. The French Government and Marshal Foch had never spoken of an armistice regime properly so called; but they considered that the present regime though possibly relaxed to some extent must be retained. It would, indeed, be impossible to restore the government of the Saar territory to the Germans, since, as soon as the Treaty came into force, the French administration would take possession of the mines under the terms of the Treaty itself. Control by the military authority in occupation was therefore essential. It was nevertheless clear that the present regime could be relaxed to such extent as did not prejudice the safety of the troops and on condition that no undertaking was given calculated subsequently to impair the freedom of action of the governing Commission. Marshal Foch had already given instructions to that effect. It was none the less certain that questions of detail would have to be settled with the German authorities, since the bonds uniting the German Saar administration with the Trèves and Spire

authorities were severed with the coming into force of the Treaty. Baron von Lersner proposed that they should negotiate on the matter with the chief administrator of Coblenz. They thought it better to return to the first solution proposed by the Germans themselves, that the necessary powers for these negotiations should be given to a Saar official. At the beginning of occupation and indeed for several months, the French authorities, with the consent of the German authorities, had dealt with a Saar official entitled the *Verwaltungspräsident*. It had certainly been necessary to expel the official in question on account of the part he had played during the recent strikes, but there was nothing to prevent the retention of the same system. It would therefore be well to reply to Baron von Lersner explaining the Allied point of view on the question of principle and indicating that questions of detail would be settled with a Saar official properly accredited by the German authorities.

SIR EYRE CROWE had no objections to make to this proposal.

MR. WALLACE could make no statement without special instructions from his Government.

In this connection he wished to say that, in view of the present political situation in the United States, his Government was very anxious that the minutes should leave no doubt as to the attitude adopted by the American delegate. On December 20, a resolution was adopted on which he had made a formal reservation. Nevertheless, the Note provided for in that resolution and despatched, embodying [*sic*] in the text the formula 'the Principal Allied and Associated Powers'. He asked that that formula should not be used in any document to which the American Government had not given its explicit consent.

M. CAMBON said that the observations made by Mr. Wallace would be noted in the minutes.

COLONEL REQUIN said that they must therefore define three points in the reply: 1. retention in principle of control of local administration by the military authority; 2. relaxation of the military regime as far as possible; 3. settlement of questions of detail by negotiations between the French authorities and a Saar official accredited by the German Government.

GENERAL WEYGAND wished to point out, in connection with the observation made by Mr. Wallace, that there was no question of innovation: the Council had already decided while Mr. Polk was sitting on it that the existing regime should be retained in the Saar territory after the coming into force of the Treaty and until the constitution of the Government Commission:

It was decided:

1. that there was no need to enter into negotiations with the German Government concerning the entry into office of the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission, the Military, Naval and Air Control Commissions and the Reparation Commission; the entry into force of these Commissions would merely be notified.
2. that the Commission on Polish Affairs, which was authorized to co-opt any experts it might consider of use, should, as quickly as possible,

prepare draft arrangements with the German Government concerning the transfer of sovereignty in Memel and Danzig.

3. that General Le Rond should communicate to M. von Simson the text of the instructions and of the Note for the boundary commissions as approved by the Supreme Council, and that the German members of those Commissions should be summoned to Paris when agreement had been reached between the Allied representatives to those Commissions on all questions to be settled.
4. that, with regard to the regime of the Saar territory after the coming into force of the Treaty and before the nomination of the Government Commission, the Chairman of the German Delegation should be informed: (a) that the control of local administration by the military authority was in principle retained; (b) that the regime of military occupation would be relaxed as far as possible; (c) that questions of detail would be settled by negotiations between the French authorities and a Saar official properly accredited by the German Government.

Mr. Wallace would refer the last paragraph of the present resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

3. The Council had before it a note dated January 3, 1920, from the Prisoners of War Commission (Appendix C<sup>2</sup>).

*Powers of the  
Prisoners of War  
Commission*

M. ALPHAND read and commented upon the text of the note from the Commission.

MR. WALLACE said that as there had been no American delegate on the Commission, he must reserve his opinion.

After a short discussion it was decided:

1. That the Commission for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War established by Article 215 of the Treaty of Versailles should be authorized, on meeting the Germans, to settle with them various questions connected with repatriation, in particular those concerning the cost of repatriation, the search for missing men, the restoration of articles and valuables belonging to prisoners of war.
2. That those questions which were not inserted in the chapter on Reparations should be settled independently of the Commission.<sup>3</sup> The various delegations to the Prisoners of War Commission should nevertheless keep in touch and act in agreement with delegates for relevant matters on the Reparation Commission.

Mr. Wallace would refer the last paragraph of the present resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

4. SIR EYRE CROWE recalled the fact that at a previous meeting he had stated that Mr. Lloyd George's coming visit to Paris might be such as would alter the views of the British Government concerning the agenda for the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. At the present meeting he wished

*Convocation of the  
League of Nations*

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This note submitted the two proposals adopted by the Supreme Council.

<sup>3</sup> The text here is defective. In the proposal submitted by the Commission on Prisoners of War this phrase read 'independently of the action of the Reparations Commission'.

to inform the Supreme Council that this circumstance had in no way changed the opinion of his Government, which still thought that the nomination of the Saar Boundary Commission alone should appear in the agenda for the first meeting, the fixing of the agenda for the following meetings being left to the Council of the League.

M. BERTHELOT said that as nothing was changed in the previous decision of the Supreme Council, they had only still to decide the date of the convocation of the Council. Had Sir Eyre Crowe any information concerning the wish, said to have been expressed by Sir Eric Drummond, for the postponement of the first meeting for several days in order to give more solemnity to the occasion?

SIR EYRE CROWE knew nothing about this. In any case Sir Eric Drummond was not competent to express the views of the Government; he only represented the Secretariat.

M. MANTOUX added that, on account of the political election to be held in France from January 11 to 17, M. Léon Bourgeois<sup>+</sup> would also like the first meeting to be postponed.

M. BERTHELOT considered that there could obviously be no difficulty in holding the first meeting of the Council only several days after the coming into force of the Treaty.

M. SCIALOJA asked what day was arranged for the Treaty coming into force. He had been summoned for January 6.

M. BERTHELOT said that that was the date chosen at first, but the delay in the negotiations with the German delegates would necessitate postponing it for several days.

MR. WALLACE wished to inform the Council of the views of his Government on the matter. Mr. Wallace read the note which appears as Appendix D.

SIR EYRE CROWE considered that it was for them to find the most practical method. If he understood aright, the convocation would take place in two phases: the President of the United States would issue the official convocation when he knew the day and hour fixed for the meeting; but before that, it would be well to inform the Powers represented on the Council of the League unofficially that the meeting would take place at an early date to be definitely fixed later. It would be best for this unofficial notice to be sent to the Powers concerned by the President of the Conference or the Secretariat-General. An invitation would then be given by telegraph in a form chosen by President Wilson.

M. CAMBON promised to inform the Government of the United States as soon as the Council had decided on a date for the meeting.

It was decided:

that the Secretariat-General of the Conference should unofficially inform the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations that the first meeting of the Council would take place a few days after the coming

<sup>+</sup> M. Bourgeois was elected President of the French Senate on January 14, 1920, and was Chairman of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations on January 16, 1920.

into force of the Treaty, and should indicate in his [*sic*] communication that the official convocation would be sent to those Powers by the President of the United States.

5. The Council had before it a telegram dated December 29, 1919, from General Franchet d'Esperey (Appendix E).

*Evacuation of civilian  
population from districts  
abandoned by Denikin's  
Army*

M. KAMMERER read and commented upon the telegram from General Franchet d'Esperey.

SIR EYRE CROWE was not in a position to express an opinion on the question. He doubted whether the British Government would be prepared to authorize an Allied authority to take charge of the evacuation and to have the Allies themselves bear the costs of evacuation. He thought this a dangerous step to take.

M. KAMMERER suggested in that case giving powers of direction to the Allied agents on the spot. The Bolsheviks advanced on Odessa six months ago, and everybody was convinced that the occupation of the town would only be temporary: departure was therefore rendered easy. At present things were different and there was no advantage to be gained by encouraging emigration; it was nevertheless certain that thousands would [*?dis*]embark at Constantinople, and they could not be left to die of hunger.

M. CAMBON pointed out that the Western Powers had also very important material interests in those districts and the large quantities of military and naval material which risked falling into Bolshevik hands must also be taken into account.

M. KAMMERER thought that there was no need for special instructions on this point. General Denikin or the Allied military authorities would do what was necessary. Their concern was with individuals. It must be explained to General Denikin that there was no need to evacuate many people; but it was hard to be indifferent to the laws of humanity.

SIR EYRE CROWE recalled the fact that at the time of the evacuation of northern Russia, Russians were not allowed to embark for Europe.

M. KAMMERER agreed, but thought the situation in the present case somewhat different. They had had several months in which to prepare the evacuation; also, as events had proved, the northern districts were not really threatened by the Bolshevik armies. At Odessa they would have to anticipate vengeance on the part of the Bolsheviks; many people would flee, but the whole question was, what was to become of them.

SIR EYRE CROWE would have to consult his Government.

The rest of the discussion was adjourned.

6. A Report dated December 31, 1919, from the Central Territorial Committee was laid before the Council (Appendix F<sup>5</sup>).

*Occupation of the Buk  
District by Greek troops*

After a short discussion it was decided:

1. that Greece should be authorized immediately to occupy the Buk bridgehead allocated to her by Article 27 of the Treaty of Neuilly.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This brief report recommended the proposals adopted by the Supreme Council.

2. General Franchet d'Esperey would be informed of this decision and would take the necessary executive measures.

(Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.)

7.

*Requests for the opinion of  
the Drafting Committee on  
interpretation of the Treaty*

[Not printed]<sup>6</sup>

8. SIR EYRE CROWE recalled to the Council that Marshal Foch had suggested sending General Niessel to Esthonia on behalf of the Allied Powers to negotiate an arrangement between the Esthonian Government and General Yudenitch. He has [*sic*] asked the opinion of his Government on this suggestion. The British Government thought that the Niessel mission could hardly be of great utility. Yudenitch's army was gradually being absorbed by the Esthonian Army. That was a quite natural development in which it was better not to interfere. If the Allies approved of this progressive absorption there was no need to send a special mission. It would be enough if the Allied representatives at Reval informed the Esthonian Government that the Allied Powers were not opposed to its thus engaging in its service elements of Yudenitch's Army: non-commissioned ranks would be absorbed first of all, but the same thing might well happen in the case of the officers.

M. CAMBON said that Marshal Foch had informed the Council that he was recalling General Niessel to Paris to await fresh instructions from the Supreme Council. Under those circumstances and as the matter did not seem urgent, he proposed that it should be adjourned till Monday.<sup>7</sup>

The rest of the discussion was adjourned.

The meeting then adjourned.

<sup>6</sup> The Supreme Council considered a brief note from the Drafting Committee, dated January 2, 1920 (appendix G in original), reporting that the Czechoslovak delegation had asked it for 'information as to the interpretation of certain articles of the Treaty of Saint Germain', and inquiring whether it was authorized to give such interpretations. After a short discussion 'it was decided that without *ad hoc* permission from the Supreme Council the Drafting Committee was not authorized to give to delegations which might apply to it, interpretations of clauses of the Treaties'.

<sup>7</sup> January 5, 1920.

APPENDIX A TO No. 50

*Note of January 1, 1919[1920], from German Delegation to Supreme Council  
regarding delivery of Floating Docks on basis of 624,275 tons*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN NO. 77.

*January 3, 1920.*

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN DELEGATION.

PARIS, *January 1, 1920.*

No. A 1782.

From: Baron von Lersner.

To: The Secretary General of the Peace Conference.

Being, on account of a cold, confined to bed for three days, by order of the doctor, and unable to visit you personally, I should like to communicate immediately, to your Excellency, a written summary of the remarks of my Government, concerning the estimate of our tonnage of floating docks, indicated in the document which was remitted to me, on behalf of the President of the Peace Conference.

According to the data of our technical Commission, the estimate of the tonnage made by the Germans has been, in the meetings held with the Allies, examined in detail, discussed thoroughly and found in accordance with the Allied estimates. The Allies did not assert that we mentioned docks not carried in their statement; they merely indicated that a large floating dock of 80,000 tons at Hamburg and two floating docks of about 50,000 tons at Dantzig, were omitted in the German list. Consequently, the Allies, as M. Loucheur remembered, were obliged to base their estimate on the existence in Germany of more than 700,000 tons of floating docks.

The amount, 624,275 tons, of German floating docks has never been indicated to our technical Commission or to myself. We were obliged to count, therefore, that the Allies calculated our floating tonnage as being over 700,000 tons. If, therefore, as I have said several times to your Excellency and to M. Loucheur, during our last confidential conversations, our tonnage of floating docks really existing is in accordance with the German valuation, we should not have to deliver more than our last offer of 30,000 tons of tonnage to be built, but, on the contrary, notably less.

Please accept.

APPENDIX B TO No. 50

Document 1

*Negotiations with the German Delegation relative to the coming into force of the  
Treaty of Versailles*

*January 2, 1920.*

*Note to the Supreme Council*

In the course of the Conference of December 30th and 31st, 1919, and of January 1st, 1920 between General Le Rond, assisted by Messrs. Rennie and Pavia,

and the German Delegation, presided over by Mr. von Simson, the question relative to first duties of the Interallied Commissions in the plebiscite territories were taken up, except the questions which the German Delegation had not the necessary experts in Paris to examine.

At the conclusion of the Conference of January 1st, Mr. von Simson remarked that, in connection with the Eastern frontiers of Germany, the questions referred to in Paragraph 4 of the Note of the Supreme Council, dated November 1, 1919, which was addressed to the German Government, relative to the operations of the Delimitation Commissions, were still unsettled, as well as the conclusion of the negotiations between Poland and Germany which were opened in Berlin, and which, according to the Supreme Council, were to be concluded in Paris.

Mr. von Simson then asked what action would be taken relative to the questions enumerated in the following paragraphs of the note above referred to:

1. Assuming of duties by the Interallied High Commission on Rhenish territories.

2. Assuming of duties by the Military, Naval, and Aeronautic Delegations.

3. Assuming of duties by the Reparations Commission.

4. Transfer of Government in the Saar Basin.

Mr. von Simson remarked that, concerning the questions 1, 2 and 3, he did not believe it necessary to open a discussion, but insisted particularly upon the necessity of regulating certain problems presented in question 4.

Pursuant to these remarks the German Delegation addressed two notes, copies of which are hereto annexed, to General Le Rond on January 2.

## Document 2

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION.

PARIS, *January 2, 1920.*

From: von Simson.

To: General Le Rond.

The Note of the Allied and Associated Governments, under date of November 1, 1919, in enumerating the questions to be settled before the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, by the Representatives of the Allies, mentions the transfer of Government in the Saar Basin.

The German Delegation requests that a meeting be called in which this subject may be treated. During the meeting it would be desirable, in particular, to determine the manner in which the administration of the territory is to be conducted until such times as the Commission to be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations will be in a position to take over the Government.

At the same time the German Delegation would be grateful for information concerning the statutes relative to the rights of the officials and employees of the State coal exploitation in the Saar Basin, who will enter the service of the French State. The elaboration of the statutes was promised by the French Delegates at the time of the Saarbruck negotiations during the month of August. In the interest of the officials and employees concerned, who are in a justified state of unrest, it would appear particularly necessary to reach an agreement as soon as possible relative to the conditions under which they are to enter the service of the French State.

Accept, etc.

### Document 3

GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION.

PARIS, *January 2, 1920.*

From: von Simson.

To: General Le Rond.

The Note of the Allied and Associated Governments, under date of November 1, 1919, in enumerating the subjects to be settled by the Representatives of the German Government together with the Representatives of the Allies, mentions among other things the labours of the Delimitation Commissions which are to be assembled within a period of fifteen days after the entry into force of the Peace Treaty. This refers to the Commissions which are instructed to fix the German-Belgium frontier; the Saar Basin frontier; the German-Polish frontier; the frontier of the future free city of Dantzig, and that of the Czecho-Slovak State.

The German Delegation requests that a conference be arranged in order that the manner in which the labours of these Commissions is to be conducted may be settled. At the same time, the German Delegation would be grateful for a list of the names of the members of the Delimitation Commissions.

Accept, etc.

### APPENDIX D TO No. 50

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

*January 2, 1920.*

#### *Memorandum:*

The Government of the United States regrets that owing to the present political situation of America not to [sic] be able to send the preliminary notice as proposed in the resolution of November 10th.<sup>8</sup>

It might, however, be possible for the Department of State to verbally inform in Washington the diplomatic representatives of the Nations represented on the Council of the League of Nations.

In the event that this procedure were not considered advisable, it is proposed that M. Clemenceau, in his quality of President of the Peace Conference send notice to the Nations represented on the Council of the League that President Wilson will call the first meeting of the Council immediately after the going into effect of the Treaty by virtue of the deposit of ratifications by three of the Allied and Associated Powers and by Germany.

The Department of State would like to know if it is desired that the preliminary notice be given by the Department of State or by M. Clemenceau; and desires to know:

The hour, the date and the exact place where it is desired to have the meeting take place.

The President intends to send the convocation in the following sense:

'In compliance with article Five of the Covenant of the League of Nations which went into effect at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles of June 28th, 1919, of which it is a part, the President of the United States, acting on behalf of those nations which have deposited their instruments of ratification in Paris as certified

<sup>8</sup> See No. 18, minute 6.

in a procès-verbal to agreement of by [*sic*] the French Government dated (. . .) has the honour to inform the Government of . . . that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations will be held in Paris on (date).

'The President earnestly ventures the hope that the Government of . . . will be in a position to send a representative to this first meeting. He feels that it is unnecessary for him to point out the deep significance attached to this meeting or the importance which it must assume in the eyes of the world.

'It will mark the beginning of a new era in international cooperation and the first step toward the ideal concert of nations. It will bring the League of Nations into being as a living force devoted to the task of assisting the peoples of all countries in their desire for peace, prosperity and happiness. The President is convinced that its progress will accord with the noble purposes to which it is dedicated.'

If this draft meets with the approval of the Supreme Council, the hour, date and the place of meeting should be added at the end of the first paragraph.

#### APPENDIX E TO No. 50

##### *Telegram from General Franchet d'Esperey of December 29 regarding situation on Denikin's Army Front*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN NO. 76.

January 3, 1920.

FRENCH DELEGATION.

CONSTANTINOPLE, December 29, 1919.

The present situation on the Denikin Army front<sup>9</sup> indicates that an important percentage of the civil population will attempt to escape from the Bolsheviks by sea.

On account of the disorder and the lack of resources at the disposal of the Russian authorities the care of these refugees will devolve upon the Allies, as they cannot allow them to die of hunger.

It is impossible to receive them at Constantinople, as the city is overpopulated now and the cost of living is very dear, without incurring the risk of famine and epidemic. I will investigate locally to what extent the Serbians and Bulgarians can come to our assistance.

I have already taken the matter up with the High Commissioners of the Allies and the British Command, but I am of the opinion that the question cannot be satisfactorily regulated unless the Supreme Council agrees:

1. to appoint a supreme Allied authority to ensure the conduct of the affair, as a centralization of authority is necessary in order to avoid the hesitations and difficulties which occurred last spring.

2. to fix the share each Power must contribute towards the expenses. In my opinion, all the Great Powers and Greece should participate in the expenses.

I would be grateful to have this question examined at once by the Supreme Council.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. No. 57, appendices D and E.

H.D. 122.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, January 5, 1920, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.  
*Great Britain*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. Norman.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: *Great Britain*: Capt. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*Great Britain*: Cmdr. Lucas, R.N., Cmdr. Macnamara, R.N., Lt. Col. Kisch, Mr. Malkin, Mr. Herman, Mr. Millington Drake.  
*France*: M. Cambon, M. Loucheur, M. Leygues, Gen. Weygand, Gen. Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Seydoux, Adl. Le Vavasseur, M. Kammerer, M. Fromageot, M. Hermitte, M. Arnavon, M. de Montille, Capt. Roper.  
*Italy*: Gen. Cavallero, Vice-Adl. Grassi, M. Pilotti.  
*Japan*: M. Nagaoka.

1. M. LOUCHEUR stated that at the preceding meeting of the Council he had explained the state of the negotiations with the German Delegation concerning the tonnage claimed by the Allies. The German Delegation had sent a telegram to Berlin explaining that the 180,000 tons of docks which had been over-estimated by the Allies would be deducted from the figure of 400,000 tons originally claimed. That telegram did not take into account the error on the other side committed by the Allies, who had not reckoned the 80,000 tons, whose existence had been revealed by the German inventory. The point of view adopted in that telegram could not evidently be accepted by the Allies. Had it been admitted the 400,000 tons claimed would have been reduced to only 220,000. M. Dutasta and himself had explained to M. von Lersner that they could not accept the point of view of the German Delegation. M. von Lersner had then proposed as a compromise a draft which implied that the reduction agreed to by the Allies could not exceed 150,000 tons. The total amount to be surrendered by the Germans would thus have been 250,000 tons. They had then said to M. von Lersner that that figure seemed to them too small for the Council to accept it. After a rather long discussion, M. von Lersner had proposed the following draft:

'From the 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges claimed by the Allies, there will therefore be deducted such ton-

nage of floating docks as, after verification, shall be found to appear in the Interallied inventory by mistake—tonnage which therefore does not in reality exist. That reduction, however, will not exceed a total of 125,000 tons.'

They had reserved their reply; but upon thinking it over they proposed that the Council accept that text, which constituted a very acceptable basis of compromise.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that if he understood aright that text would guarantee to the Allies a minimum of 275,000 tons with the possibility of obtaining more.

M. LOUCHEUR agreed that that was so in principle; but they should not conceal the fact that it was very unlikely that they would obtain a larger figure.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether it were necessary to arrive at a definite decision on that very day, or whether he might consult his Government on the proposed figure.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that naturally if Sir Eyre Crowe expressed the desire to consult his Government, they could not take an immediate decision; the question, however, was urgent, and it was advisable to have it finally decided.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked whether the French Government accepted the text proposed by M. Loucheur.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it did.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that in that case he also would accept it.

M. LOUCHEUR stated that it would be wise to add in the last paragraph of the draft letter to the German Delegation, after the words—'The 192,000 tons proposed by the German Government'—the following phrase: 'And of which the list was submitted when the technical commissions discussed the subject.'

It was a pure question of form but that addition would be useful to obviate all chance of misunderstanding.

It was decided:

to approve the draft letter to the Chairman of the German Delegation contained in Appendix A, with the following addition: 'and of which the list was submitted when the technical commissions discussed the subject.' That sentence should be placed in the first sentence of the last paragraph of the draft letter, after the words: 'The Allied and Associated Powers add that the 192,000 tons proposed by the German Government . . .'

(Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.)

GENERAL LE ROND said that the Commission over which he presided had had two interviews with the German Delegates since the last meeting of the Council. Questions which it was absolutely important to solve before the coming into force of the Treaty were those concerning, on the one hand the transmission of administrative powers, and on the other, economic affairs.

On the first point agreement had practically been reached, but certain economic questions had been referred back to the Reparation Commission.

With regard to the situation of the plebiscite territories, their point of view had been given to the German Delegates in all its details four days before. The Germans had referred the question to Berlin. It was hoped that the reply of the German Government would arrive either on that or the following day.

Concerning the evacuation by German troops of the territories subject to plebiscite, the Germans had not been able to furnish any precise information. They had endeavoured to draw the negotiations to Berlin, but on account of the Allies' definite refusal they had declared that they would send for experts and the arrival of these was imminent. On questions which affected Poland, they had asked the advice of the Reparations Commission, and they hoped that the latter would communicate to them its opinion in as short a time as possible. As a matter of fact, it was only a question of finding out whether the Reparations Commission accepted the texts which they had proposed.

With regard to Memel and Dantzig, the Supreme Council had decided at its last meeting that the Commission on Polish Affairs would be charged with preparing the draft agreement with the German Government concerning the transfer of sovereignty over those territories.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was important that the Commission on Polish Affairs submit to the Council a draft at its next meeting.

GENERAL LE ROND remarked that besides the questions which he had just enumerated there remained to be settled the one relating to transportation and that of the strength of the troops of occupation, which had been raised by a recent letter of M. von Lersner. (Appendix D.)<sup>1</sup>

GENERAL WEYGAND said that there was no longer any difficulty on the question of transportation, properly speaking. M. von Lersner's letter, however, to which General Le Rond had just referred, might possibly reopen the whole question as it asked that the strength of the troops of occupation in the various plebiscite zones should be reduced.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he did not believe that M. von Lersner's letter really reopened the whole negotiation. The Chairman of the German Delegation was merely calling the attention of the Conference to the considerable expenses involved in occupying the Plebiscite Areas by the numbers of forces proposed. For Dantzig alone, the costs would amount to 80 million of gold marks, or nearly 800,000,000 of paper marks at the existing rate of exchange.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that that was certainly an important point, and suggested that it should be referred to a commission composed of the Chairmen of the Plebiscite Commissions.

SIR EYRE CROWE inquired whether M. Clemenceau thought that a commission of that kind could give the Council useful advice.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the question of the forces in the areas of occupation had already been examined by a mixed commission composed of diplomats and army members. Should they wish to proceed with a fresh

<sup>1</sup> In error for appendix B, q.v.

inquiry into the question, it might be dealt with by the said commission, which had already been in operation, and consequently possessed the requisite working knowledge.

M. LOUCHEUR said that it was not to be wondered at that the Germans were a little taken aback by the amount of the sums demanded from them. Thus, for Dantzig, whose budget was four millions of marks per year, the cost of occupation as estimated was to be 800 millions of marks.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, with regard to Dantzig, they had only decided on the organization of a base. The cost of maintenance of those troops could only be set against the Germans in the event of their having to be employed in the maintenance of order in the territory.

M. LOUCHEUR remarked that the Germans were depending upon a figure of 8,000 men to be sent to Dantzig.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that they should take care not to reduce their forces too much. In Upper Silesia, for example, the Germans had massed considerable forces and difficulties might be expected. It would be unwise not to have sufficient Allied forces on the spot.

GENERAL LE ROND said that the question of Upper Silesia presented itself in a very special light. But there was no reason to prevent their maintaining the forces agreed upon for Upper Silesia, while they might make reductions in the quieter regions, such as those of Allenstein and Marienwerder.

M. LOUCHEUR said that it was evident that the Germans themselves understood the difficulties which might take place in Upper Silesia. And for that reason, they only asked in that province for a reduction of one-third on the estimated Allied forces.

M. DE MARTINO stated that they had always been in favour of as great a reduction as possible of the Allied forces in the territories to be occupied. It was only because of the reiterated demand of the Allies that they had consented to sending the number of battalions which had been asked of them and which on account of their demobilization made it very difficult for them to furnish.

It was decided:

that the Commission which had decided the strength of the troops of occupation to be sent to the plebiscite zones in Germany, as well as to Dantzig and Memel, should be entrusted with the further inquiry into that question, as also the objections contained in M. von Lersner's letter dated January 2, 1920 (see Appendix B); this commission would be entitled to hear the Chairmen of the various Plebiscite Commissions.

2. M. LOUCHEUR commented upon a note of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission on that question, dated December 29, 1919. (See Appendix C.)

*Conditions for a loan to  
the Austrian Govern-  
ment*

He added that, besides its being purely a matter of form, he wished very earnestly to draw the attention of the Council to the situation in Austria which remained extremely threatening. No serious steps had yet been taken to protect Austria from famine with

the exception of the sending of the 20,000 tons of food-stuffs now at Trieste. The victualling of Austria was only assured until the end of January. The Czecho-Slovaks had stated that they were unable to furnish the coal they had promised, as they lacked the rolling stock necessary for its transport. The situation could only be alleviated by the granting of a loan to Austria at the earliest possible moment. In this respect, however, it was impossible for the Allies to take any action until America had declared her intentions.

MR. WALLACE said that before taking any action the United States Government required a decision of Congress, which had not yet been obtained.

SIR EYRE CROWE remarked that if nothing were done a famine would occur in Austria by the end of the present month. Could not Mr. Wallace bring influence to bear on his Government, in order that the gravity of the situation in Austria might be emphasized to Congress, and that the latter be asked to reach a quick decision in the matter?

M. DE MARTINO inquired what time would be required for sending to Austria the actually indispensable food-stuffs, and would they arrive in time to save Austria from famine?

M. LOUCHEUR replied that as soon as they knew exactly where they stood, they could act rapidly. If need be, they would divert certain cargoes which would proceed to Trieste and the redistribution from there could be effected without much delay.

SIR EYRE CROWE asked how far they had got with the question of the creation of a commission for the temporary distribution of rolling stock between the various states resulting from the breaking-up of the ex-Austro-Hungarian Kingdom.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that the decisions of the Council on the subject were being dealt with.

With regard to the loan of 30,000 [?30] million of florins which a Dutch group was to make to Austria,<sup>2</sup> the terms put up to the Austrian Government seemed very hard and there was the risk of a deadlock. The Austrian Minister of Finance was to arrive in Paris very shortly to discuss that question. In order to save time they intended to have him assisted by two members of the Reparations Commission. But in any case, this deal could not be concluded for a certain time and he wished to clearly state that it seemed impossible to him to stave off famine from Austria if the United States Government did not furnish a definite reply by the following week at the latest.

MR. WALLACE said that he would submit to his Government the situation described by M. Loucheur.

M. CLEMENCEAU inquired what the situation would be, should the America's [*sic*] reply be in the negative.

M. LOUCHEUR replied that nothing could then prevent starvation in Austria. Even if they decided to make the necessary financial sacrifices without America, their efforts would be unsuccessful, for the reason that it would be impossible for them to get dollars, which America alone had.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 40, minute 5.

3. M. KAMMERER commented upon two notes of the French Delegation on the question, dated December 31, 1919 and January 6 [?4], 1920. (See Appendices D and E.)

*Assistance demanded by General Denikin*  
SIR EYRE CROWE said that he thought the question presented itself from a military standpoint. Before attending to Denikin's demands they should decide whether the measures which he required of the Allies were not utterly useless. That was a question upon which their military experts should be called upon to give their opinion.

M. KAMMERER said that General Denikin was of the opinion that the Allies had three ways of helping him: (1) Bring pressure to bear upon Poland and Roumania to force them to give adequate help to the Russian Army fighting against the Bolsheviks. That question was essentially one of a political nature. (2) Authorize the Bulgarians to send detachments to the assistance of Denikin's forces. The question at issue was really whether appeal could be made to an enemy power with whom peace had not yet been ratified. It should be noted as a matter of fact, that the enrolment of Bulgarian troops in the Russian armies was expressly forbidden by Article 103 of the Treaty of Neuilly. (3) Lastly, any armament in Bulgaria in excess of that allowed for under the Peace Treaty might be sent to Denikin. That third question was of a military nature.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he believed that the military considerations should be the foundation of the decision to be taken, and that it was therefore necessary to consult their military experts. Why, for example, apply pressure on the Poles in order to ask them to help Denikin, if their assistance were not to change anything in the unfavourable situation in which that general found himself? He was personally inclined to think that Denikin's troops would continue to retreat whether the Poles intervened or whether they remained at a standstill. In any event, they could not give a decision without knowing what their experts thought.

M. DE MARTINO said that he believed with Sir Eyre Crowe that if their aid were not sufficient to remedy the unfavourable situation of Denikin's army, it would hardly be worth while to force the Poles into an enterprise which would surely be useless and which involved certain dangers for Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that it seemed to him that the opinion of the Council was against any pressure being applied on the Poles to make them intervene in Denikin's favour. That was also his feeling. As for using Bulgarian troops, he would be very much opposed to that course, for it would cause considerable difficulties in the Balkans.

SIR EYRE CROWE stated that, with regard to the first question, he could not express any opinion without referring to his Government. As for the use of Bulgarian troops, he was absolutely in accord with the President's way of thinking.

M. KAMMERER said that it would, in principle, be quite desirable to send the surplus material to Denikin. The continued retreat of Denikin might, however, result in the loss of that material by allowing it to fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks. It would, therefore, be wise to send it only to places from

which it could be rapidly evacuated, in case of need. That was a question for the military experts and for General Franchet d'Esperey, who was on the spot, to examine.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that they might refer the question either to Marshal Foch or directly to General Franchet d'Esperey.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that, as the situation in Southern Russia was changing from day to day, it would be wiser to leave the matter to the judgment of the Allied military representatives on the spot.

It was decided:

to let General Franchet d'Esperey decide upon the wisdom of sending the Bulgarian war material in excess of the amount provided for in the Treaty of Neuilly to General Denikin's troops, as well as on the means to be used for ensuring the forwarding, if need be, of that material.

(Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.)

4. The Council had before it a note of the British Delegation on the question, dated January 4, 1920. (See Appendix F.)

*Representations to be made by the Allies to the Esthonian Government concerning the relations between that Government and Yudenitch's Army*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that as he had explained at the preceding meeting, the British Government deemed it useless to send General Niessel to Reval in order to re-organize the Russian Army of the Northwest, which had been thrown back on to Esthonian territory. He thought that the best course to follow would be to allow the

Esthonian Government to take the measures it deemed necessary with regard to General Yudenitch's troops. His Government, therefore, proposed that the Esthonian Government be informed that the Allied and Associated Governments had no further objection to its proceeding with the dissolution of the Russian forces of the Northwest in accordance with its original plan.

M. BERTHELOT said that the idea of sending General Niessel to Reval to re-organize Yudenitch's army had been abandoned, and he agreed with Sir Eyre Crowe in thinking that General Niessel's mission would be inopportune. He did not, however, think it possible to accept the British proposal, for the present situation was as follows: the Esthonians had badly used and completely disorganized the Russian forces which had taken refuge on their territory. They had, on the other hand, signed an armistice with the Bolsheviks and seemed disposed to negotiate a definite treaty with them, which would be absolutely contrary to the Allies' views. They had, furthermore, quarrelled with the Letts on the subject of some contested territory, and were threatening military occupation. As a result we had no reason to be satisfied with the present attitude of the Esthonians. The Allies had asked the Esthonian Government to spare Yudenitch's forces; the Esthonians had not taken any account whatever of that admonition of the Allies. They might, of course, leave the situation as it was, but it seemed to him that they would be going too far if they expressly withdrew the observations they had made. It would seem to encourage the Esthonians at a time when they were

atisfied with their attitude. If the Esthonians concluded peace with the  
ts it was to be feared that the whole cordon of Baltic States, perhaps  
Poland, would soon follow their example, and that would constitute a  
real danger.

1 EYRE CROWE said that he did not wish to hide the fact that serious  
nents could be brought forth in favour of a policy of inaction. The  
ion did not, however, seem to him to be quite as just described by  
erthelot. They had asked the Esthonians to suspend the disarmament  
e Russian troops while waiting for a decision of the Council. They  
d therefore let them know what course the Council had decided to  
v. He had accused the Esthonians of having concluded an armistice  
the Bolsheviks; they should, however, not forget that when the Estho-  
had asked them for assistance against the Soviets, they had refused to  
rene. It might very well be that the Esthonians had been so closely  
ed by the Bolshevik forces that no other course was open to them. It  
ared that the maintenance of a Russian army under arms on Esthonian  
ory was contrary to certain clauses of the armistice which had just been  
uded and that measures were to be taken to effect the withdrawal of the  
an troops after disarmament.

KAMMERER said that from the latest news they had received from  
nia, the situation of Yudenitch's forces appeared to be desperate. They  
rised approximately 15,000 sick men, and the 3 or 4 thousand remaining  
en did not offer any military value. It was rumoured that these weak  
ngents would be transferred south. But that news had not been con-  
d.

BERTHELOT stated that they had not merely requested the Esthonians  
o disarm Yudenitch's army; they had also informed them that they were  
sed to any armistice with the Bolsheviks. That armistice was all the  
regrettable as the Esthonians did not seem to have been forced in any  
to conclude it.

1 EYRE CROWE said that they did not know anything about that. A  
ram received from Esthonia and which seemed more recent than the  
mation given by M. Kammerer, indicated that the withdrawal of the  
ian troops was under way, under the conditions of the preliminary dis-  
ment which was required by the armistice concluded between Esthonia  
he Soviets.

1 BERTHELOT said that they were ignorant of the real situation. It there-  
seemed that the best course would be to close their eyes with regard to  
resent attitude of the Esthonian Government and to leave, for the  
nt, affairs in the *status quo*.

2 EYRE CROWE said that he agreed that no communication be made to  
Esthonian Government.

It was decided:

that no representations should be made, for the time being, by the  
Allies to the Esthonian Government on the subject of the relations of that  
Government with the Army of General Yudenitch.

5. GENERAL WEYGAND commented upon a note of the French Delegation, dated January 3, 1920, on that question. (See Appendix G.)

*Authorization demanded  
by the Polish Govern-  
ment to buy arms and  
munitions in Germany*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the exceptions to the general rule consented to by the Supreme Council in favour of General Yudenitch and of the Czecho-Slovak Government were of minor importance. The exception now proposed in favour of Poland was of greater import. It seemed that before consenting, they should first find out whether the Poles actually lacked rifles and cartridges and whether their present claims did not conceal a desire to procure war material at small expense.

GENERAL WEYGAND remarked that even for an army which was not fighting, it was necessary to be constantly replacing rifles, as the wear and tear was extremely rapid. They had means of verifying the needs of the Polish Army, but he was inclined to think they were real.

SIR EYRE CROWE replied that they knew the importance attached in England to the idea of a progressive disarmament; he would not, therefore, like to furnish the Poles with war material of which they were not strictly in need. As a matter of fact, there was another point of view: if the Poles were in possession of too great a quantity of guns of German origin they would be obliged to continue to obtain German material which would be contrary to the business interests of the Allies.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that the latter argument had a certain value, but that, on the other hand, they should recognize that Poland found itself isolated in opposing the Bolshevik wave and it was necessary that she should be strong to resist it.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that before taking a decision he would ask for the opinion of his Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they had a double reason for strengthening Poland: she constituted the strongest rampart against Bolshevism and on the other hand, on account of the strategical position she occupied, she might be of decisive aid in case of difficulties with Germany. All the other considerations seemed to him secondary and there would be time to examine them later. The Poles would not be using Mauser rifles forever. As for the allusion which Sir Eyre Crowe had made to disarmament, he wished to state that he was in favour of that policy, but that it was necessary that Germany should be the first to disarm. He did not personally see any objection to the 300,000 rifles in question being in Poland, a friendly country, rather than in Germany.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would be surprised if the Germans consented to selling this material to the Poles.

GENERAL WEYGAND said that they would not have to interfere in that aspect of the question. The Poles said that they had the means of buying the material in Germany and asked for their authorization. The rest concerned the Poles.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it seemed to him difficult to refuse to the Poles what they had granted to the Czecho-Slovaks. They had every reason to

nake use of the Poles to bring that troubled part of Europe to that state of equilibrium which alone would allow the possibility of the disarmament policy to which Sir Eyre Crowe had just referred.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he would point out that the material in question could not in any case remain in the hands of the Germans as the Treaty provided for its destruction. The whole question, for him, was whether the Poles were really in need of that material. He would explain to his Government the arguments which had been put forward in the discussion which had just taken place.

M. DE MARTINO said that the question would be brought before the Council when the British Delegate had received the instructions of his Government. He wished, however, to say at once that the Italian Delegation was of the opinion that if the transaction proposed by the Poles took place, the proceeds of the sales of these arms and munitions should be paid into the reparations fund.

MR. WALLACE stated that he would refer the question to his Government and would communicate its opinion as soon as he had received the necessary instructions.

The discussion was adjourned to a later date.

M. SEYDOUX commented upon a note of the French Delegation on the question, dated December 29, 1919. (See Appendix H.)

*Inhibition of enemy  
trade in Turkey*

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he had been instructed by his Government to support the proposal of the High Commissioners at Constantinople. He would point out that Bulgaria was in exactly the same situation as Turkey as their relations with her were still governed by the Armistice Convention. He would summarize in five points the proposal of the High Commissioners, such as he understood it:

1. No further licence would be granted to German ships to enter Turkish ports,
2. Ships used for the repatriation of Turkish, Bulgarian and Russian prisoners would no longer be authorized to land goods in Turkey,
3. All goods embarked in a German or Bulgarian port on an Allied, neutral or enemy ship, could no longer be landed in Turkey, and no goods could be shipped by an Allied, neutral or enemy ship in Turkey destined for a German or Bulgarian port,
4. No goods could be landed in Turkey by a German or Bulgarian ship; goods could be shipped on a German or Bulgarian ship in Turkey,
5. All goods shipped in ports situated outside Germany and Bulgaria, by a non-German or Bulgarian ship, could be landed in Turkey, whatever their origin might be.

If he understood M. Seydoux, he believed that these five points simply summarized the proposal of the French Delegation and coincided with it.

M. SEYDOUX agreed.

M. DE MARTINO stated that the question before them was being submitted to the examination of the Organization Committee of the Reparations Com-

mission. The Italian Delegation was in favour of the suppression of Article 23 of the Armistice of October 30, 1918, with Turkey, for the following reasons:

1. Because the convention had been signed on October 30, 1918, i.e., while they were still in a state of war with Germany and there was need to strengthen the blockade against Germany; whereas at the present time the Treaty of Peace was signed and on the point of coming into force, the blockade had been raised, thus allowing Germany to trade freely.

2. Because Article 23 of the Armistice Convention was intended primarily to closely encircle Germany and was not directed against Turkey, who might, and still could, transact every kind of business with Allied or neutral countries. The blockade of Germany having come to an end, Article 23 no longer had the same importance.

3. Because it was admittedly in the interest of the Allied and Associated Powers that Germany should be able to recover economically so as to be in a position to pay its debts.

The question which was before them having been postponed a number of times, he would ask that it be submitted to the Reparations Commission and that the latter should communicate its opinion before any decision was taken by the Council.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he did not believe that the Reparations Commission was qualified to interfere in the present case.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he also thought that the Reparations Commission was not competent, as there was no Treaty with Turkey.

SIR EYRE CROWE said that the question was to prevent the Germans from getting a footing commercially in Turkey, before peace with that Power was signed, and from devoting themselves to a propaganda which, as recent incidents proved, might be full of danger. It was that which they had to consider and not the whole question of foreign trade in Turkey, a question bristling with difficulties.

M. DE MARTINO said that he would consult his Government on the subject but would point out that the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission had already dealt with questions referring to the preparation of Treaties which had not yet been signed.

The discussion was adjourned to a later date.

7. CAPTAIN ROPER commented upon a draft note to be addressed to the German Government in reply to the German note of November 17, 1919<sup>3</sup> (Appendix I).

*Reply to the German Note of November 17, 1919, concerning the manufacture of aeronautical material and the organization of aerial navigation*

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to adopt the draft note to be addressed to the German Government in reply to the German note of November 17, 1919 (see Appendix I).

<sup>3</sup> This note, A.A.I. No. 6724, read as follows in translation: "The point of view taken up by Marshal Foch and communicated in note No. 1842/G of the 25th of last month, that the installation of aerial communications in Neutral Territory (50 km. zone) does not come into

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.)

FROMAGEOT commented upon the Drafting Committee's note of January 3, 1920 (see Appendix J)<sup>5</sup> concerning the Polish protest against modifications of the financial arrangements of the Treaty. (See Appendix K.)

SIR EYRE CROWE said that he believed with the Drafting Committee that the modifications which the Poles complained of, tended, as a matter of fact, only to improve their situation.

As a practical proposition after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, as of the ceding of German aeroplane material stipulated in Article 202 of the Peace Treaty is not shared by the German Government. It has already been pointed out in note No. 6061 of 1st October that the civilian flying material which is in Germany does not come under the provisions of Article 198 of the Peace Treaty. As to any limitation in the use of such material, there can be no question either before or after the coming into force of the Peace Treaty. So far as the argument is based on Article 201 of the Peace Treaty according to which the manufacture and import of aeroplanes etc. and their parts, ship motors and parts, is forbidden in Germany, the German Government cannot have [sic] the point of view taken up in regard to this. According to the German Government, this regulation is only applicable to aerial craft and motors of a military character, and does not apply to those of purely civilian character. Part XI of the Peace Treaty does not contain any such limitations, and it is not possible to extend the rulings of Part XI, Section 3 of the Treaty, which is only concerned with military and naval aerial navigation, to include civil aerial navigation in Germany.

Under these circumstances it is still possible to maintain aerial navigation routes in Germany after the Peace Treaty has come into force. Also there is no foundation in the Peace Treaty for assuming that the zone laid down in Part III, Section 3 of the Peace Treaty, is a prohibited one for civilian air traffic. On the contrary the provisions in Part XI of the Peace Treaty are based particularly upon the assumption that civilian German air traffic can take place without any local limitation. If it had been the purpose of the Treaty to prohibit such local limitations it would certainly have been pointed out in this part of the Treaty. Also article 43, according to the view of the German Government, cannot be interpreted as a foundation for the limitations asked for, as it is only concerned with the provisions of civil aviation. If one were to conclude from this clause that prohibition for the construction of civilian aerodromes was meant, then it is considered that the clause would be misinterpreted. Such an interpretation, moreover, would lead to absurd results, for the same way the retention of all railway installations in this zone could be forbidden. Furthermore, inasmuch as the ruling of this article is not subject to any time limit, a total prohibition of flying in a large industrial area of Germany would be brought about and a permanent severing of this section of the country from the rest of German traffic.

Under these circumstances the German Government does not consider that the objections of Marshal Foch are well founded, and reserves to itself the right to arrange civilian air traffic in the territory indicated in article 42 and 44.

'Ow-Wachendorf.'

No. 36, note 2. This declaration is printed as Treaty Series (1920), No. 7, Cmd. 637, as printed. This note stated in part: 'No reason has been given by Poland in explanation of her protest, which rather indicates a certain susceptibility of pride. It is, furthermore, difficult to understand this protest considering that the modification, brought about by the Declaration of December 8, in reality creates a more advantageous situation than resulted from the original Arrangement. . . . In the opinion of the Drafting

M. FROMAGEOT stated that an examination of the Polish note had led the Drafting Committee to ask whether, for the purposes of reparations, the Poles should or should not be considered as creditors of Austria. The natural deduction was, as a matter of fact, that if that question was to be answered in the negative the situation of Poland would not be in any way affected by the modifications made to the financial arrangements of St. Germain.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Supreme Council had not, as far as he knew, given a decision on that point.

M. DE MARTINO said that the terms of the reply to be made to the Poles should not leave it possible for the latter to interpret them as constituting a decision of the Supreme Council in their favour, since the Council had not thereby intended to settle that delicate question.

M. FROMAGEOT said that they would avoid giving to the Poles on that point any assurances whatsoever.

It was decided:

to request the Drafting Committee to reply to the Polish Delegation's note of December 19, 1919 (see Appendix K). That reply should take into account the considerations set forth in the Drafting Committee's note of January 3, 1920 (see Appendix J).<sup>5</sup> The reply should, however, avoid giving the Polish Delegation the impression that the question whether Poland was or was not a creditor of Austria under the heading of Reparations had been settled in one way or the other by the Supreme Council.

9. M. FROMAGEOT stated that the draft Treaty with Hungary as it now stood left in suspense a certain number of questions which ought to be solved without delay. If the Council did not find it inconvenient, they would furnish a list of those questions to the Secretariat-General which might in turn put them, if advisable, before the Supreme Council.

The proposal was adopted.

10. MR. WALLACE stated that he noticed that in the draft note to the German Government on the aeronautical material existing in Germany (see Appendix I), the expression 'Allied and Associated Powers' was used. As he had already explained at the last meeting of the Council his Government asked that if it had not explicitly given its assent, this formula should not be employed in any document. It would therefore be necessary to modify in the sense of the observations he had just made the text of the reply the Council had just approved.

M. FROMAGEOT said that the question raised by Mr. Wallace was of a very grave character. The American representative on the Supreme Council had no power of decision. If the American Government now intended to forbid

Committee, the best course to be taken would be, to induce Poland to withdraw her protest and agree to sign the Arrangement, by again presenting the Polish Delegation with the explanations which she has probably misunderstood. In case Poland should persist in her refusal to sign, the consequences do not seem to be very important.'

sing the expression 'Allied and Associated Powers', the tendency was less than the dissolution of the Conference. That would be an extremely serious decision, for which he, for his part, would not assume responsibility.

BYRE CROWE asked whether they might not avoid the use of the expression 'the Principal Allied and Associated Powers'. That was a question for the Council to decide.

DE MARTINO observed that the American Government did not oppose the use of the expression 'Allied and Associated Powers'. It asked that it should be used only in documents which it had expressly approved.

LEMENCEAU said that the essential thing was to know whether or not they would use the expression 'Allied and Associated Powers'. To be unable to do so would amount to the dissolution of the Conference. In that case he would resume his own freedom of action and his own responsibilities; in his own, to speak for himself, he had no misgivings.

WALLACE said that if the Council would only refer to the Minutes of the meeting (see H.D. 121),<sup>6</sup> it would see that they were not objecting in principle to the use of the formula under discussion, and that they only asked to restrict its use to the documents expressly approved by the Government of the United States of America at Washington.

LEMENCEAU said that they would examine anew that question at the next meeting, for it was absolutely necessary to know whether or not they would continue to use a formula which expressed, in the eyes of the enemy Central Powers, the unity of the Conference.

HARRISON explained that Mr. Wallace had not opposed the employment of the phrase 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers', but had requested that when its use was proposed, as in the present instance, the assent of the United States Government should first be obtained. The meeting then adjourned.)

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 51

*from the Supreme Council to the German Delegation of January 6th regarding the signature to the Protocol<sup>7</sup>*

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN /87

January 7, 1919 [1920].

That the Protocol of November 1st has been signed by the qualified representatives of the German Government, and the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles deposited in consequence the Allied and Associated Governments wish to inform the German Government again that although they claimed necessary for the signature of the Protocol (minute 2).

The final text of this note was communicated to Baron von Lersner on January 10, 1919, and published two days later in the British press.

reparations for the scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow they do not wish to injure Germany's vital economic interests. By the present letter they confirm the declarations which the Secretary General of the Peace Conference was directed to make verbally on this point, December 23rd, to the President of the German Delegation. These declarations were as follows:

1. The Secretary General was authorized by the Supreme Council to assure the German Delegation that the Interallied Commissions of Control and the Reparations Commission would act scrupulously in conformity with the assurances contained in the note of December 8 concerning the safeguard of Germany's vital economic interests.

2. As the experts of the Allied and Associated Powers are inclined to believe that part of the data upon which they based their demand for 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges may have been inaccurate in certain minor details, they think a mistake may have been made as to the 85,000 tons of floating docks in Hamburg. If the investigation to be conducted by the Interallied Commission of Control proves that an error has really been made the Allied and Associated Powers will be disposed to reduce their claims proportionately, so as to bring the quantity down to 300,000 tons in round figures or even lower if convincing arguments prove that this is necessary. But absolute facilities must be granted qualified representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers to make all necessary investigations in view of verifying the German assertions before any reduction of the original demands of the Protocol can be made by the Allied and Associated Powers.

3. The Allied and Associated Governments referring to the last paragraph of the letter containing their reply do not consider that the scuttling of the German ships at Scapa Flow constitutes a crime of war for which individual penalties should be demanded according to Art. 228 of the Peace Treaty.

On the other hand, the Allied and Associated Powers draw attention to the fact that, mindful of Germany's vital economic interests, they had requested 400,000 tons on the basis of the inventory made by them. The German experts made a statement, which will be verified and which sets forth an inferior figure. Therefore, from the 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, tugs and dredges demanded by the Allies, will be deducted the tonnage of the floating docks which, upon verification, will prove to have been erroneously included in the Interallied inventory and which, therefore, do not exist. Nevertheless, this reduction must not exceed the amount of 125,000 tons.

The Allied and Associated Powers add that the 192,000 tons offered by the German Government must be delivered immediately. For the remainder of the tonnage as determined by the Reparation Commission a time-limit of not more than two years<sup>8</sup> will be granted to the German Government for the full delivery.

Please accept, etc.

<sup>8</sup> In the final text of the note this time-limit was altered to thirty months in accordance with M. Dutasta's earlier suggestion (see No. 49, minute 1).

## APPENDIX B TO NO. 51

RESIDENT OF THE GERMAN PEACE DELEGATION

No. 74

PARIS, *January 2, 1920.*

From: von Lersner.

To: Clemenceau.

By order of my Government, I have the honour to present the following remarks relative to the plan for dividing the Allied contingents destined to occupy the plebiscite zones, and also the territories of Dantzic and Memel.

Article 95 of the Peace Treaty provides for the evacuation of the territory of Eastern Prussia (Allenstein) by the German troops, but not for the occupation of this territory by Allied troops. By the terms of Article 97, the Commission for Western Prussia (Marienwerder) will have at its disposal 'in case of need' the necessary allied forces, while paragraph 2 of the Annex to Article 88 provides for the occupation of Upper Silesia by the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers, once, and unconditionally. As the German Delegation has already pointed out on several occasions, this is not due to an error in the drafting of the articles, but to a difference which is caused by the peculiar position of the territories in question.

However, if the Allies insist in placing foreign troops at the disposal of the International Commission in Eastern Prussia as well, they are going beyond the rights which they themselves stipulated in the Peace Treaty. Furthermore, in this instance, it cannot be contended that such a course was necessary as the Commission has sufficient police forces at its disposal for the guarding of the frontier and the maintenance of order.

Nevertheless, the German Government does not wish to enter any protest against the plan of the Allies: the Government accepts that this plan deviates from the provisions of the Peace Treaty on certain points. However, in the Allenstein territory, as in the other plebiscite zones, the troop strength should remain limited to that absolutely required by the circumstances. In Allenstein, for example, it will only be necessary to accompany the ceremonies of transferring the powers of administration to the International Commission by the presence of a small detachment. In Marienwerder, the protection of important railway lines must be added. In Upper Silesia the situation is, it is true, a little different. The industrial region contains numerous disturbing elements and it will also be necessary to dispose of an important corps of military frontier guards. Nevertheless, order has been completely re-established for several months, and a lifting of the state of siege appears practicable. Finally, and above all, it is certain that a foreign corps of occupation need have no fear of an aggression on the part of insurgents from localities beyond the frontier.

The sending of contingents of greater strength than is absolutely necessary also presents objections: the financial situation of the States interested should be taken into account, and the fact that the unfavourable rate of exchange will greatly increase the expenses should be reckoned with. The regards which are due the population are also an important factor: experience has shown that all military occupation entails burdens and inconveniences, the aggravation of which is out of proportion with the increase of the strength of the occupying forces.

For these reasons the German Government requests that the occupation forces in Eastern and Western Prussia be reduced to one battalion for each of these

territories, and that the troops destined for Upper Silesia, especially the Infantry, be reduced by about one-third.

Concerning the territories of Dantzig and Memel, the Peace Treaty does not stipulate upon whom will be incumbent the expenses of military occupation. The German Government supposes that neither the free city of Dantzig nor the territory of Memel should bear these expenses, because their paying capacity is far from sufficient. Furthermore, the projected occupation would be a heavy burden on the population. The garrison strength of the troops destined for Dantzig will be considerably superior to that of peace times, and it will be impossible to billet them in the military buildings. In Memel, where the population is peaceful and, in greater part, rural, a very small garrison would suffice to assure peace and order.

Consequently, the German Government feels obliged, in the interest of the populations concerned, to request that the effectives destined to occupy these territories, be also reduced.

Please accept, etc.

#### APPENDIX C TO No. 51

##### *Note of December 29 in regard to granting credits to Austria*

#### ORGANIZATION COMMITTEE OF THE REPARATION COMMISSION.

We have the honour to inform you that in execution of the Resolution of the Supreme Council of November 20, 1919 (H.D. 97. IV),<sup>9</sup> the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission again examined the paragraph of its conclusions beginning with the words 'require immediately the Austrian Government'.

The Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission agreed to propose to the Supreme Council the following draft of this paragraph:

(1) Inform the Austrian Government that no granting of credits could be considered if it did not agree to:

(a) Not effect, or allow to be effected, any alienation of public properties, or disposal of public authorities, even in the form of concessions or monopolies, without the consent of the Reparation Commission, and to declare null and void any alienation of this sort effected since the Armistice, November 3, 1918.

(b) To take, at the request of the Organization Committee of the Reparation Commission all measures liable to prevent the alienation outside of Austria, or to other than Austrian nationals, without the consent of the Reparation Commission, of all private property if the alienation of such property would be of a nature to compromise the guarantees for credits to be opened.

p. o. of the Committee

The Interallied Secretary  
Signature.

#### APPENDIX D TO No. 51

##### *Assistance requested by General Denikin*

*Dec. 31, 1919.*

The gravity of the military situation in Southern Russia has been the subject of two requests, of which the French delegation deems it its duty to make a report to the Supreme Council.

<sup>9</sup> No. 27, minute 4.

On one hand, General Denikin sent to the French Government, a telegram thus worded:

“The failure of the struggle against the Bolsheviks in the East of Russia, the Russian policy which has broken the north-western front, and the passivity of Polish troops, have made it possible for the Bolsheviks to concentrate as much as 500,000 men against the army of Southern Russia. The obvious superiority of my adversary has placed my troops in a difficult situation and causes a retreat which might lead to abandoning the coal basin of Donetz, where are kept the riches of coal, which aliment all Southern Russia, all the ships and ports of the Black Sea, and where are a great number of foreign establishments. Considering the weight I am fighting against the Bolsheviks as an undertaking, not only of Russia, but of all Europe, I deem it my duty to inform you that a certain help in men and arms from the Allies is necessary for us, even if it were only one or two army corps. Without this help, the struggle threatens to drag on, for a long time, and not only to destroy what is left of Russian culture, but also to spread over the countries the escape moral and economic disorganization. At the same time that I inform you of these facts, I beg you to let me know if I can count, in a short time, on the assistance of the Allied troops, to what extent and on what conditions.”

On the other hand, the Russian Embassy in Paris has suggested that the Allies should authorize the enlistment in the Denikin Army of Bulgarian volunteers. It is estimated that about 30,000 commissioned and non-commissioned officers and Bulgarian soldiers might be recruited in this way.

This suggestion is different to that of General Denikin's [sic] in that it is based on the help of an enemy country, with which peace is signed, but not yet ratified. The French Delegation deems it its duty in a similar order of ideas, but not without reservation, to point out the results of a study made by General Franchet d'Esperey, of the conditions of the Bulgarian Armament.

According to this document, after the operations at present in course of execution are provided for, (sending arms and munitions to General Denikin, restoring to Roumanians the Roumanian material seized by the Bulgarians, unbreeched arms in the army depots, army inspections, etc.), there will remain in Bulgaria, in comparison with the armament provided for this country by the Treaty, an excess immediately available of about:

- 181,300 rifles
- 600 machine guns
- 900 cannons and trench guns
- 3,697,000 shells
- 10,200,000 cartridges.

It must be remarked that as Bulgaria has to be disarmed, it is necessary to dispose of this material. Owing to General Denikin's situation, is it advisable to send him?

## APPENDIX E TO NO. 51

### *Enrolment of Bulgarians in the Denikin Army*

THE DELEGATION.

*January 4, 1920.*

General Mangin, sent by General Denikin, arrived at Constantinople on January 1. He reports that the military situation of the Volunteer Army is getting

worse every day, the demoralized troops are not able to hold any halts. Only foreign help can prevent a disaster. Poland and Roumania could help Denikin but require territorial compensations, which the latter has no power to accord. Denikin affirms that Bulgaria offers him 40,000 equipped, armed and officered men. He could transport them by sea, if coal were supplied to him. The serious objections the Allies may think of making to this project do not escape him: viz: the necessity of altering the Bulgarian Treaty, the possible pretensions of Bulgaria, the discontent and perhaps the opposition of Greece, Serbia and Roumania. But he adds that he is fighting for all Europe, and that the Allies have a primordial interest in saving him from defeat.

General Denikin is right in anticipating the opposition of the Balkan States, which are hostile to Bulgaria. In a letter dated December 27, addressed to the Minister of War, Colonel Ractivan, the Greek Military Attaché, at Paris, protested against the possible enrolment of Bulgarian officers in Denikin's Army. He argues that this enrolment is forbidden by Article 103 of the Treaty of Neuilly, which obliges Bulgaria to prevent her nationals from taking service, even as instructors, in the naval, military, or air forces of a foreign country. He requests the French Government to assure the execution of this clause of the Treaty.

#### APPENDIX F TO No. 51

##### *General Niessel's Projected Mission to Reval*

#### BRITISH DELEGATION.

PARIS, Jan. 4, 1920.

The British Government considers that any attempt which might be made either to re-organize the Russian Army of the Northwest on the Esthonian territory, or to transport certain units of this army, specially selected to be utilized elsewhere, would be both vain and impracticable. The British Government thinks that the best way would be to authorize the Esthonian Government to take freely such measures as may be deemed necessary to disarm and utilize the forces still remaining on the Esthonian territory. In case the Supreme Council should share this point of view, the intervention of a corps, Commission or Officer with a special mission would be useless, whether of an Interallied character or not.

The Esthonian Government has been invited to suspend the disarmament of Russian troops, while awaiting the decision of the Supreme Council. The British Government suggests that this Government might be now informed that the Allied and Associated Governments do not object to the continuation of the dissolution of the Russian forces of the Northwest, according to the plan originally proposed by it.

#### APPENDIX G TO No. 51

##### *Note from the French Delegation*

##### *The Polish Government asks to buy Arms and Munitions in Germany*

The Polish Government asks to buy in Germany:

300,000 Mauser rifles  
8,000,000 cartridges  
1,000,000 kilos of powder.

The purchase would be made through the intermediary of Mr. Louis Moon, agent for the Purchasing Commission of the Polish Delegation to the Peace Conference, acting in the name of the Polish Minister of War; Mr. Moon would have to go to Berlin, as soon as possible, for this purpose.

Marshal Foch favours this request, on account of the critical situation in which General Denikin's defeats may place the Polish Army.

The French Delegation on this subject recalls that in its meeting of August 22 last, the Supreme Council decided that although Germany cannot alienate her war material, the Allies have the right to deliver licences in certain special cases. In consequence, the Supreme Council, in the same meeting, authorized Germany to delivery [*sic*] miscellaneous material to General Youdenitch as well as to the Czecho-Slovakian Government.<sup>10</sup>

The French Delegation has the honour to suggest to the Council that a similar measure be taken in favour of the Polish Government.

## APPENDIX H TO NO. 51

### Document 1

#### *Note from the French Delegation on the Prohibition of Enemy Trade in Turkey*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESII BULLETIN NO. 65

*December 30, 1919.*

In a telegram, copy of which is enclosed, the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople make to the Supreme Council two propositions, with a view to restrict trade with the enemy in Turkey, and assuring integral application of Art. 23 of the Armistice.

It must be recalled that when the Armistice with Turkey was concluded, the blockade was still in force, and that consequently, it was necessary to prevent Germany being provisioned by Turkey. The situation is different now, and Germany has been authorized to resume commercial relations with various foreign countries, on certain conditions.

However, it seems to be dangerous, from a political point of view, to authorize Turkey to resume her commercial relations with the Central Powers, before a treaty has been concluded with her; this would open the way to German influence in the East, before the Allies established the economic status of the former Turkish Empire.

At a time when the Treaty of Versailles is going into force, and when in consequence, Germany is going to enjoy equal rights, it seems unnecessary to adopt stricter measures than those at present existing in Turkey. The present provisions which prohibit direct importation in Turkey of goods loaded on a German ship, or in a German port, seem to be sufficient to prevent any German political action, and any action of her business men for propaganda purposes: in consequence, the aim of the Allies is realized.

On the other hand, any modification of the Armistice Convention of October 30, 1919 [1918], seems to be premature, as long as the Peace negotiations with Turkey are not ended.

<sup>10</sup> See Vol. I, No. 40, minute 4.

Therefore, it is proposed that the existing measures destined to assure the execution of Art. 23 of the Armistice be maintained.

## Document 2.

### *Telegram*

CONSTANTINOPLE, *December 23, 1919.*

The High Commissioners are trying to assure the execution of Art. 23 of the Armistice and to prevent, as much as possible; the resumption of enemy trade in Turkey.

For his [this] purpose, they have taken measures, of which I informed you, prohibiting the importation in Turkey of all goods loaded on a German ship or in a German port.

But this prohibition is not sufficient.

The Germans have promptly found means to evade it, by sending their goods from Allied or neutral ports and in Allied or neutral ships.

Therefore it is necessary to take some other measures.

The best means would be to require certificates of origin: but the resumption of this system, which has been applied during the war, seems to be impossible at present.

The High Commissioners propose (two) solutions.

(1) Impose on the German products, destined to Turkey, and which, under the present regime, may be unloaded there, after having travelled through an Allied or neutral country, the obligation to be nationalized in this country, by paying importation duties. This obligation would not entirely prevent German goods from being introduced into Turkey, but would constitute an obstacle and would place these goods in a disadvantageous situation, in comparison with the Allied or neutral products; the nationality should be verified upon the arrival in Turkey, by showing the receipt of the Allied or neutral customs-house, which received the duties.

(2) Publish a notice that no goods of German origin shall be received in Turkey, whatever may be the nationality of their owner, the port of embarkation, and the nationality of the transporting ship. This measure would be most efficacious, and would prevent even the Allied or neutral tradesmen from introducing into Turkey any goods of German origin they may possess. But its application would be difficult on account of the circumstantial verifications which should be made at the unloading.

It should be notified that the Commanders or the agents of the navigation Companies could transport goods of German origin, only at their own risks, and that they should declare, upon their arrival in a Turkish port, that they have no German goods, bound to Turkey.

In case of false declaration, the Commander of the Allied ports should inflict upon them a penalty, and they should re-embark, at their own expense, those German goods. Besides, the Allied customs-houses, and especially the Chambers of Commerce, could often give the necessary information for the application of this measure.

However, the Italian High Commissioner insists upon remarking that it would be advisable to consider whether the shipment, from an Allied or neutral port to

a Turkish port, of German goods, nationalized in the States from which they come, would constitute an infringement of Art. 23 of the Armistice.

Before adopting one of the above solutions, and on account of the repercussions which the second might have on the Allied or neutral trade, the High Commissioners decided to refer to their Governments, and to ask them, by this telegram to the Supreme Council, for instructions.

DEFRANCE.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 51<sup>11</sup>

*Draft of Note, to be addressed to the President of the Interallied Air Commission of Control, for transmission to the German Government, as soon as the going into force of the Peace Treaty*

I have the honour, in the name of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, to reply as follows, to the German Government's Note, A. A. I. No. 6724, under date of November, 17, 1919.<sup>3</sup>

Concerning the three first paragraphs of this Note, I beg to recall the terms of my Note . . . . .<sup>12</sup> in which the opinion adopted by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as to what material, actually existing in Germany, may be considered as civil material, is clearly expressed.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers are obliged to reject the interpretation of Art. 201, which the German Government seems to have adopted. Article 198 permanently forbids Germany to possess any naval or military air force. Moreover, Art. 201 forbids, for six months, the fabrication or importation of any air material in Germany. If it did not concern civil air material, this article would be meaningless, considering the stipulations of Article 198.

Part XI as indicated by its title, deals only with Air Navigation, and has no relation to the obligations imposed on Germany, for military reasons, and from an aeronautic point of view, and especially with the six months' prohibition of fabrication and importation of any air material, whether its character be military, naval or civil.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers do not pretend that the existence in Germany of routes for air navigation will be impossible after the going into force of the Treaty.

The existence of such routes may be admitted, and these routes may be utilized by:

1. Any aircraft, the civil nature of which shall have been thoroughly verified by the Interallied Air Commission of Control.

2. Any aircraft of non-military type which may be imported or constructed in Germany, after the expiration of the period of six months provided for by Article 201.

Concerning the neutral zone, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers shall only have to see that Article 43 is not violated.

<sup>11</sup> The original of this appendix also contained a brief covering note of December 11, 1919, from General Duval to M. Dutasta enclosing the draft note to the German Government and explaining that it had been 'drawn up by the Commission on Air Clauses' and 'read and corrected by the Drafting Committee of the Peace Conference'.

<sup>12</sup> Punctuation as in original.

They do not lay down, as a principle, that no landing fields for the civil air circulation, should not [*sic*] be established in the said zone, but it is obvious that the creation of landing fields might give rise to a state of things inconsistent with the strict execution of the clauses of Article 43.

In consequence, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have a right to see that the Commissions on the Establishment and Upkeep of landing fields be of such a nature as to assure the execution of the stipulations of the Peace Treaty.

#### APPENDIX K TO NO. 51

POLISH DELEGATION TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

PARIS, *December 19, 1919.*

To: The Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.

From: The Polish Delegation.

After having learned the reasons for the modification of the Arrangement of September 10th regarding the contribution towards the costs of liberation of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and considering that the modifications proposed do not correspond to the interests of Poland, the Polish Delegation has the honour to solicit that, as far as Poland is concerned, the Arrangement which she signed, together with the Allied and Associated Powers, September 10, 1919, be maintained.

The Polish Delegation at the same time takes the liberty of expressing its keen regret that it did not have the opportunity to present, at an earlier date, its point of view in this respect.

Please accept, etc.

#### No. 52

H.D. 123.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 6, 1920, at 10.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.

*Great Britain*: Sir Eyre Crowe; SECRETARY, Mr. Norman.

*France*: M. Cambon; SECRETARY, M. de Saint Quentin.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *Great Britain*: Capt.

Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*Great Britain*: Mr. Millington Drake, Gen. Sackville-West, Cmdr. Macnamara, Mr. Carr.

*France*: Gen. Weygand, Gen. Le Rond, Adl. Le Vavasseur, M. Laroche, M. Kammerer, M. Hermitte.

*Italy*: Gen. Cavallero, Vice-Adl. Grassi, Cmdr. Scanagatta, M. Vannutelli-Rey, M. Stranieri, M. Manciola.

*Japan*: M. Sawada.

1. GENERAL LE ROND told the Council that in the course of conversations he had had with M. von Simson the latter recalled that the German delegation in a note of 28 October last had raised the question of the revision of the German-Polish frontier but that no reply had so far been made to their communication. He had replied that the German note amounted to nothing less than raising the whole question of the treaty of Versailles and that, he considered, could not be countenanced by the Allied Governments. M. von Simson had then said that he would take note of the comment but that the German delegation were none the less anxious to have a written reply in order to justify themselves in the eyes of the local population who had insisted upon the German Government's obtaining some modification of the treaty. In those circumstances he had prepared a draft reply which had been submitted to M. Fromageot and which he would read to the Council.

General Le Rond then read the document which appears as Appendix A.

It was decided:

to adopt the draft letter to the German delegation proposed by General Le Rond. (Appendix A.)

GENERAL LE ROND said that the German delegates had also recalled that in a letter of 5 November last they had asked that a certain limited territory, situated in the southwest of Upper Silesia and which, according to the treaty of peace, ought to go to Czecho-Slovakia, might be allocated to Upper Silesia and allowed to share the same fate as the plebiscite accorded to that province. He had confined his reply in that case also to saying that no modification of the Treaty of Versailles could possibly be considered. M. von Simson was satisfied with the reply and insisted only that it be communicated to him in writing. Nevertheless M. von Simson's request emphasized the necessity of an understanding between the Germans and the Czecho-Slovaks if the evacuation of that territory by the Germans and its handing over to Czecho-Slovakia were to be assured. He had advised the Czecho-Slovak Delegation about that situation in order that it might take steps to be represented for that question in the negotiations actually taking place. A draft statute for the territories of Memel and Dantzic was to be submitted to the Council that very day. It had been prepared by the Commissions of Polish and of Baltic Affairs in joint session. It might be well if a sub-commission comprising two or three members of those Commissions would be good enough to take part in the negotiations that were going on.

That proposal was adopted.

GENERAL WEYGAND told the Supreme Council that, in accordance with its instructions, the commission which had fixed the numbers of troops to be sent into the areas of occupation had met on the previous day to examine the objections raised in M. von Lersner's note. It had been unanimous

(b) *Revision of the numbers of Allied troops to be sent to the areas of occupation*

in thinking that the troops proposed could not be reduced in number without serious inconvenience and likewise that the arguments put forward by the Germans could not be discussed at all. For example, the Germans had professed that their military barracks did not have sufficient accommodation, although, as a matter of fact, the numbers of the troops fixed for the occupation were very appreciably lower than the numbers stationed in the German barracks in those territories in time of peace. Nevertheless, so far as concerned Allenstein, since the British troops had had to be reduced to the extent of one battalion, they had in the draft letter he was submitting to the Council, offered as a concession in that case that the number of battalions to be sent would be reduced from four to three.

On the other hand, since the Government of the United States had not yet ratified the Treaty, and consequently could not for the moment send into Germany the forces originally decided the total force anticipated was reduced by one quarter. The Germans had therefore at the moment partial satisfaction and he proposed to tell them that that circumstance would allow the Allies to make a trial of the reduction asked by them.

General Weygand then read the draft reply to the note of the German Delegation of January 2, 1920 (Appendix B).<sup>1</sup>

It was decided:

to adopt the draft reply to the note of the German Delegation of January 2, 1920 (Appendix B).<sup>1</sup>

M. LAROCHE read a report on that question, presented jointly by the commissions of Baltic and of Polish Affairs. (Appendix C.)

(c) *Draft arrangement with the German Government on the transfer of sovereignty at Dantzig and Memel*

He added that the basis of the arrangement with Germany which appeared as an appendix to that report had been prepared by the Drafting Committee. The Commission had thought it well to make certain modifications and proposed to the Supreme Council the adoption of a text rectified in certain particulars.

M. Laroche then read the draft (Appendix D).

He explained that the points on which they had modified the draft prepared by the Drafting Committee were two in number. One bore upon the condition in which the German officials of those territories would retain the rights they had acquired, and the other upon economic and revenue arrangements.

In agreement with the Drafting Committee they had deemed it necessary to give to the Germans, who would not fail to raise the question, certain concessions, but the formula of the legal experts had seemed too rigid, considering especially that the provisional regime, insofar as it affected Memel,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. This reply was in the sense of the preceding remarks by General Weygand. There was added in the last paragraph: 'In order to do away with any misunderstanding, it should be remarked that only police forces may remain in the territories occupied after the entry into force of the Treaty and such forces should only include local or municipal police forces and gendarmes, exclusive of all formations which depended directly on the central authority before the entry into force of the Treaty.'

might last for a considerable time; the draft they were proposing seemed to have the advantage of not prejudicing the future and of leaving to the Allied and Associated Powers greater liberty of action.

MR. WALLACE said that, so far as concerned Clause 1, dealing with the procedure of the handing over of the ceded territories, he was obliged to state that the use of the formula 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers' would make it necessary for him to ask instructions from his Government.

M. LAROCHE insisted that they could not in that document use any other term than the one which already appeared in the Treaty of Versailles.

MR. WALLACE said that he did not insist.

It was decided:

to accept the basis of arrangement with Germany on the transfer of German sovereignty over Memel and Dantzic and the provisional administration of those territories as appeared in Appendix D.

- [2] M. CAMBON proposed to postpone until the following meeting the examination of that question as the Roumanian Government's reply was known to them so far only by the telegrams of the French Chargé d'Affaires at Bucarest. They had just received the text of the Roumanian reply itself; there was every reason, it seemed to him, to postpone the discussion of the question till the text of that reply could be distributed to the several Delegations.

*Reply of the [Roumanian Government to the two first [points in the [Supreme Council's [note] of November [2 15, 1919]*

(The remainder of the discussion was postponed until the following meeting.)

- [3] M. CAMBON commented upon the French Delegation's note of January 4, 1920 (Appendix E). After a short discussion,

*Representations to the Hungarian Government in favour of the Communists condemned to death*

It was decided:

that the Allied generals at Budapest receive instructions to make representations to the Hungarian Government in order to ask its clemency towards the communists con-

demned to death.

- [4] M. DE SAINT QUENTIN explained to the Council that, in accordance with its instructions, the Drafting Committee had handed to the Secretariat General the list of questions affecting the Hungarian Treaty which were not yet definitely settled. The Secretariat General had obtained from the several competent commissions the necessary information on the stage reached in the decisions upon those questions.

*Status of the Treaty with Hungary*

The first point concerned the liquidation of the property of Hungarian nationals by the Roumanians. That question had been the subject of a note from Sir George Clerk. The Drafting Committee had examined the possible consequences of that liquidation as it affected Hungarian or foreign nationals in the territories ceded to Roumania. As they were aware, Roumanian

<sup>2</sup> See No. 23, minute 2 & note 3.

legislation prohibited foreigners from owning property, the Economic Commission had been apprised of the question and would send in its report that very day.

The second point concerned the military and naval clauses, modifications in which were demanded by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation (note of December 22[?20], 1919) and by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation (note of December 27, 1919).

The military representatives at Versailles were then examining those two notes and their report would be ready probably towards the 8th or 9th of January.

A third point affected the mines of Pecs. The Commission on Roumanian Affairs had proposed to the Supreme Council to submit the exploitation of those mines for five years to the control of the Reparation Commission which would be in a position, if it considered that advisable, to take into account the Serb-Croat-Slovene State's need of coal.<sup>3</sup> The Serbs had then sent a note to the Conference on December 22nd, in which they maintained that that arrangement was not such as could give them complete satisfaction and that in any case it would leave them without coal until the Treaty came into force. The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs was to meet on the following day to examine the Serb-Croat-Slovene note and would submit to the Supreme Council a report upon the possibility of acceding to the Yugo-Slav demand, both from the economic and from the political point of view.

The fourth point affected the economic clauses of the treaty. The Czecho-Slovaks had made a formal protest against the obligations imposed upon them by the Treaty to supply to Hungary a certain quantity of coal. A decision of the Supreme Council of December 31st had referred that question to the Coal Commission.<sup>4</sup> But Powers with limited interests being represented on that Coal Commission, there would be great difficulties in arriving at unanimous results for the reason that the interested parties themselves were represented thereon.

SIR EYRE CROWE pointed out that it was nevertheless impossible to make the conclusion of the Treaty await a decision of the Coal Commission.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN thought it would be preferable to consult only the experts of the Principal Powers.

SIR EYRE CROWE believed that that solution would indeed be preferable and, even so, it was necessary to hasten matters since the Hungarians were to arrive the following day.

It was decided:

to cancel the decision of December 21,<sup>5</sup> 1919, referring to the European Coal Commission the examination of the Czecho-Slovak protest against supplying coal to Hungary and to refer the examination of the question to the technical experts of the Principal Powers.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 34, minute 2.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 49, minute 10.

<sup>5</sup> In error for December 31 (see note 4 above).

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN explained that another economic clause still remained in suspense, that namely which dealt with the liquidation of Hungarian property in the territories acquired by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. The question was to be examined that day by the competent Commission.

A further question had been raised by the British Delegation: it dealt with the measures to be taken in favour of Allied nations who had been adversely affected by the issue of notes by the Hungarian Communist Government, notes which were then without value. The question had been referred to the Financial Commission. That Commission had asked the British Delegation for precise information about the conditions in which the issue and exchange of those notes had taken place. It had also asked the Economic Commission to let it know whether the financial measures of the Government of Bela Kun could be considered as coming under the definition 'exceptional war measures', mentioned in Article 232 of the Treaty. The Economic Commission had stated that it had no objection to the insertion in the treaty of an article taking into account the case cited by the British Delegation. The Financial Commission would continue to meet to come to a decision upon the question which had been submitted to it.

One last point, a request from the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation referred to canal administration in the Bachka, the Baranya and the Banat. The Serbs had presented two demands, one for the cession of the territory of Baya. It seemed to him that that demand could not be granted as the competent Commission had decided in favour of the maintenance of the frontier and the Supreme Council had approved its decision. The second demand of the Serbs on the same subject had been referred to the Commission of Ports, Waterways and Railways and the Secretariat General had asked that Commission to expedite its reply.

To resume, none of the points he had touched upon seemed to present insuperable difficulties and they might hope that the final text would be prepared by Friday.<sup>6</sup>

M. DE MARTINO asked whether that final text would be submitted to the Supreme Council.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN answered that the text had already been approved by the Supreme Council except in the four or five points which he had just discussed and upon which the Council would still have to give its decision.

M. DE MARTINO explained that his financial expert had told him on the previous day that certain economic and financial clauses of the treaty had not been communicated to him.

M. DE SAINT QUENTIN felt it difficult to understand how that could have happened. The clauses of the Treaties were as a matter of fact drafted by the Commissions and then, after approval by the Supreme Council, revised by the Drafting Committee. In any case the Italian financial expert might easily have communicated to him the clauses that interested him by applying to his colleague on the Drafting Committee.

The meeting then adjourned.

<sup>6</sup> January 9, 1920.

## APPENDIX A TO NO. 52

PARIS, January 6, 1920.

PEACE CONFERENCE.

The President.

Mr. President:

In the course of the present conversations, M. von Simson, President of the German Commission of Experts, asked for a reply to your letter of October 28, enclosing a Note 'relative to the temporary demarkation line between Germany and Poland, and a rectification of the Eastern frontier'.

The proposals contained in the said Note are tantamount to placing the Treaty of Versailles under question, therefore, they cannot be given consideration.

The Allied Powers can only comply with the stipulations of the Treaty of June 28, 1919.

Accept, etc.

## APPENDIX C TO NO. 52

### *Report presented to the Supreme Council by the Commissions on Polish and Baltic Affairs*

During the meeting of January 3, 1920, it was decided by the Supreme Council: 'that the Commission on Polish Affairs, which is authorized to employ the experts it may deem necessary, will immediately prepare plans for arrangements with the German Government concerning the transfer of sovereignty over Memel and Dantzig.'

In the course of an exposé presented to the Supreme Council by General Le Rond, it was indicated that the Arrangement between the Allied Powers and Germany might be elaborated on the following bases: (a) temporary maintenance of German officials, with the guarantees enjoyed by them; (b) maintenance of the jurisdictions existing at the present time; and creation of a Superior jurisdiction; (c) maintenance of the German legislation; (d) delivery of the properties belonging to the Reich and Prussia to the Allied Powers; (e) temporary maintenance of the economic and financial *status quo*.<sup>7</sup>

The Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission on Baltic Affairs met on January 5.

They were unanimous in deciding that the immediate arrangements should be of a general nature, and that it was advisable to authorize the Temporary Administrator, representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Dantzig, and the Commander of the Occupation Forces in Memel, to adopt any necessary measures of detail on the spot.

Under these circumstances it appeared desirable to have special clauses prepared to cover the points (c) and (d) in the concluding of the Arrangement.

As Germany will automatically lose all rights of sovereignty over the territories of Dantzig and Memel, upon the entry into force of the Treaty, the temporary maintenance of the German legislation will be decided by the Allied and Associated Powers alone without requiring consultation with the German Government.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 50, minute 2.

Furthermore, as the delivery of the properties belonging to the Reich and to the various German States is provided for, by Article 107 of the Treaty for Dantzig, and in the two first paragraphs of Article 256 for Memel, the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers will be authorized to regulate the conditions of this delivery on the spot.

Finally, it appeared to the Commission that it would entail serious inconveniences to formally agree to maintain the economic and financial *status quo* now existing.

If, in principle, this maintenance appears temporarily inevitable, it is important, nevertheless, to reserve, in the interest of the territories transferred to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, the right to adopt any measures which may be deemed necessary (interdiction to export to Germany, for example).

In the same way, if the maintenance of the present local jurisdiction appears unavoidable, it is desirable to provide, in the Arrangement with Germany, for the creation of a Superior jurisdiction applicable in the ceded territories.

As Germany's relinquishment of her sovereignty rights releases, *ipso facto*, the inhabitants of Memel and Dantzig from the jurisdiction of German tribunals, the Allied and Associated Powers are authorized to institute a Superior District Court under any conditions deemed advisable by them.

From the German point of view, the maintenance of the local jurisdiction amounts to an application of the temporary statutes of the magistrates now officiating in the ceded territories. (Therefore the question conflicts with point (a).)

The Arrangement between the Allies and Germany might be limited to a certain number of provisions according to which the officials of administrative or judiciary order, who would temporarily remain in office, would retain the powers vested in them by the German Government, but, on the other hand, it appeared to the Commission necessary that provisions be adopted regulating the conditions under which the delivery of ceded territories is to be effected, (settlement of the accounts, turning over of the archives, etc.).

In accord with the Drafting Committee, and under reservation concerning certain modifications made in the text prepared by the Committee, the Commission has the honour to submit the plan of Arrangement hereto annexed<sup>8</sup> for the approval of the Supreme Council.

For the reasons above exposed, the Commission is unable to agree with Alinea 5,<sup>9</sup> and proposes that it be replaced by the text submitted in Annex 2.<sup>10</sup>

#### APPENDIX D TO NO. 52

##### *Bases for the Arrangement with Germany concerning the Transfer of German Sovereignty on the Territories of Memel and Dantzig and the Provisional Administration of these Territories*

###### *1. Procedure for the transfer of the ceded territories.*

The sovereignty being transferred *ipso facto* to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers by the coming into force of the Treaty, the transfer of these territories will be effected (by the highest functionary of the German Administration) to the

<sup>8</sup> Not printed. This annex was the first draft of the document in appendix D. (Cf. M. Laroche's explanation recorded in minute 1(c) above.)

<sup>9</sup> i.e. General Le Rond's proposal (e) above.

<sup>10</sup> See paragraph 2 of appendix D.

representative of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers at the request of the latter and under the conditions which he will indicate.

2. The German financial administration and the . . . ,<sup>11</sup> as well as the administrative and judicial registers will be closed at the date of the transfer of these territories. All archives and registers will be remitted into the possession of the new authority.

3. *Procès-verbal* [sic] of the above operations will be made and signed by the respective representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and of Germany.

4. A few days' delay is granted them for the carrying out of these different formalities.

4. [sic] *Provisional Administration of the Ceded Territories.*

The administrative and judicial personnel and in general the personnel in the public service of the state, which, in accord with the representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, will continue to exercise their functions temporarily, will keep their acquired rights in Germany. If they later return in the German service, these functionaries will be considered by the German Government as having been temporarily on leave. In the event that they would remain definitely in the service of the ceded territories, their rights in regard to Germany will be determined at the date of the transfer of the territories and will be the object of a subsequent convention.

5. The Economic and Customs regime of the ceded territories would only be determined when the final political regime of these territories shall have been established. The modifications which it may be necessary to bring provisionally in the present relations between these territories and Germany will take into serious account the reciprocal needs and interests of the population.

## APPENDIX E TO NO. 52

### *Proposal to request the Clemency of the Hungarian Government for certain Communists*

*January 4, 1920.*

#### FRENCH DELEGATION.

##### *Execution of Communists at Budapest*

From concordant information sent from Budapest by General Gordon [Gorton] and General Graziani, the Hungarian Courts have condemned to death a certain number of communists, several of whom represented the most moderate element in the Government of Bela Kun. On the date of December 23, 14 communists had already been executed. At that time, General Gordon [Gorton] asked for and obtained from his Government instructions to intercede in favour of the condemned. But his steps were either too late or vain. Since then, he asked his French and Italian colleagues for assistance.

The French Government is willing, jointly with the other Governments, to invite the Hungarian Government to be indulgent, if the Supreme Council thus decides.

<sup>11</sup> The text here is uncertain. The earlier draft originally included in appendix C read: 'The German management of the finances and recording thereof, as well as' etc. The text printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 816, reads: 'The German financial administration and the [book of accounts] as well as' etc.

H.D. 124.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, January 9, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.

Great Britain: Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, Mr. Bonar Law; SECRETARY, Sir M. P. A. Hankey.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Arnavon, M. de Saint Quentin.

Italy: M. Nitti, M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. France: M. Massigli. Italy: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

Great Britain: Mr. Leeper.

France: M. Loucheur, M. Cambon, Gen. Weygand, Gen. Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. de Fleuriau, M. Hermitte, M. de Montille, M. Fromageot.

Italy: Gen. Cavallero, Vice-Adl. Grassi, M. Manciola.

Japan: M. Sawada.

1. The Council had before it a note of the Drafting Committee, dated January 6, 1920 (see Appendix A),<sup>1</sup> and a note from the British Delegation, dated January 8, 1920 (see Appendix B).<sup>1</sup>

*State of negotiations with the German Delegation*

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that before dealing with the agenda he wished to express his thanks to the distinguished representatives of Great Britain and Italy who had been kind enough to attend. They hoped that it would at last be possible, by a common effort, to settle with them the questions arising out of the war, which had not yet received a solution.

They intended to sign the protocol on the following day and to proceed to the deposit [of] the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles. There remained, however, a difficulty which M. Loucheur would explain to the Council.

M. LOUCHEUR said that there was a dispute concerning a sentence of the letter which they had decided to deliver to the Head of the German Delegation after he had signed the protocol. The last sentence of the last paragraph but one of that letter<sup>2</sup> noted that the reduction which might be made from the original demand of 400,000 tons of floating docks, floating cranes, etc., should not exceed 125,000 tons. The Drafting Committee, however, feared ambiguity; it might well be understood that the maximum of 125,000 tons only applied to the reduction which would be proposed by the experts after verification of the existing material. If the Supreme Council meant to say

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. The notes in appendices A and B were as summarized below by M. Loucheur.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. the last sentence of the draft passage proposed by Baron von Lersner: see No. 51, minute 1.

that that maximum included all the reductions which might be proposed for whatsoever cause, the Drafting Committee considered that it would be necessary to modify the text. The British Delegation supported these observations, and Sir Eyre Crowe declared that, in his opinion, the figure of 125,000 tons, as adopted by the Council, should include all reductions, whatsoever.<sup>3</sup> He hastened to say that they were all in agreement with Sir Eyre Crowe's interpretation. It was to be distinctly understood that in no case should the total of reductions to be made on the original demand of 400,000 tons exceed 125,000 tons. That point once established, it seemed to him dangerous to modify the terms of the letter which M. von Lersner had already accepted. Furthermore, was such a change necessary? They were the sole judges of reductions which might be consented to for economic reasons. It was therefore sufficient for the Allies to agree among themselves that in no case should the total of reductions, made for whatsoever cause, exceed 125,000 tons; but it was useless to notify their agreement to the Germans.

It was decided:

- (1) that the total of the reductions allowed for whatsoever cause, on the original demand of 400,000 tons of floating docks, cranes, etc., as reparation for the Scapa Flow affair, should not in any case exceed the figure of 125,000 tons;
- (2) that if the Council were agreed on that point, there would be no need to modify the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph of the letter to be delivered to M. von Lersner after the signature of the protocol.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the following ceremony would take place on the afternoon of the following day: they would first meet in M. Pichon's room, M. von Lersner would be introduced and would sign the protocol alone. They would then proceed to the Clock Room where the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications would be signed by a representative of each of the Powers which had ratified.

3. The Council had before it a memorandum of the German Delegation dated January 3, 1920 (see Appendix C), a note of the German Delegation, dated January 8, 1920 (see Appendix D), and a draft letter to M. von Lersner, dated January 9, 1920 (see Appendix E).

*Letter to the German Delegation in reply to the first paragraph of the German memorandum dated Jan. 3, 1920*

M. FROMAGEOT said that the German Delegation had addressed a memorandum to the Conference, the first paragraph of which stated 'until such time as it is known whether the United States of America will ratify the Treaty or not, the German Government is prepared to let the Allies decide how the American representatives on the

<sup>3</sup> The British note stated that 'Sir Eyre Crowe certainly understood that it was [the] sense of the Supreme Council that the amount of 125,000 tons should include all possible reductions, granted according to the experts' inquiry, or for economic reasons'.

Commission provided for by the Treaty may be temporarily replaced'. On the other hand, the German Delegation raised anew the question of the American representation in a short note concerning Memel and Dantzig, which had been received on the preceding day. Under these conditions it was advisable that there should not be a misunderstanding between the Allies and Germany, the consequences of which might be serious. The United States not having ratified the Peace Treaty, had no claim to sovereignty over Memel and Dantzig: the Allied Powers did not, therefore, represent the rights of the United States—rights which were then non-existent. It was important, on the other hand, that Germany should not be able to maintain later on that she had only accepted the Treaty temporarily and that, should the United States not ratify it, she was justified in questioning its validity. That was an argument which was directly contrary to the final stipulations of the Treaty. It had for that reason appeared necessary to reply to the German memorandum by a note which he would read to the Council. (M. Fromageot then read the draft note contained in Appendix E.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was in agreement with what M. Fromageot had just said. It was understood that when three of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other, had ratified the Treaty, it should then come into force. That arrangement held good, irrespective of which of the Powers had ratified, and the situation would be similar if Great Britain, for example, had not ratified. Were this not so, there would be no peace; the state of war could not be prolonged. It was impossible to wait until America let them know whether she intended ratifying or not, before putting the Treaty into force. The Treaty was not a provisional one: it was a final Treaty which bound once and for all the Powers which had ratified, and Germany. This being so, and whilst approving the note as a whole, he wondered whether it would not be possible to suppress the reference made to China on the second page.<sup>4</sup>

M. FROMAGEOT remarked that this was a good argument.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it might be, but the question was whether the use of that argument were opportune.

M. FROMAGEOT remarked that they might simply say 'the absence of the signature of one Power would not prevent the Treaty from existing . . . etc.'

M. SCIALOJA did not consider the argument a good one. The question in substance was not whether the Treaty came into force or not, but to decide how such of its clauses as dealt with special action to be taken by the United States, or its representatives, could be applied: for example, those which mentioned the participation of the United States on such and such a Commission.

A case in point would be whether, in the absence of the American representative, a Commission could exercise its functions. The problem was not to decide whether the Treaty should be applied, but to decide how it could be applied.

<sup>4</sup> This reference was not included in the text in appendix E. The passage in question is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 828.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they were therefore all agreed to omit that argument.

It was decided:

To send to the Head of the German Delegation the letter, of which a draft was given in Appendix E, omitting in the last paragraph of page 2 the argument drawn from the absence of China's signature of the Treaty.<sup>4</sup>

4. The Council had before it a note from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, dated January 6, 1920 (Appendix F), and a draft verbal note to the German Delegation (Appendix G).<sup>5</sup>

*Draft of a verbal note to the German Delegation (Concentration of troops in Western Prussia)*

GENERAL WEYGAND read and commented upon the note of Marshal Foch.

MR. WALLACE asked whether the Germans had not already agreed to withdraw their troops from those regions.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that the Germans had concluded an agreement with the Poles which laid down the conditions of the evacuation of the territories ceded to Poland. The Poles were now anxious about the concentration of German forces in the territories to be ceded, and especially of troops which came from the Baltikum: they feared incidents at the time of the handing over of those districts to the Polish authorities. For that reason they asked the Conference to intervene.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wondered whether it would be advisable to send a note of that kind. The Germans were responsible for the maintenance of order until such time as the Polish and Allied troops would occupy those territories. Was it wise to send a note of that kind before they felt sure that the Germans intended to violate the Treaty? Up to that time there was no reason to suppose that such was their intention. He would point out that the evacuation of the German troops was only to begin on the seventh day. He feared a delay in the evacuation by the Germans much less than a delay on the part of the troops which were to replace them.

GENERAL WEYGAND replied that as the Council had decided to bring the Treaty into force on the following day, he would not insist, as the question lost much of its interest.

It was decided:

that there was no need to send a verbal note to the Head of the German Delegation on the subject of the concentration of troops in the territories of Western Prussia.

5. GENERAL WEYGAND stated that on the preceding day they had signed an agreement with the German representatives concerning the transport of Allied contingents in the plebiscite areas. That agreement satisfied their demands regarding the number of wagons to be supplied by the Germans. The German representatives, however, had made reservations in the document

*Transport of Allied contingents in the plebiscite areas*

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This draft verbal note was based on the note by Marshal Foch in appendix F and concluded by making to the German Government the two requests proposed by him.

which had been signed on the preceding day, with regard to the cost of this transport, stating that they had not received a reply from Berlin; they had therefore not agreed to grant the Allies military rates.

The Council took note of General Weygand's communications.

6. M. DUTASTA said that they had received a telegram from the French Minister at Copenhagen, dated January 5th, stating that the representative of the German Government had not yet communicated in writing whether he was authorized to accept the arrangement which had been submitted to him by the International Commission concerning the occupation of the plebiscite area in Schleswig. M. Dutasta had seen M. von Lersner on the preceding day and had informed him that the Council must receive written approval of that agreement by the German Government by the following day. M. von Lersner thought that that approval must have been given since January 5th. In any case, he would obtain authority to give it himself, if need be.

*Arrangement relative  
to Schleswig<sup>6</sup>*

7. M. BERTHELOT said that in order to meet certain wishes and also to give a certain solemnity to the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, they had agreed to postpone that ceremony for a few days. In any event it would be well to fix the exact date thereof without delay, and communicate it to President Wilson who would send out the official convocation. M. Bourgeois suggested January 19th.

*First meeting of the  
Council of the League of  
Nations*

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question was as follows: did they wish the first meeting to be an official ceremony or not? Unless he were mistaken, that first meeting would only decide a practical question, i.e., the nomination of the Delimitation Commission of the Saar. Would it be necessary to have a highly ceremonial function for that? It seemed that a simple business meeting would be sufficient to attain that object. The inauguration, properly speaking, of the League could then take place, once all the delegates had been appointed and when it became possible to decide upon a more complete agenda.

M. BERTHELOT said that it was, however, rather difficult that the first meeting should take place without any ceremony; and it was natural enough that some speeches should be made on that occasion. Some time previous, M. Fromageot had found an ingenious solution which came very near to Mr. Lloyd George's idea: to wit, to hold the second meeting before the first. . . .<sup>7</sup> He did not think that would be possible. . . .<sup>7</sup>

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the fact nevertheless remained that that meeting would not do very much, and were it not for the necessity of appointing the Saar Commission, there would be no need to call the Council at the present time.

M. BERTHELOT replied that there were two distinct questions: the question of the agenda upon which they were agreed, and that of the date of meeting.

<sup>6</sup> A French text of this minute is printed by A. Tardieu and F. de Jessen, op. cit., p. 345.

<sup>7</sup> Punctuation as in original.

Sir Eric Drummond had asked that the first meeting be postponed. It was in order to meet his wish that they proposed a delay; but it was clear that there was no reason to surround that event with too much ceremony.

LORD CURZON said that M. Bourgeois, who was to preside at the first meeting, intended to make a speech, and he wished him to make one likewise. As far as he was concerned, he was willing not to do so and he thought that M. Bourgeois would also consent to this.

After some discussion,

It was decided:

that Lord Curzon and M. Bourgeois should agree upon the date of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.

8. The Council had before it a note of the Chairman of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission, dated January 5, 1920 (see *Expenses of the Rhineland Interallied High Commission* Appendix H).<sup>8</sup>

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

That the expenses of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission should be paid by Germany by priority, on the same basis as the expenses of the army of occupation, provided for in Articles 249 and 251 *b* of the Treaty of Peace.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

The meeting then adjourned.

(The Chiefs of Delegations met *in camera*.)<sup>9</sup>

#### APPENDIX C TO NO. 53

##### *Memorandum from German Delegation of Jan. 3rd regarding temporary replacement of American Delegates on Commissions provided for in the Treaty*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN L 91.

January 8, 1920.

(1) In order to facilitate the suppression of the difficulties caused by the non-participation of the United States of America in the establishment of the first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications, the German Government wishes to continue to offer proof of its good faith. Until such times as it is known whether the United States of America will ratify the Treaty or not, the German Government is ready to let the Allies decide how the American representatives on the Commissions provided for by the Treaty may be temporarily replaced.

(2) By the terms of the Note of December 22, the Allied and Associated Governments received information to the effect that, after November 3, the floating docks, floating cranes, and dredges which are not carried on the list submitted by the German Technical Commission, are to be sold abroad. An investigation ordered

<sup>8</sup> Not printed. This note proposed the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council.

<sup>9</sup> See No. 63.

by the German Government shows that this information is incorrect. If, however, it were established that sales of this nature were being conducted by private individuals without the knowledge of the Government, the circumstance should be taken in consideration.

(3) The German Government, in the absence of more definite information from the Allies, is not in a position to assume a stand relative to the affirmation, according to which, among the crews interned consequent to the Scapa Flow incident, there are individuals who are guilty of a violation of the laws and customs of war and concerning whom Article 228 of the Peace Treaty [is] applicable. The German Government again protests against the fact that the crews which, with confidence in the terms of the Armistice Convention entered enemy waters, are retained by force.

(4) According to a passage in the Allied Note of December 22, relative to the delivery of the five cruisers mentioned in the Protocol, the Allied and Associated Governments esteem that the change desired by Germany in the Article in question in the Protocol of November 1 would be in contradiction with the provisions of the Peace Treaty. The German Government is not in a position to judge to what extent this is exact, and would be grateful for more specific information in the matter.

According to Article 181 of the Treaty, the German Naval forces which are available include six small cruisers. According to Article 190, paragraph 3, the cruisers as well as the battleships may be replaced by new constructions after a period of twenty years after their launching. This provision indicates, in the estimation of the German Government that, when Germany was authorized to keep six cruisers, it was not intended to include ships whose launching dates so far back that they are susceptible to replacement after three or four years. In delivering the five cruisers exacted by the Protocol, there would remain eight cruisers from which to choose the six cruisers which are to be put into service. Now, among these eight cruisers there are only three which were built subsequent to 1900 or, to be exact, in 1902 and 1903. Moreover, the present condition of these eight ships is so bad that only two at most are available for military use, and this after a considerable outlay of money, repairs and time. In the meantime, it is absolutely necessary for Germany to dispose of militarily serviceable cruisers in the defence of her long coast line if she is to avoid being exposed to the attack of any naval forces, however feeble.

PARIS, *January 3, 1920.*

#### APPENDIX D TO No. 53

##### *General Observations from the German Delegation regarding the negotiations as to the Territories of Memel and Dantzig*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN NO. 95.

*January 12, 1920.*

*January 8, 1920.*

The German Government believes it its duty to remark that according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace Germany must renounce her rights and titles to the territories of Memel and Dantzig in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers

collectively (articles 99 and 100). I suppose that as the United States of America have not yet ratified the Peace Treaty, the Four Principal Powers who have ratified will provisionally represent the rights which in this respect belong to the United States, and I presume that the Government of the United States will agree to this procedure.

#### APPENDIX E TO No. 53

*Note to the German Delegation of January 9th, regarding the provisional replacement of the United States Delegates, particularly in regard to Memel and Dantzig*

AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS.

ESH BULLETIN NO. 96.

January 12, 1919 [1920].

PEACE CONFERENCE.

Monsieur le Président:

In an aide-mémoire of the 3rd of this month, you were kind enough to inform the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference that 'as long as the question of whether the United States would ratify or not remained in suspense, the German Government was prepared to leave to the Allies the task of deciding how American representatives in the Commissions provided for by the Treaty should be temporarily replaced'.

In 'General Observations in Regard to the Negotiations as to the Territories of Memel and Dantzig' of January 8th, the German Delegation further remarks that according to the terms of the Treaty of Peace 'Germany must renounce all rights and titles to these territories in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers collectively' and assumes that 'the Four Principal Powers who have ratified will provisionally represent the rights which in this respect belong to the United States' as long as this last Power shall not have ratified.

It is to be feared that the terms in which these communications have been drafted may lead to some misunderstanding, which Germany and the Allies have a mutual interest to obviate. In the first place, there can be no question of replacing even temporarily the American representatives in the Commissions, for such replacement would constitute a modification of the Treaty. Neither is it conceivable that the Four Principal Powers can represent the rights belonging to the United States to Memel and Dantzig, since these rights resulting from the Treaty cannot exist for the United States until they shall have ratified.

Therefore, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan are, at the present moment, the only Powers who according to the Treaty have the quality of Principal Allied and Associated Powers as provided for by the Treaty.

To these four Powers and to these Powers alone, for the time being, do the provisions regarding the 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers' apply.

It is therefore to these four Powers only that the undivided sovereignty of Memel and Dantzig is transferred. When the United States ratify, the undivided sovereignty will belong to five Powers instead of four; but that does not concern Germany.

Finally, the German Government has no reason to consider the non-participation of the United States at the first deposit of ratifications to question [*sic*] any

provision of the Treaty or to reserve its liberty of action in case the United States decide not to ratify the Treaty.

From the moment of the procès-verbal establishing the first deposit of ratification, the Treaty must receive from all the Powers participating in the deposit full and absolute application in all its provisions.

Besides, the Supreme Council cannot in this respect do anything else but refer to its note of December 22nd and maintain without change the conclusions which the first paragraph of this document formulated on strict conformity with the final clauses of the Treaty.

Please accept [etc.].

## APPENDIX F TO No. 53

### Document 1

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ALLIED ARMIES

General Staff

G.H.Q., Jan. 6, 1920.

No. 28, Section Three

From: Marshal Foch.

To: President of the Council, President of the Peace Conference.

According to information of Polish origin, copy of which is hereto annexed, it is shown that the Germans are maintaining important forces in Western Prussia, which is in no way justified by the internal situation of the country.

These troops are composed, in particular, of Baltic elements and are principally concentrated in the region of Thorn.

As a result of an anterior intervention, General Dupont obtained the assurance of the German Government that the territories of Western Prussia, which are to be annexed to Poland, would be freed of all the elements which had arrived, or might arrive, from Courland.

It would appear, from the information above referred to, that these promises have not been adhered to.

In the meantime any concentration of German troops in the regions to be evacuated, and particularly of troops brought back from the Baltic, would tend to provoke conflicts which it is important to avoid.

Consequently, it is desirable to invite the German Government, before the entry into force of the Treaty, to:

(a) reduce the forces in Western Prussia to a strength strictly necessary to assure the maintenance of order, and safe passage across the territory for the Polish troops;

(b) send all the elements having belonged to the Baltic troops, at the present time located either in territory which is to be ceded to Poland or in plebiscite territory, to Central Germany.

These measures, which are similar to those applied in Upper Silesia relative to the military situation, might, should it be deemed expedient, be carried out in the same manner, by means of a verbal communication to M. von Lersner.

F. FOCH.

Document 2

POLISH MILITARY MISSION IN FRANCE

PARIS, Jan. 4, 1920.

No. 172<sub>1</sub>B

From: General Rozwadowski, Head of the Polish Military Mission.

To: The Commander-in-Chief of the Interallied Armies.

I have the honour to inform the Marshal of France that, according to a reliable source, the Germans are concentrating important forces at the base of the Vistula.

These forces are composed as follows: the 33rd Reichswehr Brigade, near Instertbruck; the Olita Brigade, near Elk; the 20th, 41st, and 37th R. Brigades, near Thorn, while only three brigades are covering the Posnania front. All these units have received reinforcements since December 1st. The Germans have concentrated the Freikorps Diebitsch, the Freikorps Plehwe, the Schaurath Detachment, the elements of the 17th R. Brigade, all except the elements of this Brigade coming from Courland and Lithuania, in the neighbourhood of Thorn.

The Courland troops, noted for their brutality and hostility towards the Poles and their lack of discipline, have evidently been brought to these regions to provoke the Polish population, and in that way, impede the turning over of these regions to Poland.

I have the honour to request that the Marshal of France cause the necessary measures to be taken to ensure the evacuation of these territories by the heavy German fighting units before their cession to Poland, and especially, the removal of the undisciplined detachments from Courland before the commencement of the Polish occupation.

If such measures are not taken serious troubles might take place between the Germans and occupying troops, while, on the contrary, greatly inferior forces would be wholly sufficient to maintain order and assure the correct rendition of the territories in question.

ROZWADOWSKI.

No. 54

H.D. 125.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs [sic], held at the Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Saturday, January 10, 1920, at 11.30 a.m.*

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.

Great Britain: Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, Mr. Bonar Law; SECRETARY, Sir M. P. A. Hankey.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint Quentin.

Italy: M. Nitti, M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. Winthrop. Great Britain: Capt. Lothian Small. France: M. de Percin. Italy: M. Zanchi.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

France: M. Cambon, M. Laroche, M. Hermitte, M. Arnavon.

Italy: Gen. Cavallero.

Japan: M. Sawada.

1. MR. WALLACE referred to a reservation made by the American Delegation to the resolution of the Supreme Council on the subject dated December 9, 1919 (H.D. 110).<sup>1</sup>

*Use of Native troops of the Togoland and Cameroon for the defence of the metropolitan and of the Colonial territory*

He explained that he had been authorized by his Government to accept, in the name of the United States, the suggestion made by Sir Eyre Crowe on the 9th of December on the subject of employing native troops in the Togo and Cameroons, to the effect that the text of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations will be maintained but interpreted with reference to the minutes of the Council of Ten, of January 30, 1919; in other words, in the event only of a general war, France will be allowed to raise within the territory held under her mandate native troops to be employed in her own defence as well as in that of the territories in question.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU read the text of the arrangement concerning the Inter-allied military organization which would take effect after the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles; the arrangement was couched in these terms:

*Interallied military organization after the coming into force of the Treaty*

‘The Allied and Associated Governments decide that the Interallied military organization shall continue under the presidency of Marshal Foch at Versailles and shall have as terms of reference:

‘(a) to act as advisory council to the Allied and Associated Governments in military questions arising out of the execution of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

‘(b) to carry into execution the orders given it by the Allied and Associated Powers in matters concerning the Commissions of Control and the Allied forces of occupation in the Rhineland and Plebiscite areas.’

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in the name of the British Government he very gladly agreed to the proposal put before the Council. It was necessary that that organization should continue to sit at Versailles. Versailles was a word to which public opinion in England was accustomed. Further, he should very much like that that organization should be consulted not only upon the military questions arising out of the execution of the Treaty with Germany but also upon military questions bearing upon other issues of common interest to the Allies. Among such questions he would cite those affecting southern Russia, Azerbaidjan and Georgia, where the situation—and he was going to discuss it shortly with the Council—was very grave.

M. MATSUI pointed out that during the war Japan had not been represented on the Versailles Military Council. The Council was now being prolonged; was it understood that Japan would be represented?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that that depended upon Japan; that it was Japan itself that had not wished to be represented in the former Council.

M. MATSUI asked whether they would have any objections in the event of his Government being prepared to be represented.

<sup>1</sup> No. 39 (minute 6).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE felt that the Allies would have no objection whatever. M. NITTI approved the proposal submitted to the Council.

It was decided:

that the Interallied military organization should continue under the presidency of Marshal Foch at Versailles and have for instructions:

- (a) to act as advisory council to the Allied and Associated Governments in the military questions arising out of the execution of the Treaty of Peace with Germany;
- (b) to execute the orders given it by the Allied and Associated Powers in matters concerning the Commissions of Control and the Allied forces of occupation in the Rhineland and Plebiscite areas.

It was further decided:

that, should the occasion arise, the Council could be consulted upon all military questions of common interest to the Allies which the latter might be agreed to submit to it.

Mr. Wallace would refer this resolution to Washington for instructions of his Government.

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE told the Council that they had just received from the Caucasus very disturbing news. The Bolsheviks were advancing upon the Caspian; if, having entirely defeated Denikin's army, they should reach the sea, it was possible that the Turks might join with them, an event which would throw the States of the Caucasus into a desperate situation. It became incumbent, therefore, on the Council to find out whether it would be wise to support those States by sending them, for example, arms and ammunition to facilitate their resistance to the Bolshevik drive. He did not mean to express in that place an opinion upon so delicate a question, but suggested referring it to the military organization at Versailles which without prejudicing the political solution might be able to give them the information of a purely military nature which they required in order to take a decision.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it might be good if the British Delegation drafted a memorandum which the Council could submit to the military council at Versailles.

It was decided:

to refer to the Versailles Military Council the question of the aid it might be necessary to give to the Caucasian States against the Bolsheviks. The British Delegation would prepare a memorandum upon the subject which would be submitted to the Versailles Military Council for immediate examination and report to the Supreme Council.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE expressed his regret at again proposing a subject not down on the agenda. But the agenda for that meeting was rather long and might possibly occupy them for quite a considerable time. There was a danger of its being so on the following days. Mr. Clemenceau's time was extremely limited as indeed was his own, for he would doubtless have to return to England shortly

on account of serious labour troubles. To save time, he would suggest recourse to a method of organization that had already been tested, namely, to constitute on the one hand a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which would examine questions relative to the Peace Treaty with Hungary and all questions of detail on which, for that matter, Lord Curzon was much better informed than himself and to form on the other hand a Council of the Heads of Governments who would examine only the larger questions of general policy, the discussion of which had been essentially the object of his visit.

M. Nitti supported Mr. Lloyd George's proposal. He too could not prolong very much his stay in Paris. He would remind them that he should have to be in Italy for labour questions, the solution of which was urgent, as well as for the reopening of Parliament which was to take place before the end of the month. The Council of Heads of Governments ought naturally to deal with the question of the Adriatic, but it was desirable that it should also examine the Albanian question which he very earnestly desired to have solved before his departure. The maintenance of a force of occupation in Albania was costing them enormous sums and they anxiously desired to have it settled.

It was decided:

that during the presence in Paris of the British and Italian Prime Ministers, there should be constituted:

- (1) a Council of the Heads of Governments who would deal with questions of general policy;
- (2) a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs who would deal with questions arising out of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary and all matters not examined by the Council of Heads of Governments.

The meeting adjourned.

## CHAPTER II

# Meetings in London and Paris of Allied Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs

December 11, 1919—January 21, 1920

### No. 55

I.C.P. I.] *Notes of a Conversation at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W., on  
Thursday, December 11, 1919, at 3 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The  
Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for  
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Philip Kerr.

*France*: M. Clemenceau,<sup>1</sup> M. Cambon,<sup>2</sup> M. Berthelot, M. de Fleuriau.<sup>3</sup>

SECRETARY: Sir M. Hankey.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

I. M. CLEMENCEAU said that there were two ways of approaching this question, either as a whole or in detail. He thought perhaps the best plan would be to begin by discussing certain details, such as Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine, which raised questions more especially concerning Great Britain and France.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that it would be better to begin by considering the question of Turkey as a whole.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had no objection to this course.

He suggested that, to start with, the system of mandates should be renounced so far as Asia Minor is concerned, and that the question of the Ottoman Empire should be dealt with as a whole in the manner which seemed best. When he spoke of renouncing the system of mandates for Turkey, he did not wish to include the Arab part of the former Turkish Empire. In discussing the question from a Turkish point of view, however, he felt he ought not to include Cilicia as part of Syria, since the Turks did not admit that it was part of Syria. He therefore asked whether Mr. Lloyd George agreed with him in abandoning the system of mandates for Turkish Asia, excluding the portions inhabited by Arabs.

<sup>1</sup> M. Clemenceau, accompanied by a French staff, had arrived in London on the morning of December 11, 1919, in order to discuss with members of His Majesty's Government important questions of common interest (cf. No. 37, note 4). M. Clemenceau returned from London to Paris on December 14.

<sup>2</sup> M. Paul Cambon was French Ambassador in London.

<sup>3</sup> Minister in the French Embassy in London.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE replied in the affirmative.

(Lord Curzon entered at this point.)

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that the first question to be considered was that of the future of Constantinople. It was a very difficult and controversial subject. He would say at the outset, in order to clarify the discussion, that in his view the Straits must be kept in the hands of an Allied force and taken altogether out of the hands of Turkey. Should the Straits include Constantinople? That was one question. His opinion was that it would be a mistake to take the Turks out of Constantinople. He would consider Constantinople as separate from the Straits. This was not because he anticipated a difference of opinion between the United Kingdom and France, but because of the difficulties he apprehended would arise with other nations. We must recognize how the agents of the various countries would persist in the pursuit of old quarrels, renewing old traditions, and making trouble between the two nations contrary to the tendencies of the Governments themselves. If the idea of cutting up Asia Minor was abandoned, it was our interest to leave a certain amount of prestige to the head of the State of Asia Minor. It was unnecessary to talk of the blunders that the Turks had committed, or to recall the losses they had occasioned. If the Sultan was to govern in our interest, the more responsibility we could give him the better. It would be easier to govern through the Sultan as an intermediary, and for this reason it would be better to leave him in Constantinople. An alternative would be to let him go to Brusa, but this would cause difficulties that it would be better to avoid.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, in anticipation of these conversations, he had discussed this question with his colleagues as lately as the previous evening. On the whole, the British Government felt objections to leaving Constantinople in the hands of the Turks. They agreed that Asia Minor was not a suitable field in which to apply the system of mandates. They also agreed that the Straits must be placed under some form of international control. He recalled that owing to the Straits being in the hands of the hostile Powers, the war had probably been prolonged for a period of two years beyond what would have been the case if the Straits had remained open. As regards Constantinople itself, the British Government felt that complete control of the Straits would not be assured unless Constantinople also was in the hands of some international force. Constantinople was situated at the gates of the Bosphorus. There were perhaps some 500,000 Turks in Constantinople. If they were left in control there, they would close the Bosphorus, even though the Dardanelles were open. Hence he felt that there should be an international force in Constantinople. Another consideration was that the Allied peoples would not wish to have placed upon them the burden of paying for the troops required to keep open the Straits. The Straits ought to be made self-supporting, but this could not be done without Constantinople. In the port and city of Constantinople it should be possible to raise sufficient taxes and dues to pay for the troops. This could

not be done, however, if there were a large population there outside of the control of the Allies. The fact was he did not want to include a big sum in his budget for maintaining troops for the Straits. The view of the British Government was that there should be an international force composed of French and British troops; it would probably be necessary to include Italians, and possibly also Greeks. This force should be under the direction of a neutral commissioner, who might be called a president or commandant of troops, or something of the kind. He wished the Straits to be really neutral. In the future there might be trouble with Russia, which might join itself with Germany. For this reason he wanted an inter-allied force at Constantinople. He was unwilling to trust the Sultan. In the event of a possible Russo-German combination, the Germans might get a hold on the Sultan, as they had during the late war. He wanted an absolute guarantee of the neutrality of the Straits which could prevent the possibility of anything of the kind. That was the second reason.

Another reason was that the question of Constantinople depended to some extent on the settlement as regards Asia Minor. There were two ways of dealing with Asia Minor. One method was to have an independent Turkish State there, and the other was to have a State somewhat analogous to Egypt with a Sultan who was the nominal sovereign, while the real control was exercised by Great Britain and France. That meant a condominium. Frankly, he was afraid of this (M. Clemenceau observed: 'So am I'). Supposing the British and French Governments agreed as to their policy, which might not always be easy; from time to time rebellion and massacres would occur. He presumed the Sultan would be told he must stop them. He might reply that he was unable to. Very likely the army would be against him. In such a contingency, he asked, were Great Britain and France to send troops? A condominium would, he feared, place the two Governments in the position of issuing futile orders about Asia Minor which would never be obeyed. He was afraid of that policy. If the Sultan was in Constantinople his Ministers and Administration would also be there, and there would be constant intrigues, &c. He would attempt to divide the Powers and play one off against the other. And even if the Governments and their representatives were in agreement, as M. Clemenceau had observed, their agents would constantly be at work causing difficulties. Hence, it was better, in his opinion, that the Sultan should be out of Constantinople.

An alternative which had been suggested, he thought first by M. Veniselos, was that the Sultan should be established in a sort of Vatican at Constantinople. He should be given Yildiz Kiosk. We might say to him: 'Brusa is your capital, but you can have Yildiz Kiosk as a residence and as the religious centre of Islam.' He would be allowed to have a small Turkish guard, just as the Pope had his guard in the Vatican. But the Allies would be in occupation of all the surrounding country and of the Golden Horn.

He did not want the Sultan in Constantinople with a Turkish population of half a million, with Russia always desirous of obtaining Constantinople, and with Germany constantly intriguing. One advantage to us of the Vatican

proposal was that it would help us with the Mahometans. He recalled that during the Peace Conference representatives of the Mahometans of India had appeared before the Council of Four to urge that the Sultan should be left in Constantinople. He did not underrate this, but what he specially wanted to avoid was trouble in Europe.

LORD CURZON said he would like to add one or two points to reinforce what Mr. Lloyd George had said. Mr. Lloyd George had pointed out the difficulty of an international administration of the Dardanelles which did not extend to the Bosphorus; and that if the Turks were left in possession of Constantinople many of the troubles of the past would arise. An additional objection was that if the Sultan was left in Constantinople a difficulty would arise as regards Adrianople. The arguments for the Turks remaining in Adrianople were just as strong as in the case of Constantinople. Then at once there would arise the difficulty of the country between the two Straits, which was inhabited largely by Greeks. Was it proposed, he asked, to tear up the work of the Peace Conference, which trended towards some international control in this régime? Another point which had to be borne in mind was that the Turkish policy of the future would be strongly nationalist. It would be the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress<sup>4</sup> in a more advanced form. Some indication of their probable policy was furnished by Mustafa Kemal, who was the principal exponent of it at the present time. If the Sultan at Constantinople was in control of such a party with all the memories and prestige of the past, and strongly nationalist in sentiment, there must inevitably be trouble which would react on the French in Tunis and Tripoli and Algeria no less than on the British in Egypt and India. The Mahometan world would say that the Turk had never been beaten at all, and to prove it they would point to the fact that he was still in possession of Constantinople and Adrianople, from which places he continued to exercise his full powers as Khalif.

M. BERTHELOT, referring to the proposal for establishing a Mahometan Vatican at Constantinople, asked whether it was proposed to leave the Sultan there specifically as spiritual head of the Moslem faith, or was it merely proposed to give him a palace at Constantinople, just as the Pope was allowed to live in the Vatican without his being specified as spiritual head of the Roman Catholic religion.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that since the Mahometans did, in fact, recognise the Sultan as their spiritual head, he would actually continue to be so whether designated or not.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that in his view no object was to be gained by continuing indefinitely *ex tempore* discussions on such a difficult subject. Every system was beset with difficulties. His great desire in all this was to do everything possible to avoid friction between Great Britain and France. Perhaps it was impossible entirely to eliminate friction, but it should be reduced and attenuated as far as possible.

<sup>4</sup> The organ of the movement of the Young Turks, which had pursued the national revival of Turkey during the years preceding the First World War.

As regards the proposal to keep the Sultan in Constantinople, he himself had at one time felt the same as Mr. Lloyd George in the matter, and he thought that the British representatives had also changed their view. Lord Curzon's points, he admitted, were of considerable importance. He agreed that the system he proposed was full of dangers, but so was any other system.

He, himself, was opposed to the creation of a new Pope in the East. It was quite bad enough to have one Pope in the West, and as to establishing a holy place in Constantinople, it must be recalled that the Mahometans already had Mecca. If the Sultan was at Brusa he would be in a better position than Pius VII in Napoleon's time had been at Fontainebleau. But, nevertheless, he had been able to exercise his functions as a spiritual chief from Fontainebleau. He admitted that if the Sultan was left at Constantinople there would be a danger of the Mahometans saying that the Turks had never been beaten, and that the Allies had not dared to remove him from Constantinople. On the other hand, if he were sent to Brusa there might be a movement to send him back to Constantinople. For himself, he would like to get rid of the idea of creating a new Vatican.

As regards Asia Minor, if the system of mandates was suppressed it would be necessary to have some international control of the Turkish Government. The Turks had shown that they were not fit for self-government, and there must be some form of supervision and some form of control over their military organisation over the Dardanelles and Bosphorus with a strip of territory behind. He preferred the system he had proposed, though he realised the objections to it. Nevertheless, he would range himself alongside of the British plan if some of the difficulties which he foresaw could be removed. The great necessity was to avoid Anglo-French friction. He thought it was possible for the two nations to control the Straits by a joint force. As regards Asia Minor also he required a solution which would avoid friction, which was the one thing he wished to escape. He realised that the logical solution was to join Constantinople to the Dardanelles and Bosphorus under a single inter-allied European authority, and if certain objections could be surmounted he would accept it. Anyhow, the proposal certainly deserved thorough examination. He was opposed to the suggestion that the President of the United States should be asked to nominate a president of the international authority. It would be difficult enough to reach an understanding when only two nations were concerned, although these two had the common interest of both wishing above all to maintain peace in Europe. He did not believe that any Government in Great Britain or France would be so unreasonable as to push a quarrel too far. But he did not think that the United States of America could help much. To begin with, they were very far away. Moreover, he could not forget that politically America had forced a peace system on the Allies with which she had now refused to agree.

It was necessary to establish a sort of a balance between the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, Constantinople and Asia Minor. In those regions Great Britain came first in commercial interests, but France came first in matters of local

enterprise and industry. On this basis he thought that some satisfactory agreement might be reached. Provided the two Governments were in agreement in regard to their general policy in Europe the questions of Constantinople and Brusa would be easier to solve. Otherwise the difficulties might take an aspect leading to a quarrel between the two nations which he wished at all costs to avoid. This being so, he felt that a solution could not be reached in *ex tempore* discussions. It was necessary to adopt some system which would give greater precision. His own preference was in favour of a system under which there would sometimes be a British President and a French Vice-President and at other times a French President and a British Vice-President. In the event of difficulties the Power affected would then know that it only had to apply to London or Paris to get the matter settled. Of course, the Italians must be included in the system. This was regrettable because the Italians, as experience had shown, sometimes tried to play off one nation against the other. He would, therefore, put in charge a Frenchman or an Englishman, reserving for further consideration the question of the Italians and Greeks. He would prefer not to bring Italy into the pourparlers.

As regards procedure, his suggestion was to charge a British representative and a French representative to meet and compare the two systems that had been proposed and to work them out in full detail and submit them in writing. This would not take long. But each plan should be studied in all detail, financial and otherwise. The two plans could then be discussed between Mr. Lloyd George and himself.

To speak quite frankly, there had been a great deal too much delay. The responsibility did not rest with the Governments, for the delay was largely due to British and French agents, who were clinging to the old system and causing trouble. Under his plan he thought that a solution might be found within a fortnight.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the scheme which M. Clemenceau advocated was one of Anglo-French control at Constantinople, leaving the Sultan there, but taking charge of the Administration? Did his proposal include the control of Asia Minor? Was any other Power to intervene?

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that the Turkish Government would be either at Constantinople or at Brusa, and would be under some international organization. Italy would certainly have to be included.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE admitted that he himself had leaned sometimes in one direction and sometimes in another as regards Constantinople. When the details were worked out, it might transpire that some third plan was better than either. Hence he not only accepted M. Clemenceau's proposal, but thought it a most admirable suggestion. He proposed that the task of examining these problems should be commenced immediately after the present conference. He would nominate Lord Curzon as the British expert.

M. CLEMENCEAU nominated M. Berthelot.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that M. Berthelot should remain in London until some sort of an agreement could be reached.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as M. Pichon was seriously ill and would be

away for some time, it was difficult for him to spare M. Berthelot from Paris.

M. BERTHELOT said that Lord Curzon probably had the whole question at his finger ends and he himself had the necessary documents with him, so perhaps they could begin at once.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he proposed M. Berthelot should stay in London for two or three days longer.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was one point of detail he wished to clear up. Was the Sultan at Brusa to act under international control?

M. CLEMENCEAU said he contemplated financial control.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if the control was to extend to the army.

M. CLEMENCEAU explained that the army would be controlled through finance.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was really one of the questions to be discussed between Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that they should explore all aspects of the question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Clemenceau had indicated that hitherto the industrial development in Turkey had been mainly French, whereas the commercial development had been British. What was his idea as to the future?

M. CLEMENCEAU said that matters ought to be left where they were.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if there were to be spheres of influence.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the negative.

3. In reply to Lord Curzon, who had asked whether Italy was to have a sphere of influence in the south of Asia Minor, he said that this *Italy and Greece* opened up the whole of the Greek-Italian question. He understood that the Italians were ready to clear out of Asia Minor if the Greeks did the same. The Italians had gone to Asia Minor without consulting the British and French Governments. Signor Orlando had said that they would withdraw morally, but that physically they would remain. It was difficult to turn the Greeks out of Smyrna and he thought that a mistake had been made in allowing them to go there. But he thought the Greeks would be impressed by the argument that they could not hold Smyrna against the Turks. At present they were only maintained there by the financial support of the Allies. If they were given a good trace for their frontier elsewhere, such as the Americans now agreed to,<sup>5</sup> he thought that some arrangement might be made about Smyrna. The Italians had no right to go to Asia Minor at all.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was a strong supporter of M. Veniselos. He had been the friend of the Allies right through and had stuck to them through thick and through thin. He had opposed himself to King Constantine and he ought to be supported.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that personally he put this aspect of the question

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Vol. I, No. 49, minute 3.

very high, and he would like to know what M. Veniselos thought about leaving Smyrna.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it would be better not to ask M. Veniselos, since it would be very difficult for him to say he would withdraw.

M. BERTHELOT said that in his last conversation with M. Veniselos the latter had complained that he had been treated rather harshly by President Wilson, and had added that if M. Clemenceau had told him that he could not have Smyrna he would not have allowed Greek troops to go there.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that some status might be created for the Greeks in and around the town of Smyrna.

LORD CURZON said he supposed M. Clemenceau meant some privileged position. He reminded M. Clemenceau of our obligations to Italy under the Treaty of London.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Italy was in a very different position from Greece. In and about Smyrna there was a big Greek population, but in Asia Minor there was no Italian population at all, and Italy had no right of occupation. Possibly she might claim a right of exploitation. He did not fancy, however, that the Italians really wanted to stay. The fact was they did not quite know what they did want. He had suggested to Signor Scialoja that, if only he would refund the £750,000,000 that Great Britain had spent on the Turkish campaign, he could have Mesopotamia and Palestine, and everything else. He thought he had made the same suggestion to M. Clemenceau.

#### 4. LORD CURZON raised the question of Cilicia and Armenia.

*Cilicia and Armenia* M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Armenians were a dangerous people to get mixed up with. They required a great deal of money, and gave very little satisfaction. He was in favour of letting them have a republic, or whatever else they wanted. France was unwilling to spend any money in Armenia.

LORD CURZON, reverting to the question of Asia Minor, asked how, supposing an international control was set up, it would be possible to prevent armed bands of what were virtually brigands doing what they had done in the past—sweeping through Armenia massacring the population. How would it be possible to make them behave themselves? By setting up an international commission a heavy responsibility would be incurred.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Turks would be controlled by means of the finance.

LORD CURZON asked if M. Clemenceau contemplated complete financial control and management of the whole of the finances of the Turkish State.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied in the affirmative.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what was done in China.

LORD CURZON said that we merely collected the customs which were levied mainly on European and American trade, and certain taxes, such as the salt revenue and other odds and ends. He could recall no case where a great Empire's finances were administered by foreign control.

5. M. CLEMENCEAU asked if it was proposed to give the Dodecanese to Greece.

*The Dodecanese* MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was in favour of this.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Veniselos had announced in the Greek Parliament that he had come to an agreement with the Italian Government in regard to the Dodecanese.

It was agreed:

That Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot should jointly examine the schemes proposed by the British and French Governments respectively in regard to Constantinople, the Straits, and Asia Minor, and should work out in detail the two schemes with a view to their further consideration.

6. M. BERTHELOT handed to Lord Curzon a memorandum on the subject of oil. He explained that this document had been prepared personally for M. Clemenceau, and this must be borne in mind in studying it. It contained a review of the question of oil as a whole. It treated the French point of view and the British point of view, and showed the importance of the two Governments standing together on this.

The question was left for discussion between Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot.

7. M. BERTHELOT handed to Mr. Lloyd George a proposal made by the French Government in regard to the fifteen reservations proposed by the American Senate to the Treaty of Peace.<sup>6</sup>  
*The Attitude of the British and French Governments towards the United States of America*

8.

It was agreed:

*Palestine and Syria* That Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot should confer as to the question of the head-waters of the Jordan as affecting the boundaries between Syria and Palestine.

9. LORD CURZON asked if M. Clemenceau had any ideas at present in regard to the future of the Caucasus.

*The Caucasus* M. CLEMENCEAU said he understood that the British were at Batum and Baku, and were virtually governing the country.

LORD CURZON said that M. Clemenceau was misinformed. The British Government had withdrawn all their troops except a Brigade maintained temporarily at Batum.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled that the Caucasus had been offered to the Italians, who had sent a mission there, after which they had withdrawn.

10. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had nothing to add to what he had told Mr. Lloyd George that morning.<sup>7</sup>

*Russia* MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was in full agreement with M. Clemenceau.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. No. 58, appendix 1.

<sup>7</sup> See No. 56, minute 2.

LORD CURZON said the difficulty was to understand what would happen next after we had disinterested ourselves entirely from all the anti-Bolshevik States.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not propose that we should disinterest ourselves. We should continue to keep an eye on them, surrounding them, as it were, by a barbed wire entanglement, and spending no money.

LORD CURZON asked whether the missions now in these States would still be maintained.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not propose to withdraw the missions. Each case should be considered by the two Governments on its merits. But he was opposed to any attempt to set up any separate States in Russia, as in that case the people of Russia would claim that we were trying to dismember Russia. He only proposed to withdraw and watch the result.

11. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he felt Great Britain did not take sufficient interest in Poland. A strong Poland was the best way to avoid a war between Germany and the Allies, since Poland had half a million good soldiers. Moreover, owing to her situation, Poland was able to help in the most effective way. He wanted Poland to feel that the Allies were united in her support. At present there was a bad feeling against England in Poland, which, no doubt, was quite unjust. For example, there was great discontent about the mandate which had been given to Poland over Eastern Galicia for twenty-five years.

M. BERTHELOT said that in the end the Commission on Polish Affairs had unanimously recommended this.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that nevertheless Poland felt badly about it. He had had a letter from a M. Pathée,<sup>8</sup> who was a very sensible and moderate man. He had come to M. Clemenceau and asked if the conference would reconsider their decision. He had said that the mandate proposal affecting what Poland considered her own had created very bad feeling. He had not said that the Polish army would revolt or become Bolshevik, but he had suggested it would be a good thing if the question could be left open for a time. The Poles were a very sentimental people, and they wanted to feel that Great Britain was more favourable to them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had only been opposed, in the interest of the Poles themselves, to their taking a large German population into Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if Mr. Lloyd George could instruct the British representative at the Supreme Council to leave the question open, it would soften the Poles.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that two-thirds of the population of East Galicia were Ruthenians.

LORD CURZON said the difficulty was that the *intelligentsia* was Polish.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it was a small question which he would not press

<sup>8</sup> The reference is uncertain. It seems likely that M. Clemenceau may have referred to M. Patek.

if it was inconvenient to Mr. Lloyd George, but he wished to repeat that Poland was a strong bulwark against Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Poles had always been a very troublesome people in Europe.

M. CLEMENCEAU said this applied to the British and French also. The Poles had preserved their nationality through a great many years.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that they had tried to obtain large slices of German territory, and now they had gone to Galicia and were trying to take into their system millions of people of a different race and religion from themselves. This would cause mischief, and he was not sure that we had not already gone too far.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the great point was that Germany had now been suppressed and that the Poles could give great help in keeping her in order. We wanted all the help we could get in this. If only we could get rid of Germany there would be peace in Europe.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he believed Germany was already completely down, and wanted peace.

12. M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not want to repeat tittle-tattle, but he had heard reports that British influence was being exerted in a special way in Hungary. If so, he would like to understand the position. Great Britain could, of course, do as she liked, but he did not like what he had heard—that she was encouraging the Archduke Joseph.

LORD CURZON said that this story was a mare's nest. On Admiral Troubridge's name being mentioned, he said that some story had reached the Foreign Office of Admiral Troubridge speaking in favour of the Archduke Joseph,<sup>9</sup> in consequence of which Admiral Troubridge had been told that it was none of his business, and that he would be recalled if he intruded in matters of this kind.

M. BERTHELOT said that there had been reports that the Hungarians wanted an English Prince.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that they were not likely to get one.

13. It was agreed:

*Morocco and Egypt* That certain questions relating to Morocco and Egypt should be discussed between Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Cf. No. 23, minute 6.

<sup>10</sup> The reference was apparently to certain questions, more particularly with regard to the status of the Tangier Zone and Franco-Spanish relations in Morocco, arising in connexion with Article 141 of the Treaty of Versailles. (Cf. *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. iv, pp. 127–37.) In requesting British support for French policy in Morocco the French Government had referred to the Anglo-French Agreements of 1904 as having established a connexion between the British and French positions in Egypt and Morocco respectively. In a despatch of December 29, 1919, Lord Curzon informed Sir E. Howard, H.M. Ambassador in Madrid, of a conversation concerning the Tangier Zone 'which I had with the Spanish Ambassador a few days before Christmas', in which the latter had welcomed 'my assurance that I had not had any conversation on the subject with either M. Clemenceau or M. Berthelot during their recent visit to England'. Between the date of Lord Curzon's conversation with the Spanish Amba-

14. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had explained to M. Clemenceau that morning that, in the view of the British Government, the guarantee to Belgium must contain a reciprocal clause, under which Belgium would undertake not to commit any unneutral act if her neutrality was guaranteed.

*The Guarantee of  
the Neutrality of  
Belgium*

It was agreed:

That some form of words could be found for achieving this.

15. M. CLEMENCEAU said that as soon as the ratifications of the Treaty of Peace were deposited, Marshal Foch's command would come to an end. Already General Degoutte commanded the Allied forces on the Rhine. He proposed that an International Military Commission should be set up at Versailles for the purpose of supervising the execution of the treaty, and that Marshal Foch should be its president. The commission would not be allowed to take any decisions, which would be reserved to the Governments of the Allied and Associated Powers. Marshal Foch's organization, however, would be used as an organ of transmission of communications to the German Government, and for advising the Allied and Associated Governments. The Americans had said that they would accept anything that the British Government would agree to. Field-Marshal Wilson had expressed a favourable opinion, but, of course, he realized that this did not commit the British Government.

M. BERTHELOT said that Field-Marshal Wilson had said that against Germany it was necessary to employ 'big guns', and we had no bigger 'gun' than Marshal Foch.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he would consider this proposal favourably and give a reply to M. Clemenceau.

2, Whitehall Gardens, December 11, 1919.

## No. 56

I.C.P. 2.] *Secretary's Notes of a Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W.1, on December 12, 1919, at 11.30 a.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal, The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council, The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. de Fleuriau.

*U.S.A.*: The Hon. J. W. Davis.<sup>2</sup>

*Italy*: Signor Scialoja, The Marquis Imperiali.<sup>3</sup>

SECRETARY: Sir M. Hankey.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

sador and that of his despatch to Sir E. Howard, Lord Curzon had, however, had a conversation concerning Morocco with M. de Fleuriau and M. Berthelot 'who had returned from Paris in order to discuss the Turkish Peace Treaty with me'.

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 841 f.

<sup>2</sup> Ambassador of the United States in London.

<sup>3</sup> Italian Ambassador in London.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE proposed that the discussion should begin with the question of the Adriatic. A joint note had been prepared by the *The Adriatic* representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain, in Paris,<sup>4</sup> with a view to its presentation to Signor Scialoja, and he understood that M. Clemenceau was prepared to hand the note.

M. CLEMENCEAU handed Signor Scialoja the note. He said he had already informed his colleague, Signor Scialoja, semi-officially of the existence of this note, and had told him that it had been signed in complete agreement by the representatives of the United States of America, France and Great Britain. The object of the note was to try and find a final settlement. The delay on this question had kept the conference at bay for months. The same delay had brought Italy into a situation that was veritably revolution. There could be no peace in Europe until this question was settled. The United States Government, through President Wilson, had given an indication of the concessions to which it could agree and as to what it could not accept. On that basis Great Britain and France had always sought to find a text which would be acceptable to all parties. The difficulties had been increased owing to the occupation of Fiume by d'Annunzio, and owing to the fact that a part of the Italian army and fleet had refused to obey the orders of the Italian Government. The British and French Governments had considered the question point by point, from the point of view both of the position of Italy and of President Wilson's concessions, and had done their best to bring the views of all into accord. They knew that the Italian Government opposed resistance on certain points. They knew also that the Italian Government would accept the note in the friendly spirit in which it was offered, but asked to be allowed to make a reply and to present observations and criticisms. In handing this note to Signor Scialoja, he asked him, as well as the Italian Government, to bear in mind that it constituted a supreme and, as they hoped, a final effort to secure a peaceful settlement. He implored the Italian Government to make an attempt to reach an agreement. No great concession on their part was required. If the Allies could succeed in settling this question, it would remove one of the great obstacles to the pacification of the world.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he would receive the note with the same friendly sentiments as had been expressed by M. Clemenceau on behalf of the Allies. He had learned from M. Clemenceau that this note was to be presented, and he had afterwards learned certain further details from Mr. Polk and Lord Curzon, who had indicated to him the broad lines of the new proposal.<sup>5</sup> He doubted if Italy could accept it without certain alterations. What he attached great importance to was that the note explained the reasons on each point. Up to now he thought that the reasons had not been sufficiently discussed in the consideration of this question, which had been treated too vaguely. The subject must be examined in close detail, with full regard to

<sup>4</sup> This memorandum, dated at Paris on December 9, 1919, is printed as document 1 in Cmd. 586 of 1920 (*Correspondence relating to the Adriatic Question*).

<sup>5</sup> A report by Lord Curzon of a conversation on this subject which he had with Signor Scialoja on December 8, 1919, is printed as document 2 in Cmd. 586.

the realities of the situation. He thought if the reasons were examined on each point, a solution could be found. He recognised that the Adriatic question was closely connected with the general European situation. Italy had suffered very much from the failure to settle the question of Fiume, and he recognised that Italy's internal difficulties were closely connected with these external difficulties. He asked what would be the best procedure as regards the Italian reply. To whom should it be addressed, in order to pave the way for an agreement? Should this question be separated and considered by itself?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he took a very strong view in regard to Signor Scialoja's last question. He did not believe that this matter could ever be settled by notes. It was no use for the Powers to sling documents at each other's heads. This question would never be settled until people who had authority to sign a document could meet together. Personally, he was so anxious for a settlement of the question of Fiume that he would go anywhere and at all risks, and there were risks at a time when strikes were threatening. A point which strongly impressed him had been that the question would go from bad to worse if it was not settled soon. Already it constituted a danger to the internal peace of Italy, and it could not do this without affecting all the other countries. Moreover, it created doubts as to the unity of the Allies. He hoped, therefore, that there would be an end of note-writing, and that persons with authority to settle would meet and come to an arrangement. He knew Signor Scialoja's difficulties, and naturally he could not settle the question in the absence of the Italian President of the Council. He would propose, therefore, that the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy, together with a representative of the United States, with full powers, if this could possibly be arranged (though he fully realised the difficulty of this) should meet together. Even in the very regrettable absence of a representative of the United States with full powers, he thought it should not be impossible to reach an agreement which he felt sure would carry great weight with the American Government. He therefore asked Signor Scialoja if the Italian President of the Council, with his Foreign Minister, could not meet his colleagues somewhere and settle the question. When he had been in Paris the question had been bad enough, but since then d'Annunzio's *coup* and the trouble with the Italian army and navy had made it infinitely worse. It would be a great advantage, therefore, if Signor Nitti could meet his colleagues, together with the Foreign Ministers, and settle the question.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he would put this proposal before Signor Nitti. For the moment he feared it would be impossible for Signor Nitti to leave Rome, as the Chamber was engaged in difficult and, indeed, tumultuous debates. Signor Nitti could not leave the Chamber without a pilot. The session of the Chamber, however, would not last long, and, he thought, would be over about the 20th. Consequently, a meeting might be possible during the Christmas holidays.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested a meeting at San Remo.

M. CLEMENCEAU said it was easier to find a place than to settle the question. It was important that everyone present should have full powers. There would be no difficulty about this in the case of Mr. Lloyd George and himself. He did not feel so sure, however, in regard to Signor Nitti. He feared that probably Mr. Davis would not receive full powers. In this event they might have a delightful journey to San Remo with deplorable results. The key to the whole question was the difference between Italy and President Wilson. He would ask the Italians to remember that they were all animated by the most friendly intentions towards them. He was afraid, however, that Italy approached the question exclusively from an Italian point of view, while their Allies were obliged to take into account the state of Europe and the peace of the world. The essential point was that all should come with full powers. It would be a great pleasure for him to meet Signor Nitti at San Remo, or anywhere else, but it would only mislead public opinion if the meeting took place between people who had not full powers. If Signor Nitti was willing to discuss the question from the general European point of view, as well as from that of Italian local considerations, there was every prospect of an agreement. He would ask Italy to give some signs of a desire to settle. Then, if agreement could be reached, an approach might be made to the Government of the United States.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that if Signor Nitti and he came to a meeting, he would, of course, as Prime Minister, have full powers, and the two together would fully represent the Italian Government. Naturally, the possession of full powers did not involve an obligation to agree to any particular settlement.

(The Marquis Imperiali interposed that, of course, they would come with the full intention of settling, but they could not agree in advance to any particular settlement.)

In order to prepare for the discussion, it would be necessary for him to return to Rome in order to discuss all the points with Signor Nitti. If a meeting were arranged to take place in ten or twelve days' time, this would give him ample time. While the Italian representatives would come with full powers and a desire to settle, he felt some doubt as to whether a United States representative would be given full powers.

MR. DAVIS, in reply to Mr. Lloyd George, said that he could not say much. He doubted as to whether the United States could send a delegate with full powers.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, supposing an agreement were reached between France, Great Britain and Italy, it would not carry great weight with the American Government.

MR. DAVIS replied that so much might be taken for granted.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he felt he ought to explain why he felt doubt as to the full powers of Signor Nitti. He was not speaking of full powers from a constitutional point of view. He had no doubt about that. But Italy was somewhat out of the constitutional track. Besides their regular full powers he thought that Ministers, in order to act with freedom, required irregular full powers. Italy was now suffering from the worst kind of revolution, namely,

a military revolution. The danger was that the Italian representatives might come and say that they were in agreement with their Allies, and were ready to give the necessary orders, but they know that the army and the fleet would not obey them. This would create a very grave situation, and extreme embarrassment. He knew well that Signor Nitti would come with the best desire to settle. But if the army and navy would not obey him, and if Italy was still bound to continue sending supplies to their troops at Fiume, no useful results would be achieved, and it would be a matter of extreme anxiety. It was most important that Signor Nitti should not be bound or tied by any agreement with d'Annunzio. This was not a matter that he would allude to in public; but this was a secret conference. He had seen a despatch which stated that d'Annunzio had offered to the Italian Government to come out of Fiume provided the Italian Government would not yield from the position which Signor Orlando had taken up. If Signor Nitti came to a conference bound by such an agreement, he would place his friends in great difficulty. It was essential that Signor Nitti should come really free, and in possession of the fullest powers to settle.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that he did not accept the statement that Italy was out of the constitutional track. He admitted that she was faced with very considerable and grave difficulties. These difficulties were one of the results of the Great War, and if we all looked in the mirror we would find that our faces had altered. The difficulties, however, had been founded on an exaltation of national sentiment. If d'Annunzio had not fundamentally been supported by public opinion he could not possibly have exerted any power. Naturally every Italian statesman must take national sentiment into account. From this point of view the Italian Ministers could not deal with the question as an abstract one dependent on historical and geographical considerations. All States had to take into account the sentiments of their peoples. The question which the Italian Government had to consider was whether it could accept a settlement without creating a greater difficulty behind its back. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister together could determine the point to which Italy could yield. They did not wish to remain in a negative position, which would be a danger to all. But they could not ignore the nationalist feeling which represented an important part of public opinion, and which in particular represented the forces of law and order on which the Government might have to depend in the event of certain contingencies. They could not overlook the possibility of a situation in which the nationalist forces were those on which they would have to rely very largely.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that, in a spirit of personal goodwill and of national goodwill towards Italy, he must repeat what he had said in regard to the Italian Government and its constitutional authority. The d'Annunzio incident had made the greatest impression in France, and, he thought, in Great Britain as well. The Italian army had flouted the Italian Government by refusing to obey its orders. If Mr. Lloyd George undertook an engagement and gave an order to the British army, everyone knew that it would be executed. Exactly the same applied in the case of France. But this was not

the case in Italy, and we had already seen what might happen. As he had so often said to Signor Orlando when the latter was in office, the trouble had been begun by the Italian Government themselves. They had established themselves at Fiume, not as participants in an Allied action, but separately. They had eliminated their Allies and posted up notices with the Italian Royal Arms at the top. This had been the great mistake that had been the beginning of the revolution. This, of course, was now past. If, however, a reasonable settlement was to be reached, the Italian army must be induced to obey the orders of the Italian Government and, through the Italian Government, of the Supreme Council, since Fiume was really at the disposition of the Allied and Associated Powers as a whole. What he had said about d'Annunzio was based on despatches, and Signor Scialoja had not attempted to answer him. The statement in the despatches was that d'Annunzio had demanded that the Italian Government should pledge itself not to make concessions. If such pledges were made, it would be useless to meet at San Remo or anywhere else. He urged strongly, therefore, that Signor Nitti should come to the conference with his hands free, and he would ask Signor Scialoja to tell Signor Nitti that one member of the conference, at any rate, had taken this question most seriously.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that, like everyone else, he deplored the abnormal situation which had existed at Fiume since its occupation by d'Annunzio. The Italian Government had for a long time been struggling to find a solution. He did not know what was happening between Signor Nitti and d'Annunzio. He had telegraphed for information, but had received no positive answer. It was very important that he should be able to telegraph something definite to Signor Nitti as the result of this conference, as Signor Nitti was at the moment treating with d'Annunzio.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, like M. Clemenceau, he hoped that Signor Nitti would not tie his hands in such a way as to render a conference futile. If the conference came after some agreement with d'Annunzio it would not be fair to ask M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon, himself and Lord Curzon, to come to a conference, and would create a critical position. They did not want to meet in order to receive d'Annunzio's decision as to what the settlement was to be. Hence, it was essential that Signor Nitti's hands should be free, and that he should not be merely a messenger from d'Annunzio. Subject to that, he was all in favour of holding a conference. If it would be easier for Signor Nitti to come to some place in Italy, he was ready to meet him. He knew that Signor Nitti's domestic difficulties in connection with this question were greater than his own. He knew also that they were not difficulties of his own creation, but inherited difficulties. Therefore, if it was easier to Signor Nitti to arrange the matter on Italian territory, either because it was difficult for him to leave Italy for several days or for any other reason, he was ready to come to Italy. It would be useless, however, if Signor Nitti was bound to d'Annunzio.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said that, as to the locality, he thought Signor Nitti would find no difficulty in coming to Paris. This would involve less travelling

for M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, and Signor Nitti was the youngest of the three.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would make to Italy all the concessions admissible.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he hoped Signor Scialoja, in communicating with Signor Nitti, would make clear the importance of Signor Nitti coming with a free hand, and not tied by any agreement with d'Annunzio.

M. CLEMENCEAU recalled that Mr. Davis had said that if the three Powers were unanimous it could not fail to exercise the greatest influence on President Wilson. He would observe, however, that if President Wilson thought that one of the three Powers had bound itself in advance, and if he thought that the settlement merely followed the dictations of d'Annunzio, he would not be so favourably impressed.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in the House of Commons he had ventured to say<sup>6</sup> that at their next conference the Allied and Associated Powers would consider the question of Russia. He felt that they ought to have a common policy. He had spoken to M. Clemenceau on the subject on the previous day, and M. Clemenceau's views had been so much in accord with his own that he would ask him to recapitulate them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had the more pleasure in reverting to his conversation with Mr. Lloyd George on the previous day in that that very morning he had received a visit from Mr. Churchill, who was reputed to hold very strong views on the question of Russia. He had found they agreed at almost every point. He thought that all were agreed that there could be no peace in Europe so long as Russia remained in her present state of anarchy, disorder, robbery, crime and revolt. This was a danger not only to Russia herself, but to the whole world. All were convinced of the truth of this. Intervention had been tried by every means—men, supplies and money—with the object of setting up a stable Government. Up to now no result had been achieved. The anti-Bolshevik elements had proved insufficient. He would not examine the reasons for this, which would bring him into the sphere of high political philosophy. This was not the occasion to discuss that. It was sufficient to face the facts. It was certain that up to now the Allied policy had not succeeded. They had tried to help Kolchak with material aid. They had sent him a proclamation. That proclamation had produced no result, and now Kolchak had retired to the middle of Siberia and his troops were in a deplorable condition. Then the Allies had believed in Denikin, and great efforts had been made in his support by Great Britain and, to some extent, also by France. Denikin, however, was now retiring. It therefore seemed useless to continue on these lines, and he would suggest making, as it were, a barbed wire entanglement round Russia in order to prevent her from creating trouble outside, and in order to stop Germany from entering into relations with Russia, whether of a political or military character. This was

<sup>6</sup> On November 13, 1919, when Mr. Lloyd George had made a statement on British policy towards Russia: see *Parl. Deb. 5th Series Commons* (1919) vol. 121, cols. 471-5.

not such a difficult policy to carry out. The stories which had been circulated of an enormous army in Germany were, he believed, entirely fanciful. We knew that Germany had an army of 400,000 men. In addition, she had *Sicherheitswehr* and an *Einwohnerwehr*, which was equipped with machine guns, *Flammenwerfer*, &c., but was only trained for street warfare. They had arms in their depots, but he did not believe the present German Government could stand without them. There was some evidence that Germany was in danger of a civil war, which might be occasioned by the return of the German forces from the Baltic to Berlin. This might end in a revolution. He did not believe, however, that Germany would fight again, in view of the great desire of her population to avoid further war. We must not be bluffed, and would have to watch the situation carefully; and, further, we must take no risks. We had been told that Germany would resist in the Baltic and in Upper Silesia, but now it seemed that she would obey. The Allies must have perseverance, fairness and patience. In his view the support of Poland was the best way to check Germany. Poland occupied a first-rate strategical position. She had an army of half a million good soldiers enured to hardships and animated by a strong patriotism. Politically she was well-disposed to the Allies, and sufficiently armed. She only asked the Allies for help. It would be a great mistake if we did not maintain Poland in order to dam up the Russian flood and to provide a check to Germany. Mr. Churchill had observed to him that Poland must be regarded as the left wing of Denikin's army as against the Bolsheviks. He agreed that this ought to be carefully considered. He believed that Great Britain and Italy, and probably the United States of America, would agree with him on this matter. He would give up all idea of further direct intervention in Russia. All efforts in this direction would prove wasteful in the future as in the past. It merely led people to believe that we had an honest desire to resuscitate the ancient régime in Russia. Our policy rather ought to be to fortify Poland in order to keep Russia in check and to contain Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the previous day he had expressed his full agreement with M. Clemenceau. Great Britain had spent about £100,000,000 in Russia, partly on the Archangel expedition, but mainly in support of General Denikin. This sum included the last 'packet' of £15,000,000 to £16,000,000, which would be delivered by the end of March. She had not got much in return for it. The last news was that General Denikin had been driven back, and the Bolsheviks were now nearing Kharkov. If Kiev, and especially Kharkov, should fall, there would not be much left to Denikin, because of the difficulties occasioned by Maknov,<sup>7</sup> who had occupied Ekaterinoslav in his rear. The situation in South Russia did not look at all satisfactory. So far as the British House of Commons was concerned, and, he believed, so far as France was concerned, these two countries were not prepared to go on helping in a material manner the anti-Bolshevik forces. He did not know how Italy and America regarded the question.

<sup>7</sup> M. Maknov was an anarchist leader of an independent force of irregulars operating in south Russia.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI thought that Italy was of the same view.

MR. DAVIS said that he could only express his personal opinion, but he thought the United States were not willing to give further assistance.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that on the previous day a proposal had been discussed for a federation of the anti-Bolshevik States. This was of no use unless the Allies were prepared to support the federation, and such support meant money, guns and equipment. He and M. Clemenceau had come to the conclusion that this was not a very helpful expedient. As regards Poland, in his view this depended upon whether Poland was expected to attack the Bolsheviks.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that nothing was further from his mind.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had mentioned the matter because, when he was in Paris in September, M. Paderewski had stated that he was prepared to march on Moscow if supported and equipped.<sup>8</sup> Even Marshal Foch, who was most strongly anti-Bolshevik, had not supported this view, as he had considered that the traditional feeling in Russia against the Poles was so strong that it would only consolidate the resistance. The same would apply to the Finns. It would have much the same effect as the attacks of the Prussians and Austrians had had on the Jacobins in France. Hence, if the Polish army were re-equipped, it must not be for an attack on Russia, but rather for future contingencies. He was so much in agreement with the rest of M. Clemenceau's observations that he would say no more.

SIGNOR SCIALOJA said he agreed entirely with Mr. Lloyd George.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he understood it was agreed that the conference of anti-Bolshevik States and organisations should not be undertaken. He asked if Mr. Davis had anything to say.

MR. DAVIS said he spoke with hesitation and embarrassment, insomuch as he not only had no authority, but not even instructions from his Government. He believed, however, that the United States Government would be in accord with what Mr. Lloyd George had said. He knew that from the first they had been opposed to military intervention in Russia, and had gone as far as they were willing to go in rendering financial assistance.

LORD CURZON summed up M. Clemenceau's proposals as follows:—

- (i) A barbed wire fence, as it were, round Russia, within which the Allies should not interfere.
- (ii) To put an end to contributions of supplies and money for the purpose of upholding or re-establishing order in Russia.
- (iii) To build up Poland as a barrier against Russia and a check on Germany.

These were accepted by Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Scialoja, and, so far as he had authority to speak, by Mr. Davis. He doubted, however, if the question could be solved in such precise terms. The Prime Minister had mentioned an alternative suggestion, namely, to call a conference of the anti-Bolshevik States and organisations. He had rightly said that this was only a

<sup>8</sup> See Vol. I, No. 57, minute 4(b).

continuation of what had hitherto been attempted, except that perhaps it meant giving supplies to one set of men instead of to another. That seemed to condemn the proposal. But we must not leave the impression that we took no interest in Russia. Our interest depended on what was happening immediately outside the barbed wire fence. We must remember that all the States round Russia were struggling for freedom. This applied equally to Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, Denikin and the Caucasus. Each of these was struggling for a national existence. He hoped, however, that if we withdrew our material support we should not also withdraw our moral support and take our representatives away. A second point was that we could not precisely draw a line as to when the new policy would begin. For example, the British Government had promised aid to the extent of a further £15,000,000 for Denikin, and this would take some time to send. It had been pointed out that Kolchak's Government was falling, and this was true. For some time past we had ceased to supply him with any material help. He hoped, however, that everything would not be withdrawn as a result of this conference; for such action would mean the collapse of Kolchak and the overrunning of Siberia by the Bolsheviks. The result would probably be that the Japanese would go in and establish a powerful force in Eastern Siberia. He hoped, therefore, that the policy would not be adopted with too great precision, and that every latitude would be allowed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was in complete accord with Lord Curzon.

MR. BALFOUR raised the question of the Baltic States. He felt much embarrassed as to where we stood in regard to this question, although, owing [to] the chaos, the present position was perhaps inevitable. We had acknowledged the independence of Finland and Poland, but he did not know where we were as regards the States lying between them. He understood that we had refused to acknowledge their independence, but we had recognised them as *de facto* Governments. Was our intention to give them no help, or were they to be included in the general decision?

LORD CURZON said that we had not for a long time given them any assistance, although we had allowed them to raise loans, so far as they were able to do so.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if we were to recognise their independence.

MR. BALFOUR hoped that we should not do so. He asked if we were to acquiesce in their making peace with the Bolsheviks. We ought not to encourage them not to do so unless we could give them some support and assistance. If we were to surround Russia, as it were, with a barbed-wire fence, could we leave so big a gap as lay between Poland and Finland? This would be to cut off Finland from Poland and to give the Bolsheviks access to the sea. If we did not acquiesce in their making peace with the Bolsheviks, what steps were we to take?

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was of opinion that we could not disinterest ourselves from the Baltic States. We could lend them aid and give them assistance, but the nature of this need not be discussed to-day. Each case was different and would have to be considered on its merits. How to prevent

them making peace was a proper subject for diplomatic communications between Paris, Rome and London, but was not one that need be considered now.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he understood that the populations of these States were very formidable people. They seemed to have made up their minds not to attack the Bolsheviks. He had had a letter from Sir Esme Howard, who was formerly much concerned in our policy towards these States, and he regarded the Esthonians and the Letts as a very formidable people. He did not believe that the Bolsheviks would attack them further. The Esthonians and the Letts had already driven out the Bolsheviks and were rapidly driving out the Germans. If the Bolsheviks were to attack again, the question could be reconsidered. As regards their making peace with the Bolsheviks, he agreed that we could not give advice unless we were prepared to support them. As a matter of fact, they had some time ago asked us to let them have £10,000,000 for the purpose of resisting the Bolsheviks. At present the responsibility was theirs. He did not think they intended to make peace, but they were suspending active military operations against the Bolsheviks.

MR. BALFOUR said he would be very sorry to see any peace which gave Russia access to the Baltic.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Baltic States might offer a means of peaceful penetration into Russia. The Bolsheviks had talked much of propaganda, but he thought that civilisation might also undertake its peaceful penetration.

2, Whitehall Gardens, December 12, 1919.

## No. 57

I.C.P. 3.] *Secretary's Notes of an Anglo-French Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, S.W.1, on Friday, December 12, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal, The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, The Right Hon. Sir Auckland Geddes, President of the Board of Trade, Mr. A. R. Duncan, Coal Controller.

*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Loucheur, M. Cambon, M. Berthelot, M. de Fleuriau.

SECRETARY: Sir M. Hankey.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY: Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

1. M. LOUCHEUR said that he and Mr. Chamberlain had discussed the question of finance that morning. He had expressed to Mr. Chamberlain the desire of the French Government that a portion of the loan for the liberated areas should be issued in London. Mr. Chamberlain had shown sympathy with the proposal, but had suggested that the first thing to do was to clear up any possible sources of friction on questions already under discussion. The first

*Reparations. The  
Proportion for Dis-  
tribution*

of these was the question of the reparation. During the discussions which took place in Paris when the treaty was being prepared, the French and British representatives went into the question of fixing the right proportion of the amounts to be received by their respective countries. It was most important for the friendly relations of the two countries that a solution of some kind should be reached. Unfortunately, the interests of the two nations, as creditors of Germany, were mutually conflicting. Mr. Chamberlain had agreed with him that it was essential that some amicable settlement should be agreed upon. During the discussions in Paris, the British representatives had suggested that the proportion should be 50 for France and 30 for Great Britain. This was not accepted by the French. At a conference which took place when President Wilson was also present the American delegation had suggested that the French should agree to the proportion of 50 and 25. This M. Loucheur had not been able to accept on behalf of his Government. The proportions considered equitable by the French Government were 55 for France and 25 for Great Britain, and they anticipated considerable difficulty in getting these figures accepted by the French Government. The more they examined the devastated areas the larger the bill seemed to grow, as the cost of reconstruction would evidently be much greater than had been at first imagined. The French Government was still prepared to accept a proportion of 55 to 25, although this would involve a distinct loss. In fact, they believed that if exact calculations were now to be made of the actual losses, and estimates prepared of the cost of reparation, the proportions would probably be more like 60 to 20.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what the Germans were doing so far as reparations were concerned.

M. LOUCHEUR said that up to the present they had done practically nothing. They had been asked to supply building material, and had been furnished with long lists of the French requirements, but nothing had been received. As regards coal, the French had at present received less than one-third of what the Germans had promised. The question of German labour in France had been considered by the French Government and the German delegation, but the Germans had submitted conditions which were quite unacceptable, *e.g.*, that German workers in the devastated areas should have the right to strike, to form trades unions and to join the French trades unions. This, of course, would create an impossible situation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought he saw a possible solution about reparations, but before coming to any definite agreement he would like to consult his colleagues in the matter.

M. CLEMENCEAU said this was only natural, and he readily agreed to it.

2. M. LOUCHEUR said the next question was what was to be the composition of the Reparation Commission and who was to preside at it. The French Government desired definitely to claim that the chairman should be a Frenchman. The British proposal was that he should be an American, and that, only in the

*The Presidency of the  
Reparation Committee*

event of America's declining to preside as chairman, should he be a Frenchman. The French Government took the view that, having regard to the attitude of America towards the treaty, it would be impossible to agree to an American chairman. They fully understood that the British Government was entitled to have every possible guarantee that British interests should be safeguarded. What the French proposed, therefore, was that the commission should have a French chairman and a British secretary-general. If Great Britain preferred to have a vice-chairman instead of a secretary-general, the French were prepared to agree to this. They further proposed that the branch of this commission dealing with maritime operations should sit in London under a British chairman.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that it would be quite impossible to induce the French Parliament to accept the Reparation Commission unless the chairman should be a Frenchman.

MR. BONAR LAW enquired whether the French would object to the commission sitting in London.

M. LOUCHEUR pointed out that this point was settled by the treaty, which definitely mentioned Paris as the seat of the commission.

MR. BONAR LAW enquired whether, if the French Government could not agree to a certain proposal because of the risk of parliamentary opposition, was not the position analogous to that of the Italian Government as described at the conference they had had that morning.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the two positions were quite different. The situation in Italy had been aptly described as 'outside the Constitution'. What would happen in France if the Government agreed to relinquish the chairmanship of the commission would be that a vote of censure would be passed and the Government would have to go.

M. LOUCHEUR said another point was that Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Chamberlain objected to a member of the French Cabinet representing France on the commission. The French were in entire agreement with this.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed and expressed the view that the chairman of the commission would have far too much to do to enable him to carry on his Ministerial duties at the same time.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there was a question of equality as between members of the commission. They ought to be able to speak to each other on an equal footing. Great Britain would be represented by an official, Sir John Bradbury.

3. M. LOUCHEUR, after paying a tribute to the ability of Sir John Bradbury, said that a few minor questions remained. For instance, there had been a slight dispute in regard to the purchase of British stores in France.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that this question would be finally disposed of if M. Loucheur accepted the terms of a letter from Lord Inverforth,<sup>1</sup> which

<sup>1</sup> Minister of Munitions.

should by this time be in M. Loucheur's hands. This M. Loucheur had undertaken to do.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the matter, therefore, might be considered as settled.

4. The next point was Great Britain had lent to France various sums during the last four months. He was not prepared to discuss this question at the moment, but it would be necessary to come to some friendly agreement. Mr. Lloyd George said that he would give his answer on the subject of reparation on the following day, after he had consulted his colleagues.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he wished to have one word on the subject of the respective proportions. He was quite prepared to spend a fortnight in England, examining the facts and figures with a British representative, and he was convinced he could prove that the proportion suggested by the French was decidedly favourable to Great Britain, and if he were unable to convince the British representatives after they had gone into the figures, the French would be willing to have the agreement reconsidered.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought the best thing would be to find a solution at once without any further delay. He proposed that they should now turn to the question of coal.

5. M. LOUCHEUR said that the coal question fell under two headings, quantity and price. As regards price: hitherto it had been regulated by a system of licences issued by the Coal Controller which entitled France to buy certain fixed quantities in Great Britain, but a new system had lately been established removing the licences, exporters being now free to sell to the highest bidder. Under this system there was no guarantee that France would receive one single ton of coal. Moreover, there was a danger that, as the deficiency of Europe amounted to 80 million tons and Great Britain had only 30 millions for exportation, there would be tremendous competition in the market between would-be buyers. The second question was that of price. At the present moment the price in Great Britain was 45s. a ton, rising to 96s. abroad. He saw no reason why the price should not soar presently to 120s., or even to 150s. He understood perfectly well that this arrangement was quite defensible from the point of view of finance, but he desired to call attention to the following points. France was in an exceptional position owing to the damage done to her mines in the north by the German forces. The coal which would have been obtainable from those mines must be replaced by German coal; but until the latter were received the French must be able to buy coal in England to replace what they should have got out of the destroyed mines. As matters stood at present the French would, in fact, have to pay a double price because of the destruction of their mines. He had just made an offer of 80s. a ton in Cardiff which had been rejected, 85s. being demanded.

SIR AUCKLAND GEDDES said he did not understand this. The average price for exportation at present was 62s.

MR. BONAR LAW said he had never heard of such a high price as that mentioned by M. Loucheur. He enquired where the coal was to be delivered, and if 85s. was the price at the home port or after delivery.

M. LOUCHEUR said that the price named was for the coal in Cardiff Harbour.

SIR AUCKLAND GEDDES said that all the figures in his possession showed that the average price for coal for exportation was 62s. 6d.

M. LOUCHEUR offered to show him the correspondence.

(At this point Mr. Duncan, the Coal Controller, joined the conference.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked M. Loucheur to repeat his statement for the benefit of Mr. Duncan.

M. LOUCHEUR repeated that last week the French had tried to buy coal for January and February at the price of 80s. a ton, and the offer had been refused because the coal merchants stood out for 85s.

MR. BONAR LAW said it was difficult to see what could be done after the declaration of the British Government that there would be no fixed price for exported coal.

M. LOUCHEUR suggested that if certain quantities were reserved for the French as formerly they would be in a better position to discuss the price. Otherwise, countries like Switzerland and Spain, who were in a more favourable position as far as the exchanges were concerned, would stampede the market and take all the coal.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN pointed out that it would be very difficult to guarantee a certain quantity being delivered to France without giving a similar guarantee to other countries, such as Italy and Roumania. They might be certain that directly it was known that France had been given preferential treatment to which she was entitled by her losses, Italy would come and ask for identical treatment.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired what were the British exports of coal before the war.

MR. BONAR LAW said that they were between 50 and 60 million tons.

M. LOUCHEUR pointed out that the claim he had made applied only to the case of France, as it was in the nature of compensation for the loss of her destroyed mines.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN admitted that it was true that Italy could put forward an identical claim, but he pointed out that Italy had no coal mines at all and had been always obliged to rely upon Great Britain.

M. LOUCHEUR acknowledged that it would be difficult to guarantee supplies of coal to France and not to Italy. From the French point of view, it would have been preferable to maintain the old system of allocation. He admitted that for political reasons, such as those which the French Government had often to take into consideration, it might have been impossible to continue that system; but he maintained that the case of France was special. The guarantee they will now ask him for afforded a preferential solution to cover the interval until France received from Germany the monthly supplies of coal the Germans were bound to deliver according to the treaty.

MR. BONAR LAW enquired as to the price.

M. LOUCHEUR thought this question would easily settle itself once the French were guaranteed priority for a certain quantity of coal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the conference might now adjourn, as he wished to consult with his colleagues as regards reparation. He enquired as to what time it would be convenient for the conference to meet the following morning, and whether it was proposed that the American question should be discussed.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested 10.30 a.m., and stated that he was quite prepared to take the American question. He had already submitted a note on the subject to Mr. Lloyd George.<sup>2</sup>

*(The conference adjourned at 4.30 p.m.)*

2, Whitehall Gardens.

<sup>2</sup> See No. 55, minute 7 and No. 58, appendix 1.

## No. 58

I.C.P. 4.] *Secretary's Notes of an Anglo-French Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W.1. on Saturday, December 13, 1919, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal, The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council, The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The Right Hon. Lord Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor (for Minutes 5 and 6).<sup>1</sup>  
*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Loucheur, M. Cambon, M. Berthelot.

The following were also present:

*British Empire*: The Right Hon. Sir Gordon Hewart, Attorney-General (for Minutes 5 and 6), The Right Hon. Sir Ernest Pollock, Solicitor General (for Minutes 5 and 6).

*France*: M. de Fleuriau.

SECRETARY: Sir M. Hankey.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY: Lieutenant-Colonel Storr.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

The conference had before them:—

- (a) A note communicated by M. Clemenceau, dated the 19th December,<sup>2</sup> 1919, containing a draft of a proposed Anglo-French Declaration accepting ten or eleven of the fourteen reservations of the American Senate to the Treaty of Peace, on condition that the remaining three or four reservations, which are incompatible with the treaty, were withdrawn (Appendix 1).
- (b) A copy of the reservations by the American Senate to the Treaty of Peace with Germany (Appendix 2).

<sup>1</sup> It appears that the Rt. Hon. Austen Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, was also present during part, at least, of this meeting: cf. below.

<sup>2</sup> In error for December 9.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred to certain telegrams which had passed between Lord Curzon and Viscount Grey, dated the 6th, 8th and 12th December, 1919,<sup>3</sup> in the latter of which it was stated that the American Secretary for Foreign Affairs said the situation was very disappointing, and one in which the foreign Governments, if they attempted to influence it, could only do harm; there was a quarrel between the President and the Senate, and whereas foreign opposition to the reservations would only stiffen the Senate, their acceptance would be resented by the President. In the circumstances, he suggested that the discussion of America's attitude and possible action in the future in regard to the treaty should be deferred until Lord Grey's arrival.<sup>4</sup>

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU said that he understood that the German reply to the last Allied joint note<sup>5</sup> was on its way. His idea was that the Germans had raised no fundamental objection to its terms. It appeared, however, that they could not furnish dockage, and they would offer to substitute some other form of reparation.

3. M. CLEMENCEAU informed the conference that Roumania had signed the treaty. He hoped, therefore, that ratification all round would shortly follow.

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was anxious to raise the question of the future of the Peace Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that one of the questions was that of the Middle East, which must be settled between France and Great Britain before it came up to the conference. Then there was the Adriatic question, and this could only be decided by the principals. Recently, in Paris, he had asked Mr. Polk: supposing the United States turned round and definitely stated that they would refuse to have anything more to do with the Peace Treaty, and that the Allies might settle matters as they liked, in that event what were we to do? The main question lay between Germany and ourselves, i.e., France and Great Britain. It was the application of the terms of the treaty which must engage the attention of the conference. In his view it was most unlikely that Germany would fight the Entente. She had no money, and no munitions, very few men and no supplies. Moreover, the people were tired of war. It was natural that their leaders should talk big in order to save their faces. Any other great nation would have done the same.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE was of opinion that the real danger was that the present German Government might go out, which would be a serious

<sup>3</sup> These telegrams are untraced in Foreign Office archives. It appears probable that they were private telegrams not entered upon the files.

<sup>4</sup> Lord Grey left Washington for England on December 30, 1919.

<sup>5</sup> The reference was to the Allied note of December 8 relative to the signature of the protocol to the Treaty of Versailles and reparation for the sinking at Scapa Flow: see No. 37, note 4.

disaster. The present Government was moderate, and they sincerely desired peace. Its successor might either be Spartacist or Militarist.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought it might be half and half, but he did not think that either a Spartacist or a Militarist Government could really wield power. It was important that he and Mr. Lloyd George should meet frequently and be always ready to send at a moment's notice replies to any notes received from Germany. Proceeding, M. Clemenceau said that he wished to raise the question of Marshal Foch. We must, of course, have all our arrangements ready in case we had once more to resort to force. He was quite prepared to accept any proposals that the British might put forward. He did not want, however, that executive power of any kind should be delegated to the marshal. He felt that Marshal Foch was the man to take military control, on account of his great reputation. The marshal had told him that he would feel happier when matters had been discussed by the respective Governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that everybody agreed that Marshal Foch should be in military charge. He was immensely popular in England, he was a great general, and he commanded confidence on both sides of the Channel. As regards the locality of the Supreme War Council, he thought this should remain at Versailles, with Marshal Foch at its head. He wished to know, however, what the council was to do. During the armistice the marshal was our channel of communication with the enemy. Henceforward, the channel must be the respective Governments. He asked what were M. Clemenceau's views as to the functions of the War Council.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that it would give advice on military matters, and would execute the orders of the Allied Governments where necessary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was in cordial agreement with this definition of the council's functions.

LORD CURZON enquired whether the proposed Council of Ambassadors was to take the place of the conference when the treaty was ratified.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he understood that this was to be so. He felt, however, the necessity of the Ambassadors being men of power and authority; they should not, however, decide matters over the heads of their respective Governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE concurred, and said that otherwise we might gradually be led into war. During the Peace Conference, plenary powers and confidence had been given by the British nation to Mr. Balfour and himself. The position was different now, and the Conference of Ambassadors could not have plenipotentiary authority.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, but hoped that the process of transition would not be too rapid.

MR. BALFOUR said that when he left Paris endless small matters were coming up every day for settlement. He suggested that such matters might well be left to the Ambassadors.

LORD CURZON suggested that a limit should be fixed for the labours of the Peace Conference. He suggested that it might close down by Christmas, as

he agreed with Mr. Balfour that the Ambassadors should be left to settle minor questions, larger matters being referred to the Governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it might be difficult to fix a definite date when the conference should close down. He agreed with M. Clemenceau that the question of the Middle East must be discussed and settled between the French and British Governments.

MR. BONAR LAW thought that the Peace Conference might be allowed to settle the Hungarian question.

LORD CURZON concurred, and thought that the Peace Conference might be reassembled in London or Paris at a later date to settle the Turkish peace.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if the British desired it he would ask Marshal Foch to come to London and to discuss questions with them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that this was unnecessary, and said that now they knew the proposed limit of Marshal Foch's functions he and his colleagues were quite satisfied. What he desired to know was that the negotiations were not to be conducted through military channels. As complete agreement had been reached by the conference in regard to this question, he proposed to invite discussion upon other questions on the agenda paper, among which were the question of reparation and the trial of criminals for breaches of the laws of war.

As regards reparation, he understood that Mr. Chamberlain and M. Loucheur, who had been requested at their meeting on the previous day to go into this matter, were in substantial agreement about the main points. He would ask them to communicate to the conference the results of their discussion at a later moment.

(At this point Sir Gordon Hewart and Sir Ernest Pollock joined the conference.)

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was startled at the numbers of German offenders against the laws of war, which appeared on the lists that he had seen. Our own lists had no less than 130 names, and the French had 500, and the Belgian even more.

*Breaches of the  
Laws of War*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was quite willing that the numbers should be examined by a body with a view to eliminating doubtful cases. It was, however, most difficult to discriminate, as there were so many similar crimes committed in almost identical conditions. He had considered this question carefully, and had reached the conclusion that it was almost impossible to reduce the list. However, he was quite prepared that a Judicial Committee should go into all the cases, sift the evidence, and that we should then send a revised list to the Germans. But there was no time to be lost.

LORD BIRKENHEAD, in reply to an invitation by the Prime Minister to express his views, said that his difficulty was that the matter had passed out of his hands, since he had relinquished the appointment of Attorney-General.

SIR GORDON HEWART said that the Law Officers of the Crown had twice revised our own lists, which showed 130 names of men who had committed atrocities by sea, by land and in the air. By sea, they were all cases of atrocities

by submarine crews. On land, there were many cases of cruelty, maltreatment of prisoners, and so on. In every case the charge was supported by very strong evidence. France had 600 names on her list, Belgium 800, and Italy 50. The German army of occupation in France and Belgium had, of course, great opportunities of committing these crimes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the large total of 1,580 would render it more difficult for the Germans to surrender the whole of them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that although the Germans had signed the treaty, they were practically conniving at the escape of many of these men.

LORD BIRKENHEAD thought that M. Clemenceau's suggestion of a judicial committee to scrutinise the lists might be accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was rather taken aback at the idea of more than 1,500 separate trials.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the effect would be admirable upon public opinion.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN was afraid that a prolonged series of trials might have the opposite effect and even arouse sympathy.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that it was important that the trials should be conducted expeditiously.

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK said that he had spent six hours last Tuesday<sup>6</sup> with the French Minister of Justice, and they had also seen M. Beaunir, who had been mainly responsible for preparing the French lists. They had examined these latter most carefully, and had endeavoured to see whether anything could be done to cut down the numbers. Excluding the large numbers of cases which occurred in the armies of occupation, the British had 67 cases of cruelty to prisoners, and the French 135. In his view it was impossible to ask France and Belgium to reduce their big numbers to something comparable with ours, as the difference was due, as he had shown, to the fact that British soil had not been occupied by the enemy. The test that had been applied by himself and his French colleagues was: 'Do these charges shock any plain man's conscience?'

MR. BONAR LAW pointed out that a large number of cases of cruelty must have been carried out by order from superior authority.

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK agreed, but said that, in order to trace it home to the higher officials, it might be necessary to try those who had carried out their orders, for the purpose of establishing that the orders came from a common source.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Belgian list looked to him much too big. Many large towns in France had been occupied by the Germans, and, on a comparable basis, France would probably have to prosecute about 5,000 Germans.

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK said there were two periods in the case of Belgium. The first was the period of sack, which included 300 cases; and the second, a period of occupation, which included another 300. Then, after this, came the cases of cruelty to prisoners of war. He thought it would be almost im-

<sup>6</sup> December 9, 1919.

possible to ask the Belgians to reduce their numbers, after reading what took place at various towns and the terrible brutalities perpetrated.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that you could not prosecute mere agents who were deporting women on the orders of higher officials.

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK said that the Germans' own enquiry into the Belgian atrocities constituted a very thick volume, and these only took into account the first period. The French Minister of Justice and himself had compared the British and French with the Belgian cases, and they had eliminated all cases of robbery and simple destruction. Assuming that the Belgians cut down their numbers to half, that is to say, 400, and that the French reduced their numbers to 500, these, with the cases of Italy and Poland, would still reach the considerable total of 1,200. Even if we did not succeed in laying our hands upon these men and bringing them to justice, the lists that had been prepared containing a summary of the charges preferred would remain for all time a record of German brutality.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought it was essential to have some basis of prosecution, and suggested that a committee of British, French and Belgian legal experts should scrutinise the lists and reduce them to one denomination, based on the same principle.

SIR ERNEST POLLOCK said that this had been tried, but great difficulties had been encountered.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that France had a definite right to demand of the Belgians that the same basis should be employed. He asked what were the numbers of deportations in Belgium. In the case of Lille, the French were prosecuting only the higher officials, and not the agents.

MR. BONAR LAW, referring to a point which had been previously raised, said that in Great Britain they had had experience of the reaction that follows hate and resentment after these had reached the culminating point.

MR. BALFOUR doubted if this would be the case in the present instance, as the special crimes with which the Germans were being charged would never lose their horror.

It was suggested that the committee should assemble as soon as possible in London, and that the Attorney-General of England should take the necessary steps to convene it.

6. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had noticed that recent telegrams from Holland stated that the revelation of Herr Kautsky<sup>7</sup> had had considerable effect upon opinion, and had turned even Socialists against the Kaiser.

LORD CURZON thought that the principal reason for which the Socialists feared the Kaiser was that they were afraid that he might become a centre of intrigue and of militarist reaction.

<sup>7</sup> In November 1919 the so-called Kautsky Documents had been published. These were German official documents relating to the outbreak of the First World War, which had been collected by Herr Kautsky. (An English translation of the Kautsky documents is printed under the title of *Outbreak of the World War*, New York, 1924.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that in that case the Allies had better press for his leaving Holland as soon as possible.

LORD CURZON asked, as a matter of law, supposing we requested the Dutch to turn the Kaiser out of their territory, and the Dutch replied that they would be very pleased to do so as they had no concern with him, what would be the next step?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if he crossed over to Germany the present Government would hand him over to us. He would be much more likely to go to the United States.

M. CLEMENCEAU suggested that action should be taken immediately the treaty had been ratified.

MR. BONAR LAW enquired whether we were entitled to insist on his being handed over, supposing the United States dropped out of the conference?

SIR GORDON HEWART said that, under article 227 of the treaty, it was laid down that the Kaiser was to be tried by five judges, one judge being appointed by each of the principal Powers. The Germans might say: 'We will hand over the Kaiser to a tribunal constituted as above, but not to one where the United States was not represented.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said this was a serious matter, as this principle might be applied to lesser criminals, to the question of reparation, and so on. We must therefore insist upon our point, that the defection of the United States does not alter circumstances. Otherwise, unless the United States signed the treaty, the whole thing might tumble to pieces.

SIR GORDON HEWART said that he would like to have a case formulated for the Law Officers' considered opinion. He admitted that there was great danger of the Germans making capital out of the point.

M. LOUCHEUR pointed out the great difference between the representation of the United States on the Reparation Commission and their representation on an international tribunal. In the case of the Reparation Commission the treaty provided for the withdrawal of any member without prejudice at any moment. No such provision existed so far as an international tribunal was concerned. It was open, therefore, to the United States to withdraw if and when she liked.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the Germans would say that they were influenced in signing the treaty by the fact that the United States were associated with it.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had seen Baron von Lersner officially, and one of the first questions he had put to him was in respect of the composition of the commission. He particularly enquired whether the United States would be represented. M. Berthelot had replied that they would not. Baron von Lersner had then wished to know if it was by the wish of the Allies that the United States had withdrawn, and he had replied that this was not the case; the Allies themselves were in entire accord. Baron von Lersner had said that the non-association of the United States enabled the German Government to raise a legal question if they cared, but they did not propose to do this;

only they hoped the Allies would remember this and regard it as a proof of their goodwill.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN enquired whether they had stated this in writing.

M. BERTHELOT said they had not, but in another document they had expressed the same sentiment.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN confirmed this, and said that it had been expressed in somewhat the following form: 'We hope that you will take this into account and give us credit for it when we surrender our criminals.'

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was impossible for the Allies to concede the point if the German Government raised it.

MR. BALFOUR enquired, supposing the person of the Kaiser were surrendered to us directly the treaty was ratified, what the international tribunal could do.

SIR GORDON HEWART, in reply to a question, said that a clause in the treaty laid it down that it should come into effect as soon as it was ratified by three Powers.

LORD BIRKENHEAD agreed, and said that the tribunal would have to quote this clause. He further agreed that it was desirable to proceed with the demand for the surrender of the Kaiser immediately the ratifications of the Treaty of Peace with Germany were exchanged.

(At this point Lord Birkenhead, Sir Gordon Hewart and Sir Ernest Pollock withdrew.)

7. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had discussed this question with his colleagues the previous afternoon. As regards quantity, our total *Coal* output was down by 50 to 60 millions of tons. Apart from Labour difficulties, our main trouble was the great congestion at the ports. He had received on the two previous days an influential deputation and had discussed the matter with them. Owing to shortage of trucks and railway stock, our ports were greatly congested, the export of Cardiff being down by 3 millions, and other ports by 30 per cent. It was impossible to get labour to work more than eight hours a day. Even if the loading of a ship could be completed by an extra 10 minutes' work, the men refused to do it. He had asked the railway representatives, representatives of the coal-owners and miners and the trade unions to meet and try to devise some means of increasing output. They were hopeful of increasing it by 3 or 4 millions, and were starting their work of enquiry at once. Earlier in the week the British Government had endeavoured to get their Coal Bill accepted by Parliament, which would have given them more control over coal, and have enabled the Government to allocate coal for exportation. As it was, all restrictions upon export had been removed, and we had great demands for coal from all the foreign countries. Until some Bill could be passed through Parliament, the Government could have no control at all. He thought that it might be possible to persuade some of the coal-owners to send coal to France for patriotic reasons. He reminded the conference that the coal interests and industry were enormously powerful in England.

M. LOUCHEUR said that France had also experienced great difficulty in regard to shipping. This they hoped to mitigate by the introduction of new electric machinery for rapidly loading and discharging cargoes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British Minister of Transport hoped to set up similar installations here; but now that the war was over, the public resented any Government interference.

M. LOUCHEUR said that he appreciated the difficulties of the situation, and suggested that he should come over again in a fortnight's time to England to review the coal position.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought a useful purpose might be served by sending a French representative to South Wales to make an appeal on behalf of France to the mine-owners and to Labour generally.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought the best man for this purpose was M. Loucheur himself.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was sure that the Welsh people would be delighted to see him.

8. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that a mistake had been made the previous day, *Japanese Representation at the Conference now sitting* when a conference of Allied representatives had met and had discussed various important questions, including Russia. Great Britain, France, Italy and America had all been represented, but Japan had been inadvertently omitted.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed that the Japanese representative should be invited. The most important thing, however, to his mind, was that France and England should be in absolute agreement on all big questions.

LORD CURZON said that the previous evening he had received a letter from the Japanese Ambassador stating that the latter understood from the newspapers that an Allied conference had met the same morning and had discussed, *inter alia*, the question of Russia; and had expressed surprise that no invitation had been sent to any Japanese representative. Lord Curzon said that the reply was a simple matter; he had informed the Ambassador that the conference had met to discuss the question of Fiume and the Adriatic, and it was without premeditation that the conversation had turned upon Russia, and he had promised that, supposing Russia were to come up for discussion at any future conference, the Ambassador would certainly be invited. In Lord Curzon's view, the Japanese were not really concerned with what was going on in Europe, but they did desire to know what part Japan was expected to play in Siberia.

It was agreed:

That an invitation should be sent to the Japanese Ambassador to attend the conference to be held that afternoon.

9. MR. CHAMBERLAIN said that he hoped to circulate that afternoon if possible an agreed *procès-verbal* of the conversations which he and M. Loucheur had held regarding the question of reparation. He wished to point out that the agreement reached bound the Dominions as well as ourselves.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was important that the Dominions should be informed at once.

M. LOUCHEUR said that Mr. Chamberlain and himself had come to an amicable understanding.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN agreed, and thought that the Americans were the first who should be told.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was going to make a statement, which he particularly requested might be included in the notes of the meeting, about the method of priority, the adoption of which he and his colleagues had already urged in the interest of France. They had submitted this system to the Peace Conference and, after the latter had turned it down, the question had been referred to the French Parliament during the debates upon the Peace Treaty, and it had taken a very important place in those debates.

The Chamber had compelled him to make a certain formal reservation on this question. If, however, he took the matter up again that day it was not solely on account of the mandate which had been given him by the French Parliament, it was because France had suffered more than any other country from invasion and German devastation. It was this which in the eyes of himself and his colleagues justified the priority that they asked. He remembered the argument which Mr. Lloyd George had used when he said 'Human lives are worth more than shattered chimneys.' But under these chimneys there were French families stricken and ruined. Ten French departments, the richest in the country, had been absolutely devastated so that they were no longer able to produce anything; and this was one of the principal causes of the very serious economic and financial difficulties that France was experiencing to-day. What he asked for was priority frankly and clearly admitted, such as had been granted to Belgium. The decision of the conference with regard to Belgium was a just decision, and it was he himself who had evoked it. The same solution in the case of France would not be less just, and it would give to the people of France a moral no less than a material satisfaction. It was impossible to exaggerate the importance this question had assumed in debates which had taken place in the French Parliament. Several men of eminence, including a member of the present French Government, M. Dubois, now French Minister of Commerce, had spoken very forcibly in favour of the system of payment that he and his colleagues had recommended to the conference. The conference had not agreed to it, but it still formed one of their most pressing needs. Above all, it was essential that the whole moral force of their two countries should be devoted to common and concerted action. He wished to repeat that it would give the greatest satisfaction in France if her right to priority was recognised, and it was his duty to insist as forcibly as he possibly could upon a point which lay so near to his heart.

M. LOUCHEUR said that if France asked for priority it was not in order to recoup herself in advance for all that she had already spent upon reparation, but in order to restrict the ruin caused by the Germans. The French calculated that they would have to spend in five years nearly 125 milliards of

francs. The money that one or other of the Allies would receive to defray the expenses of reparations already carried out was not the same need as money which was essential to re-establish a country which had been the battleground of the whole world. It was upon this aspect that so much insistence had been made in their Parliamentary debates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was amazed at the 125 milliards mentioned by M. Loucheur.

M. LOUCHEUR said that this was approximately the result of their latest calculations; and this was the reason why he said the previous afternoon that the French, in accepting the proportion of 55 to 25 were, in fact, making a sacrifice.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that, speaking generally on behalf of the British Government, they could not agree to priority. If they could not do so, it was not because the British nation did not realise the incomparable suffering of France. They fully appreciated this. The reason was our grave financial difficulties in this country. Public opinion was much upset by the very heavy taxes and with the fact that we had not received a penny from Germany. He asked the French Government to look at the question from the point of view of the British Empire. Continuing, Mr. Lloyd George said that France claimed £5,000,000,000 and Belgium £1,000,000,000. If priority were granted to France, it must be granted to others; in other words, about £12,000,000,000 would have to be liquidated before the British taxpayer got any relief; that is to say, not for thirty years. He himself could not face this, nor could the Prime Minister of Australia. Australia, with a population of 4½ millions, had lost more men in the war than the United States. They had a big war debt and also a very heavy pension debt. Again, New Zealand, with a population of 1 million, had lost more men in dead than Belgium, and they also had a big debt. As regards the question of reparations, he and his colleagues did not wish that the British representatives on the commission should have to examine separately each French claim, which would make them appear as if they were trying to assist the Germans to reduce those claims. That would mean constant and lasting protection [*sic*]. They must keep, and act, together. The Anglo-French Alliance, which had stood the test of the greatest war in the world, must continue, and was most important for France and Great Britain. The view of himself and his colleagues was that the French suggested too low a proportion. In order, however, to preserve the present cordial relations between the two countries, they were prepared to accept; and they hoped that France, on her part, would not press for priority. The British Government were anxious to do nothing to make the Dominions feel less ready to come forward and take their part in the next war. He himself had witnessed the terrible devastation of France, and that country had his most sincere sympathies.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN stated that M. Loucheur's opinion was that it was undesirable that any public statement should be made as to the proportions fixed. It would be sufficient that it should be placed on record that agreement had been reached between England and France. The question

might then be taken up with our Allies by M. Loucheur and Sir John Bradbury.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred again to the grave financial position of Great Britain. He pointed out that many were paying half their incomes in tax as well as being faced by the existing high prices. Large incomes were paying not less than 15s. in the £.

MR. BALFOUR remarked that there was nothing to be comparable to this in France.

10. MR. LLOYD GEORGE read, as a basis of discussion, the following draft of what he thought had been agreed between M. Clemenceau and himself in regard to Russia. He suggested that the draft should be discussed, and it should then be decided as to what should be published:—

(1) The Russian policy agreed to at the conference may be summed up as follows:—

Not to enter into any further commitments beyond what has already been promised as to furnishing assistance to the anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia, whether in the form of troops, war material or financial aid; the anti-Bolshevik elements still to be free to purchase war material in the Allied countries; each Power to have discretion to leave on the spot all political or other missions, which may either be attached to the anti-Bolshevik elements or the despatch of which may already have been decided upon; and to leave Bolshevik Russia, as it were, within a ring fence.

(2) The conference considered that a strong Poland was in the interests of the Entente Powers, and left for further consideration the question of the form and extent of the assistance to be given.

(3) The conference rejected a proposal to summon a meeting of representatives of the various anti-Bolshevik States and organisations in Russia.

LORD CURZON suggested the following additional paragraph:—

(4) As regards the border States with non-Russian populations which before the war belonged to the Russian Empire, but have since severed themselves from it, *e.g.*, Finland, the Baltic States and the States of the Caucasus, the Allies will give them such moral and material assistance in support of their struggle for freedom as may be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arises.

M. CLEMENCEAU expressed the fear that the action proposed might make the Allies very unpopular in Russia. He said that he had recently seen the Polish Minister, who was considerably perturbed at the withdrawal of our support. He suggested that we might say that we were willing to consider the case of Poland in due course.

MR. BALFOUR enquired whether anything was settled as to the boundary between Lithuania and Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU hoped that the point would not be raised.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE feared that the Poles were bound to get the Allies into

trouble, by annexing foreign populations and expecting us to back them up. He thought that the Allies had gone rather too far with the Czechoslovaks.

M. BERTHELOT then translated Lord Curzon's proposed additional clause into French.

MR. BALFOUR wondered whether it would be wise to include this paragraph.

LORD CURZON said that something like it was absolutely necessary.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that a qualifying sentence should be introduced stating that we would protect the various States if attacked.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the conference was agreed on the first three paragraphs, but thought the fourth required some further consideration. He suggested that an announcement to be made in public should be drafted, and he proposed that the draft should be prepared by M. Berthelot and Mr. Philip Kerr in time for consideration at the next meeting of the conference. As regards the announcement, it would be made in England in Parliament.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he would prefer to make an announcement in the press. It did not matter what method was adopted so long as the announcement was made simultaneously.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that at the afternoon's Allied conference he would propose the acceptance of the four clauses, and would invite the French, the Italians, the United States and the Japanese in turn to state whether they approved.

MR. BALFOUR said that the Japanese approached the Russian problem from quite a different point of view from ourselves and the French. They had great interests in Siberia. He asked whether our desire was that they should remain there or clear out.

LORD CURZON agreed, and said that this depended upon the United States, who were afraid of what Japan might do if she remained in Siberia.

MR. BALFOUR suggested that he should say to the Japanese: 'This is the policy that we have decided to adopt in view of our special circumstances; as to what you should do in regard to Siberia, we do not presume to advise.'

11. MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that as the petrol question was one of urgency it should be considered in the first instance by French and British experts, who should agree upon some joint scheme, if possible.<sup>8</sup>

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he fully concurred in this suggestion.

It was agreed:

That French petrol experts should come over to London on the following Wednesday<sup>9</sup> to meet Sir Hamar Greenwood<sup>10</sup> and Sir John Cadman.<sup>11</sup>

(*The conference adjourned at 1.25 p.m. until 3.30 p.m.*)

2, Whitehall Gardens, December 13, 1919.

<sup>8</sup> The negotiations here proposed resulted in the Anglo-French Agreement signed at San Remo by M. Berthelot and Sir J. Cadman on April 24, 1920 (Cmd. 675 of 1920).

<sup>9</sup> December 17, 1919.

<sup>10</sup> Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade.

<sup>11</sup> Director of H.M. Petroleum Department.

APPENDIX I TO No. 58

*Note communicated by M. Clemenceau*

POUR RATIFICATION AMÉRICAINE DU TRAITÉ

*Suggestion d'une Déclaration franco-anglaise acceptant dix ou onze des quatorze Réserves du Sénat américain, à condition que les trois ou quatre Réserves incompatibles avec le Traité disparaissent.*

(Typed from Manuscript, Paris, December 9, 1919.)

1. From many statements made by you it appears that you<sup>12</sup> view with grave concern the failure of the Senate of the United States to ratify the Treaty of Peace with Germany. It also seems evident that your concern grows out of your conviction that this failure on the part of the United States may endanger the successful operation of the treaty and may prejudice the peace of Europe.

2. The failure of the treaty in the United States Senate is due to the fact that the representatives of one political party therein are not strong enough in numbers to force the acceptance of the treaty with the fourteen reservations which they attached to it, while the representatives of the other party are not strong enough in numbers to force the acceptance of the treaty without these reservations.

The party which refuses to accept the reservations is the party which supports the President. That party refuses to accept them because it believes that the President's attitude may be due to a belief that these reservations will not be accepted by you.

3. Let us examine these reservations in the light of the probability that they will be maintained; that their maintenance, unless something be done to break the present deadlock, will cause the final rejection of the treaty by the United States; and that then, according to your own conviction, the peace of Europe will be gravely endangered. The continuance of that peace is surely of far more vital interest to you than the meaning and effect of a number of the reservations can possibly be.

4. You have doubtless noticed that eight of these reservations relate exclusively to the covenant of the League of Nations, and that two more relate, in part, to it.

The covenant of the League of Nations is not an essential part of the Treaty of Peace with Germany or with any of our recent enemies. The object of these treaties is to bring an end to the present state of war; the object of the covenant of the League is to provide a check against further wars, but no more with our recent enemies than with our present friends. The covenant could be cut from the treaties, with the understanding that we will subsequently negotiate a treaty embodying it, without causing you the slightest concern.

5. But it is not necessary to separate the covenant from the German treaty, nor from any of the others. To show this, let us examine very briefly the nature of the reservations:—

(a) The preamble to the resolution of ratification provides that this ratification shall not take effect on the part of the United States until the reservations have been accepted by an exchange of notes between the United States and at least three of the other four Great Powers with which we were associated during the war.

If it can be shown that many of these reservations do not stand in the way of putting the Treaty of Peace with Germany into effect, what objection can you have,

<sup>12</sup> The particular persons to whom this draft declaration was addressed were not specified.

in view of your belief in the great danger otherwise resulting, to declaring your acceptance of these reservations? If there be any of them which prejudices the treaty with Germany, you are justified in objecting to them. And, as it seems quite possible that there cannot be more than three of them which could fall in this category, it is possible, and even probable, that an attitude taken by you such as is hereinafter suggested might result in a compromise in the United States Senate by which these reservations, objectionable to you, may be eliminated.

If, on the other hand, you should refuse to accept these reservations, which the great majority of the people of the United States believes to be vital to their own interests, is it not quite certain that in the separate negotiation of a covenant you would be obliged to yield, or else go without a League of Nations so far as our participation is concerned? But I do not think that you would wish to give the impression that you embodied the present covenant in the present treaties for the purpose of having the United States accept responsibility for rejecting the Treaty of Peace with Germany or else to accept, with that treaty, objectionable clauses in the covenant. It seems the more improbable that this was your purpose, because it was currently reported during the exhaustive study made of the covenant here that you had all stated that the meaning read into the covenant by at least some of the reservations is substantially the meaning that you had in mind at the time of its formulation.

(b) The first reservation construes article 1 of the covenant to mean that the United States shall be the sole judge as to the fulfilment of 'its international obligations and all its obligations under this covenant.' Will not that be, in practice, the attitude that will be taken by your own Governments? How can any one of the Great Powers be forced, without war, to remain in the League because of some other Government's construction of its obligations? Is it not evident that a refusal by you to accept this reservation would show that the very first clause in the covenant may prove a cause of war rather than a check against it? Will it not be better, in view of your fear of a total failure of the treaty, to trust to the common sense and general intelligence of the United States to take a proper attitude when the contingency occurs, and to assume that, when the United States judges that its obligations have been fulfilled, you will also agree that they have been fulfilled?

(c) You know quite well that the construction given in the second reservation is in accord with the requirements of the Constitution of the United States, which no law enacted by Congress can override. A treaty, while it is a part of the supreme law of the land, is nevertheless only law, and as such is under, and not over, the Constitution.

(d) Article 22 of the covenant provides that 'advanced nations . . . who are willing to accept it' may be given a mandate over one or more of certain territories. The United States is doubtless one of these 'advanced nations.' How can you determine whether that nation is willing to accept a mandate except by action of the Congress of the United States? What objection, therefore, can you have to the third reservation?

(e) Do you intend to surrender your present right to pass upon all questions which are within your domestic jurisdiction? Do you intend to give other nations the unlimited right to decide how many hours of labour shall constitute a day's work, or how many francs or shillings shall constitute the compensation for such a day's work? Do you intend to surrender your present right to regulate the immigration of aliens into your country, to regulate your coastwise traffic, to regulate your tariff, &c.? If not, what objection have you to the fourth reservation?

worth your while to imperil the successful operation of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, merely to maintain a point of procedure in a League of Nations which has not come into existence? Thus it would seem that there are eleven of the fourteen reservations that could be accepted, resulting in the continued solidarity of the United States with the European Allies and in the prompt resumption of the status of peace for which the world longs.

6. But it seems unlikely that the present deadlock in the United States Senate can be broken, except by a compromise. This compromise will involve the retention of some reservations and perhaps the modification of some others. This compromise cannot be made so long as the President believes that no reservations will be acceptable to you, or until you indicate to him what reservations, modified or not, you will accept. Millions of people in the United States, who think about the treaty at all, believe in these reservations solely for the reason that they are afraid that they are not acceptable to you. If they are not acceptable to you they believe that the clauses of the treaty to which they relate contain some hidden meaning concealed from the American representatives and which, if known, would not have been accepted by them.

If you will give to the treaty and to the President the support of your declaration that you have no objection to certain of these reservations upon the acceptance of which the American people are very earnest, and that others of them will be acceptable to you by certain indicated modifications, the ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate will be made as certain as possible, even though there may be one or two or three of the reservations which you entirely reject.

Even the reservation relating to the disputed rights in Shantung could be accepted. Surely, the peace of the world is not so much affected, even by implication, by this reservation as it will be by the United States withdrawing entirely from the *Entente* as result of its rejection of the treaty.

The American people is earnest in its sincere desire to have peace and would have it under the general terms of the proposed treaty. Surely, in such an enormous document, affecting such a multitude and such a variety of subjects, it is a matter of wonder that a great nation, whose interests are so vitally affected and whose traditional policy is so rudely shocked, has found occasion to make so few reservations the larger proportion of them [?which] do not affect the Peace Treaty with Germany at all. They can safely be left to be worked out by the League of Nations when it comes into existence. If you really wish the Peace Treaty to be ratified by the United States, it is possibly easily within your power to accomplish it. But there is no time to be lost.

## APPENDIX 2 TO NO. 58

### *Reservations to the Treaty of Peace with Germany*

(Reported by Mr. Lodge from the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

The committee also report the following reservations and understandings to be made a part and a condition of the resolution of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said following reservations and understandings have been accepted as a part and a condition of said instrument of ratification by at least three of the four principal Allied and Associated Powers, to wit: Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan:—

1. The United States so understands and construes article 1 that in case of notice

of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations and all its obligations under the said covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

2. The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations—whether members of the League or not—under the provisions of article 10, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.

3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under article 22, Part I, or any other provision of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.

4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labour, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States—and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the League of Nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other Power.

5. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to enquiry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy commonly known as the 'Monroe' doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone, and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said Treaty of Peace with Germany.

6. The United States withholds its assent to articles 156, 157 and 158 and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.

7. The Congress of the United States will provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations and may in its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in any commission, committee, tribunal, court, council or conference, or in the selection of any members thereof and for the appointment of members of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils or conferences, or any other representatives under the treaty of peace, or in carrying out its provisions, and until such participations and appointment[s] have been so provided for and the powers and duties of such representatives so defined, no person shall represent the United States under either said League of Nations or the Treaty of Peace with Germany or be authorized to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder, and no citizen of the United States shall be selected or appointed as a member of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils or conferences, except with the approval of the Senate of the United States.

8. The United States understands that the Reparation Commission will regulate

(f) Article 21 of the covenant provides that 'nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of . . . regional undertakings like the Monroe Doctrine.' What objection, therefore, can you have to the fifth reservation, which withdraws from arbitration or enquiry the Monroe Doctrine? Otherwise, the protection purported to be given to that doctrine by article 21 is a mere form of words, and is so recognised by the common sense of all the people of the United States.

If it be your intent at some future time to call that doctrine into question, surely it is not worth your while to now make that fact evident, thereby causing the rejection of the Treaty of Peace with Germany by the United States and thus imperilling the peace of Europe. It will require a united Europe to call that doctrine into question with any hope of success, and it will be better for you, from the point of view of your own interests, to secure the successful operation of the treaty with Germany in order that when, in some future and distant year, you call the Monroe Doctrine into question you may have a united, and not a Balkanised, Europe behind you.

(g) The sixth reservation withholds the assent of the United States to those articles of the treaty with Germany which relate to the disposition of disputed rights in Shantung. This reservation and the eighth and twelfth reservations relate to matters which affect the integrity of the treaty. For this reason they are reservations to which you may refuse to give your formal assent. But, if in respect to all of the others, you take the attitude suggested hereafter, you will have taken the surest course to secure a compromise by which these reservations may be alienated.

(h) The seventh reservation provides that the representatives of the United States in the Assembly and on the Council of the League of Nations must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This is the same provision in American law which applies with respect to countless officials and representatives of the United States.

The same reservation makes this principle of procedure apply to all representatives of the United States on any commission, committee, &c., required under the Treaty of Peace or in carrying out its provisions.

It is difficult to conceive that any nation can object to the United States following its habitual practice in the selection of its official representatives.

(i) The ninth reservation declares that the United States cannot contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations or under the Treaty of Peace, except in accordance with an appropriation bill duly enacted by the Congress of the United States. This is merely a statement of fact. Its intent, like that of some of the other reservations, is to inform foreign Governments, who may not be aware of it, that there are certain methods and limitations imposed by the organic law of our Government and thereby prevent any future misunderstanding. Every citizen of the United States understands that by no possibility can a penny of public funds be withdrawn from the Treasury, except in pursuance of an appropriation law.

(j) The tenth reservation reserves to the United States the right to increase its armaments without the consent of the League should the United States find itself threatened with invasion or engaged in war. Is there any nation which will construe the provisions of article 8 of the covenant in any other way, no matter whether it has made a reservation or not?

(k) The eleventh reservation reserves to the United States the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking State who reside within the United States or in countries other than the covenant-breaking one to continue their commercial, financial and personal relations with the nationals of the United

States. This does not, as some have assumed, limit the power of the League to impose a blockade upon the covenant-breaking State. For example, if X be the covenant-breaking State; if some of its nationals reside in the United States and others in the States of B and C, the reservation would permit the League to impose a blockade upon the covenant-breaking State X, while, at the same time, the relations between the nationals of that State residing in the United States and in the States B and C may continue as before. What real interest is threatened by this reservation? At least to such an extent as to warrant a refusal to accept this reservation and thereby imperil the treaty with Germany.

(l) The thirteenth reservation withholds the assent of the United States to Part XIII (the organisation of labour) until Congress by law provides for the representation of that Government in this organisation as well as the conditions which shall govern the participation of the United States in it. This subject is one of those which have no essential relation to the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and the success of that treaty should not be prejudiced by a refusal to accept the reservation.

(m) The fourteenth reservation denies the binding effect upon the United States of any obligation resulting from an action of the council or Assembly of the League in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies, &c., have cast in the aggregate more than one vote.

In like manner it denies the binding effect of any obligations arising from an action of the council or Assembly in any dispute between the United States and any member of the League provided that member or any of its self-governing dominions, colonies, &c., has cast a vote.

The second of the foregoing two provisions is manifestly fair and just provided neither of the disputants casts a vote. Doubtless, this is what was intended by the Senate of the United States and a mere suggestion to that effect will cause this to be made clear.

The first of the two above provisions is, in the minds of many, equally just and fair, although there are some who think that it would require a revision of article 15 (and perhaps others) of the covenant. But it is believed that such revision is not now necessary. The success of the League of Nations depends upon all its members entering it with confidence in the ultimate sense of justice of the entire body. It will be observed that the fourteenth reservation does not declare that the United States will not be bound by any obligation arising from the action of the council or Assembly after the casting of votes as indicated above. It reserves the right to declare the obligation in case injustice results. Why cannot the nations of the League assume that it will be a long time before even an attempt at injustice toward the United States would be made? And that even then the full and free discussion will prevent the attempt from being realised? The processes of operation of the League will, undoubtedly, be modified from time to time, as experience shows to be wise. If, as some people believe any nation under the present covenant has an undue preponderance of votes, and if at any time this preponderance should bring the League face to face with a proposed act of injustice, can we not trust to the common sense of justice of the League to work out a solution? It may be years before such an act of injustice would be proposed. During all that time the United States will be in the League, day by day cementing the relations of friendship between all the nations, resulting in a spirit that will make the solution of the difficulty under consideration easy when the time comes for it.

The essential question is, have you any such object in view in giving to one United Nation six votes as against the one vote of the United States as makes it

worth your while to imperil the successful operation of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, merely to maintain a point of procedure in a League of Nations which has not come into existence? Thus it would seem that there are eleven of the fourteen reservations that could be accepted, resulting in the continued solidarity of the United States with the European Allies and in the prompt resumption of the status of peace for which the world longs.

6. But it seems unlikely that the present deadlock in the United States Senate can be broken, except by a compromise. This compromise will involve the retention of some reservations and perhaps the modification of some others. This compromise cannot be made so long as the President believes that no reservations will be acceptable to you, or until you indicate to him what reservations, modified or not, you will accept. Millions of people in the United States, who think about the treaty at all, believe in these reservations solely for the reason that they are afraid that they are not acceptable to you. If they are not acceptable to you they believe that the clauses of the treaty to which they relate contain some hidden meaning concealed from the American representatives and which, if known, would not have been accepted by them.

If you will give to the treaty and to the President the support of your declaration that you have no objection to certain of these reservations upon the acceptance of which the American people are very earnest, and that others of them will be acceptable to you by certain indicated modifications, the ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate will be made as certain as possible, even though there may be one or two or three of the reservations which you entirely reject.

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3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under article 22, Part I, or any other provision of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.

4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part to its internal affairs, including immigration, labour, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States—and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the League of Nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other Power.

5. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to enquiry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy commonly known as the 'Monroe' doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone, and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said Treaty of Peace with Germany.

6. The United States withholds its assent to articles 156, 157 and 158 and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.

7. The Congress of the United States will provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations and may in its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in any commission, committee, tribunal, court, council or conference, or in the selection of any members thereof and for the appointment of members of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils or conferences, or any other representatives under the treaty of peace, or in carrying out its provisions, and until such participations and appointment[s] have been so provided for and the powers and duties of such representatives so defined, no person shall represent the United States under either said League of Nations or the Treaty of Peace with Germany or be authorized to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder, and no citizen of the United States shall be selected or appointed as a member of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils or conferences, except with the approval of the Senate of the United States.

8. The United States understands that the Reparation Commission will regulate

or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States by Act or Joint Resolution of Congress approves such regulation or interference.

9. The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations, or of the secretariat, or of any commission, or committee, or conference, or other agency, organized under the League of Nations or under the treaty or for the purpose of carrying out the treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States.

10. If the United States shall at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League of Nations under the provisions of article 8, it reserves the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

11. The United States reserves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking State, as defined in article 16 of the covenant of the League of Nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than that violating said article 16, to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States.

12. Nothing in articles 296, 297, or in any of the annexes thereto or in any other article, section or annex of the Treaty of Peace with Germany shall, as against citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any confirmation, ratification or approval of any act otherwise illegal or in contravention of the rights of citizens of the United States.

13. . . .<sup>13</sup>

14. United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any election, decision, report or finding of council or assembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies or parts of Empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote, and assumes no obligations to be bound by any decision, report or finding of council or assembly arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member of the League, if such member or any self-governing dominion, colony, or part of Empire united with it politically has voted.

<sup>13</sup> Thus in original. For this reservation see paragraph 5(l) in appendix 1 above.

## No. 59

I.C.P. 5.] *Secretary's Notes of an Anglo-French Conference held at 10, Downing Street, S.W., on Saturday, December 13, 1919, at 3.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal, The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council.

*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Cambon.

SECRETARY: Sir M. Hankey.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY: Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE referred to the draft conclusion in regard to Russia, and read the fourth paragraph as regards the assistance to be given to the border communities.

*Russia*  
M. CLEMENCEAU agreed to the wording as proposed of this paragraph of the Russian conclusions and the draft resolution (A) was agreed to. (Resolution (A)—see I.C.P. 8.<sup>1</sup>)

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if the draft conclusions as to the future of the Peace Conference appeared suitable.

*Future of Peace Conference*  
M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that one of the chief things which the Peace Conference had to deal with was the question of peace with Turkey. In the circumstances he did not altogether like the wording of the first paragraph, which provided for the present Peace Conference coming to an end at an early date.

Some discussion then ensued regarding the wording of the first paragraph of the draft, and it was agreed that the words 'cession [session] of the' should be inserted so that the first line should read 'that the present session of the Peace Conference shall. . .'

Some discussion then ensued regarding the wording of paragraph 2 of the draft conclusions, during which Mr. Balfour suggested that at the beginning of the paragraph the words 'that pending the resumption of the conference' should be inserted, and 'that at the end of the paragraph the words 'a Conference of Ambassadors in Paris' should be amended to read 'the Ambassadors in Paris.'

LORD CURZON doubted if such wording would make it clear whether the Ambassadors were to discuss the questions as now or in conference. Further, he thought that the proposed wording would deprive the Peace Conference from now on of the right of dealing with any matters.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the wording in the draft was quite clear.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that quite frankly he did not want large questions of policy, to which the British Government might be committed, to be dealt with by the Peace Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that this was his view also. What he suggested was conferences such as that which they were having now in order to discuss difficulties in connection with the peace with Turkey, and also with Hungary, and these questions would then have to be submitted to the Peace Conference.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said His Majesty's Government would not send anyone to Paris to discuss the Turkish treaty, and he wanted that considered amongst themselves.

M. CLEMENCEAU replied that in any case it would be necessary to send someone to say what had been decided, as when the Turkish delegates had to be dealt with they would have to come to Paris, and the question would then have to be discussed by the Peace Conference.

LORD CURZON called attention to the fact that whenever the discussion of the Eastern question started in Paris the question of the East would occupy

<sup>1</sup> No. 62.

a great deal of time, and, in his opinion, could not be disposed of in less than six weeks.

M. CLEMENCEAU was inclined to think it would not take so long as suggested by the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as, if the French and British representatives had come to an agreement beforehand, the other Powers would not have very much to say. America and Japan were not greatly interested, and Italy might possibly have something to say. He could not agree as to the question not being discussed in Paris, but he was quite prepared to leave the door open for the matter to be discussed later.

After some further discussion it was agreed that—

The conclusions in connection with the future of the Peace Conference should be worded as shown in resolution (B) (I.C.P. 8).<sup>1</sup>

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the next matter to consider was the proposed wording of the agreement in connection with the breaches of the *Breaches of the Laws of War* laws of war.

After a short discussion, during which M. Clemenceau said that the French representative could come to London whenever required, and Sir M. Hankey said that the English Attorney-General would like him to come on Friday, the 19th instant, the wording of the proposed draft conclusion in this connection was agreed to. (Resolution (C) (I.C.P. 8).<sup>1</sup>)

4. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the next point to consider was the question of the surrender of the Kaiser.

*Surrender of the Kaiser*

After a short discussion, during which Mr. Lloyd George said that Lord Hugh Cecil<sup>2</sup> had suggested his internment in Dover Castle if he was brought to England, the wording of the draft conclusion in this connection was agreed to as shown in resolution (D) (I.C.P. 8).<sup>1</sup>

5. MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that it was very desirable before the Japanese Ambassador arrived to come to some agreement as to what reply should be given to him if he asked whether the Allies wished Japan to remain in Siberia or not.

*Policy as Regards Siberia* M. CLEMENCEAU thought that the only reply that could be given was that President Wilson would have to be consulted in the first instance.

MR. BALFOUR agreed, and said that at the same time it might be said that it was recognized that America and Japan were the two Powers primarily interested.

LORD CURZON referred to the fact that the Japanese had still 30,000 men left in Siberia. It was for consideration whether it was in the interests of Europe that Japan should stay there or not. He then explained what, in his opinion, were the arguments for and against Japan remaining in Siberia.

The advantages of Japan clearing out of Siberia were:—

- (1) Japan would conform to the policy of the Allies.
- (2) If Japan remained, China would be in constant apprehension.
- (3) If Japan withdrew altogether, the Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks would be free to fight it out amongst themselves.

<sup>2</sup> Privy Councillor and Member of Parliament for Oxford University.

The arguments for Japan remaining were:—

- (1) Japan requires an outlet somewhere as the Japanese were debarred from going to America and certain British possessions, and Siberia offered an immense field for emigration.
- (2) If Japan were allowed to remain in Siberia, she might leave China alone.
- (3) It is not clear how we could get her to go out if she did not want to go.
- (4) Her presence in Siberia was a guarantee against the triumph of Bolshevism.

On the whole he thought that the arguments were in favour of allowing Japan to stay, but he thought it only right to call the attention of the conference to the fact that if she remained there, she might not confine her interests to the east of Lake Baikal, and the result might be that a difficult Eastern question would have to be grappled with in the future.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE did not see what objection there could be, from a purely European point of view, to Japan remaining in Siberia.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

Some discussion then ensued as regards the possibility of an alliance between Russia and Japan, and M. Clemenceau pointed out that he thought such a possibility was somewhat remote, and that every decision arrived at must have some dangers in view.

2, Whitehall Gardens, December 13, 1919.

## No. 60

I.C.P. 6.] *Secretary's Notes of a Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W.1, on Saturday, December 13, 1919, at 4.30 p.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal, The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council, The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer.

*U.S.A.*: The Hon. J. W. Davis.

*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Cambon.

*Italy*: The Marquis Imperiali.

*Japan*: Viscount Chinda.<sup>2</sup>

SECRETARY: Sir M. Hankey.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY: Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were two questions which it was very desirable to discuss while M. Clemenceau was in London. The first was the Russian question, and the second was what arrangements should be made as regards the future of the Peace Conference.

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 853 f.

<sup>2</sup> Japanese Ambassador in London.

1. As regards Russia, the question to be decided was what was to be done in regard to giving more money; and, again, what was to be done if the Baltic States were attacked by the Bolsheviks. Further, there was the question of the Caucasian States, and what was to be done if these were attacked by General Denikin. There was, yet again, the question of Siberia, although this was much more the concern of the United States of America and Japan than of the other Powers. He understood that the Japanese had 30,000 men still in Siberia, and the Americans, 8,000. In so far as Russia in Europe was concerned, the views of the British, French and Italian Governments were that no further commitments should be entered into. England had promised to do certain things, and the French the same; and after that it was intended that neither Power would be under any obligation, but that each Power should have discretion to leave on the spot, or not, their political or other missions which may either be attached to the anti-Bolshevik elements or the despatch of which may have already been decided upon. The next question on which these Powers were agreed was that a strong Poland was desirable. The third point was that the Powers were agreed that the proposal to summon a general conference of representatives of the anti-Bolshevik States must be rejected. The fourth point was in connection with the assistance to be given to the border communities, and it was agreed that the Allies should give them such assistance in defending their liberties as might be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arose. These were the principal points which it was desired to submit to the conference for consideration.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he understood that it was not intended to encourage Poland to take offensive action, and that the extent of any assistance which might be given to her should be for the defence of her territories, and not for other purposes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that this was so, and the conference approved of the addition to the wording of paragraph 2<sup>3</sup> of the words 'to her for the defence of her territories'.

VISCOUNT CHINDA referred to the sum of £15,000,000, which he understood the British Government were giving to the anti-Bolshevik forces. He would like to know whether that sum was earmarked to General Denikin, or whether some of it could be given to the anti-Bolsheviks in Siberia. In his opinion, the situation in Siberia was very critical, and without further financial or military assistance he did not see how it could be retrieved.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE explained that the money allotted by the British Government for assistance to Russia was earmarked for General Denikin, and asked Mr. Davis if he knew whether America was prepared to give any further assistance to Admiral Kolchak.

MR. DAVIS said that he did not know what the situation was in this connection.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he understood that the United States and Japanese Governments were discussing the question at the moment. He would like

<sup>3</sup> Of resolution (A) in No. 62.

to read to the conference the views of the Viscount Uchida, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in connection with the Siberian situation. These, as explained by Viscount Chinda, were, briefly, that the Japanese Government view with very great concern the situation in Siberia. The retirement of Admiral Kolchak had encouraged the Bolsheviks, and if Admiral Kolchak's retreat had to be continued the Allied and Associated troops might find themselves face to face with the Red Russian army. In the opinion of the Viscount Uchida, there were three alternative courses which might be taken:—

(i) An attempt to crush the Red Russian army by sending sufficient reinforcements to Siberia, and by acting in co-operation with the anti-Bolshevik forces.

(ii) The carrying out of partial withdrawal in order to avoid an encounter with the Red Russian army.

(iii) An attempt to stop the Red Russian army by maintaining the *status quo*. To adopt course (i) would entail sending reinforcements of considerable strength, and public opinion in Japan made this impossible, in so far as Japan was concerned, as the Opposition in the Japanese Parliament were even demanding withdrawal from Russia. As regards the second course, it was the opinion of the Japanese Government that any partial withdrawal would lead to the augmentation of the Bolshevik strength and would necessitate in the end a total withdrawal. Such a situation would create a serious menace of Bolshevism to Manchuria, Korea, and even to Japan itself. Consequently, the only course of action appeared to be the third alternative, which was to maintain the *status quo* by sending such forces as were imperatively necessary in order to strengthen weak points on the front; and, in the opinion of the Japanese military authorities, 5,000 to 6,000 men would be required for this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if the Japanese Government were contemplating the despatch of these reinforcements to Siberia it would be better, in drafting the conclusions in regard to Russia, to introduce in the first paragraph, after the word 'promised', in the second line, the words 'or decided upon'.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said he would like to explain that it was not the present intention of the Japanese Government to send all these reinforcements themselves, but that that was the estimate of the size of the force which, in the opinion of the Japanese military authorities, would be required.

After some further discussion, it was agreed:—

That the first part of paragraph 1 of the conclusions in regard to Russia should be amended to read as follows:—

'not to enter into any further commitments beyond what have already been promised, or, in the case of Siberia, may be decided upon between the Governments of the United States of America and Japan as to furnishing . . .', &c.

It was also agreed:

That paragraph 3 should be amended to read as follows:—

'The conference agreed that no useful purpose would be served by at-

tempting to summon any general conference of the representatives of the anti-Bolshevik States at the present time.'

After some further discussion, the conclusions in regard to Russia, as shown in resolution (A) (I.C.P. 8),<sup>4</sup> were agreed to.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE raised the question of the publication of some statement to show the policy agreed upon. There appeared to him *Announcement of Russian Policy* to be two alternatives, viz., either—

- (a) For each Power to agree to make the same statement, or
- (b) To agree to the conclusions, and that each Power should make its own statement, based on these conclusions.

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that before any public statement was made as to policy he would like to consult his Government.

MR. DAVIS similarly said that he would have to consult his Government before committing himself to any public statement on policy. He would also have to dissociate himself from any statement that might be made in the meantime as regards policy.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he was in the same position as Mr. Davis.

After some further discussion it was agreed:

That each Government should be left to make what statement it thought fit, based on the conclusions arrived at.

2. MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the next question was to decide what was to be the final text of the conclusions in connection with the future of the Peace Conference. He would like to ask the conference if they would agree to the draft which was before them and had been concurred in by himself and M. Clemenceau. *Future of the Peace Conference*

THE UNITED STATES and ITALIAN AMBASSADORS both pointed out that it would be necessary for them to refer the conclusions in this respect to their Governments. They presumed that they might understand that the British and French Governments were in agreement on the matter and invited their Governments to concur.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this was so.

VISCOUNT CHINDA said that he agreed to the terms of the conclusions on behalf of the Japanese Government.

The terms of the conclusion, as agreed to by the French, British and Japanese Governments, are given in resolution (B) (I.C.P. 8).<sup>4</sup>

3. MR. LLOYD GEORGE raised the question of the conclusions which had been arrived at in connection with the breaches of the laws of war and the surrender of the ex-Kaiser. *Breaches of the Laws of War*

THE MARQUIS IMPERIALI said that he was afraid he had not come to the conference prepared to discuss these questions, which exceeded his competence, and the matter was dropped.

2, Whitehall Gardens, December 13, 1919.

<sup>4</sup> No. 62.

I.C.P. 7.] *Secretary's Notes of an Anglo-French Conference, held at 10, Downing Street, London, S.W.1., on Saturday, December 13, 1919, at 5.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal, The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour, Lord President of the Council, The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The Right Hon. A. Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Cambon, M. Loucheur, M. Berthelot, M. de Fleuriau.

SECRETARY: Sir M. Hankey.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY: Brigadier-General S. H. Wilson.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

I. MR. CHAMBERLAIN reported that M. Loucheur and he had reached an agreement on all the points referred to them except two. These related to the cost of the armies of occupation and to the classification of coal as land-borne or sea-borne under the terms of the treaty with Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if that meant that the question of the army of occupation had not been settled.

MR. BONAR LAW replied in the affirmative and said that that question would have to be settled by the Reparation Commission, if not otherwise.

M. LOUCHEUR explained that he did not dispute the correctness of the British contention that the British Government was entitled under the treaty to the full cost of the British army, including pay, but he thought that the French contention in regard to coal was equally well founded. He was confident that he could prove this, and would send experts to London to discuss the matter with the Coal Controller.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN proposed that the agreement drawn up between M. Loucheur and himself, which made no mention of these points, should be approved.

The conference decided—

To approve the agreement (Appendix A).

MR. CHAMBERLAIN then read in English the statement respecting the proposed agreement, which M. Loucheur proposed to make to the French Parliament. He explained that the amount of the French loan to be issued in England would depend on what the conditions of the market permitted at the time of issue, which would probably be about March next.

After some further discussion, during which it was pointed out by Mr. Bonar Law that it was very essential that the rate of interest should also be agreed upon—

The conference agreed to the terms of the proposed statement with the addition of the word 'conditions' (*modalités*) after 'the date and amount.' (The statement as approved is given in resolution (E) (I.C.P. 8).<sup>1</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> No. 62.

2. MR. CHAMBERLAIN again called attention to the necessity of securing the assent of the British Dominions before the British Government could give their final approval to the proposed distribution of reparation as between France and the British Empire.

M. CLEMENCEAU and M. LOUCHEUR assented.

3. It was further agreed that nothing should be said publicly on this subject until M. Loucheur and Sir J. Bradbury had completed their negotiations with the other Allies.

2, *Whitehall Gardens, December 13, 1919.*

## APPENDIX A TO No. 61

### Document 1

It is agreed—

1. That neither the French nor the British Government will appoint a Minister to represent them on the Reparation Commission.

2. That the position and duties of the chairman shall be as defined in the attached paper marked 'A'.

3. That the secretary general shall be British.

4. That payments by Germany shall be devoted, first to the payment of the armies of occupation and for such supplies of food and raw material as may be allowed to Germany as provided by the treaty; secondly, to satisfying the Belgian priority; after this the proportionate distribution to be applied to all receipts from Germany, including restoration in kind, except where the article restored is actually identified as having been removed from the country to which it is now given back (article 238 of the treaty). Subject to the assent of the British Dominions, it is agreed that the share of the reparation accruing to France and the British Empire collectively shall be divided between France and the British Empire in the proportion of 11 to 5.

5. The British Government will support the choice of a French chairman. The French Government agree to the proposal already accepted by the American, Italian and Belgian representatives that the shipping section shall sit in London and will support the choice of a British chairman for this section.

6. The British Government further agree that it may be announced that they have assented to the issue of a French loan in London for as large an amount as the state of the British market at the time may permit. It is anticipated that the loan may be issued about the month of March next, but the exact date and the amount are reserved for further discussion between the two Governments. The proceeds of the loans will be spent entirely in the United Kingdom.

(Initialled) J. A.

(Initialled) B. P. B.

7. The French Government will not ask for the repayment of the gold handed over under the Calais Agreement<sup>2</sup> until the moment arrives when the whole of the French debt to the British Government is liquidated.

<sup>2</sup> The reference was to the protocol of agreement drawn up at the conclusion of an Anglo-French financial conference at Calais on August 24, 1916, and signed on the one hand by Mr. Asquith, British Prime Minister, and Mr. McKenna, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and on

Cette clause est soumise au Ministre des Finances, qui seul peut y donner son agrément.

(Initialled) J. A. (J. AVENAL).<sup>3</sup>

Subject to clause 7 being finally agreed.

(Initialled) B. P. B. (B. P. BLACKETT).<sup>4</sup>

December 13, 1919.

## Document 2

'A.'

1. It shall be the duty of the chairman to preside at the meetings of the commission and to exercise such authority in regard to the calling, postponement of, and the conduct of business at, such meetings as may be given by the standing orders, and it shall be the duty of the deputy chairman to discharge any or all of the duties of the chairman in his absence. Otherwise the powers of all the delegates shall be equal.

2. All minutes of proceedings at meetings of the commission shall be signed by the chairman (or in his absence by the deputy chairman) and countersigned by the secretary general.

3. All documents and correspondence issuing from the commission [? shall] be initialled (*visé*) by the secretary general and signed by two delegates unless the commission otherwise determines.

4. No individual delegate shall have power to act in the name or on behalf of the commission unless expressly authorised to do so by resolution of the commission in regard to a specific matter. Any delegate so authorised may sign letters and documents on behalf of the commission in respect of such matter, provided that such letters or documents are expressed to be issued by direction of the commission and the resolution of the commission giving the authority is quoted therein.

(Initialled) J. A.

(Initialled) B. P. B.

December 13, 1919.

the other by M. Briand, French Prime Minister, and M. Ribot, French Minister of Finance. The first three articles of this agreement read:

'(1) In order to meet the financial requirements of the French Government for the six months, the 15th September, 1916, to the 15th March, 1917, His Majesty's Government will discount French Government Treasury bills as the money is required, but at a rate not exceeding £25,000,000 a month, up to a total amount of £150,000,000.

'(2) In return for the above advances, the French Government undertake to request the Bank of France to place at the disposal of the British Treasury a sum of £50,000,000 in gold, this sum constituting a loan to be repaid by the British Government on the same dates as the repayment of the bills to be discounted under clause 1. The Bank of France will forward the gold by instalments, to be delivered to the charge of the British Government at a French port. Such deliveries to take place after the shortest possible delay, at the request of the British Treasury, subject to a maximum of £5,000,000 weekly.

'(3) The French Government Treasury bills to be discounted under clause 1 will be sterling bills of a currency of twelve months, and will be discounted at the advertised rates for British Treasury bills of the same currency on the day of discount. They will be finally repayable in three years after the conclusion of peace. In the intervening period, the British Government will facilitate by all the means in their power the issue of a French funding loan on the London market.'

<sup>3</sup> Apparently in error for Avenol. M. J. Avenol was French financial delegate in London.

<sup>4</sup> An official of the British Treasury.

I.C.P. 8.] *Conferences of the Allied and Associated Powers and of the British and French Governments, held at 10, Downing Street, London, on Thursday, Friday and Saturday, December 11, 12 and 13, 1919.*

TEXT OF RESOLUTIONS.

(A.) *Policy in Russia.*

(Discussed at conference of American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese representatives.)

1. The Russian policy agreed to at the conference may be summed up as follows:—<sup>1</sup>

Not to enter into any further commitments beyond what has already been promised or, in the case of Siberia, may be decided upon between the Governments of the United States of America and Japan, as to furnishing assistance to the anti-Bolshevik elements in Russia, whether in the form of troops, war material, or financial aid; the anti-Bolshevik elements still to be free to purchase war material in the Allied countries; each Power to have discretion to leave on the spot all political or other missions which may either be attached to the anti-Bolshevik elements or the dispatch of which may already have been decided upon; and to leave Bolshevik Russia, as it were, within a ring fence.

2. The conference considered that a strong Poland was in the interests of the *Entente* Powers and left for further consideration the question of the form and extent of the assistance to be given to her for the defence of her territories.

3. The conference agreed that no useful purpose would be served by attempting to summon any general conference of the representatives of the anti-Bolshevik States at the present time.

4. As regards the border communities with non-Russian populations which have been struggling for freedom and self-government, the Allies will give them such assistance in defending their liberties as may be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arises.

(B.) *Future of the Peace Conference.*

(Discussed at a conference of the American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese representatives.)

It was agreed that—

1. The present session of the Peace Conference shall come to an end at Christmas or at latest within a fortnight of the first *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Note in original: 'An understanding was reached that each Government should announce this policy in the words and in the manner it considered most convenient, but in any case not before 3 p.m. on Monday, the 15th December.'

2. After the termination of the present session of the Peace Conference large questions of policy shall be dealt with by direct communication between the Governments themselves, while questions of detail shall be dealt with by a Conference of Ambassadors in Paris.

3. The principles of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey shall be first discussed between the heads of Governments before the conference meets to consider the necessary treaties.

4. The Inter-Allied Military Organisation shall be continued under the presidency of Marshal Foch at Versailles and shall be instructed—

(a) To give advice to the Allied and Associated Governments on military questions relating to the execution by Germany of the Treaty of Peace.

(b) To execute such orders as the Allied and Associated Powers may give them.<sup>2</sup>

(C.) *Breaches of the Laws of War.*

(Discussed between the British and French Governments)

It was agreed that—

A committee should be immediately set up in London composed of legal representatives of the British, French, and Belgian Governments, in order to revise and, if possible, to cut down the list of persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war under article 228 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and in order to ensure that the several lists are based on similar principles.

The Attorney General of England undertook to take the initiative in summoning the committee.

(D.) *The Kaiser.*

(Discussed between the British and French Governments.)

It was agreed—

To proceed with the demand for the surrender of the Kaiser under article 227 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany immediately after the first *procès-verbal* of the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

(E.) *Economic Questions.*

*Reparations, Finance, and Coal.*

The conference agreed to the following communiqué to be issued by M. Loucheur in Paris as the result of his conversations with Mr. Chamberlain:—

‘An exchange of views has taken place in regard to the working of the Reparation Commission and has demonstrated the identity of view of the two Governments. The economic and financial situation has been exam-

<sup>2</sup> Resolutions A and B above are printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, pp. 857–8.

ined in detail. In order to remedy the fall in the exchange, prejudicial to the two nations, the British Government has accepted the issue of a French loan in England, the date, the amount and the conditions of which will be fixed by agreement between the two Governments. Finally, it has been decided that the system of licences for the exportation of coal shall be provisionally prolonged by some days in order to allow time to study the question further.'

\* \* \* \* \*

*The Attitude of the United States of America to the Peace Treaty.*

In view of a communication from Viscount Grey to the Prime Minister, in which the former had advised that foreign opposition to their reservations would only stiffen the Senate, it was agreed that discussion of America's attitude and the possible action of the Allies towards it should be postponed.

*Peace with Turkey.*

(Discussed at a conference between the British and French Governments.)

There is no formal resolution on the subject, but it was agreed that Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot should examine various questions connected with the peace with Turkey and should prepare alternative drafts for consideration.

*Petrol.*

(Discussed at a conference between British and French Governments.)

It was agreed that the French petrol experts should come over to London on the following Wednesday<sup>4</sup> to meet Sir Hamar Greenwood and Sir John Cadman.

<sup>3</sup> Thus in original.

<sup>4</sup> December 17, 1919.

## No. 63

I.C.P. 9.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, January 9, 1920, at 12.15 p.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: U.S.A.: The Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. L. Harrison.

*British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. A. Bonar Law, Lord Privy Seal, The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Leeper.

*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Massigli.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, Signor Scialoja, SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: Mr. Matsui.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, pp. 859-60.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had had the pleasure of several conversations with Signor Nitti in London. The latter had made *The Adriatic. The Question of Fiume* certain suggestions<sup>2</sup> which he himself had taken into consideration with his colleagues. As the result of their deliberations, he had prepared a memorandum of proposals which he would now invite his colleagues on the Supreme Council to examine.

(At this point Mr. Lloyd George's proposals were handed round (Appendix).<sup>3</sup>)

His latest proposals, though based on Signor Nitti's suggestions, had not yet been seen by Signor Nitti. His suggestion was that the proposals in his memorandum should be considered as presented to the conference and to Signor Nitti by M. Clemenceau and himself. In this connection, Mr. Lloyd George recalled that on the 19th April, at the Council of Four, in the presence of President Wilson, he had informed Signor Orlando that Great Britain stood by the Treaty of London, and had made it clear that, if Italy insisted on it, Great Britain would abide by it. M. Clemenceau had taken the same attitude. At the same time, he had also made it clear that, in the opinion of the British Government, the Treaty of London was not quite suitable to existing conditions. He was quite well acquainted with Signor Nitti's difficulties, which were largely internal. The fact was that Fiume had become, as it were, a 'flag' to Italian public opinion. Apart from that, it was not really a question of any great intrinsic importance. Nevertheless, it was very urgent to settle the matter. Otherwise the situation was full of peril to Italy, to the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and to Europe. He did not think the council could take the responsibility of allowing the present state of affairs to continue. In this complicated question no perfect solution was possible. The populations of this area were so mixed as to prevent this, and the only thing to do was to reach some rough-and-ready solution which all parties could accept. Consequently, if his new proposals should prove acceptable to Italy, he proposed that the Council should then see the representatives of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and put the proposal before them.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if Signor Nitti had had an opportunity of studying the document.

SIGNOR NITTI replied that he had not.

M. CLEMENCEAU then proposed that, in order to give Signor Nitti time to study the question, it should be adjourned until 11.30 on Saturday, the 10th January.

*Paris, January 9, 1920.*

<sup>2</sup> Signor Nitti had communicated these suggestions to Mr. Lloyd George in a memorandum on January 6, 1920. This memorandum is printed as document 4 in Cmd. 586.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This appendix, headed 'Draft of suggested Joint Memorandum by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George' and dated January 9, 1920, was identical with the memorandum published as document 5 in Cmd. 586 except that the draft contained a paragraph 8, subsequently omitted, which read: 'There must also be a discussion of the boundaries of Albania.'

I.C.P. 10.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the British, French and Italian Governments, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, January 10, 1920, at 11.50 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Leeper.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. de Percin.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

1. SIGNOR NITTI handed in a note on the Adriatic question prepared in reply to the note handed in by Mr. Lloyd George on the previous day (Appendix).  
*The Adriatic Question*

(M. Mantoux read Signor Nitti's note in French.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE apologised for discussing first the last point in Signor Nitti's memorandum. He wished to obtain from Signor Nitti certain information in regard to Albania, with special reference to the following sentence at the end of his memorandum:—

'The Italian delegation does not doubt that this discussion will restrain itself to the boundaries of Southern Albania, it having already been settled that to the north and the east the boundaries laid down in 1913 could bear no restrictions without rendering it impossible for the Albanian State to exist.'

He wished to know what were the boundaries of Albania as laid down in 1913, and more particularly as to whether they included Scutari. It was necessary to avoid cutting the Serbs from the sea in the south, as had already been done in the north, in regard to the Yugoslavs. This would be to create an impossible situation.

SIGNOR NITTI observed that he could not see how it could be said that the maritime ports were taken from the Yugoslavs, since they would have nearly all the ports on the east coast of the Adriatic. In fact, it was necessary to observe that the frontier already possessed by these peoples would not be altered.

(After some discussion a map was produced, from which it was apparent that Scutari was included in Albania.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he could not accept that Albania should have Scutari. (M. Clemenceau said this was impossible.) This was not a question solely for the decision of the council. It was also a question of inducing the Yugoslavs to accept. It was true that it might be possible to force a decision upon the Yugoslavs, but it would only result in their becoming sulky and troublesome. The council ought to find a solution which the Yugoslavs also could accept. If Italy got the Croats opposed to her as regards Fiume in the

north, and the Serbians opposed to her in the south on the question of Albania, there would be bound to be trouble. The Serb-Croat-Slovene State would appeal to the United States of America, and afterwards to Russia, and there would be an infernal situation.

SIGNOR NITTI said it was necessary to remember that his own situation was difficult, and that of Italy very difficult. Under the proposals in the memorandum of the previous day Italy was practically abandoning everything that had been granted to her by the Treaty of London, and getting nothing in exchange. The questions in regard to the corridor to ensure contiguity between Fiume and Italy were not so much territorial as moral, for Italy, since Fiume did not form a part of Italy.

(Mr. Lloyd George observed that the question might perhaps be better described as political than moral.)

Fiume being a moral question, Italy must retain something for herself. Under the treaty as now proposed, nearly the whole of the eastern coast of the Adriatic would be attributed to the Yugoslavs, who would not lose a single port on that coast. The question of Albania was a very complicated one. Besides the Albanians there were Greeks and Serbians in constant conflict. The mandate exercised by Italy in Albania involved the maintenance of the Italian troops in Albania, and cost an enormous amount of money; more, indeed, than two billion lire. Once the question was settled, this garrison would be materially reduced. Scutari was the only town of importance in Albania. If it was attributed to the Yugoslavs there would certainly be a rising in Albania. If he desired to make trouble for the Yugoslavs he would give them Scutari, but that was not his thought. Before giving his reply he would like to study the question with his experts and to give an answer on the following day. In the meantime he would like to continue the discussion of other points in the memorandum.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would not discuss whether the question of Fiume was a moral or a political one. He would remind Signor Nitti, however, that the council were not giving anything to the Yugoslavs, since the whole of that coast was overwhelmingly Yugoslav in character. The Yugoslav preponderance in the population was something like 15 or 20 to 1. It was true that there were certain Italian settlements, but the bulk of the population was overwhelmingly Yugoslav. As regards Scutari, article 7 of the Treaty of London provided that Scutari would be Albanian, and that there would be set up an Albanian State. But if France, Great Britain, and Russia desired it, the northern part of Albania, which would include Scutari, could be attributed to Serbia. Now we were tearing to pieces the Treaty of London. It was proposed to deprive Serbia of Scutari, and to deprive the Yugoslavs of Fiume. It was impossible to do this. It would create very great difficulties, and such a solution could not succeed. M. Clemenceau as well as he himself ardently desired to overcome the difficulties of Signor Nitti. They realized that they were not difficulties of Signor Nitti's own creation, and that they had developed before he came into office, and they were doing their best to

meet them. Signor Nitti, however, must not create difficulties by getting the opposition of the whole of the Slav races with the United States of America behind them.

SIGNOR NITTI took note of what Mr. Lloyd George had said, and assured him of his goodwill. In Italy he himself was accused of abandoning everything, and, though this was a great exaggeration, he was nevertheless taking a very moderate view. If he renounced so much, some compensation was necessary, particularly in regard to the safety of Italy in the Adriatic. The question of Albania was a very difficult one, as it was a wretched country, full of misery, without any future. To have to look after it was a bad business for Italy, whose sole interest was that, if some other State held it, it constituted a menace. The maintenance of order in Albania was no easy task for Italy to undertake. Public opinion in Albania at the present time was very excited, and there was much trouble between the Albanians, the Greeks and the Serbs. The Serbs knew quite well that Italy, in Southern Albania, had made concessions to the Greeks, and it might be possible to make concessions to the Serbs also. He had not known that the question would be raised to-day in these express terms, and without further study he was not clear as to what would be the consequences of what Mr. Lloyd George had suggested. The question was mainly an internal one for Italy, and was very troublesome. Italy had her Bolshevik danger both from the Right side and from the White [*sic*] side, to say nothing of the Socialists. Hence it was very necessary for him to have a solution before he met the Chamber, and that that solution should be one which he could conscientiously defend. Under the present proposals Fiume would remain what it had been, namely, a sort of separate body. Its future would be that of a great port for the Yugoslav territory, but the Yugoslavs would also keep all the ports along the coast. He would like to discuss the question to-morrow, and he wished his colleagues to be assured that towards the Yugoslavs his intentions were both moderate and friendly.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that according as Signor Nitti accepted or not what had been proposed as regards Scutari, he himself would be inclined to make concessions as regards Fiume.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he shared this view.

SIGNOR NITTI asked whether the proposal was to give the Serbs Scutari only, or some territory round Scutari. What was the expectation of the Yugoslavs? He asked whether the council was in agreement as regards other points in the Italian memorandum?

(At this point there was some consultation on a map.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the object of the Yugoslavs, he thought, was to have an outlet to the sea in the neighbourhood of Scutari for their commerce, which consisted largely of pigs.

MR. LEEPER said he understood that the idea of the Yugoslavs was to canalise the River Bojana and to make a railway.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was not in a position to reply to Signor Nitti's question, but he would give him a reply at the next meeting.

(The meeting was then adjourned until immediately after the signature

of the protocol,<sup>1</sup> which had been arranged to take place at 4 p.m. that afternoon.)

*Paris, January 10, 1920.*

#### APPENDIX TO NO. 64

*Memorandum handed in to the Supreme Council by Signor Nitti  
on January 10, 1920<sup>2</sup>*

The Italian Government have seen with the greatest satisfaction that the British and French Governments, in recognizing the efforts and sacrifices borne by Italy, which have rendered possible the constitution of the new States which have arisen after the crush [<sup>?</sup> crash] of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, have also confirmed the rights which Italy is entitled to in virtue of the Treaty of London of the 26th April, 1915. On its part the Italian Government wishes to pursue the exchange of views happily undertaken, in order to promptly reach an amicable transaction on the Adriatic question, and it begs to submit the following considerations to the Allied Governments:—

##### I

The proposal of a settlement of the Adriatic question which the British and French Governments have submitted to the Italian Government on the 9th instant takes no account of the Italian delegation's demand to obtain the territorial continuity between the *corpus separatum* of Fiume and the territory of the Kingdom. This demand was based, however, on real necessities, upon which the Italian delegation wishes again to draw the most serious attention of the Allied Governments.

These necessities are principally in relation with the state of the feeling in Fiume, as well as with the state of the Italian public opinion. It is to be feared that the Italian Government might be unable to ensure the acceptance of a transactional solution which involves such heavy sacrifices in regard to the stipulations of the Treaty of London, if the Italian public opinion and the inhabitants of Fiume did not receive the satisfaction which they expect, with the territorial continuity. It is purely moral satisfaction, and it is out of the question that the narrow corridor in question could represent a menace of any sort to the free town of Fiume.

The *corpus separatum*, with the town of Fiume, being surrounded on all sides by Slav populations, find themselves in the necessity of demanding a point of contact with Italy, all the more so as the eastern boundary of the town of Fiume is in direct contact with Sussak, which is almost completely Slav.

In order to avoid practical inconveniences such as customs, &c., which have been opposed to the Italian proposal, the Italian delegation suggests that the strip

<sup>1</sup> The protocol recording Germany's unfulfilled obligations under the armistice conventions and supplementary agreements; this protocol was signed immediately before the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles (cf. No. 53, minute 2).

<sup>2</sup> Document 6 in Cmd. 586 is headed 'Italian Memorandum of January 10, 1920'. This document is, however, dated at foot 'Paris, le 3 janvier 1920', and is in fact an Italian memorandum of that date replying to the joint American, British and French memorandum of December 9, 1919 (see No. 56, minute 1 and note 4). Hence it appears that in Cmd. 586 the Italian memoranda of January 3 and January 10 were confused. The veritable Italian memorandum of January 10, 1920, is now here printed.

of territory between the sea and the railway should be allotted to the *corpus separatum* of Fiume until a point within half a kilometre of the village of Volosca. It is well understood that the railway shall remain outside of this strip of territory. The length of this strip is  $5\frac{1}{2}$  kilom. Its widest part is 700 metres; its narrowest, 200 metres. Its medium breadth is 360 metres. Its surface is of about 200 hectares.

It would be superfluous to prove how such a small fragment of shore could never constitute a menace for the Free State of Fiume.

Naturally this solution involves the allotment to Italy of the villages of Volosca and Abbazia, with barely 6,000 inhabitants.

The Italian Government insists very seriously on the Allies taking in favourable consideration this modification of their proposal, and a close examination of this modification will show that it is of secondary importance.

But in case the Allies could absolutely not agree to the above said point of view, the Italian delegation submits another proposal to their approbation.

Paragraph 2 of the memorandum of the 10th September, 1919,<sup>3</sup> containing 'proposals submitted by Messrs. Clemenceau and Lloyd George to President Wilson' runs as follows:--

'2. For Fiume two solutions are suggested. First solution: 'The city and district of Fiume (*corpus separatum*) shall be placed under the sovereignty of Italy. In this hypothesis, there will be no independent State of Fiume. Jugoslavia will receive all the territories comprised in this State according to the line of President Wilson (including the island of Cherso and excepting only Albona).

'On the other hand, all the territories in question that would have formed part of the independent State will be demilitarized permanently.

'Still in the same hypothesis, the port of Fiume will be handed over with all facilities for its development, as well as for that of the railways terminating there, to the League of Nations, which will make such arrangements as it may see fit, for the country for which this port is the outlet, as well as for the city of Fiume itself.'

This solution proposed by Messrs. Clemenceau and Lloyd George, which, on the other hand, had been prepared in accordance with Signor Tittoni, the Italian Government takes up again for its own account.

The Italian Government asks, furthermore, for a rectification of the frontier in view of suppressing the salient of Senossecchia, as it cannot be admitted from the military point of view, seeing that it approaches the frontier to less than 20 kilom. from Trieste.

## 2

The statute of the town and district of Fiume which was in force under the Hungarian régime had been approved by the Hungarian Government in 1874 in a temporary way, and more exactly, until the moment in which the relations between the *corpus separatum* and the State would not [*sic*] be definitely settled by a special law. There was no question, therefore, of a traditional and perpetual constitution of the *corpus separatum*, but rather of an application (which was not completely sufficient) of the general guarantee recognised by Maria Theresa in 1879<sup>4</sup> and confirmed by later Hungarian laws.

Not being Fiume now<sup>5</sup> a part of the Kingdom of Hungary, but of the free State

<sup>3</sup> See Vol. IV of this series.

<sup>4</sup> In error for 1779.

<sup>5</sup> This should apparently read: 'Fiume not now being' etc.

(in which the Slavs form the majority of the population), it must needs obtain now some new guarantees in accordance with its new situation, in order to safeguard its nationality, which once already had been safeguarded from the Croats.

It is evident that all that part of the statute concerning the relations of the town with the Hungarian Government must be radically changed. However, it must be avoided that foreign elements introduce themselves amongst the population of Fiume, by means of the public functions which they might be called to exercise there. This, of course, did not happen under the old régime, because it was not in the Hungarians' interest to change the ethnical character of the population, whilst the Slavs, on the other hand, have every interest to obtain it.

The statute must recognise the right to use Italian as the official language in administrative and juridical acts as well as in the schools.

Italian University and High Schools' diplomas must be admitted for the teaching in the schools of Fiume.

Fiume will have a special police corps. We do not think that one can seriously object to these modifications or such others as might be reached by common agreement. These could of course be completed by the guarantee of the Government of the League of Nations, but the latter cannot substitute them. Such a Government would have to be composed, as had been already admitted by the President of the United States at the time of the discussion on the constitution of the free State, by two Italian members, one Yugoslav representative, one inhabitant of Fiume and one member belonging to a free State comprised in the League of Nations.

### 3

As regards the Island of Cherso, the Italian Government wishes to point out that together with Lussin it forms an indispensable element of the defence of Pola. Furthermore, article 4 of the Treaty of London allots the Island of Cherso expressly to Italy.

This allotment is not only confirmed in the annexed note but in the text of the article itself, which shows how much importance the signatories of that treaty laid on the Island of Cherso.

### 5<sup>6</sup>

In the first place, the Italian Government wishes to declare that no plan of absolute domination in the Adriatic has ever entered its thoughts. Italy's demands are only based on the consideration of its legitimate defence.

Therefore, the starting point of all settlement of the Adriatic question must consist in the fact of the great diversity which exists, from the military aspect, between the eastern and the western coast of this sea. The former is abundantly provided with all kinds of naval bases. The latter completely lacks them.

Now, the settlement that the Allies have submitted to the Italian delegation would improve the strategical situation only in the high Adriatic, with the substitution of Pola to Venice, but in the central and southern Adriatic the situation would remain as dangerous as before the war, for the possession of Valona, which forms a good point for guarding the entrance of the Adriatic, will never be of any aid for the defence of the Italian coast.

The control of the Adriatic will virtually belong to the State which holds Cattaro and Sebenico. It is proved by the study of technicians that an enemy fleet, issuing

<sup>6</sup> The numbering corresponds to that of the joint memorandum of January 9, 1919 (cf. No. 63, note 3).

from Sebenico, can easily come and bombard a town on the Italian coast opposite, and return to its base, before the Italian fleet at Venice or Pola could arrive in time to intervene, even in the case that it had received the warning at the same time of departure of the enemy fleet.

In regard to the islands of the Adriatic, it is to be noted in a general way that, from the military point of view, they must be only considered in strict connection with the coast to which they belong.

Now, the neutralisation of the islands and not of the coast would be of no practical advantage. These islands, in fact, situated as they are in front of a very cut-out coast, richly provided with excellent anchorages, would never serve as a base for any offensive organisation, but serve very well instead to cover and mask the organisation of the coast. In consideration of this, it is evident that, far from preventing this function of the islands, the proposed neutralisation might result of a nature to favour it.

It is therefore very evident that the Italian Government is induced to insist that the principle of neutralisation, confirmed by the Treaty of London, which has purely defensive aims, should be extended to the whole of the eastern coast of the Adriatic, from the Free State of Fiume to the mouth of the Voyussa (with the exception of Ragusa and Gravosa).

The strategical reasons which, besides the ethnological and economical ones, had induced Italy to demand and to obtain by the Treaty of London the allotment of a part of Dalmatia would thus have partial satisfaction in the neutralisation of this coast.

## 86

The Allies' memorandum proposes in No. 8 that there should be a discussion about the boundaries of Albania. The Italian delegation does not doubt that this discussion will restrain itself to the boundaries of Southern Albania, it having already been settled that to the north and to the east the boundaries laid down in 1913 could bear no restrictions without rendering it impossible for the Albanian State to exist.

It seems here useful to remember that in 1913 the Albanian territories of Ipek, Djakova and Dibra were annexed to Serbia and Montenegro.

*Paris, January 10, 1920.*

## No. 65

C.M. I.] *Notes of a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held at the Quai D'Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, January 10, 1920, at noon.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.

British Empire: Lord Curzon.

France: M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.

Italy: M. Scialoja.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Captain Winthrop. Great Britain: Captain Lothian Small. France: M. Massigli. Italy: M. Zanchi.

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 955 f.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned.

*Great Britain:* Mr. Norman.

*France:* M. Sergeant, Gen. Desticker, M. de Fleuriau, M. Hermitte, M. Serruys.

*Italy:* Gen. Cavallero, M. Manciolli.

*Japan:* M. Sawada.

1. The Council had before it a report of January 7, 1920 by the Military representatives at Versailles upon modifications to the military clauses of the Hungarian Peace Treaty requested by the Czecho-Slovak and the Jugo-Slav Delegations. (Appendix A).

*Conditions of Peace with Hungary. (a)*  
*Military Clauses*

GENERAL CAVALLERO read and commented upon the military representatives' reports as well as a draft reply to those delegations prepared by the military representatives.

After a short discussion,

It was decided:

to communicate to the Czecho-Slovak and to the Yugo-Slav Delegations in accordance with the recommendation of the military representatives at Versailles the letter, the draft of which appears in Appendix A.<sup>2</sup>

2. The Council had before it a report of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, dated January 9, 1920. (See Appendix B).

*Conditions of Peace with Hungary. (b)*  
*Exploitation of mines of Pecs*

M. LAROCHE said that the report which the Council had before it was drafted in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by those members of the Commission who were present at its last sitting, but it had not been approved in a special meeting of the Commission.

The British Delegation, however, had promised its approval, and he thought that the report was also in agreement with the views of the Italian and American Delegations.

M. Laroche then read and commented upon the report in question.

M. CAMBON asked what they would do if the Hungarians refused to conclude with the Reparations Commission the arrangement proposed by the Commission.

M. LAROCHE replied that they would be justified in letting the Hungarian Delegation know that, should the Hungarians, pending the coming into force of the Treaty, refuse to supply coal to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, they would feel obliged to authorise the Serbs to prolong their occupation until the Treaty came into force.

It was decided:

to adopt the proposals of the Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs, made in its report of January 9, 1920, concerning the exploitation of the mines of Pecs and the distribution of the coal drawn from those mines until the coming into force of the Peace Treaty.

<sup>2</sup> The draft was not included in the original of this appendix.

3. The Council had before it a note from the Secretariat General of the Economic Commission, dated January 7, 1920. (Appendix C).<sup>3</sup>

*Conditions of Peace  
with Hungary. (c)  
Financial sub-clauses*

M. SERGENT said that the Council would recall that the British Delegation put before it the case of Allied and Associated nationals who were adversely affected by measures which the government of Bela Kun adopted for the substitution of Hungarian 'blue' bank notes by Bolshevik 'white' notes,<sup>4</sup> notes which, by an order of the new Hungarian Government, would be accepted at only one-fifth of their value. The Economic Commission, to which the matter had been referred, considered that the losses thus borne, entered within the category of 'exceptional war measures', as defined in Article 232 of the Treaty of Peace with Hungary; but it thought it well to take the opinion of the Financial Commission upon the question. That Commission, which met that same morning, considered that the case was in fact covered by Section E of Paragraph 1 of the Appendix to Article 232 and that, should those nationals have difficulties on the point, they could submit their case to the mixed Arbitration Tribunal provided for in that Appendix. Under those circumstances, it seemed [un]necessary to insert in the Hungarian Treaty special *ad hoc* provisions.

The Financial Commission had also been informed of the modifications which the Serbian Delegation wished to have introduced to the regulations concerning the liquidation of enemy property. The Serbian request had been already the subject of a report by the Economic Commission.<sup>5</sup> The Financial Commission would be unable to consider that subject until its meeting on the following Monday.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This note (i) considered the question of Hungarian banknotes, as indicated below by M. Sergent; (ii) reported that 'the Economic Commission has examined, in detail, the different British notes [not printed], relative to the liquidation carried out, up to the present, by the Roumanians, in the territories which are to be transferred to them, in execution of the Peace Treaty; as well as the report presented on this question by the Drafting Committee.

'The Economic Commission is in full accord with the Drafting Committee in esteeming that the Roumanian Government has no right to take such measures on her territories, as long as the Treaties which confer them on Roumania have not come into force.

'On the other hand, the Economic Commission esteems that, after the coming into force of the said Treaties, Roumania may, under reserve of the clauses relating to nationalities, and of the Convention relating to the protection of minorities, apply, on the territories which she will have acquired, such legislation as she may institute concerning the situation of foreigners.

'In the course of its debates, and even before taking up the elaboration of the clauses concerning the situation of Allied and Associated nationals in enemy territory, the Economic Commission had admitted the principle of the complete liberty of each Allied and Associated Power, in the matter of the establishment of foreigners, under the following form: "Each of the Allied and Associated Powers shall keep its full freedom of action in the regulation of the conditions under which former enemy foreigners may establish themselves on its territories, colonies, or Dominions."

'It is to be remarked, however, that the above advices, formulated by the Economic Commission, were expressed in the absence of the British and American Delegates, to whom a copy of this text has been sent.'

<sup>5</sup> See No. 48, appendix H.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. No. 41, note 7.

<sup>6</sup> January 12, 1920.

The Commission was confronted further by a much more delicate problem. The Serbian Delegation asked that in the preparation of the Hungarian Treaty, account be taken of the fact that Croatia was not an integral part of Hungary but a distinct State, united to Hungary under the Crown of St. Stephen. From that circumstance the Serbian Delegation made a series of deductions which had important consequences from the financial point of view. Between Hungary and Croatia there existed, the Serbians maintained, a financial understanding, just as one existed between the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Kingdom; this last understanding had been taken into account in determining, for example, what part of the Austro-Hungarian debt would have to be met by Austria and what part by Hungary. Account ought therefore to be taken of the Hungarian understanding in settling the allocation of enemy liabilities and assets. They had carefully examined the documents supplied them, as indeed it deserved careful examination. They were of opinion, nevertheless, that they were not competent to decide whether, from the legal point of view, the Serbian proposition was just. On that point they would like to consult the legal advisers, all the more so, since the decision which would be taken might affect other parts of the Treaty. The question was certainly pregnant with consequences, not on account of the significance of the amount involved, for that indeed was very slight, but from the point of view of Croatian pride. The Serbian Delegation maintained that the Croats had always claimed that there was an independent Kingdom of Croatia; they could hardly then admit that the Treaty of Peace proclaimed that there was not.

M. CAMBON said that the question would be adjourned until Tuesday.<sup>7</sup>

It was decided:

that there was no reason for inserting in the treaty of peace with Hungary a special clause concerning the losses sustained by Allied and Associated nationals through the substitution by the Government of Bela Kun of Bolshevik 'white' notes for the Hungarian 'blue' notes in circulation, and by the decision of the new Hungarian Government to accept those 'white' notes in payment at only one-fifth of their value. Compensation for the losses that Allied and Associated nationals might have sustained thereby was ensured by Article 232 of the Hungarian Treaty.

4. LORD CURZON stated that, in company with M. de Fleuriau, he had seen M. Bourgeois on the preceding day, with the object of deciding with him the date of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. They had agreed upon the 16th of January at half past ten. The agenda would be limited to the nomination of the Commission of the delimitation of the Saar. M. Bourgeois would give a short address and he would himself make some remarks. It was further M. Bourgeois' intention that on the eve of the first meeting the representatives of the various Powers who were to sit on the Council, should meet at his house to decide upon the procedure to be followed.

*First meeting of the  
Council of the League of  
Nations*

<sup>7</sup> January 13, 1920.

MR. WALLACE said that if the Council ratified that decision, he would cable it to his Government.

It was decided :

- (1) that the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations would be held at 10.30 a.m. on the 16th of January, 1920 at the Quai d'Orsay ;
- (2) that Mr. Wallace would inform his Government of the date fixed upon in order that the President of the United States might issue the official convocation.

5. LORD CURZON said that Mr. Lloyd George had just raised the serious question of South Russia and the Caucasus. (H.D. 125).<sup>8</sup> The *Situation in the Caucasus* Bolshevik victories had given rise to a grave military danger. The Versailles Council would take up that matter, but the problem had also a political aspect which he would like to put before the Council. The following were the considerations he had proposed to submit to the Heads of Governments :

There were three States in the Caucasus: Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The fate of Armenia would be decided by the Peace Conference when it made its decision upon the Turkish problem. There remained, then, Georgia and Azerbaijan whose independence for the last year and a half had been most precarious. These countries were exposed to a threefold danger: in the first place they lived in dread of the conquered army of Denikin which might perhaps come down upon them from the North; on the other hand, they were exposed to the Bolshevik peril, Bolshevik troops advancing upon them from two sides—along the Caspian and in pursuit of Denikin's armies; finally, on the west and on the south there was the Turkish danger—already in Azerbaijan Enver Pasha<sup>9</sup> and his brother Joury were at work. The military authorities would take the steps required by the situation; but, on the other hand, there was a political step which the British Government was very anxious to see taken, and from which it anticipated happy results; he meant the recognition of the 'de facto' Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan. British troops had occupied those regions since the armistice and His Majesty's Government had thus had, more than any other, the opportunity of manifesting its sympathy with those States. Later, they had evacuated those regions except Batoum; but they had consuls at Baku, Tiflis, and elsewhere. The countries he mentioned had shown a firm desire to become real states. Their Governments were socialist but decidedly anti-Bolshevist. They were living in dread of a Bolshevik invasion, at once political and military. They turned, therefore, towards Europe as suppliants. They asked the Allies to accord their support; to recognise their 'de facto' Governments would be equivalent to according them support. That was how they had acted towards the Baltic States.

<sup>8</sup> No. 54 (minute 3).

<sup>9</sup> Enver Pasha, the former leader of the Young Turks and Turkish Minister of War, had at the end of the First World War fled to Germany whence he proceeded to Azerbaijan by way of Russia. His activities in the Caucasus were somewhat involved but he retained his earlier Pan-Turanian orientation.

M. BERTHELOT said that he had already discussed this subject with Lord Curzon in London. He had given M. Clemenceau an account of that conversation and he knew that he was willing to accord that 'de facto' recognition subject to the reserve that the recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan in no wise prejudiced the future frontiers of Armenia.

LORD CURZON said that he agreed with him on that point.

M. SCIALOJA said that he was equally inclined to grant that 'de facto' recognition on the same conditions as for the Baltic States.

M. MATSUI remarked that, on a question of that nature, he would have to ask for instructions from his Government.

Mr. WALLACE said that he was in the same situation.

M. BERTHELOT added that the Powers who were already disposed to recognise those 'de facto' Governments would take such a step together.

It was decided:

that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should together recognise the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan as 'de facto' Governments, subject to the reserve that the representatives of the United States and Japan would request instructions from their Governments on the question.

6. M. BERTHELOT said that he had received from M. Adatci a letter in which he asked to be informed of the day on which the Commission appointed to examine the question of handing over Wilhelm II would meet. That problem would arise immediately; they were awaiting British proposals.

LORD CURZON asked whether he meant that the British Government should lay a special proposition before the Council.

M. BERTHELOT said that he merely wished to know whether the Commission that had met the preceding day under the Presidency of the Lord Chancellor was to examine the question.

LORD CURZON said he did not think so. That Commission was concerned only with reducing the list of criminals whose surrender was to be demanded from the Germans, for the reason that it would be easier to obtain the surrender of 500 of these, than 1,000.

M. SCIALOJA stated that a special commission was indeed useless: the Treaty itself stipulated that the surrender of William II be demanded. It was merely a matter of finding the formula in which the demand should be made. The formula should be as legal as possible. The task of drafting it should be left to the Drafting Committee.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would like simply to put the following question: the Peace Treaty provided for the handing over of William II to the Allies. Were they going to ask for it? In what form and at what moment?

M. CAMBON remarked that it would appear that it was for the President of the Conference to formulate that demand, it was for him therefore to instruct the legal experts with drafting it and consequently it would be sufficient for them to refer it to the Drafting Committee.

Article 128 of the Peace Treaty with Austria) prohibits the maintenance of any society having any interest, even incidental, in military questions.

—that, in consequence, the said clause prohibits any military organisation outside of the Army, and renders the addition proposed unnecessary.

(5) Concerning the 5th addition demanded, namely:

Insertion in Article 128 (as aliena 3) of the following paragraph: 'Hungarian nationals shall not take part in any military exercise or study within boundary territory.'

—that this clause would be without real value unless it were applicable to a frontier zone of a depth of at least 50 kilometres.

A zone of this depth in Hungary cannot be considered on account of the geographical situation of the country and the extensive area which it would include. A less extensive zone would offer no guarantee to the boundary states.

—that, moreover, such an interdiction would prevent Hungary from studying the eventual defence of her territory.

(6) Concerning the 6th addition demanded, that is to say:

Insertion after Article 128 of the Peace Treaty with Hungary, of an Article, corresponding to Article 180 of the Treaty with Germany, which would be drawn up as follows:

'All fortified works, fortresses and field works, situated in Hungarian territory, at a distance of 50 kilometres from the Czecho-Slovak or Jugo-Slav frontier shall be disarmed and dismantled.'

—that the construction of any new fortification, whatever its nature or importance, is prohibited within the zone determined in alinea 1 of the present Article.

—that no permanent modern fortified works exist at the present time in this zone.

—that the servitude to be imposed upon Hungary, at the request of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Delegations may be claimed, for the same reasons, by the Roumanian and Austrian Governments.

—that there seems no justifiable reason for prohibiting Hungary to organize the defence of her frontiers.

(7) Concerning the 7th addition demanded, that is to say:

Insertion in Article 136 (last alinea) of the following paragraph: 'The armed ships of the Hungarian Danube Fleet (or of the Hungarian Danube Police) shall not navigate in that part of the Danube which forms the frontier, between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, (or the Kingdom of the S.C.S.).'

—that it is in the interest of the boundary states to allow Hungarian Government [the] possibility of maintaining order.

—that to this effect an intervention by the armed ships of the Hungarian Danube Police, may be necessary in the frontier district itself.

—that, besides, the Peace Treaty only grants to Hungary, the right to keep three scouting launches, for the Danube Police Service.

*Consequently, the Military Representatives esteem:*

That there is no reason to take into consideration the demands presented by the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Delegations, and that consequently it is not advisable to make any modification in the military clauses approved by the Supreme Council on August 20th.

*Reservation of the American Military Representative.*

Colonel T. Bentley Mott, as Representative of the United States of America, specified that he is not qualified to take any decisions in the name of the American Peace Delegation, or to make any agreement in the name of his Government—although he will take part in the debate, and give his opinion concerning the military questions which might be raised.

Colonel Mott called attention to the fact that, when Mr. Polk left Paris, the Treaty with Hungary was complete and ready to be presented to the Hungarians, and Mr. Polk signed the Treaty, in the name of the United States. That is why any modifications in this Treaty should be submitted to Washington, because nobody in Paris at present is authorised to accept and sign, in the name of the United States, any modifications which may be made.

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APPENDIX B TO NO. 65

*Report addressed to the Supreme Council by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs*

PARIS, January 9, 1920.

I. *Provision of the Treaty covering the exploitation of the Pecs Mines*

During its Session of December 5, 1919, the Supreme Council, upon a proposal submitted by the Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs and the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, decided<sup>12</sup> to add to Paragraph 1, Annex 5, Section [I], Part VIII of the Treaty with Hungary, the following phrase:

‘Hungary grants, furthermore, to the Allied and Associated Powers, as partial reparation, an option on the annual delivery, for a period of five years to follow the entry into force of the Treaty, of an amount of traction coal to be taken from the Pecs Mines. This amount will be periodically fixed by the Reparations Commission and will be disposed of in favour of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, under conditions to be established by the Reparations Commission.’

II. *Demand of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation*

In a Note dated December 22, 1919, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation requested that the Paragraph above referred to be completed, by stipulating:

- (a) that the amount distributed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State by the Reparations Commission be not less than 60% of the total production;
- (b) that special organizations, appointed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, be entrusted with the execution of the decisions of the Reparations Commission;

<sup>12</sup> See No. 36, minute 6.

M. MATSUI said that M. Adatci's question had been called by a sentence of Mr. Lloyd George uttered on the previous day. He had understood that the Commission over which the Lord Chancellor presided would also deal with the question of the surrender of William II. They were not interested in the handing over of criminals but only in the surrender of William II.

It was decided:

to ask the Drafting Committee to submit to the Council at its next meeting a draft note asking the Dutch Government to hand over the ex-German Emperor.

The meeting then adjourned.

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 65

##### *Report concerning the Modifications to the Military Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Hungary requested by the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Delegations.*

###### SUPERIOR WAR COUNCIL

###### Military Representatives.

PARIS, January 7, 1920.

The Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Delegations, by respective letters dated December 20, 1919, and December 27, 1919, requested the Supreme Council to authorise a certain number of additions to the Military Clauses of the Peace Treaty with Hungary (Clauses adopted by the Supreme Council during the Session of August 20, 1919).<sup>10</sup>

After having confirmed that the two requests were identical in their draft, and after examination of the said requests,

###### *The Military Representatives decided:*

(1) Concerning the first addition demanded: namely insertion in Article 120 of the Peace Treaty with Austria (as alinea 2): 'The military forces of Hungary shall be limited to two divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry.'

- that the total strength of the Hungarian forces authorized (35,000 men) and the limit of the maximum and minimum strength of each full unit, as imposed by the Military Clauses of the Treaty (Table 4), prohibit Hungary from mobilising more than three divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry, of minimum strength;
- that Hungary's obligation to group her forces in two divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry, whose strength might be more important, would not constitute a decrease in her military power;
- and that, consequently, it will be unnecessary to change the method of limitation as applied to Austria and Bulgaria.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> See Vol. I, No. 38, minute 5.

<sup>11</sup> Note in original: 'The French Military Representative esteems that it would be advisable to clearly specify that Hungary is forbidden to organize the military forces accorded her by the Peace Treaty, into Mixed Brigades, as such organizations are particularly adaptable to rapid mobilization by transferring the Mixed Brigades into as many Infantry Divisions.'

(2) Concerning the second addition demanded, namely:

Insertion in Article 122 (as alinea 2) of the following paragraph:

‘The Hungarian General Staff and all other military formations will be dissolved and may not be reconstituted in any form.’ (Similar to Article 160 of the Treaty with Germany);

—that Article 105 of the Military Clauses (corresponding with Article 121 of the Peace Treaty with Austria) prohibits any organization involving ‘the commanding of troops or preparation for war’, other than those prescribed in the annexed Tables;

—that these Tables indicate no Staff or organ superior to the Infantry Division or Cavalry Division Staffs;

—that the maintenance of the Hungarian General Staff or even of any Staff of a Corps d’Armée or the grouping of the Divisions is clearly prohibited.

(3) Concerning the third addition demanded, namely:

Insertion in Article 120 (as the last two alineas) of the following paragraphs:

‘The Hungarian troops are to be quartered on the territory in their Peace garrisons and are not to be assembled in proximity to the frontiers.’ ‘During a period of five years after the entry into force of the present Treaty, no Magyar garrisons are to be installed within a distance of 10 kilometres from the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav frontiers; and that, within a zone 50 kilometres deep from the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav frontiers no concentration of more than one quarter of the Hungarian forces will be allowed’.

—that Article 104, last alinea, (corresponding with 120 of the Peace Treaty with Austria) stipulates that: ‘the Hungarian army is to be exclusively employed in the maintenance of order throughout the territory, and in the police of the frontiers.’

—that it is to the interest of the boundary states that the Hungarian Government be in a position to maintain order;

—that, for this purpose, military intervention may be necessary within 10 kilometres from the frontier;

—that the greater part of the Hungarian cities (inclusive of the capital) are located within 50 kilometres from the frontier and that the maintenance of order in these important centres may necessitate the concentration of more than one quarter of the Hungarian forces, that is, 9,000 men;

—that the servitude imposed on Hungary in favour of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav States should be imposed under the same conditions in favour of the Roumanian and Austrian States, which in view of the relatively small extent of the Hungarian State, would render any movement of Hungarian troops almost impossible.

(4) Concerning the 4th addition demanded, namely:

‘Insertion in Article 128 (as alinea 2) of the following paragraph: ‘No military organisation outside of the army (Preparation Societies, Police forces, Local Guards, etc.) will be allowed.’

—that the Peace Treaty authorizes Hungary to maintain police forces, on the condition that they do not exceed the strength for similar service in 1913, within the boundaries of Hungary such as they are determined by the Peace Treaty.

—that Article 112 of the Military Clauses with Hungary (corresponding with

Article 128 of the Peace Treaty with Austria) prohibits the maintenance of any society having any interest, even incidental, in military questions.

—that, in consequence, the said clause prohibits any military organisation outside of the Army, and renders the addition proposed unnecessary.

(5) Concerning the 5th addition demanded, namely:

Insertion in Article 128 (as aliena 3) of the following paragraph: 'Hungarian nationals shall not take part in any military exercise or study within boundary territory.'

—that this clause would be without real value unless it were applicable to a frontier zone of a depth of at least 50 kilometres.

A zone of this depth in Hungary cannot be considered on account of the geographical situation of the country and the extensive area which it would include. A less extensive zone would offer no guarantee to the boundary states.

—that, moreover, such an interdiction would prevent Hungary from studying the eventual defence of her territory.

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—that the construction of any new fortification, whatever its nature or importance, is prohibited within the zone determined in alinea 1 of the present Article.

—that no permanent modern fortified works exist at the present time in this zone.

—that the servitude to be imposed upon Hungary, at the request of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Delegations may be claimed, for the same reasons, by the Roumanian and Austrian Governments.

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—that to this effect an intervention by the armed ships of the Hungarian Danube Police, may be necessary in the frontier district itself.

—that, besides, the Peace Treaty only grants to Hungary, the right to keep three scouting launches, for the Danube Police Service.

*Consequently, the Military Representatives esteem:*

That there is no reason to take into consideration the demands presented by the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Delegations, and that consequently it is not advisable to make any modification in the military clauses approved by the Supreme Council on August 20th.

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PARIS, January 9, 1920.

I. *Provision of the Treaty covering the exploitation of the Pecs Mines*

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‘Hungary grants, furthermore, to the Allied and Associated Powers, as partial reparation, an option on the annual delivery, for a period of five years to follow the entry into force of the Treaty, of an amount of traction coal to be taken from the Pecs Mines. This amount will be periodically fixed by the Reparations Commission and will be disposed of in favour of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, under conditions to be established by the Reparations Commission.’

II. *Demand of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation*

In a Note dated December 22, 1919, the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation requested that the Paragraph above referred to be completed, by stipulating:

- (a) that the amount distributed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State by the Reparations Commission be not less than 60% of the total production;
- (b) that special organizations, appointed by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, be entrusted with the execution of the decisions of the Reparations Commission;

<sup>12</sup> See No. 36, minute 6.

- (c) that, until the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, the exploitation of the Pecs Mines remain under the control of the military authorities of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom.

### III. *Opinion of the Commission*

The Commission on Roumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs, after having heard the experts on reparations and coal matters, esteems that the two first proposals of the S-C-S Delegation would infringe on the prerogatives of the Reparations Commission, and would interfere with its action which, to be effective, must be freely exercised. Concerning the third proposal, tending to effect the insertion of a stipulation in the Treaty, establishing a régime before the entry into force of the same Treaty, the Commission is of the opinion that it is inadmissible, and is in favour of a rejection of the S-C-S demand.

However the Commission fears that in the absence of formal engagements Hungary may refuse to supply the Serb-Croat-Slovene State with any coal from the Pecs Mines, before the entry into force of the Treaty, and that the S-C-S State, in order to provide against the serious inconveniences which such action would cause in the operation of her railways, might attempt to postpone the evacuation of the mines despite the orders of the Supreme Council.

### IV. *Proposals of the Commission*

Consequently the Commission has the honour to submit the following proposals to the Supreme Council:

1. As soon as the credentials and powers of the Hungarian Delegation shall have been verified, the Reparations Commission of the Treaty of Versailles, acting as Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission provided for in the Treaty with Hungary, shall negotiate and conclude with the Hungarian Delegation an Arrangement established on the following basis:

- (a) Hungary agrees to furnish from the present time until the entry into force of the Treaty, to the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission, a certain quantity of traction coal to be taken from the Pecs Mines. This coal will be disposed of in favour of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, under conditions to be established by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.
- (b) The Arrangement to be assumed by Hungary will determine, in percentage, the proportion due the S-C-S State by Hungary from the total monthly production of traction coal from the Pecs Mines. In determining this percentage, account will be taken of the average distribution, in 1913, of this same coal to the territories now attached to each of the two States by virtue of the Peace conditions.
- (c) Payment for the coal will be effected according to compensation methods which will be determined by the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.
- (d) The Arrangement will come to an end upon the entry into force of the Treaty.

2. Immediately after the conclusion of the Arrangement, the Supreme Council will renew the injunction already addressed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government on November 7, 1919, to the effect that all Hungarian territory situated beyond the boundaries assigned the S-C-S State, within which territory is [*sic*] located the Pecs Mines, must be evacuated.

I.C.P. II.] *Notes taken by the Secretary during a Meeting held in M. Pichon's Office at the Quai d'Orsay on January 10, 1920, at 4.30 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister.

*France*: M. Clemenceau.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti.

SECRETARIAT: *British Empire*: Sir M. Hankey. *France*: M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. de Percin. *Italy*: Signor Trombetti.

MM. Pasitch, Trumbitch, Zolger and Radovitch, delegates of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, were introduced.

M. CLEMENCEAU (addressing M. Trumbitch) said that he would ask him to explain to the Council the Serbian point of view regarding the question of the Adriatic and that of Albania.

M. TRUMBITCH: I will begin by a general remark. The object at which we are aiming in the settlement of the Adriatic question is the establishment of a sure and stable basis for a lasting peace. We wish to arrive at those economic agreements with Italy which will constitute the best foundations for peace. That is the entirely peaceful object which we propose in the first instance to attain.

In order to arrive at a durable agreement we are ready to make considerable territorial sacrifices, involving the surrender, not only of isolated groups of the Slav population, but also of compact masses of our nationals. We are willing to sign an arrangement which would give Italy the Gulf of Trieste and the larger part of Istria with its hinterland.

A frontier line following the course of the Arsa would be excellent from the geographical and strategical point of view. It would, it is true, leave a compact mass of 400,000 Slavs within the Italian frontier. If one leaves out of account Gorizia, Trieste and a few coastal towns which show an Italian majority, the whole country between Trieste and Tarvis is entirely Slav. In order to ensure a lasting peace we are, nevertheless, ready to accept an arrangement on these lines, notwithstanding the considerable sacrifices which it would entail for us.

But it is necessary that this numerous Slav population which would be left in Italy should receive guarantees enabling it to pursue its national existence and its economic development in any direction which it may desire. While being good and loyal subjects of Italy, the Slav inhabitants of these regions have indeed the clear right to develop in cultural and economic matters in conformity with their ethnical desires.

Why do we consent to these important sacrifices? Our reason, as I have said, is, in the first place, to ensure peace, but we have also another and still more worthy object. It is necessary that we should come to an understanding with Italy in order that we may constitute, together with her, a barrier against the common danger which threatens us: the Germanic pressure from the north. The admirable resistance offered to Germanisation by the

Slovenes, a race which is highly developed and far advanced in civilisation, has alone prevented the success of the German plan, which consisted in driving Germanic infiltration as far as Trieste and the Adriatic. But Germanism is not laying down its arms, and if it succeeded at any time in gaining Trieste it would no longer be either the Italians or the Slavs who would be masters of the Adriatic, but the Germans. The German is a redoubtable enemy against whom it is to a common interest of the Slavs and the Italians to form a firm front in mutual agreement. A frontier between us and Italy passing through the Julian Alps would form an excellent bulwark against the German thrust.

The chain of the Karawanken, which separates Carinthia from Carniola, constitutes a powerful rampart against Germanism, which we shall succeed in defending, if Italy and Yugoslavia remain united against the common danger from the north. It is in order to attain this object, which is of such primary importance, that we are willing to make the considerable concession to Italy that I have mentioned.

But after such heavy sacrifices no one can reasonably demand that we should make any others. To go any farther would not be to serve the cause of our good relations with Italy, it would, on the contrary, create a constant danger of conflict between Italy and Yugoslavia, and sow threatening seeds of discord on the Adriatic coast instead of that friendship which we desire to cultivate with our Italian neighbours.

We require a good geographical frontier, and the chain of the Julian Alps constitutes an excellent strategical frontier between the two States.

As regards Istria, the little River Arsa has a history which dates back to the Roman and Venetian periods; for eighteen centuries past it has formed the frontier of Istria, which has never overstepped this boundary. That is a very interesting historical fact, for this river, with its canal, which gives access to the sea and is occasionally marshy, is the only natural frontier existing in Istria.

There is another important point, it is that this river has two watersheds, that of Pola to the west, and that of Rieka (Fiume) to the east.

The western part gravitates towards the Gulf of Trieste, and the eastern part towards the Gulf of Fiume. This decisive geographical consideration has historically always determined the establishment of the administrative frontier of Istria.

The eastern and western coasts belong to two entirely separate economic and national watersheds. The eastern coast with its islands—with all its islands—forms a geographical and ethnical unit; it is in some sort the western frontier of the Balkan Peninsula; it is the coast line of the whole of Yugoslavia, of the national Yugoslavia, the political Yugoslavia of to-day. One cannot separate the islands from the coast; any separation of any of the islands would be unnatural and contrary to the political interests, not only of Yugoslavia, but even, I believe, of Italy.

From the ethnical point of view, on the eastern coast, near the Arsa, there is no Italian population, there are groups of Italians, of which the principal

are at Fiume and Zara; on the other hand, 25,000 Italians are scattered along the coast and throughout the islands.

Seeing that there is a larger agglomeration of Italians at Fiume and *Zara*, I am going to lay most stress upon those two towns.

Bearing in mind the ethnical conditions, we claim the whole coast, with the islands, starting from the Arsa, but we are willing to discuss the status that may be given to Fiume and Zara, seeing that in those towns there is an Italian population which in Fiume, according to pre-war statistics, constitutes half of the total inhabitants, namely, 25,000 out of 50,000, and in Zara 9,000 out of 12,000, or about three-quarters. These figures are, moreover, not unfavourable to the Italians, because the statistics were compiled by the municipal authorities, that is to say, at Fiume by the Italians and the Hungarians who were in power, and at Zara by the Italians, who were also in power in the commune. There is therefore no reason to dispute the authenticity of these statistics as far as the Italians are concerned.

I think, however, that I may maintain with every show of reason that the mere fact of the existence at Fiume and Zara of an Italian agglomeration is absolutely insufficient to give the majority of the population of those two towns the right to dispose of the sovereignty of the surrounding country; the latter must submit to the destiny of the whole region in which are situated the two towns, the status of which, as I have already said, we are willing to discuss. As regards the town of Fiume, everything concerning the interests of the town might be incorporated in a municipal statute. The same may be said as regards Zara; but I repeat that the sovereignty over either town cannot be separated from the sovereignty of the country of which it forms part.

From the economic point of view Fiume constitutes the sole commercial outlet to the sea which we now possess. All those who are acquainted with the formation of the eastern coast of the Adriatic know that there are enormous technical difficulties connected with the construction of a commercial railway linking the hinterland with any port on the Eastern Adriatic, with the exception of Fiume. Fiume is primarily the commercial outlet of Croatia-Slavonia, Voivodina and of the Slovene countries which are included within our frontiers. From the economic point of view this is a reason of first-class importance which militates in favour of the retention of Fiume by Yugoslavia.

The importance of the considerations of an ethnical nature is not the same from the point of view of sovereignty, as from the local point of view. I may add that Fiume, which was originally called Rieka, a name which was given to the town by the Slav population, retained a Slav majority until 1900, according to the statistics compiled by the municipality; it was only about 1910, the date of the last statistics, that the number of Italians became somewhat larger than that of the Slavs.

This change is explained by the fact that for about fifty years past Fiume has been becoming an important commercial centre, a point of attraction to traders and workmen, and the Magyar rulers, finding it impossible to carry on the administration of the town with the Magyar language, which is quite unknown in Fiume, made use of the Italian language in their struggle against

the Croats, who did not wish to allow Hungary finally to wrest Fiume from Croatia. It is for this reason that it cannot be said that Fiume is an Italian town. It is a mixed town from the national and linguistic points of view. Italian is spoken in commercial and maritime circles, but Croat is the principal language, and some of the inhabitants, who, however, are not numerous, speak Hungarian or German.

To sum up, I may say that Fiume ought, from the political point of view, to share the fate of the region to which it belongs geographically. Any different solution would be contrary to the nature of things which one cannot violate with impunity.

The *corpus separatum* of Fiume has been mentioned; I should like to say a few words on the subject. This has never been a political, but rather an administrative conception.

Under the reign of Maria Theresa, the Hungarians, who coveted Fiume in order to have a commercial outlet into the Adriatic, succeeded in having Fiume constituted a *corpus separatum* by a decree of that Empress, the *corpus*, according to the statute, enjoying only a local administrative autonomy, which has subsisted, with changes, until the present day. But Fiume has never had any independent political life; it has never had any right of self-determination; Fiume always belonged to Croatia and through that channel to the Crown of Saint Stephen.

In 1866, when the Austro-Hungarian Compromise was concluded, Hungary made an agreement with Croatia, for Croatia has never been a Magyar province, but rather a State associated with the Crown of St. Stephen; there was an association of States under the Crown of St. Stephen, and Fiume belonged to Croatia.

The original text of the compromise between Hungary and Croatia, drawn up by the two Assemblies, said that the two parties had not arrived at an agreement on the question of Fiume because Croatia demanded the incorporation of that town with Croatia, whilst Hungary had raised a claim to it; a text was therefore drawn up asserting that the agreement had not been concluded. Now, over this text, which was sanctioned and signed by the Emperor, the Magyars caused to be pasted a document according to which Fiume was directly united to the Crown of St. Stephen, without the intermediary of Croatia.

A great deal has been said of the right of self-determination of Fiume. We have already had an opportunity, and the honour of explaining to the Supreme Council our conception of the principle of free self-determination; we have recommended it as the best and most just means of resolving the differences between Italy and ourselves, and we still propose it to-day; we have set it forth in a memorandum which we had the honour to submit to the conference and to which we still adhere. We believe that the will of the country in question constitutes the most certain basis for the establishment of the best frontier and the best relations between the two countries. In other words, our suggestion is to submit to the popular vote all the territories disputed between us or claimed by both States; the result of this reference to the

people will afford a most happy solution. It is, in fact, not a question of an ignorant population with no political sense and not having arrived at a sufficient degree of development; it is a question of a population, whether Italian or Slav, which is fully developed, having attained a high degree of civilisation, which knows what is meant by the right of free self-determination and would be quite able to vote according to its aspirations.

But if the principle of free self-determination is admitted, it must be admitted without restriction; one cannot at one and the same time refuse the plebiscite to hundreds of thousands of men and admit the principle of free self-determination in the case of a small agglomeration which differs from the country as a whole in its language and nationality.

Moreover, one must dispute the right of the population of Fiume to dispose of such an important point as that town, which includes not only the city, but also the port with the railway, of which it forms the terminus; that is to say, the commercial outlet for at least 20 million inhabitants.

Now, the port and the railway were not constructed by the inhabitants of Fiume, far less by those of to-day than by those of former times, because a large number have immigrated recently, as may be seen from the statistics. Therefore the population of Fiume, who did not create the port nor incur the necessary expenditure, cannot dispose of the 'lungs' of 20 million inhabitants—from the commercial point of view. The modern port, I repeat, was constructed by the countries of the Crown of St. Stephen, that is to say, by the Hungary of to-day, by Croatia-Slavonia, by the Voivodina, and by all the provinces now detached from the former Hungary and united to Czechoslovakia and to Yugoslavia. The port therefore belongs to the population of these provinces and not to that of Fiume.

That which may be admitted to belong to that population is the right of free self-administration. We are ready to give Fiume a local autonomy which will satisfy this legitimate desire.

As regards international traffic, it is therefore of primary necessity that guarantees should be given to the populations which gravitate towards Fiume, in other words, to Hungary; with the exception of Fiume there is no other port on the Croatian coast capable of being used for commerce, for it is almost impossible, and in any case very difficult, to construct a railway capable of serving as a commercial line. On the Dalmatian coast the existing railways, which are connected with Bosnia-Herzegovina, are local railways which can never acquire any considerable commercial importance likely to interest the whole country; they will always remain lines of local interest, such as that terminating at Sebenico, part of which is of narrow gauge, and that running from Mostar down towards the Narenta, another branch of which runs to Graveza and Cattaro.

This is a narrow gauge line, constructed for strategical reasons and which serves the local trade, nothing else.

It must therefore be concluded that Fiume is to-day, and may, perhaps, for ever be, the only outlet of our State on the Croatian and Dalmatian coasts.

As regards Zara, there has been some talk of creating a free city, a political organisation of such a kind that the town would be politically detached from our country.

We cannot agree to such an arrangement, which would in the first place be the ruin of Zara, and would, moreover, constitute a prejudice to us.

Zara is a little town, the centre of a political commune which, according to the last statistics that I possess, those of the year 1900, had 33,000 inhabitants of whom 22,000 were Yugoslavs.

These statistics were compiled by the Office of the Mayor of Zara, M. Ziliotti, who is still in office at the present date and is a well-known Italian. These statistics cannot therefore be suspected of having been compiled in favour of the Yugoslavs, and consequently the number of Yugoslavs mentioned therein must be beyond dispute.

There are said to be 9,234 Italians, a few Germans and others of various nationalities, numbering altogether about 1,500. Such is the population of the Commune of Zara.

This place of, I believe, 12,000 inhabitants was constructed in the Middle Ages on a small peninsula which then constituted a very important strategical point on the Adriatic Sea. At the present date the only fortifications it retains are its ancient Venetian bastions.

Zara has no economic resources of its own. It lives not only on those of the surrounding territory, but on those of the whole of Dalmatia.

It is the official capital of Dalmatia, the centre of all the administrative services; at Zara are to be found the Governor, and the educational, financial, political, ecclesiastical and military services; it is a town of employees and public officials.

If Zara is detached from our State, it is certain that all the public offices which constitute the principal economic resource of Zara will emigrate.

All the modern buildings which make a very good impression when one arrives in this town by boat have been constructed with funds from the whole of Dalmatia, by means of loans advanced to the owners by the *Crédit Foncier Dalmate*, the head office of which is in the town, as are those of other provincial institutions.

We arrive therefore at the conclusion that if Zara is detached from Dalmatia, that is to say, from our State, this little town will fall into economic ruin; it will no longer exist; its buildings will be empty, and there will be no more population, since only public officials live there. In fact, if a stranger arrives at Zara before 10 o'clock he will see numbers of persons walking on the finely constructed quay, but after 10 o'clock, when the employees are in their offices, the town is dead, the quays and the little streets with their Venetian appearance—for the town was for a long time under Venetian domination—are deserted, and the town appears uninhabited.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Is there any other town in Dalmatia which might become the administrative capital in the event of Zara being detached from Dalmatia?

M. TRUMBITCH: Yes, and better situated than Zara. I say so frankly, for

I must tell you the actual truth; it is Spalato. Spalato is situated in the centre of Dalmatia and in the heart of that country from the geographical and economic point of view. But Zara has always been the capital of Dalmatia—during the epoch of the Croat State; you know that Croatia has been an independent State for several centuries and that its frontier was the Narenta; under the domination of Venice and under the Austrian domination it was the same thing, because this town, which was already a capital, had fortifications.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: So that if Zara ceased to form part of Dalmatia, Spalato would quite naturally become the capital of Dalmatia and Zara would decline.

M. TRUMBITCH: That is so.

I have replied to Mr. Lloyd George's question from the point of view of the geographical situation; but from the ethnical or administrative point of view it would be a great pity to remove the capital, because at Zara there are all the necessary buildings, because all the offices are very well housed, because it is a historic town, while at Spalato it would be necessary to construct all the necessary buildings. To do that would require time and money, and one would thus end in ruining the town and imposing unnecessary expenditure on the State.

There is another military consideration in favour of the maintenance of Zara as the capital, namely, that the population there is very calm, seeing that it is composed almost exclusively of officials and employees. Spalato, on the contrary, is a little town which is developing very well at the present day, because it is at the centre of the political life of Dalmatia and of all that concerns the national movement, at the head of which it was during the Balkan war; it fêted the Serbian victory, it was persecuted by Austria and all that happened there is well known in Europe.

Spalato, as a centre of national effervescence, is therefore less to be recommended than quiet Zara as the administrative capital, Zara, where one can work in peace at the administration of the province. Although I am myself a native of Spalato, I should not wish, for the reason which I mention, to see it become the capital of Dalmatia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Would the same objection exist if Zara, instead of becoming an independent town, merely became autonomous under Dalmatian (Jugoslav) sovereignty, as a *corpus separatum*? In other words, would Zara as a *corpus separatum* be necessarily deprived of the advantages it now enjoys as administrative capital?

M. TRUMBITCH: No, it would not be deprived of them, because, as the town would remain under Jugoslav sovereignty, all offices concerned in the administration of the province would remain at Zara.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Even if the inhabitants were entitled to self-government in municipal affairs?

M. TRUMBITCH: In municipal affairs, most certainly.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: It would be the same kind of constitution as that granted to Fiume by Maria Theresa?

M. TRUMBITCH: It would be an autonomous local administration. Everything concerning the town and everything concerning local interests could come under the autonomy. The population of Zara would be entitled to self-government; it would furthermore retain its present economic position, as it would be an integral part of our territory.

In this connection, I beg to put forward a small map showing the territory of the Commune of Zara.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The municipal autonomy to be provided for in the treaty should be guaranteed, under the authority of the League of Nations.

M. TRUMBITCH: Just as in the treaty for the protection of minorities, there would be clauses guaranteeing the local autonomy of Zara under Yugoslav sovereignty, and Yugoslavia would be bound to respect such clauses.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Do you think that, under these conditions, Zara would continue to be the administrative centre of Dalmatia?

M. TRUMBITCH: Yes. That is all I have to say concerning Zara from the economic point of view. From the national point of view I wished to speak of the present state of the schools, but this would not appear to be necessary. I could, however, give an explanation if required, seeing that, under the Italian occupation, there are now more Slav than Italian children in the schools of this town.

M. CLEMENCEAU: How do you explain this?

M. TRUMBITCH: It is in accordance with the general state of affairs, the origin of which is as follows. When Austria had to cede Lombardy and Venetia to Italy in 1856<sup>1</sup> and 1866, a great many Italian officials emigrated from these two provinces and followed Austria's fortunes. There were some very good men among them, especially among the judiciary.

Justice was very well administered in Austrian Italy. There were some excellent and well-known jurists, who were Italians occupying the highest judicial positions in contemporary Austria. When the Austrian Administration withdrew, a very large number of those officials did likewise and settled down in the Austrian coast provinces, i.e., on the Adriatic. All these regions, with the exception of certain localities on the coast, are Slav.

There were, however, no official cadres for administrative departments. As the Italian language was generally understood by educated people, the Austrians introduced it as the official language for administrative purposes.

I was born at Spalato and there completed my education in Italian at the local *lycée* in 1882, that language being spoken in all the schools, although my fellow-scholars were mostly Slavs.

Austria did not then fear Italy, and never dreamt that the latter would lay claim to the Eastern coast of the Adriatic, but she already feared Slavism. Serbia was beginning to develop her programme of national claims, and Austria knew very well that the Yugoslav territories included all the southern part of the Monarchy.

For political and practical reasons, therefore, Austria governed the entire coast as though it were Italian territory.

<sup>1</sup> In error for 1859.

Zara thus became a bureaucratic and an Italian-speaking centre, as all its officials used the Italian language. This caused a concentration of the Italian language in that town.

The position became altered by reason of the development of the Slav national movement, which spread very greatly in Dalmatia. Slav schools and *lycées* were opened, and we had a university at Agram, where a great many Dalmatians who knew the literary language well went to complete their studies. The Slavs then asked the Central Government to put an end to this abnormal state of affairs of a Slav country governed in Italian.

In 1912, the Dalmatian Slavs and Italians arranged a compromise which was accepted by the Vienna Government, according to which the Slav language was restored as official language for administrative purposes. The Italian language was retained, all inhabitants desirous of so doing being allowed to use it officially, and to have legal documents, &c., drawn up in Italian. The question was settled in this manner, and that is why Zara will become completely Slav in a couple of generations.

I terminate my remarks on this point by saying that Dalmatia is absolutely Slav territory, with a highly developed sense of nationalism, that it is an integral part of Yugoslavia, and that it ought to belong to us with all its islands, which are entirely Slav.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: You know what line President Wilson proposed as boundary for an independent State of Fiume? How would you describe the population living within this line? Is it Slovene or Croatian?

M. TRUMBITCH: About 90 per cent. is Slovene.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: What is the difference between Croats and Slovenes?

M. TRUMBITCH: A difference in dialect.

M. CLEMENCEAU: What is the total number of Slovenes?

M. TRUMBITCH: There are 1,200,000 in all.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How many would there be in the free State?

M. TRUMBITCH: I am not exactly clear about the boundaries, but some 200,000 Slovenes have been mentioned. The frontier of the Julian Alps would, if adopted, leave about 400,000 in Italy. The remainder—i.e., about half—would remain with us. The treble dismemberment of a civilised people would thus be achieved!

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The Slovenes are therefore concerned at the thought that some of them would be included in this free State?

M. TRUMBITCH: That is so. This would mean that the Slovene people would be trebly dismembered. It is terrible to contemplate and I cannot properly express my feelings when considering this possibility.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How would you describe the population of Dalmatia?

M. TRUMBITCH: Dalmatia is inhabited by Croats. There are Serbians in the south-west; the same dialect is spoken in Croatia and in Serbia. The Catholics call themselves Croats and the Orthodox call themselves Serbians. There is, however, no difference of language between them. There is a difference of dialect between the Slovenes and the Serbo-Croats.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Then the Slovenes are not in favour of the creation of this free State?

M. TRUMBITCH: I think that this State would become a place of refuge for adventurers, and for people carrying on agitations and propaganda under the cloak of patriotism. Many people would call themselves Italian or Yugoslav patriots, and would do a great deal of harm. The free State would doubtless possess no army and would have no military service, and this would be sufficient reason for a great many deserters to seek an asylum there. There would be neither geographical nor economic unity in the free State.

Finally, I can sum up the Dalmatian question in a word by saying that all Dalmatia should be given to us.

Now I come to Albania. This country does not resemble ours from the national point of view. It is not inhabited by Slavs, but by Albanians, and it was made into an independent State in London in 1913.

Its future status should now be decided. This question concerns us very closely, seeing that all the Eastern and Northern frontiers of Albania are likewise ours. We are persuaded that the question can best be solved by reverting to the *status quo* created in London, in 1913, i.e., by allowing the Albanian State to remain as it is, with an autonomous administration.

We are quite persuaded that no foreign administration would be a success, the position of Albania being absolutely peculiar to itself. From what we know of the Albanians, they would be able to form an administration capable of governing the country. It must be remembered, in the first place, that there are Albanian towns on the coast and in the interior. This proves that the country is aware of the necessity for public organisation, the more so as, under Turkish administration, the State paid no attention to the organisation of the country nor to the construction of ways of communication, but that notwithstanding this the country developed in such a manner as to give rise to the formation of important centres.

In the past, Albania was an independent country governing itself, even before the Turkish invasion; the Albanians are therefore capable of looking after themselves.

The first autonomous Albanian administration did, it is true, create a bad impression in Europe and gave the impression that the Albanians were incapable of self-government. The truth of the matter is that it was the government of the Prince of Wied—whose choice may well be said to have been a mistake—which collapsed of itself, and that the Prince fled the country for certain well-known reasons. But though it was proved that the Prince of Wied was incapable of governing Albania, it was in no wise proved that the Albanian people was incapable of self-government. Owing to this war, in which all nations have painfully acquired great experiences, the Albanians have acquired the sentiment of unity and desire self-government.

This would be the very best solution, not only from the point of view of Albanian interests, but also in our own interests.

We are of opinion that a self-governing Albania would be able to live in friendly relations with us, whereas if another Power were admitted into

Albania, the interests of such a Power would hardly coincide with our own.

That is why we fear that the introduction of another State into Albania might there become a source of fresh difficulty on our frontier and in the Balkans.

On the other hand, an Italian mandate has been spoken of, to be given in virtue of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

My personal impression is that this article is not applicable in the case of Albania, because it provides for a mandate for territories or colonies possessing neither independence nor sovereignty, and, as a matter of fact, refers to the former German colonies.

In any event, I consider that, in accordance with paragraph 4 of article 22, the wishes of the population should be consulted for the purpose of ascertaining the name of the Power on whom the mandate should be conferred, the wishes of the population being the determining factor.

From the point of view of general interests, I think that the mandate for Albania should greatly resemble that given to Austria for Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the Treaty of Berlin.

A perusal of the minutes of the Congress of Berlin forces one to accept the important reasons then set forth in justification of the mandate given to Austria-Hungary, and to acknowledge that the representatives (of certain Great Powers, at least) acted in absolute good faith and with the best possible intention of re-establishing peace and quiet in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The object of the mandate then proposed was, first and foremost, the protection of the Christian population (which was persecuted by the Turks), the pacification of the country, and the settlement of the agrarian question, which were all important matters and well justified from the point of view of civilisation. By force of circumstances, however, the mandate developed in a direction absolutely different to that foreseen by the Congress of Berlin—i.e., instead of merely concerning herself with the pacification of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the protection of Christians and the agrarian question (which has not even been settled up to now), Austria's one idea was to govern it as a conquered country, and, after forty years of occupation, she ended by annexing it in an arbitrary manner, thus contributing one of the direct causes of the present war.

We Jugoslavs of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and Serbia, in an even greater degree (as an independent State), suffered enormously by reason of the mandate given to Austria for Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why we fear any other attempt which might concern our interests and, in the shape of a mandate, go counter to the best intentions of the Great Powers called upon to decide, and even to those of the Italian Government. If the latter were given that mandate, this political institution might develop in a manner unfavourable to general interests, to the interests of peace, and to our own interests.

I venture likewise to point out that the Vardar Plain is easily reached from the north-eastern frontier of Albania, which also provides easy and direct

access to Skoplje (Uskub). The railway from Belgrade to Salonica (the only trade artery in Serbia) passes Uskub, and the Skoplje Railway could easily be dominated by heavy guns, which would cut Serbia's vital communications. Furthermore, this railway passes close to the Bulgarian frontier, over which the Bulgarians came on entering the war in 1915; the railway line was cut and this caused the Serbian catastrophe. I might even say it was one of the causes of the prolongation of the war, for if Serbia had been able to make a stand, and if Bulgaria had been unable to link up with Austria and Germany by means of Serbia, the war would have been over more quickly.

The Skoplje railway is even more threatened from the Albanian than from the Bulgarian side, for, although the Bulgarian frontier is nearer, it is much easier, owing to the conformation of the ground, to reach Skoplje from the Albanian frontier and then to cut the railway than it would be from the Bulgarian frontier.

I beg to draw the attention of the council to this question, which is a vital one for us. If Italy is admitted into Albania, and if mutual relations should eventually cease to be friendly, and if recourse were finally made to arms, it would not be merely a difficult position for us; our very existence would be at stake. Now the southern portion of Serbia is enclaved between the Albanian and the Bulgarian frontiers. The distance is not very great, and, by means of pressure from both sides at once, Serbia would easily be crushed and communications established over her territory, which would be the beginning of the end for us.

This consideration is of vital importance for us, which will be clearly seen when it is remembered how the policy of the Austrian mandate developed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

M. CLEMENCEAU: If M. Trumbitch still has a good deal to say, it might be as well to continue the hearing at a later meeting.

M. TRUMBITCH: I still require about an hour to complete my statement. The question of Albania is exceedingly complicated, and I should like to touch on all the points.

I ought, also, to refer to the question of demilitarisation, of neutralisation, and of the Dalmatian coast, as also to various minor points.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: What is the population of Scutari?

M. TRUMBITCH: 25,000.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Does that include Slavs?

M. TRUMBITCH: Some 2,000 Orthodox Serbians, and about 8,000 Mussulman Serbs in the neighbourhood.

M. CLEMENCEAU: How about the remainder of the population?

M. TRUMBITCH: It is composed of Albanians.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I suggest, gentlemen, that we should meet the day after to-morrow (Monday), at 11 a.m., and continue the meeting in the afternoon, in order to settle this question, if possible.

*(This suggestion was agreed to and the meeting rose.)*

I.C.P. 12.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the British, French and Italian Governments, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, on Monday, January 12, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; SECRETARY, Sir M. Hankey.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARY, M. Massigli, A Stenographer.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

The following were also present:

*British Empire*: Mr. Leeper.

*France*: M. Berthelot, M. Dutasta.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

MM. Pasitch, Trumbitch, Zolger, and Radovitch, delegates of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, were introduced.

THE CHAIRMAN<sup>1</sup>: I will call upon M. Trumbitch to continue his statement.

M. TRUMBITCH: Gentlemen, the day before yesterday, when discussing the possibility of an Italian mandate for Albania, I drew attention to the danger which might arise for our country from the military point of view. Uskub would be easily threatened, since that town is only separated from the frontier by a distance of 48 kilom. as the bird flies. At the same time as Uskub, the Salonica-Belgrade railway would also be menaced, together with the Serbian towns of Dibra, Struga, Ochrida, Jacovitza, Monastir and Prizrend, which are all situated close to the frontier.

If occupied by Italy, Albania would become a concentration camp and centre of preparation for offensive operations all along its eastern and northern frontiers, directed against our country.

I cannot refrain from referring to the fact that, if one is to believe secret documents which have been published, an Italo-Austrian Convention is said to have been signed at Rome, on the 8th May, 1913, which is said to have fixed and provided for the military occupation of Albania, in order to pacify the country and maintain order.<sup>2</sup> If this fact is true, it is of special and considerable significance as regards the Serbo-Montenegrin frontier, a significance which our country must not overlook.

If Albania were placed under Italian administration, she would constitute an obvious danger for us in the event of complications with our State; if, on the contrary, Albania were administered by an autonomous Government and eventually subjected to neutralisation as in the case of Switzerland, this would afford a suitable solution of the problem of our relations with the

<sup>1</sup> M. Clemenceau.

<sup>2</sup> For Italo-Austrian relations with regard to the possibility of joint intervention in Albania in May 1913 see L. Bittner and H. Uebersberger: *Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik 1908-14* (Vienna and Leipzig, 1930), vol. vi, p. 301 f.; Field-Marshal Count Conrad von Hotzendorf: *Aus Meiner Dienstzeit 1906-1918* (Vienna, 1921 f.), vol. iii, p. 295 f.; G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley: *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914* (London, 1926 f.), vol. ix, part ii, p. 735 f.

neighbouring States, and would, speaking more generally, be better adapted to maintain the peace of Europe.

After the flight of the Prince of Wied, in May 1914, Scutari was administered by an inter-Allied commission; Durazzo, on the contrary, was the seat of an Albanian Government, under the presidency of Essad Pasha, which remained in office until February 1916. It must be admitted that this latter form of government gave satisfactory results, better, in any case, than those attained by the foreign Government of the Prince of Wied.

It may, perhaps, be pointed out that the military danger we foresee does not exist in reality: that the mandate will be of a pacific or non-military character and the powers of the mandatory may be limited as regards military forces, the latter being restricted to the contingents necessary for the maintenance of peace and order. I am obliged to declare that we cannot accept such guarantees as sufficient when the safety of our country is at stake; international engagements are liable to alteration as the result of changes which may take place in the general situation; the presence of a great military Power in Albania remains a fact involving various consequences.

Neither is the mandate of which I have just spoken desirable from the religious point of view. Catholics represent a small minority in Albania; the arrival of a purely Catholic Power would probably arouse the suspicions of the Mahometans and Orthodox Christians, as happened when Austria planted herself in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the same way, from the political point of view, we consider that the presence of Italy in Albania would be a source of anxiety: the Balkans constitute a field of political surprises; they have already caused the Powers much anxious thought from the point of view of general politics.

One of the causes for this anxiety has, it is true, been the antagonism which has manifested itself between the young races which have regained independence; but another and perhaps still more fatal cause has been the rivalry between two great Powers which have collapsed during the late war, and the covetousness of which reacted in a singular manner among the Balkan States.

It was all these exterior influences which brought about the second Balkan war, started by Bulgaria's sudden attack on her Serbian allies. Count Tisza's speech to the Hungarian Parliament in 1913 had proclaimed that the Balkan nations were at liberty to assassinate each other; he incited Bulgaria to attack.<sup>3</sup>

One sole conclusion is to be drawn from these various considerations: in the interests of general peace it is necessary to adhere to the principle of 'the Balkans for the Balkan nations'. If a foreign Power has a footing in the Balkans, even in the guise of a mandatory, this may mean the continuation of the former system of political and military penetration into the Balkans, which system has already proved itself so disastrous.

One [? Our] point of view is therefore the following: an independent Albania,

<sup>3</sup> M. Trumbić was referring to the outbreak of what is sometimes known as the Third Balkan War, which began on June 29, 1913, when Bulgarian forces, without warning, attacked those of Serbia. The speech mentioned was that delivered by Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, to the Hungarian Parliament on June 19, 1913.

self-governed; this is in the general interests. Albania, by herself, can constitute a danger to none of the neighbouring States; a Government formed of natives would have the primary advantage of knowing the habits and customs of the country. The existence of towns and large communities in the region, moreover, furnishes a proof that a sense of government is not absent. In Albania and in Central Europe, highly educated Albanians are to be met with in fairly large numbers; our country would be able to maintain cordial relations with an autonomous Albanian Government.

From the religious point of view, there is a peculiar affinity between Albania and Jugoslavia; on each side one finds three large religious groups, Orthodox, Catholic, and Mahometan; the régime of liberty and religious tolerance which will be adopted by our constitutional charter will afford the Albanians a good example to follow. On the other hand, the liberal application of the principle of the protection of minorities will enable the Albanians who are subjects of our State to obtain instructions [*sic*] in their own language; it will be possible to make use of educational text-books in the Albanian language in the schools of Albania, which have been deprived of such books.

Intellectual intercourse will thus be set up across the frontier of the two countries, to the great benefit of the Albanians.

Finally, economic relations will develop between the two countries with all the more facility, as Upper Albania is the sole natural outlet of our country in that region.

The Serbs and Albanians never fought against each other when they were free, that is to say, before the Turkish invasion; it is baleful foreign influence which often sows discord among nations.

If the solution of an independent and self-governing Albania is not adopted, we reserve to ourselves the right to claim our legitimate rights in that country. If Valona and Southern Albania were attributed to another Power, we should demand that the northern part of Albania be reserved to us.

In the first place, stress must be laid on the fact that our State possesses acquired rights in that region. At the Conference of London in 1913, the Ambassadors recognised Serbia's right of access to the sea. The Treaty of Berlin guaranteed to Montenegro freedom of navigation on the Boyana. At the present day Montenegro is a riparian State of the Boyana.

On the other hand, during the course of the Balkan wars our nation shed torrents of blood for Scutari, the century-old capital of the Serbian sovereigns of the Middle Ages. I must emphasise the fact that the Serbians remained at Scutari for seven centuries, until that town fell under the Turkish domination in 1479. In the sixteenth century there were Serbian printing works at Scutari; at the present day Serbians still exist in the town and the surrounding country and the Serbian language is far from having disappeared. The commune of Scutari numbers about 25,000 inhabitants; a few hundred persons of Serbian race live in the town itself, while in the neighbourhood there are approximately 1,500. But both in the town itself and in the surrounding country the Serbian language is fairly widespread; several thousand Mahometans who still speak it are of Serbian origin.

The Montenegrin troops, after having lost a third of their forces, occupied Scutari in 1913; they subsequently evacuated it in order to meet the wishes of the Great Powers, because Austria, who had already mobilised, was threatening to go to war. It was to serve the general interests that our troops retired. We firmly believe that at that period Scutari might have been incorporated with Montenegro if the latter State had consented to the cession of Mount Lovcen to Austria, or at least to its neutralisation.

We ask that note may be taken of the service we then rendered to the cause of general peace.

The valley of the Drina, that is to say, Northern Albania, constitutes, with the neighbouring regions of Montenegro and Serbia, one geographical and economic unit. It is the direct route to the sea; the well-known scheme for the Danube-Adriatic railway was to cross Central Serbia, follow the Drina and reach the sea at Scutari.

The Lake of Scutari is the reservoir which accumulates all the waters flowing from the Serbo-Montenegrin districts; the valley is the course taken by the waters and the route taken by men. The greater part of the trade of Montenegro gravitates by the Lake of Scutari and the Boyana towards the sea.

On the other hand, the valley of the Drina forms one whole with our country. It is completely separated from the rest of Albania by a chain of mountains which the river cuts through; the construction of the Central Serbian railway along the Drina constitutes one of the most important railway problems with which we are faced; this railway will possess the same economic importance for that part of our country as the railway terminating at Fiume now has for the northern part of our State.

The Drina frontier line would be particularly necessary from the point of view of military security if other Powers were installed in the remainder of the Albanian territory.

The proper upkeep of the Lake of Scutari and the Boyana is of extraordinary economic importance. Through the negligence of the Turkish administration, about sixty years ago, an arm of the Drina became detached from the principal arm of the river, and led its water back into the Lake of Scutari; this accident has increased the danger of floods in the country surrounding the lake and made the conditions much less favourable to navigation on the Boyana.

Two-thirds of the Lake of Scutari already belongs to Montenegro; by improvement works on the Boyana and the Drina, 20,000 hectares of extremely fertile land already belonging to Montenegro might be drained and restored to cultivation.

It is obvious that we are the State most legitimately interested in Northern Albania. The presence of a foreign Power in that region would manifestly prejudice all our interests. If, on the contrary, Northern Albania is allocated to our State, we agree to ensure and guarantee an autonomous administration to Scutari, considering that the Serbs are there in the minority and that the Albanians constitute the great majority of the population.

Independently of all these considerations, another question arises, that of the rectification of the frontier between our State and Albania.

At the Conference of London in 1913 an impossible and unjust frontier was traced; there are places in which the countryside is separated from its natural centres, others in which Albanian villages have no access to Albania except across our territory; the Albanian countries on the shores of the Lake of Ochrida are separated from Albania by a very lofty chain of mountains; the countries inhabited by the Yuza and Cassi tribes, composed of Serbians who, although professing Mahometanism, still for the great part retain the Serbian language and customs, are detached from their centre, Prizrend, which belongs to Serbia; others gravitate towards Jacovitza, a Montenegrin town; the whole countryside around the town of Dibra has been separated from its centre; the populations of these places themselves desire to be incorporated with our State, to which they are attached by their most vital interests. The Klemanti and Kastrati tribes were attributed to Albania by the Conference of London solely by reason of the special insistence of Austria, supported by Germany, in spite of the fact that they belonged to Montenegrin territory.

Finally, as a result of Austrian manœuvres, a small strip of land on the right bank of the Boyana was detached from Montenegro when the frontier was traced, whilst the whole of the right bank was allotted to Montenegro on the middle and lower reaches of the river. The commission charged with the demarcation of the frontier on the spot was, moreover, unable to complete its task by reason of the insurmountable difficulties with which it was faced as a result of the decision of the Conference of London.

These are our reasons for asking for a rectification of our frontier, which would be continued west of the Ochrida as far as the mountain chain and which would be formed by the Black Drina north of Dibra. The Klemanti and Kastrati tribes would be included in the Montenegrin frontier, as well as that part of the right bank of the Boyana which is not yet included therein.

The frontier line which we ask for would, in other words, be the following:—

To the east (starting from Lake Ochrida), the mountain chain. Beyond Dibra, the Black Drina as far as a point to be determined later on. Then the Montenegrin frontier, including the Klemanti and Kastrati tribes and the small strip of territory on the right bank of the Boyana still remaining in the hands of Albania.

This rectification (?) of the population concerned, which is not numerous, and a great majority of which has already expressed itself in favour of this alteration.

I should add that, in the Russo-Turkish Treaty of San Stefano,<sup>4</sup> the Klemanti and Kastrati tribes, as well as that part of the right bank of the Boyana to which I have just referred, were assigned to Montenegro. This arrangement was altered by the Treaty of Berlin.

I would now like to say a few words with regard to the demilitarisation which, according to the press, is about to be imposed on our territory. This

<sup>4</sup> This treaty of March 3, 1878, was superseded by the Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878.

question has been raised in such a manner as to make me request permission to draw your attention to it.

If what the newspapers say is to be trusted, a demilitarised zone is to be created to the east of the Wilson line, which extends from the Karavanken to the north as far as the Adriatic coast to Istria, and which also includes the Quarnero and Dalmatian islands.

The object of such demilitarisation is to assure the strategic security of Italy.

I beg to point out, in the first place, that this would be an absolutely one-sided arrangement. The strategic interests of Italy would be considered, and our own requirements in that direction completely forgotten.

Our population represents rather more than one-quarter of the Italian population. Our State is in process of formation, whereas Italy is a great Power possessing an army and a fleet adequate for her needs, and which are more powerful and more extensive than before the war.

In these circumstances, the balance of power and of the *status quo* would be disturbed; Italy would enjoy absolute superiority, whilst our position would be extremely difficult. This demilitarisation would interfere with our sovereignty, and even with our independence. The Peace Conference would, for the first time on record, be creating an international servitude to the detriment of the sovereignty of an Allied State.

If demilitarisation were carried out, our strategic position would be as follows: our frontier would be completely dominated by Italian forces from Tarvis in the north as far as Lake Ochrida, a distance of several hundred kilometres in a straight line; our country would find defence impossible. The Tarvis mountain group would form a first-rate rampart for the purpose of defence or attack by Italy, as it dominates the valley of the Drave, which is the line of penetration into the very heart of our country.

In passing, I would point out that not a single international convention mentioned Tarvis during the war. It was we who, although entitled to claim it as Slav territory, consented to its cession to Italy. It would be neither agreeable nor equitable if such an excellent bastion were to be used against us.

Should the proposed demilitarisation be carried out, there would be a pillar, so to speak, at each end of this extensive frontier, i.e., Tarvis (already referred to) and Valona. The islands being demilitarised, there would be nothing to prevent action on the part of the Italian fleet; it would mean the collapse of our entire western frontier. The islands would become an easy prey and would fall into the enemy's hands at the first attempt, and it would then be easy for him to land troops unhindered on the coast.

Such a state of affairs would, by placing us in an inferior position, serve to encourage our mutual enemies, causing them to infer a split in the relations between countries formerly belonging to Austria. Worse still, a handful of rebels (I am justified in mentioning this, as it is the truth) might invade our territory. I cannot guarantee that we would then, as hitherto, retain our calm under the pressure of vital necessity.

We are absolutely hostile to the idea of this demilitarisation, which I, moreover, consider to be equally contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

According to the provisions of article 10, all members of the League undertake to respect and preserve their respective territorial integrity and political independence; therefore, each State belonging to the League of Nations is entitled to territorial integrity and to political independence; all are bound to respect and preserve the same. But, above all, it is the duty of each State to protect and to preserve its own frontiers. Each nation should, therefore, be in a position to defend itself against foreign aggression, demilitarisation would mean a limitation of such right.

In the second place, article 8 of the covenant, which deals with the reduction of national armaments, provides that such reduction shall be made to the lowest point consistent with national safety. To demilitarise any part of its territory is, so far as any particular State is concerned, almost equivalent to giving up the maintenance of security.

The question is all the more serious for us as we have extensive frontiers, beyond which former enemies are still dreaming and will continue to dream of revenge.

I believe that the League of Nations also lays down the principle that frontier defence is a better guarantee for general peace than disarmament, i.e., the impossibility of self-defence. Self-defence is a natural law, which is really one with the law of existence.

Even the international conventions, which provided for neutralisation (concerning Belgium and Switzerland, for instance), preserved intact the right of neutral countries to defend their frontiers by force of arms. Demilitarisation of our frontier would infringe our right of self-defence.

Yet another very important argument should be adduced. Whilst bearing the German peril in mind, it must not be forgotten that some of our neighbours also present a danger—the danger of future attempts to restore the former régime in Danube countries. The return of the Germans and Magyars to power in these countries would be a menace to our national existence. The peril is a real one, and it will continue to exist until Central Europe shall have been finally established within the frontiers laid down by the Peace Conference.

We are ready to place ourselves unreservedly at the disposal of the common cause, in order to defend the régime inaugurated by the conference for the countries of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. But any demilitarisation of our territory would tend to create an atmosphere of distrust between Italy and Jugoslavia. It would certainly serve to encourage our enemies; it would be a breach through which northern foes would still see the waters of the Adriatic shimmering in the sun.

Finally, we declare ourselves absolutely and frankly opposed to any one-sided measure of demilitarisation, which would be dangerous to our existence and to the balance of the new order of things created by the Peace Conference in Central Europe and in the Balkans.

Before concluding my statement I should like to summarise it shortly.

A plan based on a very firm foundation is, in my opinion, necessary to the successful settlement of the Adriatic problem, which is not only requisite in the interests of Italy and of Yugoslavia, but is also one of the conditions for general peace. No proper solution of the question can be arrived at if we get lost in a maze of details, without any fundamental idea having been laid down. I am convinced that this fundamental idea will be found in the plan submitted by us, and that it is equitable and clear.

Extensive amputation of our ethnical territory is presupposed by the Wilson line, which gives to Italy the port of Pola -- a first-rate war port -- and Trieste -- a commercial port of world-wide importance -- and with Trieste, the possibility of fresh economic development on a large scale. This line includes within Italian frontiers nearly all the Italians formerly under foreign domination; it completes Italian national unity.

Outside this frontier, there would not remain as many Italians as there are Slavs in the city of Trieste alone, who number about 60,000. These Italians would be absolutely protected from the ethnical and the international points of view, more especially in Fiume and in Zara, where they would enjoy absolute liberty. The remainder, numbering a few hundreds scattered in small groups along the eastern coast of the Adriatic, would be protected by the clauses of the Treaty for the Protection of Minorities.

I repose full confidence in the liberal Italian spirit; I trust and feel assured that our compatriots, in becoming loyal Italian citizens, will find in their new country all guarantees necessary to their development.

The great basin of Venice, Trieste and Pola will become an Italian lake. Each within her own territory, Italy and Yugoslavia will be free to the west and to the east of the Adriatic. This solution is clear and precise, and represents a guarantee for general peace. By becoming the joint domain of two free peoples, the Adriatic will be a point of centralisation and stabilisation for the nations of the Danube and the Balkans.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I thank you for your statement.

(*The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.*)

## No. 68

I.C.P. 13.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the British, French and Italian Governments, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Monday, January 12, 1920, at 3 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister;  
SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Leeper.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. Dutasta, M. Massigli, A Stenographer.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

1. SIGNOR NITTI said that it was essential not to lose time over the question of the Adriatic. It was not a question of discussing the history of the world, but one of settling a particular difficulty. His colleagues did not say that the Treaty of London was an unjust one. The treaty had been made in good faith, and there was a mutual obligation to execute it in good faith. How to alter it to suit the present conditions was a matter for consideration. His colleagues had said that they recognised their obligation to carry out the treaty, but that, if carried out, the whole of its clauses must be carried out. It was recognised now, however, that for the good of Europe the general plan of the treaty must be altered. He assured his colleagues that Italy had every interest to reach an agreement with the Jugoslavs. They were a young nation and must be expected, to a certain extent, to sow their wild oats, as young nations do. Italy, however, must be interested in a neighbouring population, which was devoted largely to agriculture and to forestry. Under the Treaty of London, half Dalmatia was attributed to Italy, together with Valona, many of the islands and Istria, with the eastern part of Julia, as far as Volosca, but it did not include Fiume. It was necessary to find some solution between the Italians and the Jugoslavs which would establish the Italianism of Fiume. Two solutions had been proposed. One was to establish a Free State in the territory in the hinterland of Fiume, the town itself becoming a *corpus separatum*. The other was to hand over the town of Fiume to Italy, providing for the internationalisation of the port and railway, which would be worked in the interests not only of the Jugoslavs, but also of Hungary and the other States concerned. This was an interest to Italy also, and she would provide every guarantee for the development of the port in these interests. On its side, Italy would have to give up Dalmatia, except Zara. Fiume must either be an Italian town, or there must be a Free State. Referring to recent events, Signor Nitti said that great things, including the establishment of Rome itself, had arisen out of the action of brigands. In the present state of public excitement, he was afraid that all sorts of ventures might begin and a great propaganda in these regions was certain. In these circumstances, private property would be safer than public property. If Italy were to get Fiume, the whole of the rest of the Free State would go to the Jugoslavs. Guarantees would be given as to the port which ought to satisfy all the interests concerned.

As regards Dalmatia, he would not go into figures, since, with so mixed a population, it was very difficult to fix the statistics. The truth was, however, that the Italian population there was particularly strong in the cultured and educated classes. The mass of the working people, it was true, were Slav. It was true also that that was the reason why the Italians, though in a minority, took so important a part in the life of the country, and that was also the reason why the Socialists were, as a rule, among the Jugoslavs, while the steadier classes of the population were Italian. Exact statistics, however, were difficult to establish and were without any great importance. The Treaty of London gave to Italy both Dalmatia and the Island of Lussin. Italy was prepared to renounce Dalmatia (except Zara) and many of the

islands, if she received Fiume. Zara had been recognised by M. Trumbitch himself as an old Italian city and a centre of Italian culture. For Italy it was a bad business to have to make over Dalmatia to the Jugoslavs, but Italian public opinion could be induced to accept this provided that Zara was not included. If it were, public opinion in Italy would revolt. The Jugoslavs were a much less cultured and a more primitive people than the Italians, who represented a much older civilisation. As regards Zara, however, he thought that a formula might be found providing for its autonomy and enabling it to choose and regulate its diplomatic representation.

The third question was that of Albania. Here, again, Italy was engaged in an unprofitable transaction. In spite of what M. Trumbitch had said in the morning, Albania was not really fit to be independent. The country was very backward and divided by racial differences as well as by the fact that there were three religious sects, namely, Catholics, Orthodox, and Mussulmans. Only some European State could establish and guarantee order there. Albania had already cost Italy more than two milliards of lire, and he wanted to reduce this as soon as possible. If Italy had kept Dalmatia, it would be natural that Serbia should have had Scutari, but this was not now the case, since Italy was not to keep Dalmatia or the majority of the islands. If, however, Fiume was attributed to Italy, he was prepared to discuss a readjustment of the northern boundary of Albania, provided that Italy received a mandate for Central Albania.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to know what was now proposed. M. Clemenceau and he had said that they would honour their respective countries' signature to the Treaty of London, but now it appeared that the Treaty of London suited nobody. Italian opinion, so far as a stranger could judge from studying the Italian press, was principally concerned about Fiume. As he understood Signor Nitti's proposals, Fiume would be assigned to Italy under Italian sovereignty and the Italian flag, with guarantees for the use of the port, not only by Croatia, but also by Hungary and, he thought, Transylvania. The first question he wished to ask was whether the Free State was to vanish? He assumed that, in this event, the territory which was to have been included within the Free State would be assigned to Croatia, since its population was mainly Slovene. He thought that there had been force in what M. Trumbitch had said in the morning as to the desirability of applying some principle to this settlement, and the main principle was not to take national populations out of their own country. If the Slovenes were torn in two there would assuredly be trouble for Italy. There would be created a Slovene Irredenta. After all, it was the Irredenta Italiana that had eventually broken up Austria. It must be remembered, however, that the Slavs were wont to hang together. Russia, for example, had always picked up the quarrels of Serbia. Hence, it was undesirable to have a great tract of Slovene territory handed over to a foreign country. He supposed, therefore, that if Fiume became Italian, the rest of the Free State would become Jugoslav.

As regards Zara, it was very awkward to tear out of Dalmatia its capital, with all the Government buildings established there. In this event, the Jugo-

slavs would have to establish their capital at Spalato. Zara had no resources except as the capital of Dalmatia. He suggested, therefore, that it should not be definitely independent, but should be placed under a special statute—a *corpus separatum*, or call it what you like—in order to maintain Italian culture and to secure that the Italians there received fair play. He had asked M. Trumbitch whether, in the event of such a solution, it would be necessary to remove the capital, and he had replied that it would not. If, however, Zara was made independent the Jugoslavs could not be expected to maintain it as the capital of Dalmatia.

As regards Albania, no one seemed to want it. If, therefore, the Italians were willing to take it, they would not find anyone else desired to have it. If Signor Nitti were really looking for trouble, he would perhaps like to have Ireland as well, where exactly the same sort of trouble existed! The trouble was, once you took these places you could not get rid of them. He thought that M. Trumbitch had established a very good case for a readjustment of the boundaries of Albania. If a mandate for Central Albania were given to Italy she ought to agree to an adjustment of the boundaries.

The first question he wished to ask, however, was as to whether the whole of the Free State would be assigned to the Jugoslavs in the event of Fiume becoming Italian.

SIGNOR NITTI said that there was one general consideration which he ought to mention. The Treaty of London had been made between the British, French and Italian Governments, and the great State which had become the protector of the Slav races, namely, Russia. Presumably, in accepting the Treaty of London, Russia was satisfied that it did justice to the Slavs.

(During the translation of this passage from the French, Mr. Lloyd George interposed that the Russians had detested the treaty, and had said that, rather than sign it, they would prefer not to have the co-operation of the Italians. Signor Nitti replied that it had been signed by M. Sazonov.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Lloyd George made the rejoinder that Russia had never thought the treaty a fair one, but that, eventually, Mr. Asquith had himself persuaded them, and the Tsar had said that to please the Western Powers he would sign whatever they liked. The Tsar had not wanted Italy to come into the war at all.)

Signor Nitti, continuing, said that, in view of the Russian signature, he could not admit that the Treaty of London was against the Slavs. On the contrary, it had contributed to accentuate the aspirations of the Southern Slavs, and he wished to throw into relief the fact that the Treaty of London could not be considered as directed against the Slavs or their interests.

As regards statistics, they were a matter of extreme uncertainty in the eastern regions where the races were so mixed, and all sorts of racial, ethnological and religious interests were involved. He did not believe that the statistics quoted by M. Trumbitch could be relied on, or existed. The populations were much too mixed for reliable statistics. For example, he had said that there were 2,000 Serbs in Scutari. According to a map prepared

<sup>1</sup> Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1910-16.

by a French military authority, however, there were no Serbs there. It was understandable, and perhaps a noble aspiration, for these young countries to try and find compatriots in other countries, but what M. Trumbitch had said was not the fact.

The question of principal importance, however, was that of Fiume, which had never been a Yugoslav town. It had been a great Hungarian town, and M. Trumbitch had insisted that the Italians had been brought there for political reasons, but, nevertheless, it was an historic fact that the Italians were there in a great majority. Italy desired to have the frontier of the Treaty of London, with a small correction of the frontier, for military reasons, in the region of Senossecchia. The object of this was to prevent Trieste, in the event of war, being within the range of heavy guns. South of this he desired to have the frontier of the Treaty of London. In addition, if Fiume was to be an Italian city, it must be connected with Italy by a corridor, since it could not be separated from Italy.

He asked Mr. Lloyd George to bear in mind that of all the countries in Europe, Italy was the one that would have the smallest foreign element in its population if these proposals were carried out. It was almost impossible in adjusting frontiers to avoid including a certain number of foreign populations within national frontiers.

If Italy received Fiume he was disposed to give up the whole of Dalmatia (except Zara). Dalmatia had formed the Roman bridge-head to the Balkans, and any Power with ambitions in the Balkans would wish to keep it, but he was prepared to renounce it. He could not, however, renounce the town of Zara, which was purely Italian. Zara, however, did not really establish a very great difficulty, because of the tradition of small States in the Mediterranean. Italy already had one such small State in San Marino, which, to some extent, was maintained at Italian expense. His reason for making a similar demand in the case of Zara was that it was an entirely Italian town. So moderate, however, was the Italian point of view that Italy did not claim the whole district of Zara, which she knew was inhabited largely by Yugoslavs, but only the limits of the municipality. Italy had no business interest in Zara and accepted it only as a national heritage. For Zara he would propose a special constitution with a right to choose its diplomatic representation. He did not ask that the diplomatic representation should be Italian, but that Zara itself should choose whether it should be Yugoslav or Italian, or whether it should be represented by one of the Allies.

In regard to the rest of Dalmatia, he wished to make one other claim, namely, that the Italians should be allowed to decide whether they would claim Italian citizenship.

The whole question should be considered as a political one to be settled on the basis of mutual convenience.

In conclusion, he thought there should be no difficulty in reaching a compromise. By the Treaty of London, Italy was to receive frontiers from near Mount Tarvis to the Gulf of Fiume, without, however, including Fiume. She was also to receive Dalmatia, a number of the islands, and Valona. He

now said that if Fiume was confided to Italian sovereignty he would be satisfied with a frontier down to the Gulf of Fiume rectified only in regard to Senosecchia, and to provide a connection with Italy.

(During the translation of this part of Signor Nitti's statement he explained the situation on a map.)

All the rest of the coast would go to the Jugoslavs, including the whole of Dalmatia. Zara alone was to be made independent and was to be free to choose its diplomatic representation. In the rest of Dalmatia the Italians should be free to elect for Italian nationality. As regards the islands, he only asked for those which President Wilson had agreed should be assigned to Italy, together with Lagosta and Cherso. Valona, he thought, was not in dispute, and as regards Albania he was prepared to discuss the northern frontier.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had listened with the closest attention to the exposition of the question made by Signor Nitti and Mr. Lloyd George, and he would now define the questions on which a discussion should be instituted.

He accepted the ideas of Signor Nitti as regards the settlement of Albania. He accepted that Italy should have a mandate for Central Albania, and that the southern frontier of Albania should be adjusted to include Argyrocastro and Koritza in the Greek territory. No fundamental objection had been raised by Signor Nitti to this. As regards the north of Albania, he would accept that the frontier should be readjusted so as to extend the territory of the Jugoslavs as far as St. Jean de Medua.

There remained other questions. As regards Fiume, if Italy would accept his views in regard to Albania, he would accept Italian sovereignty and the Italian flag in Fiume. This was hard for him to do, not because he was unwilling to give what Italy asked, but because only to-day he had received from d'Annunzio's friends in Fiume a letter headed 'Ville de Fiume', asking to be heard by the conference. This made it a little hard to give Fiume to Italy under the menace of d'Annunzio. M. Orlando had said that he would suppress the trouble in Fiume, but instead he had fed d'Annunzio's troops there. If Fiume were completely free he would have no scruples. But from the point of view of the conference it was disagreeable, because it meant yielding to a rebel whom the Italian Government could not suppress. In spite of this, however, he would accept Signor Nitti's proposal. He was willing to agree to Fiume becoming Italian, because it was an Italian town. When he agreed to this, however, Signor Nitti asked him to hand over territory connecting Fiume with Italy, and he objected to this for the very reason that the population of this territory was not Italian. He believed that there were something like 20,000 to 30,000 Slavs in the country between Fiume and the Italian boundary. He was not disposed to concede this, unless new reasons were given in favour of it.

Further, Cherso and Lagosta were not Italian, and he could not make a concession here.

As regards the islands, he did not know how many Signor Nitti proposed to claim. Did he want as many islands as possible? (Signor Nitti interjected

that he would only claim as few as possible, and he thought they could agree there.)

As regards Dalmatia, it must be remembered that the Serbs were a nation who, in discussion, would resist foot by foot. He had been impressed by what M. Trumbitch had said in regard to the neutralisation of Dalmatia. What M. Trumbitch had said was that by neutralising the coast he deprived Jugoslavia of the right of defending herself, which was equivalent to depriving her of the right of existence. Compared with the Italians, the Serbians (who were a nation of only 12,000,000) were not in a position to attack, but the Jugoslavs said that if they were not allowed to fortify their coasts they would be helpless and could not defend themselves if an Italian force was landed there.

As regards Zara, he preferred Mr. Lloyd George's plan, but if the Italian solution was pressed, he was disposed to agree to it. M. Trumbitch had said that if Zara became Italian he could not keep the capital there; but Zara had no other means of supporting itself.

These were the principal points. If they were agreed they might be discussed one by one and an agreement must be reached. He asked Signor Nitti if he was prepared to do this.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he had the greatest possible interest in settling this question. He did not wish to leave Paris for Italy until the question had been settled. It was a question not only of foreign policy, but also of internal policy in Italy. M. Clemenceau had spoken of d'Annunzio. To speak frankly, he did not think that he could be suspected on this question, as he had been exposed to attacks and a regular literature had been created against him on the subject. As chief of the Government in Italy, however, he could be satisfied [*sic*] with what had happened. It must be recalled, however, that d'Annunzio's action was an expression of a national spirit of exaltation. Italy had entered the war without being forced to do so, and it had been necessary to rouse the national spirit; and out of this there had arisen a great Adriatic programme. No doubt the question had been very greatly exaggerated. Now, however, after all these hopes had been raised, there was a disposition for public opinion in Italy to point out how little Italy had received.

D'Annunzio had come to be regarded as an expression of this national opinion. He himself would like to settle the Adriatic question, but unfortunately it was beset with great difficulties. D'Annunzio was in a town where the whole of the population was as agitated as he was himself. Italy could not have settled the question without using guns to fire on the town. It was essential, however, that the question should be settled as soon as possible.

(M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George interjected at this point that this was their opinion also.)

Continuing, Signor Nitti pointed out that under the Treaty of London Italy had been granted hundreds of islands. Now she was only asking for those islands which President Wilson had been willing to assign to her, together with Lagosta and Cherso.

Lagosta was an island with a very small population. Cherso was a much

more important island. The great objection to its being handed over to Italy had been that it would enable Italy to block the channel to Fiume. This question would, however, now disappear, since Fiume was now to be Italian.

As regards the frontier of Fiume, Italy claimed the frontier of the Treaty of London with the modifications he had named. It was true that this included a connection with Fiume, and that the territory concerned included a majority of Jugoslavs; but it must be remembered in this connection that Italy was abandoning a considerable population in Dalmatia and a population of a superior civilisation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how it was proposed to establish communications between Italy and Zara.

SIGNOR NITTI said that this was an entirely different problem, since there was all the Adriatic between Italy and Zara, whereas Fiume was close to the Italian frontier.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the excited state of opinion in Fiume had really been created by the Italian Government itself. He knew that not Signor Nitti but his predecessors were responsible for this. The Italian Government had had no right to send 21,000 men to Fiume. They had had no right to take the command there. They had had no right to post bills on the walls with the Italian Crown on the top. They had no right to allow riots to arise which had resulted in Frenchmen being killed. They had had no right to compel England, the United States of America and France to withdraw their ships from Fiume. When they had done all this they turned round and said that this was not the fault of the Italian Government. If there was a state of excitement in Fiume it was directly due to the action of the Italian Government which had endangered the peace of Europe. All the Allied ships had had to withdraw, the French leaving last of all under the threat of d'Annunzio, after French subjects had been killed. This being so, it was not a pleasure for him to have to yield to the Italian claims. He could not forget all that had happened owing to the mistakes of the Italian Government, nor the humiliation of having to order these ships to withdraw at the behest of d'Annunzio. This being so, he thought that Italy should make her demands as small as possible. He asked Signor Nitti where he would like to begin the detailed discussion—in Albania, in Fiume, or wherever he wished.

SIGNOR NITTI said he would prefer to begin in Fiume.

M. CLEMENCEAU referred to Signor Nitti's statement that he had wished to take a complete settlement home with him to Italy. He must understand, however, that this was not possible. The settlement could not be complete without the co-operation of the United States of America. All that could be done was to reach an agreement and then to notify to President Wilson that this arrangement had been reached in the interests of Europe and to ask him, with every possible argument, to accept it. Without President Wilson's consent, however, it was impossible to say that the conference agreed. He was reminded by M. Berthelot, however, that if the Jugoslavs could be induced to accept, the agreement of President Wilson would be much more probable.

SIGNOR NITTI said that this was, without doubt, quite true, but if Italy agreed and the Yugoslavs accepted, President Wilson would not have very much to say in the matter on a strictly logical argument.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that logic did not govern the world.

SIGNOR NITTI said that if the Allies agreed in the spirit of the solution the Yugoslavs would accept.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was ready to discuss the question of Fiume at once. Taking for granted that Italian sovereignty was to be retained over Fiume, the first question that arose was as to whether there should be a corridor connecting Fiume with Italian territory.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there was also the question of securing facilities for the development of the port and railway.

M. CLEMENCEAU and SIGNOR NITTI agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it would be an advantage not to have this corridor. It would, of course, be more agreeable for the Italian people to see a map with a corridor on it. There were disadvantages, however, in having a large town at the edge of a frontier. These disadvantages were especially acute in the case of Fiume, which was separated from another part of the town only by a ditch. This was not a satisfactory arrangement, as unquestionably it would become a centre of agitation. What was sought at the present time was a permanent peace, and this was the main interest of Italy's allies in the matter. He himself, however, would not refuse the corridor on these grounds if it did not take territory that was inhabited by Slavs. It would be necessary to include the shores of the Gulf of Quarnero and the southern part of the Istrian Peninsula, which was purely Slav.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Volosca, a town of 34,700 inhabitants, only contained 900 Italians.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that to put the question the other way, what would Italy say if there were a similar disparity of population just across the borders in Jugoslavia?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that at Castel Nuovo out of a population of 16,600 there were only seven Italians, yet that would be included in Italian territory under Signor Nitti's proposals. It was impossible to defend that sort of thing. The only argument that could be advanced was to enable Italy to have a road from Trieste to Fiume. There were only seven Italians in the whole place.

SIGNOR NITTI said that putting aside the Treaty of London, which included Volosca in Italian territory, Abazzia and Volosca were seaside towns full of hotels with a very mixed and variable population, and consequently the statistics were deceptive. On all frontiers there were mixed populations, even on the French frontier. It must be borne in mind that there were nearly 40,000 Italians in Dalmatia in such places as Spalato and Sebenico, but Italy realised that it was inevitable for her to lose them, and she did not dispute it. Did his colleagues, however, not think that it was important to secure a connection between Italy and Fiume? He could assure them it was very important. However, he would make a proposal reducing the number of

Jugoslavs in Italian territory to a minimum and bring it on the following day.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE questioned whether there were in reality so many Italians in Dalmatia if Zara were left out of account.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was inclined not to give Cherso and Lagosta to Italy. It was essential that the port of Fiume should be free, but if Cherso were given to Italy she would have command of the entrance channel.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that the population of Cherso was 3 to 1 in favour of the Jugoslavs.

SIGNOR NITTI said that Lagosta was an entirely different question from that of Cherso and should belong rather to a discussion of the strategical considerations in the South Adriatic.

As regards Cherso, the cultivated part of the island was almost entirely in the hands of Italians, and the whole municipality consisted of Italians. It was connected by a bridge only 7 metres wide with the island of Lussin. Everyone was agreed that there was a majority of Italians in Lussin, which should be assigned to Italy. The two islands, however, being connected by a bridge, were practically one. Nearly all the educated and commercial classes in Cherso were Italians. The great objection to Cherso being Italian had been that it would bar the way to Fiume, when it was proposed to establish a free State. The situation now under discussion, however, was entirely different. Italy had agreed that the island of Veglia should be Yugoslav. It had been agreed that Lussin should be Italian. In Cherso it was true there was a majority of Yugoslav inhabitants, but the *bourgeoisie* of the islands were entirely Italian. The island itself was of no great importance.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Veglia had been assigned to the Jugoslavs because it had an overwhelmingly Yugoslav population and contained only 1,500 Italians. Italy must not claim as a merit that she had given this up. The Jugoslavs might as well claim it as a merit that they had given up Taranto. The island of Lussin had been assigned to Italy because it contained an Italian majority in its population. If, however, Lussin and Cherso were one island, it would be found that the total population contained a large Croatian majority, and it should therefore be assigned to the Jugoslavs. No case had been established for assigning it to Italy. He was wondering how much the Serbs and Croats were prepared to take. If they would accept an agreement the Allies could certainly accept it. He suggested that, as on the following morning M. Clemenceau had to preside at the French Council of Ministers, he and Signor Nitti and M. Trumbitch should meet together and try to reach an agreement.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would give Mr. Lloyd George all his powers.

SIGNOR NITTI asked that Mr. Lloyd George would not insist on this proposal. There were certain rules established in this conference and it would be better to adhere to them. He knew the Jugoslavs very well, and they had very exaggerated ideas. It would be better to approach them with the authority of the *Entente*. Mr. Lloyd George could obtain all the information he liked from the Jugoslavs, but for him it would be very difficult to attend this meeting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he understood Signor Nitti had already met M. Trumbitch.

SIGNOR NITTI said he had only met him personally and not officially and did not feel that there would be any use in doing so at this stage. He asked the source of Mr. Lloyd George's statistics.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said they were the official Austrian statistics of 1910, which were not likely to err in the direction of being pro-Slav.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the conference now wished to reach its goal, and to do so great resolutions were required just as it was necessary to whip up a horse to cross an obstacle and win the race. He himself had had to make great concessions again and again, and he appealed to Signor Nitti to do the same. He was a very charming personality, but he had an iron mind.

SIGNOR NITTI said he was only a modest parliamentarian.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that a modest parliamentarian in Italy could teach much to French and British parliamentarians. It was no use continuing the discussion unless some agreement could be reached on Fiume.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he and M. Clemenceau could not make concessions; all they wanted was agreement. The Jugoslavs might agree to something which was being fought over at the present time. He thought it was a great pity, therefore, that Signor Nitti could not agree to meet the Jugoslavs. It would take twice as long to reach an agreement if he and M. Clemenceau had to argue first with Signor Nitti and then with the Jugoslavs. Why should the latter be treated as enemies instead of as friends and allies?

SIGNOR NITTI said he would bring fresh proposals on the following day.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he wanted an agreement with the Jugoslavs, and not to have to force something on them. Otherwise President Wilson would make the strongest objections.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether Signor Nitti would not meet Mr. Lloyd George the following morning with a view to reaching an agreement.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed to call on Mr. Lloyd George on the following morning at 11 o'clock and to bring his proposals.<sup>2</sup>

*(The conference rose at 5.20 p.m.)*

*Paris, January 12, 1920.*

<sup>2</sup> No record of Signor Nitti's visit to Mr. Lloyd George has been traced in Foreign Office archives.

C.M. 2.] *Notes of a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held at Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 13, 1920, at 11 a.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: U.S.A.: Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARY, Mr. Harrison.  
*Great Britain*: Lord Curzon; SECRETARY, Mr. Sargent.  
*France*: M. Cambon; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. de Saint-Quentin.  
*Italy*: M. Scialoja; SECRETARY, M. Trombetti.  
*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.  
 JOINT SECRETARIAT: U.S.A.: Capt. B. Winthrop. *Great Britain*: Capt. Lothian Small. *France*: M. de Percin. *Italy*: M. Zanchi.  
 INTERPRETER: M. Cammerlynck.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*Great Britain*: Capt. Fuller, R.N., Comdr. Macnamara, R.N., Mr. Malkin, Mr. Campbell, Mr. Herman [? Norman], Mr. Hutchinson.  
*France*: Adl. Le Vasseur, M. de Fleuriau, M. de Serruys, M. Laroche, M. Seydoux, M. Escoffier, M. Fromageot, M. Hermitte.  
*Italy*: Rear-Adl. Grassi, M. Ricci-Busatti, M. Manciola, Capt. Ruspoli, R.N.

1. The Council had before it a note, dated January 12, 1920 (Appendix A),  
*Treaty of Peace with Hungary. Report of Drafting Committee on nature of compromise between Hungary and Croatia-Slovenia* from the Drafting Committee, in reply to certain questions raised in a note from the Financial Commission (Appendix B), concerning the relation of Croatia-Slovenia towards Hungary in common law.  
 M. FROMAGEOT explained the note from the Drafting Committee (Appendix A) the conclusion of which was

that there was no need to grant the request formulated by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation in its letter of December 29, 1919, and that the text of the Treaty with Hungary could remain in its present form as far as that question was concerned.

After a short discussion,  
 It was decided:

to reject the alteration to the text of the Treaty with Hungary requested by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation in its letter dated December 29, 1919.

2. A note from the Financial Commission dated January 12, 1920 (Appendix C), was laid before the Council, in which the former pronounced against an alteration of the text of the Article of the Treaty with Hungary corresponding to Article 211 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain, which alteration was requested in a report of the Economic Commission dated December 27, 1919 (Appendix D).<sup>2</sup>  
*Treaty of Peace with Hungary. Report of Financial Commission on modification requested by Economic Commission of Article corresponding to Article 211 of Treaty with Austria* M. CHEYSSON explained the note from the Financial Commission (Appendix C).

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 968 f.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This appendix was identical with No. 48, appendix H, q.v.

M. SCIALOJA: I am entirely in favour of the conclusion adopted by the Financial Commission. In addition to the considerations urged by the latter, another argument may be invoked, i.e. that the question of entail has nothing in common with that of public undertakings. It is a question of interior regulation and concerns private international law. If Serbia considers the institution of entail as contrary to public order, she will be perfectly free in future not to recognize this mode of transferring property within her territory. In Italy we have taken certain measures against trusts, which we consider have drawbacks of an economic nature. There is nothing to prevent Serbia from taking similar measures if she so desires. But it is, I repeat, a domestic question which arises more naturally in legal terms than within the sphere of finance and politics.

M. SERRUYS: The question raised by the Italian Foreign Minister presents a certain gravity and much exceeds the Article in question. I do not think it at all obvious that the provisions of the Treaty with Hungary leave Serbia entirely free in her domestic legislation where these entails are concerned. I would point out, moreover, that a similar question has arisen in Roumania, where a law has just been promulgated concerning the settlement of foreigners. The provisions of the Treaties in force are apparently opposed to the application of this law to former Austro-Hungarian nationals.

M. SCIALOJA: Serbia will obviously not be able to confiscate these entails, but will be free to regulate the conditions of administration and succession of these properties as she likes.

M. SERRUYS: Entail represents quite a special form of property which does indeed seem to be guaranteed by the provisions of the Treaties. They constitute an economic appropriation of ceded territory and I think they can be compared to a certain extent with public concessions. I would, moreover, point out that, according to the solution we propose, the Reparations Commission could, after liquidating such property, attribute it as it thought best. This property might therefore return to the Hungarians themselves. Without in any way prejudging the financial clauses, we thought it fair to free Serbia from an economic appropriation which might become very formidable. Moreover, the position of Serbia is particularly critical from the point of view of reparation, since the Serbs possess no Hungarian security in Serbia, since sequestrations which had been enforced were raised as a result of the enemy occupation of Serbia. Sums owed by Serbia to Austria-Hungary were paid as the result of violent measures taken by the occupying authorities, sale of furniture, &c. Serbia therefore possesses no material security for the sums owed her by Hungary. I do not think the alteration we propose is contrary to the general system forbidding the liquidation of property of persons belonging to ceded territories.

M. CAMBON: I see good reasons in favour of each of the two solutions proposed to us, one by the Economic Commission and the other by the Financial Commission. My opinion is that, as M. Scialoja suggests, the question comes chiefly within the legal sphere. In those circumstances, I rather think it would be wise to refer the question to the Drafting Committee, which might

be consulted immediately. In my opinion we should nevertheless explain to it the desire of the Council that, where domestic legislation is concerned, Serbia should be assured freedom in the liquidation of these entails.

LORD CURZON: I am in favour of the solution proposed by the Financial Commission. I know that the Economic Commission has given its judgment after thorough investigation, but I note that no British representative was present during its deliberations. Had the British representative been present, I do not think the Commission would have reached an unanimous decision. For my part, I am quite prepared to settle the question immediately by accepting the conclusions of the Financial Commission.

M. SCIALOJA: I am also in favour of this solution.

M. CAMBON: We must nevertheless avoid appearing to cover and perpetuate the institution of entail which may present serious dangers for Serbia, and at least be certain that the Serbs will be entirely free to settle the method of succession of these domains as they think best, without the possibility of opposing the provisions of the Treaty to the legislative measures they may be called upon to take. A question of private international law arises which might be referred to the Drafting Committee.

M. SCIALOJA: I myself am a legal expert and I am unable to understand what legal objection could be formulated with the object of refusing Serbia complete freedom of action where her domestic legislation is concerned.

M. CHEYSSON: I must point out that the Financial Commission has not examined the question in principle; it has merely given its decision on the clearly defined proposal of the Economic Commission.

M. LAROCHE: To avoid all difference of interpretation, would it not be possible to introduce a short provision expressly reserving the right of the Serbs to regulate as they wish the conditions of transmission of the domains in question, while protecting them against any attempt at liquidation or seizure?

M. SCIALOJA: I do not see what article there is which could possibly be opposed to measures taken by the Serbs.

M. SERRUYS: It is the article protecting the property of enemy nationals inhabiting ceded territories. The institution of entail implies certain special forms of ownership and administration of property which might, like exemptions from taxation, be considered as forming part of the property itself and consequently as being protected by the same provisions of the Treaty. If we leave the text of the Treaty unaltered, it is to be feared that the Hungarians will maintain that the Serbs have no right to alter the transfer of property as provided for by the instrument constituting the entail.

M. LAROCHE: An article might be inserted making it possible for the Serbs to abolish the law of entail subject to an indemnity to the owners.

M. SCIALOJA: I do not think such a provision necessary. In my opinion the abolition of entail can in no way be considered equivalent to confiscation.

M. CAMBON: Even if a provision of this kind is superfluous, I see no drawback to inserting it.

M. SCIALOJA: If we provide for an exception in the Treaty with Hungary a similar provision would have to be inserted in all the other Treaties, which

has not been done. General legal principles are obviously applied, without any necessity for expressly stating the fact.

M. CAMBON: In view of the legislative confusion arising out of the creation of so many new States and the litigious nature of the Hungarians, we must avoid leaving any doubt which might later cause the Serbs serious difficulties. I think it would be better to provide a special provision for the case under discussion.

M. SCIALOJA: The aim of the Serbian request was nothing less than the confiscation of entail, which we cannot allow. I should like to know which article is feared for the domestic liberty of Serbian legislation.

M. SERRUYS: It is Article 276 [267] of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

M. SCIALOJA: That Article refers expressly to the case of seizure or liquidation. It does not, therefore, apply to the situation under consideration. By raising useless exceptions we risk causing doubt as to the general rule to be applied.

M. LAROCHE: Then we might draft a reply to the Serbian note indicating the reasons for which their request was not allowed. They would thus know that they are free to alter the conditions of transfer and administration of entail if they think fit.

M. CAMBON: This solution seems to me the best. M. Scialoja, whose opinion has prevailed, might, if he will, undertake to draft this reply to the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, explaining to them the reasons for which their freedom of domestic legislation on this question of entail remains intact.

It was decided:

(1) to adopt the conclusions of the Note of the Financial Commission of January 12, 1920, and not to alter the Article of the Treaty with Hungary corresponding to Article 211 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.

(2) to instruct M. Scialoja to draft a reply to the note of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation of December 12, 1919, explaining the reasons for which there is no need to grant its request and specifying that no provision of the Treaty is opposed to the right of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to settle by provisions of domestic legislation the conditions of transfer and administration of entails situated within the districts ceded by Hungary to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

3. The Council had before it a joint note, dated January 13, 1920 (Appendix E)<sup>3</sup> from the representatives of the Economic Commission and

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This short note proposed that article 224 of the treaty of peace with Austria should be modified to the following effect for insertion in the treaty of peace with Hungary: '1. To take into account, in determining the quantities to be delivered, the amount of lignite which Czecho-Slovakia received from Hungary. 2. Not to burden Hungary with new obligations, such as would result from the furnishing of traction coal from the Pecs mines to the S-C-S State. 3. To subject the furnishing of lignite by Hungary to Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to the same conditions as those which are imposed on these States in connexion with the furnishing of coal to Hungary. The text attached hereto has been unanimously approved by the Mixed Commission.' This text (not printed) was, with verbal variation, the draft of article 207 of the treaty with Hungary, which is printed in *The Hungarian Peace Negotiations*, vol. i, p. 607.

those of the European Coal Commission. This note was in favour of an alteration of Article 224 of the Treaty with Hungary,<sup>4</sup> which makes it compulsory for the Czecho-Slovak State and for Poland to supply Hungary with a certain quantity of coal or lignite in exchange for food-stuffs and raw materials.

*Treaty of Peace with Hungary. Report of special Commission on modifications to Article 207 claimed by the Czecho-Slovak Delegation*

M. SERRUYS commented on this note from the Economic Commission. (Appendix E).<sup>3</sup>

It was decided:

to adopt the conclusions formulated in the note from the Economic Commission dated January 13, 1920 (Appendix E),<sup>3</sup> together with the alterations to Article 224 of the Treaty with Hungary,<sup>4</sup> indicated in the annex to that note. (See also Appendix E.)<sup>3</sup>

4. M. SEYDOUX: The last time that the question of enemy trade in Turkey came before the Council, a note from the French Delegation was discussed (see H.D. 122,<sup>5</sup> Appendix H), favouring the retention of the *status quo*; and the British Delegation had likewise drawn up a proposal of five points (see H.D. 122)<sup>5</sup> reaching practically the same conclusions. As the Italian representative considered that the question concerned the Reparations Commission, he asked to refer the matter to his Government. The United States Ambassador also declared that he must refer the matter to Washington.

*Prohibition of enemy trade in Turkey*

LORD CURZON: The proposal of the French Delegation and that formulated by the High Commissioners in Constantinople differ very slightly. Nevertheless the latter applies to Bulgaria in the same way as to Germany, which is not, I think, the case in the former. I should think it better to accept the proposal formulated by our agents on the spot.

M. SEYDOUX: The original proposal of the High Commissioners in Constantinople considered a very strong reinforcement of the measure at present in force. The French Delegation thought it was impossible to render the existing state of affairs more severe at a time when the Treaty was about to enter into force and that it was sufficient to retain the *status quo*. The desired object was not to paralyse German trade in Turkey, but only to prevent German direct action for propaganda purposes in a country with which we are not yet at peace. When the question came before the Council, the British Delegation submitted a draft of five points the conclusions of which almost equalled the retention of the *status quo*. I should like to know whether the proposal referred to by Lord Curzon is really that of the five points or the telegram from the High Commissioners in Constantinople asking for much more radical measures.

LORD CURZON: I am referring to the five points proposed by the British Delegation and I recommend their adoption.

<sup>4</sup> This reference should be to article 224 of the treaty with Austria (article 207 of the treaty with Hungary): see note 3 above.

<sup>5</sup> No. 51.

M. SCIALOJA: Those five points amount in short to excluding direct trade by sea between Germany and Turkey. I should nevertheless like to make one remark: since we discussed this question a fresh fact has arisen, i.e. the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles. Since the day before yesterday, Germany has ceased to be an enemy Power and enjoys all rights not expressly taken from her by a definite provision of the Treaty. I do not think we could find in the Treaty of Versailles any provision limiting Germany's right of trade abroad.

LORD CURZON: Germany's rights are limited by the conditions of the Armistice with Turkey.

M. SEYDOUX: Article 23 of the Armistice Convention with Turkey forbids all commercial relations between Turkey and the Central Powers.

M. SCIALOJA: But Germany was then an enemy Power while to-day, from the legal point of view, she is a neutral Power between us and Turkey.

M. CAMBON: We cannot impose restrictions on Germany, but we are free to impose them on Turkey, with whom we are not yet at peace.

M. SCIALOJA: I think there is nevertheless a serious difficulty in so doing.

MR. WALLACE: My Government is not in sympathy with this proposal. We are not at peace with Germany as you are, and we think that the Reparations Commission should deal with the question, so that the payment of sums owed by Germany to the Allies may not be made more difficult by imposing useless restrictions on her commerce.

M. CAMBON: The French Government has received from Washington a telegram indicating that the United States has informed Germany that their relations with that Power are still regulated by the Armistice Convention of November 11, and by subsequent agreements.

MR. WALLACE: My Government's point of view on this question is perhaps broader, for the United States are not as especially interested in this question of reparation as other countries.

M. SEYDOUX: I would recall the fact that, the last time that the Council discussed this question, the Italian representative thought that the question concerned the Reparations Commission, but M. Clemenceau pointed out that the Reparations Commission was only competent to deal with the execution of treaties already in force and the majority of the Council appeared to agree with him. I would add that the system we recommend puts no obstacles in the way of German-Turkish commercial relations, but merely limits the possibilities of direct relations and consequently of German influence in Turkey. German trade with the Ottoman Empire is therefore not abolished. Moreover, this trade cannot, in my opinion, have a great effect on the question of reparation.

M. SCIALOJA: It would be well to examine the five points separately.

M. CAMMERLYNCK read the five points of the British proposal. (See H.D. 122.)<sup>5</sup>

M. SCIALOJA: I think these five points can be accepted. But the drafting

of them must be altered in such a way that we do indeed seem to forbid Turkey, and not Germany; to trade.

LORD CURZON: I approve entirely M. Scialoja's proposal.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve in principle the five points of the British proposal concerning the prohibition of enemy trade in Turkey as they appear in the Minutes of the Meeting of January 5, 1920 (H.D. 122);<sup>5</sup>
- (2) to instruct the British Delegation to modify the drafting of these five points so as to address the prohibition against trading formulated therein to Turkey and not to Germany.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for instructions from his Government.

5. The Council had before it a note, dated from Coblenz, January 5, 1920 (Appendix F),<sup>6</sup> from the Interallied Rhineland High Commission. This note asked the Supreme Council to decide that the costs of the Commission should be refunded by Germany by priority, before Reparation, and on the same footing as the costs of the army of occupation.

*Costs of Interallied  
Rhineland High  
Commission*

M. SCIALOJA: I should consider that there are drawbacks to accepting purely and simply the proposal submitted to us. It seems to me dangerous to depart from the terms of the Treaty. Now the latter expressly states what are the privileged expenses to be refunded before reparation. The costs of the Interallied Rhineland High Commission are not included in that category. To include them with a high hand would be to create a dangerous precedent, and, were that example followed, would risk lessening appreciably the common security of Reparation. In any case, I do not think the Supreme Council, whose existence is coming to a close, is competent to take a decision of this kind, the result of which might be serious. Only the Reparations Commission could deal with the question. The rather vague wording of Article 248 leads one to suppose that the Reparations Commission is competent to deal with the matter. I should see no drawback to the extension of the competence of the Reparations Commission in this way; but I should object to the Supreme Council entering on a course of action which would lead to a derogation of the Treaty.

M. CAMBON: We might certainly refer the question to the Reparations Commission, although its Chairman is in favour of the proposal submitted to us.

It was decided:

to refer to the Reparations Commission the proposal formulated in the note dated January 5, 1920, from the Interallied Rhineland Commission.

6. ADMIRAL LE VAVASSEUR commented upon the note which appears as Appendix G.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This note had already been the subject of a resolution of the Supreme Council on January 9, 1920: see No. 53, minute 8 and note 8.

MR. WALLACE: Is the proportion of 2 per cent. which it was proposed to allocate to the United States in the distribution of enemy warships and docks maintained?

*Distribution of enemy surface warships, submarines, and port material* ADMIRAL LE VASSEUR: The Naval representatives have had no occasion to examine the question anew since they submitted their report in which they proposed the bases of distribution which the Council examined and which the American representative was to submit for the approval of his Government.

MR. WALLACE: Inasmuch as the arrangement is maintained, I am authorized to state that the Government of the United States will not demand or expect to receive any portion of the surrendered German Navy, or of the material which is to be handed over as reparation for Scapa Flow.

LORD CURZON: Does the United States Government's waiver of the proportion allocated to it apply also to the vessels which were to be employed for propaganda purposes?

ADMIRAL LE VASSEUR: The question of the propaganda ships is entirely distinct from the question of distribution of tonnage.

M. BERTHELOT: The United States refuse the 2 per cent. allocated to them because they consider that proportion insufficient: that consideration does not apply to the propaganda ships, for the distribution of which they are upon the same footing as the other Allied Powers.

M. CAMBON: The Council will record Mr. Wallace's declaration. The distribution can be effected forthwith.

LORD CURZON: As a result of the United States' waiver of their share, a surplus of 2 per cent. remains. I propose, if the Japanese Ambassador has no objection to that procedure, that it be divided equally between France and Italy.

M. MATSUI: I accept Lord Curzon's proposal.

M. CAMBON: We thank Lord Curzon for his friendly proposal and accept it gratefully.

It was decided:

- (1) to approve definitely the basis of distribution of enemy warships, submarines, and port material, provided for in the resolutions of the Supreme Council bearing the respective dates of November 29, 1919 (See H.D. 102),<sup>7</sup> December 2, 1919 (H.D. 104),<sup>8</sup> and December 9, 1919 (H.D. 110);<sup>9</sup>
- (2) to allocate to France and Italy, in equal shares, the two per cent. attributed to the Government of the United States, to which the latter waived all claim;
- (3) that the waiver of the United States Government to the percentage of two per cent. refers expressly to the reservations made by Mr. Polk concerning the ratio attributed to the United States in the distribution of enemy warships (H.D. 102,<sup>7</sup> Paragraph 4, Minute 1, also H.D. 110,<sup>9</sup> Paragraph 1, Minute 1), of enemy submarines (H.D. 104,<sup>8</sup> Paragraph 3, Minute 9, also H.D. 110,<sup>9</sup> Paragraph 1, Minute 1), and of port material (H.D. 110,<sup>9</sup> Paragraph 1, Minute 1, and Appendix A, Paragraphs 2 and 4, to H.D. 110).

<sup>7</sup> No. 32 (minute 1).

<sup>8</sup> No. 34 (minute 9).

<sup>9</sup> No. 39 (minute 1).

7. The Council had before it a note submitted by the Secretariat General concerning the general collection of the Conference records (Appendix H).

*Publication of the  
records of the Con-  
ference*

M. ESCOFFIER: All practical arrangements are made in order that the publication of the records of the Conference may be made as soon as possible and approximately within a period of from six to nine months. But a certain number of questions of principle arise in connexion with the publication on which we require instructions from the Council.

The first is that concerning the printing of the records of the Supreme Council. Should they be printed, and if so, how many copies, and in what conditions should they be distributed? From both the historical and practical points of view, it seems better to have these documents printed, since they have been struck off on the duplicator on fragile paper and would disappear quickly were they to remain the only copies.

M. CAMBON: The duplicator is certainly a poor means of preserving the traces of our deliberations for history. In my opinion it would be better to have a small number of these documents printed, on condition that they were placed in the archives without being made public.

MR. WALLACE: I have a very strong impression that Mr. Wilson considered the conversations of four which took place sometimes at his rooms, sometimes at those of Mr. Lloyd George or M. Clemenceau, as absolutely confidential and never to be printed. Does M. Escoffier think that the deliberations of the Council of Four should also be printed?

M. BERTHELOT: When we speak of printing these texts, it must be clearly understood that it is not a question of publishing them. We simply mean that it would be better to have these texts printed, both for the examination of precedents and for the work of future historians.

LORD CURZON: The question is of much importance. A careful distinction should be made between documents which it is a question of publishing and those which are simply to be printed while retaining their secret character. Plenary meetings and those of the Commissions can eventually be published. But I am here referring specially to the minutes of the various Councils, Council of Ten, Council of Five, Council of Four. These are very confidential documents which only exist in type and which it is now proposed to replace by printed documents in order to ensure their preservation.<sup>10</sup> In theory I accept this proposal, the advantages of which are obvious, but subject

<sup>10</sup> In making this statement Lord Curzon was unaware that during the earlier part of the Peace Conference the British delegation, by direction of the War Cabinet, had printed at Auteuil, for confidential official use, a number of copies of certain of these records, notably the 'I.C.' records of the Council of Ten and the Council of Five or Foreign Ministers. (Records of the Council of Heads of Delegations were never so printed.) This discrepancy, with its bearing upon resolution 2 below, was subsequently observed in the Foreign Office and the matter was taken up with Sir M. Hankey on March 16, 1920. A member of his staff informed the Foreign Office that the French delegation had been fully aware of the British printing of these documents and had had several copies of them. In view of this statement no further action was taken in the matter.

to the reservation that the figure proposed by the Secretariat General of 100 copies for each of the Allied and Associated Powers seems to me clearly too large. Such a large number of copies would lead to a divulgence of these documents which must remain wholly secret. I would propose fixing the total number of copies printed of the records of the Supreme Council at 50.

It should be understood that, once the printing was done, the forms would be destroyed.

M. BERTHELOT: That is understood: moreover, they always are destroyed.

M. SCHALOJA: Was there not a period when there were no regular minutes, but only notes taken by the various secretaries, especially by Sir Maurice Hankey and M. Mantoux? These notes cannot take the place of real minutes and in those circumstances it seems to me rather difficult to think of having them printed, even if they are to remain secret.

M. BERTHELOT: This is how it happened. With one single exception which I shall give later, the records of the Supreme Council first formed two sets of minutes. One was drawn up in English by Sir Maurice Hankey and is a model of the kind, the other was prepared by M. de Bearn under my direction and its accuracy is also certain. It was not till later that a joint secretariat was established, responsible for drafting one single set of minutes. These minutes are attested and are the only ones prepared under absolutely regular conditions. But the two sets of minutes prepared by Sir Maurice Hankey and M. de Bearn complete each other remarkably and could perfectly well serve as a basis for printing, especially in view of the fact that it is a question of documents not meant for presentation to the public.

The exception which I pointed out just now applies to the Council known as the Council of Four, or of Three, according to whether the Italian Representative was present or not. Strictly speaking, no regular minutes were taken down. As regards the first few meetings, notes exist which were taken down by M. Mantoux, who was acting as interpreter. It was not until half way through these meetings that Sir M. Hankey drew up minutes which were much more complete than M. Mantoux's notes.<sup>11</sup> As to the latter, it was decided that they should be destroyed, and only one copy thereof exists which is in the possession of M. Clemenceau, who keeps them in a safe, and I think, intends to destroy them. Mr. Wilson and his colleagues were very much concerned that these notes should not become known, so that they themselves should not be confronted with them later. As to the minutes drafted by Sir Maurice Hankey, it would be a pity to destroy them. One copy exists, in the possession of the English, and another, which we have. I should be in favour of these copies being kept, with the understanding that each Government undertakes, on its honour, to treat them as absolutely secret. I see, therefore, no objection to destroying the notes taken down by M. Mantoux, more especially seeing that these contained disjointed conversations, and that traces of the conclusions arrived at by means of these

<sup>11</sup> The recorded meetings of the Council of Four began in the last week of March, 1919. Sir M. Hankey attended only intermittently before April 19 when his attendance as secretary became regular.

conversations are evident in the resolutions of the Council of Four, which are preserved in the archives of the Secretariat General, as in those of the Delegations of the Great Powers.

M. SCIALOJA: Since these resolutions are extant, would it not be advisable to distinguish between them and the deliberations of the Council of Four? In my opinion the resolutions should be arranged in groups and even distributed to all the Delegations, since they are of general interest. The publication thereof should include any reservations, made with regard to one or other of these resolutions, by any members of the Council. I do not think that any one of these resolutions is of a secret nature. Once these resolutions had been published it would be time to consider whether the deliberations should or should not be published *in extenso*.

LORD CURZON: This being the case, which are the documents of which there is a question of publishing 50 copies?

M. ESCOFFIER: The position therefore is as follows: in the first place, it is now merely a question of the records of the Supreme Council. As regards the Council of Four no documents are to be printed. The deliberations of the Council of Five and those of the Council of Ten are to be printed, the total number of copies being 50.

M. MATSUI: I should like to point out that we were not represented on the Council of Four, and do not know what took place at its meetings.

M. BERTHELOT: You were aware of the resolutions taken by the Council of Four.

M. ESCOFFIER: As regards all the other records of the Conference, the Secretariat General agrees with the Drafting Committee in considering that the distribution of those documents should be effected in accordance with the rules laid down in the Note of September 23, 1919, section I (see Appendix G).<sup>12</sup> It also considers that the meetings of Commissions of a general nature should be distributed to all the Powers with limited interests, and that the minutes of meetings of Commissions on which only a few of the Powers with limited interests were represented, should be distributed only to the Powers represented thereon. As regards publicity, the Secretariat General is of opinion that only the minutes of plenary meetings should be made public. Other documents of the Conference, which would be marked 'confidential' would be reserved exclusively for the use of the Governments.

MR. WALLACE: When will the minutes of the League of Nations be published?

M. ESCOFFIER: If it were necessary, we should, from a material point of view, be ready to publish them in a week's time.

MR. WALLACE: It would be most embarrassing for the American Government if these documents were published before the ratification of the Treaty by the Senate.

M. ESCOFFIER: We are merely considering a complete publication of these documents which will not take place before five or six months at the earliest.

The Delegations will be kind enough to inform the Secretariat General how many copies they require of each set. A double edition will be made of

<sup>12</sup> In error for Appendix H.

the records of the Conference, one part printed in English under the auspices of the British Delegation,<sup>13</sup> and the other in French, drawn up by the Secretariat General.

It was decided :

- (1) that the minutes of the meetings of the Council of the Heads of Governments should not be printed. The British and French Governments should preserve the notes taken at those meetings and kept by them, pledging themselves to treat the same as strictly secret;
- (2) that the records of the Council of Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers, those of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and those of the Council of Heads of Delegations should be printed, the total number of copies being 50, and distributed to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, at the rate of ten per Government. The type used to print these documents should be destroyed as soon as the latter were worked off;
- (3) that all the resolutions (with the reservations referring thereto) adopted by the various Councils mentioned in paragraphs (1) and (2) above, should be printed in a separate collection and distributed to each of the Allied and Associated Powers;
- (4) that the conclusions of Part B of the Note from the Secretariat General be adopted (Appendix II);
- (5) that a double edition be made of the records thus printed, one part in English under the auspices of the British Delegation,<sup>13</sup> and the other in French under the auspices of the Secretariat General;
- (6) that each Delegation should inform the Secretariat General of the number of copies of each set which it would require.

8. The Council had before it a Note from the British Delegation dated January 12, 1920, concerning this question (Appendix I).

*American Representation  
on the Interallied  
Naval Commission of  
Control in Germany*

M. BERTHELOT commented upon this Note. He added the following: It seems to me that the question raised by the British Delegation should be considered as settled by a previous resolution of the Council, whereby American

<sup>13</sup> The preparation of the English edition was begun in the Foreign Office as soon as the British archives of the Peace Conference had been transferred from Paris. But in the course of preparation it became apparent that the English records, other than those of the Supreme Council in its various forms, were in a number of cases of doubtful value as compared with the often better authenticated French texts. Furthermore, the orders placed by foreign governments for the English edition were smaller than had been anticipated so that by the summer of 1922 it was calculated that the projected English edition, already planned on a reduced scale as compared with the French *Recueil Général des Actes de la Conférence de la Paix*, would involve a financial loss of about £6,500. Under these circumstances the British Embassy in Paris on December 4, 1922, communicated a memorandum to the Ambassadors' Conference in which it was observed that 'the completion of the edition would involve the British Government in a loss of some thousands of pounds for editorial and printing expenses. In the present stringency of national finances the British Government cannot feel that it would be justifiable to incur this loss, and the British Embassy is instructed therefore to announce to the Conference of Ambassadors that the British Government do not propose to proceed with the English edition, as originally approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers on January 13, 1920.'

representatives are free to take part, or not, in Commissions sitting in Germany, to be present at their meetings in an official or officious capacity, according to the instructions from their Government. Under these circumstances it seems to me that the Chairman of the Interallied Naval Commission of Control in Germany cannot refuse to receive American Naval Officers who apply to him with a view to taking part in the said Commission. It is not for us to change our view on a question which we have had much difficulty in preventing the Germans from raising.

The Drafting Committee decided that the Germans could not derive any argument from the absence of the American Representatives, with a view to evading the obligations imposed on them under the Treaty.

LORD CURZON: The British Note raises two questions. It is a question here of American naval representatives who have come from the United States in order to take part in the work of the Commissions at Berlin and Heligoland. On the other hand, however, the American Government is sending no representative to the Military Commissions. I cannot understand the difference thus made by the Americans between the Military Commissions and the Naval Commissions.

MR. WALLACE: I cannot understand it any more than you, and I will put the question to my Government immediately.

LORD CURZON: The second point is of practical importance; i.e. who is to pay the allowances of these officers. M. Berthelot tells me that there is no reason for refusing to recognize them. I admit this, strictly speaking; but the German Government will doubtless refuse to pay them, and naturally the British Government cannot think of doing so. What will the position be?

MR. WALLACE: In view of the fact that the Germans have not yet raised any difficulties on that point, it would be better to leave the question open until I have received the instructions which I am going to ask for immediately.

LORD CURZON: If we are to wait for instructions from Washington it would be preferable for these officers not to take part in the labours of the Commissions until we know what our position is.

MR. WALLACE: It is possible that these officers may be provided with credentials from the American Government without my knowledge.

M. BERTHELOT: There has probably been a lack of co-ordination between the American military and naval administration. It would be advisable for a joint decision to be taken, or for the American Government to point out the reasons for this difference which has been established between the two situations, which appear to be similar. In any event it seems that we ought to leave the American officers entirely free to act as they think fit.

MR. WALLACE: I shall endeavour to obtain some light on the subject, and I hope to receive a reply with[in] a very short time.

LORD CURZON: Then we will do nothing before we hear the decision of the American Government?

M. BERTHELOT: We might, however, ask the American officers to refrain from taking part in the labours of the Commission until this slight misunderstanding has been cleared up.

M. CAMBON: We might inform the Chairman of the Commission that the Supreme Council is asking for explanations from Washington through the intermediary of Mr. Wallace, and considers it preferable that the American officers refrain from taking part in the meetings of the Commission until the Government of the United States has made known its intentions.

It was decided:

to inform the Chairman of the Interallied Naval Commission of Control in Germany in reply to the latter's request concerning the question of American representation on the said Commission, that the American representative on the Supreme Council was asking his Government whether the American officers were authorized to take part in the labours of the Commission; and that pending a reply from the Government at Washington it would be preferable for these officers to refrain provisionally from attending the meetings of the Commission.

9. LORD CURZON: I should like to raise an important question concerning the formation of our Council itself. This Conference has, during the last six months, included M. Clemenceau as Representative of France, Mr. Polk as Representative of the United States, Sir Eyre Crowe as Representative of the British Empire, M. Scialoja as Representative of Italy, and M. Matsui as Representative of Japan.

*Organization of the Conference*  
It was decided two days ago to replace this Council by a Council of Foreign Ministers.<sup>14</sup> The present state of affairs can only last a few days, since M. Scialoja and myself have neither the time, nor the possibility, nor - so far as I myself am concerned - I will add - the competence, to discuss each day questions of detail which take considerable time. The object of my journey to Paris was to examine the Adriatic question as also Turkish affairs. It would be impossible to prolong my stay beyond a few days. M. Scialoja, who has represented his country for several months on the Conference, is better informed than I am of the questions which are before it, but he also is pressed for time. It is therefore impossible for the present Council to be prolonged for more than a few days. It is to be replaced by the Ambassadors' Council. Would it not be preferable for the Ambassadors' Council to take our place without delay? It would be better for it to examine forthwith the questions with which it will deal in future. I confess that I think the formation of our Council to have been a mistake, and that it would have been better to institute from the outset the Council of Ambassadors.

M. CAMBON: The considerations put forward by Lord Curzon are most certainly worthy of attention, but I should like to point out that we were appointed through a decision of the Heads of Governments, and it is for them to decide whether we remain in function or disperse.

It seems to me that Lord Curzon's proposal is beyond our competence.

LORD CURZON: I do not think so. It was not the Council of Heads of Governments which appointed us, but rather the Supreme Council, of which we are the legitimate successors. I consider, therefore, that we are perfectly free to dissolve if we think the time has come.

<sup>14</sup> See No. 54, minute 4.

M. MATSUI: As far as I personally am concerned, the question affects me very little, since being at the same time Ambassador and Plenipotentiary, I would necessarily take part in either Council. I must point out, however, that the formation of a Council of Ambassadors was decided several months ago, in order to ensure the execution of the clauses of the Treaty with Germany. It is evident from its mandate that it is only competent to deal with these questions. It would not be competent to deal with other questions, notably with those concerning Hungary, unless indeed we extend its competence by a fresh decision; and I see difficulties in the way of such a course.

LORD CURZON: It would, however, be an actual practical impossibility for us to continue to sit indefinitely.

M. CAMBON: In spite of Lord Curzon's remark, I am not convinced that we are not obliged to consult in this matter the Heads of Governments. Doubtless one has always the right to commit suicide, but it seems to me that it would be difficult for us to take a decision to dissolve without notifying the Prime Ministers.

M. SCIALOJA read the resolution adopted on December 13, 1919, at the meeting in London (see Appendix J).<sup>15</sup> He added: In spite of the extreme importance of that meeting on account of the rank of the persons attending it, it cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a meeting of the Supreme Council.

I think, however, that Lord Curzon's proposal is capable of a practical solution without our being obliged to adopt it by means of a formal resolution. Each of us is free to delegate his powers, and to instruct either the Ambassador of his own Government in Paris or one of the delegates at the Conference, to represent him. We should thus arrive by practical means at the immediate formation of the Ambassadors' Council which Lord Curzon desires. I agree, moreover, with my British colleague in thinking that the meetings of the Council cannot continue indefinitely unless the formation thereof is changed.

M. CAMBON: I should also like to state that since our agenda is finished, there will be no need to fix to-day the date of our next meeting.

LORD CURZON: This being the case, it is not necessary to form an immediate resolution as regards my proposal. I shall interview the British Prime Minister on the subject, and would be glad if my French and Italian colleagues would, on their part, kindly see M. Clemenceau and M. Nitti on the matter.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 69

##### DRAFTING COMMITTEE FOR THE CONFERENCE.

*January 12, 1920.*

1. According to Article 1 of the Hungro-Croatian Compromise of 1868: 'Hungary, Croatia-Slavonia, and Dalmatia form a sole and same political com-

<sup>15</sup> Not printed. This resolution was, with verbal variation, resolution B (1-2) in No. 62.

munity, in relation to other nations, subject to H.M., as well as in relation to all other countries.'

In practice, however, from a point of view of international relations, no Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatian individuality or character has ever been recognized by the Powers, regardless of what might have been in fact or in law the position or the character of Croatia in relation to Hungary.

2. According to the Austrian Treaty, Article 203, and according to the present draft of the Hungarian Treaty, Article 186, it will be the duty of the Reparations Commission to estimate the contributory capacity of the ceded territories.

It is true that a financial compromise conventionally determined the contributive share of Croatia in regard to her own and Hungary's mutual expenses. The last financial compromise, drawn up in 1906, was to expire in 1913, and has not been renewed. The drafting Committee is unaware as to whether or not this compromise has remained effective by tacit agreement.

If the application of the quotations stipulated in the compromise be admitted in determining the share each of the ceded territories must assume towards the Hungarian debt, the estimates which are to be determined *ex aequo* and [*sic*] *bono* would, automatically, fall beyond the competence of the Reparations Commission. Now for political or other reasons, it is possible that the provisions of the compromise were not based exclusively on the paying capacity of the two countries. A new system would, therefore, not be in conformity with the general principle adopted.

3. Finally, it is desirable to indicate that the Financial Arrangement (Article 2) signed by the Serbians, relative to the contributions towards the war expenses, has already settled the question for these territories, inclusive of Croatia, by sanctioning the solution adopted in the Austrian Treaty and the present draft of the Hungarian Treaty.

#### APPENDIX B TO NO. 69

The Financial Commission, during its meeting of December 29, 1919, examined letter No. 4668, and annexes thereto, submitted by the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation, relative to the Peace Treaty with Hungary.

According to the S-C-S Delegation, Croatia-Slovenia constitutes a state apart from Hungary. These two states alone formed the country of the Saint-Etienne Crown [*sic*], and their unity, comparable to the Austro-Hungarian unity, was regulated by compromises. The last of these compromises was established in 1904 [? 1906].

Now that these countries of the Saint-Etienne Crown dissolve their union, it is desirable to effect a liquidation. The method of conducting this liquidation has been set forth by the S-C-S Delegation. The Delegation considers that in the division of the Hungarian debt and in the payment of public properties it will be impossible to apply provisions similar to those inserted in the Austrian Treaty, which were provided for ceded territories and not for states united under a same crown, the separation of which has been decided upon.

The Financial Commission, before examining the liquidation methods to be applied between Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia, desires the opinion of the Legal Advisers on the question of International Law raised by the Serb Delegation.

Are there any grounds for assuming that Croatia-Slavonia enjoyed special

statutes distinguishing her from the Banat, Prekomania, and other Hungarian comitats?

Were the successive compromises between Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia similar to the compromises between Hungary and Austria?

Do they authorize us to conclude that Croatia-Slavonia was an independent State, possessing an independent debt, and having full possession of domanial properties the greater part of which have been, in all probability, governed by the common Hungarian administration?

Do these compromises authorize Croatia-Slavonia to claim a right of possession over common Hungro-Croatian property, whether situated in Croatia or in Hungary?

Do these compromises authorize a distinction between the Croat-Slovene expenses and the Hungarian expenses, as well as the common expenditures of Hungary and Croatia?

What was the quota of Croatia-Slavonia in the contribution towards the common expenses in 1914?

As soon as the Financial Commission receives the advice of the Legal Advisers, it will be in a position to examine the technical provisions proposed by the Serb Delegation relative to the division of the debts and the payment of public properties.

#### APPENDIX C TO No. 69

PEACE CONFERENCE, FINANCIAL COMMISSION.

*January 12, 1920.*

The Financial Commission has examined the proposition made by the Economic Commission, relative to a modification to be introduced into the text of Article 194 of the Peace Conditions with Hungary (corresponding to the Article 260 of the Treaty with Germany) destined to give satisfaction to a claim made by the Delegation of the S-C-S.

The Financial Commission considers that it is not in a position to appreciate whether the maintenance in the Hungarian territories, which have been transferred to the Kingdom of the S-C-S, of majorats, ensuring certain Hungarian subjects both an economic influence in vast estates and certain lordly rights, would not be likely to create political or administrative difficulties.

The Commission esteems that it is a political question which can only be settled by political measures and not by financial clauses.

The terms of Article 194 of the Peace Treaty with Hungary (corresponding to Article 211 of the Treaty with Austria) should, according to the opinion of the Financial Commission, be taken in a restrictive sense, in order not to infringe the principle laid down by Article 250 (corresponding to Article 267 of the Treaty with Austria), and make it possible to the States which have ceded Hungarian territories to obtain through the intermediary of the Reparations Commission the disposition of Hungarian property, which they were forbidden to liquidate themselves.

#### APPENDIX G TO No. 69

1. In a resolution H.D. 102 (1)<sup>7</sup> of Nov. 29, 1919, the Supreme Council, in order to permit Mr. Polk to refer to his Government, decided to postpone the settlement of the percentages to be observed in the distribution between the Principal Allied

and Associated Powers, of enemy battleships [*sic*] and port material claimed from Germany by the Protocol of November 1.

A similar decision was taken in the resolution H.D. 104<sup>8</sup> (VI<sup>16</sup> of December 2, in regard to enemy submarines).

2. The Treaty of Peace with Germany will shortly come into force. This Treaty provides that the ships to be delivered shall be taken to Allied Ports; therefore, these ports should be indicated; but this cannot be done before the attribution of the ships shall have been agreed upon by the Powers concerned. Now this distribution depends upon the percentage.

3. For the above reasons, it is requested that the Government of the United States be invited to make known, as soon as possible, whether it accepts the proposal presented by the other four Allied Powers, concerning the distribution of the enemy surface battleships [*sic*] and submarines, and of the port material.

## APPENDIX H TO No. 69

### Document 1

#### *Note relative to a General Compilation of the Acts of the Conference*

##### PEACE CONFERENCE, SECRETARIAT GENERAL.

The Secretariat General of the Conference has, at the request of the Delegations, taken up the question of printing a General Compilation of the Acts of the Conference. The plan of classification hereto annexed (Annex A)<sup>17</sup> is approved by the General Secretariats of the Principal Powers.<sup>18</sup>

The Secretariat General has the honour to submit this plan for adoption by the Supreme Council, with a special request that the Council pronounce, in particular, on the following points:

#### (A) *Printing of the Acts of the Supreme Council.*

Those Acts only exist in a state of mimeographed copies, and as they are liable to disappear rapidly, it is desirable to have them printed and kept in the Archives of the Governments having participated in the different phases of the Supreme Council.

It is certain that during the execution of the Treaties of 1919, the Allies will be obliged to repeatedly refer, for interpretation of texts, to the Resolutions of the Supreme Council and to the discussions which preceded their adoption.

The number of copies of the Acts of the Supreme Council might be limited to 100 to each of the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

#### (B) *Distribution of the Minutes and Reports of the Commissions.*

In the course of the Conference, copies of the minutes and reports were printed and distributed among the Delegations for their immediate needs. However, in the course of the execution of the Treaties, the various ministerial Departments of the Allied and Associated Powers and the organizations on execution will require an ensemble of these documents printed and bound, as is the custom at the conclusion of any international Conference.

<sup>16</sup> In error for IX, i.e. minute 9.

<sup>17</sup> Document 2 below.

<sup>18</sup> Note in original: 'The British Delegation has agreed to publish the compilation in English; the Secretariat General will publish the French compilation.' (See note 13 above.)

However, in view of the character of certain Commissions whose deliberations are to remain secret, it is desirable to arrange distribution and publicity rules to cover these various documents.

The Drafting Committee has given its views in the annexed note (Annex B).<sup>19</sup>

The Secretariat General agrees in regard to the part upon which the Drafting Committee was unanimous, but refers to the Supreme Council for a decision relative to No. 4 of Part I of the said Note, namely:

4. Each of the other Allied and Associated Powers should receive the Minutes and Reports of the Commissions (including the Sub-Commissions, Committees, or Sub-Committees) in which they participated.

1. Whether the Minutes of the Commissions should be distributed to Powers other than those having participated therein;

2. Whether these documents should be not only delivered privately, but generally published.

(1) As there were two different kinds of Commissions; those of a general order in which all the Powers with special interests were represented by Delegates nominated by them; or those in which only a few Powers with special interests were represented; the Secretariat General esteems:

that, relative to the Acts of the first named Commissions, it is desirable to distribute them to all the Powers having special interests;

and that, relative to the Acts of the second named Commissions, only the Powers represented—and not those merely consulted—should be entitled to these documents.

(2) Concerning general publication, the Secretariat General esteems that, in conformity with the rules of the Conference, only the Protocols of the Plenary Sessions should be given publicity, and that the other documents of the conference which bear the mention 'Confidential' should be reserved for the exclusive use of the Governments.

## Document 2

### *Annex 'A'. General Compilation of the Acts of the Peace Conference*

#### CLASSIFICATION PLAN

##### Part I. *Acts of the Supreme Council*

(Not printed and reserved.)

- A. Council of the Heads of Governments and of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. (January 12–March 24, 1919).
- B. Council of the Heads of Governments (March 25–June 28, 1919).
- C. Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (March 27–July 5, 1919).
- D. Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers (July 5, 1919–January 20, 1920).

##### Part II. *Minutes of the Supreme Economic Council*

##### Part III. *Protocols of the Plenary Sessions, and of the Meetings of the Powers of Special Interests*

- A. Plenary Sessions: Protocols 1 to 8.
- B. Meetings of the Powers of Special Interests (2 and 3).

<sup>19</sup> Document 3 below.

<sup>20</sup> Blank in original.

Part IV. *Commissions of the Conference. (Minutes, Acts, and Reports)*

A. Committee on the Verification of Powers.

2. Drafting Committee.

B. General Questions.

1. Commission of the League of Nations.
2. Commission of the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, and penalties.
3. Commission on the Reparations of Damages.
4. Commission on International Labour Legislation.
5. Commission of the International Regime of Ports, Waterways, and Railways.
6. Financial Commission.
7. Economic Commission.
8. Air Commission.
9. Prisoners of War Commission.
10. Geographical Commission.

C. Territorial Questions.

1. Commission on Czecho-Slovak Affairs.
2. Commission on Polish Affairs.
  - (a) Interallied Polish Commission.
  - (b) Permanent Interallied Teschen Commission.
  - (c) Commission on Polish Affairs (Paris).
  - (d) Commission for the Negotiation of an Armistice between Poland and Ukrainia.
3. Commission on Roumanian and Jugo-Slav Affairs.
4. Commission on Greek and Albanian Affairs.
5. Commission on Danish and Belgian Affairs.
6. Commission on Baltic Affairs.
7. Central Committee on Territorial Questions.

D. Special Questions.

(a) Preparation of the Treaties with enemy States.

1. Commission of the Drafting of the Military, Naval, and Aerial Clauses.
2. Commission on Sub-Marine Cables.
3. Moroccan Commission.
4. Commission on German Colonies.
5. Interallied Commission to [sic] the Left Bank of the Rhine.
6. Tien-Tsin Commission.

(b) Treaties between Allies.

1. Commission on New States.
2. Revision of the Acts of Berlin and Brussels.

(c) Divers Treaties.

1. Spitzberg Commission.
2. Commission on the Revision of the Treaties of 1839.

Part V. *Treaties—Negotiation and Signing of*

A. Treaties and Conventions with Enemy Powers.

(a) Germany.

1. From the convocation of the German Delegation until the delivery of the Observations of that Delegation on the Peace Conditions (April 17–May 29, 1919.)
  2. Study of the Observations of the German Delegation and Reply of the Allies. (Minutes of the Reply and Coordination Committees.) (May 10–June 16, 1919.)
  3. From the delivery of the Observations of the German Delegations until the signing of the Treaty (from May 30 to June 28, 1919).
- Annex—Successive Stages of the Treaty.

(b) Austria.

1. From the convocation of the Austrian Delegation until the delivery of the Observations of that Delegation on the Peace Conditions (May 2–August 6, 1919.)
  2. Study of the Observations of the Austrian Delegation and Reply of the Allies. (Minutes of the Reply and Coordination Committees.) (August 6–September 2, 1919.)
  3. From the delivery of the Observations of the Austrian Delegation until the signing of the Treaty (from August 6 to September 10, 1919).
- Annex—Successive stages of the Treaty.

(c) Bulgaria.

1. From the convocation of the Bulgarian Delegation until the delivery of the Observations of that Delegation on the Peace Conditions. (July 10–October 24, 1919.)
  2. Study of the Observations of the Bulgarian Delegation and Reply of the Allies (Minutes of the Reply and Coordination Committees.) (October 25–November 3, 1919.)
  3. From the delivery of the Observations of the Bulgarian Delegation until the signing of the Treaty (from October 27 to November 27, 1919).
- Annex—Successive stages of the Treaty.

(d) Hungary.

1. From the convocation of the Hungarian Delegation until the delivery of the Observations of that Delegation on the Peace Conditions (December 1, 1919).

2.<sup>20</sup>

3.<sup>20</sup>

Annex—Successive stages of the Treaty.

(e) Turkey.

1. From the convocation of the Ottoman Delegation to the departure of that Delegation. (June 4–July 4, 1919.)

B. Treaties and Conventions with the Allies.

(a) General Treaties between Allies.

1. Aeronautic.
2. Arms.
3. Spirits.
4. Revision of the Acts of Berlin and Brussels.

(b) Special Treaties between Allies.

1. Poland.
2. Czecho-Slovakia.
3. Serb-Croat-Slovene State.
4. Roumania.
5. Greece.
6. Etc.

C. Treaties and Conventions with other States.

1. Spitzberg.
2. Revision of the Treaties of 1839.

Part VI. *Treaties — Entry into Force*

A. Preparations of the Entry into Force.

1. Committee on the Execution of the Clauses of the Treaty.
2. Rhineland Commission.
3. Commission on German Colonies and Mandates.
4. Scapa Flow Commission.
5. Prisoners of War Commission.
6. Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission.
7. Commission of the League of Nations.
8. Commission on the Organization of the Labour Conference.
9. Organization Commission on Mixed Tribunals.

B. Exchange of Notes relative to the Entry into Force.

1. Germany.
2. Austria.
3. Bulgaria.
4. Etc.

C. Ratification, Accession, and Entry into Force.

Part VII. *Miscellaneous Documents*

1. Delegation Memoranda.
2. Fiume and Smyrna Inquiry Commissions.
3. Etc.

Document 3

*Annex 'B'. Note for the Secretariat General*

*September 23, 1919.*

The Secretariat General of the Conference has asked the Drafting Committee to present its opinion relative to the distribution of the documents concerning the preparatory labours of the Peace Treaties.

The Committee has the honour to reply as follows:

## I

1. Each of the Allied and Associated Powers and each of the enemy Powers concerned should receive the minutes of the sessions of the Congress,<sup>21</sup> that is, the Versailles Sessions, relating to Germany; the Saint-Germain Sessions, relating to Austria; and the sessions at Paris and Neuilly, relating to Bulgaria.

2. Each of the Allied and Associated Powers should receive the Minutes of the *Plenary Sessions* of the Peace Conference, which is an Interallied Conference.

3. Each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should receive all the Minutes and Reports of the Commissions (including the Sub-Commissions, Committees, or Sub-Committees) and in general all the official works of the Conference.

4. Each of the other Allied and Associated Powers should receive the Minutes and Reports of the Commissions (including the Sub-Commissions, Committees, or Sub-Committees) in which they participated.

The opinion of the Committee is unanimous on these different questions.

## II

Relative to the questions as to whether or not the distribution above referred to should be extended, and, in particular, if the minutes of the Commissions should be distributed to Powers other than those having participated therein—whether these documents should be given publication instead of being delivered privately—the Drafting Committee, whose views on this point are not unanimous, esteems that this point is essentially a political matter and that any legislation pertaining thereto should be submitted to the Supreme Council.

For the Drafting Committee.

## APPENDIX I TO No. 69

BRITISH DELEGATION, PARIS.

January 12, 1920.

### *Memorandum*

The question has been raised by the President of the Naval Interallied Commission of Control for Germany as to American representation on that Commission.

He states that the United States officers designated by their Government as members of the Commission propose to present themselves to him, in his capacity as President.

His view is that he cannot recognize them as members of a Commission set up under a Treaty to which their Government is not a party; and he requests that the Supreme Council may decide as to whether the American representatives can form part of his Commission, either officially or unofficially. If they co-operate unofficially, it is thought that the Germans may have the right to refuse to pay any expenses on their behalf.

<sup>21</sup> It appears that the term Congress was here employed in the technical sense whereby a Peace Congress was distinguished from a Peace Conference in that the former, unlike the latter, included representatives of enemy powers.

I.C.P. 14.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the British, French and Italian Governments, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 13, 1920, at 3 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister.

*France*: M. Clemenceau.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti, General Cavallero, Colonel Castoldi.

SECRETARIAT: *British Empire*: Sir M. Hankey. *France*: M. Berthelot, M. de Martelle, A Stenographer. *Italy*: Signor Trombetti.

The following were also present:

*British Empire*: Mr. Leeper.

*France*: M. Berthelot.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I have had another discussion with the Jugoslavs. They are quite inclined to accept our proposals. The Slovenes would be very happy to arrive at a settlement, but it is they who hold all that little corner regarding which there is a question of making concessions. The Prince's secretary<sup>1</sup> told me that what they expect is that you should impose a solution. The Slovenes represent in all 700,000 persons, some of whom must be transferred to Italy. There is no doubt that the Croats and Serbs are ready to accept our proposals if we say clearly to them: this is our solution.

THE CHAIRMAN: Signor Nitti, do you accept the régime of Danzig?

SIGNOR NITTI: It is rather difficult, for the conditions are not the same in all the territories.

THE CHAIRMAN: I am making a concession; if you make none we cannot arrive at an agreement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Whereas Danzig is a commercial port, at Fiume all the trade of the port comes from the interior, and if the Serbs and Croats are not given satisfaction on this point we shall not arrive at a settlement, unless the régime of Danzig is applied to the port of Fiume. The interests of the town and port of Fiume are altogether distinct from each other.

SIGNOR NITTI: It will be necessary to study the régime which it is advisable to give to Fiume, while providing international guarantees.

THE CHAIRMAN: Guarantees without some one to apply them are nothing but a scrap of paper.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: If there are any works to be carried out in the port of Fiume, it is not the town of Fiume which will bear the expense, but the Hungarians and Serb-Croats.

THE CHAIRMAN: Do you agree that the town should be assigned to the Italians and the port to the hinterland?

SIGNOR NITTI: By whom will the port be governed?

THE CHAIRMAN: How is the Governor of Danzig appointed?

<sup>1</sup> The Prince Regent of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was then in Paris.

SIGNOR NITTI: I agree that the organisation of the port should be effected by the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: It is the League of Nations that appoints the Governor of Danzig.

THE CHAIRMAN: I agree that it should be the same in the case of Fiume.

SIGNOR NITTI: Then the Governor of the port will be appointed by the League of Nations and the organisation of the port will be approved by the League of Nations. We agree. What we desire is that no one's interests should be sacrificed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The League of Nations will organise the port and will have the railway under its control.

THE CHAIRMAN: We agree.

SIGNOR NITTI: Do not let us speak of Danzig, because of certain local difficulties.

THE CHAIRMAN: We will not speak of Danzig.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: And what about Lagosta?

THE CHAIRMAN: Signor Tittoni said he did not ask for Lagosta.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: And the 'corridor'?

SIGNOR NITTI: We are agreed as to the corridor to the north.

THE CHAIRMAN: I never go back on my word. If I gave it to Signor Nitti, I should be very pleased to do so, but I am giving it to d'Annunzio, and that is why I am not very pleased to do so.

SIGNOR NITTI: When you have granted us that, the matter will be settled.

THE CHAIRMAN: Naturally, when I have given him all that he asks he will claim nothing further. And Zara!

SIGNOR NITTI: We were agreed as to Zara. But there is still the question of Sebenico.

THE CHAIRMAN: I give Zara to the Italians as an Italian town, but seeing that you have a port like Pola, we cannot refuse Sebenico to the Slavs.

SIGNOR NITTI: That makes the situation very difficult.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is difficult for everybody. I assure you that I state the utmost limit of my concessions at once. I cannot take Sebenico from the Serbs, otherwise I should be their enemy. The Serbs said the other day that if they were attacked they could not defend themselves. For them it is a question of life or death. I undertake to bring urgent pressure to bear on the Serbs in order to finish with the matter. I have given you everything, I have nothing left to give.

SIGNOR NITTI: The northern frontier is of supreme importance to us.

THE CHAIRMAN: I agree that the Albanian population should be given the right of minorities.

M. BERTHELOT (Director of Political Affairs): An arrangement might be adopted similar to that which was decided upon in the case of the Ruthenes. A group of Ruthenes was enclosed in the Czechoslovak State. It was arranged that the Ruthenes should have certain rights and parliamentary representation. Those rights were defined in agreement with the Czechoslovaks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The Ruthenes in the Czechoslovak State have a

Diet and at the same time they send representatives to the Czechoslovak Parliament.

M. BERTHELOT: It would not be necessary to constitute a Diet; we should be guided by a broad conception of the right of minorities.

SIGNOR NITTI: It is to the interest both of the League of Nations and the Yugoslavs that the port should work under the best possible conditions. Who will look after Sushak?

THE CHAIRMAN: The League of Nations.

SIGNOR NITTI: It is important that the question of the railway should be settled.

THE CHAIRMAN: The League of Nations will settle it.

SIGNOR NITTI: I beg you to consider this question, if only in the interests of the Yugoslavs.

M. BERTHELOT: The following formula might be adopted: Fiume for the Italians; Sushak for the Yugoslavs and the port for the League of Nations.

THE CHAIRMAN: We might quite well adopt that formula.

SIGNOR NITTI: The important point is that the work of the port should be carried on. We want the Yugoslavs to give us a guarantee that they will respect those elements of the population who wish to remain Italian.

THE CHAIRMAN: They will only have to become naturalised.

(M. Veniseelos was here announced.)

The Chairman: The business before us is to solve the question of the Adriatic.

The Italians declare that if you will give them Athens, they will accept it with pleasure.

Will you please state your claims as regards Albania? We hope that we shall be able to come to an understanding at once. That is why we have summoned you in such haste.

M. VENISELOS: I think that we are not far from an understanding. I have lately had occasion to discuss this subject with Signor Tittoni. There have hitherto been no serious divergencies of opinion. A rectification was contemplated of the line formerly traced to the north.

What decided us on putting forward this claim was that if the line is maintained as traced, North-Eastern Greece will be separated from North-Western Greece by the whole of that great mountain chain.

Here is a map showing the line for which we asked and here is the rectification that we submitted, in agreement with a commission with which Signor Tittoni put me in touch.

I can let the Supreme Council have a map showing exactly the rectified line.

THE CHAIRMAN: Has Signor Nitti any remark to make on this point?

SIGNOR NITTI: It is a little complicated. It will be necessary to see how the frontier has been traced.

M. VENISELOS: As far as I am concerned, I accept this frontier, on which we agreed with Signor Tittoni.

THE CHAIRMAN: You came to an agreement with Signor Tittoni?

M. VENISELOS: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is Signor Nitti aware of this agreement?

SIGNOR NITTI: Yes, but it is necessary that certain conditions should be fulfilled.

M. VENISELOS: There is a general agreement as to everything that concerns us.

THE CHAIRMAN: Then we are agreed.

M. VENISELOS: If the Supreme Council has no further question to ask me I will withdraw.

(M. Veniselos then withdrew.)

SIGNOR NITTI: We have relations with the Jugoslavs and with the Greeks, and the general agreement of which M. Veniselos speaks is subsidiary to an agreement regarding Asia Minor.

THE CHAIRMAN: That does not concern us. We cannot agree that the question should be stated in that manner. What we are endeavouring to bring about at present is an agreement concerning the Adriatic.

SIGNOR NITTI: In this way we are decreasing the chances of discussion, Mr. Chairman, but it is for you to decide the procedure. At the present time we are giving without receiving anything.

THE CHAIRMAN: As usual! You should have said that when M. Veniselos was here.

SIGNOR NITTI: It is a question of procedure.

THE CHAIRMAN: We are at present settling the question of the Adriatic, and we shall settle the question of Asia Minor later on.

SIGNOR NITTI: I wish to make a slight reservation.

THE CHAIRMAN: The agreements which you may have entered into do not concern us. We are at the present moment settling the question of the Adriatic; we shall settle that of Asia Minor later on.

(Signor Nitti withdrew, leaving Signor Trombetti.)

(MM. Pasitch and Trumbitch were here introduced.)

The Chairman: Gentlemen, we have just had a long and comprehensive conversation with Signor Nitti. We have discussed all the points with him. Mr. Lloyd George and I are agreed as to the concessions to be made and we have insisted on the concessions to be obtained from Italy. As a result of that discussion, we have drafted a text which will be submitted to you; after having heard it, you will give us your opinion; but I must warn you that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain better terms. We have done everything that we could. In my opinion, you obtain the maximum amount of satisfaction. I have secured Sebenico (?) for you, Cherso and Lagosta are left to you. In fine, the note will be read to you.

(The note contained in the annex [Appendix A] was hereupon read aloud.)

That, gentlemen, is what we have agreed upon. I consider that we have made an effort in your favour, which, if I may say so, has been crowned with success. The real price of all this is Fiume and its annexation to Italian territory; if we had not made that concession, we should not have obtained the rest.

As far as I am concerned, I was struck with the argument you put forward, namely, that you must be given the right to defend yourselves. That seems to me obvious. That is why I would not give way with regard to Sebenico, where you can establish a military port if you so desire.

The great advantage of this arrangement is that we find a way out of a situation which was becoming insoluble for everybody. If we can tell Mr. Wilson that the Italians and Jugoslavs are agreed, I do not think that he can oppose his veto any longer; and that you will [*sic*] be a great success for all of us. You keep the islands; the Italians have not got Ciherso, they have no establishment which is really on your coast; Zara, as a free town, can in no way prejudice you; consequently, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State will exist in the plenitude of its power. And above all, you have Scutari, the Drin and Saint John of Medua. All this seems to me to represent considerable advantages.

I therefore urge with all my power on behalf of the British Government, on behalf of the French Government, I may say on behalf of Europe, that you cause our negotiations to be crowned with success and enable us to finish to-day.

M. TRUMBITCH: I have to express our gratitude to the Great Powers which have worked for and done their best to arrive at a compromise which would, in their opinion, cause us most satisfaction, and this sentiment of gratitude makes it all the more regrettable that it should be my duty to raise objections to the scheme which has been communicated to us. The entire situation, and more especially the geographical one, is well known to us, and we are well aware of the importance of the Adriatic questions for our entire State.

Furthermore, we are conscious that it is our duty to co-operate with the principal Allied and Associated Powers, in order to arrive at a positive result in the interests of general peace. This second consideration renders even more painful our manifest duty of raising objections with regard to this scheme.

The first question to be dealt with is that of Fiume and of the territory which could connect this city with Italy—the question of Italian sovereignty over Fiume.

There are two great groups on the Adriatic, two vast lungs containing 50,000,000 inhabitants; we have agreed to the cession of Trieste and its great slopes to Italy, which proves that we have taken the situation into account. This settlement was not an equitable one from the ethnographical point of view, but as other reasons militated in its favour, we duly considered them. As regards the gulf and town of Fiume, however, as regards this large port which is the terminus of a first-rate trade route—the only route of the entire hinterland, in fact—the settlement proposed is impossible . . . <sup>2</sup>

THE CHAIRMAN: We are giving you this port.

M. TRUMBITCH: So I understand, and I beg to express my thanks for your intention to allow us trading possibilities with Fiume. The establishment of foreign sovereignty at Fiume will, however, render our trade precarious,

<sup>2</sup> Punctuation as in original.

notwithstanding all guarantees, international or otherwise. We would be shut out of Fiume, if ever relations became strained between the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Italy. Seeing how close the Italian frontier is to the railway which links Fiume with Slovakia [?Slovenia], we should be done for if complications arose. We cannot yield on this point. Fiume is the only port available for our imports or exports, or through which we could obtain war material in case of necessity. We have no other access to the sea, no other port . . .<sup>2</sup>

THE CHAIRMAN: You will have this port in peace time. Your argument is that war might break out, but this might happen to any country and cannot be prevented; nobody can prevent it. You cannot ask us to make arrangements which would allow a war to break out later on; on the contrary, it seems to me that the necessity for co-operation will be yet another reason for preventing the outbreak of war.

M. BERTHELOT: And then you have the guarantee of the League of Nations.

M. TRUMBITCH: That is true, and this argument carries great weight. But the existence of the League of Nations does not exclude the possibility of a state of war between two States.

THE CHAIRMAN: Notwithstanding the existence of the League of Nations, London might perhaps declare war on Paris to-morrow. The future is not within my ken.

M. TRUMBITCH: Serbia used to be a State surrounded by neighbouring States on all sides. She did everything in her power, accepted any and every sacrifice in order to reach the sea, to have access to the sea. We have now become an important State, but would not have access to the sea, commercially speaking . . .<sup>2</sup>

THE CHAIRMAN: No, no; you will have Saint John of Medua.

M. TRUMBITCH: Time will be required to fit it up.

THE CHAIRMAN: Time is required for everything.

M. TRUMBITCH: Can we say with certainty that we would have been able to organise? If war should break out, should we be able without fail to have an outlet allowing of successful organisation?

THE CHAIRMAN: It is my opinion that every policy must take time into account. I should like, M. Trumbitch, to make a remark.

Call to mind the time when, in the interests of all, Serbia accepted all Austria's terrible conditions. Serbia could not well have made a greater sacrifice than the one which she consented to make—and yet this did not prevent the outbreak of war. You then behaved admirably, as did France, England and the United States, in a war such as humanity had never seen before. And now Serbia occupies the entire eastern coast of the Adriatic. She will occupy Fiume in peace time. She will be mistress of this port during peace time. That cannot be disputed. Furthermore, Fiume is chiefly an outlet for Hungary and Transylvania, rather than for Serbia.

M. TRUMBITCH: Not for Serbia.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, Serbia is being given all the islands near the coast and the entire coast, with Spalato and Sebenico, without being forbidden to have a war fleet. . .<sup>2</sup> And you say that time will be required for this. I

should think so! But will not we Frenchmen, who have had ten departments devastated, require time and millions (which we have not got) to make good our losses?

I went to London. I went hat in hand to beg of Mr. Lloyd George, so as to get a loan from England. Would you not call that a sacrifice? And we will have to make many more sacrifices.

Therefore, if Serbia wants everything at once, we cannot give it to her.

Nobody opposed the idea of giving Fiume to Italy more than I did, and yet now I have made an effort in that direction. And why? So that you should have all the rest. You *must* decide now, or not decide; you must say yes or no. If you say 'No', the Treaty of London will have to settle matters. And what a pickle we shall be in. Italy will remain in a state of revolution. This will suit neither you nor us. You will get nothing in Dalmatia, and it will be absolutely impossible for us to conclude peace.

In view of these circumstances, I think that every effort should be made on both sides. I have, moreover, set an example, and have made various concessions to the Allies. They have fought valiantly in our cause, and that is why I thought that concessions should be made to them. I was blamed for this in the French Chamber of Deputies, but this did not alter my opinion that I had acted for the best.

I beg you, therefore, to make an effort. In political life, there always comes a time when one must have the courage to say yes or no; it is the attribute of statesmen to know when to be resolute. One cannot be a statesman without accepting responsibility.

Some of your countrymen will, I presume, tell you (as I have been told) that you did not put up any resistance, and will blame you. It is always easy to formulate reproaches concerning work in which one did not share, and to blame those who carried it out. But do not forget that the fate of Serbia is closely linked with that of the *Entente*, with that of England, with that of France—who are asking you to consent to what is said in this note.

And it is no small thing to see England, who has made enormous sacrifices, to see ravaged France turn towards Serbia and say: 'You know that we have opposed Italy for more than a year. French soldiers have been killed by Italians in Fiume; could there be anything sadder than that? There were English warships in the port of Fiume, and they left; there were American warships, and they left. France was the last to go, but she left in the end. Do you call that a pleasant state of things?'

But there was one predominating object—that of the great peace which we shall bring into being, and thanks to which Serbia will begin to take an important place in the world.

As you say, time will be required, but no country can develop without the aid of time. It is necessary, therefore, that you should accept the situation. If you do not accept it, I will be unable to negotiate; we shall have to fall back on the Treaty of London, and peace will never be attained.

At the beginning of the war your nation gave such a grand example of sacrifice as made me doubt the evidence of my senses. You were noble and

generous; you showed yourselves to be imbued with concern for Europe as a whole. England and France intervened gladly on your behalf; they wish to be and to remain your friends, they desire that Serbia should develop and grow materially, territorially, and morally. You cannot say to them: 'What you have done has been in vain. We are now strangers.' I beg you not to do that.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I quite agree with what our chairman has said.

M. TRUMBITCH: Mr. Chairman, your words move me deeply. What you have said has gone straight to our hearts, and death would, I think, be less painful to me than the fact that I must refrain from telling you, with grateful thanks, that I accept the proposed settlement. Yet I cannot accept it. I beg that you will not, even indirectly and involuntarily, accuse us of not being willing to make a sacrifice in the general interest. We have already given proof of our goodwill by consenting to have territory containing 400,000 inhabitants lopped off. . . .<sup>2</sup>

THE CHAIRMAN: I know that.

M. TRUMBITCH: We continue to be willing to make all necessary sacrifices, but Fiume represents a political error. How can it profit Italy to take away an outlet which does not belong to her, to take Lissa? In Lissa there is not one Italian to a thousand inhabitants, who live by fishing and by selling their agricultural produce to us at Spalato. What sense is there in demilitarising the islands?

If the reason is to arrive at a settlement of a temporary situation in Italy or in our country, I do not consider it a good one.

What is really necessary is to create enduring relations between Italy and ourselves. Would our responsibility not be tremendous towards our nation and the whole world if, in twenty years' time, a dispute were to arise by reason of the situation now created?

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

M. TRUMBITCH: That is why the line we now propose is not an academic idea. It represents the sum of our convictions on the map.

THE CHAIRMAN: I understand. But M. Berthelot, who is very well read, quoted a saying of Montesquieu to us the other day, which I should like to recall to you: 'In politics,' Montesquieu says, 'one has never to choose between a good and a bad course; one chooses between the balance of disadvantages.' Now, there are disadvantages in the good course and also in the bad; it is between the balance of disadvantages that it is necessary to choose.

As far as I am concerned, I am not discussing Italy with you, except as regards one point, which I am entitled to mention to you, because I said so to Signor Nitti. I consider that the strategical position of Fiume is the worst that can be conceived. The town is surrounded on all sides by the Jugoslavs, and is only linked to Italy by a narrow strip of land which could be cut off by two or three shells. Consequently, I do not think the position dangerous for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State; on the contrary, I consider it bad for Italy.

But Italy is yielding to a question of sentiment. What can one do? I.

cannot forget certain facts. I have had many quarrels with Italy, but I cannot forget that her soldiers fought and died on our battlefields with their British, American and French comrades.

What is one to do? History is not being born to-day; and she will still continue at a time when we shall no longer know her workings. The present peace is a pause; who can say whether, when intercourse is re-established between Serbia and Italy, relations and opinions will not evolve in one direction or another? We can know nothing. Who can say whether different situations will not result in the various territories? We may even be certain that that will happen, because that is fate.

I can talk to you as I do because of my great age; it is the only advantage I can claim over you; but the mistake when one makes arrangements, whatever they may be, is to believe that time is going to stand still, that nothing will ever change again. But everything changes, my dear friend, the world changes, men change as well as countries; trade which used to take one direction turns in another; new relations are established. Do you think it possible to judge the state of the Europe of to-morrow by the state of that same Europe five or six years ago? It is quite a different world.

You are right; I agree with all that you have said, and I have told the Italians so; but when I ask you to make certain concessions, do not imagine that life is going to stand still, and that the arrangements we are making will remain unchanged. No. The just share assigned to you only represents a small share of wider justice. The Italians have the Dodecanese; they were glad to take those islands from the Greeks at the time of the war with Turkey;<sup>3</sup> they are going to restore them.

For all these reasons, consider the total sum of justice and legitimate satisfaction which you will have gained for your compatriots. Of course they will not be entirely satisfied; one never is. France and England are not satisfied; no one is anywhere. But you who are deciding the destiny of nations at this moment, if you are convinced that you are obtaining real material and moral satisfaction for your country, which will increase its self-respect, give it fresh strength for action, and prepare it for the economic struggles of the future, you may be sure that you will have done great things in the interests of your country by accepting the agreement we are proposing.

You will meet with men who will blame you, as we have been blamed; there is no doubt of that. But long after you are dead, justice will be done to your memory and perhaps statues will be raised to you by the children of those by whom you have been insulted. In any case, even if no statues are raised to your memory, you will have the satisfaction of having fulfilled your duty to your country; for my part, I know no greater satisfaction.

M. TRUMBITCH: I am extremely sorry not to be able to give you a satisfactory reply; in any case, M. Pasitch and I cannot assume the responsibility of giving you a definitely negative reply. Please allow us to consult our colleagues.

<sup>3</sup> Italy occupied the islands of the Dodecanese during the Turco-Italian War of 1911-12, and maintained her occupation of them.

I would ask you, at the same time, Mr. Chairman, kindly to let us have a copy of the note which was read to us, also of the map mentioned in the note.

THE CHAIRMAN: That document only states the case approximately.

M. TRUMBITCH: I understand; it gives the general outlines.

(*The meeting adjourned at 5.20 p.m.*)

## APPENDIX A TO NO. 70

### *The Adriatic Question*

The *corpus separatum* of Fiume to be under Italian sovereignty. The town of Sushak to go to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. The whole port to be handed over with all facilities for its development, as well as for that of the railways terminating there, to the League of Nations, which will make such arrangements as it may see fit in the interests of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Hungary and Transylvania, as well as of the town itself.

2. The free State to disappear and the boundary between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to be drawn (a) so as to provide a connection by road along the coast within Italian territory, but to leave the whole of the railway from Fiume northwards through Adelsberg within the Serb-Croat-Slovene State; where the railway from Fiume passes along the coast the boundary is drawn between the road and the railway; (b) so as to provide for the protection of Trieste involving a readjustment of the Wilson line in the region of Senossecchia; (c) otherwise the frontier to be drawn as marked by the blue line on the map attached<sup>4</sup> so as to leave purely Jugoslav districts in the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

3. Zara, within the limits of the municipality, to be an independent State under the guarantee of the League of Nations, with the right to choose its own diplomatic representation.

4. Italy to retain Valona, as provided for in the Treaty of London and in addition, to have a mandate over Albania. The boundaries of Northern Albania to be readjusted as shown on the map attached.<sup>4</sup> The Albanian districts which will thus come to be administered by the Serb-Croat-Slovene State will enjoy a special régime as an autonomous province similar to that provided under the Treaty of Peace with Austria for the autonomous Ruthenian province of Czechoslovakia. The southern boundary of Albania to be the line proposed by the French and British delegates on the Greek Affairs Commission, leaving Argyrocastro and Koritza to Greece.

5. The following islands to be assigned to Italy: Lussin, Pelagosa and Lissa: the remainder of the islands to be under the sovereignty of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

6. All the islands of the Adriatic to be demilitarised.

7. Special provisions will be made permitting Italians in Dalmatia to opt for Italian nationality without leaving the territory.

8. Existing economic enterprises in Dalmatia to have their security safeguarded by an international convention.

PARIS, *January 13, 1920.*

<sup>4</sup> Not annexed to the filed original.

I.C.P. 15.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the British, French, and Italian Governments, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, January 14, 1920, at 11 a.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Leeper, Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Wise.  
*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. Dutasta, M. Massigli, A Stenographer.  
*Italy*: Signor Nitti, General Cavallero, Colonel Castoldi; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.  
 INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU asked if the Serbs had yet given a reply.

*The Adriatic* M. BERTHELOT said that they had undertaken to send a reply before midday, but that they had been asked to come themselves to the council and give their reply verbally.

SIGNOR NITTI, referring to the document which had been handed to M. Trumbitch and M. Pasitch on the previous afternoon, suggested that the words at the beginning of paragraph 5, which are as follows:

'The following islands to be assigned to Italy,'  
 should be altered to the following:—

'The following island *groups* to be assigned to Italy.'

He pointed out that the council had agreed to accept the islands attributed to Italy by President Wilson, and the intention had been to include the small islets round the principal islands mentioned. For example, the Island of Unie should be included with Lissa.<sup>1</sup>

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was informed by his experts that this interpretation was correct.

M. CLEMENCEAU accepted the alteration.

It was therefore agreed—

That paragraph 5 of the document headed 'The Adriatic Question', handed to M. Trumbitch on the previous day, should begin as follows:  
 'The following island groups to be assigned to Italy:—'

Later in the meeting the question was raised as to whether this decision should be immediately communicated to M. Trumbitch, but M. Clemenceau suggested that it would be better to tell M. Trumbitch and M. Pasitch verbally when they attended at the Quai d'Orsay on the same afternoon.

2. It was agreed—

*Hungary* That the Hungarian delegates should be received on the afternoon of the following day at 4 p.m. and presented with the draft of the Hungarian treaty.

<sup>1</sup> Apparently in error for Lussin.

3. (At this point the following were introduced: Mr. Wise and Mr. Philip Kerr for Great Britain; M. Kammerer for France; and M. Berkenheim and M. Krovopouskov representing the co-operative movement of Russia.)

*Commercial Policy  
in Russia*

M. CLEMENCEAU informed M. Berkenheim and his colleague that the council had been considering a memorandum by Mr. Lloyd George, in which suggestions were made as to what could be done for the re-establishment of commerce with Russia.<sup>2</sup> He would be glad if M. Berkenheim would indicate his views in a general way.

<sup>2</sup> It appears probable that this document was, or was based upon, the following memorandum of January 6, 1920, by Mr. Wise (cf. No. 76, note 5), a British member of the Supreme Economic Council, on 'Economic Aspects of British Policy concerning Russia', which had been circulated to the Cabinet by Lord Curzon on January 7:

'1. The policy of the Allies in relation to Russia has to be considered from two points of view:—(1) Political and Military. (2) Economic. Up to the present, political and military considerations have mainly determined Allied policy.

'The purpose of this memorandum is to examine the economic aspects of the matter.

*'Russian pre-War Exports.*

'2. Before the war the vast resources of the Russian Empire, crudely developed though they were, were a factor of enormous importance in the economic stability and organisation of the world.

'In 1912, for example, Russian exports included the following foodstuffs and raw materials:

	Tons.
Grain and flour . . . . .	8,898,000
Oilseeds . . . . .	206,000
Oilcake . . . . .	690,000
Butter . . . . .	72,000
Sugar . . . . .	371,000
Flax . . . . .	311,000
Hemp . . . . .	52,000
Timber. . . . .	5,500,000
Leather and hides . . . . .	51,000
Petroleum . . . . .	827,000

'The bulk of this trade was with Europe. Exports to other countries were negligible, with the exception of goods sent to China and Persia. They were as follows:

Germany . . . . .	30 per cent. of the total.
The United Kingdom . . . . .	21 " " "
France and Italy . . . . .	10 " " "
Scandinavia, Holland, and Belgium . . . . .	17 " " "
Austria . . . . .	5 " " "

'3. The transfer of Russian-Poland would not materially affect the above figures, since Polish exports were principally manufactured goods, eggs, and poultry. But, on the other hand, Poland imported large quantities of grain, flour, &c., from the rest of Russia which do not appear in the above totals.

'4. The Russian contribution in wheat to the total world export was 4,000,000 tons, or approximately one-fourth of the whole. The United Kingdom was the purchaser of a considerable proportion of this huge quantity.

'Four-fifths of the flax grown in the world was harvested in Russia; some of it of course in the new Baltic States. The linen industries of Belfast and Dundee depended on Russian

M. BERKENHEIM said that the situation was in some respects very difficult. It must be understood that the co-operative society had no politics. They

supplies for three-quarters of their total raw materials. They are at present only about one-half employed and stocks are running out. They may in present circumstances receive 15,000 tons this year, but their total needs are at least 80,000 tons per annum.

'About one-third of our total supply of imported butter came directly or indirectly from Russian sources, and there is no hope of supplying an adequate ration until these sources are again open to us.

'5. On the other hand, the United Kingdom alone exported to Russia 27 millions sterling worth of manufactured and other goods, including re-exports, whose worth at present values would probably be nearly 75 millions sterling. The demand of the Russian market for goods as soon as trade is possible will undoubtedly be on a colossal scale, and will only be limited by the power of Russia to organise exports for payment.

#### *'Present Russian Production.*

'6. Information as to present Russian supplies of food, raw materials, &c., is necessarily scanty.

'The grain harvest is reported to be of almost record size, and in addition considerable surpluses of grain from previous harvests have been stored up by the peasants. From the area previously occupied by Denikin alone, the estimates of the surplus available for export range from 1 million to 4 million tons. Such reports as are available of the area previously occupied by Koltchak are almost as favourable.

'It is true that in Petrograd, in Moscow, and in several other towns there is famine. This is due mainly to transport difficulties and to the inability of the towns, owing to the Blockade, to pay in goods for agricultural produce. In any case, Petrograd and North Russia, on account of the difficulties of railway communications, have always been fed mainly by imports from the Baltic, and even if Russian transport were working at full efficiency, it would still be impossible to transport the bulk of the South Russia grain to the north. Even allowing on a generous scale for supplies to be imported by any means into the famine-stricken areas, there is no doubt that Russia has a vast exportable surplus of grain which might be utilised by the Allied countries, by Central Europe, and by other famine-stricken countries such as Armenia.

'It is stated on good authority that considerable quantities of flax and timber have been stored. Some little butter of fairly good quality has come through from Siberia, and more would be at once produced were it not for the present practical impossibility of export.

#### *'Effects of Withdrawal of Russian Supplies.*

'7. The continuance of Civil War in Russia and the Blockade have cut off these vast supplies from the rest of the world and are one of the main causes of high world prices. Europe has been forced to get her breadstuffs and her fats from America at American prices or to starve. American grain prices are at this moment higher than they have ever been and are still rising. The news of substantial exports from Russia would not only bring prices down but might also have the other desirable effect of making the American Government anxious as to a market for some of its surplus and, consequently, much more prepared to supply Europe even on credit.

'8. The present dependence of Europe for foodstuffs on America is of course the main cause of the fall in the American exchange which, by itself, inflicts a tax of 20 per cent. or more on everything purchased from across the Atlantic. U.S.A. wheat exports alone to Europe have increased as compared with pre-war from 2½ million tons to 7½ million tons per annum, at an approximate cost at present prices of 25 million sterling per million tons of wheat. The effect on exchange of replacing even 1,000,000 tons of wheat by a corresponding quantity from Russia would be enormous. The need of transporting from overseas the foodstuffs previously imported into Central Europe overland, has materially added to the present almost intolerable strain on tonnage resources. Broadly, the opening of Russia to

only had commercial interests and were, as it were, an economic Red Cross Society for Russia. Before the revolution they had an organisation whose

trade would go further than any other factor to reduce the cost of living, to put right the American exchange, to reduce freights, and to ease the general shipping situation.

'9. The economic effect on Central European countries of the continuance of war with Russia is equally disastrous. Poland would naturally receive a considerable proportion of her foodstuffs from the rest of Russia and would find a market for her own produce there. Instead of this, she is forced to buy her imported foodstuffs with an enormous loss on exchange, in American and other markets. Her resources are wasted in maintaining a large standing Army on the Frontier, and in the purchase of munitions, &c. Her industries are either engaged in the production of war material or are still idle, and the energies of her people, instead of being directed to the colossal task of creating a self-supporting and economically independent State, are frittered away in warlike adventures and in the resulting political and industrial unrest. The position in the other Baltic States is much the same.

'The German and Austrian food difficulties look as if they may be insoluble without Russian supplies between now and the harvest. Approximately 1,000,000 tons of imports from overseas will apparently be needed between now and September to supply the minimum needs of Central Europe, or serious danger to the peace of Europe will be caused. So far as can be seen neither the necessary ships nor supplies will be available save at the risk of shortage and much higher prices in Allied countries. If appreciable quantities of grain were available from Russia the whole situation would be transformed.

*'Future Policy.*

'10. The following lines of policy appear to be possible:

- (i) The present policy might be continued of the blockade of Bolshevik Russia, of moral but not material support to the anti-Bolshevik Armies, and of no recognition of the Soviet Government.

'Within the last few weeks the Bolsheviks have captured or are in process of capturing tremendous stocks of grain, the Donetz coal basin, the estuary of the Volga, which will give direct access to the Caspian oil supplies, and probably a considerable proportion of both Denikin's and Koltchak's rolling stock. They may also capture Rostov with the only important railway repair workshop on which Denikin and his army can rely. Internal transport, except for the Blockade, [?] is the main difficulty of the Bolshevik Government. With coal, oil and increased rolling stock and repair facilities, they may be in the position within a short time to effect such improvements in transport as to transform their whole internal situation.

'If, in addition, the Bolsheviks are able, as seems possible, to make peace with Esthonia and the other Baltic States, the Blockade would become impossible. Even if it were decided to blockade all the countries adjacent to the Baltic, which could only be done by declaring war on them, nothing could prevent the passage of goods into Bolshevik Russia overland from Germany and probably from elsewhere.

'The Blockade, in any case, is a clumsy weapon. For months its use against Russia has been open to the gravest objections. In the absence of a definite declaration of war, it is contrary to International Law and has considerably embarrassed Allied relations with the American and other neutral Governments. The attempt to induce the German Government to participate in it has not been successful. Nor should the fact be overlooked that the public opinion of the industrial classes in this country regards with increasing misgiving and hostility the responsibility this country bears and the odium it is creating for itself in starving not merely the Bolsheviks' families but the women and children of non-Bolsheviks also.

- (ii) The second alternative is the full political recognition of the Soviet Government.

'This would raise political difficulties, which are outside the scope of this memorandum,

headquarters were at Moscow. After the Bolshevik Revolution the direction had been divided up. One part of the directorate had been retained at Moscow to look after the population of that city. Another part had been established at Rostov, for the southern part of Russia and the region of the Don. He himself was in Paris for the purpose of developing export and import trade. For this there were possibilities of an enormous development.

both with the Allies and with the non-Bolshevik Russian Governments. It is possible in any case that the same economic results might be obtained by the suggestion below.

- (iii) The third alternative is, whilst avoiding formal diplomatic recognition of the Bolshevik Government, definitely to abandon the Blockade and to place no obstacles at all in the way of the restoration of commercial relations with the whole of Russia. Steps would of course be taken to prevent Bolshevik propaganda outside Russia and the import of arms and munitions into Russia.

‘The effect of this would be that some goods would at once start to move into and out of Russia. Relief supplies of foodstuffs would go into Petrograd and some stocks of flax, timber, platinum or other materials would come out in payment.

‘If, as seems likely, the Bolsheviks capture Odessa, it is practically certain that trading relations, by means of which South Russian grain might be exported, would recommence. There is considerable evidence that the Agricultural Co-operative Organisations in Bolshevik Russia have been able to maintain themselves and that they could temporarily provide the necessary machinery for restarting, if only on the basis of barter, the exchange of agricultural produce for clothing and other manufactured goods. Their agencies are established in London, and have been making preparations with this end in view with British trading and co-operative interests for a considerable time.

‘It is certain that, with the stoppage of hostilities, trading between Poland, Esthonia and the other border States on the one hand, and Bolshevik Russia on the other hand, would rapidly restart. Not only would this help to save the States immediately concerned from economic disaster, but it would have immediate reactions on the whole European economic position.

‘Further, it would render possible access for trading purposes to Siberia, which has suffered much less from revolutionary mis-government.

‘From a purely British trading point of view there can be no doubt that the longer reopening of trade with Russia is delayed, the more formidable will be German and American competition. At the moment Germany has not got the manufacturing resources to compete effectively, and America has not acquired the necessary knowledge of the export trade and the needs of the Russian markets. Our relative advantage in both respects tends to grow less each month.

‘The mere removal of the Blockade would of course not be followed for some time by the complete economic recovery of Russia. Critics of the Blockade, both in Russia and outside it, have ascribed to it misfortunes that are really due to more fundamental economic causes. As happened with regard to Austria and Germany, the Blockade merely accentuates the fundamental injuries to normal economic well-being, which war with its diversion of labour and capital from productive to non-productive purposes inevitably entails. But until the Blockade is removed the process of recovery cannot properly start.

‘The Soviet Government has shown itself by no means lacking in initiative or organising capacity in levying war under conditions of extraordinary difficulty. It is possible that when it turns its resources and attention to the task of economic reconstruction it may show unexpected aptitude and power. The removal of the Blockade is of such vital importance to it that it would probably be prepared to agree to it on any reasonable economic or other conditions that we are likely to impose, and to reopen trading and exchange as rapidly as possible.

E. F. WISE.’

Practically the whole population of Russia was connected with the co-operative movement. There were actually 25 million members, but if it was remembered that most members were fathers of families it would be seen that practically the whole population of Russia was included. Their situation in Central Russia was very difficult. The organisation was in no sense political, and had relations with all the parties engaged in the Russian civil war. In spite of this, however, it was impossible to discuss the economic question without discussing the political question. When he arrived from Moscow, representatives of the British Government had asked him for his views, as a practical man, as to the situation in Russia. He had replied that, in his opinion, the only means of re-establishing the situation in Russia was to start commerce going again, and to get the population to work. In their view, the only solution of the struggle against Bolsheviks was to supply the people with what they required, and to establish commercial relations with the Russian population. Both in Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik Russia there practically existed only one organisation that could do this, namely, the co-operative organisation. Wherever the Bolsheviks were in occupation, the economic system of Russia was practically dead. Unhappily for his country, the mechanism of private trade had been practically annihilated. There were no serious business houses, and apart from the co-operative movement there were only a few speculators, who involved themselves in huge speculations to the great disadvantage of the population. The only result of uncontrolled speculation had been the defeat of the anti-Bolsheviks, both in Siberia and in South Russia. Nevertheless, Russia must not be regarded as a destitute or a mendicant country. Last year there was in Russia an enormous quantity of raw materials. Practically all the peasants had been saving their produce, with the result that there were enormous quantities both of corn and of cattle. Cattle, indeed, existed in greater quantities than ever before.

If he could be permitted to speak not only of Russia but of the economic situation in the whole of Europe, the importance of the question of re-establishing commercial relations not only to Russia but to every part of Europe would at once be understood. Russia had sufficient supplies of food and raw material for the whole of Europe. He would now give some precise data of the position. As regards the possibilities of an exchange of merchandise between Russia and Europe, the best plan was to utilise the co-operative organisation. The difficulty was to go further and give details. One practical question, however, which he would undoubtedly be asked was whether the Bolsheviks would allow the Allies to send goods to Russia.

(During the interpreting of this passage, Mr. Lloyd George interpolated that another question was as to whether they would allow Russian goods to come out; to which M. Krovopouskov replied that no absolute answer could be given.)

Continuing, M. Berkenheim said that he thought the Bolshevik Government would be obliged to permit it. A country could be kept deprived of essential things for a very long time, but only in time of war. As soon as events reached a more or less normal condition, any Government which wished to

stay in power could not maintain such a position and would be bound to permit an exchange of goods.

(During the interpretation of this passage Mr. Lloyd George interpolated that the Allies would not exchange goods for worthless Bolshevik paper money, but only for hides, wheat, fats, &c.)

Continuing, M. Berkenheim said that this was the view not only of himself personally but of the whole co-operative system, which wanted to rescue his unfortunate country. They were convinced that this could only be done by economic means.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether M. Berkenheim thought that this was the most effective way of striking a blow at Bolshevism.

M. BERKENHEIM said he was absolutely sure of this. The power of the Bolsheviks was in the hands of only a very small proportion of the population. Such a condition was only possible in time of war, when the whole power fell into the hands of a few. The present situation was a paradox, and he was quite convinced that it was only hunger which made Bolshevism possible, although Bolshevism was, on the whole, popular in most of the country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked how much wheat there was in Russia for export.

M. BERKENHEIM said that he had precise data only for South Russia. Last year the crop had been a record one. In the south the surplus for export amounted to 600,000,000 poods, equal to 10,000,000 tons. It must be understood, however, that the exportation of this was not an easy matter. The grain existed in enormous quantities, but there had been a complete collapse of the transport, particularly on the railways, and the peasants would not part with the grain for paper money. It was necessary to send goods in order to establish some system of exchange. As regards the next few months he thought that all that was possible was to get out a million tons, or possibly two million tons. He thought that means to transport that quantity, and for an exchange of goods, might be arranged.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he quite well understood Russia's need of imports, and that she had ample supplies for export. He also realised that the Allies had goods which they wished to send in exchange. But to organise this seemed to involve some political relations. Every Government had a certain power over these matters. How, he asked, could this organisation be started? The Government must intervene somehow or another. What would he advise the Allied Governments to do?

M. BERKENHEIM said that he feared he had not made himself quite clear. There was no question of asking for the intervention of the Government. All that was necessary was to give the co-operative society permission to work the business in their own way. He could not, of course, answer for the Bolshevik Government. He thought, however, that sheer necessity would force them to permit it, though they might possibly forbid. Practically he thought that if the Allied Powers would indicate their willingness to permit them to go ahead, something might be done; and in the condition of their country it was the duty of the co-operative society to do its best. However, he could give no guarantee as to success.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if the same observation applied to the flax harvest in the north, as to the wheat harvest in the south. Could the co-operative society get the flax out, and, if so, in what quantity?

M. BERKENHEIM said that he had left Russia for a year and did not know the exact present position as regards flax. When he left Russia, however, there had been in the hands of the co-operative organisation some 6,000,000 poods, equal to 100,000 tons, in the depots of the co-operative societies. In addition, last year's crop ought to amount to another 10,000,000 poods, say a total of 15,000,000 poods, equal to 250,000 tons. He had read in a Russian paper that there was some question of using a quantity of flax as a substitute for cotton, and perhaps part of the crop in the north had been disposed of in Russia itself. The Russian factories, however, could not do very much, owing to their shortage of coal and other difficulties. In any case it might be assumed that there would now be disposable for export not less than 10,000,000 poods, equivalent to 150,000 tons.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he observed that co-operative societies had an organisation at Reval, which was in Esthonia. As Esthonia had declared an armistice, could they not use the Esthonian organisation in connection with the export of flax?

M. BERKENHEIM said that he thought this was practically impossible. Reval might be used as an intermediary, for a small part of the export. Part of the exchange, however, must be done not openly, but by underhand means, and one agency could not effect very much. It was necessary to organise every agency in order to get any considerable amount.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the Bolsheviks might allow trade with the Esthonians, who were not now at war with them, particularly if the Esthonians said they would furnish boots and clothes in exchange. This was one alternative, if entry could not be obtained to Russia by other means.

M. BERKENHEIM said perhaps this agency might be employed, but the quantity that could be passed through it would not be very great. For example, the corn was available only in the south of Russia, but the communications were in such a terrible state that there was no possibility of getting any considerable quantity of grain to Reval. The question of the railways was so serious that it was only possible to bring the grain to the nearest ports for export. Reval was a small port, without any great possibilities. Libau and Riga were much more important to the trade of Russia. He did not think that Reval could do much as an intermediary, though some use of it might be made as a neutral port.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked as to the possibilities of motor transport.

M. BERKENHEIM said that motor transport was of great importance in some parts of Russia. In many cases it was the only possible transport; for example, for some of the smaller ports on the Sea of Azov, such as Mariupol. Enormous quantities of corn were accumulated in these districts and could be exported. Motor transport was also useful for carrying the materials to the railways.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked if river transport was much employed.

I.C.P. 16.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the British, French, and Italian Governments, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, on Wednesday, January 14, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Leeper.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. Dutasta, M. Massigli, M. Arnavon.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARIES: General Cavallero, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Trombetti.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

1. A letter was read from the Hungarian delegation asking for several days in which to verify the credentials of the plenipotentiaries of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (Appendix 1).<sup>1</sup>

*The Hungarian  
Peace Terms*

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what reply it was proposed to make.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought a very stern reply should be sent. They should be told that they must either receive the peace terms on the following day or return home.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU instructed M. Berthelot to prepare a reply on these lines. (At the end of the meeting the reply in Appendix 2<sup>2</sup> was approved.)

2. The council had before them a reply by the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation to the proposed settlement handed to M. Trumbitch and M. Pasitch on the previous day (Appendix 3).

*The Adriatic. Reply  
of the Serb-Croat-  
Slovene Delegation*

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what should be done.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Serbs accepted nothing. The difficulty was that if the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation had agreed, there would probably have been no difficulty with the United States of America. His view was that it would be necessary to force the proposed solution on the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this could not be done. It was true the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation refused everything. What, then, could be done? Should we inform them that the alternative was the Treaty of London? Supposing this solution were adopted, what, he asked Signor Nitti, would Italy do with Fiume?

SIGNOR NITTI said that frankly it would be a position of great embarrassment, but if the council were reduced to falling back on the Treaty of London, Italy would evacuate Fiume. At present Italy not only occupied *de facto* Fiume itself, but she also occupied the whole territory attributed to her by the Treaty of London, including Zara.

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M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the council would authorise him to say to the Serbs that the council were ready to fall back on the proposals of Signor Tittoni;<sup>3</sup> that is to say, that Fiume should be a free town. If the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation would not accept this, they would be told that there was nothing for it but the Treaty of London.

SIGNOR NITTI said that if this was necessary he would accept. It should be a free town, with a corridor connecting it with Italian territory.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if Fiume was accepted as a free town with a corridor, she should also have the same right as Zara to choose her diplomatic representation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if that was declined, then the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation should be informed that the only alternative was the Treaty of London. It was impossible to continue this discussion for ever.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the discussion must be finished at once.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Italy would then have to evacuate Fiume.

SIGNOR NITTI said that this would be a great difficulty, but he would agree to do so. The boundary must be corrected in Italy's favour as regards Senossecchia, and Fiume would be a free town without a free State behind it.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Veniselos had that morning sent him the text of the frontier of Southern Albania, which he had agreed with Signor Tittoni.

(At this point Signor Nitti and Signor Trombetti withdrew, and M. Trumbitch and M. Pasitch were introduced.)

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the council had received and examined a communication that the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation had made in reply to their proposals. The council could not undertake to recommence the discussion. The Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation had refused everything. He deplored this action, which threatened to create a situation in Europe of which the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would be the first victim. Mr. Lloyd George and he had not been disposed to make any undue concessions to Italy. If concessions had been made, it was because somehow a solution had to be reached, since the discussions could not be prolonged indefinitely. As it was, Mr. Lloyd George had been greatly inconvenienced, and he was grateful to him for giving so much time to the settlement of this question. If, however, the conference was ever to come to an end, this discussion must be concluded. He must say, on his conscience, that he had observed two currents of influence in the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation, one of which was Serb and the other Croat, the latter being the most uncompromising. The council were obliged to take into account that whereas Serbia from the first day of the war had been fighting with the Allies and had made enormous sacrifices, the same was not true of the Croats, much of whose blood had been shed in fighting against the Allies. It was a painful fact, but it was one that could not be left out of account. When these questions had been discussed before, the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation had shown an inclination to help.

<sup>3</sup> For the earlier negotiations relative to the question of the Adriatic see Vol. IV of this series.

M. BERKENHEIM said that the Dneiper was useful, but the Don was a smaller river and not of so much value. It was essential, however, that something should be done with the railway system. He had had pourparlers with firms here for buying wagons and locomotives for the co-operative associations. Denikin had given permission for this.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what was the state of the roads.

M. BERKENHEIM said that, on the whole, they were very good.

M. KROVOPOUSKOV said that in some districts the roads were particularly good, but it was essential for the railways to be improved. It was also essential that wagons should be provided to bring the stuff from the villages to the railways and for the ports.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that to reach a conclusion, supposing it was agreed that M. Berkenheim's scheme was a good one, what was necessary to put it in practice?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the scheme was very attractive, if feasible. He proposed that an Allied Committee should be set up to work out the details and to report to the council as soon as possible. There should be a representative of France, Italy and Great Britain, to discuss the whole matter and go into the details of finance, &c.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked if this proposal would appeal to M. Berkenheim.

M. BERKENHEIM replied in the affirmative. The first thing the co-operative associations required was an invitation to go on with the business.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that there should first be a discussion on the subject between M. Clemenceau, Signor Nitti and himself alone.

(At this point all withdrew, except the following: -

For Great Britain: Mr. Lloyd George and Sir M. Hankey.

For France: M. Clemenceau, M. Berthelot, M. Dutasta, M. Massigli.

For Italy: Signor Nitti, Signor Trombetti.

With Professor Mantoux, *interpreter*.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought this scheme was worth taking up. Prices were going up in France, Italy and Great Britain, and this very fact tended to create Bolshevism. He saw no prospect of prices coming down. On the contrary, they seemed likely to rise. The moment the Germans started work and came into the market, prices would go higher still. Mr. Wise, who knew more about the matter than anyone else in Great Britain, told him that we used to get 8,000,000 tons of wheat for Europe from Russia. The total obtained from the United States of America used to be 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 tons, but was now 7,000,000 tons. This created enormous difficulty in the market, and inflated the prices. It seriously affected the exchanges for all three countries. From the point of view of exchanges and prices, the Russian supplies were vital. The second thing was that this scheme would destroy Bolshevism. The moment trade was established with Russia, Communism would go. The Bolsheviks would probably wink at the establishment of this trade. They knew that their people were starving, and would therefore be bound to permit it. What had the Allies to offer in exchange? The principal articles appeared to be boots, clothes, machinery

and drugs. Probably Great Britain alone could supply the first two. Machinery was a great difficulty, as there was not much to spare, and he doubted if France could help in this matter much, owing to the needs of her devastated areas. This, however, was a matter to be arranged between the Allies. It was no use to go to the United States of America, as this only increased the difficulty as regards exchanges, and, if possible, the matter should be arranged without them. He suggested, therefore, that a strong committee should be set up and should report at once. Mr. Wise was one of the ablest men in the British Government Service, and had had charge of the whole of the meat importation for the Ministry of Food. Unless M. Clemenceau wished to press the claims of M. Kammerer, he would suggest that Mr. Wise should take the committee in hand. However, he was entirely in M. Clemenceau's hands in the matter. He would therefore suggest a committee to consider M. Berkenheim's proposals from the point of view of finance, exchange, goods, &c.

SIGNOR NITTI said that a question of great importance had been put. From the point of view of Italy the great need was coal, and this would be facilitated by communications being established with Russia. He understood the organisation of the co-operative movement in Russia was superb. What was required was direct communication, and this might be established through the Russian co-operative organisation. He entirely shared Mr. Lloyd George's view that to establish commercial relations was the proper way to beat Bolshevism, and he would accept the whole of Mr. Lloyd George's proposals.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he was also in agreement.

SIGNOR NITTI said he thought it was a very remarkable proposal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether Mr. Wise would be president of the committee.

This was accepted.

It was agreed—

That a committee, composed as follows:—

Mr. Wise (in the chair),

M. Kammerer,

Marquis della Toretta,

should meet at 4 p.m. the same afternoon to examine M. Berkenheim's proposals from every point of view, and report to the Supreme Council as soon as possible.

4. M. CLEMENCEAU handed round two drafts of despatches to the Dutch Government, one prepared by the French delegation and one prepared by the Drafting Committee, on the subject of the Kaiser (see Appendices 1 and 2 of I.C.P. 17).<sup>3</sup>

*Paris, January 14, 1920.*

<sup>3</sup> No. 73.

I.C.P. 16.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the British, French, and Italian Governments, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, on Wednesday, January 14, 1920, at 4 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Leeper.  
*France*: M. CLEMENCEAU; SECRETARIES, M. Berthelot, M. Dutasta, M. Massigli, M. Arnavon.  
*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARIES: General Cavallero, Colonel Castoldi, Signor Trombetti.  
 INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

1. A letter was read from the Hungarian delegation asking for several days in which to verify the credentials of the plenipotentiaries of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (Appendix 1).<sup>1</sup>  
*The Hungarian Peace Terms*

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what reply it was proposed to make.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he thought a very stern reply should be sent. They should be told that they must either receive the peace terms on the following day or return home.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU instructed M. Berthelot to prepare a reply on these lines.

(At the end of the meeting the reply in Appendix 2<sup>2</sup> was approved.)

2. The council had before them a reply by the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation to the proposed settlement handed to M. Trumbitch and M. Pasitch on the previous day (Appendix 3).  
*The Adriatic. Reply of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Delegation*

M. CLEMENCEAU asked what should be done.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Serbs accepted nothing. The difficulty was that if the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation had agreed, there would probably have been no difficulty with the United States of America. His view was that it would be necessary to force the proposed solution on the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought this could not be done. It was true the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation refused everything. What, then, could be done? Should we inform them that the alternative was the Treaty of London? Supposing this solution were adopted, what, he asked Signor Nitti, would Italy do with Fiume?

SIGNOR NITTI said that frankly it would be a position of great embarrassment, but if the council were reduced to falling back on the Treaty of London, Italy would evacuate Fiume. At present Italy not only occupied *de facto* Fiume itself, but she also occupied the whole territory attributed to her by the Treaty of London, including Zara.

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M. CLEMENCEAU asked whether the council would authorise him to say to the Serbs that the council were ready to fall back on the proposals of Signor Tittoni;<sup>3</sup> that is to say, that Fiume should be a free town. If the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation would not accept this, they would be told that there was nothing for it but the Treaty of London.

SIGNOR NITTI said that if this was necessary he would accept. It should be a free town, with a corridor connecting it with Italian territory.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if Fiume was accepted as a free town with a corridor, she should also have the same right as Zara to choose her diplomatic representation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if that was declined, then the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation should be informed that the only alternative was the Treaty of London. It was impossible to continue this discussion for ever.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the discussion must be finished at once.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Italy would then have to evacuate Fiume.

SIGNOR NITTI said that this would be a great difficulty, but he would agree to do so. The boundary must be corrected in Italy's favour as regards Senossecchia, and Fiume would be a free town without a free State behind it.

M. BERTHELOT said that M. Veniselos had that morning sent him the text of the frontier of Southern Albania, which he had agreed with Signor Tittoni.

(At this point Signor Nitti and Signor Trombetti withdrew, and M. Trumbitch and M. Pasitch were introduced.)

M. CLEMENCEAU stated that the council had received and examined a communication that the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation had made in reply to their proposals. The council could not undertake to recommence the discussion. The Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation had refused everything. He deplored this action, which threatened to create a situation in Europe of which the Serb-Croat-Slovene State would be the first victim. Mr. Lloyd George and he had not been disposed to make any undue concessions to Italy. If concessions had been made, it was because somehow a solution had to be reached, since the discussions could not be prolonged indefinitely. As it was, Mr. Lloyd George had been greatly inconvenienced, and he was grateful to him for giving so much time to the settlement of this question. If, however, the conference was ever to come to an end, this discussion must be concluded. He must say, on his conscience, that he had observed two currents of influence in the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation, one of which was Serb and the other Croat, the latter being the most uncompromising. The council were obliged to take into account that whereas Serbia from the first day of the war had been fighting with the Allies and had made enormous sacrifices, the same was not true of the Croats, much of whose blood had been shed in fighting against the Allies. It was a painful fact, but it was one that could not be left out of account. When these questions had been discussed before, the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation had shown an inclination to help.

<sup>3</sup> For the earlier negotiations relative to the question of the Adriatic see Vol. IV of this series.

There was one concession which he had just asked Signor Nitti to make, and which Signor Nitti had agreed to. The council had been struck by the argument that the concessions which the Serb-Croat-Slovenes were now asked to make were greater than those which had been asked for by Signor Tittoni. This was a fact. He would, therefore, now ask the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation as to whether they would accept Fiume as a free town, with a corridor connecting it with Italy and a right to choose its own representatives abroad. If they would not accept this offer, he and Mr. Lloyd George were resolved to apply the Treaty of London as it is, in order to establish peace in this vital issue. If they were driven to fall back on this expedient, it would create a very risky situation. If the Serb-Croat-Slovene State refused to accept the Treaty of London, they would leave it to Signor Nitti to apply it. The proposal now made involved the evacuation of Fiume by Italy, but Signor Nitti said that, though very difficult for him, he would face it. Hence, it was for the Serb-Croat-Slovenes to take a final resolution in order to establish peace in Europe. They had seen how the Reparation Commission had done its best to find satisfaction for the needs and just claims of their State. Great Britain and France had done their best to show their sympathy with them. They knew well how much their people had suffered, and they understood how difficult the matter was for them. They hoped, however, that they would now make the necessary sacrifices to secure a settlement. If they refused this offer, Mr. Lloyd George and he himself would inform Signor Nitti that they would abide by the Treaty of London.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was in complete accord with M. Clemenceau, and had nothing to add.

M. TRUMBITCH asked that he might be allowed to assure M. Clemenceau in all sincerity that he had been greatly struck by the remark he had made that there were two currents in the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation, one Serbian and one Croat. On his conscience, he could assure him that his information was not correct. There were not two currents, but only one current, which sought the prosperity of the future of the country. He was ready to declare that the reply of the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation was the expression of the views of the whole delegation and of his own Government, which acted together unanimously and was in absolute agreement. Up to this moment he could say that the Government and the delegation were in entire agreement. As to the struggles of Serbia and the situation of Croatia, that is to say, of the Yugoslavs under Austro-Hungarian rule during the war, he observed that a political situation which had existed in the war ought not to be a charge against them now. It was a question of fact that this people had been under foreign domination, but it ought not to be a charge against a people who had shown their sense of liberty during the war. In 1915 and 1916, when the majority of these oppressed races had not yet raised their heads against the Austro-Hungarian domination, the Serbs had already given to the Allied cause thousands of soldiers. These had been formed from among prisoners who had entered the Russian army and had formed a division which had fought against the Bulgarians in the Dobrudja. Here they

had not been fighting for their own happiness, but simply for the common cause. Afterwards, a second division had been formed, under a Serbian general and under the Serbian flag, because the Serbian races were not only of their own blood, but had been acknowledged as fighting as the representatives of their national liberties. When Serbia had been heavily defeated, the soldiers of the oppressed races had been the first to make the tour of the whole world, starting from Vladivostok and ending at Salonica. The Serbian army had been replenished by these and by Jugoslavs drawn from the whole world, from the United States of America to Africa. It was these divisions which had given the *coup de grâce* to the Bulgarians, cutting them in two, and these had been largely filled with Jugoslavs from Austria-Hungary. By these facts they had shown to the whole world, and especially to the great Allied Powers, that they knew what devotion meant and were willing to shed their blood in the common cause.

He himself had the honour to be the president of the Yugoslav Committee which had directed and organised propaganda in Great Britain, France and the United States of America. By this means he believed they had given considerable assistance to the common cause. This was especially the case after the Rome Congress.<sup>4</sup> After this he had paid a visit to the Italian front, where a vigorous propaganda had been carried out, and he himself had seen hundreds of Yugoslav soldiers surrendering with pamphlets bearing his signature at the bottom in their pockets. If the war had gone on, Yugoslav soldiers would have continued to fight as volunteers in the cause of liberty. He had shown, therefore, that Croatia on the field of battle did as much as possible for the common cause. Of course, there was no doubt that many had fought on the Austrian side. This was inevitable, because all the oppressed peoples under Austria-Hungary had been obliged to fight. The Germans and the Magyars had so constituted the army as to render this unavoidable, and if these men had not been forced into the ranks they would have succumbed long before. He could assure the council of the solidarity of the Jugoslavs to remain a single State and to stick together. In this particular question, in which he regretted that they were not yet agreed, he could assure the council it was his firm conviction that the proposals of the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation provided a solid and durable basis, the object of which was to establish mutual intercourse and commerce with their Italian neighbours. This was their sole aim. They did not mind losing a town or two, or even a few islands, for they had larger objects in view. Hence, he declared that they were loyally prepared to make great sacrifices, and they had already done so. They had accepted the Wilson line, which involved the sacrifice of some 400,000 men of the Yugoslav race. These would remain under Italian rule, with absolutely no guarantees for their language or nationality or tradition. Nevertheless, they had accepted the respon-

<sup>4</sup> A congress of representatives of nationalities subject to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy had been held in Rome in April 1918. The Pact of Rome was concluded at this congress on April 10, 1918. (For a text of the Pact of Rome see H. W. V. Temperley: *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. London, 1920 f., vol. v, pp. 396-7.)

sibility for this sacrifice owing to the higher objects involved. They objected, however, to other sacrifices beyond this, which met all the necessities of the case. He would say frankly that the proposals as regards Fiume were artificial, with the corridor and the Italian sovereignty. It was providing a permanent solution of a temporary problem. As regards the islands also, the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation had accepted demilitarisation. This was a charge, an international servitude, on their freedom. If the islands were demilitarised, he did not see why any of them should be ceded. The islands were geographically and economically linked up with the Dalmatian coast, and this was stated in the document signed by M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, which had been communicated to Signor Scialoja and had subsequently been published in full in the press of Trieste and Fiume. Italy's claim to the islands was based entirely from the point of view of the strategical defence of the Italian coast, which was sandy, flat and indefensible. This reason, however, disappeared if the islands were demilitarised. There were special objections in the case of Lissa, which was entirely a Slav town, which lived by fishing and agriculture, and sold its products in Spalato to Yugoslavs. If it formed part of another nationality, it would fall back into misery, because Italy produced the same commodities herself. These arguments justified their attitude.

M. Clemenceau had said that if these proposals were not accepted, there was no alternative but the Treaty of London. On this he could not say much, as the Treaty of London had been made by the Great Powers themselves. But the Treaty of London, he would recall, was made against Austria. It was now being applied against Jugoslavia. Italy had entered the war for the purpose of fighting Austria. To-day there was no Austria. Hence it was not justifiable to apply the Treaty of London to the conditions of to-day. He would end on this note. He would declare, in the name of M. Pasitch, the president of the delegation and himself, that the statements made by M. Clemenceau were very serious and grave, but they could not take the responsibility of presenting an absolute negative. They must consult their Government, with whom the responsibility lay. Both proposals, that of the previous day and that of to-day, would be communicated at once to their Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked when the reply would be received.

M. TRUMBITCH said, 'As soon as possible,' as his telegram would be sent this very evening. He would ask the President of the Council to give further consideration to their situation. He would ask him to realise that the Adriatic contained interests besides those of Italy and Jugoslavia. He would send his reply as soon as possible, and he hoped that he would not be reproached by the council for his attitude, which was based entirely on national considerations.

M. PASITCH said he would like to make a few remarks. He felt obliged to declare that between the Serbs and the Croats there was absolutely no difference, but only a desire for a common unity. The only difference lay in the matter of religion, and this difference was to be found in every country. In

the whole of their history there had been no war between the Serbs and the Croats. They were united in their desire to be free together. In 1914 the Serbs had said that if, unhappily, they fell into the same condition as the Croats, that is to say, under Austro-Hungarian domination, then they would unite with them in the same cause of seeking their liberty. Thanks to the assistance of the Great Powers, they were united, and their only desire was to be a united and prosperous State. They desired and demanded that they should not have to cede the port of Fiume. It was the only port through which they could carry out their exportation and importation. The Croats had really less desire for this port than the others, because they themselves, at any rate, had some small ports along the Adriatic. For the others, however, Fiume was the only port. It ought not to be given to Italy. From Fiume to Italy was a railway journey of several hours. In the town of Fiume he admitted that at the present time the Italians had a majority, but he could remember the time when Fiume had a Serb-Croat majority. He had visited the place every year for many years. This development in the situation had taken place under the Magyars. They had drawn in workmen from all parts, including men from Italy, for the construction of quays and warehouses, and little by little an Italian majority had grown up. Now Italian pride claimed this town, but if any Italians were to pass through it they would be surprised at the number of streets entirely inhabited by Jugoslavs. They were not right to begin by asking for this port. The other ports of the Adriatic were small and had no communication with the interior, and there could be no great traffic. For that reason they had urged that they should never lose Fiume. They were prepared to give every guarantee to preserve the Italian character of the town, but the port should belong to the Croats and Slovenes. Once more he must declare that the Serbs and the Croats (and the same applied to the Slovenes, who only spoke a different dialect) after many centuries had come into a position where they could develop their national unity. Now they were placed in a difficult position because they could not make progress if their economic needs were not properly safeguarded.

M. TRUMBITCH asked M. Clemenceau to explain exactly what he had said to Signor Nitti when he spoke of Tittoni's proposal in regard to Fiume.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he meant a free town under the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that under Signor Tittoni's proposal the port was to have been in a free State.

M. CLEMENCEAU (who had left the room for a few moments and had now returned) said he had asked Signor Nitti, who agreed that the port and railway should be in the hands of the League of Nations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to say a few words. France and Great Britain were not in a position to make an absolutely just settlement. They were dealing with a treaty which they had entered into with Italy and under which Italy had come into the war. By this treaty some 800,000 Jugoslavs would have been placed under Italian rule. This number was now reduced to 400,000. It might be said that this ought not to have been agreed to.

Possibly this was true, but, nevertheless, Great Britain and France were bound by it. What, he asked, would have happened if Italy had not entered the war? What would then have been the position of Croatia and Yugoslavia? Croatia would have remained an Austrian province. M. Trumbitch had said that two divisions of Yugoslav troops had been formed and had fought for the Allies. He understood that there were some 7,000,000 Yugoslavs under Austrian rule. Taking the same proportion of troops as Great Britain had put into the field, they would probably have sent some 800,000 soldiers to the war, of whom perhaps 60,000 had fought for liberty and the rest against us. But for Italy, Croatia would not have been freed. The council were bound to take this into account. Under the treaty 800,000 Yugoslavs would have been Austrian. He therefore thought that it was very fortunate for the Yugoslavs that the Italian population had suddenly become so eager for Fiume. Italy was now prepared to sacrifice Dalmatia and the islands in order to get Fiume. In fact, Fiume had emancipated Dalmatia. He thought that Yugoslavia was paying a very small price for this. Under the Treaty of London most of the territory to the north of Fiume would have been assigned to Italy. Now the boundary had been gradually forced back, and some 150,000 Yugoslavs would come into the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. If the final decision of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State was that they could not accept this latest proposal, speaking for Great Britain, he felt bound to recognise the Treaty of London, and he was given to understand that the Italians were in occupation of all the territory mentioned in the Treaty of London. All that Yugoslavia would receive would be the satisfaction of knowing that they had placed an additional 400,000 Yugoslavs under the Italian flag. The only other satisfaction they would have would be the establishment of a blood feud with Italy which would probably prove disastrous to both.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the council would await the reply of the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation.

M. TRUMBITCH declared that he and his colleagues were fully convinced of the great effort which M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George had made to obtain a settlement. They expressed their devotion to M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George and to their nations, who had fought for their liberties. He hoped that their intentions would not be misunderstood. The Serbians had fought side by side with the Great Powers, and were truly grateful for what had been done for them, but they had to consider and provide a good future for their State.

M. CLEMENCEAU thanked M. Trumbitch.

(During some subsequent discussion, the document handed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation on the previous day was redrafted to embody the latest proposals, and is attached in Appendix 4.<sup>5</sup>)

*Paris, January 14, 1920.*

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. This redraft is printed as document 7 in Cmd. 586.

*The Adriatic Question*

*Reply forwarded by the Delegation of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, on January 14, 1920, to the Memorandum presented to them by the Supreme Council on January 13, 1920.*

1. Italian sovereignty over Fiume (*corpus separatum*) cannot be accepted. The project of Signor Tittoni<sup>3</sup> did not claim this sovereignty any more than the latest vote of the Italian Parliament.

2. We cannot accept that the Italian frontier in Istria shall be connected with Fiume by a corridor. The memorandum sent at London to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has set aside this demand which had already been included in the project of Signor Tittoni; it is the Wilson line from the Julian Alps to the Arsa, which ought to form the Italian-Yugoslav frontier.

3. The town of Zara (not including the remainder of the territory of the commune of Zara) will be endowed under Yugoslav sovereignty with the largest local autonomy, which will be fixed by an international convention and placed under the protection of the League of Nations. The municipality of Zara and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State will elaborate in concert the statute prescribing this autonomy. In case of disagreement the difference will be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.

4. In the case of Albania being deprived of its independence and not having an autonomous Government, and of Italy receiving Valona and a mandate over the remainder of Albania, while Greece receives Southern Albania with Argyrocastro and Koritza, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State ought to receive, besides Northern Albania, a rectification of the Serb-Albania frontier on the eastern portion of this frontier. It will be necessary to fix a term to the mandate and to neutralise and to demilitarise Albania.

5. The Serb-Croat-Slovene State will give its consent to the demilitarisation of the islands on condition that all the islands are assigned to it. The demilitarisation will consist in the prohibition to fortify the islands; however, ships of war shall be able to circulate freely in their waters.

6. The Italians of Dalmatia will have the right to opt for Italian nationality without leaving the territory of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

7. An international convention will guarantee the rights acquired by Italian subjects so far as concerns their industrial enterprises in Dalmatia.

8. In the same way the full and entire protection of the nationality of the language and of the economic and cultural development of the Yugoslav population remaining in Italy shall be guaranteed.

PARIS, *January 14, 1920.*

I.G.P. 17.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the British, French, and Italian Governments, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, on Thursday, January 15, 1920, at 3 p.m.*

PRESENT: *British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. Lord Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor; SECRETARY, Sir M. Hankey.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARY, M. Massigli. A Stenographer.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARIES, Signor Trombetti, Signor Galli.

The following were also present:

*France*: M. Berthelot, M. Dutasta.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

1. The council had before them the following draft notes to the Netherlands *The Kaiser. Note to Government in regard to the delivery of the Kaiser: - the Dutch Government* A draft prepared by the French delegation (Appendix 1).

A draft prepared by the Drafting Committee (Appendix 2).

The draft prepared by Mr. Lansing and approved by the Council of Four on the 26th June, 1919 (Appendix 3).

LORD BIRKENHEAD said that there was very little to say on this matter. Article 227 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany contained elaborate provisions in regard to the arraignment of the Kaiser, and represented the views of those who had considered the matter at the time of the drawing up of the Treaty of Peace. The only matter which was now under discussion was the form in which the demand for the handing over of the Kaiser by the Netherlands Government should be made. His attention had been called to a draft that had been prepared by Mr. Lansing and had been provisionally approved by the Council of Four on the 26th June, 1919. Since that time the United States of America had withdrawn from the conference. Two new drafts had been prepared, one by the Drafting Committee and another by the French delegation. The differences of these alternative drafts were not considerable, and to his mind it did not very much matter which was adopted. On the whole, however, after studying all the drafts carefully, he preferred the proposal of the French delegation, which was drawn up in judicial language and was particularly clear and precise. Speaking as a judge, the French draft made a strong appeal to him; hence, he proposed that the draft of the French delegation should be accepted. It did not appear necessary to say much more at this stage, but when the reply of the Netherlands Government was received, a good deal more might have to be said. He would therefore formally propose that the draft of the French delegation be accepted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he did not recollect approving or discussing Mr. Lansing's draft at all.

M. CLEMENCEAU said neither did he.

SIR M. HANKEY said that he had been acting as one of the secretaries of the Council of Four on the 27th June, and had drafted the minutes.

(Sir M. Hankey sent for the minutes of the Council of Four, which were produced later on in the meeting, from which it appeared that the question had first been raised by President Wilson on the 25th June, when, after some discussion, it had been agreed that Mr. Lansing, who had acted as chairman of the Commission on Responsibilities, should be asked to draft a despatch (C.F. 92, Minute 10). Mr. Lansing's draft had been read and approved on the 26th June, when Baron Makino had reserved his assent (C.F. 93, Minute 6).

On the 27th June, however, Baron Makino had given his assent (C.F. 95, Minute 4), and the despatch had been taken note of for use when the time came to give effect to article 227 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE, after reading Mr. Lansing's draft, said it did not differ materially from the other drafts, but it contained the following paragraph, which he thought ought to be included:—

‘Persons residing in Germany against whom judicial proceedings are to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers will be delivered to them in accordance with the terms of article 228 of the Treaty of Peace. If the ex-Emperor had remained in Germany he would have been delivered to them by the Government of that country upon the request of the Allied and Associated Powers. As, however, he is temporarily residing in the Netherlands, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, acting in their own behalf and in behalf of all the signatories of the Treaty of Peace, and in accordance with its terms, have the honour respectfully to request the Government of the Netherlands to deliver to them the ex-Kaiser at a time and place to be later specified, to be proceeded against in the manner provided in article 227 of the treaty.’

M. CLEMENCEAU accepted this suggestion.

SIGNOR NITTI also accepted the suggestion.

It was agreed—

To adopt the French text (Appendix 1), in which should be incorporated a passage based on the paragraph of Mr. Lansing's draft quoted above.

2. Later in the meeting M. BERTHELOT drew attention to the fact that Mr. Lansing's draft began as follows:—

‘The Governments of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan have the honour to call the attention of the Netherlands Government.’ &c.

He asked what would be the proper formula for beginning the note, since the United States of America could not participate.

It was agreed—

That the best formula was that adopted in the draft of the French delegation, which begins as follows:—

‘In now notifying the Queen's Government of the text of article 227 (certified copy attached) of the Treaty of Peace with Germany,

which came into effect on the 10th January, 1920, the Powers have the honour,<sup>7</sup> &c.

3. M. BERTHELOT suggested that the council might like to take advantage of Lord Birkenhead's presence to consider whether there was any further action required in connection with those guilty of breaches of the laws of war under article 228 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. The number had now been greatly reduced, and an agreed list had been drawn up. He understood that the text of the note to be presented to the German Government had also been agreed.

LORD BIRKENHEAD said he would like to make a few brief remarks. A total of several thousand persons had originally been proposed. He had no hesitation in saying that every one of those in the original list was justly included. It had occurred, however, to certain members of the British Government and, he thought, of the French Government also, that there were certain political reasons why the list, which originally included 3,000 names, should be reduced. In consequence, his colleague, the British Attorney-General, had in London and in Paris set to work with his French and other Allied colleagues, to reduce the list, which had then been brought down to 1,000. He himself had had the privilege of attending the committee since his arrival in Paris, and a discussion of three or four hours' duration had taken place. It had been agreed that it was desirable to reduce the lists as low as possible, for the following reasons: the vindication of the moral law of the world made it highly desirable that a certain number of those who had violated international law should be punished. It had been felt that if the Germans would hand over a smaller number willingly, while they would not consent to hand over a larger number, it would be desirable, in the vindication of the moral law referred to, to make a reduction. Eventually he and his British, French and other Allied colleagues had cut the total list down to about 800. It was only found possible to do this by excluding some persons who undoubtedly had been guilty of criminal acts: that is to say, it had been necessary to make an arbitrary curtailment of the list. The question was one of high policy, which he felt sure must have exercised the thoughts of M. Clemenceau. He himself did not pretend to know what the prospects were of the Germans being willing to hand over as many as 800. If, however, they were more likely to assent to hand over a total of 500 than 800, he would urge with all his force to cut the list down to the lower number. This, of course, would involve a further arbitrary curtailment. He could not say whether the Germans would hand over 500, but he would observe that every hundred by which the list was cut down made acceptance easier for the Germans. They might be quite willing to hand over 100. The matter was so speculative that he would not venture to dogmatise in regard to it. What was of supreme importance, in order to vindicate the moral law of the world, was that some of those who had perpetrated crimes should be made answerable for them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he accepted the general view of the Lord Chancellor.

He would talk to M. Ygnace on the subject, and press him to make some reductions. One objection he felt was in regard to Belgium, which had suffered more than any other country, and to a greater extent than ought to be allowed to be passed over. He would reply to Lord Birkenhead that he would see the Under-Secretary with a view to making some reduction.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he agreed. The more he thought of it (and he had devoted a great deal of thought to the matter) the more he felt that even now we were asking for more than any Government could be expected to comply with.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that some people felt very keenly on this question.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this, no doubt, was the case. But if, in different circumstances, a demand had been made by a German Government on a British or French Government for the handing over of 800 officers, he did not believe that they would ever comply with it. No British or French Government could do so.

M. CLEMENCEAU pointed out that the British and French officers would not have perpetrated such abominable crimes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished they could get the number considerably reduced. If even twenty were shot it would be an example, though he did not suggest that twenty was a sufficient number.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the difficulty was to give a reply when women came up from the provinces and told him that their daughters had been carried off by the Germans and that they had their names and yet they were not included in the list. Still, he would do his very best. He would frankly admit that he had told M. Ygnace not to give too much, as this would make things difficult for the Government. He would require twenty-four hours to consider the matter, which would then be brought before the council again.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the worst crimes committed against the British had been in the case of submarines.

M. CLEMENCEAU recalled the case of Captain Fryatt.<sup>1</sup>

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were some bad cases of German submarines firing on men in boats.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would do his best.

4. M. BERTHELOT called the attention of the council to two notes from the Hungarian delegation, which were read by M. Mantoux  
*The Treaty of Peace with Hungary* (Appendices 4 and 5).

The council took note that the Hungarian delegation had now agreed to attend to receive the Treaty of Peace the same afternoon.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he did not think it was possible to refuse to the

<sup>1</sup> Captain Fryatt, master of the Great Eastern Railway's steamship *Brussels*, was captured at sea by enemy action on June 23, 1916. He was condemned to death by German court-martial for having allegedly attempted to ram the German submarine U.33 on March 28 of that year. Captain Fryatt was shot in captivity on July 27, 1916.

Hungarians the right to state what they wanted to the council. He recalled the deplorable statement of Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau.<sup>2</sup> If Count Apponyi wished to make a statement from Hungary's point of view, he did not think he ought to be refused.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE recalled that the Turks had also been allowed to make a statement.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that he thought the council ought to hear what the Hungarians had to say, but they ought not to discuss anything with them. The proper course would be to appoint a day and to inform Count Apponyi that no discussion would be permitted, and that a *procès-verbal* would be taken of what he said.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE also agreed. He said our object ought to be, if possible, to detach the Hungarians from the German connection.

It was agreed---

That M. Clemenceau should inform Count Apponyi that the council would hear what he had to say on the following day at 2.30 p.m., but should notify him that there would be no discussion, and that a *procès-verbal* would be taken of what he had to say.

5. M. BERTHELOT raised the question of Belgian participation in the Military Council at Versailles. This question had been discussed at the council before, when it had been thought that Belgium might participate. Marshal Foch had now reported that, when this question was discussed by the military representatives, General Sackville-West had expressed the view that the Belgians ought not to participate except when questions relating to Belgium were under discussion: for example, the Rhineland and the execution of the military clauses of the German Treaty. This, he pointed out, was a very wide definition, and would enable the Belgians to take part in practically all discussions relating to the execution of the German Treaty of Peace. It would, however, exclude questions relating to Central Europe. Marshal Foch therefore now proposed the question as to whether the Belgians should be allowed to participate on the same footing as the Great Powers, or only in purely German questions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the answer to Marshal Foch's question depended largely on the responsibilities and liabilities which Belgium was prepared to accept. If Belgium was prepared to accept responsibility in regard to such matters as military action for the defence of the Caucasus and the Caspian, which had been referred to the Military Advisers, then he would be very glad to have the advice of their military representative.

<sup>2</sup> The reference was to the statement made on May 7, 1919, by Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, then German Foreign Minister and head of the German Peace Delegation, in a plenary session of the Peace Congress at Versailles on the occasion of the presentation of the conditions of peace to the German Delegation. This speech was published at the time. An English text of it is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, vol. iii, pp. 417-20.

Otherwise, however, he did not see why they should take part in such discussions.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed.

M. Clemenceau instructed M. Berthelot to prepare a reply to Marshal Foch in this sense.

6. M. BERTHELOT recalled a decision which had been taken in London, and confirmed in Paris, in regard to the continuance of the Inter-Allied military organisation under the Presidency of Marshal Foch at Versailles,<sup>3</sup> the second part of which stated that the Military Council should execute such orders as the Allied and Associated Powers might give them. The Italian delegation had made an objection to this comparatively wide extension of the functions of the Military Council.

After M. Berthelot had given a further explanation of the circumstances, Signor Nitti said that he would withdraw his objections.

Paris, January 15, 1920.

#### APPENDIX I TO No. 73

##### *Draft of the French Delegation, January 12, 1920*

In now notifying the Queen's Government of the text of article 227 (certified copy attached)<sup>4</sup> of the Treaty of Peace with Germany which came into effect on the 10th January, 1920, the Powers have the honour to make it known at the same time that they have decided to put the terms of this article into execution without delay.

In consequence the Powers are addressing to the Netherlands Government an official request to place William of Hohenzollern, ex-Emperor of Germany, in their hands in order that he may be tried.

The Netherlands Government is aware of the indefeasible reasons which imperiously require that those, even those most highly placed, who have been guilty of the premeditated violation of international treaties as well as the systematic disregard of the most sacred rules of the law of nations should undergo the process (sanction) laid down by the Peace Conference.

The Powers will briefly recall among so great a list of crimes the cynical violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, the barbarous and pitiless system of taking hostages, the massed deportations, the seizure of young girls from Lille from the midst of their families who were handed over without any protection to the worst treatment, the systematic devastation of great regions without any military purposes, the unrestricted submarine war, including the inhuman abandonment of its victims on the High Seas, the innumerable acts committed against non-combatants under German authority in violation of the laws of war, &c.

All these acts for which the responsibility, at any rate the moral responsibility, lies at the door of the supreme Lord, who ordered them and who abused his absolute

<sup>3</sup> See No. 58, minute 4 and No. 54, minute 2.

<sup>4</sup> Not annexed to original. For the text of this article see appendix 3 below.

power in order to infringe or allow to be infringed the most sacred rules of human conscience.

The Powers cannot bring themselves to believe that the Government of the Netherlands can regard with less condemnation than themselves the immense responsibility which lies upon the ex-Emperor. Holland would not fulfil its international duty if it refused to associate itself with the other nations as far as its powers permit in order to bring to justice, or at any rate not to impede, the punishment of these crimes.

In addressing this request to the Netherlands Government, they think it well to point out its exceptional character. They have the duty of enforcing the execution of article 227 without allowing delay for the purpose of discussion, because in existing circumstances it is not fundamentally concerned with a public accusation, having a juridical character, but with an act of high international policy required by the conscience of mankind in which the forms of justice have been specially considered in order to ensure that the accused shall have guarantees such as public right has never yet experienced.

The Powers are convinced that Holland, which has always shown its respect for right and its love for justice and which has been one of the first to claim its place in the League of Nations, will not wish to extend its moral approval to the violation of these fundamental principles of the solidarity of nations who are all equally concerned to prevent a repetition of so great a catastrophe. The people of the Netherlands are deeply concerned that they should not appear to protect the principal author by giving him protection on their own territory and that they should facilitate the trial demanded by the voices of millions of victims.

## APPENDIX 2 TO No. 73

### *Draft Note to the Netherlands Government prepared by Drafting Committee, January 10, 1920*

In view of the breaches of every kind committed under the supreme authority of William of Hohenzollern, ex-Emperor of Germany, in defiance of promises given and of the principles of justice and humanity developed during the progress of civilisation, the Allied and Associated Powers consider that all civilised nations have a common duty not to allow such a reversion to barbarism to pass without bringing those responsible to book.

Accordingly the Allied and Associated Powers have publicly arraigned William Hohenzollern, ex-Emperor of Germany, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.

In consequence and in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Peace signed with Germany on the 28th June, 1919, and now in force, the Allied and Associated Powers have the honour to ask the Government of the Netherlands to deliver into their hands the person of William Hohenzollern in order that he may be brought to trial.

The Allied and Associated Powers do not doubt that the Government of Her Majesty the Queen will associate itself with the sentiments by which they are themselves animated, and will be anxious, as are the Allied and Associated Powers themselves, that the people of the Netherlands should not appear to the world as the defenders of acts which have so deeply moved all mankind.

*Communication to the Government of the Netherlands*

(Approved by the Council of Four on June 26, 1919.)

The Government of the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, have the honour to call the attention of the Netherlands Government to article 227 of the Treaty of Peace, signed at Versailles the 5 day of June, 1919, to which the twenty-seven Allied and Associated Powers and Germany are Signatory and Contracting Parties.

Article 227 is thus worded:—

‘The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.

‘A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.

‘In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed.

‘The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.’

Persons residing in Germany against whom judicial proceedings are to be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers will be delivered to them in accordance with the terms of article 228 of the Treaty of Peace. If the ex-Emperor had remained in Germany he would have been delivered to them by the Government of that country upon the request of the Allied and Associated Powers. As, however, he is temporarily residing in the Netherlands, the principal Allied and Associated Powers, acting in their own behalf and in behalf of all the signatories of the Treaty of Peace and in accordance with its terms, have the honour respectfully to request the Government of the Netherlands to deliver to them the ex-Emperor at a time and place to be later specified to be proceeded against in the manner provided in article 227 of the Treaty.

The principal Allied and Associated Governments respectfully call the attention of the Netherlands Government to the fact that the delivery of the ex-Emperor is requested ‘for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties’; that proceedings against the ex-Emperor are before a special tribunal in which the accused is to have ‘the guarantees essential to the right of defence’; that the decision is to be ‘guided by the highest motives of international policy’, and that the punishment to be inflicted upon the accused, should he be found guilty of the offence with which he is charged, is to be fixed by the tribunal ‘with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality’.

The principal Allied and Associated Powers further call the attention of the Government of the Netherlands to the well-established principle of universal application, that even if the offence with which the ex-Emperor is charged were to

<sup>s</sup> Omission in original.

be considered political at the date of its commission the agreement of the nations to submit it and its submission to a judicial tribunal, thus transforming it from the political to the judicial forum, make that judicial which would have otherwise been political.

The principal Allied and Associated Powers will be happy to receive the assurance of the Government of the Netherlands that it will take the necessary measures to comply with the present request.

#### APPENDIX 4 TO No. 73

##### *Count Apponyi to M. Clemenceau*

DÉLÉGATION DE HONGRIE,  
NEUILLY, le 14 janvier 1920.

M. le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 14 janvier courant, par laquelle vous invitez formellement la délégation hongroise à se rendre demain, à 4 heures de l'après-midi, au Ministère des Affaires étrangères afin d'y recevoir le texte des conditions de paix arrêtées par les Puissances alliées.<sup>6</sup>

Bien que n'ayant pas encore pu achever la vérification des pouvoirs des représentants des Alliés, nous aurons l'honneur de déférer à cette invitation.

Jamais, d'ailleurs, l'idée ne nous est venue de chercher des prétextes pour nous dérober à une tâche pour l'accomplissement de laquelle nous sommes venus à Paris.

Le minime délai que nous vous avons demandé n'avait rapport qu'à la vérification des pouvoirs; la question de notre situation vis-à-vis de l'Amérique n'avait rien à y voir, comme le texte de notre lettre le prouve à l'évidence. Indépendamment de la question du délai, nous avons le devoir d'éclaircir cette situation et, n'ayant aucune communication directe avec le monde extérieur, il fallait bien nous adresser dans ce but à votre obligeance.

Vous avez, d'ailleurs, bien voulu nous renseigner que le représentant du Gouvernement des États-Unis sera présent à la remise des conditions de paix et nous avons en même temps reçu les pleins pouvoirs de M. l'Ambassadeur Wallace qui l'autorisent à conclure la paix avec la Hongrie.

Veuillez, &c.  
APPONYI.

#### APPENDIX 5 TO No. 73

##### *Count Apponyi to M. Clemenceau*

DÉLÉGATION DE HONGRIE,  
NEUILLY, le 14 janvier 1920.

M. le Président,

La délégation hongroise à la Conférence de la Paix a exprimé dans sa note du 14 janvier le désir de pouvoir participer à une discussion orale des problèmes touchant son pays, et elle a indiqué les raisons, concluantes à mon avis, qui pourraient amener le Conseil suprême à changer la procédure dans le cas de la Hongrie.

<sup>6</sup> See No. 72, minute 1 and note 2.

Si, toutefois, cela ne pouvait se faire à titre officiel, je me permettrais de demander aux représentants des grandes Puissances alliées et associées—France, Grande-Bretagne, États-Unis d'Amérique et Japon—de bien vouloir m'accorder un entretien particulier, non officiel, où je pourrais mettre sous leurs yeux le point de vue hongrois, sans la connaissance duquel il me semble impossible d'aborder les graves questions d'équilibre et de tranquillité en Europe orientale. Peut-on, en bonne justice et équité, refuser à une nation placée dans une situation telle que la nôtre d'être écoutée avant de prononcer son arrêt définitif? Peut-on arriver à la vérité en n'écoutant qu'une des parties intéressées dans des questions controversées? Peut-on résoudre les problèmes de l'Europe orientale, en passant à côté de la Hongrie, qui pendant des siècles en était la clef de voûte?

En tout cas, je dois à mon pays et à la lourde responsabilité que la confiance de ce pays fait peser sur moi, de tout tenter pour être entendu, de tout faire pour rétablir au dernier moment du moins, et dans la mesure du possible, l'équilibre des parties en litige dans un procès où l'existence même de la Hongrie est en question.

Je ne crains pas de refus dans ces conditions. Mais, si les représentants des grandes Puissances préféraient s'entretenir avec un ou avec quelques-uns de mes collègues à la délégation, ceux-ci sont entièrement à votre disposition.

En votre qualité de président de la Conférence de la Paix et du Conseil suprême, c'est vous seul, monsieur, qui pouvez recevoir les communications des délégations étrangères. A ce titre, je me permets de vous prier de faire parvenir à leur destination les lettres, identiques à celle-ci, que j'adresse en même temps aux représentants des grandes Puissances susnommées.

Agréez, &c.

APPONYI.

## No. 74

I.C.P. 18.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the American, British, French, and Italian Governments, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, on Friday, January 16, 1920, at 10.30 a.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: U.S.A.: The Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARIES, Mr. Harrison, Captain Winthrop.

British Empire: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; SECRETARY, Sir M. Hankey.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARY, M. Massigli.

Italy: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

The following were also present:

British Empire: The Right Hon. the Viscount Grey of Falloden, Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Wise.

France: M. Cambon, M. Ygnace, M. Berthelot, M. Dutasta, M. Kammerer, M. Arnavon.

Italy: Marquis della Toretta.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

<sup>1</sup> A variant text of this document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 863 f.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU said he had discussed with M. Ygnace the possibility of cutting down the numbers of persons to be demanded under article 228 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany. M. Ygnace declared that, while demanding that the French should cut down their list, the British had increased their own list. What he proposed, therefore, was that M. Ygnace should talk the matter over with the British Lord Chancellor and that they should bring a joint report at a future meeting.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed to this.

(M. Ygnace then withdrew, to await Lord Birkenhead, to whom a telephone message had been despatched.)

2. With reference to I.C.P. 15,<sup>2</sup> Minute 3, the council had before them the report of the committee which they had appointed to consider the question of commercial policy in Russia (Appendix 1).

*Commercial Policy  
in Russia*

M. BERTHELOT stated that the committee had met twice on the previous day, and had eventually agreed on the report which had been circulated. The committee had generally agreed that it was extremely important to try and establish direct contact between the Western countries and the Russian peasants, in order to secure exports from Russia, which would bring down the price of raw materials and affect the rate of exchange. The difficulty was that this had to be done without entering into negotiations which would involve any sort of recognition of the Bolsheviks. Therefore it was impossible to have direct communication with the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, it was impossible to proceed without having the assent of the Bolsheviks. There might be something in the argument that the Bolshevik Government would agree because of the great need of the Russian people. They knew that they could only give paper money in exchange for imported goods, and that these roubles were of no value. As the peasants had very great need of such articles as clothing, boots, drugs, &c., it was possible that the Bolsheviks would allow the export of wheat, flax, coal, oil and other essential raw materials. It therefore resulted in this, that the Allies could not send official representatives to discuss with the Bolshevik Government, but that the Russian co-operative associations, which had offices in Paris and London and had headquarters in Moscow, might possibly be able to get authority from the Bolsheviks for this commerce. They were prepared to make the attempt, and would inform the Allied Governments as to the result.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there seemed complete agreement as to the general lines of the report. There were one or two alterations in the form which he wished to suggest. He referred first to paragraph 8, the second and third lines, from which he proposed to omit the following words:—

‘from the Bolsheviks,’

so that the first sentence would read as follows:—

‘With regard to transport, the co-operative headquarters at Moscow

<sup>2</sup> No. 71.

would endeavour to secure at least four complete trains for use to and from the Black Sea ports.'

He also proposed that the heading should read as follows:—

'Report of committee appointed to consider the reopening of certain trading relations with the Russian people.'

Finally, in the same order of ideas, he proposed that in line 3 of the first paragraph, instead of the words 'the whole of Russia,' should be substituted 'the Russian people,' so that the first sentence would read as follows:—

'The committee understands that it has been instructed to consider the practical details of a scheme for reconstructing trading operations with the Russian people.'

M. CLEMENCEAU and SIGNOR NITTI agreed to these alterations.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the next step was to refer it to the committee to carry out the policy.

M. KAMMERER said that the only step to be taken was to send a radio telegram to Moscow.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked what communication should be made to the press.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that as little as possible should be stated to the press.

M. KAMMERER said that the Bolsheviks would state that this involved raising the blockade.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the blockade had already been raised, since our ships had been withdrawn.<sup>3</sup> It had just been suggested to him, he said, that it would be impossible to keep this information from leaking out, because the co-operative associations would have to publish it.

The question was adjourned to enable a press communiqué to be drafted.

At a later stage of the meeting M. Berthelot read the press communiqué in Appendix 2.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had two objections to this draft. The first was that the co-operative associations would not like the inference that they were taking the initiative in the matter. They had their own friends in Russia, and would not wish to compromise them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did not feel that so much as the suggestion of the intervention of the Governments.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that also it was not expedient to state in direct terms that we would not recognise the Bolshevik Government. This was to introduce a provocative note.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that every word of this announcement required to be weighed, and he would therefore propose to consider the matter after hearing the Hungarians that afternoon.

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Lloyd George may have been referring to the winter withdrawal of British naval units from certain areas such as the Gulf of Finland. It does not appear that specific instructions raising the blockade had been issued by that date.

It was agreed—

- (a) To approve the report of the committee appointed to consider the reopening of certain trading relations with the Russian people, as amended in the form shown in Appendix 3.<sup>4</sup>
- (b) To remit to the committee the task of giving effect to the report.
- (c) To reserve the question of the press communiqué until the afternoon meeting.

(M. Jules Cambon entered at this point.)

3. M. CAMBON said that on the previous day, as instructed by the council, he and Mr. Philip Kerr and the Marquis della Toretta had got into touch with the representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan. They had begun by communicating to them the resolution of the council that the Governments of Georgia and the Azerbaijan should be recognised as *de facto* Governments.<sup>5</sup> They were then asked for their observations and whether they had any requests to make. Two representatives (including M. Tseretelli)<sup>6</sup> and two for the Azerbaijan had spoken in succession. They had thanked the Principal Allied and Associated Powers for giving them recognition as *de facto* Governments, but had asked for more. They desired that nothing should be done to hinder their endeavour to detach themselves completely from Russia, and they said that they might require financial, political and military aid to enable them to establish their old position. He and his colleagues had then put some questions to them as to their external situation, and particularly as to what dangers they might expect from Russia. They had shown themselves more preoccupied with the intentions of Denikin than of those of the Bolsheviki. In view of the situation of General Denikin's army at the present time, however, they were for the moment somewhat reassured. He and his colleagues, and particularly Mr. Philip Kerr, had then asked for particulars as to the military situation of the republics. At first they had not replied with any precision, but on being pressed they had stated that the Georgians could put in the field an army of about 50,000 men, while the Azerbaijan could provide an army of about 100,000 men. Their army was composed of a small force of regulars, which was provided with officers of the old Russian armies, including generals and major-generals, in addition to which there was a national guard. M. Tseretelli had considered that the forces were sufficient for the defence of Georgia and Azerbaijan against invasion by the Bolshevik armies. He had laid stress on the fact, however, that the people would not agree to any offensive war and that the army was only equal to a defensive.

M. CLEMENCEAU thought that even this was doubtful.

M. CAMBON said that, even though the numbers of the forces of these republics were sufficient, they lacked arms and ammunition, and they asked the Great Powers to make good their needs in this respect. When Denikin

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. This appendix was identical with appendix 1 subject to the three amendments proposed by Mr. Lloyd George.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 65, minute 5.

<sup>6</sup> A Georgian representative.

had been prosperous he had imposed his authority in Daghestan, but, since Denikin's army had practically ceased to exist, Daghestan had been freed. Representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan had pressed the Powers to recognise the Government of Daghestan as a *de facto* Government in order to provide a buffer zone between them and the north. He wished to add one word as to one difference of opinion between the representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan. The Georgians, as could be understood from the situation of their country, expressed the opinion that the principal danger from Russia—whether from Denikin's forces or from the Bolsheviks—would come from along the coast of the Black Sea, and that there was no serious danger from the direction of the Caspian. The Azerbaijanians, however, whose State borders on the Caspian suggested exactly the reverse, and considered that the great danger came from that side. If the Bolsheviks, on the disbanding of Denikin's army, followed them as far as Derbend, they would easily take Baku, and the whole coast would be in danger. This danger was especially great, because some of the ships belonging to Denikin were frozen up, and there were no means of meeting an attack. There was only one ship there flying the British flag, and that would not be able to effect much.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked for details as to what they had said about Daghestan.

M. CAMBON said that they had asked that it should be recognised as a *de facto* Government.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that there were really four States in the Caucasus: the Russian Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan. The two former were Christian.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked of what kind. He understood from the Georgian Minister that they were Gregorians, but when he asked him what Gregorians were he said he did not know.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he believed that these tribes would put up a most formidable resistance to the Bolsheviks. It had taken the Russians a long time to conquer them in the past. The trouble was that Denikin had shown himself hostile to them and had bombarded some of their villages. We had tried to stop him, but we had not succeeded in doing so. It was satisfactory that the representatives of Georgia and the Azerbaijan had not asked for any troops. The Caspian fleet, which was now in Denikin's hands, required 1,500 sailors to man it. The question arose as to whether it was worth sending sailors if Denikin was willing to hand it over. Possibly, however, he might not be willing. The British had four battalions of troops at Batoum. The Government now had to consider whether they would take these away or leave them to stiffen the troops in the Caucasus. If they were useful, they might leave them there, but only if they were useful. The Aga Khan had told him that the Mahometans throughout the world would be very well pleased if the Powers would recognise Azerbaijan and Daghestan, which were Moslem States. He thought it would be worth while to send ammunition to the Caucasus.

M. CLEMENCEAU agreed, if there were any to send.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the British had plenty, and he thought the French also.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he thought it had all been given to the Soviets, through Denikin.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that a good deal of ammunition was now on its way to the Black Sea, and he would like to divert this from Denikin to the Caucasus. He believed also there were lots of material at Novorossisk, and this might be diverted to the Caucasus.

The question was adjourned to a later meeting, when Marshal Foch and Field-Marshal Wilson would be present.

*(The meeting adjourned at 11.20 a.m.)*

*Paris, January 16, 1920.*

#### APPENDIX I TO NO. 74

##### *Report of Committee appointed to consider the Reopening of certain Trading Relations with Russia*

The committee understands that it has been instructed to consider the practical details of a scheme for reconstructing trading operations with the whole of Russia without recognising officially the Bolshevik Government, and that, in particular, it is to examine how far it is possible for the co-operative organisations to assist in this process.

The following outline proposals, which are made after taking into consideration the suggestions put forward by M. Berkenheim, are recommended for adoption by the conference on the assumption that direct communications between Allied countries and territories occupied by Bolshevik forces are practicable:

1. The Allied Governments should inform the co-operative organisations that they are prepared to permit the exchange of goods, on the basis of reciprocity, between all Russia and Allied and neutral countries, and should invite these organisations to export surplus grain, food and raw materials from Russia so as to provide exchange for clothing and other goods needed by Russia.
2. The co-operative organisations would then communicate by wireless with their headquarters in Moscow, and enquire whether the co-operative movement was prepared to undertake the responsibility for handling the export and import of goods and whether such exchanges were practically possible. Representatives of the Paris or London office of the co-operative organisations would at once proceed to Moscow to discuss details.
3. The co-operative headquarters in Moscow would ascertain whether it would be permitted to export grain, flax, &c., and whether transport and other necessary facilities would be afforded to it.
4. On receipt of a reply, the co-operative headquarters would then communicate its decision to its Paris representatives.
5. If the co-operative headquarters are prepared to undertake the responsibility, M. Berkenheim and the other officials of the co-operative organisation would then be prepared to make definite contracts to supply grain, flax,

- &c., from Russia, provided that they were financed at the beginning up to 25 per cent. of the full value of the contracts either direct or through British, French or Italian co-operative organisations or private traders.
6. The balance of the credits required they would themselves provide from their own resources in London, Paris, &c., or by arrangement with the British, French or Italian co-operative movement or private bankers or traders.
  7. They would immediately proceed to start the shipment of goods purchased with these credits to the Black Sea or the Baltic ports, any loss falling on them if the goods were confiscated or destroyed.
  8. With regard to transport, the co-operative headquarters at Moscow would endeavour to secure at least four complete trains from the Bolsheviks for use to and from the Black Sea ports. If this was impossible, M. Berkenheim and his associates would utilise some of their credits for purchasing trucks and locomotives in Allied countries. They would, in any case, send out a number of motor-lorries to assist the railways.
  9. As soon as it became clear that grain started to be moved out of Russia and that the Bolsheviks were offering no resistance, the contracts would, of course, be considerably extended so as to cover the full amount of at least 1 million tons of grain, which it is estimated can be exported within a reasonable time.

E. F. WISE.  
A. KAMMERER.  
DELLA TORRETTA.

PARIS, *January 15, 1920.*

## APPENDIX 2 TO No. 74

### *Draft Press Communiqué*

The Supreme Council has taken up the question and has tried to remedy the cruel situation and isolation of the peoples in the interior of Russia, who find themselves deprived of all manufactured products and food from abroad as the result of the complete disorganisation that exists in the interior of Russia.

Qualified representatives of powerful co-operative societies, who extend their organisation and their union in all parts of Russia, and who have offices abroad, in particular, in London and in Paris, have been heard by the council of the Allies. Their proposal of trying to organise quite outside all political interference regular exchanges of merchandise (cereals and commodities and Russian raw material against clothes, shoes and manufactured products of all kinds, as well as medical stores), has been taken into consideration by the Supreme Council.

This humane attempt does not involve any modification of the Allied policy with regard to the Soviet Government. It is the interested individuals themselves who, quite independent of all Government action, will try to establish a current of exchanges which is so indispensable not only to the well-being of the inhabitants, but to their very life itself.

PARIS, *January 16, 1920.*

I.C.P. 19.] *Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Principal Powers, held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Friday, January 16, 1920, at 2.30 p.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: U.S.A.: The Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARIES, Mr. Harrison, Captain Winthrop.

*British Empire*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; SECRETARY, Sir M. Hankey.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARY, M. Massigli. A Stenographer.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

The following were also present:

*British Empire*: Mr. Wise.

*France*: M. Berthelot, M. Dutasta.

*Italy*: Marquis della Torretta.

*Hungary*: Count Apponyi, two other delegates.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

THE CHAIRMAN: I call upon the chairman of the delegation to speak.

COUNT APPONYI:<sup>2</sup> Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, I beg to thank you once more for having given us this opportunity of approaching you. I would frankly prefer a discussion--which would, in my opinion, be the only means of arriving at a proper idea and a clear knowledge of the complicated questions concerning ourselves--but as the Supreme Council has made up its mind in the matter, I have only to acquiesce and to accept the situation such as it is. In order not to trespass too much on your valuable time, I shall plunge into my subject at once.

Since yesterday we have been officially cognisant of the conditions of peace. I feel the immense responsibility resting on me, by reason of the fact that it is I who must speak the first words on the part of Hungary concerning these conditions.

I do not hesitate to tell you frankly that, unless certain essential alterations are made therein, the conditions of peace which you have been good enough to present to us appear to be unacceptable for my country. I have a clear knowledge and accurate perception of the dangers and ills which would be caused by refusal to sign this peace. And yet, if my country finds that it must choose between acceptance of the terms as they stand and refusal to sign, it would have to ask itself the question whether it would be worth while to commit suicide in order to escape death.

Fortunately, this stage has not yet been reached. You asked us to submit our remarks, and we had the honour to submit some of them even before the

<sup>1</sup> A variant text of this document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 872 f.

<sup>2</sup> An English text of the Hungarian version of the following statement by Count Apponyi is printed in *The Hungarian Peace Negotiations*, vol. i, pp. 310-17.

conditions of peace were handed to us. We feel confident that those remarks which have already been and those which have yet to be submitted will be considered by you as thoroughly and as seriously as the gravity of the matter admits and demands. We hope to be able to convince you. Our hope in this direction is the more real as we do not intend, either now or later on, to make a useless parade of our sentiments nor even to adopt an exclusive and irreconcilable attitude regarding the special interests entrusted to us for defence. We look for common ground where we may all meet and be able to come to an understanding. This common ground exists, Gentlemen; it is that of the great principles of international justice and of the liberty of nations which the Allied Powers have so clearly enunciated; it is that of the great and mutual interests of peace and of European stability and reconstruction.

It is from the point of view of these principles and interests that we should consider the conditions of peace suggested to us.

In the first place, it is impossible not to be struck by their extreme severity. Allow me to explain.

Somewhat rigorous conditions of peace have certainly been imposed on the other belligerent nations, Germany, Austria and Bulgaria. But none of them involved territorial adjustments affecting so essentially the very existence of the nations as those imposed on us.

In the case of Hungary, it would be a question of losing two-thirds of her territory and nearly two-thirds of her population, and would, moreover, mean that what remained of Hungary would lose almost all that was necessary to her economic prosperity, since this poor nucleus, separated from the surrounding districts which furnish the major part of her coal, ore, salt, timber, oil and bituminous gas, cut off from her sources of extra labour and from her Alpine pastures which contain her reserves of cattle, this poor nucleus, I say, would be deprived of all the resources and all the means of economic progress left to the country, while at the same time an enhanced production is demanded of her. In view of such a serious and exceptional situation, one wonders in what way the above-mentioned principles and interests can have required this special severity in the case of Hungary.<sup>3</sup>

It is from the standpoint of the great principles and interests referred to above that I touch upon this question with the greatest possible brevity.

Would it be an act of justice inflicted upon Hungary?

You, Gentlemen, whom victory enables to constitute yourselves judges, you have pronounced guilty your former enemies, the Central Powers, and you have decided that the consequences of the war shall fall upon those who were responsible for it. But then it seems to me that the punishment ought to be proportionate to the degree of culpability, and since it is Hungary on whom are inflicted the hardest conditions of peace, and those which strike most sharply at the very roots of her existence, one would imagine that it is she who is considered the most guilty nation of all. Now, Gentlemen, without

<sup>3</sup> The two paragraphs immediately preceding, and considerable extracts from the present text of the remainder of Count Apponyi's statement, are printed by D. Lloyd George: *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938), vol. ii, p. 963 f.

thoroughly threshing out this question, regarding which we shall submit documents to you, it seems to us at the outset that this verdict could not be pronounced upon a nation which, at the date of the outbreak of war, was not completely independent, which had only a partial influence on the decisions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and which, as is proved by the documents recently published by its representatives, exerted that influence against such measures as were likely to lead to war.

I do not think that it can be a question of a verdict, because a verdict implies proceedings in which the parties are heard under equal conditions and ought to have equal facilities for presenting their arguments. Now, Hungary has not been heard; it is therefore impossible that these conditions of peace should bear the character of a verdict.

Is it, Gentlemen, a question of an application of the principle of international justice with a view to creating, in place of a polyglot agglomeration such as was presented by Hungary, new formations, distributing the territories in a more just and equitable manner between the different nationalities and better assuring the liberty of each? Here once more, upon studying the facts, I am forced to doubt whether this can be the reason for these new arrangements.

In the first place, among these 11,000,000 persons whom it is wished to separate from Hungary, there are 35 per cent. of Magyars, three and a half million, if computed in the manner least favourable to the interests of our cause. There are approximately a million and a quarter Germans, which makes 45 per cent. of the total population which it is desired to cut off from Hungary. Not only would they not benefit by the application of the racial principle, but they would, on the contrary, suffer by it. Therefore, supposing—though I am far from admitting it—that in the case of the remaining 55 per cent. the racial principle were to be more justly applied than in Hungary of the past, that principle would still not find its application in the case of nearly one-half of the population separated from us. Now it seems to me that if there is a principle, that principle ought to be applied equally to all those affected by the provisions of the treaty.

But there is more than that to be said. If we consider the territorially augmented States that would arise from the ruins of former Hungary, we shall see that they would nearly all be better off from the racial point of view than was she.

I do not wish to weary you by quoting statistics, which will, moreover, be contained in the documents which we shall submit to you on this subject. But until you have had an opportunity of studying those documents, I beg you to admit my postulate in order to follow the arguments which I shall take the liberty of deducing from it.

I cannot see that the racial principle, the principle of national homogeneity, will gain from this amputation. It would have one sole consequence, which I take the liberty of mentioning without wishing to say anything in the least offensive to anyone whatever. I merely desire to state a fact. This consequence would be the transfer of national hegemony to races which, at the

present day, still stand on a lower level of civilisation, at any rate in the majority of cases.

I wish just to lay before you a very few figures:—

Among the Magyars, the proportion of those who know how to read and write is 80 per cent.; amongst the Germans in Hungary it is 82 per cent.; amongst the Roumanians, 33 per cent.; amongst the Serbians, 59 and a fraction per cent., nearly 60 per cent.

If we take the upper classes and consider those who have received a higher education, who have passed what is called in French the *baccalauréat*, those who have a degree of education equivalent to the *baccalauréat*, it will be seen that 40·84 per cent. of those who have received such an education and have obtained a degree equivalent to the *baccalauréat* are Magyars, who form 54 per cent. of the total population; 4 per cent. are Roumanians, who number 16 per cent. of the total population; and 1 per cent. or 2 per cent. are Serbs, who number 2·5 per cent. of the total population.

I repeat that I call attention to this fact with no intention of wounding the susceptibilities of anyone whomsoever. This state of affairs is explained by the very simple reason that these neighbouring nations, owing to the unhappy incidents of their history, entered later than we into the family of civilised nations. The fact, however, remains, and cannot be denied. It seems to me that this transfer of national hegemony to an inferior civilisation is not a matter of indifference from the point of view of the great intellectual interests of mankind. We have already been furnished with a proof of this contention. For at least a year past these neighbours who aspire to part of our territory have helped themselves to it by force. Under the terms of the armistice they had the right of military occupation, but they seized the whole machinery of government. The consequences are patent. In a special document which we shall submit to you, we shall enumerate all the destruction of objects of cultural value committed during this year. You will learn that two fine universities, one, that of Presburg, a former residence of the House of Savoy,<sup>4</sup> the other, that of Koloshvar, being somewhat less ancient, but both equal to all requirements of modern science, have both been destroyed. The professors have been expelled, and I should like you to see who have been installed in their stead. I would invite you to send commissions of savants to make a comparison and to ascertain the true state of affairs. It is impossible that these historical universities and faculties should thus disappear and be replaced by anything of an equal value. It is impossible to replace these great cultural institutions.

The same applies to the machinery of government, and to the teaching profession as a whole, from the highest to the lowest degree.

Some 200,000 children are already running about the streets in territory occupied by the Roumanians, deprived of any instruction whatsoever owing to the lack of teachers, Hungarian teachers having been removed and it being impossible to replace them.

<sup>4</sup> The text here is evidently incorrect and is not in accordance with the Hungarian version, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 312.

Finally, Gentlemen, I consider that, from the point of view of wide humanitarian interests, one cannot contemplate with indifference or with complacency this transfer of national hegemony to a race which, notwithstanding all its promise, stands on an inferior cultural level.

We have already seen that it is not an act of justice which appears to have given rise to the severe terms imposed on Hungary.

We have seen that the principle of nationality has nothing to gain thereby.

Is it possible that action was taken in the name of the liberty of nations?

If so, something must have been taken for granted—the conjecture that the non-indigenous races of Hungary would prefer to become part of a State belonging to those with whom they are racially akin, rather than to become citizens of the Hungarian State, with Magyar hegemony.

Granted—but it is nothing but a supposition. I beg to point out that, if conjecture is to be admitted, the opposite conjecture also holds good, i.e., that these 45 per cent. of Magyars and of Germans to be transferred to the new States might, just as validly, be considered as desirous of remaining members of the Hungarian State. It would merely be a case of changing preferences about. But why proceed by conjecture? Why act on a supposition, when one simple and unique means of settling the question remains, a means which we loudly claim should be applied? That means is the plebiscite.

In the name of the great principle, so well enunciated by President Wilson, that no group of people, no population, can be transferred from one State to another without being consulted, as though they were witless cattle,<sup>5</sup> in the name of this great principle—which is, moreover, an axiom full of good sense and desirable from the point of view of ethics—we ask for, we claim, the plebiscite for all parts of our country which it is desired to detach, and I hereby state that we are willing to abide by the results of such plebiscite, whatever they may be. We ask, of course, that it should be taken under conditions assuring absolute freedom.

This plebiscite is the more necessary as the Hungarian National Assembly (which will finally decide as to acceptance of the proposed conditions of peace) will be incomplete. The inhabitants of occupied territory will not be represented therein. And no Government, no National Assembly, is legally or morally entitled to dispose of the fate of any unrepresented population. Furthermore, the Treaty of Peace contains, under this head, expressions which would appear to anticipate difficulties. It states that: 'In so far as she is concerned, Hungary renounces . . .'.<sup>6</sup> This is approximately what the treaty says. But it would be impossible for us to come to any decisions of a legal or moral nature which would be binding upon any population unrepresented in the National Assembly.

I repeat that this is substantially the principal request which we submit to the Peace Conference. If all the arguments which we could adduce in favour

<sup>5</sup> Note in original: 'Is this quotation correct, or should the reference be to "pawns in a game"?—*Translator*.' (The English text of the Hungarian version here reads: '... as though they were a herd of cattle with no will of their own'.)

<sup>6</sup> Punctuation as in original.

of our former territory and of historical Hungary do not appear to be well founded, and if you consider none of them to be conclusive, we would ask you to enquire of the populations concerned, to refer to those whose lot is to be decided. We declare beforehand that we will abide by their verdict.

If we take up this standpoint, and if those who oppose us do not dare to submit their pretensions and their aspirations to this popular verdict, there is but one question to be asked: In whose favour would conjecture be?

There is yet another point of view from which the principle of self-determination can be considered. It may be said that the liberty and rights of national minorities will be more securely assured within the territory of the new nations than they used to be in Hungary.

I do not wish to remind you, Gentlemen, of the accusation levelled against Hungary with regard to the alleged oppression of non-Magyar races in that country. All that I can say is that we shall be only too pleased if our Magyar brethren are destined to enjoy, within the territory to be detached from us, all the rights and all the possibilities of self-expression which our fellow-citizens of non-Magyar nationality enjoyed in Hungary.

But that is a question which must be dealt with later on. It is not my task to discuss it at the present moment, nor would it be possible for me to do so, not having the indispensable documents at my disposal, but I am ready to discuss it at length, no matter where or when. I merely wish to say this, that if the Hungarian régime as regards nationality had been a thousand times worse than it was said to have been even by our most inveterate enemies, it would still have been infinitely preferable to what is going on in the districts occupied by our neighbours and their troops.

We shall lay before you, Gentlemen, a series of documents dealing with circumstances which are taking place, especially in Transylvania. We have carefully sifted all the information received on this subject; although we have obtained the evidence of the heads of the three Christian Churches in Transylvania, Catholic, Calvinist and Italian, we do not claim—we could not do so—that our unsubstantiated statement should be believed, since it is opposed by contrary statements; what we do ask is that you should go and see what is taking place, that you should send out a commission of experts, before you arrive at a final decision, in order that you may ascertain for yourselves what is happening in the region I have mentioned.

It is we, Gentlemen, who ask that light should be thrown on the subject; it is we who wish for no other decisions than those taken in full knowledge of the matter at issue, and our one further demand is that, in the extreme event of territorial adjustments being imposed on us, there should be a more efficacious and detailed arrangement for the protection of minorities than that contained in the draft treaty presented to us. In our opinion, the guarantees provided are absolutely insufficient. We are quite willing to apply them to all the non-indigenous populations remaining in Hungary. In this respect we are in entire accord with their representatives, but we believe that it will be difficult to obtain satisfactory guarantees on the part of our neighbours, whose racial zeal undoubtedly surpasses our own. Our present experiences

show us that that will be very difficult in the case of the withdrawal of the Roumanian troops as far as the line of demarcation, a withdrawal which we demanded and which our Government even made a condition for the despatch of the peace delegation to Paris. The language used by the Allied Powers to Roumania on this subject was so strong that it seems impossible that it should not be followed by actions. Nevertheless, that is what is happening. You will at once understand the anxiety we should feel regarding our kinsmen, our brothers, if they were to fall under this foreign domination.

Having finished the discussion of principles, the principle of international justice and that of the liberty of nations, and having found no application of those principles which would enlighten me as to the reasons for the conditions of peace which have been imposed on us, I ask myself whether they were inspired by those great interests that I mentioned in my opening words, the interests of peace and stability, and the interests of European reconstruction.

Gentlemen, the Hungarian problem does not represent such a slight proportion of this general problem as statistics may seem to you to indicate.

For centuries past, the territory which constituted and still legally constitutes Hungary, has played an extraordinarily important part in the maintenance of the peace and security of Europe, and especially of Central Europe. During the centuries preceding the acquisition of this territory by the Hungarians and their conversion to Christianity, there was never any rest, never any security for Central Europe, which was subject to every kind of barbarian incursion. It is only since the date when the rampart was constructed that security has existed. It is important in the general interests of stability and peace that the hotbed of disturbances formed by the east of Europe should not be extended, and that those disturbances should not reach the heart of Europe through the Balkan peninsula. Historical development having been arrested by the Turkish occupation, the balance has not yet been regained. Please Heaven, this state of things will soon be changed. It is therefore essential that these disturbances which have so often caused anxiety in Europe and which on several occasions led us within a hand's breadth of war, should not spread farther afield.

Historical Hungary has fulfilled this task of maintaining balance and stability, thus assuring the peace of Europe against immediate danger from the east. She has fulfilled it for ten centuries. She was able to do so thanks to her organic unity 'This country . . .'<sup>26</sup> I am quoting the celebrated French geographer, Elisé Reclu, 'this country enjoys the most perfect geographical unity which exists in Europe. Its systems of rivers and valleys, all converging from its frontiers to its centre, form a unit which can only be administered under one unified régime, all its parts being economically interdependent, the centre forming a vast agricultural workshop, whilst the surrounding districts contain everything necessary for the progress of agriculture.'

As I have already had the honour of informing you, the surplus population asks no better than to be supported by the proceeds of industrial work. This historical Hungary has the most natural geographic and economic unity to be found in Europe. In no direction can you trace any natural frontier on

her territory; you cannot separate any portion from her without injuring the remainder. That is why history has preserved this unity for ten centuries. You may challenge history as a principle of legal construction and I shall have no objection, but you cannot reject it as a witness when it says the same thing during the period of a thousand years. It is not an accident, it is the nature of things which is speaking. Hungary had all the conditions of organic unity with one exception, racial unity.

I have just said that a State created under the terms of this treaty from the ruins of Hungary would not possess greater racial unity, the sole principle of unity lacking in Hungary; and I may add that she would have no other unity. A State thus created by cutting through natural geographical lines would interrupt that fertile internal emigration which leads workers to those spots which offer the best opportunities of employment; it would cut the thread of traditions which, after all, create a common mentality among those who have lived together for centuries, have suffered the same reverses, have shared the same glory, the same success, the same progress, the same misfortunes. Is it not to be feared that instead of creating a centre of stability, one may create a continual hotbed of trouble, for we must be under no illusion in this respect; a new edifice would be undermined by far more dangerous irredentism than that which it is believed had been discovered in Hungary, which did indeed exist, but hardly penetrated to the masses; it would be undermined by the irredentism of nations which felt themselves to be subjected not only to foreign domination, but also to the hegemony of a civilisation inferior to our own. That is an organic impossibility. In extreme circumstances it might be conceived that even a national minority, with perhaps a higher degree of civilisation, might dominate a majority possessing an inferior degree of culture, but that a minority or a very slight majority having a lesser degree of culture should be in the dominating position, should be able to obtain the voluntary submission and moral assimilation of a majority possessing a higher degree of culture: that, Gentlemen, is an organic impossibility.

People are pleased to credit us with the intention of correcting by means of force anything which may not suit us in the arrangements concluded. We are far, Gentlemen, from nursing such insensate schemes. We await everything from the moral force of the truths and principles to which we appeal, and, as regards those things which we cannot obtain to-day, we expect everything from the pacific action of the League of Nations, the very mission of which is to remedy those international arrangements which are likely continually to jeopardise the maintenance of peace.

Having said this in passing, in order that my words may not be interpreted in the sense of a threat which would be as childish as it was futile, I declare to you, Gentlemen, that it is not possible, in that troublous part of Europe which is so important to the peace of the world, ever to arrive at pacification by political means. Internal peace alone can preserve Central Europe from the dangers constantly threatening the East.

Europe is still in need of economic reconstruction. Well, it is impossible

that economic progress should not be arrested by these new creations. I have demonstrated how this will necessarily be the case in the lands remaining to Hungary. But it will also be the case in the other portions detached from Hungary, for the simple reason that they would become subject to inferior administration, to the régime of a lesser degree of culture, and that they would be separated from the other portions of that organic unity with which they might progress in common, but without which they would be reduced in the most favourable event to stagnation, and in all probability to retrogression.

Europe has need of social peace. You are better acquainted than I with the dangers menacing social peace. You know better than I how far the effects of the war have upset minds and disorganised the conditions of economic life. Our unfortunate experience has been that the progress made by revolutionary tendencies is principally due to everything which shakes the moral forces of society, therefore to anything which exasperates national feeling, but, above all, to the miseries of unemployment. If you aggravate the conditions of labour in this part of Europe, which is very near to the ever-burning furnace of Bolshevism, if you act in such a way as to render more difficult the resumption of productive labour, you will increase the dangers threatening social peace. All barriers are powerless against epidemics, especially those of the moral order.

Very probably, Gentlemen, you will say that all these fine speculations are counter-balanced by one great fact—that of victory and the right to victory. We are aware of this. We are sufficiently practical in politics to reckon with this factor. We know what we have to pay to the victors. We are quite prepared to make good the price of our defeat. But is that to be the only principle of reconstruction? Is force alone now to be the foundation of the new edifice? Is material force to be the only thing destined to keep upright that which crumbles in the building? The outlook for Europe would, in that case, be a black one. Gentlemen, we cannot believe this; we cannot believe this to be the mentality of the victorious nations. We can find no hint of it in the declarations by which you defined the principles for which you fought, nor in the war aims proclaimed by you.

I say that this does not appear to us to be the mentality of the Great Powers who have emerged victorious. Do not take it amiss if, beyond France, England and Italy (to mention only victorious European nations), I see the shadow of that other France which always led the van of noble endeavour, which was ever the mouthpiece of splendid ideas, of that England which was the mother of all political liberty, of that Italy which was the cradle of the Renaissance and of arts and letters. And even as I accept, without murmuring, this law of the victor, I bow before that other France, that other England, that other Italy, accepting them willingly as our masters and teachers. And—let me lay stress on this, gentlemen—do not imperil the great moral influence which you are entitled to exercise, by forcing the note of that power which is now yours and which may suffer change. Do not let the finest portion of your inheritance be sullied in that way.

Notwithstanding all the difficulties with which we are beset, notwithstanding all misunderstandings and the obstacles which are placed in our way, we set confidently forth on the road which has as last been opened to us and which leads to participation in the work of peace, and we do so in absolute trust. We trust the sincerity of the principles which you have proclaimed: it would be an insult to do otherwise. We place our trust in the moral forces with which we wish to identify our cause, and I can wish you nothing better, gentlemen, than that the glory of your arms may be even surpassed by the glory of that peace which you are giving to the world.

Gentlemen, I have but little more to say.

You will understand that I cannot now plunge into a detailed examination of the draft treaty which you have handed to us. I have only referred to the territorial question because, strictly speaking, it includes all the others. But I should like to draw your attention to some points which ought, in my opinion, to be settled with all speed.

First place should be given to a humanitarian question, that of prisoners of war.

According to the terms of the treaty, repatriation of prisoners of war can only begin after ratification of the Treaty of Peace. I beg you, Gentlemen, to be good enough to set aside a formalism which causes suffering to many innocent families.

We have addressed a special request to the Supreme Council, with regard to the unhappy prisoners of war in Siberia. I appeal to your kindness and to your humanity for the settlement of this question, for they are sentiments which should out-soar politics, even during the most desperate times of war.

I should also like to make a remark with regard to the financial clauses.

In my opinion, the exceptional position of Hungary has not been sufficiently realised. That country has not only suffered two revolutions, but has also had to endure the ravages of Bolshevism for four months and to submit itself to Roumanian occupation for several months. In these circumstances, it becomes impossible for us to carry out the financial and economic clauses of the treaty, if (as is stated therein) all credits granted to us by citizens of the victorious Powers become payable immediately upon signature of the Treaty of Peace. If that is really so, it will spell insolvency and bankruptcy for us, and the victorious nations will certainly feel the effect thereof. We have many creditors in your various countries. They will be paid if we are given time to do this, but they will not be paid if the debts are to become payable immediately.

We are also required—and this proves how desirable it would have been to have heard us before—to supply iron ore to Austria. In view of the fact that we are ourselves obliged to import this ore, it will be impossible for us to supply it.

The same remark applies to timber used for building purposes.

These are details which I beg you to consider with that goodwill which has been promised us by several of your official representatives.

Before concluding, I should like to thank you, Gentlemen, for having

allowed me to speak, and for having accorded such kind and uninterrupted attention to my statement.<sup>7</sup>

THE CHAIRMAN: Plenipotentiary delegates of the Hungarian State, you will have seen with what attention we have followed the statement which has been made to us.

All the arguments which have been put before us will be carefully considered. But you must understand that we can arrive at no decision as the result of a one-sided statement. It is, therefore, my duty to remind you that we have handed you in writing the text of the Treaty of Peace which we propose to you. We await your reply before we can pronounce an opinion. We have offered you a period of fifteen days in order that you may study the treaty. We hope that that period will be sufficient to enable you to collect any documents that you may wish to submit to us and to put forward any observations that you may desire to make. We should be glad if you could give us an assurance that your reply would reach us within fifteen days.

COUNT APPONYI: I cannot give you that assurance, Mr. Chairman, but we shall do our utmost to enable our reply to reach you within that period. We shall be obliged to study the treaty in every detail, and doubtless to go to Budapest. If it is necessary, we shall ask you for a few days' prolongation; nevertheless, we shall make every effort in order not to be obliged to ask you for any extra time.

The questions on which we lay most weight are, the plebiscite of the populations which it is desired to separate from Hungary, and the despatch of inter-Allied commissions to the occupied districts, in order that you may ascertain the state of affairs created by a year's occupation.

THE CHAIRMAN: Does anyone else wish to speak?

The meeting is adjourned.

(*The meeting rose at 4.10 p.m.*)

<sup>7</sup> According to Mr. Lloyd George (op. cit., vol. ii, p. 963) Count Apponyi delivered the above statement in French and proceeded to repeat it, first in English and then in Italian. Cf. also *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 883.

## No. 76

I.C.P. 20.] *Notes of a Meeting held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Friday, January 16, 1920, at 4 p.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: U.S.A.: The Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARIES, Mr. Harrison, Captain Winthrop.

British Empire: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister; SECRETARY, Sir M. Hankey.

France: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Massigli.

Italy: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 885 f.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*Great Britain:* Mr. Wise.

*Italy:* Marquis Della Torretta.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

This meeting took place immediately after the reception of the Hungarian plenipotentiaries (see I.C.P. 19).<sup>2</sup>

1. MR. LLOYD GEORGE communicated to M. Matsui the report of the committee charged with the examination of the question of the commercial policy to be followed towards Russia and approved by the Council at its morning meeting (see I.C.P. 18).<sup>3</sup>

*Commercial Policy  
towards Russia*

M. MATSUI (having read the document): I shall communicate this report to my Government. It does not, however, seem to be of very great interest for Japan.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE handed to M. Clemenceau and Signor Nitti a draft communiqué to the press prepared by Mr. Philip Kerr and Mr. Wise.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I should like to make certain modifications of this draft, using for that purpose the draft prepared by M. Berthelot (see Appendix B to I.C.P. 18).<sup>4</sup>

After some discussion the draft communiqué to the press, as contained in Appendix A, was approved.<sup>5</sup>

2. M. MATSUI read the text of the note addressed to the Dutch Government concerning the surrender of Wilhelm II (see Appendix B).

*Surrender of  
Wilhelm II* M. CLEMENCEAU: The note will be delivered this evening at 6.30 p.m. to the Dutch Minister.

M. MATSUI: This is the first time that I have seen this document. The question has already been examined and a draft approved, but I cannot give my approval to the new text without first referring to my Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU: It is impossible to delay the communication which must be made to the Dutch Government.

MR. WALLACE: I myself have not known anything about this note.

<sup>2</sup> No. 75.

<sup>4</sup> No. 74, appendix 2.

<sup>5</sup> It appears that the Foreign Office had not been kept currently informed of the deliberations resulting in the issue of this communiqué. Thus on January 20, 1920, Lord Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, being in receipt only of press reports, represented in telegram No. 77 from the Foreign Office to Lord Curzon in Paris: 'Decision of Supreme Council published here on January 17 regarding trade with Soviet Russia is naturally giving rise to much speculation and it is desirable that it should be confirmed and amplified as soon as possible. We are particularly anxious to know the scope of the decision and the reasons which prompted it.' Lord Curzon replied in an unnumbered telegram of January 22 from Paris, marked 'Very confidential, not for circulation', in which he stated: 'Decision of Prime Ministers in Paris with regard to trade with Soviet Russia was taken by them in the absence of any Foreign Office representative, and after the circulation of paper by Wise (? have) withheld account of proceedings, vide minutes as kept by Hankey. Prime Minister took line in private conversation that this was not the affair of Foreign Office, but of Food Ministry, who should control procedure. Answer (? to your) question should therefore be sought from Hankey and Wise.'

<sup>3</sup> No. 74 (minute 2 and note 4).

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: This is a matter concerning the execution of a treaty which the United States has not yet ratified. The Allies can inform Mr. Wallace of their decisions upon the subject; but it is difficult for them to ask him to participate in the discussion.

MR. WALLACE: I would simply wish to point out that I was not concerned in the drafting of this document.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: When we hear the Hungarian plenipotentiaries we are concerned with the preparation of a new treaty; the presence of the American representative was therefore quite natural. In the other meeting, however, we were examining various measures of execution of a treaty which we have ratified; only the Powers who had ratified could participate in the discussion.

M. CLEMENCEAU: The note to the Dutch Government will be presented in the name of the council, but not in the name of the United States, which have not ratified the treaty, nor in that of Japan, which has not yet approved the draft. M. Matsui can, if he so desires, address a note on the subject to the secretariat general, or present his remarks at the next meeting; they will then be recorded in the minutes.

*(The meeting then adjourned.)*

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 76

##### *Note respecting the Decision to Permit the Exchange of Goods on a Basis of Reciprocity between the Russian People and Allied and Neutral Countries*

With a view to remedying the unhappy situation of the population of the interior of Russia, which is now deprived of all manufactured products from outside Russia, the Supreme Council, after having taken note of the report of a committee appointed to consider the reopening of certain trading relations with the Russian people, has decided that it would permit the exchange of goods on the basis of reciprocity between the Russian people and Allied and neutral countries. For this purpose it decided to give facilities to the Russian co-operative organisations which are in direct touch with the peasantry throughout Russia, so that they may arrange for the import into Russia of clothing, medicines, agricultural machinery and the other necessities of which the Russian people are in sore need, in exchange for grain, flax, &c., of which Russia has surplus supplies.

These arrangements imply no change in the policy of the Allied Governments towards the Soviet Government.

PARIS, January 16, 1920.

#### APPENDIX B TO NO. 76

##### *Note to the Queen of Holland [sic] demanding the Delivery of the Kaiser for Trial*

The Powers, in communicating herewith to the Government of the Queen the text of article 227 (certified copy annexed hereto)<sup>6</sup> of the Peace Treaty with Germany, which was put into force on the 10th January, 1920, have, at the same time,

<sup>6</sup> Not annexed to original of this appendix.

the honour to advise that they have decided to enforce the provisions of that article without delay.

Consequently, the Powers address the official request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to the Allies of William of Hohenzollern, ex-Emperor of Germany, in order that he may be put on trial.

As the persons residing in Germany against whom complaint has been lodged by the Allied and Associated Powers must be surrendered to them in compliance with article 228 of the Treaty of Peace, the ex-Emperor, if he had remained in Germany, would have been surrendered under the same conditions by the German Government.

The Dutch Government is aware of the unassailable reasons which imperatively demand that the premeditated violations of international treaties, as well as systematic disregard of the most sacred rules of international law, suffer, irrespective of persons, no matter of how high position, the penalties provided for by the Peace Congress.

The Powers call attention, among other crimes, to the cynical violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg, the barbarous and merciless hostage system, the mass deportations of populations, the carrying away of the young women of Lille, torn from their families and thrown defenceless into the most promiscuous environment, the systematic devastation without military justification of entire territories, the unrestricted submarine warfare, including the inhuman abandon of victims on the high seas, the innumerable acts committed by the German authorities against non-combatants in contempt of the laws of war, &c. The responsibility for all these acts, at least the moral responsibility, lies with the supreme chief who commanded and who took advantage of his power to break, or to permit to be broken, the most sacred rules of the human conscience.

The Powers cannot conceive that the Dutch Government could consider the tremendous responsibility of the ex-Emperor with less disapproval than they themselves.

Holland would not be fulfilling her international obligations if she refused to join the other nations within the means at her disposal in carrying out or at the very least in not hindering the punishment of the crimes committed.

In addressing this request to the Government of the Netherlands, the Powers deem it their duty to dwell especially on the particular character of this request. It is the duty of the Powers to ensure the execution of article 227 without being held back by argumentation, because the case under discussion does not fall within the lines of a public accusation of a fundamentally legal nature, but it is an act of high international policy, imposed by the conscience of the universe, for which the procedure was provided in order to give the accused such guarantees as have never been known before in international law.

The Powers are convinced that Holland, a country that has always asserted its respect of law and its love of justice, and which, among the first, asked for a place in the League of Nations, will not attempt to help cover with her moral authority violations of the essential principles of the solidarity of nations, all equally interested in preventing the return of a similar catastrophe.

The people of the Netherlands have the highest interest in not appearing to protect or to shelter the principal author of these crimes on their territory, and in facilitating the trial which the voices of millions of victims demand.

PARIS, *January 15, 1920.*

I.C.P. 21.] *Notes of a Meeting held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Monday, January 19, 1920, at 10.30 a.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: U.S.A.: The Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARIES, Mr. Harrison, Captain Winthrop.

*Great Britain*: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, The Right Hon. W. S. Churchill, Secretary of State for War, The Right Hon. Walter Long, First Lord of the Admiralty; SECRETARY, Sir. M. Hankey.

*France*: M. Clemenceau; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Arnavon, M. Massigli.

*Italy*: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned: -

*Great Britain*: Admiral Earl Beatty, First Sea Lord, Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson, Bart., C.I.G.S., Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Carr.

*France*: M. Cambon, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, M. Laroche, M. Kammerer, M. Hermitte, M. de Montille.

*Italy*: General Cavallero, Colonel Castoldi, Marquis della Torretta.

*Japan*: M. Sawada.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mautoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU: The first question that arises is that of the telegram that ought to have been sent dealing with the arrangement with the Russian co-operatives. That telegram has not been sent. *Commercial Policy with Russia* Why?

M. KAMMERER: We were waiting for instructions on the point. Last night M. Berthelot told me that the telegram could be sent. I stated that, for my own part, we had no objection to its despatch.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Were you in a position to raise objections to the despatch of that telegram?

M. KAMMERER: Not at all, but I had to say that I had not had instructions and that I was awaiting them. In any case the telegram is ready and is going to be sent.

SIGNOR NITTI: To arrange the details of execution of the question in the best way possible, it would be well to send it to the Supreme Economic Council.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I am in entire agreement. All that ought to be done by the Economic Council and not by the Foreign Ministers.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We are then agreed upon that.

It was decided:

That economic questions involving the commercial policy of the Allies in Russia should be dealt with by the Supreme Economic Council.

<sup>1</sup> This document is published in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 889 f.

Mr. Wallace would refer the present resolution to Washington for the instructions of his Government.

2. M. CLEMENCEAU: We will go on [to] the Caucasian question. I think that Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson or Marshal Foch ought first to be heard.

*Situation in  
the Caucasus*

MARSHAL FOCH: A question on this subject was put to the Inter-Allied Military Committee at Versailles;<sup>2</sup> the committee pronounced an opinion. It is to that opinion that I am now going to refer.

M. CLEMENCEAU: You mean, I take it, the pronouncement of the 12th January; that has been circulated; everybody here knows it; have you nothing to add to that? (See Appendix.)

MARSHAL FOCH: No, Mr. President, I have nothing to add unless it be that since that time the situation cannot have appreciably changed, that in any case, if it has changed, that can only be to our disadvantage, and consequently that the restrictions we formulated are perhaps even more justified at the present moment.

SIR HENRY WILSON: I also am in the position of having nothing to add.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: What is necessary at the very outset is to collect all available information so as to be in a position to discuss the matter profitably later on.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We are agreed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The military advice, if I have understood it correctly, is that no barrier consisting of less than three divisions would be effective against the Bolsheviks; and Lord Beatty could not send his sailors unless there were already assurance of such effective military measures.

LORD BEATTY: I have nothing to add to that statement of the situation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The situation may be regarded from another point of view. With the object of holding up the Bolsheviks, would it be any good to supply the Caucasian Republics of Azerbaijan, Daghestan and Georgia with guns and war *matériel*? And, if so, ought it to be done immediately?

MARSHAL FOCH: That question is very difficult to answer from here. Only an officer on the spot would be in a position to say what effective force those countries can muster and whether therefore it is worth while supplying them with anything whatsoever.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Does the marshal suggest entrusting such a mission to an Allied general?

MARSHAL FOCH: There is an English general with Denikin and the French General Mangin is also there.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: But what I want now is military advice. We have already been asked to send *matériel* to those tribesmen. I want to know if that is militarily expedient.

MARSHAL FOCH: I am entirely without information as to whether those populations are ready to receive *matériel* and to employ it to advantage or

<sup>2</sup> See No. 54, minute 3.

whether all that we might send would not simply fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

SIR HENRY WILSON: In the meeting that took place the day before yesterday and at which we examined the defence of the Batoum Baku line, the conclusion was reached that unless the British navy effectively held the Caspian, that line could not be effectively defended: and, inversely, that unless there existed the means of defending that line, it was impossible to send naval forces into the Caspian. For that matter, unless the Caspian is occupied and held, Baku will certainly fall.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I take it then to be Sir Henry Wilson's advice that we ought not to send war material to those peoples to help them to defend themselves against the Bolsheviks.

SIR HENRY WILSON: That, Sir, is undoubtedly my opinion, if the Caspian is not effectively held by the British navy. I should then send nothing.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: I entirely agree with Sir Henry's opinion on that point. Indeed, if the Caspian were not held, all that we might send would almost immediately pass into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

LORD CURZON: I should like to add a word. If, as General Wilson says, an Allied military expedition could not succeed, then obviously we ought not to send one, but the present question, it seems to me, is not so comprehensive. I have been speaking with the representatives of the Caucasian republics who are at this moment in the adjoining room. They have told me already that the Bolsheviks will attack them; they are anxious to defend themselves, provided we supply them with food, arms and munitions. So supplied, they believe that the danger could be averted. Without supplies, their fall, they say, is inevitable. In any case I suggest that we take no decision upon the matter without first of all hearing them.

MARSHAL FOCH: I repeat my question: can we inform ourselves sufficiently here? I am willing to accept the discussion which ought to be profitable, but I think that we cannot have really adequate information unless we send actually on to the spot a representative of the Allied Powers.

M. CLEMENCEAU: The reason for your remark is, I believe, that you did not quite understand what has just been said, to wit, that the representatives of the republics of the Caucasus are at present within the building and that it would be possible to hear them now.

(The representatives of the Republic of Georgia, MM. Tshaidze, Tseretelli and Avalov, and of Azerbaijan, MM. Topchibachev and Magaramov, were then introduced.)

M. CLEMENCEAU: Gentlemen, the conference has been discussing the urgency of sending to Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaijan, food, arms and ammunition. We are told that you can give us information about an intended Bolshevik attack upon your people and of the means at your disposal for defence. We wish to know if at this juncture you would be in a position to exploit the help that we might be able to send you. We are quite disposed to do something effective, but we want to know the present state of your

countries and whether such aid would be effectively used against the Bolsheviks, or whether it is more likely to happen, as it did with Denikin, that the Bolsheviks would be strong enough simply to capture from you the *matériel* sent and thus to make matters worse.

M. TSERETELLI: I speak in the name of the Georgian delegation as well as in that of the delegation of Azerbaijan. We are equally likely to be attacked by the Bolsheviks, but we do not know whether we shall be or not. Were we helped by the *Entente*, the Bolsheviks might hesitate to attack us. In any case, we need the material assistance of the Great Powers if we are to defend ourselves.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Am I to understand that you are asking us to send troops also?

M. TSERETELLI: That would be better still; but the mere fact of being protected on the sea and receiving the arms, munitions and food we require would be an invaluable help. The state of mind of our people is such that, should the Bolsheviks attack, and if at the same time we received the material support of the *Entente*, we hope to defeat every attack. But such material aid is necessary immediately. We would like in any case to point out that the present situation in the Caucasus is dangerous from the point of view of the morals [*?* morale] of the populations. When Denikin was in our land, our despairing peoples fought his troops by every means in their power, and a current of sympathy with the Bolsheviks appeared. To-day, our people see their independence recognised and we are convinced that all the forces of the Highlanders will be used to resist a Bolshevik invasion and to defend our independence. It is under those circumstances that we build so much hope upon receiving help from the Supreme Council. We do not wish war: we are even ready to come to an agreement if that were possible with the Bolsheviks, but only upon the condition that they also recognise our independence.

M. CLEMENCEAU: You would really sign an agreement with the Bolsheviks?

M. TSERETELLI: Yes, on condition that they pledged themselves not to invade our country and that they did not try to introduce propaganda among our people. But I must repeat, if we were strong, and the *Entente* were to help us, the Bolsheviks would be obliged to recognise our independence and give up their attempts.

I should nevertheless like to point out that there are three Transcaucasian Republics—Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. We would like to know why Armenia has not received *de facto* recognition. That recognition would help us all and render easier resistance to any aggression whatsoever. But, in short, it is in immediate help that our hope of resistance lies.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How many men can Azerbaijan put into the field?

M. MAGARAMOV: A military law has been passed by our Parliament; assuming that we have the necessary arms and munitions, we shall be able to put into the field some 100,000 men.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Have you the troops at the moment?

M. MAGARAMOV: We have a little army, in the command of a native

Azerbaijan general, about 50,000 strong, perhaps more, disciplined; but there are only from 10,000 to 12,000 of these men with arms.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: And in Georgia?

M. TSERETELI: We have about 16 battalions of regular troops, each 600 strong, and nearly 15,000 men of the National Guard. These are well-disciplined troops. In a fortnight we could mobilise 50,000 men if we had the necessary arms and munitions. But on the other hand, in a war for independence we could count upon the support of our whole people, among whom national enthusiasm runs very high. I am myself not a military specialist; but, if the Supreme Council wishes quite accurate information we can ask our Government by telegraph to supply it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Is compulsory military service the system obtaining in Georgia?

M. TSERETELI: Yes, and in the Russian army Georgian officers were considered the best. Our troops too were among the flower of the Russian army.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Have the young men of Azerbaijan received military instruction?

M. MAGARAMOV: There was no compulsory military service with us; but at the beginning of the war there were organised detachments of volunteers who distinguished themselves in the Iron Division. We had remarkable officers and generals. It was only two years ago that our republic was constituted. Henceforth all our youth must serve with the colours.

LORD CURZON: Reports that I have received say that a certain number of officers of Azerbaijan are Turkish officers. Does the presence of these Turkish officers in the army leave us the guarantees necessary in a fight against the Bolsheviks?

M. MAGARAMOV: After the conquest of Azerbaijan by Russia a great part of the population emigrated twenty-five years ago to Turkey. Later on, when the Turkish army invaded the Caucasus, a certain number of its officers were natives of our country and of Daghestan. Among these, some fifty preferred to remain in Azerbaijan, but they are native Caucasians, and we can be certain that they, like all our populations, will use their whole energy in fighting the Bolsheviks for the defence of our independence.

M. TOPCHIBACHEV: We, the inhabitants of Azerbaijan, dread Bolshevism even more than do our Georgian neighbours. We have had an experience of it. The Bolsheviks occupied our country for four months. I myself, head of a Transcaucasian committee, was a prisoner with them for two months and a half.

The danger threatens us from two sides—from the north and from the Caspian. On the Caspian side we hope that the English, who have a naval base at Enzeli, will give us, perhaps, marines and, in any case, arms and munitions. As for the northern frontier, we believe that in order to protect the whole of Transcaucasia, and especially Azerbaijan, it is expedient to recognise the Republic of the Highlanders,<sup>3</sup> which would then form a buffer

<sup>3</sup> i.e. Daghestan.

State against Bolshevik attacks. These Highlanders are, indeed, a very brave people.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Did the fight against Denikin take place in Georgia or Daghestan?

M. TSERETELLI: Denikin invaded Daghestan and the fight developed between the Highlanders and him. As for Georgia, it has always been threatened by Denikin; we displayed our sympathy with the Highlanders, who were defending themselves against him.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Why did Denikin attack Daghestan?

M. TSERETELLI: Denikin looked upon Daghestan and all Transcaucasia as Russian provinces. He judged it easier to invade those territories than to fight the Bolsheviks; it was against the peoples of the Caucasus that he turned the arms which were supplied to him to maintain the fight against the army of the Soviets.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: For that attack had he great forces at his disposal?

M. TSERETELLI: His forces were fairly large, how large I cannot say, exactly. Anyhow, he had to use a great many men in maintaining the strife of factions in which the Highlanders involved him. The fight lasted nearly a year; I do not know whether it is not still going on. We have no recent news. I believe that Denikin has issued an appeal to his troops. Whatever may be the number of his forces, they are disorganised and demoralised and are doubtless no longer worth very much.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: What is the Cossack's attitude towards Denikin?

M. TSERETELLI: According to reports we have received from Tiflis, confirmed by M. Bitch, president of the Kouban delegation, who is in Paris, great discontent reigns among the Kouban population; it is possible that the discontent is already receiving some direction. In the existing situation the Red army is able to invade Kouban. But resistance to the Bolsheviks is being organised under the direction of M. Magaramko, the President of the Rada of Kouban. But it is still necessary to have the guarantee that it is not Denikin who will profit by the defeat of the Bolsheviks.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How long has the Kouban delegation been in Paris?

M. TSERETELLI: For a year.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Is there a Separatist movement in Kouban?

M. TSERETELLI: That is the political tendency of the Kouban delegation, which is keeping in touch with its own country. That delegation presented to the conference a memorandum asking for recognition of the independence of the Kouban Republic.

SIGNOR NITTI: If I have properly understood M. Tseretelli, the real objective of Denikin's army is the reconstitution of the old centralised Russia, rather than the defeat of the Bolsheviks—is M. Tseretelli quite sure about that?

M. TSERETELLI: I am certain. I do not know Denikin's personal ideas, but the unanimous opinion was that, had he managed to defeat the Bolsheviks, he would immediately have turned all his efforts towards the reduction of those nations whose independence has been proclaimed. That is not merely my

conviction, it is that of all those independent States of which I speak and which defended themselves against him. It is the conviction also of our Azerbaijan neighbours.

SIGNOR NITTI: Do you believe that the recognition of the Caucasian republics, which exist already, or which will be recognised later, could arouse the spirit of resistance in the country?

M. TSERETELLI: I am convinced that that recognition will strengthen resistance to all aggression from whatever side the aggression comes. We entertain the high hope that after the first step which has just been taken, the Supreme Council will go to the full length of recognising our republics *de jure*. That is the hope that sustains the courage of our peoples and our Governments; our population will display all the more zeal, as they know that this *de jure* recognition will come about.

As for Denikin's policy, he has declared officially several times that he did not recognise the right of our nations to self-determination; in his eyes, we still constitute mere provinces of the old Tsarist Russia.

M. MAGARAMOV: The Georgian delegate, in explaining the dangers that might menace his country from the direction of the Black Sea, has shown that on that side the *Entente* could send ships of war. But for us, on the Caspian, the situation is entirely different. Sending ships of war there cannot be thought of. There is a Bolshevik fleet to the north of Petrovsk and a small fleet of Denikin's between Petrovsk and Baku; finally, at Enzeli, there is an English ship with some small gunboats.

Recently, the Azerbaijan Government protested against the allocation of a fleet to Denikin; but, at the present moment the volunteer army is beaten and the crews of his fleet, who manifested sentiments of sympathy with the Bolsheviks, are going possibly to join them; hence will arise a danger for Baku and for the defence of all Transcaucasia. That is why we should be happy if the conference would be good enough to take the necessary measures to prevent Denikin's joining the Bolshevik fleet.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Could you garrison Baku if you were given the arms? How many men could you find to defend that town?

M. MAGARAMOV: There is a strong garrison at Baku already.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Of how many men?

M. MAGARAMOV: We do not know now, as for two months direct communications have been cut off. Within that time the strength of the garrison may have varied. However that may be, two months ago there were 7,000 men in Baku, all natives of Azerbaijan, of which State Baku is the capital.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Why did Denikin not receive the support of the peasants in Ukraina? Why did they abandon him?

M. TSERETELLI: I think that Denikin was considered in Ukraina the representative of the counter-revolutionary movement which was going to take the land from the peasants and restore it to the nobility. He was looked upon as a man who had placed the Ukraine under the yoke of a centralised Government reminiscent of Tsarism. In fact, both from the social and from the national points of view, the peasants looked upon Denikin as the enemy.

To avoid all misunderstanding, allow me to supplement what I said a little while ago. I spoke of Kouban. I am not qualified to make known here the aspirations of its population, and I cannot say whether the Separatist movement is very strong in that region or whether it is merely destined to avert the possibility of a civil war. In any case, I should not like to give the impression that the cause of Azerbaijan and of Georgia ought to be considered from the same standpoint as that of Kouban. As you know, our populations are, from the national point of view, quite different. For centuries they have lived as independent States. I want it to be clearly understood that all I have said has merely the value to be attached to the information that can be given by a man who has read the newspapers. There is a Kouban delegation in Paris; only that delegation is in a position to speak precisely upon the national aspirations.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: Was the Kouban delegation regularly appointed by the Rada?

M. TSERETELLI: Yes, and its president is the President of the Rada. He is M. Bitch, a man very well known in the Caucasian world. He has been here for nearly a year.

(At this point the representative[s] of Georgia and of Azerbaijan left the conference.)

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: Could Marshal Foch tell us whether he looked upon the question of the defence of the Caucasus as a problem standing by itself or as a part of the problem of the general defence against Bolshevism?

MARSHAL FOCH: I have not considered the problem exclusively from the former point of view. To me it seems obvious that that question is part of the general problem of the defence against Bolshevism.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: On which side are the forces at present threatening the Caucasus most formidable, Denikin's or the Bolshevik?

MARSHAL FOCH: I believe that Denikin's forces may be considered so far reduced that in a short time they will not exist, but I have no precise information. I have still less information about the Bolshevik army; but it is beyond question that Bolshevism is in the ascendant, that it is led by a great number of German officers, who, having no occupation at home, are going to gain their living elsewhere. We can therefore count upon seeing it still carried on by its own momentum; I would not say victorious, but at least penetrating various countries under different guises. In those circumstances, it is high time to establish, wherever we can, at least a barrier.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: Does Marshal Foch consider Poland in danger? Is he aware of concentrations of Bolshevik forces in that direction? And assuming that Denikin's forces disappear, does he think it probable that Poland will be attacked. In that case, when might the attack take place?

MARSHAL FOCH: I do not know that Bolshevik concentrations or attacks are in preparation, but that is quite possible at some undefined future date. Considering the extent of their resources, that seems all the easier; the Bolsheviks are going to have at their disposal vast territories of enormous resources, and also, as I already said, German officers who will imprint a

military stamp upon bands hitherto rather loosely organised. There is therefore every reason for apprehension. I do not know that they are going to attack Poland, but such an attack might well take place. When it does they may easily be strong enough to get the better of the Polish army. Were Russia to recover all its former vast area, any calamity is possible unless serious precautions are taken to meet it. In a word, it is necessary to confront a vast Bolshevik Russia with strong, united efforts. It is not by Poland alone that it must be resisted, but by every State which can collaborate in the effort.

The forces that can be opposed to the Bolsheviks are those of scattered republics, organised or unorganised. Passing from Azerbaijan by the Caucasus there are Georgia, Bessarabia, Poland, Esthonia, Latvia—all new States which might be placed in a very difficult situation if they were abandoned. If, on the contrary, they are taken in hand, it is possible to succeed in establishing a system of military forces powerful enough to hold Bolshevism in check.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Do you propose a military *entente* between these different States with the object of attacking Soviet Russia, or, on the contrary, with the object of common defence in case the Bolsheviks attack?

MARSHAL FOCH: The first thing to be done is to stop the advancing Bolshevism and to consolidate the States which have just been founded. It is a matter of establishing a defensive organisation, a safety belt to protect Central Europe against the advance of the Bolsheviks. That is the goal to be reached first of all.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: You would not then propose equipping the Polish army to enable it to enter Russia?

MARSHAL FOCH: No, and I go further still. Even if the Polish army were equipped it could not accomplish that task. If I were asked for my opinion I should only propose to realise an *entente* between Poland, Roumania, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia and Finland. An *entente* in the first instance, political, with the object of arresting the progress of Bolshevism. That league the Transcaucasian countries would join and Bolshevism would thus be surrounded.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Do you know whether the Bolsheviks are preparing to attack those countries?

MARSHAL FOCH: That one cannot know till after the event.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Could you now mention a single one of those countries against which the Bolsheviks contemplate a military attack?

MARSHAL FOCH: When that attack takes place, I shall be in a position to reply. I could not do so beforehand.

(At this point the military experts left the conference.)

LORD CURZON: I should like to explain why, when recognition was given to Georgia and Azerbaijan, it was not also given to Armenia. I myself was responsible for the original proposal that Georgia and Azerbaijan should be recognised.<sup>4</sup> Why I did not propose at the same time to recognise Armenia was that the question of Armenia had still to be decided by the Treaty of

<sup>4</sup> See No. 65, minute 5.

Peace with Turkey. It was felt that to give recognition at that time would be to anticipate the work of the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, there are now strong reasons for giving recognition to Armenia. The present Armenian State forms part of the old Russian Empire with its capital, Erivan, just as did Georgia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Armenian State is prepared to join in the defence of the Transcaucasian States against the Bolsheviks. Consequently, I think it would be just and wise to give it recognition on the clear understanding that that does not prejudice the ultimate delimitation of Armenia, the boundaries of which have still to be decided in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Are there any objections? As there are none, we therefore agree to recognise the Armenian Republic on the condition just proposed by Lord Curzon.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: The decision we have just taken, being of a diplomatic and political nature, does not solve the military problem. The present situation of the Armenian Republic, like that of the other Caucasian republics, remains precarious; attacked by Turks on the south, and threatened on the north by the Bolsheviks, its complete extinction is a possibility to be reckoned with.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I am informed that the United States Treasury has made a recommendation to Congress that the sum of 25 million dollars should be allotted to Armenia. The recommendation has still to be considered by Congress and the Senate, but I understand that it will probably be adopted. That will be a very material help.

MR. WALLACE: I believe that Mr. Lloyd George's statement is accurate.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: That is one very important matter settled. We have now to decide what support, if any, ought to be given to the Caucasian States. Marshal Foch has said that three divisions are necessary. The British Government cannot possibly spare these.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Neither can we.

SIGNOR NITTI: Italy, too, cannot send any.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We must then find out whether we can send arms and munitions.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: That question is bound up with the Caspian problem.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: That question does not quite arise at the moment, but may be considered later on. I do not see that any harm can come of sending arms and supplies. Before the Bolsheviks can reach the Caucasus, they have to pass through the most productive provinces of Southern Russia; consequently they would have no need to capture any food we might send to the Caucasus. As for war *matériel*, the Reds already have so many rifles that the capture of 25,000 or 50,000 more would not make much difference; they have captured from General Denikin some 600 guns, many of them made in Great Britain, and they have also captured some excellent tanks. In these circumstances, the danger from supplying a certain number of guns and rifles to the Caucasian States is not very great. These people claim that they

can put up a good enough fight to impress upon the Bolsheviks that it is not worth their while to attack. The chances are, too, that the Bolsheviks do not want to wage a big fight in those regions except in order to secure Baku. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion to supply the Transcaucasian republics with all the material aid asked for, on the express condition that the Caucasian States will resist the Bolsheviks and garrison Baku with all their strength.

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL: I hope that any grant of arms to the Caucasian States will not be deducted from the final 'packet' of supplies to be sent to General Denikin.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I should like to point out that the final 'packet' to Denikin is purely a British affair.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Our immediate question is whether arms should now be sent or whether further enquiries on the spot should be made first of all. I myself agree with Mr. Lloyd George, and I think that the council has already sufficient information on the subject. Under these circumstances, I agree with Mr. Lloyd George's proposal. That, I think, is the decision that ought to be communicated to the military experts, telling them we have decided to send war *matériel* to the Caucasus as quickly as possible; and they should be asked to deal with the question of quantity and the means of despatch.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I am in entire agreement.

SIGNOR NITTI: The Italian Government cannot undertake in this matter any engagement at all, either in men or arms, since to do so would be contrary to a law which has been passed in the Italian Parliament by all parties, including the Conservatives, almost unanimously. The gist of that law is that Italy can take no part in any intervention against *de facto* Governments, such as that of Russia. The object of the Italian Chamber is to prevent the Bolshevik Government from increasing its strength as a Nationalist Government. Unfortunately, the Bolshevik Government has already assumed a sort of Nationalist character.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We are going to send that *matériel* to *de facto* Governments; that cannot be regarded as intervention in Russian affairs, as assistance to Kolchak or Denikin might be.

SIGNOR NITTI: Intervention in favour of the one or the other is for us impossible. I must conform to the vote of the Italian Chamber.

LORD CURZON: If my information is correct, there is, nevertheless, a precedent for Italian intervention. Some time ago Italy sent arms to the Daghestan, whose cause found warm support in the Italian mission; on the other hand, my information is that much is hoped from the Italian aid at Baku and in the Daghestan.

SIGNOR NITTI: I cannot do anything officially. There are some Italian interests in Georgia, and I believe that Italian volunteers have gone there. Probably I will be able to help this move; it will be impossible, however, to send regular troops, or even to send any *matériel* officially; if I did, I would have the Italian Government against me, even the Conservatives.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: It does not matter very much whether the arms are sent officially or unofficially, so long as they reach the Caucasian States.

SIGNOR NITTI: I may say very confidentially that I could supply arms and war *matériel* if Great Britain or France will take the responsibility of sending them.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We agree.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We decide then to accept, in principle, the supply of war *matériel* and food to the republics of the Caucasus, and to refer to the military experts for their solution of the problem just put.

LORD CURZON: Whom do you mean by 'military experts'?

M. CLEMENCEAU: In practice that would be Marshal Foch and Field-Marshal Wilson, since officially we cannot include an Italian representative. If that is done, it ought to be possible to reach a conclusion within forty-eight hours.

It was decided:

1. That the Government of the Armenian State should be recognised as a *de facto* Government on condition that this recognition in no way prejudiced the question of the eventual frontiers of that State.
2. That the Allied Governments are not prepared to send to the Transcaucasian States the three divisions contemplated by the Inter-Allied Military Council.
3. To accept the principle of sending to the Transcaucasian States arms, munitions, and, if possible, food.
4. That Marshal Foch and Field-Marshal Wilson are requested to consider of what these supplies should consist, and the means for their despatch.

Mr. Wallace will refer the present resolution to Washington for instructions.

M. Matsui also reserves the acceptance of his Government with regard to paragraph 1.

## APPENDIX TO NO. 77

### Document 1

ALLIED MILITARY COMMITTEE, BRITISH SECTION, PARIS, *January 12, 1920.*

The British delegation has prepared a memorandum on the situation created in the Caucasus by the defeat of General Denikin's armies, and of the measures to be taken to enable the Caucasian republics to offer a resistance to the junction of the Bolshevik and Mussulman forces across their territories.<sup>5</sup>

After a preliminary examination of the question the Allied Military Committee is of the following opinion:—

If it has not been possible to overcome Bolshevism on its own soil, it should be possible to arrest it on certain dangerous routes, such as that of the Caucasus.

<sup>5</sup> See No. 54, minute 3, and document 2 below.

With this end, the organisation of a military barrier on the line of the Caucasus could well be considered.

In view of the unstable condition of the local Governments and of the immature condition of their military forces, this barrier should first of all be organised by European troops, whose strength might be fixed at two divisions.

Eventually these European troops could be relieved by local forces, as soon as the latter shall have been reconstituted, organised and provided with the necessary armament.

Beyond financial and material provision, this organisation of the defensive barrier of the Caucasus would require time (a minimum of three months should be allowed).

It would be advisable, therefore, to undertake it without delay.

In the meantime the elements of General Denikin's armies of the East, which, in spite of their reverses, constitute the only force in these regions which has any military value, might advantageously continue the struggle with a view to denying to the Bolsheviks the approaches to the Caucasus and of allowing the necessary time for organising the defensive barrier.

Consequently, without being able to foresee the period during which their resistance would be effective—probably not a long one—it would certainly be advisable to continue to give them material assistance within the scope of possible action by them.

The military barrier of the Caucasus should be strengthened and completed by the grouping under Allied command of as large a number of ships in the Caspian Sea as possible; thus ensuring the command of this sea.

It is on these lines—according to the available information on the present situation—that the general conditions of defensive military action in the Caucasus should be drawn up.

If the Allied Governments consider it advisable to undertake such action, the question would remain of considering the possibilities of carrying it out and of examining the best means to that end.

F. FOCH. G. SACKVILLE-WEST. UGO CAVALLERO.

## Document 2

### *Note prepared by British Delegation*

Present situation caused by defeat of both Kolchak and Denikin.

Bolsheviks, having failed to upset Europe, have made agreement with Mussulmans to attack the East.

Owing to collapse of Denikin, Transcaucasus becomes bridge which must be defended by Allies to prevent union of these two hordes.

It, including the Caspian and especially Georgia, is the natural barrier separating these two forces.

At present, in consequence of impending advance of Red army towards the Caucasus, the situation in Georgia becomes complicated. Without effective aid Georgia, which is passing through painful economic crisis, will be unable to resist attack from both north and south, and crushing of Georgia will have serious consequences for Allies. If Allies will help, Georgia will have sufficient courage and strength to defend her frontiers.

As a preliminary measure and before considering the larger aspect of preventing Bolshevik invasion of the East, certain steps can and should be taken:—

1. Recognition by Allies of Georgia and Azerbaijan (this has now been done).<sup>4</sup>
2. Diversion of all stores, &c., now *en route* to Denikin, to these republics and to Armenia.
3. Additional help by Allies to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia—
  - (1) Financial.
  - (2) Military stores, especially cartridges and boots.
  - (3) Provisions, especially bread.
4. Sufficient military assistance to secure Batoum and Baku.
5. Denying of the Caspian and the fleet to the Bolsheviks. Denikin's fleet must either be voluntarily sunk or secured for our own use.

PARIS, *January 12, 1920.*

## No. 78

I.C.P. 22.] *Notes of a Meeting held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Tuesday, January 20, 1920, at 10.30 a.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: U.S.A.: The Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARIES, Mr. Harrison, Captain Winthrop.

Great Britain: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Leeper, Captain Small.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Millerand; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Massigli.

Italy: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:—

France: M. Cambon, M. Ygnace, Marshal Foch, General Weygand.

Italy: Marquis della Torretta, Colonel Castoldi.

Japan: M. Sawada.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

1. M. CLEMENCEAU: The agenda comprises the drawing up of the list of guilty persons to be demanded from Germany.

*List of Guilty Persons* M. YGNACE: You have given us a double mission: firstly, to draw up the list of guilty persons which the *Entente* is to demand from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles; secondly, to arrive at a settlement concerning the mixed tribunals which are to judge persons who have been guilty of crimes against nationals of various States.

Each Power prepared a list, which, at the outset, was fairly long. We then

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 905 f.

proceeded to revise the lists, and arrived at the following result, which we submit for your consideration:

The British Empire . . . . .	claims	95	guilty persons;
France . . . . .	"	334	" "
Italy . . . . .	"	29	" "
Belgium . . . . .	"	334	" "
Poland . . . . .	"	51	" "
Roumania . . . . .	"	41	" "
The Serb-Croat-Slovene State . . . . .	"	4	" "

amounting to a total of 888 accused persons to be demanded from Germany.

I will point out immediately that from this figure of 888 it will be necessary to deduct certain individual entries which have been made more than once and which amount to thirty-four. The number of accused persons whom we are demanding from Germany under the Treaty of Peace is therefore 854.

Complete agreement has been reached between the Lord Chancellor and myself concerning this figure.

It was decided:

To sanction the list revised by the Lord Chancellor and M. Ygnace of guilty persons, the surrender of whom will be demanded from Germany in accordance with article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles.

2. The council had before it a draft telegram addressed to the French Ambassador at Washington, for transmission to the American Government (Appendix A).

*Telegram to  
Washington concerning  
Russian Affairs*

M. BERTHELOT: Mr. Lloyd George asked that the text of this telegram should be submitted to the council, in order that it might receive Signor Nitti's approval.

SIGNOR NITTI: I approve of this draft.

M. MATSUI: Concerning the recognition of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, as *de facto* Governments, I must make certain reservations. I have referred the matter to my Government, and am awaiting its instructions.

It was decided:

That M. Clemenceau, as president of the Peace Conference, should address the telegram which figures in Appendix A to the French Ambassador at Washington, in the name of the Supreme Council, to be transmitted to the American Government.

M. Matsui made reservations with regard to the last paragraph of the said telegram, concerning the recognition of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia as *de facto* Governments.

3. [Not printed]<sup>2</sup>

*Judicial Administration  
of Thrace*

<sup>2</sup> The meeting approved a note and 'plan of statutes', submitted by the Central Committee on Territorial Questions, relative to the administration of justice in the occupied territory of Western Thrace after the entry into force of the Treaty of Neuilly (appendix B in original).

4. M. CLEMENCEAU: I had a visit from M. Ador,<sup>3</sup> who expressed his desire to be heard by the council. He attaches much importance to the explanations which he intends to submit; I therefore ask you to receive him. Because of the effect it must have upon national *amour-propre*, I think that hearing him can only have good results.

*Admission of Switzerland to the League of Nations*

As far as I could understand, he would like us to settle questions which only the League of Nations can decide. He would like to know, in particular, how the neutrality of Switzerland can be reconciled with its membership in the League of Nations. It is in the interests of his country, Gentlemen, that I ask you kindly to hear him. If he asks us definite questions, we will give him equally definite replies; otherwise we will refer him to the League of Nations.

M. BERTHELOT: The question has already been examined by the council. Switzerland had sent a memorandum concerning the manner in which her neutrality was to be interpreted. The Supreme Council then decided to refer the question to the League of Nations.<sup>4</sup> M. Ador asks to be heard in order to explain the difficulties which may result for the neutrality of Switzerland through her entry into the League of Nations under the conditions now contemplated.

(M. Ador and Professor Max Huber<sup>5</sup> were admitted.)

M. ADOR: I thank the Supreme Council for giving me the opportunity of being heard. I apologise for troubling it with a question which it may consider secondary, i.e., that of the neutrality of Switzerland.

For us it is of very great importance. The Federal Council, the Chambers and the Swiss nation desire most ardently to be able to join the League, provided, however, that Switzerland still preserves the character which she has possessed from all time, i.e., that of perpetual neutrality granted her in the interests of Europe.

In the Treaty of Peace you have inserted an article 435, according to which the Powers which are signatories to the said treaty recognise afresh, as being in the interests of Europe, the obligations established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, in favour of the recognition of perpetual neutrality for Switzerland. Also, in the Covenant of the League of Nations an article 21 has been inserted stating that international agreements for the maintenance of peace are by no means incompatible with the aim of the League of Nations.

We are therefore confronted with two texts: article 435 of the Treaty of Peace, drafted and inserted by you, and article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, also inserted in the Treaty of Peace.

These two texts seemed to us to possess unquestionable clearness. No doubt existed in our minds as to the significance and interpretation of this article. However, the French Government, or, rather, the secretariat general of the conference, transmitted to us on the 2nd January, in reply to questions by the Swiss Government concerning the time limit for joining the

<sup>3</sup> President of the Swiss Confederation for 1919.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 46, minute 5 and appendices D and E, and No. 49, minute 5 and appendix D.

<sup>5</sup> Legal Adviser to the Swiss Department of State.

League of Nations, a note, which in its second part, after observing that a connection between article 435 of the Treaty of Peace and article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was being established by a decision of the Federal Chambers, declared that the examination of this question would have to be reserved.<sup>4</sup>

This note was the cause of much misgiving in Switzerland; people wondered whether the question of the perpetual neutrality had really been brought once more under discussion, and whether this question, which we had always considered to be finally settled, was not really settled after all. While desiring to join the League of Nations as a perpetually neutral State, you may be sure that Switzerland intends to assume all the duties and responsibilities incumbent on members of the League of Nations. It will be said against us that we are demanding a privileged position.

We are asking to remain what we have been for many centuries, a country which has always pursued a peaceful policy. Situated in the centre of Europe and particularly exposed, our country, by reason both of its position and of its constitution, ought to be and to remain a neutral country; we intend to undertake, at our own risk and peril, to defend and maintain the inviolability of our soil; we will not permit anyone to penetrate into Swiss territory. This is a responsibility which we accept, and which we will fulfil with all the loyalty of which, in this matter, Switzerland has always given proof.

We are prepared to accept all the economic consequences of our entry into the League of Nations, and consequently to submit to all collective measures which the League of Nations may impose on its members; but we ask that it may be recognised that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland excludes the right of passage of troops across her territory.

This is perhaps a somewhat delicate point which it will be necessary to examine, but it is a fundamental article of our Swiss constitutional law, and I am expressing on this point the sentiments of my nation. We could not permit ourselves to be placed once more in the conditions we suffered in 1815, when we were obliged to abandon our neutrality to permit the hostile armies who were pursuing Napoleon to cross a portion of our territory.

I understand that the conference cannot give me a reply in this matter to-day. I did not come here as a petitioner. The question deserves serious consideration. We are being given an extremely short time in which, as an original member, to join the League of Nations. Moreover, we feel that it is entirely to your interest that Switzerland should not remain outside the League, just as we ourselves have a very real interest in joining the League, in order to continue to fulfil the humanitarian and philanthropic duties which, thanks to our geographical position, we have been able to carry on during this war, and which have been of some service to the various countries.

We are of opinion that Switzerland, if neutral, might be admitted into the League of Nations in the peculiar position of a country that has always been neutral, placed as it is in the centre of Europe and made up of races speaking different languages—a country which, consequently, can exist owing to its neutrality alone.

We earnestly beg the representatives of the Governments forming the Supreme Council to be good enough to tell us that such was their intention when they recognised the neutrality of Switzerland; and, further, if any special conditions are to be introduced, whether these may be discussed with the Council of the League of Nations. It seems to me, however, that the Council of the League of Nations ought at least to know the intentions of those who signed the Treaty of Peace, for that council might confront us with the objection that it had not signed the treaty, and that, consequently, it does not know how the latter should be interpreted on the matter of the neutrality of Switzerland. That is the delicate point to which I venture to draw your attention.

In a memorandum which I have had the honour, together with my colleague, Professor Max Huber, to address to all the representatives of the Powers at the conference, I developed and set forth with the greatest clearness and extreme frankness the point of view of the Federal Council. We are entirely at the disposal of the Governments represented here to confer with them amicably and openly on this question. We shall tell them frankly our point of view. We quite understand that you are unable to give us a final reply to this question to-day, but we wish to draw your attention to the necessity of giving it a speedy settlement, in order that the matter may not arise three weeks or a month hence, after the prescribed time limit for joining the League of Nations has expired.

These, Gentlemen, are the observations which I desired to submit.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I have now only to thank M. Ador for the statement which he has kindly submitted to us.

(M. Ador and Professor Max Huber left the room.)

SIGNOR NITTI: I agree entirely with the considerations which have just been urged.

It seems to me that the neutrality of Switzerland ought to be maintained; from the military and political point of view it is of the greatest interest that this neutrality should be as complete as possible. But the question is a complex one; it does not arise merely from a military point of view, it has also to be considered from an economic point of view. Is it to be admitted that Switzerland, in joining the League of Nations, would be able to take part in an economic blockade? That might determine a limit to punitive measures. What we desire is that Swiss neutrality should remain intact. We have every interest in maintaining it as complete as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU: It is a question which must, of necessity, be examined by the Council of the League of Nations.

M. LAROCHE: As regards the time limit prescribed for entry into the League of Nations, the opinion of the legal experts may be adopted: according to that, the time limit dates from the coming into force of the last Treaty of Peace. In these conditions Switzerland would not have two months in which to join the League of Nations, dating from the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles, she would have two months dating from the coming into force of the last Treaty of Peace.

It was decided:

- (1) Questions concerning the entry of Switzerland into the League of Nations, which were stated to the Supreme Council by M. Ador, on behalf of the Federal Council, should be referred to the Council of the League of Nations for examination and report.
- (2) In notifying M. Ador of this decision, the president of the conference shall inform him that, in view of the attitude of the Federal Constitution, and in order to facilitate Switzerland's entry into the League of Nations, the Supreme Council admits that for Switzerland only the period of two months dating from the coming into force of the covenant, as provided in the covenant, for entry into the League, shall date, not from the coming into force of the Treaty of Versailles, but from the coming into force of the last Treaty of Peace containing the covenant to be signed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

5. MR. WALLACE: The American Embassy in Paris has received a telegram according to which the general commanding the Roumanian army of occupation in Hungary, has just notified the Inter-Allied Military Mission in Budapest, where there still are a British, a French and an Italian representative, that, since the Roumanian troops are now east of the Theiss, he desires that the mission will no longer send him direct communications, but that it will address them to Bucharest. This is in contradiction with the orders of the Supreme Council.

The Government of the United States desires, on the other hand, to know what measures were taken by the Supreme Council obliging the Roumanians to effect the evacuation of Hungarian territory according to its orders.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Since we are going to hear the Roumanian President of the Council, the simplest method, in order to be certain, would be to ask him the question.

(M. Vaida-Voevod, Roumanian President of the Council, and M. Cantacuzens<sup>6</sup> were admitted.)

M. CLEMENCEAU: Before asking you to speak, I have a question to put. We have just received from President Wilson a telegram in which he asks what measures we have taken in order to compel the Roumanians to evacuate Hungarian territory.

May I ask you if you are in a position to-day to tell us by what date this evacuation will be completed?

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: It is to our interest that these territories be evacuated as soon as possible. In accordance with the obligations which we have undertaken towards the Supreme Council, this evacuation has already been begun. If it is not completed, it is because we have had to cope with difficulties of a technical nature; we have no locomotives to effect the transport of troops; and we have, further, had great difficulty, at this particular time of the year, in finding shelter for our soldiers.

It is my opinion that the evacuation will still take several weeks.

<sup>6</sup> Roumanian Minister without Portfolio and Delegate to the Peace Conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Can you fix a date for us by which you undertake that the evacuation of Hungarian territories shall be completed?

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: In order to fix a date, I should be obliged to consult our military experts. I think I can say that the evacuation will be completed within a few weeks.

M. CLEMENCEAU: What do you mean by 'a few weeks'?

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: I hope that the evacuation will be completed by the 1st March. But we will make every effort to hasten it as much as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU: There is another point to which I wish to call your attention.

The general commanding the Roumanian army in Hungary has notified the Inter-Allied Military Mission in Budapest, which still includes a British, a French and an Italian representative, that, as he is now east of the Theiss, he desires that the mission should no longer send communications to him direct, but should address them to Bucharest, a request which is in contradiction of the orders given to the mission by the Supreme Council.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: I will give proper orders on this matter.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I wish to say a word on this question. Ever since July we have urgently insisted that the evacuation of Hungary by Roumanian troops must be carried out. This evacuation has always been retarded on account of various difficulties. We are told to-day that if it cannot be carried out more quickly it is for want of means of transport. The Roumanian army of occupation has, however, been able to find the means of transport to transfer to Roumania the cattle and agricultural implements requisitioned by her. These facts may very well give rise to fresh difficulties between the Roumanians and Hungarians, and cause Roumania to forfeit the sympathies of those who are her best friends, simply on account of the resistance she has so long shown to the desire expressed by the Supreme Council that this evacuation be effected without delay. At present, since the agricultural implements have been taken away, Hungarian peasants are deprived of the means of working, it is to be feared that they may lose patience and that bloodshed may ensue. If war again broke out, it would be regrettable, under these conditions, to think that the responsibility would rest with Roumania, and that, consequently, she would not have the sympathy of the Western Powers.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: I do not wish to recall the past. My rôle is to busy myself with the present and to face the future.

I am obliged to state that Roumania was devastated by German and Austro-Hungarian troops, who took away her agricultural implements, and, above all, her cattle. The trains were not able to take to Germany all the cattle that was stolen. On account of the slowness of means of communication, these probably died on the way. Cattle worth fortunes were thus wasted between the Theiss and the Danube. Transylvania, in particular, was the object of systematic requisitioning. All the cattle in that region were taken, on the grounds that such provisions were indispensable for the army.

Roumania possessed locomotives of the latest model: Marshal von Mackensen took possession of these. In these distressing conditions, we had

to endure the Bolshevik attacks of Bela Kun, at the time when the Supreme Council was preparing a plan to deal a mortal blow to Bolshevism. The attack which surprised us was extremely violent. In order to resist it, the Roumanian army had to fight hard battles. We have to deplore, in consequence, the loss of several thousands of men and officers of high rank.<sup>7</sup>

We had to take preventative measures for the future. Unfortunately, a misunderstanding between the Supreme Council and Roumania occurred, and it is to avoid enduring in the future the evils which have overwhelmed us in the past, that I ask permission to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to certain definite facts. Admiral Horthy is at present organising conspiracies, not only at Budapest, but on our own territory. He is forming White Guards, at the head of which he is placing officers of the former Magyar and Austro-Hungarian army. These officers have under them officers of lower ranks, scattered throughout the villages. A veritable network of conspiracies has thus been established. At present they are merely at the organising state, but no secret is made of the fact that next spring they will pass on to action. A plan has already been prepared: it consists of seizing the municipal buildings, stations, and post and telegraph offices.

A fortnight ago we arrested some of the conspirators; officers who served in Karolyi's army. The Allied representatives at Bucharest requested us to set them at liberty. We made no difficulty about that. We thought that they would cease planning conspiracies, but scarcely were they released when they returned to their former activities. The High Command of the Roumanian army is taking measures to guard against all eventualities in this matter, but an attack will most certainly be directed against the Czechoslovaks, the Jugoslavs, and the Roumanians in the spring. I consider it a moral duty for the Supreme Council, in the interest of the Great Powers themselves, to take the necessary measures in order that the Magyars shall not attack us after the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

I desire especially to appeal to Mr. Lloyd George and to ask him to show some pity towards the Roumanian peasants. Whilst the Magyar peasant is still fairly well clothed, the Roumanian peasant is deprived of everything. He is overwhelmed with poverty. The German troops took everything from him. They left only one shirt to each peasant, and took away even the children's cradles. The country was literally sacked. No population has suffered so much as the Roumanian population.

If the Magyar peasants rise up, their insurrection will not be due to exorbitant requisitioning inflicted by the German troops, it will be due to the Bela Kun and the Christian Socialist movements. The Jews are now the victims of the murders and insurrections which take place, but, to-morrow, the peasants will rise against the landed proprietors, and, if any attempt is made to avoid the application of agrarian reform, they will turn against the Government which refuses them the land. Gentlemen, I do not wish to promise anything which I cannot fulfil. I will give orders for the evacuation of

<sup>7</sup> For the earlier sequence of events in connexion with the Roumanian occupation of Hungary, see Vol. I *passim*.

Hungarian territory, and I hope they will be carried out. In conclusion, I will repeat once more the urgent request which, at the beginning of these observations, I addressed to the Supreme Council, to take all necessary measures in order that the Czechoslovak[s], Jugoslavs, and we ourselves may not become the object of an attack on the part of the Magyars, and in order that our safety may be assured in future.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: You say that you are afraid of being attacked in March; your troops are, however, still in Hungarian territory, which Roumania promised to evacuate. If you were attacked while Roumania was still occupying territory which ought to remain Hungarian, what would you have to complain of? The Hungarians will employ all imaginable means in their attempts to drive you from it, and they will be entirely within their rights in so doing.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: Perhaps the Hungarian offensive will begin in this manner, but there is no doubt that the Hungarians will subsequently try to invade territories which have been assigned by the Treaty of Peace either to the Czechoslovaks, the Roumanians, or the Jugoslavs. Besides, the Roumanian troops were received with much enthusiasm when they entered Hungary, for the people considered that we had delivered them from the Bolsheviks.

M. CLEMENCEAU: You are not entirely answering Mr. Lloyd George's remark, who states that you are occupying these territories in spite of the conference. For many months past you have promised to evacuate; in not keeping your promise, you are affording your enemies a pretext for aggression. That is the opinion of the conference, and I can do nothing in the matter. You say 'It will be understood,' &c. It is not a question of understanding, it is a question of preventing the aggression of which you may be the victim.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: We shall withdraw our troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Let it be as soon as possible. If you desire the support of the conference, your troops must be withdrawn without delay from Hungarian territory.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: We shall do so as soon as possible; and then it will be necessary for you to help us.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The danger will be far less than if war were to ensue, because the Roumanian troops remained in Hungary, and the Allies were therefore unable to show for Roumania the sympathy which, in other circumstances, they would have shown.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We are well aware that you, Gentlemen, are not responsible for this state of affairs, but your attitude is of the greatest importance as regards Roumania; by your actions you will either keep or forfeit the sympathy of the conference.

If it is the desire of the council, the incident shall be considered closed, and the Roumanian President of the Council shall speak to us on the subject of Bessarabia. I will now ask him to speak, but he must not forget that the conference has already come to a decision on that subject.

6. M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: The conference has in theory come to a decision on this subject, which I have not forgotten; it has recognised Roumania's right to annex Bessarabia, but, without desiring to weary you with a long statement, I should like to ask the conference to ensure the realisation of that decision.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Yes, but you must understand that your position is a false one; you do not carry out certain decisions of the conference, while you ask it to carry out others. I know you are not personally responsible for this. I have explained to you the state of mind of the conference.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: After the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, the frontiers of Roumania on the Bessarabian side will be finally determined. The population of Bessarabia has decided to join Roumania, a decision which was proclaimed for the third time by the Deputies appointed at the last elections, without distinction of speech, race or nationality; on the 29th December, 1919, they all voted for union with the mother country. The conference has virtually recognised this state of affairs, but it has not actually proclaimed it, and our position is difficult in consequence, since we are neighbours of the Bolsheviki and have to live, not to philosophise. Bolshevik ideas were spread among us, especially recently, by Russians who fled from Odessa when the Bolsheviki again approached that town. We offered them generous hospitality, but we could not distinguish among the refugees those who were Bolsheviki and those who were not. The conference has not yet fully granted us Bessarabia, and, if the Russians advance still more, the population will be in a state of great uncertainty. Some people among them are in favour of the Bolsheviki because they hope to render impossible the execution of the agrarian reform begun by us. Moreover, there are Roumanian priests who were brought up at Kiev and who long for the old régime, which gave them a position privileged in comparison with that which they now have; they are pro-Russian agents. Such a state of affairs cannot come to an end until you recognise that Bessarabia must be joined to Roumania; until then it will be impossible to restore order in that part of our territory.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Will you kindly summarise what you ask of us?

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: We have summarised our requests in a note which I have ventured to transmit to the conference. We want the conference to recognise the union of Bessarabia with Roumania *de jure*.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Have we not already done so?

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: Yes, but that was at the time when it was still hoped that Koltchak would defeat the Bolsheviki. That was some time ago, but if now the conference would proclaim the union of Bessarabia with Roumania, the result would be a legal position on which we could base the restoration of order.

M. CLEMENCEAU: It is not the defeat of Koltchak which prevents us from giving you satisfaction, but it is your disobedience of the unanimous wishes of the conference. First of all we want the evacuation of those territories which are not given to you by the Treaty of Peace, and you talk of postponing the evacuation of Hungary once more for a month or six weeks. That is what troubles us, although we are in agreement in principle.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: We will carry out that evacuation in the shortest possible time.

M. CLEMENCEAU: You say so, but we have been awaiting your evacuation for months: I am explaining to you the difficulty by which we are confronted.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: The two questions should not be connected, since the Magyars attacked us.

M. CLEMENCEAU: But you disobeyed the conference from the very beginning. I know that it is not in the least your fault, and I should like to satisfy you. Only a short time ago we were agreed not to give you Bessarabia because you constantly disobeyed the conference. Now our opinions are different, but we cannot reply unconditionally to your request; we are obliged to defer our reply because you yourselves deferred evacuation.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: Sir, I undertake to wire this very day ordering evacuation as soon as possible.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Please believe that I am not hostile to you—quite the contrary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We cannot grant you what you ask if, when we take a decision in your favour, you accept it, but when we take a decision which is not beneficial to Roumania, Roumania resists.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: The engagement which we have taken to carry out the decision of the conference shall, I assure you, be fulfilled.

The present Roumanian Government cannot be punished for the faults of the former régimes.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We want to help, not to punish you.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: I will give the order for evacuation in conditions which are considered practicable by the conference, but I cannot give a promise which I might be unable to keep.

M. CLEMENCEAU: The conference is in sympathy with your cause, but it has been hindered by your predecessor for two years.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We are convinced of your intention to evacuate Hungary, but we think you may be faced by certain difficulties from the military party, and we think the military party would be more willing to obey the order of the conference to evacuate Hungary immediately if you said to them: 'The conference is waiting our evacuation of Hungary before deciding that Bessarabia shall be definitely Roumanian.'

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: I thank you with all my heart. From that I conclude that the conference will acknowledge our claim to Bessarabia from the day evacuation is effected. I may say that?

M. CLEMENCEAU: Yes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We cannot now say that we undertake to recognise your right; we can only say that we are going to discuss it as soon as you have evacuated Hungary.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: That does not give me the moral support which I require.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I would willingly go further than Mr. Lloyd George:

In my name, and I think I can say in the name of France, I can state that we are prepared to recognise Roumania's right to Bessarabia.

(M. Millerand<sup>8</sup> made a sign of assent.)

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: As M. Berthelot pointed out, the Commission on Roumanian Affairs, on which all the Powers are represented, has unanimously decided to attribute Bessarabia to Roumania. That is the actual position.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We are all sincere in this matter.

M. VAIDA-VOEVOD: Gentlemen, I thank you for the great concession you have granted me; I will do my best to ensure the evacuation of Hungarian territories as soon as possible, and also the settlement of the question of Bessarabia.

(M. Vaida-Voevod and M. Clantacuzens withdrew.)

The council took note of the statements of M. Vaida-Voevod; it acknowledged that, although it had as yet come to no decision as to the attribution of Bessarabia and could not do so until Roumania had carried out the orders of the conference in Hungary, the Commission on Roumanian Affairs was unanimously of opinion that this territory should be attributed to Roumania.

(Marshal Foch and General Weygand were introduced.)

7. M. CLEMENCEAU: I have before me a proposal from M. Patek, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, which raises the question of the defence of Poland against the Bolsheviks. M. Patek proposes to refer this question to the Military Committee at Versailles, of which Marshal Foch is chairman. I suppose nobody has any objections to make?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: This letter was not communicated to me.

M. CLEMENCEAU: M. Berthelot will have it circulated.

8. MARSHAL FOCH: Our plans are upset by the absence of nine English battalions destined for the plebiscite territories.<sup>9</sup> We will attempt to find a means of remedying the situation. The first question I will ask is the following: Can Italy undertake to supply some troops in place of the English battalions?

SIGNOR NITTI: For the time being I can give no undertaking.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Mr. Lloyd George, you and I discussed this matter yesterday. As England cannot supply the number of men we counted upon, we discussed the question as to whether Italy and France could make up the deficit. Marshal Foch was not there. It was a matter of no less than five battalions for us, which is a great deal. There are eleven battalions short;

<sup>8</sup> After the recent elections in France M. Clemenceau had resigned office on January 18, 1920. M. Millerand became French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs: cf. minute 8 below.

<sup>9</sup> It was considered necessary to withhold these battalions in view of the unrest then prevailing in the United Kingdom. (Cf. extracts from the diary of Field-Marshal Sir H. Wilson printed by Major-General Sir C. Callwell: *Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson*. London, 1927, vol. II, pp. 223-5.)

England was to have supplied one, Italy five, and France five. I am afraid that this is more than we can give.

MARSHAL FOCH: In view of the absence of ten English battalions, there are questions of principle which I ask leave to submit to the assembled Governments.

The most serious question is that of Danzig. Danzig was to have received four battalions, including two English and one American. These are missing; only one French battalion remains. To occupy a large town with only one French battalion is very dangerous.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Could we not send one or two supplementary battalions?

MARSHAL FOCH: We have not got them. In these circumstances I ask the Governments whether they could not consider this solution: send only one battalion to Danzig, but on condition that we keep Polish troops near at hand so as to appeal to them in case of need. Those Polish troops would not occupy Danzig, but they could enter it in case of necessity.

M. CLEMENCEAU: What do you mean by 'near at hand'?

MARSHAL FOCH: On the borders of Danzig territory.

M. CLEMENCEAU: While I am here, I should prefer that we make an effort, which, I think, [?] should be made, to send French troops instead of bringing Polish troops to some station near at hand; that would create difficulties of which we cannot at present foresee the consequences. When must Danzig be occupied?

MARSHAL FOCH: The first troops must leave on the 27th of this month. To send one single French battalion to Danzig is, I repeat, very unwise.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I propose that two battalions are taken from the 40,000 men guarding German prisoners. The Polish solution you suggested is dangerous, not from the military, but from other points of view. That is my opinion, but I believe that the President of the Council, who is to succeed me to-morrow, shares it.

M. MILLERAND: Certainly.

SIGNOR NITTI: For my part, I will do all I can.

MARSHAL FOCH: Even if two battalions are taken from the prisoners' guard, they will not be ready for some time yet.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I do not ask you to perform a miracle, I ask you to do what you can.

MARSHAL FOCH: If in a fortnight's time there should be firing at Danzig, we shall run a great risk.

The same question arises in the case of Silesia. We ought to have a total of eighteen battalions there. As the English and American battalions are lacking, six French battalions and three Italian remain, i.e., nine instead of eighteen. If absolutely necessary, that might be sufficient, on condition that we renounce the occupation of Teschen, which is quite close.

M. CLEMENCEAU: That is impossible; it would mean civil war at Teschen.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: How many battalions were there to have been at Teschen?

MARSHAL FOCH: Three; one French, one Italian and one American.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Are three battalions required at Teschen?

M. CLEMENCEAU: The Americans are lacking.

GENERAL WEYGAND: If we had had eighteen battalions in Silesia, we should have been able to do without the Americans at Teschen, keeping only two battalions there; if anything serious had happened at Teschen, we should have appealed to the troops in Silesia. But now that the troops in Silesia are practically reduced to nothing, we cannot count any more on those actually there.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I think if there is one French and one Italian battalion at Teschen, that is quite sufficient.

GENERAL WEYGAND: The position of Teschen has not changed, but we asked that the troops provided for Teschen might be sent to Silesia. The chairman of the Governing Commission of Silesia will be responsible for maintaining order in Silesia with a reduced number of nine battalions instead of eighteen. That is extremely difficult. The question is to know whether the chairman of the Silesian Commission will undertake the responsibility.

M. CLEMENCEAU: You must confer on this subject with General Le Rond. It is not for us to take decisions of a purely military nature. If, after conferring with General Le Rond, Marshal Foch says it is impossible, we shall be obliged to find another solution.

GENERAL WEYGAND: General Le Rond is chairman of the Governing Commission. In this capacity his mission is not military; he is undertaking the government of Silesia. It is by chance that this government has been entrusted to a soldier.

M. CLEMENCEAU: There is a governing Inter-Allied Commission which is going to administer Silesia. Its chairman is General Le Rond. It was arranged that he was to have eighteen battalions at his disposal. This number is reduced to nine. If the commission says: 'I undertake to administer Silesia with nine battalions,' I will let them do it; but if it says that it cannot do so, I for my part cannot impose that responsibility on it. What is the opinion of the commission?

MARSHAL FOCH: I have not consulted it. I therefore request that there may be a meeting this very evening between the chairmen of the commissions, the representatives of the Governments and the Allied military representatives to decide whether the commissions for plebiscite districts and Danzig can perform their duties with this reduced force.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I should like this question to be settled as soon as possible and the heads of Governments to be informed this very evening of the conclusions of this meeting, so that Signor Nitti, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Millerand or myself may consider the matter.

GENERAL WEYGAND: Each delegation should appoint a diplomatic or political representative, since political questions are concerned, and a military representative. They should also be able to consult the heads of the Governing Commissions.

M. BERTHELOT: All the troops provided for Upper Silesia are not required

immediately, for the difficulties of maintaining order will begin with the plebiscite operations themselves. That is not immediate. Now the two battalions at present at Teschen will be free within three months at the latest; they could then be sent to Upper Silesia. I think this consideration, which is one side of the question, should be taken into account.

GENERAL WEYGAND: An officer who has returned from Silesia states that the Germans are still retaining their troops in all the territories which must be evacuated under the treaty. Difficulties may arise on that score.

M. BERTHELOT: We can expect some violation of the treaty by the Germans everywhere. We must not forget that, but, on the other hand, we need not think that they will inevitably take place everywhere. I know the documents to which you have just referred. I do not think them convincing; the Germans have often made attempts of that kind which have come to nothing.

GENERAL WEYGAND: According to the agreements signed with the Germans, they must evacuate territories on the arrival of our troops. If we cannot send the troops on which we are counting, the Germans may consider those territories unoccupied. Will the chairmen of the Governing Commissions accept this responsibility? We must know their opinions.

M. BERTHELOT: They will give their opinion this evening.

MARSHAL FOCH: The meeting of the chairmen of the commissions and the delegates of each Government might take place at 4 o'clock.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Have you any other communications to make?

MARSHAL FOCH: At Memel there is only one battalion left. Is that enough in a port like Memel? Moreover, there is no governor at Memel.

M. BERTHELOT: It was said that the governor would be the officer commanding the troops. It may be the head of the French battalion as it was formerly the English officer.

MARSHAL FOCH: No, it was an English general. The head of an English battalion would not be enough there.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Send them an officer of high rank.

M. BERTHELOT: There is no great danger of disturbances or violence at Memel.

MARSHAL FOCH: There are no troops left in Allenstein. Allenstein was to have been occupied by the English. Is it still to be occupied?

M. BERTHELOT: The Germans have discussed the occupation of Allenstein. It was not in the treaty. The matter was entirely forgotten.

MARSHAL FOCH: There is only one Italian battalion at Marienwerder, but that is sufficient.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I do not know what conclusions will be reached at the meeting this evening. They should be communicated immediately to the heads of the Governments in order that a practical conclusion may be reached. The heads of Governments should also meet this evening or tomorrow morning at the latest to adopt resolutions.

SIGNOR NITTI: Unfortunately I have to leave for Italy this evening at 8 o'clock, on account of urgent business.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We will meet at 6 o'clock.

It was decided:

1. That in the afternoon Marshal Foch should preside over a committee composed of political and military representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments together with the chairmen of the Governing Commissions of Marienwerder, Allenstein, Upper Silesia and Teschen, and with the Allied representative at Danzig, in order to examine whether it would be possible to ensure the administration of the said territories with reduced forces, in view of the temporary withdrawal of the British contingents.
2. That the Supreme Council would meet at 6 p.m. to examine the report of that committee.

9. SIGNOR NITTI: Before the meeting rises, I must make a statement with regard to the Adriatic question. We hope, for the sake of the peace of Europe, that this question will be settled as soon as possible. Unfortunately, a solution has not been reached up to the present.

*Question of  
the Adriatic*

In those circumstances, I must make the following statement:

His Majesty's Government, being desirous of reaching an equitable solution of the Adriatic question in the general interest, has made proposals and accepted counter-proposals extending to the uttermost limit the concessions compatible with the vital interests of Italy.

During the course of negotiations, the Allies have had occasion to observe the extent of the spirit of conciliation and sacrifice shown by Italy.

In spite of this, the efforts she has made to reach an agreement have constantly failed owing to the absolutely uncompromising spirit of the Yugoslav aspirations.

Consequently, after noting with regret the impossibility of reaching a conclusion, the Italian delegation feels compelled to declare that it considers all concessions made during the long negotiations as of no effect and null and void.

In these circumstances, the Treaty of London of 1915 must be carried into full effect.'

M. CLEMENCEAU: As President of the Conference, I am obliged to say that this seems to me quite impossible under present circumstances, inasmuch as it is at variance with procedure we have already adopted.

In agreement with Signor Nitti, we have requested a reply from the Serbian Government:<sup>10</sup> this reply has not yet reached us, owing to the interruption of the telegraph wires; it does not, therefore, seem possible for the Italian Government to withdraw the concessions it has made without at the same time injuring most seriously both itself and the conference. The impossibility of an agreement cannot be stated until that becomes evident from the Serbian reply. To postulate one now would throw upon you a heavy responsibility in the eyes of all Europe, owing to the consequences which might be entailed by a rupture of the conference on this point. I am certain to express the opinion of all the members of the council when I invite Signor Nitti to prolong his stay in Paris for a few hours, until the arrival of the Serbian reply.

<sup>10</sup> See No. 72, minute 2.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I join in the appeal made by the President. Negotiations once before reached a point at which agreement seemed very probable. Then an incident occurred which caused keen feeling on both sides. Signor Orlando decided to leave for Rome;<sup>11</sup> M. Clemenceau and I besought him not to go; we told him that, if he went to Rome, there would be popular manifestations which would render it impossible for him to accept concessions which might otherwise have been possible. I believe there were members of the Italian delegation who shared this opinion. Nevertheless, Signor Orlando left: if he had left forty-five hours later with the solution of the affair in his pocket, all would be finished to-day.

No doubt it is presumptuous of me to discuss what should be done with regard to the opinion of a foreign nation, but I cannot do otherwise than support what M. Clemenceau has just said. I do not think it reasonable for Signor Nitti to leave before being certain that the Serbs will not accept the proposed solution; that would merely be fanning the flames; unless other urgent reasons compel Signor Nitti to leave Paris this very evening, we beg him to prolong his visit a little.

M. BERTHELOT: On Saturday<sup>12</sup> we were given to hope that we should have the reply this afternoon. That assurance is rather doubtful, in view of the state of communications, but it is not the fault of the Serbs.

Moreover, we have received a telegram of the 16th January from our agent at Belgrade, according to which the President of the Serbian Council accepted the proposed arrangement, save for two or three points; the opinion was conciliatory.

SIGNOR NITTI: I think, Sir, there is a misunderstanding. I did not say that I was leaving the conference because I was not in agreement with the Serbs; I said quite clearly that I was returning to Italy for domestic reasons. Since 6 o'clock this morning we have had a railway strike; a reduced service will run, but I think that my presence is necessary. This movement is not only of interest to Italy; its bearing is more general, it is only beginning with Italy; it is therefore to the interest of all the Allied countries that a solution should be reached as soon as possible. I have no desire to break with the Jugoslavs; I have always considered the Yugoslav question with the utmost impartiality and in quite a friendly spirit, but we cannot exceed the limits of the concessions we have made. If I went beyond that, I should no longer be master of the situation. If the Serbs approve of the conditions which you yourselves approved, I am at the disposal of the conference, but the situation must not be prolonged, otherwise we shall fall back upon the provisions of the Treaty of London.

M. CLEMENCEAU: The result of what you have just said is that for the moment your note is null and void: they must accept or not accept, there is no middle course.

<sup>11</sup> On April 23, 1919, President Wilson communicated to the press a statement upon the question of the Adriatic, in consequence of which Signor Orlando left Paris for Rome on the following day.

<sup>12</sup> January 17, 1920.

SIGNOR NITTI: We have made the last concession we can; if, while awaiting a solution, the Serbs were to quibble—excuse this expression—and prolong the present state of things, the result would be general embarrassment for us, for themselves, and for the conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU: In short, the concessions made by Italy are still open?

SIGNOR NITTI: Yes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We have already said that, if negotiations fail, we will carry out the Treaty of London, and we said it not only to the Italian Premier, but also to M. Trumbitch and M. Pasitch; consequently, the Serbs know perfectly well what are the intentions of France and Great Britain.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We are in agreement.

*(The meeting adjourned at 1.15 p.m.)*

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 78

##### *Draft Telegram to French Ambassador, Washington*

I beg you to submit to the American Government, on the part of the Peace Conference, the following telegram:

“The overthrow of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin has led the Allied Governments to again take up the Russian question, as it is now evident that the attempt, supported up to the present time by the Allies, to overthrow the Bolshevik régime by anti-Bolshevik forces has definitely failed.

“After attentive examination the Allies have decided upon the two following conclusions:—

“In the first place, after having heard the representatives of the Russian co-operative societies, which are the only organisations which have survived the Bolshevik efforts at destruction, and which have a membership of 25 million persons, they have decided to permit the free exchange of the products necessary for the Russian peasants, to be obtained in Allied countries, on condition that grain, flax, skins, and other raw products to be found in Russia be received in exchange. The Allies have been advised by the representatives of the Russian co-operative societies that last year’s corn crop in Southern Russia established a record, and that enormous quantities of food-stuffs and other raw products are available for exportation if the necessary transportation facilities can be obtained, and if merchandise could be shipped to Russia, in exchange for which the peasants would be disposed to surrender their products. These food-stuffs are absolutely necessary in Europe in order to meet the acute food shortage which is the principal encouragement to Bolshevism in the West. The Russian co-operative societies are also convinced that the most efficient action which could be taken against the Bolsheviks is to put these commercial exchanges into operation. These co-operatives point out that it is possible for a Government in time of war to deprive the population of many of the conveniences of life, but that, on the other hand, as soon as the pressure of the state of war ceases to be felt, the population will act on its Government in order that the sale of its products, and the purchase, in exchange, of clothing, shoes, machinery, &c., may be rendered possible. Now that the defeat of Kolchak and Denikin has robbed the Bolsheviks of the argument that they are fighting for the defence

of the revolution and the protection of peasant property, the pressure exercised by the Bolsheviks to end the state of war, restore normal conditions, and abandon the measures of repression which have no other justification than the state of war itself will be infinitely strengthened. In the opinion of the Allies the re-organisation of commerce is the best means of destroying the extremist forms of Bolshevism in Russia itself.

“The projected exchange of products will not involve any negotiations between the Allied Governments and the Government of the Soviets, nor the recognition of the Bolsheviks, nor the authorisation for Bolshevik representatives to enter the Allied countries. It will only imply a grant of facilities by which the co-operatives, which, for some time, have had organisations in the capitals of Europe, will be placed in a position to organise these exchanges of products with the Allied countries. This plan will naturally make it necessary for the co-operatives to secure the consent and the assistance of the Soviet authorities, especially in the matter of transportation, but, for the reasons which have already been presented, it is thought that internal pressure will be strong enough to compel them to give their assent. With reference to the preceding, the United States are not directly concerned, as they have never participated in the blockade, and, in consequence, the Allied Governments do not doubt but what the Government of the United States will fully approve this decision.

“The second conclusion reached by the Allied Governments is that they must declare themselves as having arrived at an agreement, in so far as the future is concerned, by which they will observe a policy of non-intervention in affairs within the boundaries of Russia, but that they have recognised the independence of the neighbouring States, to the list of which has just been added Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and that in the eventuality that the Bolsheviks would refuse to make peace with these States, and would attempt to infringe on the independence of the said communities by force, the Allies would accord these States the fullest support in their power. The Allied Governments are very desirous of knowing whether the Government of the United States is disposed to concur in this policy.’

## No. 79

I.C.P. 23.] *Notes of a Meeting held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, on Tuesday, January 20, 1920, at 6.30 p.m.*<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT: U.S.A.: The Hon. Hugh Wallace; SECRETARIES, Mr. Harrison, Captain Winthrop.

Great Britain: The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George, Prime Minister, The Right Hon. the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; SECRETARIES, Sir M. Hankey, Mr. Leeper.

France: M. Clemenceau, M. Millerand; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Massigli.

Italy: Signor Nitti; SECRETARY, Signor Trombetti.

Japan: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

<sup>1</sup> This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 929 f.

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

*Great Britain:* Field-Marshal Wilson, Mr. Wise.

*France:* M. Cambon, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Le Rond, M. Laroche, M. Hermitte.

*Italy:* Signor de Martino, General Cavallero, Vice-Admiral Grassi, Colonel Castoldi, Marquis della Torretta.

*Japan:* M. Sawada.

INTERPRETER: Professor Mantoux.

I. GENERAL WEYGAND read the report prepared by the committee charged with examining anew the situation as regarded the troops to be sent to plebiscite areas (see Appendix A).

*Allied Contingents in Plebiscite Areas* M. CLEMENCEAU: I suggest that the best course would probably be to examine each article of the report in turn.

If I understood M. Berthelot aright, he explained to us this morning that at Teschen the plebiscite would be terminated within three months and that we might then send to Upper Silesia the two battalions, one French and one Italian, provided for Teschen. Would this not be a first satisfaction?

MARSHAL FOCH: Yes, in three months.

M. CLEMENCEAU: M. Berthelot also told us at the same time that during the next three months, and also because the plebiscite was still rather far off, there would perhaps be no need to reinforce the troops in Silesia—at least, not as much as contemplated.

M. BERTHELOT: I still think that the greatest need for troops will present itself in the period when the plebiscite takes place, in order to prevent any pressure by the Germans. As a matter of fact, General Le Rond is more competent than I to reply on that point, as he is president of the Government Commission, and will thus have all responsibility on the spot.

GENERAL LE ROND: From the information at hand concerning the German occupation, the German forces have varied from 60,000 to 100,000 men. At the present time the occupation is maintained by 35,000 men, all the reductions we demanded having been made. The plan of occupation of these 35,000 men corresponds with the holding of points which it is necessary to occupy with troops. By reducing the number of troops which are indispensable in order to hold all these points, we arrived at the quota of British, Italian and French troops contemplated, while taking into account the deduction that we had to make of four British battalions it was originally intended to send. Should, however, the three British battalions be in default, we shall not be able to occupy all the principal industrial centres, railroad crossings and cities which it is indispensable to hold.

From the political standpoint, according to information which we received yesterday, the Germans wish to be ready for any emergency. But I do not know whether they will try to rise now or later. At any rate, they have prepared to take advantage of the first opportunity offered, and they will find it in the reduction of our forces. Therefore, from the military, as well as from the political, standpoint, a reduction of Allied troops in Upper Silesia is rather dangerous. I would add that the Germans have already learnt, in

the course of negotiations which took place between the 20th December and the 10th January,<sup>2</sup> the number of troops contemplated; any reduction of these numbers will therefore have certain repercussions in Upper Silesia.

My colleagues on the commission have left, one for London, the other for Rome. I am now alone to represent them here, but I believe I can speak in their name and say that they consider, as I do, that it is advisable to maintain the number of troops provided for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: It is obviously very unfortunate that the first time a matter of execution of the treaty occurs we should be forced to abstain. I need not explain here why we are obliged to act as we are doing.<sup>3</sup>

This being said, we believe that we shall be able to satisfy the proposals of Marshal Foch concerning the first point; we could send small naval forces to Memel and Danzig; I do not think that would offer any difficulty.

On the other hand, after a conversation on the subject with my Chief of Staff, I have arrived at the conclusion that it might be possible for Great Britain, by a special effort, to send two battalions into Germany; that will always help the situation a little.

M. CLEMENCEAU: That would make three battalions, counting the one which has already left.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Quite so. If it is difficult to find troops to occupy and garrison those plebiscite areas, it would be well first of all to look to the most important areas.

I feel with General Le Rond that the most important point for the time being is Upper Silesia. We are going to have difficulties there not only from the Germans, but also, I believe, from the Poles, whose feelings are running very high—an observation which only tends to strengthen General Le Rond's argument.

On the other hand, there does not seem to be the same necessity for occupying the areas of Allenstein and Marienwerder; those are quiet districts, occupied by an agricultural population, and there will be no need there of strong measures to maintain order. I will even add that these territories are principally German, and I have never very well understood the necessity of holding a plebiscite there.

To summarise, my proposal is as follows: Great Britain will furnish naval forces asked for at Memel and Danzig; she will furnish two battalions of infantry for the occupation of the plebiscite areas, thus raising the number of battalions from one to three. Lastly, should the Allies find it inconvenient to occupy all of these territories, they will abstain in the cases of Allenstein and Marienwerder.

MARSHAL FOCH: A matter of principle is involved. According to the provisions of the treaty, we take possession of these two districts, and I believe that we therefore must occupy them. The Germans are evacuating them as the treaty obliges them to. How shall we take possession if we do not occupy them?

<sup>2</sup> For these negotiations see Chap. I.

<sup>3</sup> See No. 78, note 9.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Why not be satisfied, instead of sending a battalion to Allenstein and another to Marienwerder, with sending to those districts an Allied commission?

MARSHAL FOCH: Either we must execute the treaty or say that we do not intend to carry out its terms. But in order to carry out the occupation it is not possible to draw upon the other detachments which are already insufficient.

Yesterday Great Britain withdrew nearly all of her contribution in troops to this whole task of occupation; to-day she gives us two battalions, making three in all, and then tells us to do the best we can. I am quite willing, but when I met the presidents of the commissions, these declared that of the nine battalions promised but not forthcoming, six would have to be found. Of these six, here then are two; we have, therefore, still to find four. I will ask whether Italy and France can themselves furnish these four battalions.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We were nearly agreed this morning to make a great temporary effort for two battalions; I will now ask Signor Nitti to be good enough also to give us two. I cannot believe that Italy does not recognise the necessity of this effort and that she is unable to lend us two thousand men. In this way the question would be solved, or very nearly.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The treaty does not state that the districts of Allenstein and Marienwerder should be occupied by troops. A commission must take possession of them, supported, if occasion demand, by detachments.

GENERAL WEYGAND: The treaty clearly states for Marienwerder that the commission shall be supported by troops if it is thought necessary; but there has certainly been an oversight in the case of Allenstein; there is no question of troops. But the Supreme Council itself has decided that where, under the provisions of the treaty, German sovereignty in those territories disappears and a commission takes over the government, the latter should be supported by troops;<sup>4</sup> it had been naturally thought that one could not send Allied commissions into those territories without having them accompanied by contingents for the maintenance of order. Otherwise these commissions would have to rely on German troops.

M. CLEMENCEAU: The remark just made by General Weygand seems to me very important. We cannot send an Allied commission to those territories and allow it to depend on German troops to maintain order.

I must then ask Signor Nitti to be good enough to accede to my request. Great Britain has great need of her troops for reasons we know; she is giving two battalions; so are we, although we also are confronted with extreme difficulties. I ask Italy then to furnish two battalions also.

SIGNOR NITTI: We have before us a general question and a special one. From the general point of view, I believe it is necessary that all the *Entente* countries should be represented in the occupation of the plebiscite territories, were it only for the moral effect. On the special question of Italian participation, before I can accede to M. Clemenceau's request I must ask him to wait until I have returned to Italy and studied the effectives at my disposal.

I would also point out that we have promised to send five battalions, and

<sup>4</sup> See No. 48, minute 3.

that an Italian contains more men than an Allied battalion. If I am then able to make an effort, you may be convinced that I will do so, but I would beg of you to wait.

M. CLEMENCEAU: When does Signor Nitti think he can give us a reply?

SIGNOR NITTI: Friday,<sup>5</sup> probably.

M. CLEMENCEAU: What is Marshal Foch's opinion?

MARSHAL FOCH: I conclude that we have not got the number of men to have the treaty executed. We are not meeting our obligations. I would ask Signor Nitti whether he maintains the reservation made by Signor de Martino by reason of Italy's situation?

SIGNOR NITTI: I have just promised to reply next Friday.

MARSHAL FOCH: Even concerning the battalions on which the agreement has been arrived at?

SIGNOR NITTI: We are agreed on the five battalions which have been promised; I am only speaking of the two additional battalions which we have been asked for.

MARSHAL FOCH: When shall we have the British battalions?

SIR HENRY WILSON: We shall agree on that.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Is this solution satisfactory?

MARSHAL FOCH: Practically, on condition that the hopes which have just been expressed shall be realised.

M. CLEMENCEAU: We shall keep our word; so will Great Britain; and we hope we shall have a formal promise from Italy on Friday.

It was decided:

1. That Great Britain should furnish, in order to occupy the plebiscite areas, two battalions besides one battalion intended for the occupation of Schleswig; also that she should send sufficient naval forces to Danzig and Memel.
2. In order to replace the seven other British battalions originally provided for, France should furnish two additional battalions, and Italy would make every effort to furnish two battalions.
3. That the distribution of these battalions in the areas to be occupied should be made by the Inter-Allied Military Commission, presided over by Marshal Foch.

2. MARSHAL FOCH: I wish to call the attention of the council to Baron von Lersner's note dated the 19th January, 1920 (see Appendix B). The head of the German delegation declares that his Government throws on the Allies all responsibility for the damage which may follow any delay to take place in the transfer of Allied troops. Any modification in the dispositions already taken would involve our responsibility.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Are you of the opinion that we should take this responsibility? If we have troops there, we are responsible.

MARSHAL FOCH: Yes, if those troops are there.

<sup>5</sup> January 23, 1920.

GENERAL WEYGAND then read the draft reply prepared by him as contained in Appendix C.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I approve the draft.

SIGNOR NITTI: I agree.

It was decided:

That the president of the Peace Conference should send to the head of the German delegation the letter contained in Appendix C in reply to his note of the 19th January, 1920.

3. M. BERTHELOT summarised the reply made by the delegation of the Serb-Adriatic Question Croat-Slovene Kingdom to the proposals delivered on the 14th January, 1920. The text of this reply is contained in Appendix D.<sup>6</sup>

SIGNOR NITTI: I have only a simple declaration to make.

As I have already stated, I am obliged to leave Paris to-night. As a matter of fact, I wish it to be clearly understood that my departure bears no relation whatsoever to the discussion of the Adriatic problem; it is a question of a domestic nature which obliges me to return to Italy as soon as possible.

I have, however, nothing to add to what I have said. We have made every effort of which we were capable. I must thank M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George for the goodwill they have shown in such a difficult question, in their effort to find a solution necessarily so complex, one satisfactory to everyone, and especially one able to safeguard the peace of Europe.

I wish to state quite sincerely that I have done all in my power; I have given up everything I could in order to find a solution acceptable to Yugoslavs and Italians. The compromise which we had arrived at did not seem to satisfy either the one or the other; for I must repeat it I have always regarded the Yugoslavs with a friendly feeling and I have taken into account the excited feelings of a people still in its political youth.

But having said so much, I can make no further concession of any single point in the conditions upon which we have agreed here; it would be impossible for me to defend further concessions in Italy.

I think it useless to enter into the detail of the Serbian reply; were I to do it, I should have to show the impossibility of separating the city from the commune of Zara; I should have to emphasise that the Serbian reply is a blunt refusal of any desire which the City of Zara itself might express to be represented diplomatically by a nation of its own choosing on the League of Nations—a conception which, to my mind, is still very hazy.

I therefore must emphasize what I said this morning: all the concessions which we granted in the Pact of London had a single aim, i.e., to find a solution acceptable by everyone. We are, however, not pledged, and I cannot

<sup>6</sup> Not printed. This appendix contained an English translation of the Yugoslav note of January 20, 1920, the French text of which is printed as document 8 in Cmd. 586. Annexed to this appendix as supplements were copies of Yugoslav notes of June 2, 1919, and January 8, 1920, respecting Yugoslav claims to elements of the former Austro-Hungarian fleet; these notes are printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, pp. 947-51.

myself accept anything I could not justify before the Italian Parliament. If the Jugoslavs accept our proposals, we shall agree; if they wish to have them modified, we cannot consent.

I also wish to be excused if after my departure I am unable to be represented here by our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Signor Scialoja. In case of need, Signor de Martino will be at the disposal of the conference.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Could we not now let the representatives of the Serb-Croat-Slovenes come in, and, if we are agreed, tell them that we maintain our former proposals? Each question can doubtless be discussed by itself, but that is not how the problem stands before us. There is a Pact of London, to which England and France wish to remain faithful. We have already told M. Pasitch and M. Trumbitch that they must choose between the compromise we have just outlined and the Pact of London. We can only repeat it once more and demand a reply, either 'Yes' or 'No'.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: As our Italian colleague, Signor Nitti, must return to Italy, allow me to interrupt for a moment the proceedings in order to express my very deep and grateful thanks to M. Clemenceau for the way he has presided over our discussions. I have sat on this conference for months; Signor Nitti and Mr. Wallace have participated in its proceedings for a shorter time; if those who had preceded them were present, I feel certain that they would join in the homage that I would render to our president.

It will be the great honour of my life to have taken part in the work of this conference, which has been presided over in such a wonderful way by a statesman so eminent as M. Clemenceau. He knows with what deep feelings of esteem and admiration he is regarded by my whole country, and I have greater regret than I can express at the thought that he will no longer be present with us in future. I wish the following declaration to be placed on record in the minutes:—

'Mindful of the inestimable services which M. Clemenceau, as president for more than one year of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, has rendered to the cause of peace, and grateful to the dignity, impartiality and sagacity with which he has conducted our proceedings, we, his colleagues, desire to convey to M. Clemenceau the expression of our unalterable esteem, and our hope that in a tranquil retirement he may live to see the fruits of his incomparable labours for the glory of France and the revived prosperity of the world.'

MR. WALLACE: Mr. President: It is a matter of deep regret for me to realise that we shall no longer have the benefit of your great wisdom and incomparable humour. It has been a great privilege for me to know you and therefore to love you. President Wilson spoke to me many times about his deep attachment to you and his admiration for your transcendent abilities. On behalf of the American Government and myself I wish you a long and happy life.

SIGNOR NITTI: I wish to associate myself with the sentiments so nobly expressed by Messrs. Lloyd George and Wallace. We have likewise admired

the transcendent quality of your mind, and grandeur of your sentiments. We shall always remember all that you have done for the cause of humanity and for the *Entente*, and we shall always hold you in the kindest remembrance.

M. MATSUI: Allow me, Mr. President, to add a few words in the name of the Japanese delegation.

If the head of our delegation, Marquis Saionji, were still in Paris, he would have been the first to express his thanks and feelings of deep esteem. In his absence, I am happy to join the distinguished representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments in expressing to you the cordial feelings of the Japanese people.

M. MILLERAND: In the name of the new Cabinet, I am happy to thank the representatives of the Great Powers, and particularly Mr. Lloyd George, for the homage which they have just rendered to the man who for over a year has represented the French Republic at the Peace Conference in the worthy way you have just recalled. France will be profoundly touched by this homage which her Allies have spontaneously rendered and which honours them as much as the man to whom it is addressed.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Gentlemen, when people are leaving each other, it is usual courtesy requires it to exchange friendly words. I should like to believe that in the praises, certainly extravagant, which you have been kind enough to offer me, there is a little more than the courtesy of custom. I should be happy if there remained between us the deep feeling that the alliance of our countries ought indeed to inspire. If I have succeeded in letting enter our hearts some of those beautiful feelings that you have been so kind as to express, it is clear that it is my country and your countries that are going to reap the benefit of our understanding.

We have all tried here to continue the work of our noble soldiers. The supreme event of the world has been the unexpectedness, the immensity of this war, suddenly terminated at a moment when we believed that an effort of many months would still be necessary, and we arrived here, somewhat disconcerted sometimes, by the gravity of the problems presented and the difficulty of solving them. In fighting an enemy, all are necessarily in agreement; each gives his life gladly for the great cause of his fatherland, but it is by no means necessarily the same when the victors meet to calculate and realise the fruits of victory, to arrange what belongs to each, not the honour, which is each one's share, for, were it a matter of honour, that has been shared in such quantity by our soldiers in that mighty battle that it is not ourselves who can increase it.

And yet we have tried to accomplish that difficult task. In reality, I might say that I have never presided over your meetings. They have not really been presided over. We have exchanged ideas, we have never, properly speaking, had difficulties in our discussions, and the president has never had to exercise his powers. We have been friends entrusted with a great duty to make the peace, to conclude a peace stable in the first instance between ourselves, while increasing the chances of peace for humanity.

Mr. Lloyd George, who so kindly took the initiative in this tribute, must

have smiled on recalling the great fights that we have sometimes waged. He said, when in the adjoining room he proposed me for the presidency: 'We have fought each other vigorously already.' Then he added: 'We are both of us Celts and yet we have not controlled our expressions.' That is quite true and we have continued like that.

We have all of us uncompromisingly defended what we believed to be the interests of our countries; but I think we can say that with Mr. Lloyd George as with all of us. We<sup>7</sup> have never lost sight of the necessity of a common understanding. I think, too, that we are at one to-day in affirming that if the particular interests of each nationality must be husbanded and respected, there yet cannot be a peaceful Europe unless the rights of all are recognised. We have put above all the need of the *Entente*. If Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Japan, France, remain united, we have there a guarantee of peace worth more than all those than [that] can be written on paper. If one day those nations were to become disunited, I dare not think what misfortunes might result.

Sometimes, in the course of our discussions, I have been accused of having made too many concessions. The same charge has been levelled at the other heads of Governments. That is a question that may usefully be discussed in the days to come, but at a time when the verdict will hardly interest me more. Yet my conscience is easy, I am sure that yours is, too; in the expression of our opinions, as in the decisions we have taken, we have been guided by one sole principle. The nations that have spilled so much of their blood deserved first of all national satisfaction; but thereafter it was necessary to harmonise all the national satisfactions so that there should result a great common peace to all.

Gentlemen, I do not wish to speak longer. From the bottom of my heart I am grateful to each of you for the feelings of kind sympathy expressed. In his mind's eye Mr. Lloyd George sees me in a retirement which indeed begins to-day; he expresses the hope that I shall yet see our labours bear all their fruit. He may at least be certain that I shall never take my eyes off the peace we are now concluding and that I shall continue to follow its progress; till my last breath I shall endeavour, with my earnest desires at least, to contribute to the full extent of my powers to the solidarity of that peace. If certain clements of discord should unhappily arise between us, how terrible it [? would] be to think that the finest blood of the civilised world—the blood of our soldiers—had been shed in vain for hopes not to be realised.

I cannot believe in such a catastrophe; I know well the feelings that inspire my friend M. Millerand. He is convinced, as I am, that an alliance, a lasting *entente*, must be maintained between the peoples represented here. That is the feeling that I have found in Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Wallace, Signor Nitti, Mr. Matsui and the feeling which animates all of us, animates him, too. That I can vouch for, and it is essential that you, too, now that we are separating, should be convinced of it.

For myself, I shall ever cherish among my most precious memories the

<sup>7</sup> The punctuation here is evidently incorrect.

remembrance of those friendly conversations, sometimes stormy, by which we have carried on the effort of the great war. We have learnt to know each other, to love each other. This fraternal friendship must be passed on from the statesmen to the people themselves. Let me offer you all the sincere wishes from the bottom of my heart for the prosperity of Great Britain, the United States, Italy and Japan. Let us wish for the work to which we have given the best of ourselves that the results already obtained and those the future will bring, will be such that the peoples will feel for all of us without distinction, a gratitude which, in that happy event, we shall have well deserved. Gentlemen, I thank you once again from the bottom of my heart.

(The Italian representative withdrew.)

(MM. Pasitch and Trumbitch then entered the room.)

M. CLEMENCEAU: Gentlemen, the members of the council have read the reply which you have submitted; the council is of opinion that discussion of the different points you raise is henceforth useless.

As far as I am personally concerned, I feel that your thesis can be justified theoretically and logically on many points; but the question does not thus present itself at this time. This Adriatic question has been pending for months, nearly years; it must be settled. As you know, we have for a year tried all sorts of plans without being able to solve it and reach an agreement.

Allow me at this point to tell you that your protests arrived a little late, for during all the time we discussed with the Italians we have had made known to us no Yugoslav counter-proposals.

We first discussed the subject with President Wilson. Mr. Lloyd George and myself sent him a memorandum proposing our solutions; that did not have any better success. We then tried a way which consists in bringing together the two parties by proposals acceptable by all.

If the question be examined separately, your theory, as I said before, might very easily be defended; but we looked at the question from another point of view. A great war breaks out; a Yugoslav State, Serbia, fights by our side and reaps a harvest of glory and honour which history will not deny to it; but, on the other side, we find the Yugoslavs kept in the ranks of the Austrians fighting against us until the very last minute. Of course, some divisions fought in our ranks when it became possible to organise them from amongst the prisoners we had taken, but these men were only made prisoners because they had fought against the *Entente*.

The situation must be faced courageously, and we must see, what, under these circumstances, it is possible for you to obtain.

I tell you in a friendly spirit, but firmly, that you must choose between the present proposals we are making—I say ‘we’, because it is not Italy which is offering them but the *Entente*—and the application of the Pact of London, the execution of which has already been claimed this morning by Signor Nitti. The signatures of France and Great Britain appear at the foot of this treaty. Mr. Lloyd George and I have declared that we could not repudiate it. You must therefore realise the attitude you have obliged us to adopt.

I have the honour --much as I regret it—to say this to you: You must choose between the proposals made to you by France and Great Britain, and the application of the Pact of London on the Adriatic coast. We desire an answer to this question. Italy has arrived at a point where it is impossible for us to start new discussions. We therefore turn to you. If you do not wish to accept the great advantages which are offered you, Signor Nitti has announced that he would immediately ask for the execution of the Pact of London. Neither Mr. Lloyd George nor myself will be able to refuse.

M. PASITCH: We have received from our Government the reply which we have communicated to the Supreme Council; our Government gave us permission to make the concessions shown in that reply, but it has also given us the order not to go further; we are not authorised to make other concessions than those mentioned in the reply of the Serb-Croat-Slovene delegation.

M. CLEMENCEAU: If that is the final reply of your Government, we then know what remains for us to do. If, on the contrary, it can yet be modified, do you intend to ask it of your Government?

M. PASITCH: We are ready to ask our Government immediately for another reply.

M. CLEMENCEAU: When can we expect to receive it?

M. PASITCH: We shall get in communication with our Government this very evening, and we hope to get the reply within three days.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Let us say one extra day, and that we shall have a final reply within four days.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Make it quite clear to your Government that the only question before it is whether it accepts our proposals. It must either accept or refuse. If it accepts, as I am leaving for London, there will be no need for the conference to meet further to discuss the Adriatic question; if it does not accept, our representatives here will take note of this refusal and the Pact of London will then be applied.

M. TRUMBITCH: We shall ask our Government to reply by 'Yes' or 'No'.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Exactly.

M. TRUMBITCH: You have just said, Mr. President, that we came at the last minute to state our claims—

M. CLEMENCEAU: That was not meant as a reproach.

M. TRUMBITCH: We were only asked once to appear before the Supreme Council, in February. We submitted the question as it appeared at the time, and communicated a memorandum containing our whole programme.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I am not trying to reproach you. I simply wish to explain to you our embarrassment. I beg of you to believe in the universal sympathy which you find here.

M. TRUMBITCH: I thank you.

M. CLEMENCEAU: A new State has been created; we want it to live in the glory which the Serbian army has won for it; we would like to give it better conditions. But everyone must make concessions. France also has not obtained all the satisfaction she desired. Other countries in the *Entente* are in the same position. I therefore beg of you to make a sacrifice, as we have done,

to necessity; that sacrifice will be amply repaid by the sympathetic friendship and the generous aid which will be given you by the *Entente*.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

#### APPENDIX A TO No. 79

##### *Report on Situation as regards Troops to be sent to Plebiscite Areas*

The commission appointed by the Supreme Council to again examine the situation of the troops to be sent to the plebiscite countries, met at 4 p.m., under the presidency of Marshal Foch.

The commission, after having heard the chiefs of the delegations of the various Governments, and the presidents of the commissions or their representatives, submits to the Supreme Council the following decisions:

*Upper Silesia.* No reduction is possible. Consequently, it is necessary to send three battalions to replace the three British battalions.

*Teschen.* The troops of occupation cannot be reduced. Consequently, no troops can be taken from that region to replace the absent battalions.

*Danzig.* Although Mr. Tower<sup>7</sup> declared that he could fulfil his mission at Danzig with only one battalion, it seemed to the military members of the commission quite impossible to assure the occupation of a city and port of such importance with so small a force. Consequently, it is necessary that the two missing English battalions be replaced by one battalion at least. Moreover, it would be prudent to have an English naval force participate in the occupation of Danzig, in order to reinforce it and assert its Inter-Allied character.

*Marienwerder.*—The remaining Italian battalion will be sufficient provided it is completed by a small detachment of another nation, so as to assert the Inter-Allied character of the occupation.

*Allenstein.*—Two battalions are necessary to replace the three missing English battalions.

*Memel.*—The remaining French battalion will be sufficient, provided it is reinforced by a small British naval force, under the same conditions and for the same reasons as apply to Danzig. In short, the commission esteems that a *minimum* of six new battalions in lieu of the nine English battalions originally provided for, and two detachments of naval forces at Memel and Danzig, should be assigned to the occupation of the plebiscite territories, which constitutes the first material demonstration of the execution of the treaty.

N.B.—All these calculations are based on the supposition that the Italian contingents will not be modified. However, the Italian delegate, Signor de Martino, has made reservations on this subject, on account of the situation in Italy.

#### APPENDIX B TO No. 79

##### *Baron von Lersner to M. Clemenceau*

GERMAN DELEGATION, PARIS, *January 19, 1920.*

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, in answer to the note of the 17th instant, that the German Government can only comply with the desire to postpone

<sup>7</sup> Sir R. Tower had on January 10, 1920, been appointed Administrator of the Free City of Danzig pending the appointment of a High Commissioner by the League of Nations.

for five days the transportation of the troops to the plebiscite zones of Upper Silesia, Allenstein, Marienwerder, Danzig and Memel, if the Allies assume responsibility for the damages which might result from this measure.

The transportation of the Germans, in view of the evacuation of the territories in question has already begun. The evacuation, as well as the occupation of Danzig, is only possible if the transportations being carried out by the Polish Government in Western Prussia are stopped on the fifteenth day of the evacuation, that is to say, on the twenty-second day after the going into force of the treaty.

Moreover, the German Government asks that one of the Allied generals, already in Berlin, be given the necessary powers to settle all the minor questions raised by this delay.

In order that the necessary measures may be taken, I beg you to kindly give me as prompt an answer as possible.

BARON VON LERSNER.

#### APPENDIX C TO No. 79

##### *M. Clemenceau to Baron von Lersner*

PARIS, *January 20, 1920.*

After having noted the reply of the German Government, under date of the 19th January, 1920, I have the honour to inform you, in the name of the Peace Conference, that the Allied and Associated Governments, for unavoidable reasons, are obliged to postpone for a period of five days the transportation of the troops destined to occupy the plebiscite zones of Upper Silesia, Allenstein, Marienwerder and the Danzig and Memel territories.

In the common interest of both the Allied and Associated Governments and the German Government, it is advisable that the movement of the German troops and the Allied troops, carefully harmonised in order to avoid any disorder, be executed according to the plan drawn up in common accord, but upon dates five days subsequent to the dates previously agreed upon.

If this is done the troubles which the German Government seems to fear are not likely to occur.

Naturally, the movement of Polish troops towards Eastern Prussia will stop on the fifteenth day of the evacuation.

Consequently, the Peace Conference will send a French officer, familiar with the evacuation and transportation questions, accompanied by a Polish officer, to arrive in Berlin for the 28th January, in order to arrange with the German Command subsequent questions of detail relative to movements in Eastern and Western Prussia.

Accept, &c.

CLEMENCEAU.

##### *Note*

It is necessary that the French officer to be sent to Berlin on the 28th January with a view to arranging with the German command the questions of detail relative to the movements in Eastern and Western Prussia be furnished, before his departure from Paris, with all the information necessary for the successful accomplishment of his mission.

In order that this officer may be enabled to learn beforehand just what informa-

tion will be necessary, the Peace Conference has the honour to suggest that one of the military experts having already discussed the evacuation and transportation questions in Paris, Major Michaelis or Major von Boetticher, come to Paris in order to study in advance, with the designated French officer, [? the questions to be] handled in Berlin.

In this connexion, we would suggest that Lieutenant-Colonel Lefort be chosen for the mission to Berlin.

## No. 80

G.M. 3.] *Notes of a Meeting held in M. Pichon's Room, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Wednesday, January 21, 1920, at 11 a.m.\**

PRESENT: *British Empire*: Lord Curzon; SECRETARIES, Mr. Leeper, Capt. Lothian Small.

*France*: M. Clemenceau, M. Millerand; SECRETARIES, M. Dutasta, M. Berthelot, M. Massigli.

*Italy*: M. de Martino; SECRETARIES, M. Troubetti, M. Zanchi.

*Japan*: M. Matsui; SECRETARY, M. Kawai.

INTERPRETER: M. Mantoux.

General Cavallero (Italy) was also present at the meeting to deal with questions with which he was concerned.

1. M. MANTOUX read a draft letter prepared by the British Delegation in reply to a communication from Mr. Lansing. (Appendix A.)

*Reply to Mr. Lansing's Memorandum*

A draft letter prepared by M. Berthelot in reply to the same communication was then read. (Appendix B.)

M. BERTHELOT: In preparing this draft reply I took up a different point of view, as the Council observes. Lord Curzon's reply seems to me to be infinitely superior; it is far more complete, and goes to the very bottom of the questions. But I chose to interpret Mr. Lansing's Note as a display of bad temper and not as a direct communication from President Wilson, and I replied without entering very deeply into the questions, which would have been dealt with subsequently in an appendix, in which we should have asked to know the opinion of the American Government.

M. CLEMENCEAU: It seems to me that the question of peace with Turkey ought not to be included in this reply to Mr. Lansing; it is important, I know; but this is yet another reason why it should be treated separately from the question of the Adriatic; also it is a question to be dealt with by my successor.

I asked M. Millerand to permit me to remain until now in order to settle the Italian question, concerning which we have been interrogated by Mr. Wilson; there are papers in connexion with it which are signed by me, and I intended to make a suitable reply.

\* This document is printed in *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, p. 999 f.

The question of peace with Turkey of course remains on the agenda, but it must be discussed with M. Millerand; I have no right to deal with it.

That being said, I think the two draft letters excellent; each has its advantages and disadvantages: nevertheless, I could not accept that of Lord Curzon without a slight alteration on which he will, I think, be in agreement with me: he says that, once an agreement had been reached, we should not have failed to inform President Wilson; I would rather that we used the following formula, that we should not have failed to submit it for his approval. For it is indeed a matter of approval.

M. DE MARTINO: President Wilson may prefer not to pronounce an opinion.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Then he will not pronounce one. M. Berthelot points out to me that, if we use that formula, we appear to make President Wilson an arbitrator: but in our system of discussion we are all arbitrators: we must be unanimous among ourselves; if one of us disagreed, nothing would be done.

I think the wording I propose would quite disarm Mr. Wilson: it only expresses the truth.

LORD CURZON: I agree with you.

M. MILLERAND: So do I.

M. CLEMENCEAU: With this alteration, I am prepared, while thinking M. Berthelot's text excellent, to adopt that of Lord Curzon.

LORD CURZON: I think M. Clemenceau's observation is perfectly true.

As to avoiding all mention of the Turkish question, another argument in favour of the point of view supported by M. Clemenceau is that the telegram communicated to us only spoke of Russia and Italy and not of Turkey at all.

Moreover, I quite understand that M. Clemenceau only wishes to reply to those points which concern the part he has taken in negotiations, and that the Turkish negotiations must in future be considered as within the competence of the new French Cabinet.

I am therefore prepared to accept these considerations if the text I have proposed is otherwise accepted.

Our draft has, indeed, several advantages. M. Berthelot's is, as he said, in reality a reply to Mr. Lansing, but there is no doubt, however the telegram communicated to us is read, that it comes from the Government of the United States; it would consequently be better to address that Government itself.

Finally, it is better to go thoroughly into the questions and give arguments, while showing, of course, the greatest courtesy to the American Government, both as regards substance and form.

M. DE MARTINO: Since the American Government addressed the French and British Governments, I am not concerned in the drafting of this reply. I merely thank you for so kindly communicating it to us. Nevertheless, I should like to make one request.

In his draft reply, M. Berthelot says that the Allied Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, never intended to come to a decision apart from and contrary to the advice of President Wilson: this idea does not appear in Lord Curzon's note. I request that it may be added.

M. CLEMENCEAU: I agree.

M. MATSUI: The Japanese Delegation has not always been consulted. It would therefore be better to omit this reference to Japan. I ask that this word be struck out, especially as I do not know the contents of Mr. Lansing's note.

M. DE MARTINO: May I, Sir, before you retire, return to the letter sent by M. Nitti to the President of the Conference on January 17,<sup>2</sup> of which I was speaking to you a short time ago.

It is, in short, a matter of verifying a simple *de facto* circumstance, and of seeing whether there is or is not a mistake and whether or not M. Nitti makes a new proposal.

According to us, it is a mistake which has crept into the text and which M. Nitti has to rectify by drawing attention to the enormous difficulty by which he would be faced in order to obtain the acceptance by our Parliament of the limitation of the Sovereignty of Fiume, thus placed under the control of the League of Nations. I am going to telegraph to M. Nitti.

M. BERTHELOT: I share the opinion of the Council, and so think it would be better not to speak of Turkey in the reply to Mr. Lansing. The question was well put recently, but by M. Jusserand, who pointed out that the attitude adopted by America would postpone the solution of that question indefinitely. To this Mr. Lansing replied that he had no intention of postponing the settlement by the Allies of the Turkish problem. In reality, the opinion of the American Government seems to be as follows: it did not make war on Turkey; we can therefore deal with the Turkish question among ourselves; on the other hand, if it is interested in the Adriatic question, the Russian problem, it is because it was involved in the war against Austria and was associated with Russia.

M. CLEMENCEAU: M. Jusserand's telegram is only of value to the Conference for the information it gives.

I do not oppose the request made by the Japanese Ambassador.

Finally, M. de Martino states that a drafting error has crept into the text concerning Fiume; this is a question to be settled with the Secretariat. For my part, I think we are bound to defend the document transmitted to the Jugo-Slavs; our word is pledged, as far as I am concerned, I wish to change nothing in that text.

On the other hand, the British Representative agrees not to mention Turkey in the reply to Mr. Lansing and accepts the addition proposed by M. de Martino.

We are therefore in agreement.

M. BERTHELOT: Will the note be sent through the intermediary of M. Jusserand on behalf of the Conference and signed by the President, or will it on the other hand be transmitted by the British Government?

M. CLEMENCEAU: The question is not who will send it, but who will sign it. I think it should be signed by Mr. Lloyd George and myself, since I remained here specially for this question; especially as Mr. Wallace himself transmitted it to Mr. Lloyd George and to me.

<sup>2</sup> Untraced in Foreign Office archives.

LORD CURZON: Then we must give the reply to Mr. Wallace signed by Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. I am authorized by the British Prime Minister to sign it for him.

M. CLEMENCEAU: The reply will therefore be signed by Mr. Lloyd George and myself.

It was decided:

that M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George would hand the telegram appearing in Appendix C<sup>3</sup> to Mr. Wallace for transmission to Washington.

2. LORD CURZON: I think an error has crept into the decision adopted after hearing Mr. Ador.<sup>4</sup> We decided that the question of the retention of perpetual Swiss neutrality within the League of Nations should be laid before the Council of the League, which would examine it and communicate its decisions to the Supreme Council, which would take the final decision.

*Entry of Switzerland  
into the League of  
Nations*

After investigation it appears that in this resolution there were certain drawbacks and that the question raised comes exclusively within the scope of the Council of the League of Nations.

It would thus be best to say that the Council of the League of Nations shall pronounce judgment and shall inform the Supreme Council of its decision. The danger of the adoption of contradictory decisions could thus be avoided. It is, moreover, probable that Switzerland will obtain satisfaction; otherwise she will still have the right to appeal to the Assembly of the League in conformity with the Covenant.

I therefore propose to alter the resolution adopted yesterday.

Another question arises.

We decided that the date from which should count the period allowed to Switzerland for admission into the League of Nations as an original member should be that of the entry into force of the last Treaty containing the Covenant; consequently it would perhaps be the date of the entry into force of the Treaty with Turkey, which is not yet drafted. That solution seems impossible.

The neutrals have, indeed, been informed that they had two months from the ratification of the Treaty with Germany in which to adhere to the Covenant; if Switzerland is allowed a special régime, those might plead this precedent and it would then become impossible, in case of necessity, to summon the League of Nations and its Assembly. This cannot have been the intention of the Supreme Council.

Accordingly, it would, I think, be better to retain the original decision, the period of two months from the date of the deposit of ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.

M. MARSU: From the legal point of view, this point is open to discussion:

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. This draft was identical with that in appendix A except that: (i) The last sentence of the third paragraph began: 'The French, British and Italian Governments have never had any intention, &c.' (ii) The last three paragraphs of the first draft were omitted. This redraft may be compared with the final text of the telegram, dated January 22, 1920, which is printed as document 10 in Cmd. 586.

<sup>4</sup> See No. 78, minute 4.

thus China, for instance, who did not sign the Treaty of Versailles, can ask to belong to the League of Nations after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty with Austria, which also contains the Covenant of the League.

M. BERTHELOT: It was desired to render the accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations possible and the constitutional delays required by her in order to organize her referendum were taken into account. That was the question about which M. Ador was concerned.

On the other hand, as Lord Curzon said, it is obvious that neutrals have only two months after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles; but the fact that Switzerland is allowed a privileged position on account of the guarantees of perpetual neutrality given by the Powers, is perhaps not enough to alter what was decided for the other States.

It is none the less true that it is perhaps excessive to give Switzerland two months after the coming into force of the last Treaty; between the two extremes a solution might perhaps be found in the ingenious suggestion of the Japanese Ambassador and the period might date from the coming into force of the Treaty with Austria.

M. MILLERAND: Could it not be considered enough for the Federal Government to have given its consent subject to the referendum to be taken?

M. BERTHELOT: The Swiss Government is of the opinion that this solution would not justify it before the country and that it would risk seeing the referendum decide against adhesion to the League.

LORD CURZON: My proposal was suggested to me by Sir Eric Drummond, who has dealt exclusively with the legal point of view and who, as you can well believe, is actuated by no feelings of hostility to Switzerland, but rather the reverse.

Moreover, if it was agreed that the time necessary for taking a referendum must be granted to Switzerland, the suggestion made by the Japanese Ambassador, that the period of two months should only count from the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty with Austria, would perhaps offer a means of evading the difficulty.

M. BERTHELOT: Switzerland is in an exceptional position; it is the only state which is perpetually neutral: that is perhaps legitimate reason to make special arrangements for her.

M. CLEMENCEAU: Do you then wish us to refer this question for the examination of M. Fromageot and his colleagues?

It was decided:

- (1) That the question how far the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland is compatible with her entry into the League of Nations be referred for examination by the Council of the League of Nations, which would be requested to inform the Supreme Council of its conclusions.
- (2) That the question as to how Switzerland must notify her adhesion to the League of Nations be referred for examination to the legal experts.

M. Clemenceau withdrew and M. Millerand took his place in the Chair.

3. LORD CURZON: A resolution was voted by the Supreme Council some time ago according to which:—

*Future of the Conference. Ambassadors' Council*

'The present session of the Peace Conference shall terminate at the latest in the fortnight following the drawing up of the first minutes of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty with Germany; after the close of the present session, important political questions shall be dealt with by direct communications between the Governments themselves, while questions of detail shall be settled by a Conference of the Ambassadors in Paris.'<sup>5</sup>

We have reached a time when, owing to the departure of Messrs. Lloyd George and Nitti, the illness of M. Scialoja and the need for my return to England, the Conference can no longer continue in its present form. Accordingly I think the resolution adopted during the London conferences of December 11-13, 1919, should be executed and that this Conference of Ambassadors should be inaugurated, to deal from day to day with questions concerning the Treaty and its execution, important essential political questions being reserved for direct decision by the Governments.

If we are agreed to inaugurate this new phase of our work, I declare, on behalf of the British Government, that the British representative on that Conference will be Lord Derby.<sup>6</sup>

M. DE MARTINO: M. Scialoja, whose health is happily slightly improved and whom I saw a short time ago, asked me to support the point of view which he has already defended before the Conference. Indeed, he sees no need to create a fresh organization since there are still important questions to be discussed such as that of the Treaty with Hungary and others; under these circumstances, M. Scialoja thinks it would be well to allow the Governments to be represented on that meeting by the men they consider most qualified; it may be their Ambassador but, if necessary, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs could, if they so desire, take part in person.

We are agreed in thinking that important questions of principle will be dealt with in meetings of the Presidents of the Council or by direct communication between the Governments; but the execution of decisions thus taken should nevertheless be examined and prepared by an Interallied meeting. That is why M. Scialoja wished to accept the point of view expressed by Lord Curzon to the effect that the Ambassadors would be empowered to take part in that meeting when their Governments thought fit.

M. MATSUI: I can the more readily accept Lord Curzon's proposal as I am ambassador and at the same time plenipotentiary but it is understood that if I, for instance, or Lord Derby, were prevented from being present at a meeting, we could always send somebody in our place.

M. MILLERAND: In view of the resolution already adopted and the execution of which is alone requested by Lord Curzon, I for my part have no objection to make to the execution of that resolution.

Would it not, however, be well if it was understood that, when a Government considered it better to replace the Ambassador by the Minister for

<sup>5</sup> See No. 62 (resolution B).

<sup>6</sup> H.M. Ambassador in Paris.

Foreign Affairs or by the Head of the Government, this should take place automatically? In other words, I should not like the term 'Ambassadors' Conference' to be taken in too narrow a sense, so as to prohibit Heads of Governments or Ministers for Foreign Affairs from taking part in the discussion.

LORD CURZON: I agree entirely with the President. We have a resolution to carry out: consequently, this Ambassadors' Conference must be set working; but, when circumstances render it necessary, there is nothing to prevent the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Head of the Government of a country, or even any individual whose presence is considered necessary by the latter, from taking part in it instead of and on behalf of the Ambassador.

On the other hand, I would reply to M. de Martino that, as far as the Treaty with Turkey is concerned, the Governments never intended to entrust the preparation of the Treaty to the Ambassadors' Conference. That is a question reserved for the Supreme Council and which will ultimately render it necessary for it to meet.

M. BERTHELOT: The Premiers who met in London had no idea of an Ambassadors' Conference; this meeting was given a much more modest title, that of 'Ambassadors' Committee'; it was thought that current affairs could be treated in this way by general collaboration; but it was also understood that, whenever a question required the opinion of the Government, a meeting might be held to discuss it either at London, at Rome, or Paris, as decided by the Heads of Governments.

Accordingly, when it was decided to deal with the Turkish question, the Ambassadors' Committee would not have power to discuss it: it would be examined in a meeting of the Premiers in one of the three capitals.

Moreover, unless my memory fails me, it was agreed between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau that when the Turks were summoned it should be to Paris, and that in the same way the Treaty would be signed in Paris.

LORD CURZON: I wish to make two remarks.

First, as regards the term 'Ambassadors' Conference', since the expression is used in the resolution, I think it would be better for us to retain it, instead of substituting that of 'Ambassadors' Committee'; especially as the result of the latter phrase would be to limit the object of that meeting.

In the second place, I know of no arrangement concluded between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau concerning the place to which the Turkish representatives would be summoned or where the Peace with Turkey would be signed. All I know is that Mr. Lloyd George intends the discussion of Turkish affairs to take place in London, for it will for a long time be difficult for him and for me to leave England.

I wished to make this statement, so as not to be bound by what M. Berthelot has just said.

M. BERTHELOT: In the conversation which I ventured to recall, it was indeed decided that the discussions on Turkish affairs should take place in London, but at the same time it was added that the Turks would be summoned to Paris, where the Treaty with them would be signed.

M. MILLERAND: That is, moreover, what M. Clemenceau told me. It is

clearly understood, as I have already told Mr. Lloyd George, that I am at his disposal and at yours to go to London as soon as this is desired, in order to begin discussing the Treaty with Turkey.

I only ask permission to reserve the two points indicated by M. Berthelot, i.e. the summoning of the Turkish delegates to Paris and the signature of the Treaty at Paris.

M. BERTHELOT: M. Clemenceau also relied on the fact that the Turkish delegates have already been summoned to Paris and that at a time when the Conference has sent them a reply that the question is pledged.

M. MATSUI: I wish to make a remark on the powers of this conference of Ambassadors.

A resolution was passed on the 28th July last establishing the Council of Ambassadors and investing it with certain powers;<sup>7</sup> but the resolution adopted in London in December is not at all the same. What is the opinion of the meeting on the subject?

M. MILLERAND: I imagine that it will be necessary to decide definitely on the powers of the respective assemblies.

As I understand it, the Committee or the Conference of Ambassadors will only sit in the intervals of the meetings of the Supreme Council: it is therefore essential to establish exactly the powers of the two assemblies.

For example, which of them is to deal with the Treaty with Hungary, the Committee of Ambassadors, or will it be necessary to convoke the Supreme Council?

M. BERTHELOT: The Treaty has already been handed to the Hungarians, it is therefore only a question of details and henceforth these will be examined and decided by the Conference of Ambassadors. The resolutions passed by that Conference will be submitted to the various Governments for approval and for decisions as to concessions: final decisions will be taken by the Heads of Governments.

M. DE MARTINO: Are the Ambassadors then not to have full powers as the plenipotentiaries of their Governments?

M. MILLERAND: It would appear so from the second paragraph of the London resolution; the Ambassadors are to have powers only on questions of detail. It has also been decided that the Governments represented at the Conference of Ambassadors can, if they think necessary, be represented by a substitute for the more general questions.

4. LORD CURZON: M. Clemenceau has expressed the opinion that it would be better, in the answer to be made to the telegram of the *Turkish Question* United States Government, not to mention Turkey at all but to speak only of Italy and Russia; on the other hand the negotiations on the Turkish question will be commenced as soon as M. Millerand is able to go to London. Would it not be a good thing therefore to see in what way we could advise the United States that we desire their presence and their counsels? Not to take this step might cause grave offence.

<sup>7</sup> See Vol. I, No. 21, minute 1.

It was with this in mind that I drafted my telegram on the subject of Turkey: could we not now express the same idea in some way?

M. MILLERAND: This idea you wish to express is already contained in your first draft, apart from all reference to Turkey: you say there 'It goes without saying that the French and British Governments attach the greatest importance to the presence of a United States representative.'

M. DE MARTINO: That is so; nevertheless, when the time comes actually to begin negotiations with Turkey, it would be expedient to ask once more for the co-operation of the United States. The United States Government will then have either to accept co-operation, and this would be all to the good, or to refuse: in neither case will it have any cause for complaint.

M. MILLERAND: We could now inform the United States that negotiations are about to be opened and that we should be glad to see a representative of the United States take part in them.

LORD CURZON: Who is to make this communication?

M. MILLERAND: All the Allies.

LORD CURZON: Has the passage referring to Turkey been left in the draft letter?

M. MILLERAND: I think that the most satisfactory solution both for you and for us would be to delete all reference to Turkey from your note, as was indeed decided, leaving only the passage in which you express the value we attach, generally speaking, to the presence of a United States representative here.

Further, before the meeting to be held in London, the Allies should send a note to Washington, asking the American Government to send a plenipotentiary as its representative, if possible.

LORD CURZON: I think that we should communicate this to Washington at once in as definite a way as possible; the situation in the East will not allow delay; we must not be content with merely formulating in a general way our wish to obtain the collaboration of the United States on other matters and put off until the moment of our meeting in London our request that they send a plenipotentiary to London.

M. MILLERAND: If we are agreed, as I think we are, that in the letter to be sent in answer to Mr. Lansing's telegram, all mention to [of] Turkey should be omitted, and that the expression of our wish to see the United States represented should be maintained, I see no reason why we should not at the same time draw up a special note advising the United States Government, in the name of the Allies, that a Conference by the Heads of Governments is to be held in London immediately on Turkish affairs and that we attach the greatest importance to the participation of an American plenipotentiary.

LORD CURZON: We are agreed and I therefore ask your permission to draw up the communication in question with M. Berthelot.

M. BERTHELOT: In these circumstances, the first telegram might be re-mitted to Mr. Wallace who would forward it to his Government; the other note would be transmitted to the United States Government by M. Jusserand.

The two communications would be kept definitely separate, as a sign of deference to Washington.

It was decided:

that a telegram be sent to Washington in the name of the Supreme Council to invite the United States Government to send a plenipotentiary as its representative to the forthcoming negotiations on the Turkish Question.

5. M. DE MARTINO: I understand that the Conference of Ambassadors will decide the outstanding questions on the Italian frontier?

*Frontiers of Italy and of Yugo-Slavia* The frontiers of what ought to have been the buffer state have already been fixed but the line has not yet been defined from the north of the buffer state to the Austrian frontier.

M. BERTHELOT: All that remains to be done, I believe, is the work of delimitation by the commissions on the spot.

M. DE MARTINO: It is a question of adjusting the line laid down by the Treaty of London and the Wilson line to the north of the territory to form the buffer state.

GENERAL CAVALLERO: I think that is not so. From the buffer state to Tarvis nothing definite has been decided, either in principle or in fact.

M. BERTHELOT: It is difficult to discuss this question without the aid of a map. We might study it separately and bring the matter up again before the Council of Ambassadors who in its turn would decide whether it is necessary to refer it to the Heads of Governments.

M. DE MARTINO: In any case, the question cannot be decided without our co-operation.

M. MILLERAND: This will be an example of a case in which the Ambassador of the Royal Government can, if he judges necessary, ask to have the matter referred to the Supreme Council.

M. LAROCHE: The memorandum of the 9th December 1919 has decided in principle the question of the whole Italian frontier, and only matters of detail remain which can only be established on the spot.

GENERAL CAVALLERO: The Italian Delegation considers that the frontier has not been laid down between the buffer state and Tarvis.

M. BERTHELOT: It is simply a matter of referring to the minutes of the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs which dealt with the question.

M. MILLERAND: If you allow, we will refer this matter to the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs and wait for the answer of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government. If their answer involves the fixing of the frontier and if the Italian Delegation on receipt of it considers that there is any omission necessitating a decision by the Supreme Council, the matter will be put before it.

GENERAL CAVALLERO: We consider that this is still an open question.

M. MILLERAND: You know the terms in which the Serb-Croat-Slovene representatives have been addressed. In the case of their refusal, the Treaty of London comes into force; if, on the contrary, they agree to our views and

if, then, you still consider that there is a gap in the scheme as drawn up, it will be a case of bringing the matter before the Supreme Council.

M. DE MARTINO: I suggest that this question be submitted without delay to the Commission on Yugo-Slav Affairs for their examination.

M. MILLERAND: Then we are agreed.

It was decided:

that the Commission on Roumanian and Yugoslav Affairs be entrusted with the study of the line of the frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia to the south of Tarvis in so far as this frontier has not yet been established.

The meeting adjourned at 12.50.

#### APPENDIX A TO NO. 80

##### *Draft Reply to Mr. Lansing's Memorandum*

The British and French Prime Ministers have examined with the closest attention the memorandum which was communicated to them by the Ambassador of the United States, relative to Russian and Italian negotiations.\*

With reference to the Russian question, they had already communicated their views to Washington for examination by the American Government, at the same time asking for the assent and the co-operation of this Government.<sup>9</sup>

As to the Italian question, the absence of the United States was never at any time regarded as other than temporary by the British and French Governments; they have never lost sight of the American point of view concerning this question, the solution of which is of such vital importance for the future of the world. They never had any intention of acceding to a permanent arrangement without giving full consideration to the views of the American Government.

Consequently, they took up the Adriatic question at the point where it was under discussion at the time Mr. Polk left for Washington. Mr. Nitti presented certain proposals which tended to modify the common memorandum communicated to Mr. Scialoja by the Representatives of the United States, France, and

\* This memorandum is printed as document 9 in Cmd. 536. It read as follows:

*'Telegram from Mr. Lansing to Mr. Wallace, Paris, January 20, 1920.*

'Please take up with M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George the question of the way the Russian and Italian problems have been handled and ascertain their point of view. The United States is being put in the position of having the matter disposed of before the American point of view can be expressed, as apparently M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George have sought only the views of the Italian and Yugo-Slav Governments before ascertaining the views of the United States Government. Is it the intention of the British and French Governments in the future to dispose of the various questions pending in Europe and to communicate the results to the Government of the United States? There are features in connection with the proposed Fiume settlement which both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George must realise would not be acceptable to the President.

'As it was pointed out by Mr. Polk before his departure the Dalmatian and other questions should be taken up through regular diplomatic channels, and the fact that you are not charged with full powers could have no bearing on the question. As no American official could be sent to these gatherings that could have the same authority as the Prime Ministers of the three Governments in question, it is manifestly impossible for the United States Government to be represented at the meetings of the Prime Ministers.'

<sup>9</sup> See No. 78, appendix A.

Great Britain on December 9, 1919.<sup>10</sup> At the time the Conference again assembled in Paris, about fifteen days ago, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George immediately opened negotiations between the Italian Government and the representatives of Jugo-Slavia, and reached a plan of arrangement which they consider as the best system of conciliation practicably possible between the Italian and Jugo-Slav points of view.

The details of this arrangement are annexed hereto.<sup>11</sup>

The French and British Governments are pleased to affirm that, in practice, all the really important points of the common memorandum of December 9, 1919, remain intact and have now received the approval of the Prime Minister of Italy.

Two points only of this memorandum have been modified, and these two points are to the advantage of Jugo-Slavia.

1. The Free State of Fiume, which would have separated 200,000 Jugo-Slavs from their country, disappears; three quarters of these populations are now and henceforth united to Jugo-Slavia; a source of perpetual quarrels and intrigues disappears; and if, in exchange, Jugo-Slavia is to cede to Italy territories upon which there are about 50,000 Jugo-Slav inhabitants over and above those which were included by the Wilson proposal, the balance is to the advantage of Jugo-Slavia. Fiume becomes an independent State under the guarantee of the League of Nations whose authority over the port becomes direct and absolute for the good of all concerned.

2. Relative to Albania, an effort has been made to accord satisfaction to the essential needs of all the parties concerned. The details of the administration of this country by Jugo-Slavia, Italy and Greece have not yet been elaborated, but in their elaboration the sentiments and future interests of the Albanian people will be kept fully in mind, and every effort will be made to have these points fully considered in the preparation of the permanent arrangement.

The French and British Governments esteem that in this manner a suitable arrangement of a dangerous and difficult question has been arrived at; they have informed the Italian and Jugo-Slav Governments that, in the event this arrangement were not accepted, they would find themselves obliged to place the Treaty of London, which would satisfy no one, in force.

Had a Plenipotentiary representing the Government of the United States been in Paris at the time, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau would have cordially welcomed his entire co-operation in these negotiations, but in the absence of a Representative who could speak in the name of the United States, and in view of the vital importance of the settlement of a question which has inflamed the south-east of Europe for more than a year and which, if not regulated promptly, would not only delay the rehabilitation and reconstruction of two countries greatly exhausted by the war, but might also provoke another war, the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain concluded that there was no other alternative than to adopt the measures necessary to effect a disappearance, as rapidly as possible, of the difficulties existing between two of their Allies, and this by consulting both of these Allies in an uninterrupted and exhaustive manner, and taking advantage of the fact that they were all together in Paris.

In so doing, they had no intention whatsoever to lack in courtesy towards the Government of the United States, and have not thought, for one moment, of

<sup>10</sup> Sec No. 56, minute 1 and note 4. (The memorandum was dated December 9, 1919, but was not officially communicated to Signor Scialoja until December 12.)

<sup>11</sup> Not annexed to original of this appendix.



